The Wason Selection Task: Reasoning, Decision Making or Both?

Abstract

The aim of this study is to present some of the more recent lines of experimental research into Wason's selection task (Wason, 1966, 1968) and the main debates which have arisen from this. The paper concerns an experimental task which is considered essential in the study of the role of pragmatic variables in conditional reasoning (Evans, 2017). On a theoretical level, different explanations have been considered: Theory of Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985), Social Contract Theory (Cosmides, 1989), Theory of Mental Models (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) or The Dual Process Theory (Evans & Over, 1996). On an empirical level, numerous experimental studies have been designed in which the role of variables such as content, scenario, influence of prior knowledge, experimental instructions, etc. were analysed. The results of a large part of this work have highlighted the plasticity of reasoning toward factors related to empirical knowledge. Likewise, they have been the origin of new approaches in reasoning research which attempt to respond to such questions as: (1) “Why does facilitation occur largely when deontic as opposed to indicative versions are presented?”; (2) “Do the pragmatic aspects which are activated upon the presentation of deontic statements also occur with indicative statements?”; (3) “When subjects are faced with the task, do they decide which cards to select before thinking about them (Ball, Lucas, Miles & Gale, 2003; Evans, 1996; Evans & Ball, 2010; Lucas & Ball, 2005), or do they think before selecting? (Handley, Newstead & Neilens, 2009)”. In addition, research into the selection task has formed the basis for general theoretical debate, such as human rationality or the study of individual differences, and has contributed to the configuration of a new paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning (Over, 2009; Elqayam, Bonnefon & Over, 2016)