RT Journal Article
T1 Subgame perfection and the rule of k-names
A1 García Jurado, Ignacio
A1 Méndez Naya, Luciano
K1 Rule of k names
K1 Screening rule
K1 Subgame perfect equilibrium
K1 Strong equilibrium
K1 Delegation
AB In this paper we revisit the rule of k names from a game theoretic perspective. This rule can be described as follows. Given a set of candidates for a position, a committee (formed by the proposers) selects k elements of that set using a screening rule; then a single individual from outside the committee (the chooser) chooses for the position one of the k selected candidates. In this context we first give conditions for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Then we provide conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria when the screening rule is -majoritarian. Finally, we show that when the chooser can strategically appoint a delegate to choose on behalf of him, the conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria are weaker.
PB Springer
YR 2019
FD 2019-01-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10347/38561
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10347/38561
LA eng
NO García-Jurado, I., Méndez-Naya, L. Subgame Perfection and the Rule of k Names. Group Decis Negot 28, 805–825 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09625-6
NO This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09625-6
NO Authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Gobierno de España, through project MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P.
DS Minerva
RD 24 abr 2026