RT Journal Article
T1 Per-unit versus ad-valorem royalty licensing in a Stackelberg market
A1 Antelo Suárez, Manel
A1 Bru Martínez, Lluís
K1 Licensing
K1 Per-unit royalties
K1 Ad-valorem royalties
K1 Leader
K1 Follower
K1 Welfare
AB We consider licensing of a non-drastic innovation by a licensor that interacts with a potential licensee in a Stackelberg duopoly, comparing per-unit and ad-valorem royalty two-part contracts and showing why and when each licensing deal should be used. We contribute three findings to the literature. First, ad-valorem royalty is preferred when the licensor plays as leader in the marketplace, but per-unit royalty is preferred when the licensor plays as follower. Second, only innovations that do not hurt consumers are socially beneficial. Third, our model also suggests that both the licensor’s status as a leader or follower in the marketplace and the innovation size determine the incentive to engage in innovative activities
PB Springer
YR 2021
FD 2021
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10347/30066
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10347/30066
LA eng
NO Antelo, M., Bru, L. Per-unit versus ad-valorem royalty licensing in a Stackelberg market. J. Ind. Bus. Econ. 49, 95–109 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40812-021-00205-x
NO Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. Manel Antelo acknowledges financial support from Consellería de Cultura, Educación e Ordenación Universitaria (Xunta de Galicia) through Grant GRC 2019 and Lluis Bru from the Ministerio de Economía e Innovación (Gobierno de España) (ECO2017) through Grant PID2020-115018RB-C33. Beyond this, the paper received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or non-profit sectors
DS Minerva
RD 22 abr 2026