RT Journal Article
T1 Not expressivist enough: Normative disagreement about belief attribution
A1 Pérez Navarro, Eduardo
A1 Fernández Castro, Víctor
A1 González de Prado Salas, Javier
A1 Heras-Escribano, Manuel
K1 Expressivism
K1 Belief
K1 Disagreement
K1 Normativity
AB The expressivist account of knowledge attributions, while claiming that these attributions are nonfactual, also typically holds that they retain a factual component. This factual component involves the attribution of a belief. The aim of this work is to show that considerations analogous to those motivating an expressivist account of knowledge attributions can be applied to belief attributions. As a consequence, we claim that expressivists should not treat the so-called factual component as such. The phenomenon we focus on to claim that belief attributions are non-factual is that of normative doxastic disagreement. We show through several examples that this kind of disagreement is analogous to that of the epistemic kind. The result will be a doxastic expressivism. Finally, we answer some objections that our doxastic expressivism could seem to face.
PB Saint Louis University
SN 2168-9105
YR 2019
FD 2019-10-14
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10347/32503
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10347/32503
LA eng
NO Pérez-Navarro, E., Fernández Castro, V., González de Prado Salas, J., & Heras-Escribano, M. (2019). Not expressivist enough: Normative disagreement about belief attribution. Res Philosophica, 96(4), 409-430
NO Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades, Universidad de Granada, Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Fundación BBVA.
DS Minerva
RD 27 abr 2026