RT Journal Article
T1 On the centrality analysis of covert networks using games with externalities
A1 Saavedra Nieves, Alejandro
A1 Casas Méndez, Balbina
K1 Multi-agent system
K1 Cooperative game theory
K1 Externalities
K1 Ranking method
K1 Covert network
AB The identification of the most potentially hazardous agents in a terrorist organisation helps to prevent further attacks by effectively allocating surveillance resources and destabilising the covert network to which they belong. In this paper, several mechanisms for the overall ranking of covert networks members in a general framework are addressed based on their contribution to the overall relative effectiveness in the event of a merger. In addition, the possible organisation of agents outside of each possible merger naturally influences their relative effectiveness score, which motivates the innovative use of games in partition function form and specific ranking indices for individuals. Finally, we apply these methods to analyse the effectiveness of the hijackers of the covert network supporting the 9/11 attacks
PB Elsevier
YR 2023
FD 2023
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10347/30600
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10347/30600
LA eng
NO European Journal of Operational Research 309 (2023) 1365-1378
NO This work is part of the R+D+I project grants MTM2017-87197-C3-3-P and PID2021-124030NB-C32, funded byMCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/ and by “ERDF A way of making Europe”/EU. This research was also funded by Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2021/24 from the Consellería de Cultura, Educación e Universidades, Xunta de Galicia.
DS Minerva
RD 24 abr 2026