Pérez Navarro, EduardoFernández Castro, VíctorGonzález de Prado Salas, JavierHeras-Escribano, Manuel2024-02-072024-02-072019-10-14Pérez-Navarro, E., Fernández Castro, V., González de Prado Salas, J., & Heras-Escribano, M. (2019). Not expressivist enough: Normative disagreement about belief attribution. Res Philosophica, 96(4), 409-4302168-9105http://hdl.handle.net/10347/32503The expressivist account of knowledge attributions, while claiming that these attributions are nonfactual, also typically holds that they retain a factual component. This factual component involves the attribution of a belief. The aim of this work is to show that considerations analogous to those motivating an expressivist account of knowledge attributions can be applied to belief attributions. As a consequence, we claim that expressivists should not treat the so-called factual component as such. The phenomenon we focus on to claim that belief attributions are non-factual is that of normative doxastic disagreement. We show through several examples that this kind of disagreement is analogous to that of the epistemic kind. The result will be a doxastic expressivism. Finally, we answer some objections that our doxastic expressivism could seem to face.engCC BY-NC-ND 4.0ExpressivismBeliefDisagreementNormativity720207 Filosofía del lenguajejournal article10.11612/resphil.17942168-9113open access