RT Journal Article
T1 Inferentialism naturalized and anti-exceptionalism about logic
A1 García Arnaldos, María Dolores
A1 Martínez Vidal, Concha
K1 Anti-exceptionalism
K1 Logic
K1 Exceptionalism
K1 Inferentialism
K1 Naturalism
AB Logical anti-exceptionalism, that is the idea that logic is not fundamentally different from other forms of inquiry such as science or mathematics, can be broadly characterized as being contrary to paradigmatic examples of exceptionalism about logic, such as the rationalist and semanticist conceptions. Logical inferentialism asserts that the meanings of logical expressions are determined by the basic rules prescribed for their correct application, such that comprehension of a logical expression is achieved through its use in accordance with the appropriate logical rule Brandom (Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment. Cambridge, 1994); Boghossian (Blind Reasoning. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 77(1), 225–248, 2003a), Boghossian (Epistemic Analyticity: A Defence. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66(1), 15–35, 2003b). Despite the fact that inferentialism may appear to be an exceptionalist theory given its semanticist approach, not all inferentialists keep to the exceptionalist tenets of logic. This paper scrutinizes the recent moderate anti-exceptionalist proposal of naturalized inferentialism by Peregrin and Svoboda (Moderate anti-exceptionalism and earthborn logic. Synthese 199 (3–4), 8781–8806, 2021). To contextualize Peregrin and Svoboda’s proposal, the paper presents a series of issues concerning the various anti-exceptionalist and exceptionalist theories; this discussion shows that naturalized inferentialism can resolve the adoption problem identified by Kripke, and Boghossian and Wright (Kripke, Quine, the “Adoption Problem” and the Empirical Conception of Logic. Mind, 133(529), 86–116, 2024) while remaining faithful to the anti-exceptionalism it seeks to advance, except for its adherence to the fundamental nature of logical human practice. Moreover, it illustrates that as anti-exceptionalist proposals reduce their aspirations, the distinction from exceptionalist positions progressively diminishes in clarity and precision.
PB Springer
SN 0039-7857
YR 2025
FD 2025-07-11
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10347/42653
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10347/42653
LA eng
NO García-Arnaldos, D., Martínez-Vidal, C. Inferentialism naturalized and anti-exceptionalism about logic. Synthese 206, 56 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-05104-5
NO Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. Funded by PID2020-115482GB-I00 MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by Xunta de Galicia “Consolidación e Estruturación” 2023 GPC GI-2046 – Episteme ED431B2023/24. It is also part of the PID2023-150396OA-I00 support, which is financed by MCIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and FSE+.
DS Minerva
RD 24 abr 2026