RT Journal Article
T1 Mergers in financial services and overlending
A1 Peón Pose, David
A1 Antelo Suárez, Manel
K1 Banking efficiency
K1 Behavioural finance
K1 Mergers
K1 Herding
K1 Merger paradox
K1 Overconfidence
AB In this paper we build a model of banking competition that considers a managerial-overconfidence setup resulting in two main findings. First, a merger between rational banks may change their behaviour in that, in post-merger conditions, they would follow the overconfident bank when they would not have done so pre-merger, thereby amplifying the credit boom. Second, the results overcome the merger paradox, in the sense that the merger would be profitable for participants, and thus intrinsically stable.
PB Asociación Cuadernos de Economía (ACE)
SN 2340-6704
YR 2018
FD 2018
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10347/45419
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10347/45419
LA eng
NO Peón, D., & Antelo, D. (2018). Mergers in financial services and overlending. https://doi.org/10.32826/CUDE.V42I116.80
DS Minerva
RD 20 may 2026