Equal Validity or Nonneutrality? A defense of relativism

Abstract

In this paper, I oppose Baghramian and Coliva’s characterization of relativism insofar as it attributes to this view a commitment with Equal Validity, or the idea that the many radically different ways of seeing the world are equally valid. I argue that Equal Validity conflicts with Nonneutrality, which is another of the theses that Baghramian and Coliva use to characterize relativism, and which can be summarized as the idea that there is no privileged point of view. I argue that, once we choose Nonneutrality over Equal Validity, we can make sense of the notion of faultless disagreement, which Baghramian and Coliva reject. This goes against Baghramian and Coliva’s argument that, since there is no such thing as faultless disagreement, there is no motivation for relativism either.