Fiscal consolidation and voting: on the electoral costs of budgetary stability

dc.contributor.affiliationUniversidade de Santiago de Compostela. Departamento de Economía Aplicada
dc.contributor.authorLago Peñas, Santiago
dc.contributor.authorCadabal Sampedro, María
dc.contributor.authorHerrero-Alcalde, Ana
dc.date.accessioned2025-03-05T13:45:49Z
dc.date.available2025-03-05T13:45:49Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we analyse the potential impact of policies aimed at fostering fiscal sustainability on citizens’ preferences. A survey specifically designed for this purpose quantifies citizens’ knowledge and concern about fiscal imbalances and the institutional framework that addresses them in Spain, and their possible electoral reactions to public spending cuts and tax increases. Using both ordered and unordered multinomial probit models, we corroborate that citizens tend to disapprove of retrenchment policies. However, the effect on citizens’ voting intentions varies depending on their political ideology. We confirm that left-wing voters supporting the incumbent coalition parties prefer austerity policies based on the revenue side of the budget, while right-wing voters tend to approve retrenchments based on the expenditure side to a larger extent.
dc.description.peerreviewedSI
dc.description.sponsorshipFunding information: Universidade de Vigo/CRUE-CISUG; Fundación de las Cajas de Ahorros
dc.identifier.citationLago‐Peñas, S., Cadaval‐Sampedro, M., & Herrero‐Alcalde, A. (2024). Fiscal consolidation and voting: on the electoral costs of budgetary stability. Fiscal Studies, 45(4), 559-581. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-5890.12364
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1475-5890.12364
dc.identifier.essn1475-5890
dc.identifier.issn0143-5671
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10347/40080
dc.issue.number4
dc.journal.titleFiscal Studies
dc.language.isoeng
dc.page.final581
dc.page.initial559
dc.publisherWiley
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://doi.org/10.1111/1475-5890.12364
dc.rightsThis is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes. © 2024 The Author(s). Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial 4.0 Internationalen
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.subjectDeficit
dc.subjectFiscal adjustment
dc.subjectFiscal austerity
dc.subjectElectoral impact
dc.subjectPublic spending
dc.subjectTaxes
dc.titleFiscal consolidation and voting: on the electoral costs of budgetary stability
dc.typejournal article
dc.type.hasVersionVoR
dc.volume.number45
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationaed2680a-4382-4d9e-92be-058471cb0817
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationaf3df92f-57f5-4f05-89fd-9ca97207d799
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryaf3df92f-57f5-4f05-89fd-9ca97207d799

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