RT Journal Article
T1 Allocation Rules for Games with Optimistic Aspirations
A1 Carpente Rodríguez, María Luisa
A1 Casas Méndez, Balbina
A1 García Jurado, Ignacio
A1 Nouweland, Anne van den
AB A game with optimistic aspirations specifies two values for each coalition of players: the first value is the worth that the players in the coalition can guarantee for themselves in the event that they coordinate their actions, and the second value is the amount that the players in the coalition aspire to get under reasonable but very optimistic assumptions about the demands of the players who are not included in the coalition. In this paper, in addition to presenting this model and justifying its relevance, we introduce allocation rules and extend the properties of efficiency, additivity, symmetry, and null player property to this setting. We demonstrate that these four properties are insufficient to find a unique allocation rule and define three properties involving null players and nullifying players that allow the identification of unique allocation rules. The allocation rules we identify are the Midpoint Shapley Value and the Equal Division Rule
PB Hindawi
SN 2356-6930
YR 2013
FD 2013
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10347/18513
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10347/18513
LA eng
NO Luisa Carpente, Balbina Casas-Méndez, Ignacio García-Jurado, and Anne van den Nouweland, “Allocation Rules for Games with Optimistic Aspirations,” Game Theory, vol. 2013, Article ID 540487, 8 pages, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/540487
NO They also acknowledge the financial support of the University of Santiago de Compostela, of Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación through Projects ECO2008-03484-C02-02 and MTM2011-27731-C03, and of Xunta de Galicia through Project INCITE09-207-064-PR
DS Minerva
RD 24 abr 2026