Inferentialism naturalized and anti-exceptionalism about logic

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Identifiers

Publication date

Advisors

Tutors

Editors

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Springer
Metrics
Google Scholar
lacobus
Export

Research Projects

Organizational Units

Journal Issue

Abstract

Logical anti-exceptionalism, that is the idea that logic is not fundamentally different from other forms of inquiry such as science or mathematics, can be broadly characterized as being contrary to paradigmatic examples of exceptionalism about logic, such as the rationalist and semanticist conceptions. Logical inferentialism asserts that the meanings of logical expressions are determined by the basic rules prescribed for their correct application, such that comprehension of a logical expression is achieved through its use in accordance with the appropriate logical rule Brandom (Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment. Cambridge, 1994); Boghossian (Blind Reasoning. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 77(1), 225–248, 2003a), Boghossian (Epistemic Analyticity: A Defence. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66(1), 15–35, 2003b). Despite the fact that inferentialism may appear to be an exceptionalist theory given its semanticist approach, not all inferentialists keep to the exceptionalist tenets of logic. This paper scrutinizes the recent moderate anti-exceptionalist proposal of naturalized inferentialism by Peregrin and Svoboda (Moderate anti-exceptionalism and earthborn logic. Synthese 199 (3–4), 8781–8806, 2021). To contextualize Peregrin and Svoboda’s proposal, the paper presents a series of issues concerning the various anti-exceptionalist and exceptionalist theories; this discussion shows that naturalized inferentialism can resolve the adoption problem identified by Kripke, and Boghossian and Wright (Kripke, Quine, the “Adoption Problem” and the Empirical Conception of Logic. Mind, 133(529), 86–116, 2024) while remaining faithful to the anti-exceptionalism it seeks to advance, except for its adherence to the fundamental nature of logical human practice. Moreover, it illustrates that as anti-exceptionalist proposals reduce their aspirations, the distinction from exceptionalist positions progressively diminishes in clarity and precision.

Description

Bibliographic citation

García-Arnaldos, D., Martínez-Vidal, C. Inferentialism naturalized and anti-exceptionalism about logic. Synthese 206, 56 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-05104-5

Relation

Has part

Has version

Is based on

Is part of

Is referenced by

Is version of

Requires

Sponsors

Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. Funded by PID2020-115482GB-I00 MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by Xunta de Galicia “Consolidación e Estruturación” 2023 GPC GI-2046 – Episteme ED431B2023/24. It is also part of the PID2023-150396OA-I00 support, which is financed by MCIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and FSE+.

Rights

© The Author(s) 2025. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
Attribution 4.0 International