RT Journal Article
T1 Licensing of a new technology by an outside and uninformed licensor
A1 Antelo Suárez, Manel
A1 Rodríguez Sampayo, Antonio
K1 New technology 
K1 Exclusive and non-exclusive licensing 
K1 Asymmetric  information 
K1 Screening 
K1 Per-unit royalty 
K1 Ad-valorem royalty 
K1 Welfare
AB We examine the licensing decision of a non-producer innovator with a new technology that enables the manufacture of a saleable product. The technology is licensed and each user privately knows its innovation-related production cost, whereas the licensor only knows, with a certain probability, that this cost may be low (the user is efficient) or high (the user is inefficient). When a single licence is granted through separating contracts, only the contract intended for the inefficient user involves a per-unit royalty, but when two licences are granted through separating contracts, the contracts intended for the inefficient and efficient users both feature a per-unit royalty. However, screening is less likely as the number of licences increases, to the point that the licensor does not screen users when granting three licences. Additionally, whereas the diffusion of the innovation is socially insufficient under symmetric information, with asymmetric information it may be socially optimal. Finally, when licensing with contracts involving an ad-valorem royalty is also feasible the licensor finds it less attractive than licensing with a per-unit royalty
PB Springer
SN 0931-8658
YR 2024
FD 2024
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10347/33800
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10347/33800
LA eng
NO Antelo, M., Sampayo, A. Licensing of a new technology by an outside and uninformed licensor. J Econ (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-024-00860-3
NO Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. The authors acknowledge financial aid from Consellería de Cultura, Educación, Formación Profesional e Universidades (Xunta de Galicia) through Grant Consolidación e estruturación – 2023 GRC GI-2016 Análise económica dos mercados e institucións (AEMI). The second author also thanks financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation research project PID2020-118119 GB-I00. They declare that these institutions do not gain or lose financially through publication of this paper
DS Minerva
RD 24 abr 2026