Carpente Rodríguez, María LuisaCasas Méndez, BalbinaGarcía Jurado, IgnacioNouweland, Anne van den2019-04-012019-04-012013Luisa Carpente, Balbina Casas-Méndez, Ignacio García-Jurado, and Anne van den Nouweland, “Allocation Rules for Games with Optimistic Aspirations,” Game Theory, vol. 2013, Article ID 540487, 8 pages, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/5404872356-6930http://hdl.handle.net/10347/18513A game with optimistic aspirations specifies two values for each coalition of players: the first value is the worth that the players in the coalition can guarantee for themselves in the event that they coordinate their actions, and the second value is the amount that the players in the coalition aspire to get under reasonable but very optimistic assumptions about the demands of the players who are not included in the coalition. In this paper, in addition to presenting this model and justifying its relevance, we introduce allocation rules and extend the properties of efficiency, additivity, symmetry, and null player property to this setting. We demonstrate that these four properties are insufficient to find a unique allocation rule and define three properties involving null players and nullifying players that allow the identification of unique allocation rules. The allocation rules we identify are the Midpoint Shapley Value and the Equal Division Ruleeng© 2013 Luisa Carpente et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly citedhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/journal article10.1155/2013/5404872314-6559open access