Peón Pose, DavidAntelo Suárez, Manel2026-01-232026-01-232018Peón, D., & Antelo, D. (2018). Mergers in financial services and overlending. https://doi.org/10.32826/CUDE.V42I116.802340-6704https://hdl.handle.net/10347/45419In this paper we build a model of banking competition that considers a managerial-overconfidence setup resulting in two main findings. First, a merger between rational banks may change their behaviour in that, in post-merger conditions, they would follow the overconfident bank when they would not have done so pre-merger, thereby amplifying the credit boom. Second, the results overcome the merger paradox, in the sense that the merger would be profitable for participants, and thus intrinsically stable.eng© 2018 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Artículo publicado bajo licencia de reconocimiento de Creative CommonsAttribution 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Banking efficiencyBehavioural financeMergersHerdingMerger paradoxOverconfidencejournal article10.32826/CUDE.V42I116.800210-0266open access