RT Journal Article
T1 Higher Social Choice
A1 Macías Virgós, Enrique
A1 Pereira Sáez, María José
A1 Simón García, Ignacio
K1 Algebraic Topology
K1 Algorithmic Complexity
K1 Public Choice and Political Economy
K1 Social Choice and Welfare
K1 Topology
K1 Comparative Social Policy
AB The problem of finding a social choice function in a given space of preferences has been dominated by Arrow’s and Chichilnisky’s Impossibility Theorems. Based on previous work by Carrasquel, Lupton and Oprea, in this paper, we use tools from Algebraic Topology to introduce a notion of higher social choice complexity that determines the minimum number of local social choices that must be aggregated to cover all possible individual preferences. We prove that this invariant is bounded between two known topological invariants, the higher topological complexity and its symmetric version. This result shifts the focus onto the topological structure of the preference space when studying social choice processes.
PB Springer
SN 1660-5446
YR 2025
FD 2025-01-24
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10347/42199
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10347/42199
LA eng
NO Macías-Virgós, E., Pereira-Sáez, M.J. & Simón-García, I. Higher Social Choice. Mediterr. J. Math. 22, 31 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00009-024-02792-0
NO Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. The first and second authors were partially supported by MINECO and FEDER research project PID2020-MTM-114474GB-I00. The first author was partially supported by Xunta de Galicia ED431C 2019/10.
DS Minerva
RD 24 abr 2026