RT Journal Article
T1 Thinking Disagreement
A1 Donato Rodríguez, Xavier de
A1 Verdejo, Víctor M.
K1 Disagreement
K1 Rationality
K1 Intension
K1 Reference
K1 Noncotenability
K1 Understanding
AB In this paper, we bring into focus the level of thought or content in the elucidation of disagreement. We set out the view that disagreement at this level involves a specific form of noncotenability, namely, noncotenability as captured by sense or intension as opposed to reference. We present the challenge that nourishes the alternative referential view and suggest, through examples, that (i) only intensional disagreement is apt to adequately accommodate basic rationality constraints on disagreement, and (ii) it can meet the aforementioned challenge insofar as we discriminate between noncotenability affecting one's concepts, intensionally conceived, and noncotenability affecting merely one's particular understanding of those concepts. We conclude that intensional disagreement is our best choice for an account of disagreement at the level of thought.
PB Wiley
SN https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12364
YR 2021
FD 2021
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10347/32074
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10347/32074
LA eng
NO THEORIA, 2021, 87, 1562–1584
NO Support for this work was provided by the Spanish Government andthe European Union via the funded research projects PID2019-106420GA-100,PID2020-115482GB-I00, and FFI2017-82534-P.
DS Minerva
RD 23 abr 2026