RT Journal Article
T1 On the Number of Licenses with Signalling
A1 Antelo Suárez, Manel
A1 Rodríguez Sampayo, Antonio
AB We analyse a two-period licensing game in which a non-producing upstream patent holder licenses an innovation that lasts for two periods to either one or two downstream users. Licensing is made through a payment based on a two-part tariff, namely a fixed fee plus a royalty per output unit. Regarding the innovation value when commercialized by each user (high or low), we compare a symmetric information context where such value is publicly known with a situation in which users have private information about the value, but with their period-1 output signalling that value. We find that the patent holder is more likely to prefer to grant two licenses under signalling than under symmetric information, which highlights the benefits of resorting to market competition between users to reduce the amount of informational rents.
PB John Wiley and Sons
SN 1463-6786
YR 2017
FD 2017-12
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10347/38490
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10347/38490
LA eng
NO Antelo, M. and Sampayo, A. (2017), On the Number of Licenses with Signalling. The Manchester School, 85: 635-660. https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12157
NO This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Antelo, M. and Sampayo, A. (2017), On the Number of Licenses with Signalling. The Manchester School, 85: 635-660, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12157. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley’s version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited.
NO We acknowledge financial support from the Xunta de Galicia through Project GPC2013-045 partly funded by the European Regional Development Fund. The second author also acknowledges aid received from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Research Program ECO2013-48884-C3-1-P.
DS Minerva
RD 28 abr 2026