García Jurado, IgnacioMéndez Naya, Luciano2025-01-142025-01-142019-01-01García-Jurado, I., Méndez-Naya, L. Subgame Perfection and the Rule of k Names. Group Decis Negot 28, 805–825 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09625-6https://hdl.handle.net/10347/38561This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09625-6In this paper we revisit the rule of k names from a game theoretic perspective. This rule can be described as follows. Given a set of candidates for a position, a committee (formed by the proposers) selects k elements of that set using a screening rule; then a single individual from outside the committee (the chooser) chooses for the position one of the k selected candidates. In this context we first give conditions for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Then we provide conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria when the screening rule is -majoritarian. Finally, we show that when the chooser can strategically appoint a delegate to choose on behalf of him, the conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria are weaker.engAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Rule of k namesScreening ruleSubgame perfect equilibriumStrong equilibriumDelegationjournal article10.1007/s10726-019-09625-6open access