

Nationalism in Europe
Past and Present



Volume I

EDITORS
JUSTO G. BERAMENDI
RAMÓN MÁIZ
XOSÉ M. NÚÑEZ

UNIVERSIDADE DE SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA

Nationalism in Europe
Past and Present

Volume I



CURSOS E CONGRESOS DA
UNIVERSIDADE DE SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA

N.º 84



Nationalism in Europe *Past and Present*

Actas do Congreso Internacional
Os Nacionalismos en Europa
Pasado e Presente

Santiago de Compostela, 27 - 29 de Setembro de 1993

Volume I

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1994

UNIVERSIDADE DE SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA

INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS NATIONALISM IN EUROPE PAST AND PRESENT (1993. Santiago de Compostela)

Nationalism in Europe Past and Present : Actas do Congreso Internacional Os Nacionalismos en Europa Pasado e Presente, Santiago de Compostela, 27-29 de Setembro de 1993 / editors Justo G. Beramendi, Ramón Máiz, Xosé M. Núñez. — Santiago de Compostela : Universidade, Servicio de Publicacións e Intercambio Científico, 1994. — 2 v. ; 24 cm. — (Cursos e Congresos da Universidade de Santiago de Compostela ; 84). — D.L. C-1869-1994. — ISBN 84-8121-195-8 (V.1). ISBN 84-8121-196-6 (V.2). ISBN 84-8121-197-4 (O.C.)

1. Nacionalismo-Europa. I. Beramendi, Justo G., edit. lit. II. Máiz, Ramón, ed. lit. III. Núñez, Xosé M., ed. lit. IV. Universidade de Santiago de Compostela. Servicio de Publicacións e Intercambio Científico, ed. V. Serie. VI. Título

323.1 (4) (063)

© Universidade de
Santiago de Compostela, 1994

Esta edición foi subvencionada por:
Consortio de Santiago.
S.A. de Xestión Xacobeo, 93.

EDITA: Servicio de Publicacións
e Intercambio Científico
Campus Universitario

IMPRIME: Imprenta Universitaria
Pavillón de Servicios
Campus Universitario

ISBN: 84-8121-195-8 (V. 1)
84-8121-196-6 (V. 2)
84-8121-197-4 (O.C.)

Dep. Leg.: C-1869/1994

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INTRODUCCIÓN / INTRODUCTION





As ponencias e comunicacións que se recollen nestes dous volumes, agrupadas en cinco seccións, corresponden ás contribucións presentadas ó Congreso Internacional *Nationalism in Europe: Past and Present*, celebrado na Universidade de Santiago de Compostela do 27 ó 29 de setembro de 1993 e organizado pola mesma Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, en colaboración científica co *European University Institute* de Florencia, a *Maison des Sciences de l'Homme* de París, a *Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism* (ASEN) da *London School of Economics and Political Science*, e maila *Wolfgang-Johann-Goethe Universität* de Frankfurt am Main. Sen a xenerosa axuda financeira emprestada pola Sociedade Xacobeo 93 e o Consorcio de Santiago de Compostela, a celebración do Congreso tampouco non tería sido posíbel. Vaia de entrada o noso agradecemento tanto ás institucións científicas colaboradoras como á Sociedade Xacobeo 93 e ó Consorcio de Santiago, que facemos extensivo ós seus presidentes, Excmo. Sr. Víctor M. Vázquez Portomeñe e Ilmo. Sr. Xerardo Estévez, por ter feito posíbel que teñamos o pracer de hoxe presentar ó público estes dous volumes. Igualmente, o noso agradecemento ó Excmo. Sr. Presidente da Xunta de Galicia, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, quen inaugurou oficialmente o Congreso. Os textos publícanse en inglés e castelán, de acordo coa opción respectiva elixida no seu día polos autores, aínda que no Congreso mesmo se podían presentar tamén comunicacións en galego, italiano, alemán e francés.

O propósito do Comité Organizador, coa eficaz axuda e asesoramento do Comité Científico (composto polos profesores Eric J. Hobsbawm, Miroslav Hroch, Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Stuart J. Woolf, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Mario Delgado, Antonio Elorza, Juan Pablo Fusi, Borja de Riquer, José Luis de la Granja, Ramón Máiz, E. Ucelay-Da Cal, Justo G. Beramendi e D. Conversi) era certamente ambicioso ó organizar un congreso internacional destas proporcións: reunir durante tres días na quicentenaria Universidade de Santiago de Compostela a máis de 70 especialistas de diferentes países europeos e de Norteamérica co obxectivo de alentar a discusión xeral dos problemas metodolóxicos e conceptuais máis importantes que dende hai varias décadas se plantexan no estudo dun fenómeno tan rico, plural e á vez multifacético como é o nacionalismo no Vello Continente. Endalí que se optase por tentar un equilibrio entre o estudo agrupado de casos semellantes, a discusión metodolóxico-conceptual e a consideración dos problemas de actualidade derivados do rexurdimento de diversas formas de nacionalismo en Europa —particularmente en Europa Central e Oriental, mais tamén, con diferentes formas e matices, en Europa Occidental. En función diso, e despois dunha lección inaugural pronunciada polo profesor Eric J. Hobsbawm, procedéuse a unha distribución das comunicacións presentadas ó Congreso en cinco seccións: unha adicada a historiografía e metodoloxía; tres á análise de grupos de casos que tipoloxicamente se prestasen a un estudo comparado (os

The papers collected in these two volumes are the proceedings of the international conference entitled *Nationalism in Europe: Past and Present*, which took place at the University of Santiago de Compostela from the 27th to the 29th of September 1993. The conference was organised by the *Universidade de Santiago de Compostela* in scientific collaboration with the European University Institute of Florence, the *Maison des Sciences de l'Homme* of Paris, the *Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism* (ASEN) of the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the *Wolfgang-Johann-Goethe Universität* of Frankfurt am Main.

The conference would not have been possible without the generous financial aid of the *Sociedade Xacobeo 93* and the *Consortio de Santiago de Compostela*. We would like first of all to express our deepest gratitude to the collaborating scientific institutions, and to the *Sociedade Xacobeo 93* and the *Consortio de Santiago de Compostela*, and to their respective presidents, *Excmo.Sr.* Victor M. Vázquez Portomeñe and *Excmo.Sr.* Xerardo Estévez for having made it possible for us to present these two volumes. Our gratitude is also due to the President of the Xunta of Galicia, *Excmo. Sr.* Manuel Fraga Iribarne who officially opened the conference.

The organizing committee, with the generous help and advice of the scientific committee (Eric J. Hobsbawm, Miroslav Hroch, Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Stuart J. Woolf, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Mario Delgado, Antonio Elorza, Juan-Pablo Fusi, Borja de Riquer, José-Luis de la Granja, Ramón Máiz, E. Ucelay-Da Cal, Justo G. Beramendi and D. Conversi) set itself the ambitious task of organizing an international conference of major proportions: namely, to gather together more than 70 specialists from different European countries and from North America in the quinquennial University of Santiago de Compostela with the objective of discussing the most important methodological and conceptual problems which have arisen after decades of the study of a phenomenon as rich, varied and multifaceted as nationalism in the Old Continent. A balance was sought between the study of groups of similar cases, methodological-conceptual discussion, and the consideration of present-day questions arising out of the resurgence of various forms of nationalism in Europe — in particular Central and Eastern Europe, though also in somewhat different forms in Western Europe. With this in mind, and after the inaugural lecture by Prof. Eric J. Hobsbawm, the communications presented at the conference were divided into five sections: the first dedicated to historiography and methodology; a further three to the study of groups of cases which typologically could be subjected to comparative analysis (multi-national empires, their problems and subsequent dissolution; the nationalisms of German and Italian unification; and the national problem in Eastern Europe), and a final section focussed on the analysis of present

Imperios multinacionais, os seus problemas e posterior disolución; os nacionalismos de unificación alemán e italiano; e a problemática nacional nos vellos Estados-Nación da Europa occidental), e unha sección final centrada na análise dos nacionalismos na actualidade, nas súas diversas formas e manifestacións. Cada unha das seccións contou cun ponente (os profesores James Kellas, Alexander J. Motyl, Otto Dann, Hans-Jürgen Puhle e Walker Connor) e con senllos relatores (os profesores E. Ucelay Da-Cal, Ralph Melville, Stuart J. Woolf, Juan Pablo Fusi e Daniele Conversi) que levaron a cabo de xeito eficaz o seu labor para resumir os puntos e cuestións principais tratadas nas comunicacións presentadas en cada sección, e así poder aproveitar a meirande parte do tempo útil para a discusión e debate. Debate que foi froitífero, interesante, en ocasións vivaz e polémico, e en todo caso estimulante, ó longo de tres sesións de traballo que tamén serviron, dito sexa de paso, para inserir no ámbito académico galego e español as teorías e cuestións máis candentes no «circuito internacional» e ó mesmo tempo para dar a coñecer ó mundo académico extrahispánico os avances e aportacións da propia historia, socioloxía e ciencia política españolas no eido do estudo da cuestión nacional. Estas actas encádranse así nunha tradición comezada pola Universidade de Santiago de Compostela hai uns dez anos, que buscaba en primeiro lugar poñer en contacto e diálogo ás diversas historiografías hispánicas co coloquio *Os nacionalismos na España da Restauración* (celebrado en 1983, e cuxas actas foron publicadas na revista *Estudios de Historia Social*, n.28-29, 1984), continuou en 1988 coa celebración do simposio *Os nacionalismos na II República* (actas publicadas en 1991: J.G. Beramendi e R.Máiz (comps.), *Los nacionalismos en la España de la II República*, Madrid: Siglo XXI) e remata coa edición das presentes actas, coas que podemos afirmar que se pecha un ciclo que sen dúbida outros haberán continuar.

O longo dos debates, e asemade nos textos presentados, emerxeron as eternas disputas de tipo metodolóxico e epistemolóxico que caracterizaron e seguen a caracterizar o estudo dos nacionalismos: ás consabidas diferencias de enfoque e método científico existentes entre historiadores, sociólogos e politólogos, engádense as diferentes perspectivas de análise do nacionalismo e dos seus fenómenos correlativos —a etnicidade, os movementos nacionalistas, as formas de identidade colectiva e a súas mutacións, evolución e clasificación, as súas representacións mítico-simbólicas, etc. A diferenciación básica que adoita establecerse entre os estudosos do nacionalismo xira arredor do binomio primordialistas/modernistas, é dicir, aqueles que estiman que as nacións ou grupos étnicos con conciencia de posuiren dereitos políticos colectivos son entes dados e preexistentes, denantes mesmo da Idade Contemporánea (ou sexa, anteriores a ca. 1780); e aqueles que polo contrario estiman que o nacionalismo é un produto do tránsito do Antigo Réxime á sociedade liberal

day nationalisms in their varied forms and manifestations. In each section there was a rapporteur (James Kellas, Alexander Motyl, Otto Dan, Hans-Jürgen Puhle and Walker Connor) and a discussant (E. Ucelay-Da Cal, Ralph Melville, Stuart J. Woolf, Juan Pablo Fusi and Daniele Conversi) who carried out the task of summarizing the points made, and the principle questions discussed, in the communications presented in each section, thus allowing the major part of the time available to be devoted to discussion and debate. Debate which was fruitful, interesting, on occasion lively and controversial, and always stimulating throughout the three working sessions. This debate, incidentally, also served to introduce to the Spanish and Galician academic circuit the most ardent questions from the "international circuit", and at the same time it served to introduce non-Iberian academia to the advances and contributions of Spanish historiography, sociology and political science in the study of the national question. These proceedings fall within the tradition begun by the University of Santiago de Compostela ten years ago, in an effort to bring the various Hispanic historiographies into contact and dialogue, with a conference entitled *Nationalisms in Restoration Spain* (which took place in 1983 and the proceedings of which were published in *Estudios de Historia Social* n. 28-29, 1984). A tradition which was continued with a symposium entitled *Nationalisms during the 2nd Spanish Republic* in 1988, the proceedings of which were published in 1991 (J.G. Beramendi & R Máiz (eds), *Los nacionalismos en la España de la II República*, Madrid, Siglo XXI) and which culminates with the publication of these two volumes which mark the close of a cycle which without doubt others will have to continue. The papers are divided into the five sections corresponding to those of the conference and have been printed here in either English or Spanish in accordance with the wishes of their respective authors, although papers were also presented at the conference in Galician, Italian, German and French.

The eternal methodological and epistemological disputes, which have marked and continue to mark the study of nationalisms, manifested themselves throughout the debates and in the papers presented here: to the habitual differences of focus and methodology among historians, sociologists and political scientists must be added the different analytical perspectives on nationalism and its correlative phenomena —ethnicity, nationalist movements, forms of collective identity along with its changes evolution and classification, its mythical-symbolic representation, etc. The basic differentiation which is made among scholars of nationalism is usually on the basis of the primordialist/modernist axis. In other words, there are those who believe that Nations or ethnic groups which are conscious of possessing collective political rights are given pre-existent entities even before the Late Modern Period (i.e., ca. 1780); and there are others, on the other hand,

e ó capitalismo, e que xa que logo é unha construción político-ideolóxica vencellada directamente á modernidade, que há verse acompañada de cambios políticos, sociais e económicos para estenderse entre a poboación e ter éxito. Non sempre o debate se ten plantexado exactamente nestes termos, xa que tamén existen posturas máis ou menos intermedias: autores hai que, malia recoñecer que o nacionalismo ou os movementos nacionalistas son fenómenos que se constrúen e teñen unha dinámica de crecemento intimamente vencellada a mudanzas na esfera social, económica e política, parten da existencia predeterminada de nacións ou «grupos étnicos non-dominantes», chegando ás veces a afirmar o seu rexeitamento polo mesmo termo *nacionalismo*, por consideralo demasiado ambiguo, e substituíndoo nalgúns casos polo de «movemento nacional» (M. Hroch). Pola contra, outros autores amósanse claramente partidarios da modernidade do nacionalismo e do seu carácter esencialmente político, atribuíndo un papel preponderante á necesidade por parte do Estado e das novas élites dirixentes de lexitimaren o seu poder mediante novas formas e principios políticos que creen un consenso social arredor das institucións nadas da creba do Antigo Réxime (Breuilly), en ocasións como recurso de élites contrapostas que apelan ó apoio de grupos étnicos que aquélas contribúen conscentemente a crear como comunidades nacionais (Brass). Sen que as posicións entre estes dous grupos de autores estean totalmente polarizadas, si que xorden considerábeis puntos de desacordo, ó mesmo tempo que outros de relativo entendemento: nin o máis primordialista dos historiadores ou sociólogos defendería hoxe que o nacionalismo emerxe de forma «natural» das nacións «obxectivas» sen a concorrencia dunha serie de procesos e dinámicas de cambio social, económico e político —e, polo tanto, non se cae nas tautoloxías propias da historiografía nacionalista, é dicir, aquela producida polos propios nacionalismos—; nin o máis «modernista» dos autores é quen de negar o papel que poden xogar formas de identidade colectiva prepolítica anteriores no tempo á Idade Contemporánea á hora de favorecer ou asentir precondicións favorábeis —malia non autosuficientes— para o desenvolvemento dun nacionalismo potente dende finais do século XVIII. A memoria histórica de institucións propias de autogoberno colectivo, a presenza de trazos culturais distintivos, o conxunto de elementos que podemos chamar «etnicidade» no senso outorgado ó termo pola escola anglosaxona, son factores que interveñen na consolidación dos nacionalismos europeos da Idade Contemporánea, endebén non determinan necesariamente ese proceso.

Boa parte das discusións conceptuais arredor de *qué é o nacionalismo* pecan dunha certa imprecisión á hora de definir cál é o obxecto de estudo, e precisamente varían ademais en función non xa do idioma —a mesma acepción «nacionalismo» cambia nas diversas linguas— senón tamén do enfoque adoptado e da posición previa

who believe that nationalism is a product of the transition from the Old Regime to a liberal and capitalist society, and that therefore it is a political-ideological construction related directly to modernity and which must be accompanied by social and economic changes if it is to be successful and spread throughout the population. The debate hasn't always been expressed in exactly these terms as there also exist positions which are more or less intermediate: there are authors, although they recognize that nationalism or nationalist movements are phenomena which need be constructed and possessed of a growth dynamic which is intimately related to changes in the social economic, and political sphere, who set out from the prior existence of nations or "non-dominant ethnic groups," indeed, they go so far as to reject the very term *nationalism* itself considering it to be too ambiguous and they replace it with "national movement" (M. Hroch). In contrast, other authors clearly support the modernity of nationalism and its essentially political character, assigning a dominant role to the State's, and to the new ruling elite's, necessity to legitimize their power through new forms which create a social consensus around the institutions born out of the collapse of the Ancien Régime (Breuilly). They are sometimes also a recourse for the opposing elites who call on the support of ethnic groups which they consciously helped create as national communities (Brass). The positions of these two groups of authors are not completely polarized; although there are considerable points of disagreement, at the same time there are others of understanding. Not even the most primordialist of historians or sociologists would today defend the view that nationalism emerged "naturally" from "objective" nations without the combination of a series of processes and dynamics of social, economic and political change. They thus avoid falling into the tautologies of nationalist historiography, in other words of that produced by the nationalisms themselves. Not even the most "modernist" of authors would deny the role that pre-political forms of collective identity, from the pre-Modern era, have, ever since the end of the 18th century, been able to play when it comes to favouring, or establishing conditions favourable to, the development of powerful nationalisms. The memory of institutions proper to self-government, the presence of some distinctive cultural touches, the set of elements which we could call "ethnicity" in the sense given to the term by the Anglo-saxon school, are factors which arbitrate in the consolidation of the European nationalisms of the Modern Age, even if they do not determine that process.

A significant number of the conceptual discussions about *what nationalism is* suffer from a certain imprecision concerning what exactly the object of study is. Furthermore, the discord is not just in function of the various languages—the sense of the word "nationalism" varies from language to language—but also in the focus

de cada autor: o resultado é unha proliferación de terminoloxías máis ou menos artificiosas e disensións teóricas que en parte poderían evitarse recorrendo como paso previo a unha unificación de criterios sobre conceptos básicos e modelos analíticos. Mentres persista a actual confusión conceptual e a teimosía mesmo en inventar novas acepcións dos termos «nación» e «nacionalismo» sen contrastar previamente as xa existentes, pouco se poderá avanzar cara a unha mellor comprensión dun fenómeno xa de seu polisémico e polifacético.

Como sinalou o profesor Hans-Jürgen Puhle nas conclusións finais do Congreso, tanto primordialistas como modernistas conceden unha considerábel importancia a diferentes factores na conformación das nacións e do nacionalismo. Fundamental en todo caso é lembrar que para acadarmos unha comprensión global de qué supuxo e supón o nacionalismo nas sociedades europeas da Idade Contemporánea non só se há atender ós programas políticos, á acción dos Estados ou ó desenvolvemento das bases sociais dos movementos nacionalistas: como ten sinalado o profesor Hobsbawm, o nacionalismo é unha forma máis de identidade colectiva, condicionada historicamente e construída a partir de outras identidades, superpóndose a éstas ou substituíndoas. Como se constrúe socialmente a identidade, como se transmite e como se politiza ou mobiliza, velaí un dos grandes eidos de análise para o estudo dos fenómenos nacionalistas que ademais podería axudarnos a comprendermos mellor non só o pasado das nosas sociedades, senón tamén o actual rexurdimento do nacionalismo en tódalas súas facetas ó longo de Europa.

Existe, pois, unha serie de factores arredor dos que se ten polarizado a discusión durante o Congreso, e que podemos resumir do xeito seguinte:

— O problema da identidade nacional, ou, se se prefire, das manifestacións da identidade colectiva. Ésta rara vez se presenta en forma monolítica ou homoxénea, senón máis ben en forma fragmentaria, múltiple e superposta. E ó mesmo tempo pode funcionar unicamente como elemento de exclusión, ou pode deixar portas abertas á integración de novos membros á comunidade nacional. Boa parte da responsabilidade na formación das identidades colectivas corresponde ás élites, á intelligentsia e, se se quere, ós propios nacionalistas, que fornecen á comunidade dun conxunto de imaxes comúns e á vez dunha cultura que permite establecer as fronteiras entre uns grupos e outros; ora ben, a identidade non se manifesta do mesmo xeito en tódolos grupos sociais, nin en tódalas rexións, nin en tódalas épocas; igualmente, dentro dun mesmo colectivo ou comunidade poden conviver persoas que posúen nocións moi diferentes verbo da dimensión e significado das súas identidades. Unha cuestión correlativa é a da diferenciación entre identidades «cívicas» e identidades «étnicas»,

adopted by, and in the prior position of each author. The result is a proliferation of terminologies (contrived to a greater or lesser extent) and theoretical disagreements which could largely be avoided by first of all taking recourse to a unification of criteria concerning basic concepts and for analytical models. As long as the present conceptual confusion persists, and indeed while efforts are being made to invent yet more senses for the term "nationalism" without first testing the already existing ones, little advance can be made towards a greater understanding of a phenomenon which is in itself polyvalent and multifaceted.

As Prof. Puhle pointed out in his final comments on the conference, both primordialists and modernists grant considerable importance to a variety of factors in the shaping of nations and nationalism. It is above all essential to remember that in order to arrive at an overall understanding of what nationalism means, and has meant, for European societies in the Modern Age, one cannot look merely at the political programmes, the action of the States or the development of the social base of nationalist movements. For, as Prof. Hobsbawm observed, nationalism is one more form of collective identity, determined historically, and constructed from a base of other identities, which it replaces or superimposes itself upon. How identity is constructed socially, how it is transmitted, politicized or mobilized, therein lies one of the great analytical fields for the study of nationalist phenomena which furthermore would aid us in better understanding not just the past of our own societies but also the resurgence of all facets of nationalism across Europe today.

There are series of factors around which discussion was polarized throughout the conference. We can summarize them as follows:

- The problem of national identity, or if one prefers, of the forms of collective identity. This rarely comes in a monolithic and homogeneous form, but rather in a fragmentary, multiple and superimposed form. It can function as an element for exclusion or it can simultaneously leave the door open to integrating new members. A major part of the responsibility for the formation of new collective identities is due to the elites, the intelligentsia, and if one wishes to the nationalists, who provide the community a set of common images at the same time as a culture which allows the setting up of borders between one group and another. Clearly, identity does not manifest itself in the same way in every social group, every region or in every epoch; equally within a given collective or community there may well be persons who have very different notions about the dimension and significance of their identities. A correlative question is that of the distinction between "civic" and "ethnic" identities, which is connected with the above mentioned division between primordialist and

o que se vencella coa división mentada entre perspectivas primordialistas e modernistas para a análise do nacionalismo. ¿Existe unha clara delimitación entre ámbalas dúas, non no terreo das formulacións teóricas, senón no eido dos feitos, nos exemplos concretos?

- O valor que adquiren determinados elementos configuradores da etnicidade dun colectivo humano á hora de establecer as «fronteiras étnicas» (F. Barth) ou «demarcacións culturais» entre uns grupos ou comunidades e outras. Algunhas comunicacións inciden directa ou indirectamente sobre esta cuestión, sobre a ambivalencia e á vez eficiencia deses límites (Conversi, Petrosino), sendo o papel do idioma un dos máis salientados. Sobre todo é de salientar a súa ambigüidade: a posesión dun idioma propio —idioma que á súa vez precisa ser construído e codificado por unhas élites, un movemento nacionalista e/ou un aparello estatal ou administrativo autónomo (vid. p.ex. a intervención de J. Mezo)— pode servir de elemento excluínte, mais tamén de elemento de integración dentro dunha nova identidade común (como ás veces opera en sociedades de inmigración). As identidades nacionais teñen certamente moito de irracional, un compoñente entre sentimental e pseudo-relixioso (daí aquela definición de T. Schieder segundo a cal o nacionalismo non é senón a «relixión política» da Idade Contemporánea) que coaduxa á grande funcionalidade do nacionalismo tralo colapso do Antigo Réxime: o nacionalismo integra identidades, reelabóraas e vencéllaas a un colectivo humano determinado, a un territorio (concreta ou idealmente: pénsese mesmo no sionismo) e ó poder político, chegando a subsumir ou mediatizar outras formas de identidade, baseadas na clase social ou nas relacións de xénero (Ugalde).

- Daí que xurda unha cuestión correlativa, tamén tratada de xeito central ou lateral nalgunhas contribucións (Petersen, Breuilly, Puhle): a relación existente entre proceso de cambio social, o chamado proceso de modernización en tódalas súas esferas (económica, social, política) e a conversión das identidades colectivas en identidades nacionais, através precisamente dos factores ideolóxico-políticos e institucionais que interveñen nesa evolución: a actuación socio-política dos movementos nacionalistas (Hroch) e o papel do Estado nacional na Idade Contemporánea. E, do mesmo xeito, a observación do fenómeno inverso, é dicir, a falla de evolución de sentimentos e fortes consciencias colectivas ben califícaseis de pre-nacionais cara ó estadio de nacionalismos claramente definidos (como amosa, realmente, a contribución de B. Cook sobre Sicilia, ou a visión comparativa de Puhle). ¿Cáles son os factores que inflúen de xeito efectivo na activación da identidade prenacional en nacional? Aquí cómpre considerar unha dimensión social, unha dimensión política, unha dimensión cultural (ou, se se quere, étnico-cultural), incluída

modernist conceptions of nationalism. Is there a clear delineation between the two, not in the area of theoretical formulations, but rather in the area of real actions, in concrete examples?

- The value which certain elements, which configure the ethnicity of a human collective, acquire when "ethnic boundaries" (F. Barth) are being established between one group and another. Some papers contributed directly or indirectly to this question. They look at both the ambivalence and the efficiency of these limits or cultural markers (Conversi, Petrosino), language being one of the most striking. Its ambiguity is of particular note: the possession of an own language—a language which in turn must be constructed by some elites, a nationalist movement and/or a state or semi-state apparatus (see e.g. Mejo's paper)—can serve as an element of exclusion, but equally it can be an element for integration within a new common identity (as sometimes occurs in immigrant societies). National identities certainly contain much that is irrational, a component between sentimental and pseudo-religious (hence T. Schieder's definition according to which nationalism is nothing more than the "political religion" of the Late Modern Age) which made a major contribution to the functionality of nationalism after the collapse of the Ancien Régime: nationalism integrates identities, it reworks them and relates them to a particular human collective, to a territory (concrete or ideal: think of Zionism) and to political power, thereby subsuming or mediating other forms of identity based on class or on gender relations (see the paper by M. Ugalde).

- This gives rise to a correlative question, which was also a central or side theme in some contributions (Petersen, Breuilly, Puhle): the relation existing between the process of social change, the so-called process of modernization in all its spheres (economic, social, political) and the conversion of collective identities into national identities by means of precisely those ideological-political and institutional factors which are involved in this evolution: namely, the socio-political conduct of the nationalist movements (Hroch) and the role of the national State in the 19th and 20th centuries. Equally, observation of the opposite phenomenon, namely, the non-evolution of well-qualified pre-national collective feelings and strong consciousnesses into clearly defined nationalisms (for a real example, see B Cook's contribution on Sicily, or for a comparative vision, see Puhle's paper). Which factors are effective in activating a pre-national identity towards becoming a national one? Here a social dimension, a political dimension, a cultural dimension (or if one prefers, ethno-cultural) including the religious, and an institutional dimension (the role played by the State, or by the institutions of government since the late 18th century) must be considered.

a relixiosa, e máis unha dimensión institucional (o rol xogado polo Estado, ou ben polas institucións de Goberno dende a Idade Moderna).

- O papel que xogan os mitos e as simboloxías na construción intelectual, política e social das identidades nacionais: as contribucións de Ch. Tacke, B. Tobia, L. Cole e G. Krumeich dende diferentes perspectivas tratan sobre ese aspecto, e poñen de relevo a súa función nada refugábel. A cuestión sobranceira é descubrir quen ou qué sectores sociais se achaban tralos promotores de determinados símbolos, dentro de qué contexto socio-político específico e con qué propósitos ou consecuencias. Iso tamén supón, dende outra perspectiva analítica, estudar con máis precisión a construción histórico-simbólica dos mitos de cada un dos nacionalismos, a xeneración e elaboración do discurso ideolóxico dos líderes e a intelixencia nacionalista, a aplicación dos métodos de análise aplicados ós movementos sociais (coma o *frame analysis*, etc.), aspectos nos que inciden as aportacións, dende diferentes ángulos, dos profesores Xulio Cabrera e Pedro Ibarra (construción do discurso nacionalista) e, en clave histórica, José Luis de la Granja (manipulación da Historia polos nacionalismos).

- A esfera política, comprendendo tanto a acción do Estado como a mobilización de sectores sociais en prol da consecución dun ideal nacional. Se o que define ó nacionalismo en relación a outras formas de identidade é, definitivamente, o seu carácter nidiamente político, o seu estudo se há orientar tamén cara ás relacións de poder e dominación nas que o nacionalismo se impon, interven ou é submetido, asemade as combinacións de que é obxecto maleábel con outras ideoloxías e cos intereses de diferentes grupos sociais. Este proceso é de seu ambiguo e complexo, como tódolos procesos sociais, e relaciónase á súa vez con diferentes niveis e esferas de actividade política (o Estado, as institucións rexionais, os movementos sociais, etc.), interactuantes sobre todo en procesos de cambio de réxime ou de transición política.

- En relación con este derradeiro aspecto, plantéxase en varias comunicacións a seguinte cuestión: ¿ata qué punto ten sido o nacionalismo o vehículo máis eficaz de cohesión e mobilización social, e polo tanto o referente derradeiro de lexitimidade política, cando a vella orde político-social se derruba e nos encontramos perante unha nova era na que os antigos valores xa non son válidos? Interesantes paralelismos se poden tracexar aquí entre a situación de transición do Antigo Réxime á nova orde liberal, intre de aparición do nacionalismo como fenómeno político con pleno protagonismo (como amosan, entre outras, as contribucións de Dann ou Ullrich) e o recente xermolar do nacionalismo en Europa Centro-Oriental e os Balcáns, onde de novo aquél se mostra como o único referente válido e operativo para o

- The role played by myths and symbols in the intellectual, political and social construction of national identities: the contributions from C. Tacke, Bruno Tobia, L. Cole and Gerd Krumeich are relevant to this point from a number of different perspectives, and they throw it far from insignificant role into relief. The main question is to discover who, or which social sectors, are to be found behind the promoters of specific symbols, and from within which specific socio-political context and with what objectives or consequences they operate. This also means, from another perspective, the claim for studying the historic-symbolic construction of the myths of each nationalism in greater detail, the creation and making of ideological discourse by the nationalist leaders and intelligentsia, the wider use of applied analytical methods to the social movements (e.g. frame analysis etc): this points are stressed by Xulio Cabrera and Pedro Ibarra (construction of nationalist discourse) from different angles while José Luis de la Granja (who discusses the manipulation of history carried out by nationalisms themselves) stressed the historical perspective of that problem.

- The political sphere, including both the actions of the State and the mobilization of social sectors in favour of the construction of an ideal nation. If that which definitively defines nationalism, compared to other forms of identity, is its clearly political character, then its study must also be orientated towards power and domination relationships in which nationalism is imposed, arbitrates or is imposed upon, as well as towards the combinations of what is a malleable object with other social ideologies and with the interests of different social groups. This process is by nature both ambiguous and complex, like all social processes, and it is related in turn with different levels and spheres of political activity (the State, regional institutions, social movements etc) which in turn interact, above all, in the processes of change of regime or political transition from an old order.

- Related to this last aspect various papers asked the following question: up to what point has nationalism been the most efficient vehicle for social mobilization and cohesion, and hence, the final referent for political legitimacy when the old order collapses and we find ourselves confronted by a new era in which the old values are no longer valid? Interesting parallels can be drawn between transition from the Ancien Régime to the Liberal order, the point when nationalism appeared as a very active political phenomenon (as shown in the papers by Profs. Dann or Ullrich among others) and the recent flowering of nationalism in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans, where once again it shows itself as the only valid and operative referent for the reconstruction of civil society (see the papers by Profs. R. Pearson or P. Vodopivec), even if the variety of their evolutions might force us to ask the

reartellamento da sociedade civil (vid. as intervencións de R. Pearson ou de P. Vodopivec), endebén a súa diversidade de evolucións nos pode levar á difícil cuestión de se os procesos de «nacionalización» e democratización real (ou consolidación democrática) son complementarios ou conflictivos. Desgraciadamente, tamén prolifera a intolerancia cando a expansión de diferentes nacionalismos non se ve acompañada por unha circia consolidación da sociedade civil e dunha certa tradición de pluralismo político, e sobre todo cando, ademais, un nacionalismo de tipo fundamentalista se converte no único vehículo de lexitimación non dunha sociedade en conxunto, senón de determinadas élites ou sectores procedentes da antiga Orde e que se ven obrigados a reciclarse: isto revélase na Europa do Leste tanto no período de entreguerras (vid. as intervencións de Suppan, Núñez ou Veiga) como na época actual, cos seus fenómenos paralelos de discriminación, asimilación forzosa das minorías nacionais en Estados alóxenos e, nos casos máis extremos, eliminación física doutros pobos (vid. as comunicacións de Laitin ou Gallagher). ¿Estamos perante un nacionalismo de novo carimbo, ou diante dunha continuación do que tiñan sido os nacionalismos decimonónicos nunha forma que hoxe particularmente se nos revela como negativa? ¿Cáles son as razóns sociais, económicas e institucionais para o xurdimento dos nacionalismos contemporáneos fundamentalistas? (Hobsbawm) Certamente, caben moitas respostas a esta pregunta, mais ésta se non resolve nin con xeneralizacións abusivas identificando a todo nacionalismo como intrinsecamente negativo, nin con taxonomizacións simplistas entre nacionalismos «unificadores» e «secesionistas», nin sequera entre nacionalismos «étnicos» e «cívicos». Como sinala Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, rara vez na Historia nos encontraremos cun nacionalismo cívico en estado puro, xa que tódolos Estados nacionais tenderon a *inventar tradicións* relativas a orixes comúns ou mitos fundadores, do mesmo xeito que tenderon a desenvolver políticas cultural-educativas e simbólicas homoxeneizadoras dos seus cidadáns ata onde era posíbel.

- Varias comunicacións, centradas sobre todo na época actual, tratan sobre cuestións que en parte xiran arredor do problema da convivencia de nacionalidades ou grupos étnicos diferentes dentro dunha sociedade multicultural, quer establecendo os paralelismos cos Imperios multinacionais do pasado e mailo seu substrato unificador baseado na lealdade dinástica supranacional (Motyl, Koralka, Bozarslan), quer sinalando a crecente tendencia actual cara á integración política de Europa — sobre todo e en primeiro lugar na súa parte occidental— e as perspectivas de superación da fórmula actual do Estado-nación e das identidades étnico-nacionais e maila súa substitución por un «patriotismo europeo» que na súa formulación semella cercán á fórmula concibida no seu día por Jürgen Habermas de «patriotismo constitucional». Sobre este derradeiro aspecto conviven as visións moderadamente

difficult question of whether the processes of “nationalization” and real democratization (or democratic consolidation) are complementary or conflictive. Unfortunately, intolerance also proliferates when the expansion of different nationalisms is not accompanied by a solid consolidation of civil society and a certain tradition of political pluralism, and above all when a fundamentalist nationalism converts itself into the only vehicle of legitimation not of a whole society, but of particular elites or sectors originating from the old order which are obliged to “recycle” themselves: this has occurred in Eastern Europe both during the interwar period (see the papers by Suppan, Nuñez or Veiga) and in the present epoch, with its parallel phenomena of discrimination, forced assimilation of national minorities, and in the most extreme cases the physical elimination of other peoples (see the papers by Profs. Laitin or Gallagher). Are we faced with a new breed of nationalism, or a continuation of what were the nationalisms of the 19th century, now revealed in a particularly negative form? What are the social economic and institutional reasons for the contemporary fundamentalist nationalisms? (Hobsbawm) There are certainly many possible responses to the first question, but it cannot be resolved with abusive generalizations which identify all nationalism as intrinsically negative, or with simplistic taxonomization between “unifying” and “secessionist” nationalisms or even “ethnic” and “civic” nationalisms. As Heinz-Gerhard Haupt points out, it is rare in history that we encounter a civic nationalism in its pure form, as all national States have tended to try and invent traditions relating to common origins or mythical founders, in the same way as they have attempted to develop symbolic and cultural-education policies which would homogenize their citizens as much as possible.

- Various papers, dealing with the present epoch, discuss questions which revolve largely around the cohabitation of various ethnic groups within a multi-cultural society, either by establishing the parallels with the multi-national empires of the past and their unifying substrate based on supra-nation dynastic loyalty (see the papers by Profs. Motyl, Koralka, Bozarslan), or by pointing out the present growing tendency to political integration in Europe —primarily in the West— and the outlook for overcoming the present formula of nation State and ethnic-national identities and replacing it with a “Euro-patriotism” which in concept seems to be close to the constitutional patriotism (*Verfassungspatriotismus*) developed in his day by Jürgen Habermas. Moderately sceptical visions (Connor) about this last element share the stage with more optimistic ones which insist on pointing out the role of the transcending of the national State and the concurrent strengthening of “nations without state” and the regions in this new framework (Jáuregui, and mentioned too by Nagel). But perhaps we are along way from being able to appreciate such a clear

escépticas (Connor) coas máis optimistas que teiman en sinalar a superación da forma de Estado nacional e a potenciación das «nacións sen Estado» e mailas rexións nese novo marco (Jáuregui, matizadamente tamén Nagel), mais quizabes estamos aínda lonxe de podermos apreciar unha superación tan clara da forma histórica do Estado nacional como algúns supoñen ou desexan: lémbrese que nos últimos anos apareceron xa varios novos Estados dentro do continente europeo, que tentan conscentemente seren eles tamén Estados nacionais.

- A dimensión social do nacionalismo constitúe outro dos temas tratados en varias das comunicacións aquí incluídas. En parte, o tema da construción social da identidade colectiva e a relación dialéctica entre identidade nacional e clases sociais está implícita nas contribucións xa citadas que se ocuparon da dimensión simbólica do nacionalismo; mais tamén se pode abordar a cuestión dende o punto de vista da análise dos movementos nacionalistas, quer daqueles que chegaron ó seu cume no século XIX e conduciron ó obxectivo da consecución dun Estado propio (como amosa a análise da base social do movemento nacionalista italiano levada a cabo por H. Ullrich), quer daqueles movementos nacionalistas que acadaron o seu pleno desenvolvemento e finalmente a independencia despois da I Guerra Mundial: é o caso dos nacionalismos bálticos, amosado por A. Loit, ou do nacionalismo polonés (K. Zydzowicz). Unha boa parte das contribucións ocúpase tamén dos movementos nacionalistas que se desenvolveron na Europa Occidental e a evolución dos seus apoios sociais, dende o galego (R. Máiz) ata o basco (De Pablo & Mees) ou o catalán (Canales Serrano, en comparanza co basco), pasando polo caso moi particular dos nacionalismos irlandés e protestante-unionista no Ulster (Garvin, Helle, Mezo), ou as formas de expresión do sentimento de identidade escocesa no século XIX, que non deron lugar nembargantes ata moi entrado o século XX a un movemento nacionalista en senso estrito (Morton, Keating). Ora ben, dentro do estudo dos nacionalismos tamén é preciso incluír ós típicos representantes do modelo «europeo-occidental» de nacionalismo de Estado, a súa evolución e mailos seus problemas de construción e lexitimación: sobre eses aspectos, quizáis máis nunha perspectiva de Historia político-ideolóxica que puramente social, inciden as comunicacións sobre o caso do nacionalismo español (de Blas Guerrero, Durán Franco, Sepúlveda, B. de Riquer & Ucelay-Da Cal), as correntes políticas do nacionalismo francés (Winock) ou os condicionantes da identidade nacional en Grande Bretaña (Robbins). O aumento considerábel de contribucións de síntese verbo do nacionalismo español, sobre todo, amosa un interese crecente dentro da historiografía hispánica polo que ata hai ben pouco fora o grande protagonista descoñecido da cuestión nacional na Historia contemporánea española, e mostran asemade algunhas liñas polas que será preciso seguir avantando (e que tamén son aplicábeis ós demais nacionalismos estatais da

transcension of the historic form of the national State as some might assume or desire : in recent years various new States, which have also tried consciously to be *national* States, have appeared on the European continent.

- The social dimension of nationalism is one of the other themes discussed in various of the papers presented here. In part, the social construction of collective identity and the dialectic relation between national identity and social classes are implicit themes in the contributions already mentioned which looked at the symbolic dimension of nationalism; however, the question can also be tackled from the point of view of an analysis of the nationalist movements, whether those which culminated in the 19th century and led to the objective of establishing an own state (as demonstrated by Prof. Ullrich's analysis of the social basis of the Italian nationalist movement) or those which reached their full development and finally independence in 1914-1918: such as is the case of the Baltic nationalisms (A. Loit) or Polish nationalism (K. Zydowicz). A significant number of the contributions are also concerned with the nationalist movements which developed in Western Europe and with the evolution of their social support, from the Galician movement (R. Máiz) to the Basque (De Pablo & Mees) or the Catalan (Canales Serrano, comparing it with the Basque) via the very particular case of the Irish and protestant-unionist nationalisms in Ulster (see the papers by Garvin, Helle and Mezo) or the forms of expression adopted by the Scottish feeling of identity in the 19th century, which did not give rise to a nationalist movement in the strict sense until well into the 20th century (see the papers by Morton and Keating). The study should also, of course, include typical representatives of the "Western European" State nationalism model, its evolution and its problems of construction and legitimation: these aspects are stressed, perhaps more from a politico-ideological perspective than a purely socio-historical one, in the papers concerning Spanish nationalism (de Blas Guerrero, Durán Franco, Sepúlveda, B. de Riquer & Ucelay-Da Cal), the political currents of French nationalisms (Winock) and the problems related to British national identity (Robbins). The considerable increase in the number contributions which attempt to make synthesis concerning Spanish nationalism, demonstrates above all a growing interest, in Hispanic historiography, in what which until quite recently was the great unknown actor in the national question in Modern Spanish history; it also shows some lines which will have to be followed up (and which are also applicable to the other state nationalisms in Western Europe): the mutual influences between different and sometimes opposed nationalisms within a given Nation State, the role of the State and its territorial organization, the impact of specific reformist-nationalist ideologies born out of the crisis in national sentiment in moments of collapse (like Spanish *Regeneracionismo*), or indeed the role which national identities

Europa Occidental): as interinfluencias mutuas entre diversos nacionalismos, o papel do Estado e o artellamento territorial do mesmo, o impacto de determinadas ideoloxías nacionalistas-reformistas xurdidas da crise do sentimento nacional en intres de creba ou derrota externa, ou ben o papel que poden xogar as identidades nacionais na Idade Moderna e mesmo con anterioridade —o que un tanto provocadoramente denominan os profesores B. de Riquer e Ucelay-Da Cal «paleonacionalismo»— na construción dos Estados-Nacións da Idade Contemporánea.

En todo caso, e alén dos diferentes enfoques teóricos, as adscricións a escolas determinadas e os ámbitos de estudo, unha serie de leccións parecen claras, e que aínda que a primeira vista poidan parecer cáse verdades obvias para un observador pouco versado no estudo do nacionalismo, non o semellarán ós entendidos na materia:

- Segue a ser necesario encontrar definicións claras e unívocas, superando a vaguidade, a ambigüidade e as polisemias endémicas que invaden a terminoloxía científica: como xa apuntamos, en cada idioma, en cada escola científica e cáseque en cada disciplina das Ciencias Sociais termos básicos como «Nación», «Nacionalismo», «Etnicidade» ou «Movemento nacionalista», por poñermos só algúns exemplos, seguen a significar diferentes cousas, e xa que logo o diálogo entre autores diferentes e non digamos xa entre disciplinas diferentes vése eivado dende o primeiro intre. Quizáis o título da suxerente contribución do profesor M. Hroch só recolla unha parte do problema: non soamente se trata de se sabemos bastante sobre o «nacionalismo»; o feito de que este autor prefira non utilizar o termo nacionalismo e o escriba entre aspas é dabondo indicativo. Malia se poida debater se o relativo pesimismo que se desprende da ponencia do profesor Kellas é ou non a mellor receita para superarmos ese problema, si que segue presente a necesidade de chegar a un consenso real verbo dos termos básicos partindo dende un principio: cá é o obxecto de estudo e cómo precisalo e delimitalo (Beramendi).

- Coma o Profesor Puhle salientou nas súas observacións finais, un vieiro útil pode ser precisamente o fomento dos estudos comparados de casos máis ou menos homologábeis e máis ou menos comparábeis tipoloxicamente, para o que se necesita en primeiro lugar unha axeitada combinación de teoría e empiria. Talvez o mellor método haberá ser agrupar familias de casos co fin de poder elaborar tipoloxías e modelos de acado medio, mediante a formulación de hipóteses xerais. Os estudos monográficos sen unha mínima proxección teórica están condeados a perderen interese e, progresivamente, funcionalidade, en detrimento das comparanzas sistemáticas e/ou as análises de casos concretos que se contrastan cos resultados doutras investigacións e teorías de ámbito máis amplo. Pódese discutir se é máis

can play in the Pre-Modern Age and even earlier —what professors de Riquer and Ucelay-Da Cal provocatively call “paleonationalism”— in the construction of Nation States during the 19th and 20th centuries.

Beyond the theoretical foci, the adherence to certain schools and areas of study, a series of lessons appears clear, which although they might at first sight seem to be obvious truths to an observer little versed in the study of nationalism, that is not how they appear to those better versed in the subject:

- The need to find clear univocal definitions is still very pressing, definitions which will overcome the vagueness, the ambiguity and the endemic polysemy which invades scientific terminology. In every language, in every scientific school and in almost every discipline within the Social Sciences basic terms such as “Nation,” “Nationalism,” “Ethnicity,” or “Nationalist Movement” to name but a few examples, continue to signify different things. For this reason dialogue between different authors, not to mention between different disciplines is obstructed from the very beginning. Perhaps the title of Prof Hroch’s though-provoking contribution encapsulated only one part of the problem: not only is it question of whether we know enough about “nationalism”; the fact that this author prefers not to use the term nationalism and places it in inverted commas is indicative enough. Even though it may be discussed whether the relative pessimism which emanates from Prof. Kellas’ paper is the best recipe for overcoming the problem, it nevertheless continues to be essential that we arrive at a consensus on the basic terms by going back to the beginning: what is the object of study and how can it be defined and delineated (Beramendi).

- As Prof. Puhle emphasized in his final comments, one useful path might indeed be the stimulation of comparative research of case-studies which are largely similar and comparable typologically, for which the fundamental requirement would be an appropriate combination of theory and empiricism. Perhaps the best method would be to group together families of cases with the object of developing medium-range typologies and models, by formulating general hypotheses. Monographic studies with no theoretical implications are condemned to loose interest and usefulness in the face of systematic comparisons and/or the analysis of specific cases which are tested against the results of other research and broader theories. It is open to discussion whether it is better to test theories of a very general nature, in other words whether it is more useful to develop large theoretical macro-models which attempt to explain *all* nationalisms, or whether it would be better to formulate middle-range theories or theoretical models with a somewhat wider scope.

operativo contrastar teorías de ámbito moi xeral, é dicir, se resulta máis útil elaborar grandes macromodelos teóricos que pretenden explicar *todos* os nacionalismos; ou se, pola contra, é máis factíbel formular *middle-range theories* ou modelos teóricos de acado algo máis amplo que expliquen unha tipoloxía e periodización de fenómenos (p.ex., o desenvolvemento dos movementos nacionalistas nunha área ou época determinada, ou a construción das ideoloxías nacionalistas nun período determinado) e que permitan posteriormente, por agregación e comparanza, construír un esquema explicativo por forza complexo mais de ambición máis globalizadora.

- Iso lévanos a unha terceira conclusión: a crecente necesidade de estudos interdisciplinarios sobre o fenómeno do nacionalismo, o máis abertos posíbeis á incorporación de métodos e enfoques proveñentes de diversas Ciencias Sociais. Ora ben, a apelación á interdisciplinaridade, malia compartillada por todo o mundo en teoría, é aínda pouco aplicada na práctica: os historiadores tenden a rexeitaren os modelos elaborados polos sociólogos por consideralos abstractos e carentes de correlato coa realidade empírica, os sociólogos tenden a prexulgar aprioristicamente á Historia como sóa descrición, etc. O Congreso patentizou de xeito importante que as diferentes disciplinas científicas seguen a habitar en confortábeis mesas arredadas (*separate tables*). Na literatura especializada existen xa algúns precedentes de sabia interdisciplinaridade que poden servir de base e guieiro para ulteriores elaboracións.

Os artigos que se ofrecen aquí á atención do lector quizabes non responderán de xeito concluínte e definitivo a cada un dos interrogantes plantexados, mais na nosa opinión si que constitúen un paso adiante na comprensión científica do nacionalismo. A súa relativa dispersión temática, agrupada arredor dos grandes eixos que temos sinalado, ten avantaxes e inconvintes, xa que empece quizais afondar máis en tódolos aspectos apuntados; mais precisamente o obxectivo deste Congreso foi ése: axuntar académicos de diferente orixe xeográfica e de diferentes disciplinas para fomentar o debate. Se os resultados corresponderon ou non ás expectativas, é o público científico quen ten que xulgarlo.

Justo G. Beramendi

Ramón Máiz

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Santiago de Compostela, outubro de 1994

which explain the typology and periodicity of phenomena (e.g. the development of nationalist movements in a specific geographical area or epoch, or the construction of nationalist ideologies at a particular period) and which would subsequently facilitate the construction, via addition and comparison, of a performe complex more global explanatory model.

- This brings us to the third conclusion. The growing need for interdisciplinary studies on the phenomenon of nationalism. Studies which should be as open as possible to methods and focuses from various Social Sciences. The appeal for interdisciplinarity, though supported by everyone in theory, it is still rarely put into practice: historians tend to reject models developed by sociologists as being abstract and unconnected with empirical reality; sociologists tend to prejudge history aprioristically as mere description and so on. The conference clearly demonstrated that the different scientific disciplines continue to travel comfortably in separate compartments (or separate tables). However, precedents are already to be found, in the specialized literature, of interdisciplinarity which could serve as a basis for further development.

The papers presented here for the readers attention do not perhaps respond in a conclusive and definitive way to each of the questions posed, but in our opinion they constitute a step forward in the scientific understanding of nationalism. Their relatively wide range of themes, grouped along the major axes which we mentioned, may impede us from going into depth in every one of the aspects indicated; however, the objective of this conference was precisely that of bringing together academics from different places and different disciplines to stimulate debate. Whether the results have lived up to expectations, or not, is for the scholarly public to decide.

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Santiago de Compostela, October, 1994.

OPENING LECTURE





Nation, State, Ethnicity, Religion: Transformations of Identity

Eric J. Hobsbawm

«Belonging» to some human group, apart from such relations as the biological bonds that link mothers to their children, is always a matter of context, and social definition, usually negative—that is to say, specifying the membership of the group by exclusion. Let me be more precise; what I mean by ‘identifying’ with some collectivity is giving a particular identification priority over all others, for in practice we are all multidimensional beings. There is no limit to the number of ways in which I could describe myself—all simultaneously true, as the constructors of censuses know. I can describe myself in different ways, and for certain purposes I will choose to put forward one identification rather than another, but without for a moment supposing that it excludes the others. I am only expected to choose between identifications if some outside authority or situation forces me to choose one identity because it regards two or more of them as incompatible, or because one one is treated as being more important than the others.

The primary identity which has been chosen for most of us in the 20th century is that of the territorial state, that is to say an institution that claims rights over every inhabitant of a piece of a map. If that person is a «citizen» the state claims the right to command their loyalty over all other claimants, their love (i.e. «patriotism») and, in times of war, their life.

These are historically novel arrangements which would have amazed most rulers in the past and most of their subjects, but since the 18th century we have got used to them and take them for granted. There is nothing «natural» about them. (Territories clearly demarcated from their neighbours by frontier-lines, are social innovations. The Franco-Spanish border was not formally fixed until 1869. The assumption that the territorial authority is supreme and has unique power in that territory belongs to modern history.) As every medieval historian or orientalist knows, other kinds of state are possible. They may even be preferable, especially as the operations of actual human affairs fit less and less well into the framework of territorial

states. At this moment two transnational corporations in the automobile industry, one officially based in the USA, the other in Germany, are in dispute about a Basque executive who has been lured by the American chief officer of one of these corporations to cross the ocean, with the promise that it will build a plant in the Basque country. In due course political structures will no doubt have to adjust to such realities better than they are able to do today.

I begin with «state identity», because it is today virtually universal, and because today it provides the model for all other groups which seek a political expression for their existence as a collective. It is, however, a double-sided relationship. In the course of this century all the citizens of such a state belong together as a *community* or «nation», and *second*, that what binds them together is something like common ancestry, ethnicity, language, culture, race or religion. The words «state» and «nation» have become interchangeable, as in the term United Nations. Conversely, and body of people who think of themselves as bound together by ethnicity, language etc. claim the right to have a territorial state for themselves. This is also a novel concept. Until 1918 there is no evidence that what the Kurds wanted was an independent state, or, since they were partly nomadic, that they even understood what this meant. If they *had* any political demand, it was to have *no* state, not a national territorial one or any other.

The basic confusion is between the state as a territorially defined *political* community and communities in the anthropological, sociological or existential sense. The confusion arose naturally out of the revolutionary origin of the modern political «nation», which was based on the implicitly democratic concept of sovereignty of the people, which in turn implied a common political will, and common bonds of political action for the common good such as «patriotism». So long as full citizenship was withheld from the mass of people, and their active participation in politics was neither necessary nor desired, this was largely academic. However, with the rise of democratic politics and the need to mobilize the population, the «people» as a whole became an actor, and was —necessarily— addressed as a community across the internal differences that divided it.

Nevertheless, it is essential to note that this communal cohesion of the citizens in the political nation, implied no other form of homogeneity, except for pragmatic purposes. The obvious reason why this is so is that, since the world began, no territory of any size has been inhabited by a single, culturally or ethnically or in other respects homogeneous population. Moreover, belonging, and even being loyal to a national government did not excluded belonging or being loyal to some other community,

local, kin-based, religious or whatever. The 18th century founding fathers of the modern «nation state» knew this as well as the founders of the post-1945 ex-colonial nation states, because both operated on the same principle. They defined «the people» or «nation» of their state in the only way in which it can be operationally defined, namely as the inhabitants of a pre-existing territory (e.g. the Kingdom of France, the 13 colonies). In the case of the two founding nations of the modern nation-state, France and the USA, they also included those who would join them by accepting the constitution and laws of the revolutionary state. These inhabitants, as they well knew, constituted a multiplicity of ethnic groups, cultures, languages and cults.

Hence the classic «nation-states», from the oldest to those founded in the 19th century were with the rarest exceptions (perhaps Portugal?) heterogeneous, and recognised as such. Basques, Castilians, Catalans and Galicians resisted the Napoleonic armies as Spaniards, without abandoning their identity. The idea of ethnic or linguistic homogeneity, would have made no sense. Even German nationalism, which is ethnic in character, assumed ethnic multiplicity. Being a «German» was a function of belonging to one of the various recognised *Stämme* («tribes» or «descent groups») —Swabians, Saxons, Bavarians, Franks etc. until Hitler, or so Reinhard Koselleck tells me. After 1934 being a Swabian or Saxon was a secondary characteristic of being a German, not the other way round. As for linguistic uniformity, in societies without primary education this is not even conceivable except for restricted elite.

Nevertheless, for reasons often analysed, the tendency of modern territorial states to develop a socially and functionally necessary standardization of homogenization of the body of their citizens, and to strengthen the bonds linking them to national government, is undeniable. Any means of establishing the continuity and cohesion of the state will be used for this purpose, or invented, notably that great guarantor of continuity, history. Where «ethnicity», linguistic culture and religion are available, they will be used for this purpose. Historically this has been the easiest where a state was constructed round a *Staatsvolk* which formed the largest body or even the majority of the state's population, such as the English, the Castilians, or the Great Russians. State patriotism and ethnic or religious bonding may therefore overlap.

One last point about state patriotism must be made. In the course of the 19th and most of the 20th century the demands made by states on their citizens have increased enormously, and the ability of the citizens to escape these demands diminished dramatically. So, therefore, has the need to develop incentives for the citizen to identify individually and as part of a collective with the state. The demands of the state became more total. The era of the two world wars and postwar

reconstruction probably saw the peak of this tendency. There is considerable evidence of a reaction against it since the 1960s.

II

Let me turn from the state to ethnicity. There has never been a time in history when groups of human beings have not distinguished themselves from other groups by giving themselves a collective name, assuming that members of the group have more in common with each other than with members of other groups. However, two, perhaps three observations must be made. *First*, that ethnicity in itself is not a political term, or has specific political implications. That is why I prefer the term to «nationality» which does imply a political program. *Second*, ethnicity is not a positive characteristic of groups. It describes the way they separate themselves from each other, or demarcate themselves from others. The commonest sense of an intrinsic ethnicity, namely supposed common descent and kinship, is either patently fictitious, as in large modern «nations», or arbitrary. Almost always the same population could be divided «ethnically» in different ways. In any case, ethnic membership is often changed and reclassified over time. Without «the others» there is no need to define ourselves. Let me remind you of the Polish census of 1931 which asked the inhabitants of the Pripet marshes (whom we would probably classify as Belorussians) to state their nationality. They did not understand the question. They answered «We are from here». What else needed to be said? In their society, nothing. But there is a *third* point. A large number of ethnic units are not named, i.e. created, by themselves, but from the outside, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries. The history of imperialism is full of colonial administrators who look at the great Rorschach inkblots of their subjects, and decide on what shapes to read into them «Tribes» are distinguished for administrative purposes which would have not recognised their separate existence before. Conversely, a variety of different peoples are classified together for political or other purposes, e.g. the various tribes of American Indians become members of a new collective, the «native Americans» which reflects not what the Apache and the Pueblo Indians have in common with the Mohawks, which is very little, but a specific set of legal problems of the federal government of the USA.

The category of «ethnic Germans» (*Volksdeutsche*) is another such case. Of course, however arbitrary the origin of an ethnic classification, once established it can be as real as any other. A highly heterogeneous ensemble of religions now forms «the Palestinians,» although such a classification could not have had any significance before 1918.

This lack of fixity, or even arbitrariness of the concept of «ethnicity» creates considerable problems for the definition of ethnic identity. We can observe some of the political consequences of this in situations like Bosnia. The political «nation» or «people» can be defined territorially, at least in the historic era of nation-states. But there is no equally convenient way of defining who belongs to an ethnic unit, however defined. Paradoxically, this identity, which claims to be natural or primordial, can only be defined by a conscious decision as to what constitutes the members of the group as distinct from non-members. Criteria have to be established. Biological racism is one such administrative criterion. Who is a Jew? The Nuremberg laws established one criterion (having one Jewish grandparent), the state of Israel another (being born of a Jewish mother). Both recognize that in real life there are no sharp lines which *objectively* separate Jews from non-Jews. Language is another, though equally arbitrary. How can one deny the status of ethnic Welshmen to my purely anglophone neighbours on their ancestral farms? In what sense would they be more ethnically if, in an autonomous Wales, they were obliged to use the language which is at present only spoken by 21% of the population? Conscious and arbitrary choice is the third. How else is the child of a mixed Serb-Croat marriage to decide to which of the two ethnic groups he or she belongs? There were, at the last count, 1.4 million mixed marriages in ex-Yugoslavia. But note that choice can go both ways. Moslem Tamils in Sri Lanka refuse to see themselves as Tamils, and prefer to define themselves as «Moors». Most Navarrese prefer their identity as Navarrese to their identity as Basques.

Ethnic national movements therefore face the basic problem of how to separate their constituency from other groups, and, more urgently, how to give all the members who fit their definition convincing reasons to join the movement in its conflicts with the «others». The optimal strategy to do so is so to polarize group relations that all members of group «We» treat all members of group «They» as potentially dangerous enemies, and therefore total identification with «our» group as their only protection. Terror designed to produce counter-terror is probably today the most popular strategy for securing this polarization, as we can see in Ulster, in Sri Lanka, in the Punjab and elsewhere—not least in ex-Yugoslavia.

However, a few words must be said about a special aspect of this arbitrary definition of group identity, which is often overlooked. I mean *assimilation*. There are two sides to this coin. Ethnic national movements which encourage the mass assimilation of non-members are not common, though there are some—the Catalan for instance, or, before 1914, the Magyars. However, as Jews, Gypsies and people with different coloured skins know, even in the best cases the readiness to assimilate outsiders fully is limited. On the other hand nothing is more common in the 19th And

20th centuries than individuals who wish to assimilate to some other nationality. In fact, migration and assimilation were and are probably the chief agencies for social mobility during this period. Central Europe is full of people whose family names now show that their ancestors once switched nationalities, and if many of them had not translated their original names in the language of their chosen affiliation, this phenomenon would be even more obvious. At the same time it is a familiar sociological fact about nationalist movements that in many of their pioneers and leaders come from the fringes rather than from the centre of their ethnic groups, or even (like some ethnically English leaders of the IRA) from the outside.

Assimilation illustrates precisely the unreality of ethnic identity, both as a supposedly primordial or natural identity and as an *exclusive* one. For, you will note, that in accepting a new identity the assimilees do not necessarily deny their old one. My own father's generation, children of immigrants to England, plunged themselves passionately into English culture and manners and even anglicised their names—but without ever denying their Jewish identity. Americans of Irish origin do not forget their Irish links. What enrages the zealots of group identity about assimilation is not that it means a denial of that identity—though sometimes this does occur—but that it refuses to accept the *specific* criteria of group identity on which they insist, for instance, in the case of Jews, the practice of the religion, in-group marriage or—today—a particular attitude to Israel. It is the refusal to make an either—or choice between group identities.

III

Let me now turn to *religion*, that is to say to the major world religions which, by definition, cannot serve to define a group because of their claim to universality. I leave aside religions which are *ex-officio* or in practice identified with one and only one community. However, as we know, in practice the coexistence of different religions or variants of religion makes it possible for them to function as group markers in many cases. In fact, often there is little sense in distinguishing religion from other markers. Are the conflicts in Northern Ireland or in Bosnia or in Sri Lanka religious or ethnic? It does not matter. (In the first two cases they are clearly not linguistic, since all parties speak and write the same language) However, the question of religion does enable us to trace certain layers in the phenomenon of national or group identity, and certain changes in it. I shall mention two.

The first is the difference between state patriotism, the nationalism of its leaders and cadres, and the sentiments of the masses.

As we know, from the later 17th century to the early 20th a major tendency of state development has been to separate it from religion. The nation-state was non-religious as it was non-ethnic, i.e. it ruled over a multi-religious and multi-ethnic people. Ethnic-linguistic nationalist movements maintained the principle of a multi-religious nation, though not a multi-ethnic one, especially of course, in multi-religious states. This was plainly the case of Irish nationalism, Yugoslav nationalism, German nationalism and several others. Yet the constant tension between the American Constitution, which is indifferent to religion, and the popularity of God in the American political discourse shows that in practice some degree of religiosity is one of the popular criteria for «Americanism». In Ireland, whatever the official tradition of the Republican movement, it is evident that for the masses Catholicism is the decisive criterion of Irish nationalism. This was of course, even more marked in Muslim countries even before the recent rise of fundamentalism.

The second is the nature of the recent transformations of religion which are commonly lumped together as «fundamentalism». The term is misleading, since it implies a return to some original and authentic version of the faith. However, in practice these groups are not merely often innovatory, but also imply a redefinition of the faith which narrows it and makes it more suitable to separate the in-group from the outsiders. I shall not dwell on the innovations of fundamentalism. Let me merely remind you that the Ayatollah Khomeini's concept of an Islamic state, as preached from the early 1970s, was novel, even by the standards of the politically engaged Shi'ite clergy of Iran. As for the narrowing this is obvious. The fundamentalism of Jewish zealots like the Chassidim today, imposes a degree of ritualism far beyond that traditionally required from pious Jews. «Hindu fundamentalism» —the phrase is a contradiction in terms— is a movement to make Hinduism more exclusive and turn it into a sort of state religion —another contradiction in terms for Hindus— which will make all non-Hindus into a sort of non-Indian. Similar transformations have turned Sri Lankan Buddhism from a pacific, non-political and indeed household cult into a bloodthirsty collective nationalist religion for the Sinhalese. All these movements are directed against the coexistence of groups on the same territory and within the same state, which has been the basis of the nation-state so far.

However, another point must be borne in mind. The complex of movements called «fundamentalism» today is, I think, an aspect of the decline of traditional religions, or rather churches. Now such all-embracing churches were always an

effective way of expressing group identity, as ethnicity or language were not. They could consist of actual organizations with actual buildings and territorial divisions through which «the community» could be defined at various levels: for instance, the parish, the diocese, the national or universal church. US presidents address their citizens as «Fellow Americans», but sergeants in the Russian army, both Tsarist and Bolsheviks, addressed their ranks not as «fellow-Russians» but as «True believers» or Christians. Being a Greek, an Albanian, a Bulgarian or even a Turk in the Balkans was not a defining characteristic of a person. Being an Orthodox Christian or a Catholic or a Muslim was. I am inclined to think that it is the decline of religion as traditionally accepted which has left the way open for forms of religious mobilization which are hard to distinguish from ethnic segregationist movements. I mention this in passing as a field for possible research.

IV

Let me now consider the historical transformations in these identifications, most of which occur in the present century.

The first of these, as I have argued in my book, is the injection of ethnicity and linguistic culture into the French and American revolutionary concept of nation-state, and the historic national monarchies like Russia, Britain and Spain. In short, the doctrine of self-determination to «nations» defined in the familiar way — shared by John Stuart Mill, Joseph Stalin and President Wilson. To be more precise, the demand, in Mazzini's phrase, that every such «nation» should have the right to form a sovereign state and the whole nation should be included in one state. This completely unrealistic principle became an operational reality with the collapse of the three great multi-ethnic and multi-empires, of Austria-Hungary, Russian and the Ottomans, i.e. in practice at the end of World War I,.

It immediately created problems which had not seriously arisen —which could not— arise in the multi-ethnic non-national empires for these, by definition, stood above all the various groups of their subjects. Bosnia is an excellent illustration of this. Both the Ottoman empire until 1878 and the Habsburgs from 1878 to 1918 were uncommitted to any of the local communities and thus in a position to mediate between them and to keep their conflicts under control. Communist Yugoslavia was equally uncommitted. The periods when the local Bosnian situation got out of hand, were those when the dominant state power was identified with one ethnic group (the Serbs, before and since communism) or when no effective uncommitted state existed.

A multinational territorial state identified with one single one of its ethnic-linguistic «nations» must privilege that nation over the others, and thus create problems. This is so even when that state is both democratic and tolerant of its «minorities», as in inter-war Czechoslovakia, or post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Where the dominant ethnic group had a more aggressive agenda, as in post-1918 Yugoslavia, Rumania or Poland, the situation was even more tense.

How nation-states which identified with a particular ethnic group turned into—or came to try to turn themselves into— *mono-ethnic*, *mono-linguistic* and *mono-cultural* territories is a question that requires more research, but there can be little doubt that this has been a growing tendency, particularly among small ethnic-linguistic movements and states. The logical end-product of this process is and must be one of four policies: mass assimilation or conversion by state force, mass expulsion of populations or «ethnic cleansing», genocide or the creation, *de facto* or *de jure* of an apartheid system which turns non-members of the dominant group into foreigners or a legally inferior underclass of sub-citizens. All of these have been tried. Some are being tried still. This is the second transformation.

Both these are essentially concerned with creating nation-states and a group-identification ideally co-extensive with the state and superior to all other group identifications. In the extreme case, a total identification with the state, although in the case of ethnic nationalism expressing themselves through universal religions, divine or secular, this is difficult. However, it is clear that in western states, at any rate from the 1960s, another form of apparently similar group identification has arisen. The rise of these forms of ethnicity were first noted in America by Glazer and Moynihan, but it is also evident that a new terminology has developed since then. Both the term *ethnie* and the term *identity* as applied to collectivities seem to be neologisms. For that matter we have lately seen all manner of groups which previously claimed no such status, apply such terms as «community» to themselves, or even the term «nation» (e.g. «the queer nation» in the discourse of homosexual activists in the USA). These phenomena may or may not be linked to territorial nationalisms of the old ethnic type, and some of them clearly have been. I am thinking of the radicalization of Basque nationalism and the emergence of Quebec separatism, which both fall into this period. However, I don't think that this is the central characteristic of these new forms of collective identity formation. Certainly it is not in the USA where they have become increasingly prominent; nor in the ethnic movements of Islamic immigrants in European countries, which tend to take the form of fundamentalism. I shall call them *ghetto* movements, since segregation from, and exclusion of, the wider society is their main object, both emotional, intellectual and where possible physical. Ghetto

movements among immigrants or the descendants of immigrants are the most typical, but not the only ones. The present phase of such movements differs from the ghettoization of earlier immigrants in one major respect. It has given up the aim of assimilation. The code-word for this in the English-speaking world is «multiculturalism». In practice, of course, the inhabitants of almost all ghettos live and work in a wider society, where they coexist with other groups in a complex economy and under public authorities outside and above the ghetto. Indeed, the major political function of ghetto activists is to compete with other groups for a share in the resources of the wider authority. Their strategy is the opposite of national separatism.

These developments should not, in my opinion, be confused with the changes arising out of very far-reaching changes in the structure of the existing states in most of Europe in the last 25 years, and which have enormously accelerated since the collapse of the Soviet bloc. They range from the restructuring of national states, mostly by de-centralization or regionalization to the break-up of old unitary or federal states into their components. Not to mention the move towards a confederal structure of the European Community. What these developments have in common is a weakening of the old model of the nation-state governed from a single centre. This has naturally reinforced national separatist movements both in East and West. Indeed, since the collapse of the Soviet system more new, nominally independent and sovereign states claiming to represent «nations» have been formed than at any time in the 20th century, including more than a dozen which had never in their history been independent states of the modern type. I regard the emergence of these new states essentially as a by-product of the weakening or collapse of the previous states, and not as the product of some new wave of powerful nationalist movements or national consciousness. In my view they should be analysed as consequences of breakdown rather than as causes of it. (However, once new nation-states have come into existence in whatever manner, their national consciousness becomes a serious force in its own right, and must be regarded as such. The elections of 1917 to the Russian Constituent Assembly —the one dissolved by the Bolsheviks— show that there was no serious support at that time for Latvian and Estonian ethnic nationalism. But by 1940 there was.)

The relations between the changes in the political structure of the late 20th century states and national consciousness deserve a great deal of research and analysis. However, for reasons of time I must leave them aside, and concentrate on the sociological reasons for the new search for collective identity. It is no accident that we find this happening in the West from the 1960s on, and elsewhere in the course of the 1970s and the 1980s. For during the first half of the 20th century we have been living —we are living— through the most rapid, profound and universal social

transformation in human history. And with it all the old forms of human relationships, all the traditional bonds of community, have lost any but the most residual, or metaphorical, capacity to define us. We are all uprooted people. Is it an accident that Quebec separatism became a serious political force at the end of a decade when the traditional Catholicism that had defined French Canadians collapsed—as the dramatic collapse both of church attendance and of the French-Canadian birth-rate shows? In my view it is not an accident. Let me therefore conclude with an example of the way in which such social disorientation can lead directly to the search for a new (and in this case savagely nationalist) identity. I take it from Dr Jonathan Spencer's studies of rural Sri Lanka in the early 1980s.

Sometime in the 1940s Dr Spencer's Sinhala village—then quite remote from the capital—acquired a road, a temple, a school and a lot more contact than before with the cash economy. As malaria was almost eradicated, it attracted a lot of immigrants and grew from 100 to 1000. In 1982 nearly half the households had settled in the village in the previous ten years; 85% of the heads of households had been born outside the village. The growth of the cash economy had created wider differences between rich and poor, and differences no longer predictable by a person's family or class/caste. «Now» —I quote again— «brothers and sisters, parents and children, might find themselves leading quite different lives». This was largely due to, and demonstrated by, school education. This divided those who succeeded in the wider society from those who failed. So it is not surprising —I quote— «that 'unity' and 'community' should be the source of some collective anxiety, and this goes some way to explaining the appeal of a higher (ethnic and national) identity.» That higher identity was found through the populism of this national-ethnic Sinhala appeal which —I quote again— «promised a source of community, solidarity and strength in challenging the local holders of privilege.»

Dr Spencer's argument suggests one way in which social change brings about the need for new identities. In my view the collapse of the traditional family structure, followed by the collapse of the traditional structure of (male) manual labour and industrial employment, has produced an analogous form of uprootedness and disorientation in advanced industrial countries; and so has the increasingly sharp break between the generations. The new forms of «identity politics» may or may not appeal to ethnicity (whatever that means) or create new ethnicities or find expression in religion, or for that matter in what claims to be a state patriotism, as with the neo-fascist English football hooligans who wave the Union Jack. It may do all these things at once. Moreover, it may or may not merge with an older nationalist ideology and movement. However, it is my view that it must be considered and analysed as a novel

sociological phenomenon and not as a mere prolongation of older forms of nationalism. In my view it is essentially not political, though it can obviously be exploited by politicians and will be.

It is not my function here to judge them, but I can only conclude that these movements, strong though they are, are essentially negative: they are at best cries of pain and cries for help, at worst blind protests, particularly of those without hope. They offer no political or other solutions because they do not think in terms of solution. My conclusion is a warning against anachronism: do not confuse the neonazis of Germany today even with the original National Socialists. They are different.



Section I

Historiography and Methodology in the Study of Nationalism

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Justo G. Beramendi
Paul Brass
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THE STUDY OF NATIONALISM IN EUROPE: THE STATE OF THE ART

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The 'State of the Art' in the study of nationalism can be observed in the most recent published books and articles, in the existence of specialised journals devoted to the topic, and in the activities of professional and learned associations in the field. The related areas of ethnicity and racism, while to some extent distinct from nationalism, are often linked together in academic study (for example, in the journal *Ethnic and Racial Studies*).

There has been a marked increase in recent years in all these activities. This is mainly the result of the revival of nationalism in Europe and elsewhere since the 1960s. At first (in the European context), attention focused on the western democracies, mainly Britain, France, Belgium, and Switzerland, where sub-state nationalist movements and parties become prominent in electoral politics. Attention switched to Spain after the death of Franco, for there democratisation was accompanied by Catalan, Basque, and to some extent Galician nationalism. Finally, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the break-up of the Communist bloc revealed a whole set of nationalisms throughout the former Soviet Union and central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, nationalist developments in the older western democracies continued to attract attention. It should be noticed that most academics tended to follow rather than anticipate this upsurge in nationalism. There are several reasons for this. There has been a **predisposition** among most academics and academic methodologies to downplay nationalism in their intellectual scheme of things. In part, this was an **objection** to nationalism itself on moral grounds. It was seen as a **bad** thing: atavistic, primordial, regressive and anti-modern. It was also **inconsistent** with the intellectual bases of many academic disciplines or philosophies. It **threatened** the **sociological** view of human behaviour, by claiming and displaying primordial (i.e. non-sociological) foundations for human behaviour. It threatened the **philosophical** outlook of the Enlightenment by posing the **particularisms** of human society (identities from nations) rather than Enlightenment **universalism**, which had no need for nations. It

threatened **Marxism** by giving primacy to nation over class. It threatened **historians** by claiming eternal, or at least medieval, credentials for the nation. Hence it was «a historical» or «unhistorical». It threatened **political science** by upsetting the primacy or givenness of the state in international society, functionalism, modernisation theory, the diffusion of central power and values, political homogeneity and stability, class politics, globalisation, and other orthodoxies.

The result was that for most disciplines, nationalism was less important than other subjects, and it was inconvenient for them when nationalism appeared to be as important as the central concerns of these disciplines, by the force of events.

Thus there was very little interest shown in latent nationalism, except by some long-standing scholars such as Gellner, Hobsbawm and Smith in Britain and a few in other countries, especially the United States (Walker Connor, Joseph Rothschild, Milton Esman, Karl Deutsch, etc.) and France. The study of the nationality question and ethnography in the Soviet Union was never integrated with the study of nationalism in the west, and indeed contradicted it in some respects, especially in its denial of internal colonialism in the Soviet Union.

It was regime change and mass political behaviour (usually voting for nationalist parties, and/or referendums for independence, followed by actual secession) which made some scholars turn to the study of nationalism in the late 1980s for the first time. In other words, events came before much academic writing on the subject. That is not, however, peculiar to nationalism. Few Soviet scholars in the west, for example, predicted the break-up of the USSR in 1991. An explanation for the limited predictive power in the social sciences was given by Hobbes as early as the seventeenth century, and was stressed by some later philosophers. But this did not prevent Marx and some 'scientific' writers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries claiming predictive powers. It is important to remember that these predictions included the replacement of national divisions by class divisions, and the eclipse of nationalism and nation-states by cosmopolitanism. Today «globalisation» theory in sociology and political science continues the tradition of proclaiming the demise of nationalism and the nation-state. Thus the contemporary salience of nations and nationalism is contradictory to the predictions of the Marxist and materialist schools of intellectual inquiry, and scholars in these schools either avoid the subject altogether or put it firmly in an inferior place in their theories - often as mere **epiphenomena** or **false consciousness** - which have to be explained by «reality» based on economics, material self-interest, socioeconomic classes, globalisation, etc..

In methodological terms, the study of nationalism is divided into the descriptive-historical approach, and the scientific-theoretical-predictive approach. Those in the Marxist or social science tradition combine the historical and theoretical approaches. Within both these broad schools of thought are found those who espouse comparative study on the one hand and those who specialise in one case only on the other (some will extend to two, three or four cases). Each type of writing is accompanied by a justification for the approach adopted. For example, social scientists generally use a comparative method and seek theoretical explanations. That is because they subscribe to the view that «to compare is to understand», and that constructing theory is one of the main reasons for being «social scientists» rather than «Arts» scholars.

Historians tend to view cases as unique and do not usually attempt to propose a general theory (e.g. Breuilly, 1985, 2). But they do compare cases and periods. Breuilly and some other historians develop a taxonomy of nationalisms («a series of types which can be examined separately. After that one can seek to locate underlying similarities between the various types of nationalism»). In that sense they use a scientific **method** even if they do not produce scientific **conclusions** or **laws**.

I see constructing a taxonomy as **stage two** in scientific enquiry. **Stage one** is the definition of concepts and terms. This stage is in itself a major bone of contention and delay in theorising about nations and nationalism (cf. the term «nation» meaning sometimes ethnic group and sometimes state; one term with two different concepts). Both «nation» and «ethnic» as terms etymologically mean born or birth, one from a Latin root, the other from Greek, but that evokes biological or primordial connotations which for reasons mentioned before are anathema to most writers on nationalism, though they cannot avoid using the terms.

After a taxonomy, models are frequently found in the study of nationalism, as in economics and other subjects (**stage three**). Derived from engineering, a model shows **how** something works, but not **why**. So it is worth reminding model-builders that while a model is enlightening (but also contentious) it is not the same thing as a **theory**, which **explains** the object of study (**stage four**).

Theories come in various shapes and sizes, the most ambitious being general theory. A major difficulty in making a general theory or synthesis is the breadth of the subject and the numerous academic disciplines which deal with it. These range from 'natural sciences' such as biology, genetics and neurophysiology, through 'hard' social sciences such as psychology, linguistics and anthropology, to the more 'soft' disciplines such as philosophy, history, sociology, economics, and political science

(here, 'hard' and 'soft' relate to maximum and minimum claims to make scientific conclusions with predictive power). But the 'belles lettres' and journalists' contributions cannot be ignored, as they provide valuable evidence 'on the ground' (most writing on Bosnia is of this character at the moment).

Few would place themselves entirely in one mode when studying nationalism. Thus, biologists (or sociobiologists as some call themselves) such as E.O. Wilson tend to turn to social explanations as much as to biological ones for nationalism (but not for ethnocentrism), as does van den Berghe. But these writers do not ignore biology and psychology, as do many social scientists. Similarly, some writers on language explore neurophysiological explanations for language differences (Laponce, 1985). Social psychologists who write about national prejudice and racism derive their conclusions from laboratory experiments and surveys (see Aronson, 1992; Moghaddam, Taylor and Wright, 1993; Weinreich, 1988). These 'hard' science approaches to the study of nationalism, ethnocentrism and race are a feature of some of the most recent writings on the subject (e.g. van den Berghe, Reynolds, Shaw and Wong), and they use theories from sociobiology and social psychology. But most scholars still avoid a 'hard' science approach to the subject, and use the traditional historical or descriptive method.

If a general or integrated theory of nationalism is attempted (as Kellas, 1991), then all aspects of the subject must be considered. The difficulty in constructing such a theory is in pointing to what is really important, whether biological, intellectual or political, etc., and in identifying and measuring the variables involved. My approach was to point out discrete «building-blocks» from the most primordial to the most sophisticated or «developed», and to link these together in a causal chain. On top of that, 'necessary' and 'sufficient' conditions were posited for different aspects of nationalism (which incidentally includes both an ideology and a form of behaviour). At the end of all that, the ability to predict actual outcomes, at least in the short term, seems as elusive as ever. That is because the number of variables involved is so large, and their interaction is apparently a matter of a haphazard conjunction of events and circumstances which includes the behaviour of leaders, followers, voters, etc. whose actions may appear to be largely 'free' (i.e. not bound by laws). Nevertheless, the attempt to theorise seems essential to any advance in the systematic study of nationalism, and is in fact being adopted more widely (e.g. in Motyl [ed.], 1992).

Not all theory need be general or integrated, of course. **Middle-range theory** is possible; and also the construction of **hypotheses**, which can be tested against evidence. Examples of middle-range theory are Gellner's assertion of the relationship

between industrialisation and the rise of nationalism, Deutsch's social communication theory, and Hroch's three phases of nationalist movements in Europe in the nineteenth century. Hypotheses include the analysis of nationalist voting in Scotland and Wales as 'protest' voting by major party identifiers.

The generation of theorists influenced by Marx and the later Marxists such as Lenin, the Austro-Marxists, Rosa Luxemburg, and so on, certainly aspired to 'scientific' method and laws. Their failure to predict the enduring power of nationalism was no doubt the result of their economic determinism, with its emphasis on production and class divisions. This still pervades writings on nationalism by Marxists and neo-Marxists, but there is now no escaping the enduring power of nationalism and the corresponding weakness of class, though there is no clear relationship here. Some (but not all) Marxist and materialist writers have seen cultural and even biological factors as counting as much as purely economic ones (Nairn, Hechter, van den Berghe). But this has not resulted in a very coherent theory, and the conjunction of materialist theory and the study of nationalism is an uneasy one. Yet it is a powerful tradition, and many writers on nationalism are Marxists or former Marxists, or are economic determinists such as Gellner. Gellner links nationalism to industrialisation so that the former is functional to the latter, but the implications of this for contemporary nationalisms in Europe are not clear. For most in the old Marxist school (e.g. Hobsbawm), nationalism is an out-moded nineteenth century ideology and activity, whose day ought now to be done, or shortly will be. Whether this prediction comes true is keenly awaited by students of the subject.

Amongst the economic determinists are the '**dependency**' theorists, the '**internal colonialism**' school, and those who see nationalism as the result of '**uneven economic development**'. The first two relate nationalism to imperial and colonial strategies of ruling classes or elites at the centre, whose hegemony over dependent or colonised nations on the periphery produces a reaction amongst them in the form of nationalism. 'Uneven economic development' is a more impersonal working out of economic development, which nevertheless leads to nationalism in response. The internal colonial theory includes the analysis of the '**cultural division of labour**', a very fruitful method to examine how national groups intersect with class divisions. This combines the study of classes or elites with the study of nations. Where there is a hierarchy of nations along class or elite lines, there is a good chance that some form of nationalism will result. Such theories are relevant to explaining the national tensions within multinational states and the break-up of Empires (colonial; Austrian, Ottoman, Russian; France [Algeria] and Britain [Ireland]). But they do not necessarily provide the **main** explanation for such break-up, and they have signally failed in their prediction of the

break-up of Britain through Scottish and Welsh independence (Nairn, Hechter). Nor have these theories worked well, at least in their original form, in Catalonia, the Basque Lands, Flanders, Slovenia, etc., where there is an inverted form of internal colonialism, with a poor centre (economically, but not politically and socially) and a rich periphery. The later versions of these theories stress more the disjunction of economic, political and cultural resources rather than a simple 'dependency' structure or a hierarchical 'cultural division of labour' (see Hechter in Tiryakian and Rogowski, 1985). So a segmented polity and economy appears, in this analysis, to be a recipe for nationalism. But as we shall see, consociational and power-sharing theorists do not fear such segmentation, if handled properly.

Internal colonialism theory has not been as popular with political scientists as with sociologists, and is often rejected or ignored in many cases. That is because political scientists, as mentioned earlier, usually start with the «givenness» of the state and proceed to confuse the state with the nation. «Colonialism» to them is overseas, not internal, colonialism, so the internal affairs of the state are not seen as colonial. Thus while decolonisation is accepted and studied (the break-up of Empire), the break-up of the **state** is seen as dysfunctional, regressive, and unlikely. The break-up of the Soviet Union had to be recategorised as the break-up of Empire, not the collapse of internal colonialism. But this does not work too well for Ireland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia or Pakistan, all of whose colonial characteristics seem to be **internal**, not overseas. Marxists, too, seem curiously attached to the existing state, are uninterested in theorising about it and reluctant to contemplate an alternative to existing state boundaries. Thus Hobsbawm (but not Nairn) opposes the «Break-up of Britain».

A different form of economic theory is 'rational choice' and 'conflict resolution'. In this, actors follow their self-interest by choosing an appropriate strategy. Nationalism is that strategy in many cases. Thus Tiryakian and Rogowski (1985), Lijphart (1977, 1985), Horowitz (1985, 1991) and McGarry and O'Leary (1993) explain nationalism in terms of individual and collective choices in pursuit of self-interest. These can be influenced by constitutional structures, incentives of various kinds, arbitration, force, etc.

The practical implications of these theories can be seen very clearly in the politics of Northern Ireland, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina (in Europe), and in many cases outside Europe (notably South Africa, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Nigeria). Federal constitutions such as those of Belgium and Switzerland, and 'power-sharing' arrangements such as the successive Carrington, Vance-Owen, and Geneva (June

1993) plans for Bosnia are clearly related to this area of study in political science. These use the national units as a 'virtue based on necessity' in a culturally plural democracy. Unfortunately, the examples quoted also show how difficult it is for such schemes to succeed, and how obscure can be the conditions for success. Nevertheless, this is a fast-expanding area of study, with important usefulness for policy-makers. It should be said that some combination with social psychology and sociobiology theory would help to improve consociational theory and all these should interact with the mathematical modelling in the field of conflict resolution (a new journal in this area is the *Journal of Conflict Processes*, Vol.1 No. 1, October 1992, Liverpool, England). Why «rational» choices go back to nation and ethnicity is sometimes left unanswered, however.

To summarise the 'state of the art' in the study of nationalism:

1. More scholars than ever are researching and publishing on the subject, many of whom have turned from other subjects (such as the study of communism) because of the contemporary importance of nationalism in the politics of the countries they have specialised in. This applies also to specialists in western European countries and in the study of the European Community. In the latter, the study of regionalism ('Europe of the Regions') intersects with the study of nationalism in a rather ambiguous way. Regionalism seem to be like nationalism, but without the much-disliked features of ethnic prejudice and secessionism. Of course, these distinctions often collapse when actual examples are looked at.
2. The study of nationalism has broadened in scope to include 'hard sciences' such as (socio) biology, (social) psychology and conflict modelling, as well as continuing in the traditional 'soft' subjects such as history and philosophy. Each discipline brings with it its own mode of study and its own predispositions.
3. There are more attempts to produce theory: general and middle-range, and theory with a quantitative and predictive character.
4. Older (usually socioeconomic) theories, derived from Marx and sociologists continue to be used, and have been added to by writers such as Hechter, Gellner, Benedict Anderson, and Wallerstein. These relate factors of production, the control over the economy and empire, class and elites, to nations and nationalism. There has been a shift from viewing nationalism as 'regressive' (as in Marx) to seeing nationalism as 'progressive'(Nairn), or at least 'functional' to a modern industrial economy (Gellner) or democracy (Smith).

5. New theories, stressing culture and politics as well as economics, are associated with Hechter, Smith, Lijphart, and Horowitz. Reductionism to one or other of economics, politics and culture is always a danger: interaction on a basis of equality between the three seems more enlightening.
6. Strategies for political accommodation in divided societies have been increasingly studied, especially in works by Lijphart, Horowitz, and most recently, McGarry and O'Leary. These have clear policy implications (especially in South Africa, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Belgium, etc.).
7. The professional development of the subject is seen in the increased number of publications, conferences and research projects. Associations and committees have been established (e.g. IPSA's Research Committee on Politics and Ethnicity (Newsletter), the London School of Economics' ASEN (Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism) (*Bulletin*)). The journals *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (Britain) and the *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* specialise in the field.

Having said all that, however, it is true that the study of nationalism has occupied a minor position in the disciplines mentioned, and that these committees, associations and journals are few and small in comparison with many others in academic activity. Thus the professionalism of scholars of nationalism tends to derive from their more general status as philosophers, historians, sociologists and political scientists, etc., than from their writings on nationalism. That may change, since nationalism is 'centre-stage' in the contemporary world, and can no longer be ignored or minimised.

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Discussion

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After listening to the «rapporteur», Professor Kellas, it is my job to «discuss» the twelve papers presented in this section on «Historiography and Methodology in the Study of Nationalism». In fact, I will comment thirteen papers, since I feel that Professor Kellas' report really forms a part of the whole.

Like many another «discussant» before (and no doubt after) me, my first feeling is to doubt the whole format of academic gatherings, with their rhythms, rituals and forms of generating identity, both by unity and division. In any case, I am forced to balance between necessary hypocrisies, between the pretense that we have all read the papers presented in that weighty tome of «Pre-Acts» (which I increasingly prefer to think of as «Pre-Texts») and the need of all of us to feel mentioned, academic group identity being exceedingly prone to slights. Accordingly, I have the difficult task of being, at the same time, brief and entertaining, capable of linking ideas while giving individual papers their due, presumably by running them through my own sensibility, without coloring them too markedly with my own opinions. Frankly, I do not think it is possible to do this sensibly. Nevertheless I shall try to do my best.

I have decided -perhaps mistakenly- that it would of little use to attempt a paper-by-paper run-down of the studies presented by professors Beramendi, Brass, Breuilly, Díaz-Andreu, Cabrera Varela, Conversi, Hroch, Letamendia, Neuberger, Pérez-Agote, and Tyriakian (as well as Ugalde, unfortunately somewhat in passing). The simplest methodological decision facing any scientist is to decide whether he or she wants to discover the differences or the similarities within any set of phenomena. If I were to choose to treat the papers individually, besides offering really quite a dull presentation (or so I suspect from previous experience), I think I would also implicitly be stressing the differences between their approaches and interests.

Instead, I will try to develop what I find to be the main themes in common. I do this in part because the papers themselves, whatever their arguments against other schools or rival interpretations, all seemed to me to indicate a feeling of what I might

call «professional anticlimax». That is to say, most of the papers indicated a certain tiredness with the tension of academic debates on nationalism and hoped implicitly or explicitly for some kind of breakthrough, though admittedly most also did so from from clearly stated preferences for a given line of interpretation or approach.

Logically, given the nature of this section, the papers presented here were all in some way divided in their attention between what I would call subject and object. That is to say, they were interested in interpreting both nationalism (understood here as object) and its on-going and varied analysis (subject). Within this double focus, the papers collectively discussed (1) how to best understand what nationalism is; (2) how nationalism is analysed; (3) how to analyse the analysis of nationalism. Needless to say, however, the moment the reader peers outside the individual paradigm of each contribution, things begin to get murky.

In general, the field of «nationalism study» remains relatively unordered, not subject to any clear consensus between specialists. Numerous papers (such as those of Professors Kellas, Beramendi, Brass, Breuilly, Hroch, Tyriakian, and implicitly Professor Neuberger) all pointed to the difficulty of a general theory of nationalism. These texts expressed the need for some sort of broad design so we could better know what we were talking about and, probably more important, since we are all academics, *how* we are talking about it. These same papers tended to speak from a position of confidence in macro-theorization, an attitude that is scarcely surprising, given how many of the authors mentioned above have written important interpretative works. Whatever their likes or dislikes, they were willing to recognize that there are various schools, and that this fact of life should be confronted in some useful way. The rest of the papers in this section -Cabrera, Conversi, Díaz-Andreu, Letamendia, Pérez-Agote (with a broad range of methodologies, some more, some less, empirical)- tended towards the classic format of academic presentation: an axiomatic definition (in relation to a school or a specific authority), the logical derivation of a hypothesis, the development of this hypothesis through some manner of case study, and a satisfactory conclusion (at least to the author).

This said, there seemed to major distinctions in attitude. In particular, I would point to several latent «tensions» between the diverse contributions. The first of these would be that between empiricists and theorists. I would prefer to pose the distinction here in this way, rather than referring to the more common debate between generalists and specialists in case studies, although the differences in attitude or viewpoint between these papers also could be expressed in those terms. Nevertheless, the real point of divergence between the authors in this section was not the need for

comparative work (on which everyone seemed to agree), but again *how to compare*, to what extent and what kind of secondary sources to rely on, whether empirical studies or other theoretical or interpretative work.

Logically, this kind of implicit methodological confrontation also implied the usual professional tensions between historians and sociologists and anthropologists. Such tensions are too well known to merit dwelling on here, except to remark on the fact that while everyone increasingly gives verbal acknowledgement to interdisciplinary interactions, real mixing, as opposed to token allusions, in fact remains scant. Professor Beramendi's paper pointed specifically to this question. I would also cite several other aspects that I thought significant in this ongoing academic feud. I found Professor Díaz-Andreu's paper on the ideological and political underpinnings of archeology refreshing from an archeologist (needless to say this is the voice of my own prejudice as a political scholar). I also found that, while the historians were willing to read some of the work of the sociologists and anthropologists (always not enough, given the expansive levels of production), these did not return the compliment by alluding to major interpretative work by historians. Significantly, only historians mentioned Professor Hroch's important study (both were Spaniards and both cited Hroch only to express disagreement with any application of his model to Spanish or Galician, etc., circumstances, but that is besides the point), while the sociologists and anthropologists ignored it. At best, they tended to refer to our opening lecturer, the extremely well-known historian, Professor Hobsbawm.

I thought this significant, because it pointed to a major question lurking in many of the papers presented: *Just how far back do you go?* Political sociologists -either doing field work like Professor Cabrera or doing comparative case-studies, like Professor Conversi, or doing broad interpretative comparisons, like Professors Brass, Breuilly or Tyriakian- stay pretty close to the vital present. Implicitly, they exercise a kind of distinction which for once is clearer in Spanish than in English-speaking historiography. (English-language chronologies make a clumsy differentiation between Early and Late Modernity -as in «Early Modern History»-, while, in Spanish convention, the categorical vocabulary sharply distinguishes the «Contemporary» — no further back than the French revolution— from the «Modern», which recedes as far as the mid Fifteenth Century.) This accentuated «present-mindedness» leads to the insistence in the distinctive nature of Nineteenth and Twentieth Century social and political behavior, doubtlessly true in a great many, if not most, aspects, but also equally doubtlessly more connected to the past than is sometimes conceded. Therefore, the question becomes what finally is more significant, the degree of the break between «Modern» and «Contemporary» habits and attitudes or the continuities

over time? What is more motivating to the objects of study here, i.e. nationalists (and therefore to the subjects studying nationalist behavior): is it an «imaginaire», the longterm cultural construct in the anthropological sense that presumably informs any action? Or, rather, is power the basis, the ultimate goal of any social project at whatever level, be that power economic, political, social, sexual or whatever? The arguments between primordialists and statistes, as can be seen, go directly to the very metaphysical basis of the social sciences.

The problem «how far back?» is therefore the key to the debate between the so-called ethnicists (of which explicitly here Conversi and implicitly Letamendia) and other lines clearly represented by Brass, Breuille or Tyriakian. Among historians the battle also rages: researchers of «Contemporary» Europe are usually disposed to defend the frontier of 1789 from any attack, while «Modernists» are often busy sappers, mining «present-minded» certainties with earlier examples. Nevertheless, I suspect it is in great measure a false one, since both continuities and breaks have their differing significance. This is, I fear, a peculiar «chicken-egg» problem that has bedeviled the understanding of nationalism from the beginning of the Nineteenth Century onwards, and one that depends to a large degree on the axioms of varying professional methodologies.

Going further, the question of time posits that of space. How tangible are the relationships (if I can phrase nationalism as such) that we are studying? Are patterns of consciousness (such as interest Hroch, Cabrera or Pérez-Agote) substantial only insofar as they are incarnated in institutions? Then what or which institutions?

Many of these difficulties, I think, have to do with the simple methodological fact that the simultaneous study of a same object can produce extremely differing results depending on how, when and where you approach it. As final results in the social sciences are hugely conditioned by axioms, how, where and when you go in is very likely to be how, where and when you come out. Add corporative self-identity, as well as the tendency we all have to discard as alleged «variables» all those facts that are not germane to our own model. The consequence is that we find hard battle lines drawn, even without the wide world of «real» politics slamming away on a daily basis, somewhere out there beyond the confines of scholarly argument. As a result, the call for interdisciplinary study, to make a facetious analogy, tends often to be reminiscent of the stalinist appeal for «unity through the base», in which the socialist masses were to join the communist unions, leaving behind their unworthy leadership. Each discipline calls for its rivals to lay down doctrinal arms and become sensible, and accordingly join the collective pursuit of knowledge on «neutral» terrain. The truth

is that «discipline-building» is as visceral and territorial and ideological as the «nation-building» we all wish to investigate, and probably not that different.

Clearly, many of the concepts we are using simultaneously have different meanings seen from different disciplines. Professor Hroch alluded to this implicitly and Professor Neuberger demonstrated it at length on the key term «self-determination», with considerable wit. Our epistemology, therefore, has a tendency to be like -to use a familiar visual paradox- a game of Chinese boxes or Russian dolls, with always yet another meaning within the last. This idea is implicit in the paper of Professor Cabrera, and it returns to the problem of the confusing lines between subject and object, but in a different way (something also indicated by Professor Pérez-Agote).

The ambiguity of our language leads to two other tensions visible in the range of papers presented. The first of these would be the tension between nationalists and non-nationalists. This is not altogether visible here (at least in this section), as the selection process of the congress itself has tended to exclude the more exaggerated of nationalist spokesmen within academia, but the force of this not-so-hidden political confrontation infuses the entire proceedings. In any case, nationalists tend to argue the «exceptional» nature of their cause, and use this exceptionalism as a means towards special-pleading and legitimation, while non-nationalists try to isolate nationalism as a sort of sociological «exception», purportedly distinct from the social movements that have dominated the last two centuries. Once again, at least in my understanding, we have to face up to the inherent confusion between subject and object in our field of study.

The more abstract (or ideological) tension between nationalists and non-nationalists is closely connected, in both positive and negative ways, to another, which may be the most clearly visible professional tension here, in these papers, and I would say in this congress. This is the conflict of attitude between «the locals» and «the international circuit». «The locals» would be those professionals in out-of-the-way universities, whose studies must deal with specific social or political conflicts rooted in determined nationalist problems that surround them in their daily lives. In general terms, they labor without recourse to the comparative resources and the interpretative material with which those in more important, usually English-speaking, institutions (what I can best define as «the international circuit» for their domination of the mechanisms of academic exchange) do their daily work. However, in compensation, «local» investigators are right on top of the material, and they proudly delight in discovering all the slips and errors of detail in the broader, comparative studies done by «international» scholars; the latter, on the other hand, tend to regard «local»

research as mere source material, lacking in conceptual depth. But it would be a serious mistake to conflate these two tensions -nationalists vs. non-nationalists, «locals» vs. «internationals»- into one. The «locals» can be as critical of the dangers of nationalist contagion in arguments as those on the «international circuit»: one only need compare the comments of Professors Beramendi and Brass. Nonetheless, one also must be aware that they are directing themselves with very different tools to different audiences.

By different tools I mean that an investigator on nationalism in a Spanish university -this is only a ready example of a «local» academic context- does not have easy access to the publications, both books and serials, that those on the «international circuit» commonly use to communicate with each other. The largest library in Barcelona, where I live, has 1 million volumes; the largest library in Spain, the National Library in Madrid, has 3.5 million; Columbia University, where I studied, has 5 million; Harvard University has 10 million; the Library of Congress in Washington D.C. has 18 million (these are all approximate figures for bound volumes based on statistics for the early 1980's, which nevertheless serve to give a sense of present orders of magnitude). Furthermore, publication in Spanish (not to mention in Catalan or Galician or, for the most extreme example, in Basque) has an immediate ceiling of circulation. Until the generation of young scholars now in their late twenties, French rather than English was the foreign language of choice for Spaniards; few handle German comfortably. All this means very definite patterns of information access but also very constrained market options. One only need compare the sources used by Cabrera or Pérez-Agote with those of Brass or Tyriakian or Conversi.

Thus, the limitations of access to broader intellectual trends is a necessary point to bear in mind when one compares the tone of those writing for the «international circuit», a bit on the rebound after the great orgy of theoretical work in the 1970's and 80's, with the modest discovery of the joy of theory expressed by the Spanish authors in this section after two decades of empirical tasks in a rather restrictive marxist vein. The «local» market options are even crueler: in Spain, over 50,000 books were published in 1991, in a country of 39 million inhabitants, of which over 51% do not buy a book a year, in an editorial economy without an export dimension since the collapse of Latin American consumption in the mid-1970's, and which also lacks an effective public library system. As a result, Spanish (and, even more, Catalan or Galician) readers or bookbuyers are perforce nationalist consumers, since cultural consumption in a narrow market defined by overproduction is in large measure a search for identity and social superiority. In this context, non-nationalism easily is turned into antinationalism, and it becomes virtually impossible to stand outside

debates of the meanest and most provincial sort over daily political options and slightly more longterm group alignments.

Finally, then, this alternative of viewpoints, with studies drawn up aimed at the same audience as the propaganda of the nationalists themselves or presented to a specialized readership of international academics, poses a series of methodological problems. In the first place, the alternative highlights the relative costs of outsider sources (e.g. *Conversi*) as opposed to insider sources (e.g. *Letamendia*). Of the examples cited, one makes silly statements («hundreds of executions»), while the other is lost in a welter of references that is only clear from within, and remains meaningless from without. Accordingly what does one compare? Movements in State terms and therefore inter-State comparisons, as do Brass, Breuilly or Tyriakian, or sub-State movements, making therefore regional parallels, as do Hroch or *Conversi*? Secondly, the same alternative of the «local» monopoly of details versus the «international» monopoly of theoretical nuance underlines the problematical relevance of public and private functions, not just for the nationalist «objects» under study, as Pérez-Agote indicates, but also for the scientific «subjects», for the observers themselves and how they present their data, to what kinds of publics, for what kinds of rewards. Lastly, in third place, to contrast the social role of nationalism with that of the students of the same forces us to deal with an extremely difficult question in political ethics: what justifiably can be preserved in a society and what cannot? Some kind of preservation is, after all, the basis of all nationalist arguments. This moral quandary has been ignored, to my understanding, at great cost to clarity in the social sciences and in political thinking in general.

All the great social movements of modern times, and probably always, are as much about what they want to keep intact as what they want to change. Ultimately, this preoccupation with conserving basics is as true for Marxist socialism or Communism as for nationalism, or else the discourse of creating a new man around the figure of the proletarian would make no sense. Simply, the idealized aspects of society that are isolated and projected to create the utopia or the «imagined community» of each movement are not exactly the same. The polemical needs of, first, liberalism, and, then, the working-class movement, successfully sold the idea that only the «others» -the aristocrats or the bourgeoisie- were «conservative». Once one realizes that all movements want advantages, and these mean both alterations and defenses, then one can premise what are the ethical bases for preservation, especially since the development of productive forces has finally presented as unselfish and as enlightened the need to «conserve» (as in «conservationism»).

Ergo, is nationalism conservative (i.e. bad) or conservationist (i.e. good)? Again, obviously there is no clear answer. The badness in conservatism lies in the maintenance of exclusive power relationships which at another level become identity, while the preservation of identity quickly need to express itself by means of relations of power if it is to succeed at all. Several authors touched upon the problem lightly by dealing with the question of active legitimation (Hroch, Pérez-Agote). Letamendia, as is natural in terms of his background in active nationalist politics, posed the problem with a sort of unconscious bluntness, since he does not question the right to preserve the national *certain je ne sais quoi*.

Two more personal observations, leading to a close. I was taken with a throw-away remark on the role of youth in Professor Tyriakian's paper, precisely because that is what I am working on (though not here). I have not cited Professor Ugalde's paper because I have not received it, but her absence leads me to think about the disproportion of males to females in this Congress.*

Is nationalism more a male preoccupation than a female one? As derived from testing in anthropology and social psychology (and with which primate ethologists often are willing to agree), the classic supposition is that human males are more interested in abstract reasoning and are more competitive than females, while females are more preoccupied with relationships and the requirements of these. I shall not claim this idea as valid, but rather cynically utilize it as a starting point for reflection. The first question, therefore, is what is the relation between nationalism and gender? Is nationalism, understood either as identity or as power, more a masculine obsession, while women worry about the networks behind male representations?

The second reflection I would pose, perhaps somewhat contradictory to the first, derives from the idea that nationalism always sees itself as an exception in the face of a given situation. Externally a State nationalism will do so, and internally subnationalisms will do the same. Equally, nationalism was seen by both liberal and socialist movements as an exception to the proper flow of History, selfishness in the

* With great delay, after the Congress, I have received Professor Ugalde's paper. I have chosen to maintain her text outside my remarks, so as not to have to do too much rewriting. Nonetheless, I would like to comment briefly on her contribution, given its interest on the subject alluded to here. Professor Ugalde's argument is abstract and explicitly oriented towards «discipline building»: in the beginning is gender; nationalism is a «specific frame» for the expression of gender; consequently, the relation gender-nationalism is a useful area of study. However, in discussing this relation, her paper does not remark on more than *male* Basque nationalism theorizing on the role of women, never mentioning independent female attitudes.

face of the drive towards collective generosity. I already have commented on this above. But is it not possible to consider that, on the contrary, the mental patterns of nationalist exclusion/inclusion are the real characteristic of all modern social movements, especially visible after the collapse of the ostensible historical discourse of socialism with the disappearance of the Soviet Union in 1991? In other words, are contemporary feminist or gay politics not «nationalist» in their pattern of organization and symbolic dissemination? There is the same predisposition to argue social roles from allegedly «unarguable» realities, the same logical demand for «self-determination» as a result of self-discovery, the same ambition to establish a new type of «community» based on the new group values, among other common characteristics. Indeed, were the old working-class movements truly as different and opposite from nationalism as they claimed? The hard distinction, in any event, is derived far more from strict written ideology than practical (or even unconscious) forms of behavior. Sex (or sexual behavior), class, or ethnic tradition are all real conditioners of behavior, different if intensely interrelated. Elevated to the status of intellectual categories, however, they become mere patterns of ideological construction. Just how different are they as categories?

Actually, no one need take my reflections too seriously. I suppose that all my insistence on the ambiguous relations between subjects and objects in the study of nationalism simply boils down to the perception that what much of the papers I have read say about nationalists and nationalism could be applied in some ways to the contradictions between the the students of nationalism themselves.

The papers themselves, in various and very interesting ways, point to the need for a coherent working paradigm, relatively flexible, not directly derived from workaday politics, nor too closely honed to specific disciplines, but able to permit the free play of extremely varied insights. The demand for such an intellectual space will doubtlessly grow with the increase of work in the field. For the moment, the best thing we can do is argue about it.



ETHNOS VERSUS POLIS? ON METHOD AND NATIONALISM¹

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In his book *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Anthony D. Smith (1986, pp. 7-13, & 210-212) divided scholars of the national question into two broad tendencies: a) the «primordialists» or «Parmenideans», who consider the nation to be a very old historic and «natural» reality, the basic characteristics of which are almost constant *as nation*; and b) the «modernists» or «Heraclitans» who see it as contingent, changing and restricted largely to the political societies of the last two centuries. The first posture inevitably places the nation in the Braudelian *longue durée*, which means endowing it with an essence which is unchanging, or, at the very least, one which changes only very slowly. This implies to suppose that in real history there is a fundamental coincidence of nation and non-political group identity, and consequently the equation «Nation = Ethnos» becomes the cornerstone of the theory. The second position, on the contrary, sees the nation merely as a modern political artefact, as the specific and largely dominant form of political community in recent history, and therefore separates it analitically.

If we accept this dual classification, the old confrontation of «ethnos versus polis», which has been present right from the beginning in the concepts of nation which have operated in the various types of nationalisms, would be something more than an aspect of their ideologies: scholars as a whole would have internalized this dipole reproducing it unaltered on the theoretical plane, as if Leopold von Ranke's venerable *dictum* «wie es eigentlich gewesen» —the ulterior banner of 19th century positivism, continued to play an active, though unnoticed, role in the work of writers who would be offended, and probably rightly so, if they were labelled as positivists.

¹ This paper is the first stage of the task of historiographic revision and evaluation of theories on Nationalism which I began in the autumn of 1992 while at the European University Institute (Florence) with the aid of a «Salvador de Madariaga» grant from the Spanish Government.

* Translated: Simon Magennis.

Nevertheless, it is clear that all of us, on tackling the study of nationalisms, must take a stand, one way or the other, on this question. Despite that, I believe that it is worth making two points concerning Smith's classification. The first is that there exist methodological approaches which are difficult to reconcile with either of these two stereotypes. Smith himself, in the work cited, attempted a third approach, although unsuccessfully in my opinion, as he did not really succeed in breaking away from a fundamental primordialism.² Others had tried long before him. For example, those who, within the framework of the renewal of western Marxism, proceeded to liberate themselves by degrees from Stalin's canonical definition and its methodological consequences until eventually they applied an *analytical concept* of nation which was almost totally emancipated from the *ideological concepts* of nation set out in nationalist discourse.³ The second point is that from *the point of view of method*, it is somewhat outmoded to consider the ontological status of the nation as central, although that problem nevertheless continues to be of importance as a component of the object of study.

² Smith (1986) formulated his third way thus:

... While we can no longer regard the nation as a given of social existence, a «primordial» and natural unit of human association outside time, neither can we accept that it is a wholly modern phenomenon, be it the «nervous tic of capitalism» or the necessary form and culture of an industrial society (p.3)...

although

... 'objective' factors like population size, economic resources, communication systems and bureaucratic centralization obviously play an important role in creating the environment of nations (or, more usually, states, which then help mould nations), they tell us little about the distinctive qualities and character of the national community that emerges (p.3)...

This «character» of national community, the true defining factor (a return to *Volksgeist*?) must be sought elsewhere, in «the more permanent (?) cultural attributes of memory, value, myth and symbolism» (p.3). In short it is to be found in the *ethnie* or pre-modern «collective cultural units» (p.13). Thus *ethnie* is a necessary though not sufficient condition for nation:

... If there was no model of past ethnicity and no pre-existent *ethnie*, there could be neither nations nor nationalism. There would only be states and *étatisme* imposed from above, a very different phenomenon (...) Modern conditions and trends have undoubtedly been responsible for spreading the idea and model of the nation as the sole legitimate political unit, but they needed the general inspiration of ethnicity as a model of socio-cultural organisation and particular instances of strategic *ethnie*, to bring nations and nationalisms into existence. Without *ethnie* and ethnicity there could be neither nations nor nationalism (p.214)...

In fact, unless we interpret terms such as «collective cultural units» in some rather unusual manner, it is virtually impossible to reconcile these general formulations with the *actual* historic evolution of the national question in cases, which apparently are not relevant to Prof. Smith's model, such as Spain, the United States and France or indeed one need look no further than Prof. Smith's own country. In any case, it comes as no surprise that other writers place him without further ado among the primordialists. See, for example, P. BRASS (1991, pp. 8-9).

³ See M. RODINSON (1958), P. VILAR (1962, I, pp. 15-45; 1978, pp. 279-306; 1980, pp. 143-200), E. TERRAY (1973), R. RIBÓ (1974, 1977a, 1977b), J. SOLÉ TURA (1975, 1976), I. MOLAS (1977) and R. MAIZ (1984). These authors' theoretical innovations are analysed in more detail in J.G. BERAMENDI (1987, I, pp. 33-91; II, pp. 43-67). For the treatment of the national question in Marxism, see M. J. AUBET (1977), W. CONNOR (1984), M. R. DAVIS (1972), G. HAUPT et al (1974) and R. MUNCK (1986).

This, of course, is not the only question of method which is worthy of attention, but it has always been one of the most controversial. For that reason we will emphasize it by placing it at the beginning of this paper.

Quantitative growth and qualitative development in research into nationalisms and related processes has been clearly evident over the last few decades. The persistence of these phenomena ever since the great revolutions at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th, and above all their intensification, universalization and growing diversification - which has reached a genuine climax in the present day - has undoubtedly contributed to a parallel growth in interest, on the part of experts from ever more diverse disciplines, in describing, analysing and explaining them. What was initially, and up until the Great War, the almost exclusive territory of nationalist ideologists, essayists and historians has continued to widen its list of devotees until the point where today it is a meeting ground, though not always either peaceful or cooperative, of historians, sociologists, political scientists, jurists, anthropologists, psychologists, semiologists and so on. The crop is a unspecifically specialized literature, which is impossible to manage both due to its heterogeneousness and its volume.

This avalanche of writing has ushered in major progress in knowledge about an object of study which has grown and continues to grow relentlessly. We have come along way from the time when self-affirming discourse and pragmatic-historicist or positivist historiographies, or variations thereon, dominated. Although, a not insignificant part of present day work remains firmly anchored, despite surface changes, in these latitudes, another ever increasing part has clearly moved on. Thanks to this advance, not only has the quality and quantity of information available about every case increased, but a *more rounded perception* of the various dimensions of the phenomenon has emerged. Furthermore, far greater attention is being paid to the interrelationships, and to effect of the structures and processes of change in the setting; the necessary analytical concepts have been developed, new research methods and techniques have been introduced and numerous hypotheses and theories have been advanced with greater or lesser degrees of success.⁴

However, the growing speed of these changes has not been accompanied by a similarly rapid growth in the development and consolidation of an *ad hoc* scholarly

⁴ For the most recent theories and schools see A. D. SMITH (1971), D. PETROSINO (1991), J. G. KELLAS (1991, pp. 34-50), J. BREUILLY (1993, pp. 404-424), and somewhat more restricted in scope, J. REX and D. MASON (eds) (1986).

community which, on the strength of the accumulation and treatment of the empirical data, would be constituted as such by working out in common a conceptual corpus and a methodology. In other words to elaborate a unique, coherent *epistemological code* which would enable internal dialogue, the homologation of concepts and techniques and the testing of theories and hypotheses at a level in line with the quantitative growth mentioned earlier.⁵ This delay, of a kind all too frequent in the social sciences and even more so when their approaches to the reality under study have direct political repercussions, is particularly striking in the case at hand. It is undoubtedly true that the situation has improved somewhat in recent years thanks to the proliferation of meetings and conferences, and to the promotion of interdisciplinary exchanges as well as to the creation of certain specialist journals and associations. However, there are still major deficiencies. The fact is, we are still seeing a spasmodic, alluvial cognitive process in which partially incompatible theoretical instruments, from related but relatively closed disciplines, are juxtaposed with extremely little integration, resulting in a situation where a positive exchange of ideas on theory continues to be very difficult. This means that our work, as a body, is more vulnerable than others to complaints such as rash transplant of paradigms, the survival of tacit pragmatisms, trivializing fashions, clever talk disguised as serious theory, the abuse of inductive inference, forced analogies and morphologies in place of genuine comparative analysis and, in sum, conceptual imprecision and terminological polysemy leading all too frequently to sterile logomachies rather than potentially fertile debate.⁶

⁵ On reading the preliminary version of this paper at the conference, some colleagues took this passage to mean that I was proposing a new academic discipline, some kind of «Nationology». Nothing could be further from my mind. Obviously, it is one thing for a variety of disciplines to concern themselves with the same object of study - something which in our case is not only irreversible but also is desirable - it is quite another to do so in such a way as to make collaboration extremely difficult. In genetics and its applications, for example, biologists, biochemists, doctors, vets, engineers and so on, can, as they fulfil the prerequisites mentioned, form an *ad hoc* community of scholars to tackle individual problems or sets of problems without losing their own disciplinary identity. In this way they can make progress more rapidly.

⁶ In this context in 1972, W.CONNOR (1994, pp. 39-57) listed twelve «reasons for this wide gap between theory and reality»:

... 1) Confusing interutilization of the key terms, nation and state (...) 2) A misunderstanding of the nature of ethnic nationalism and a resulting tendency to underrate its emotional power (...) 3) An unwarranted exaggeration of the influence of materialism upon human affairs (...) 4) Unquestioned acceptance of the assumptions that greater contacts among groups lead to greater awareness of what groups have in common, rather than of what makes them distinct (...) 5) Improper analogizing from the fact that increases in communications and transportation help to dissolve cultural distinctions among regions within what is fundamentally a one-culture state, to the conclusion that the same process will occur in situations involving two or more distinct cultures (...) 7) The assumption that assimilation is a one-directional process (...) 8) Interpretation of the absence of ethnic strife as evidence of the presence of a single nation (...) 9) Improper regard for

The time has arrived, in my opinion, where it would be advisable to dedicate greater effort to placing some methodic order on the chaotic proliferation of disparate approaches. Above all it is necessary to attack the problem of «theories» which are presented as being generally applicable and even as capable of making prediction, to an extent that is totally - and unacceptably - disproportionate considering the weakness of their empirical bases and the quality of the underlying analytical model.

The present paper is not intended to offer a magic formula to solve these problems with a stroke of the pen, nor does it wish to impose yet another «theory» on this panorama. It is merely proposed to initiate a systematic criticism of what I consider to be the major sources of these problems and to discuss their principle consequences for the conceptual operations on which the analytical and explicative models, most in vogue in our field, are based. Thus it is hoped that this will be a small contribution to the construction of a more effective *common method* for the study of nationalisms. To this end I have restricted my comments to those general methodological questions which in my view are the most significant; lack of space prevents me from engaging in detailed commentary on the various «schools.»

I. Some sources of problems

The general problems of method which I mention below have a variety of causes; some of these are common to all knowledge aims while others are specific to the social sciences and there are yet others which arise with particular intensity in our case. I will look only at those which I consider to be most important.

The nature of the object

This is of course the most universal wellspring. In historiography in general, and on the question of nationalisms in particular, observed reality presents particular

the factor of chronological time and intervening events when analogizing from assimilationist experiences prior to «the age of nationalism» (...) 10) Improper regard for durative time by failing to consider that attempts to telescope «assimilationist time», by increasing the frequency and scope of contacts, may produce a negative response (...) 11) Confusing symptoms with causes (...) 12) The predispositions of the analyst....

These methodical reflections are extremely meritorious, especially if we take into account the period when they were made. Nevertheless, his list is not, in my opinion, systematic as it mixes true questions (eight) of method with others which are merely reflections of the fact that not everyone accepts his particular theory. Furthermore it is incomplete as it does not discuss problems which arise from the delimitation of the object, from dimensional reductionism or from prior discrimination of factors.

intrinsic difficulties which, almost always in combination with other causes, explain certain deficiencies which I will discuss in the second part of this paper.

To the relative singularity and rapid mutability of the object which is history must be added three other characteristics in our case :

- a) we are concerned with a type of phenomena which are extraordinarily multiform and heterogeneous, which display political and social valencies which are very variable and changeable both over space and time.⁷ This increases the probability of perceiving false continuities and discontinuities and renders difficult the possibility of reaching an accord over an epistemologically suitable definition and delimitation of the object;
- b) ideas and feelings constitute an not unimportant component of the object. As always when this happens, the cognitive *feedback* which is intense in all social sciences, is maximized. This has very negative repercussions; on, for example, the capacity to distinguish the idea which is the object of study from the concept which is the tool of research, thus impeding an efficient conceptualization of the reality being studied;
- c) the researcher's ideological and emotional proximity to, if not the identification with, what is being investigated is also at a peak - something which has led to all sorts of pragmatisms and crypto-pragmatisms.

Multi-disciplinarity

The way in which the community of scholars studying nationalisms has come about means that it is by definition multi-disciplinary, however at least to date, it has been one which has been severely lacking in inter-disciplinarity. Calls for true inter-disciplinarity have become almost a cliché and are born out of the (quite correct) conviction that the best way forward and the best means of optimizing resources in this field is to overcome this watertightness by the testing and integration of methods and results. This however, requires systematic interdisciplinary communication *sine non qua* . Unfortunately, the latter is still merely incipient. Lack of understanding, ignorance and even mutual contempt continue to be the rule rather than the exception.

⁷ P. ALTER (1985, p.5) insisted quite rightly on this characteristic. Nonetheless, this diversity does not prevent us from regarding it as *one* object of study, as the whole phenomenon of nationalisms constitutes, in reality, a continuous network of interrelated phenomena which have a common set of specific characters.

Thus a large proportion of historians are unaware of the work or conclusions of those who do research on the present. They do not appreciate that this temporal immediacy, despite certain drawbacks, offers opportunities denied to those who cannot observe their subject *in vivo*, and that it can enrich their theoretical armoury and open up perspectives on method and theme which would otherwise be likely to remain closed. Instead they tend to justify their comfortable ignorance, scorning the work of sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists and others as being either empty theorizing or irrelevant to their work. This explains, for example, the delay in incorporating terms such as ethnicity, identity, social communication and so on, into the vocabulary of historiography. More importantly the astonishing tardiness in confronting the study of the social bases and implications of nationalisms, even paradoxically, by historians with Marxist leanings.⁸ The same can be said about the concept of *Nation-building*, not in the sense of taking on the theories of modernization in which it was used originally, but rather in the sense that the process of nationalization of societies ought to be one of the broad lines of research in our field. Eugen Weber's (1976) work, which was a genuine breakthrough, remains to be matched by work of a similar quality in most countries. Similar problems of lack of communication exist even among historians themselves. Language barriers, or simply laziness, frequently prevent researchers in one country from benefitting, within a reasonable timeframe, even from the progress made in neighbouring countries resulting in scandalous gaps in up to date information in large areas of this field in widely circulated reviews of the literature. Not even the work of the most famous and respected historians is faultless in this respect. Incredible as it seems in this age of the global village and e-mail, this is nonetheless true. Doubters need only check the bibliographies and footnotes of the relevant books over the last fifteen years to see that this is so.

What goes for historians is also true of sociologists and political scientists. The belief among them that historians merely «describe» or «narrate» events is still very widespread. Thus in their eyes historians are intrinsically incapable of anything but this modest function of collecting and bringing together the raw material of the process of production of knowledge, the more complex phases of which (conceptualization, analysis, theorizing) are reserved for those who lay claim to them.⁹ This vision, which

⁸ These deficiencies are looked at in more detail, especially with regard to the historiography of Spanish nationalism, in J. G. BERAMENDI (1984, 1992). See also the later, and more complete, study by X. M. NUÑEZ-SEIXAS (1993).

⁹ This conviction is as old as sociology itself. It is to be found already in A. Comte and later in E. Durkheim to mention just two important examples. Today it is not usually found in explicit form, but continues as an undercurrent. See for example M. HECHTER (1989).

was justifiable until the 1930s, can today only be interpreted in terms of ignorance of the most recent advances in historiography. This naturally hampers those who should benefit from certain perspectives and tools which can only be acquired from a continuous study of the past. Some examples of this would be; the genetic approach, and the sensibility towards change and its varying rhythms in time and space; the structure-conjuncture dialectic in non-economic ambits; the perception of all human wholes as internally complex and dynamic; or caution, sometimes excessive, in the face of hasty generalizations. Furthermore, the lack of awareness of not only the data «collected» by historians, but above all ignorance of their analyses and interpretations leads other professionals into make glaring errors when, obliged to take into account past phases of current phenomena, they explore backwards across the historical continuum using theoretical tools and research strategies which are totally unsuitable in this territory.¹⁰

It is clear, therefore, that each and everyone of us must take Michael Mann's (1986, pp. 9-10) wise council into full account in our work:

...Sociological theory cannot develop without knowledge of history. Almost all the key questions of sociology are concerned with processes which take place over time; social structure is an inheritance of particular pasts, and a large proportion of our «sample» of complex societies exists only in history. However, the study of history is equally impoverished without sociology. If historians ignore the theory of how societies function, they remain imprisoned in the clichés of their own societies...

The prediction castration complex or the Popperian fallacy

The fascination for the exactness and apparent infallibility of the so-called experimental sciences and in particular for their ability to predict is a very old complaint among the humanities and the social sciences, as is the mimesis which it

¹⁰ E. GELLNER (1983, PP. 63-64) did so when, ignoring the numerous historical studies which allow us a much more complex, and more finely gradational vision of the socio-economic, political and national transformations which came about in Europe in the XIXth century, severely over-generalized with what may be an acceptable reconstruction for the USA, when he claimed that when societies industrialise not only «are» «the old structures» «dissipated» but that so too are the old loyalties and the criteria for social stratification, something which does not, in fact, always happen. A. D. SMITH (1986, p.129) takes it upon himself to classify Cataluña among the «fully fledged nations» and Galicia among the «ethnic communities» without any specific bibliographic support beyond two articles regarding some partial aspects of Basque and Catalan nationalism and a general history of Spain and Portugal by Atkinson published in 1960!. I for one do not accept that the national question in Spain is without relevance in our field.

induced and which it is still inducing. The corresponding narrow vision of science on the part of some theoreticians and «hard» scientists also significantly predates Popper. However, we have chosen Popper as an example because the influence his work is still very much alive.¹¹

What is certain is that more than a few colleagues suffer from what, to paraphrase Freud, might be called a prediction castration complex. This is the result of an uncritical acceptance of what is, and what ought to be, «real» science. In order to overcome this apparently serious deficiency they react by going to extreme pains to demonstrate that it is not inevitable, that knowledge of social phenomena can take the same form as that of non-human realities. This attitude is closely related to the vice which is the opposite of positivist descriptivism: namely theorization without sufficient empirical foundation, based on inductive inference, on extrapolation by analogy or on pure speculation.¹²

This remedy is, however, worse than the ailment. Unless we twist the meaning of the word until it means what we ourselves have decided it should mean, science in general is not a particular *type of knowledge* but rather a *method* or set of principles and procedures for achieving, testing and developing knowledge. This is, or should be, apparent to everyone. In principle there is basically one single method, although there are an extraordinary number of variations on the theme across the various sectors.¹³ The application of these common principles to qualitatively different realities gives rise not only to specific methodologies, but also to forms of scientific knowledge which are qualitatively different both in form and content, but not in regard to their testability, improvability, or relative veracity. Absolute predictive knowledge, if such capacity exists for any reality, is only possible for repetitive or replicatable phenomena.

¹¹ K. POPPER's (1957) argument about the gnosiological status of history and by extension about other social sciences is too complex (and well-known) to summarize here. However, I would like to recall two of the central points: only is «theoric» science which can be able for the testable prediction; as history obviously is lacking in this characteristic, it does not have any potential for theory beyond the trivial:

...We cannot, therefore, predict the future course of human history. This means that we must reject the possibility of a *theoretical history*; that is to say, a historical science that would correspond to *theoretical physics* (p. vii)...

Ergo:

...I wish to defend the view, so often attacked as old-fashioned by historicists, that *history is characterised by its interest in actual, singular, or specific events, rather than in laws and generalizations*. (p. 143)...

¹² A fairly representative example of this attitude is the «new deductive theory of group solidarity» in M. HECHTER (1989). See also M. LEVI and M. HECHTER (1985).

¹³ Concerning the basic unity of scientific method, see K. POPPER (1957, pp.130-143). M. BUNGE (1969, pp. 24-38) talks in a similar vein about the unity of strategy and diversity of tactics in the sciences.

Knowledge which predicts probability, and knowledge which finds out the *whats* and the *whys* of things, is on the other hand possible in every case, although the degrees of probability, the means of verification and the speed with which theories are developed varies according to the nature of the «causality» and the complexity and variability of each object. To claim that only the first type of knowledge is «scientific» in the radical sense of this word, is the same as claiming the, equally radical, unknowability of any reality which is not cyclical, or which cannot be reproduced in the laboratory (and not just of the past or present of humanity), a claim which to my way of thinking is an unacceptable epistemological fallacy.

That which should be of concern to research workers in any area is, firstly, that their work is consistent with the general principles of scientific method and secondly, the development of a specific method appropriate to the needs of their field which will enable satisfactory solutions to be found for the problems associated with this object of study. The actual form of the results themselves is the least important of problems.

Pragmatisms and Crypto-pragmatisms¹⁴

It is well known that pragmatism in its various forms has been one of the major constants in historiography, right from its beginnings in classical Greece up to the 20th century. It has also been a constant in philosophy, as well as in all the other social sciences from the points where these became independent disciplines.

It was inevitable that there would be a strong *nationalist pragmatism* in our field, which is why the demands for the recognition, or defence, of the own nation - almost always linked with an attack on, or a denial of other nations - excessively condition the task of the academic. Sometimes that attitude took on the appearance of a generalized «anti-nationalism» which was basically almost always simple opposition to the nationalisms of *other* nations or to types of nations different from one's own. For our present purposes these amount to the same thing.

¹⁴ Obviously, the term «pragmatism» is used here in its historiographic sense, introduced by Polibius, and not in its common (realism, practicality), legal or philosophical senses. Therefore, it may be applied to all ways of writing and interpreting history which have non-scientific goals (ethic, political, religious, and so on).

While this pragmatism is clearly in retreat in the academic world today, traces of its past omnipresent influence may still be seen in some debates,¹⁵ and even today we still hear certain pleas in defence of its value and inevitability, such as the recent example from Balcells (1993). Thus, although we may consider it to be methodologically surpassed, the old nationalist pragmatism continues alive historiographically, and will probably never disappear as long as there are nationalisms in the world. It is thus worth recalling its pernicious effects: it tends to favour the judgemental over the analytical-explicative and as a result stimulates the partial or total replacement of theoretical reflection with self-proclamatory, or with condemnatory, discourse; it demands the adoption of the objective or objectivizable nation as the central category of the analysis, which in turn prevents adequate conceptualization; finally it predisposes towards ignoring those characteristics or dimensions of nationalism which serve to explain it but which do not contribute to its acclaim.

A further pragmatism which is widespread in the literature is of *Marxist* origin. Although its objectives are often the antithesis of the foregoing, its *modus operandi* and its methodological consequences are similar. Its most archaic forms, which see nationalism as a simple subproduct of the bourgeois revolution which must be attacked frontally, are of little relevance today, except as part of the recent historiographic past. Nevertheless, some of its *ticks* are still responsible for the fact that authors, both major and minor, are incapable of approaching nationalism without judgmental apriorisms¹⁶ or of clearly seeing the multiplicity of its causes or its relative autonomy from socio-economic conditions.

Other more surreptitious, or unconscious, ideological prejudices which, following Topolsky (1973, pp.98-99), we shall call crypto-pragmatisms, are equally harmful. These include the anti-nationalist bias of authors, past and present, who see themselves as champions of a universalist political rationalism. In some cases the evaluation of emerging nationalisms - which disturb the international status quo - is

¹⁵ In the case of Spain, there is a certain undercurrent of national confrontation in recent debate about the positive or negative consequences of the notable development in regional historiographies. See B de RIQUER (1990) and J.P. FUSI (1990).

¹⁶ The tendency to see the historical role of nationalisms in negative terms overall, especially in the 20th century, via, the more or less express, generalization of the reactionary nature of one part as being characteristic of the whole, is detectable even in authors of the stature of Hobsbawm (1990). Despite the fact that from a methodological stance he avoided the traditional false starting point (pp. 5-9) the eternal *qu'est-ce que la nation?* - and although he shows laudable impartiality in his assessment of nationalisms until at least 1870-1914, one can see the not insignificant influence of this tendency in his approach to the second half of the 20th century.

based on complacency towards the world dominion of their own nation-state.¹⁷ In others it is the result of an understandable ethical reaction against the excesses of pathological nationalisms, as happened after World War II in the cases of authors such as Hans Kohn (1944, p.32; 1955, pp. 81-82) or Boyd C. Shafer (1955, pp.185ff).

A more recent bias is the anti-Marxism of the cold war era, which continues to condition some scholars' vision well beyond the reasonable; it is one thing not to share Marxist ideology or to reject Marxist method, but it is quite another when this colours the representation of reality to the extent of rejecting concepts and working hypotheses simply because they sound Marxist. The fact that historic materialism, as a «philosophy of history», has been superseded as a body does not mean the same is true for each and every part of that body. Indeed, some elements of this body, modified to a greater or lesser extent, have become part of the common heritage of the social sciences. It would be difficult, for example, without a totally biased view of history, to deny the existence, on one hand, of a close relationship between socio-economic structures and changes, and social conflicts, and their political correspondents on the other. It is thus difficult not to view as ideological prejudice, the scorn poured by certain sociologists and political scientists on any concept of social class (and not just the Marxist one), or the desire to explain all nationalisms with one general theory, the central elements of which (for example, the famous process of modernization, or the «scientific» state) avoid or downplay the social actors or reduce them to groups (for example the intelligentsia) such that it would be unlikely that they could by themselves have undertaken processes of such magnitude except perhaps the very initial phases. All this without any empirical justification on a scale similar to that which the theory was to be given.¹⁸

¹⁷ As is well-known, Lord Acton (1862) opposed John Stuart Mill's thesis in favour of the right to self-determination, as well as the Mazzinian concept of political nationality, arguing that the multi-national state was a greater safeguard of liberty. Eight decades later Alfred COBBAN (1949) maintained the same posture. E.KEDOURIE (1960) takes a rather more reticent approach to nationalisms which are not connected with the large consolidated state, indeed one so contemptuous that he peppers his, so-called objective and rational, argument with gems such as the following: «The tragedy of Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*, it will be recalled, originated in her having read too many novels: *Madame Bovary* may stand not only as an archetype of romantic love, but also as a symbol of romantic politics, and nationalism may be described as a species of political Bovaryism» (p.85). In E.KEDOURIE and G. URBAN (1991, p.224) express himself much more forcefully: «Of the two great absurdities of our time - Marxism and nationalism- nationalism, is to be sure, the more attractive absurdity: yet, it is an absurdity and a dangerous one at that».

¹⁸ See for example, K.W. DEUTSCH (1953, pp. 101, 165-189) or E. GELLNER (1964, pp. 150-170; 1983, pp. 140-141). Although A.D. SMITH's (1971) analyses are far less reductionist and attempt to bear in mind the diversity of the empirical base being manipulated, he shares some important points with the previously mentioned authors, as for example when he claims that «the social group is a less suitable

II. Some methodological questions

Let us now consider some of the consequences of the above. All of the questions we have discussed are interdependent. Therefore, not only the following epigraphs, but also the order in which they are laid out, could be different without effecting their value, as long as they identify the principal problems and their interrelationships.

Definition of the object

Approaching this as a methodological problem may appear today to be an obsolete scholastic exercise or simply a *boutade*. Nevertheless, I think I may be able to show it to be extremely useful for a variety of reasons.

Firstly, it is because our object of study is still badly defined, however surprising this assertion may be. To prove this, we have only to review the explicit or implicit definitions offered by important specialists, beginning with Carlton J.H. Hayes, Georges Weill and Henri Berr and up until now. We must determine which aspects of this object, as it is collectively perceived today, figure in the definition and which do not; we must check which of the aspects included are actually studied and which are only mentioned in passing. And we must also clarify which hierarchizations of categories have been established among them, what potentially relevant factors and processes have been taken into account or not, as well as what values they have been given in these analyses. If we did this, although it is not possible here, we would find such large discrepancies that it would be reasonable to conclude that we face not a single object of study but several, all of which are confusedly intertwined. The reason being that our object of study, like in most other cases, is not given, as such, by the realities which claim our attention. As we study it, we also define and construe it. All of which implies a complex, at times partially subconscious, representational or conceptual operation, based on this reality. It is obvious, too, that such an operation can be carried out in different ways for the self-same reality. Furthermore, each individual operation is very least important than the collective cognitive process. And it seems advisable that this process should be directed towards a consensus in what constitutes the *raison d'être* of these studies.

referent than a movement or an ideology when discussing a problem such as nationalism» (p.290) or when he exaggerates the causal power of the *intelligentsia* to extremes: «In reality, the primary role of nationalism is to resolve the crisis of the *intelligentsia*»(p.193).

Secondly, taking into account that any definition of the object entails a choice among the different possible options, making such a choice will have important consequences, which will then affect the subsequent cognitive operations (conceptualization, analysis, theory), and in particular for the delimitation of that object as it is the definition which in large measure decides the limits of the field of study. These do not mean that there must be a wall separating the field of study from other fields. If this were the case any possibility for explanation would be closed. Exchanges between neighbouring territories are one matter, a quite different matter is becoming muddled up in them in a sort of chaotic *totum revolutum*.. Definition, of course, means *delimitations and separations*. Now, those limits are not parts of the realities in question, which does not mean that there may not be certain discontinuities which justify limits: *we put them there ourselves*. What, though, are our criteria for placing them? We should rule out all answers offered by coarse positivism ("criteria offered by the realities themselves") which transfers theoretical responsibilities to something theoretically inert, and we should formulate the question in a different fashion: Why do we decide that some phenomena belong to our object and others do not?

There is no simple and general answer to this question. Motivations may vary widely between disciplines, time-periods and researchers. The real evolution of a body of knowledge never follows an ideal abstract sequence: one does not begin by defining the object in question in order to deduce everything else from it, a much more complex and asystematic chain of events is involved. In fact, the object is slowly defined as empirical information is accumulated, as concepts, analytical models and alternative theories are introduced or ruled out, and according to the way in which a changing series of extra-scientific factors influence the research being carried out. In spite of all this, I believe it may clarify things to look at the question in its own logical sequence, even if this is "ahistorical".

Let us look, then, at the most basic level of our work: that which involves the observation of relevant phenomena. Naturally, the first thing we should decide is which phenomena are relevant and which are not. In my opinion, such a decision depends upon something which is antecedent, which we may call *primary motivation* and which determines the embryonic definition, *in nuce*, of the object. Every science, or part of a science, involves, initially, some sort of stimulus which sets its development in motion: some phenomenon or series of phenomena which we wish to explain, be it out of intellectual curiosity or, more frequently, in order to satisfy a need or solve a problem. The fact that that motivation is what creates object and, consequently, defines it in the first instance, does not mean that the definition will not vary or even branch out to the point where it breaks off from its origins.

What was the primary motivation, the first generator of our field of study? Even though we cannot outline either its birth or its evolution here, I think we will all agree that our primary motivation was the will to explain and/or justify, or condemn, a set of qualitative transformations which took place within the political systems existing in Europe and its American colonies until the last quarter of the eighteenth century. I am referring to the liberal-revolutionary Nation and the reactions it provoked, and to the ulterior continuous tension in reformulating the political maps of Europe and the Americas, and later the rest of the world, in the name of the principle of nationality and of the right to self-determination. A radical change occurred in the nature of political power and its social and ideological foundations. In particular, the new relationships between population and State were all founded upon the social majority's acceptance of a legitimating principle specific to this new historical age: that of national sovereignty. This principle demanded that the corresponding society "imagine" itself¹⁹ as a political body with a radically new nature: the nation.²⁰ As a correlative of all this, ideologies and socio-political movements were born; these were nationalisms which tended to establish an equation between Nation and State where it had not previously existed, or so it was considered. These, and not others, were the real historical processes which stimulated our primary motivation. They were intrinsically *political* phenomena, and we should not forget that.²¹

Now, what we observe *prima facie* is an interaction between nation and nationalism.²² Consequently, in defining our object we have at least two options:

- 1) We can consider our object to be the nation, in other words, a historical type of vertical human groupings, while nationalisms are phenomena derived from the process of constitution and evolution of the nations.
- 2) We can consider our object to be nationalism, in other words, a socio-political movement or attitude, while the nation is something related to it in a way which we must make out and explain.

¹⁹ In the sense of the definition of nation proposed by B. ANDERSON (1993, p.6): «it is an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign».

²⁰ And this independently of the fact that the word (itself), is much older, albeit with a different conceptual content, and despite the fact that some earlier historical processes anticipate some characteristics with which we are concerned today, for example the uprising of the the Castilian communities (*comuneros*) at the beginning of the XVIth century, or more obviously, the Dutch and English revolutions of the XVIIth century.

²¹ Something which does not free us from the obligation to take into account that these like any other political phenomena, are interrelated with factors and processes of a non-political nature.

²² It could be argued that the novelty of this pair nation-nationalism is more apparent than real. This possibility, critical for diacronic delimitation, can only be confirmed or denied by determining the degree of continuity or discontinuity in its main elements, as we will see later.

In principle, both options are equally respectable. It is not a question here of delivering *a priori* value judgements. However, they may not be equally efficient, in terms of method, at satisfying our primary motivation: namely, understanding what those phenomena really are and why they occur. In any case, a researcher always comes across this sort of dilemma, and different attitudes may be taken towards them. There is the possibility of ignoring the problem and putting oneself to work in order to see what will happen. This possibility, which is unfortunately taken up all too often, tends to lead to a confusing mix of the two options, bringing about various levels of conceptual chaos. Sometimes, it also happens that the researcher makes a choice when beginning work, but then is not consistent with that choice throughout the research. Lastly, others make a choice and are consistent with it at all times. Let us consider this last possibility and see some of the major consequences of one option or the other.

Should we decide that our object of study is the nation, the definition *in nuce* which comes out of the primary motivation does not help us very much, as observation does not directly offer a clear set of limits, unless we conceptualize reality in a manner which is not, or only slightly, consistent with our observations. That is why, in this case, more than perfecting the primary definition, the answer to the question "what is a nation?" will involve a new, practically *ex-nihilo*, definition. Indeed, empirical observation will show that the nation is a dubious entity, debated even by the actors themselves. Two centuries have gone by and there is no agreement as to what a nation is in general terms, just as there is no agreement as to whether this or that specific nation really exists or not, and if it does exist, what is the compass of its existence in human and/or territorial terms. Walter Bagehot put it well (1887, p.21): "We know what it (the nation) is when you do not ask us, but we cannot very quickly explain or define it." This should suffice to demonstrate that its nature lies more in the realm of ideas than in that of the realities which we usually call "objective". No one would think of denying that the Spanish State or the Catholic Church exist, not even those who would like them to disappear. On the other hand, many can and do deny the existence of the Spanish Nation or the Catholic God without thereby suffering from any sort of perceptive pathology. Can we, then, say that nations are to nationalists and States what divinities are to the faithful and their Churches? In so far as we are concerned strictly with an appropriate conceptualization of reality, I think that we can.

We are, then, faced by a collectively undefinable and, therefore, slippery object of study. This presents us with a grave handicap to start with, one which those who take this option must compensate in some way. And it is precisely that "compensation" which generates the worst methodological deficiencies, it is that which passes for a

conceptual "objectivization" of the nation and which introduces, into the method, core components of organicist-historicist or Stalinist origin, which in this case amount to the same thing.²³ The main consequences of this, in my judgement, are as follows.

First of all, it prevents a clear delimitation of the object both in the tipological-dimensional, as well as the diachronic, sense. The objectivization of the nation diffuses the outline of the object, it brings it out of focus to the point where it becomes extremely difficult to know whether the main axis of our analysis is a *type* of political phenomena or, on the contrary, whether it is just politics in general, models of social structures, ethnic questions, or all of these at the same time, without any sort of analytical hierarchization. This confusion also permits, from a diachronic perspective, the postulation of nations/proto-nations and nationalisms/proto-nationalism out of the existence of tribes, cultures, or any other sort of power structure, as well as theorizing about nations before nationalisms.²⁴ But this, however much one may wish to qualify it, is not only theoretical "primordialism" (Ethnos over Polis), but also blocks the surmounting of many methodological deficiencies, and it is particularly fertile ground for conceptual lack of precision along with its consequent terminological polysemy, as we will show later.

Secondly, centering the object of study on the nation implies, like it or not, the total or partial acceptance of a general *a priori* explanation, as that choice cannot be

²³ Stalin (1913) simply brought the movement begun by the Austro-Marxists (Karl Renner and above all Otto Bauer) to extremes, and infact he did a botch job on the theory by injecting a semi-organistic concept of objective nation into the very heart of the Marxist treatment of the national question, something which was totally incompatible with the central tenets of historic materialism. Although as we have previously mentioned, the majority of present day historians of Marxist orientation have rid themselves of this heritage, though not without great effort and much vacillation, for others the objective nation continues to be one of the grand pillars of their theoretical edifice. Such is the case of M. HROCH (1985, pp. 3-5):

... We consider the origin of the modern nation as the fundamental reality and nationalism as a phenomenon derived from the existence of that nation. However, one must not determine the objective character of the the nation with a fixed collection of the features and attributes given once and for all, just as it is not possible to view the nation as an everlasting category, standing outside concrete social relations (...) We therefore consider the nation to be a large social group characterised by a combination of several kinds of relation (economic, territorial, political, religious, cultural, linguistic and so on) which arise on the one hand from the the solution found to the fundamental antagonism between man and nature on a specific compact land-area, and on the other hand from the reflection of these reflections in the consciousness of the people. (...)

²⁴ This thesis, which is in fact as old as organicism, has come back into the limelight in new more modern and attractive form, given to it in the work of J.A. ARMSTRONG (1982) and as we have seen in note 2 was taken on with slight modifications by A.D. Smith (1986). Nevertheless, I find the new version as unconvincing as the old for reasons which I explain in the section entitled «The Compass of the Object».

understood in any other way: there are nationalisms because there are nations. This is an axiom which, even if qualified, always retains a good deal of its, once very powerful, capacity to inhibit analysis and theory. From this axiom the following methodological sequence may be inferred: 1) Define the (objective) nation in general; 2) check whether the case in question fits the definition; 3) if there is no "nation" but there is a political movement tending towards the constitution of a State, then it will not be included among the nationalisms; 4) if the prerequisites are met and there is a nation, there will normally be nationalism, in which case describe its *événementiel* development in order to see whether the rule is obeyed, and if it is then there will be no need for analytical and theoretical complications—as we already have an explanation; 5) If there is a nation, but there is no nationalism, or if it is very weak, then look for the inhibiting factors, preferably external ones, which explain the anomaly. The connection between all this and the nationalist pragmatisms is obvious.

In short, this option appears to offer more disadvantages than advantages. On the other hand, if we choose the nationalisms as the object of study, the balance is, in my opinion, much more positive.

Firstly, we are dealing with phenomena with an undeniable ontological status, which facilitates a basic conceptualization consistent with the primary definition. And although, as we will see later, this does not mean that all the problems of delimitation are automatically solved, it is true that the object is clearly circumscribed within a well-defined area inside the field of politics. Therefore, those realities which are not political *per se* do not belong to the object, although they may condition it and may even be important to its full understanding.

Secondly, those phenomena —contrary to what happens with the objective nation— do not explain anything *a priori*.; they must rather be explained from the outside, and this has several extremely positive methodological effects:

- a) it prevents the transfer of myths, acting within the object, to the analytical instruments, as well as preventing the total or partial acceptance of axiomatic theories;
- b) it facilitates the fight against conceptual vagueness and terminological polysemy;
- c) it forces us to create analytical models which are increasingly better adapted to the growing complexities of empirical observation, and in particular it stimulates the distinction between the characteristics of object, and the factors which condition the object.

This is why I believe the chosen object of study must be nationalism, or better said, all nationalisms. But this choice does not exempt us from a tighter definition, the characteristics of which will have an influence on the subsequent steps. And even if the tangible nature of nationalism helps us to avoid such large problems as those presented by the nation, there will still be disagreement among researchers. There are, indeed, definitions for every taste: some, like B. Anderson's (1993, p.4),²⁵ diverge from the political nature of the object; others are dimensionally reductionist, limiting the object to the realm of ideas, like H. Kohn (1944, p.29-30),²⁶ E Kedourie (1960, p. 9),²⁷ A.D. Smith (1971, p.47)²⁸ and, to a lesser extent, E. Gellner (1983, p.1);²⁹ and there are others that reduce it to ethnic loyalty, such as W. Connor (1994, p. XI, 40).³⁰ Lastly, there are some researchers who, in my opinion, are more in accord with the primary definition; among them P. Brass (1991, p.48),³¹ who nevertheless does not point out the specificity of nationalism in the wide spectrum of political movements; J. Breuilly (1993, p.XII, 1)³² and P. Alter (1985, p.8).³³ In this vein, I will take nationalism to mean any set of ideas, actions and organizations (which includes the so-called national or nationalist movements) oriented by the acceptance of the existence of an entity — the nation— which, as a collective subject with political rights, constitutes the legitimating foundation for real or potential political power and for its territorial delimitation, though not of the nature of that power.

²⁵ «nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind».

²⁶ «Nationalism is a state of mind. The historical process may be analysed as a succession of changes in the psychology of the community».

²⁷ «Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century».

²⁸ «nationalism is first and foremost a political doctrine».

²⁹ «Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent (...) A nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind (...) In brief, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy which requires that ethnic boundaries should not be cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state -a contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation- should not separate the power-holders from the rest».

³⁰ «Nation connotes a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related. Nationalism connotes identification with and loyalty to one's nation as just defined. It does not refer to loyalty to one's country (...) Throughout this work nationalism and ethnonationalism are treated as synonyms (...) Loyalty to the ethnic group, therefore, should logically be called nationalism».

³¹ «Nationalism is a political movement by definition».

³² «nationalism should be understood as a form of politics that arises in close association with the development of the modern state».

³³ «nationalism, such as it has appeared since the American and French Revolutions, will be understood as both an ideology and a political movement which holds the nation and the sovereign nation-state to be crucial indwelling values, and which manages to mobilize the political will of a people or a large section of a population».

The Compass of the Object

The definition of the object does not solve the problem of delimitating it, but it helps in finding a proper solution by providing the criteria for a double set of necessary coordinates— diachronic and typological.

Lets consider first the diachronic, not in the chronological sense but rather in the political-evolutive. Everyone is aware of the controversy about whether or not nations and nationalisms are specific to the «Modernity» (late 18th, 19th and 20th centuries), or whether, on the contrary, they reach back to previous historical ages. In my opinion, this controversy has as much to do with the type of definition of the object one adopts as with the hidden influence exerted by nationalist pragmatism. In any case, if the definition of nationalism I propose is accepted, the answer is clear: Nationalism (and the nation) can only exist in relation to political systems which, no matter how they came into existence and how their power works, have a mode of legitimation, which is related to the fact that the society in question, identified as the nation, takes for granted that the system is a both a product and a guarantee of the national nature of this society, and sometimes, also, of the will of its majority. This necessarily implies that politics no longer exclusively belong to a governing elite nor to a minority within the society, but constitute a part of the life of the whole society. That is why we can name them *political societies*. So, it seems undeniable that these societies, leaving aside remote and isolated cases, come into existence and develop after a break with the Ancien Régime, or with some other even more primitive political system, which settle into non-political societies, where the nation cannot exist as a referent, even if the word is associated with other meanings, or the modern idea of the nation is beginning to take shape within narrow intellectual and governing circles.

As numerous authors have stated,³⁴ this would situate our chronological limit in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, with the possible exceptions of the Netherlands and England in the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, each society will have its own limit at the beginning of its transition towards political modernity. Before that limit, we will find only non-systematic manifestations of some aspects of later nationalisms (patriotism, institutional political loyalty, group identity, the use of non-political characteristics towards political ends, and so on), but we will not find the

³⁴ C.J. HAYES (1931, p. 6), H. KOHN (1944, p. 9; 1955, pp. 18-19), B.C. SHAFER (1955, p.11), E. GELLNER (1964, p.169; 1983, pp. 35-40, 137-143), B. ANDERSON (1993, pp. 36, 134-135), J. BREUILLY (1993, pp. 366-376), P. BRASS (1991, p. 82), and so on.

set of elements proper to nationalism as we know it. The main component, in particular, is missing, the true generator of the «nation»: the modern mode of legitimating political power. No one would say that man and chimpanzee belong to the same species just because they share numerous biological characteristics which, nevertheless, are not sufficient to prevent them from being qualitatively distinct anatomical and physiological species.

Secondly, we have the typological coordinates. Even when they accept that nationalisms are specific to political modernity, some writers will only accept as nationalisms, or as being worthy of study as such, certain types of ideologies or political movements referred to a nation. Specifically, some exclude those movements which referred to nation-States, especially if the State was born in a pre-national epoch, while others leave out certain extreme manifestations of nationalism.³⁵ I consider this practice to be unjustifiable because it helps to avoid those nationalisms which are the hardest to study on account of their internal complexity, diffuse character and intermittent intensity. Furthermore, not only is this attitude inconsistent with the definition of the object, but it also has extremely negative consequences for the study of certain types of processes. For example, when we look at long-term dynamics within old States where different nationalisms, referred to different nations, are born and compete with each other, this attitude will leave fundamental aspects of the process out of our field of observation and will prevent us from perceiving any relationship between the birth and development of some nationalisms and those of others, as well as that between all of them and the State.

That is why I think, that as far as typological, as opposed to diachronic, coordinates are concerned, the delimitation should *include* all of those cases which agree with the basic definition proposed.

³⁵ J. BREUILLY (1993, pp. 5-8), in clear contradiction of his own general definition of nationalism, incomprehensibly excludes «political movements which demand independence on the basis of universal principles» for example in the American Revolution, because «the leaders of that independence made little references to a distinct cultural identity to justify their claims»(!!). Subjective voluntarist visions of the nation are excluded for the same reason as are certain recent anti-colonial movements. As far as nationalisms referred to the State are concerned, they are accepted as such only when they are of extreme forms such as National-Socialism, when their foreign policy lays claim to territory or when their internal policy is directed against specific groups or individuals. In any case, he does not believe it is useful to investigate this «governmental nationalism (...)» in a comparative way with the aim of arriving at a general understanding».

A.D. SMITH (1971, pp. 29-30) believes that discussion of fascisms should be separated from that of nationalisms.

The Basic Conceptualization

As the conversion of any reality into an object of knowledge implies its conceptual representation in a articulated form, it seems clear that the conceptualization of phenomena is a key cognitive operation. It follows, therefore, that there are certain minimum prerequisites to be observed, and that there need be agreement about the code or common language constituted by the concepts being used and the terms which denote these. All of which should not keep either the body of concepts or the language from being renewed as the discipline in question grows and develops. Unfortunately, these obvious demands are not often met by us, which is why it is necessary that we remember some commonplace assertions. Let us make clear that whenever we refer to concepts and terms, unless otherwise indicated, we are talking about those we use as instruments and not those used in nationalist discourse which constitute part of the object itself.

First of all, these concepts must be precise. They must have a well-defined content and, where possible, should be dimensionally homogeneous, with the exception of relational concepts. Furthermore, the correspondence between a concept and the term it denotes must be bi-univocal on the analytical level (even if it is not so at the level of the the object), so that each term denotes a single conceptual content and each conceptual content is denoted by a single term. Conceptual imprecision and its correlative, terminological polysemy, are major obstacles to theoretical progress, as they leave room for blurry analytical breakups.

Secondly, each concept, like each theory, has a limited field of application, which is a function not only of the empirical base on which it is founded but also of the terms of the problem it is meant to solve (we should remember the famous example of those concepts of light used in wave theory and quantum theory). The use of a concept outside its field of application is methodologically unacceptable.

Lastly, I must insist that, in studying ideologies and their relationship to politics, it should always be remembered that concepts which are the means used in the analysis (those we call *analytic_concepts*) should not be speculative images of the concepts which constitute the ideology under study (which I will call *ideological concepts*). This applies especially to everything dealing with the "nation".

Lack of space here, obliges me to illustrate the severe difficulties, involved in meeting a large number of the preceding prerequisites, with a single, though extremely prominent, example: namely, that for nation/ethnicity and the connected concepts and terms.

The fact that we have decided to make nationalisms, and not nations, our object of study, does not save us from having to deal with the analytical concept of nation, especially since we have defined nationalisms as political phenomena which *refer to the nation*. How should we conceptualize that referent which gives our object nothing less than its own specificity as a *particular type of political phenomenon*?

As we have already suggested, if we look at the political history of the last two centuries, we can see that the nation, as a historical factor, is born and actually functions as a political project for a group of people, a group which can be defined in various ways according to the circumstances. That project, conceived sometimes by a truly insignificant minority within a group, has met with all sorts of fates. In some cases, it is accepted by the majority, or the totality, of the group, which in doing so nationalizes itself and sometimes manages to realize the whole or part of the project. When this happens, the nation becomes relatively "objective" as the collective imagination confuses it with the society or, as the case maybe, with the State. This confusion may last for a long time, which is why it may seem irreversible and even "natural," or it may be challenged by part of that group after a certain amount of time has gone by. In any case, the established nation acts to preserve the status quo. In other instances, nationalization, even if it has progressed some, is not strong enough to achieve that position and works as a subversive element in conflictive coexistence with another nation; *this may even happen within the same "ethnic group"*.

The specific contents of each project, its changes, the social acceptance it receives, and the final results of the process all depend upon the actual combination of conditioning factors in each case. These factors include realities, subjective or objective, which are non-political in themselves, such as ethnicity, which may or may not play an important role in the process.

This at least is what I see when I look at the reality in question. But it is well known that many researchers, when confronted by this same reality, have been using the words "nation" and "nationality" polysemically, sometimes even in the same book, without specifying what they meant on each occasion, so that they might refer either to an institutional political structure itself or to membership thereof, or the ideological concept of nation used by nationalists, or a *Gemeinschaft*, or a *Gesellschaft*, with or without a State. Naturally, in this influence, one can still see echoes of the perennial battle between organicists and volitionists,³⁷ now transformed into the primordialists

³⁷ Among those of the first group G.P. GOOCH (1920, p.6) asserted that the nation is an « organism, a spiritual entity. Any effort to penetrate its secrets on the strength of a mechanical interpretation is

and the modernists whom we have already mentioned. However, not everything can be put down to this inheritance.

Other writers have attempted to fight this imprecision. Max Weber (1922, p. 324-327, 678-682) was one of the first to point out that "The concept of 'nation' always refers us to 'political' power whereas the 'national'— if in general it is something unitary— is a special type of *pathos* which, within a group of people united by a community of language, religion, customs or destiny, is associated with the idea of an already existent proper political community to which one aspires." Therefore, "The 'nation' is a concept which, should it be considered as being univocal, can never be defined in terms of the empirical qualities attributed to it (...). It refers then to a concept belonging to the estimative sphere."

Advancing along these lines, others have outlined the concept of nation which appears to best fit the evidence.³⁸ In keeping with them, I will reaffirm the idea I expressed some years ago (J.G. Beramendi, 1987, I, p.92-101): the nation is a complex and variable ideological referent, with two principle functions: one is the legitimation of the delimitation of the unit of political power and of the characteristics of the political system to be established or conserved within this unit; the second is that of social mobilization and organization for the realization or preservation of the accompanying political project. As a result, the nation as a historically operative entity, exists as far as, and only as far as, a group of people believe that it exists and take political action accordingly.

doomed to fail before the test of experience». R. MICHELS (1917, p.1) among those of the second group gave the following definition: «Nationality does not necessarily consist of the language, the religion, the common past, but rather it is in the will of the people. The expression of this will is generally achieved by a synthesis of some of the constituent elements which we have just listed, and sometimes, of all of them. Nevertheless, nationality may well exist in the absence of some of them and it is even possible if limited to one single element, to the essential one: will.» H. HAUSER (1916, p.7) makes a similar point; F.OPPENHEIMER (1923, I, p.644) states it more forcefully: «We must not derive the national consciousness from the nation, but rather the reverse, the nation from the national consciousness».

³⁸ According to R. EMERSON (1960, p. 102), «The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is body of people who feel that they are a nation; and it may be that when all the fine-spun analysis is concluded this will be the ultimate statement as well». This idea is repeated in H. SETON-WATSON (1977, p.5): « All that I can find to say is that a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one». And E.J. HOBBSBAWM (1990, pp.5-10), after asserting that no *a priori* definition can be adopted, and that in any case this is not a primary or immutable entity, concludes: «In short, for the purposes of analysis nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalism, but the other way around».

Clearly, this analytical concept does not include any representation of the non-political realities which are usually embraced by the term ethnicity, or which are related to it. Realities which, moreover, permeate numerous ideological concepts of nation and thus play an important role in nationalist political dynamics. What can we do about them? Should we disregard them because they *are not* political? Definitely not. That would be to commit a *lese empiria* 's crime just as grave as others which we have combatted here. It is thus essential to ponder the problems which its conceptualization gives rise to.

Something similar occurs with the terms *ethnie* and *ethnicity* as with nation and nationality. There is discord as to what exactly they mean, although in this case the discrepancies are less serious. *Ethnie* does not pose major problems and in general conserves its anthropological meaning, even if some add, to the human group differentiated by a variable set of objective and inter-subjective characteristics, «a sense of solidarity» without which there would not be «ethnie» but simply «ethnic category.»³⁹ On the other hand, *ethnicity* is for some, as one might expect, ethnic identity,⁴⁰ however for P. BRASS (1991, p.19) it is also simultaneously «a sense of ethnic identity» and a contingent and changing «alternative form of social organization and identification to class». For G.P. Nielsson (1989, p.203) it is nothing less that «a process of formation of identities», and for W. Connor (1994, pp.90-113) it is something to be rejected entirely along with many other terms because it constitutes a spurious substitute for ethno-nationalism. No comment necessary.

It thus worth reaching an accord which, one way or another, will allow us to distinguish conceptually and terminologically between phenomena which are closely related but differentiable. If we reserve nation and nationalism for the political phenomena, we will then need precise and *common* concepts for representing vertical human groupings of a non-political kind, and furthermore to distinguish the objective and the subjective in relation to them. I believe that, even from language point of view, *ethnicity* is the most appropriate for designating the set of characteristics which differentiate a group identity, or if you prefer, which configures an *ethnie*. The consciousness of ethnic belonging (given that those who have it do not consider that an *ethnie* is a nation, for otherwise we would be faced with a conscious nationalist

³⁹ A.D. SMITH (1986, pp.29-31). In a similar sense G.P. NIELSSON (1989, p.204) speaks of «ethnic group» and P. BRASS (1991, pp.16-20) of «ethnic category» or of «ethnic community». The latter two writers consider that the nation is nothing but a politicized *ethnie*.

⁴⁰ A.D. SMITH (1986, p.15); «The 'core' of ethnicity (...) resides in this quartet of 'myths, memories, values and symbols' and in the characteristic forms or styles and genres of certain historical configurations of populations».

politics) could, in order not to complicate matters, simply be termed «ethnic consciousness» in the same way as «national consciousness», «class consciousness» or «religious consciousness» are used. We might also follow A .D. Smith (1986, p.47) and refine the terms further distinguishing between ethnocentrism and ethnicism. Or accord might be reached on something different. Anything but the current chaos.

The general analytical model

The conceptualization of a complex reality is impossible without a general analytical model. That model may be implicit or explicit, consistent or inconsistent, systematic or unsystematic. It is advisable however, though unfortunately infrequent, that the model be explicit, systematic and, above all, consistent with the definition of the object and its basic conceptualization. Once the object has been defined and its scope delineated, it is time to analyze it. Every nationalism, as a real complex process is, a single whole entity. However, it is obvious that we cannot immediately recognize wholeness. We know that all “scientific” knowledge implies an echeloning of mediations which, among other things, results in the breakup of the initial integrity of the object in part or in dimensions, and of the relationships between them.

According to our definition of nationalism, we are concerned with groups of individuals, the numerical and socio-economic composition of which is variable in time. These groups, moved by sets of ideas and interests which are not necessarily either homogeneous or harmonious, undertake various kinds of action (for which they sometimes set up specific organizations) in order to achieve objectives, from inside or outside the institutions, which cause greater or lesser changes in the social environment and the political system in which they are acting. Furthermore, these collectives, which may be ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous, do not arise *ex nihilo* nor do they develop in isolation, oblivious to external pressures or influences. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect, that if we want to find an explanation for the process, we will also have to pay attention to all kinds of dynamics in the environment, in which each nationalism was born, and which is influenced by every nationalism.

Thus, the analysis of *nationalism as such and its relationship with the environment* brings us to the first step in the analytical breakup of the broad set of potentially relevant phenomena, in other words, to the most general articulation of the model: a) the *intrinsic dimensions* and their interrelationships; b) the «*external*» *conditioning factors* and their interrelationships; and c) the interactions between the

first and the second. None of these elements are given, and as a consequence could be of any nature; whatever their nature they are never neutral from the point of view of theory. Nevertheless, like in many other instances, collective practice helps eliminate bias of one kind or another.

a) *the dimensions of the object*. From our summary generic definition we can deduce the following list of main dimensions which mark the principle lines of analysis:

- the processes of nationalization, both in institutional and social aspects.
- the organisational dimension: the characteristics and development of political, union, and cultural organizations of this nationalism; their internal dynamics and their mutual relationships.
- the political dynamics: actions within the political system (elections/armed struggle, conduct in the institutions, propaganda, and so on), relations with political forces with different national referents, external relations.
- the socio-political dimension: the socio-professional origin of the nationalists, social expansion through professional or entrepreneurial organizations, mass media, cultural bodies and so on.
- ideological dimension: nationalist theories, ideologies as such, and programmes; the repercussion of all this in the collective imaginaries of society.

Any dimensional map is imperfect and open to discussion, as the division of any real continuous totality implies greater or lesser distortion. Thus it is inevitable that certain aspects “belong” simultaneously to several dimensions. Programmes, for example, which are the expression of projects of transformation/preservation, should be considered in the ideological dimension, in the organizational, and in political dynamics. This problem is largely solved, however, by suitable consideration of interdimensional relations.

On the other hand, the genuine diversity of nationalisms means that the relative importance of each dimension varies according to the *kind of nationalism* under discussion. If, for example, the criterion for classification is the relationship between nationalism and state, we would have the following major types:

A: Nationalism without state.

B: State nationalisms;

B₁: State nationalisms without any alternative internal nationalisms.

B₂: State nationalisms confronting alternative internal nationalisms.

It is clear that the organisational dimension is most important in A. In contrast, nationalism of type B are diffuse. It exists, and it is present as a political-ideological ingredient, to a greater or lesser extent, in all the political forces of this state, but these are not organised in terms of nationalism, but rather on the basis of some other ideological criteria, which is why this dimension is of less importance. In contrast, the nationalist political dynamics may be of as much importance in A as in B₂. Finally, the process of nationalization and the ideological dimension would be of considerable relevance in all cases.

Nonetheless, in the analytical phase, and before knowing and considering the conditioning factors, it would be unwise to hierarchize the dimensions. A wiser course would be to analyze all the dimensions and all their interrelationships. However, the history of our field of study demonstrates that *a priori dimensional reductionism* has been a very common practice and one which has still not disappeared. For a long time there was an exclusive concentration on ideologies and political actions, even by authors who recognized the multi-dimensional character of the phenomenon.⁴¹ In some cases this was consistent with an idealist conception of nationalism, and by extension of history. In others, as for example with some Marxists, there was contradiction between a general theory of history which emphasised the role of social classes and an application of this theory which, ignoring Lenin's famous advice ("the essence of Marxism is the concrete analysis of concrete realities"), avoided the "concrete" study of the presence or the impact of the social classes in the nationalism in question. This inconsistency was "resolved" by reducing the research strategy to one of searching in the ideologies and in the political action for the keys to confirm their prior theory about the social orientation of the nationalisms.⁴² Much time had to pass before historians and social scientists paid the requisite attention to the social dimension and to the less episodic parts of politics. Still today there remains a significant dimensional imbalance in many historiographies.⁴³

⁴¹ C.J. HAYES (1931, pp. V-VI) for example recognizes, in his initial approach, how important social and economic factors can be, but despite this, states that, he will consider only with the «body of doctrines», of «political philosophy» of nationalism.

⁴² Such is the case in J.Y. GUIOMAR (1974) or in the first work by J. SOLÉ TURA (1967).

⁴³ An imbalance which is sometimes elevated to the status of a general analytical proposal: «These common structural components, or features of nationalism include: consciousness of the uniqueness or peculiarity of a group of people, particularly with respect to their ethnic, linguistic or religious homogeneity; emphasizing of shared socio-cultural attitudes and historical memories; a sense of common mission; disrespect for, and animosity toward, other peoples (racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism)» (P.ALTER, 1985, p.7)

Many sociologists, on the other hand, regularly fall into the opposite trap: they overvalue the social dimension and underestimate the others, especially the ideological. On occasions they even concentrate solely on one part of the social dimension to the detriment of all the rest. Everyone is aware of the numerous studies on *nation-building* carried out in recent decades which do not include appropriate identification of the concrete social agents in each nationalism with the consequent decrease in the validity of the resulting theories.⁴⁴

Furthermore, the incorporation of new dimensions has been made in a disjointed manner, swinging back and forth, going from ignoring one thing to ignoring another, with the resulting impossibility of recognizing inter-dimensional relationships, in other words, of recognizing just what would give us a fuller and more exact picture of the object. This is not to say that every piece of research must cover all the dimensions contemplated in the general model. Studies which are only concerned with one, or with only some, of the possible dimensions may indeed be very useful, *but only when they do not lose sight of the general perspective, and above all, only when they do not attempt to theorize from this incomplete analytical base*. Attempting to convert one's own research deficiencies into a virtue (by, for example, claiming that the study of nationalist ideologies is of no value) is the greatest contribution to perpetuating old vices under new names.

b) *the conditioning factors*. Let us now consider the question of factors which may influence the birth, the characteristics and the evolution of a nationalism. Naturally, the list which any individual would establish depends on their definition of the object and their prior ideological and/or theoretical position.

In accordance with the definition that I have proposed, and from the conviction that all the great structures and processes in history condition one another mutually, and from what we know today about nationalisms, I conclude that it is advisable to include, at least the following, in the list:

- the processes of construction/destruction and conservation/transformation of states and sub-state politico-administrative institutions, both in so far their territorial and human compass is concerned as well as the kind of political system they contain.
- in relation to the previous, the general political dynamics (in other words, beyond the national question), among them those of the elites and of the political organizations.

⁴⁴ See J. BREUILLY'S (1993, pp.406-407) apposite criticisms, and from another angle W. CONNOR (1994, pp. 28-39 and 166-181).

- international relations and conflicts, which may have a very intense influence, positive or negative, on the *nation building* of communities without a State, as well as on the evolution of state nationalisms.
- economic structures and transformations, in so far as they generate, by action or reaction, collective interests which can be channeled politically.
- social structures and changes therein, and in particular the relative positions and the aspirations of the social classes (or what one might conceptualize as social dis-equality) and the alliances and confrontations between them, which undoubtedly have repercussions in the political dynamics.
- the presence or the strength and the extent, inside or outside the immediate setting of each nationalism, of religions, ideologies, intellectual and cultural innovations and even of scientific advances (think of Darwinism or comparative linguistics) which are used to ideological ends.
- and *last but not least* the characteristics which are potentially the foundations of a differentiated ethnicity.

There are two possible attitudes when faced with this, or any other, list. The first is to assume that none can be discounted or given priority, but that one must try to establish empirically, in each case, the type and intensity of its interaction with nationalism. This way, the selection and hierarchization of factors will be a *result* of the analysis, not its starting point. This, in my opinion, is the correct way to proceed.

The second is to make a discriminatory selection of factors, before acquiring sufficient knowledge of the object, which highlights some and minimalizes or ignores others *a priori*. This practice, which is rash from a methodological point of view, tends to be the result of pragmatism, theoreticism, or dimensional reductionism. It is normally accompanied by a prior hierarchization, given that the hypothesis is that one of the factors is of an extraordinary strong conditioning nature and “justifies” the devaluation of the others. This happens, for example, with certain modernization theories which advocate the causal semi-monopoly of the “modernization + State” pair, something which seems to exempt one from considering the possible effects of the aspirations and conflicts of real flesh and blood social groups, as well as ideas and value systems, on the process of nationalization. They forget among other things that the State and its servants possess a relative, and never absolute, autonomy towards their social setting.

In sum, I believe that a good analytic model must be receptive to the heterogeneity and diversity specified by the the object (the set of nationalisms) and to its non-uniform diachronic variation. Consequently, it must possess the following principle characteristics:

- a clear-cut definition and delimitation of the object.
- a complete dimensional breakup consistent with the definition, which ordains the broad lines of the analysis.
- a basic set of precise concepts in each dimension which, in addition, do not contradict the two previous sections.
- consideration of all the possible conditioning factors and of all the interrelationships between them and each of the dimensions of the object.
- the absence of *a priori* hierarchizations of the dimensions, factors and interrelationships. The greater or lesser importance of each dimension must be the result of the application of the model. The attaching of greater or lesser importance to each interaction should take place in the explanatory or theoretical phase and not in the analytical.

The fulfilment of these requirements will not resolve all the problems posed by the analysis. In the first place, every part of the general model needs further development. I have, for example, since 1987 been developing and testing a sectoral model, which is still being tested and improved, for the ideological dimension. The main parts of this model are represented schematically, applied to Galician nationalism, in diagrams 1 and 2. The subdimensional breakup and the conceptualization of this model attempts not just to reconstruct the set of ideas as a structured and changing whole, but also to detect their connections with the remaining dimensions and above all with the relevant processes which take place in the environment. If analysed within the framework of a complete and appropriate model, ideologies are an excellent, although not sufficient, indicator for calibrating certain inter-dimensional relations and more importantly, for observing the *modus operandi* of some conditioning factors.

In the second place, the general analytical model, whether or not it is developed sectorially, must be applied to the study of one nationalism or *one type* of nationalism, and this demands that it is adapted to this sub-object, which requires the resolution of particular methodological problems which we cannot, for reasons of space, go into here. However, it is evident that, for example, the application of the general model to the nationalisms which arose in the old European states and empires would have to be quite different from its application to the nationalisms which emerged relatively recently as a result of colonization/decolonization in Africa or Asia, as there is so much distance historically between these types that the weight of some dimensions, or the nature and relative strength of the conditioning factors, would have to be very different.

DIAGRAM 1. Structural and evolutive analytical model of nationslist ideologies.





DIAGRAM 2.. Structure of the concept of own nation



Yet the establishment of a consensus, on at least a general analytical model, constitutes a *conditio sine non qua* for interdisciplinary integration and for effective collaboration between individual researchers within the same discipline. It is also, of course, the requirement for progress towards true comparative method, something which now seems like a panacea and which is rarely practiced with the required rigour.

The theories

The analytical moment and the "theoretical" or explanatory moment are inseparably united, no matter how much we separate them in our arguments. Every analytical model is shaped by prior hypothesis. And vice-versa, the analysis itself unfolds as a more, or less, orderly set of characteristics and relations which are something more than a way of representing *what* the object is, as this way contains part of our interpretation of *why* the object is such and not some other. One part, but not all. The theory has its own moment in the process.

Its moment and its levels. With the predictive requirement discounted, it is worth asking what we understand by "theory". The explanation of why a given nationalism was as it was throughout the whole of its trajectory or only during one stage in its evolution? An explanatory model applicable to various nationalism related by some common basic characteristics? Or a general theory which postulates causalities and regularities valid for all nationalisms which exist or have ever existed in the world? We have then three theoretical levels depending on the extent of the object under consideration.

The first level, that of single case studies, is the most accessible at the present. Despite the fact that the majority of these studies are less satisfactory than expected from the methodological point of view, and as a result they have conclusions that could be much improved, it is here that the most convincing conclusions are to be found. It is also one of the testing grounds (the other is comparative method) for perfecting research techniques and generalizable analytical models.

The second level, that of type-explanatory models, obviously demands the comparative method and the establishment of typologies. This implies greater difficulties, but it is absolutely essential today for sound theoretical progress. In fact very promising advances are being made, although there is no shortage of poor analogies and outrageous inferences which result in proposals which are as brilliant as they are useless. Yet, there are various possibilities for right comparison.

From a typological point of view, the comparative method might be applied in our field to:

- 1) a basically homogeneous group, in other words, a sample which is sufficiently representative of a specific kind of nationalism. This implies a prior definition of the type. The resultant explanatory model would, in principle, only be applicable to this type, which, furthermore, would have to part of a basic typology accepted by all so that the model could be "tested" by other researchers and compared adequately with other models. However, this does not happen. The proliferation of discordant typologies is one of the most blatant symptoms of our theoretical underdevelopment.
- 2) a typologically varied group which is however formed by nationalisms belonging to the same process of transformation of one political-institutional setting, in other words, connected to the evolution of one State. Here, the comparison and the study of the set are necessary even to satisfy the requirements of the first level.
- 3) a group of cases taken from different types and without the previous condition. This inter-typological comparison would only be useful if explanatory models were already available for some of the types in the set. Otherwise it could cause, and indeed has caused, numerous errors.

From a dimensional point of view, there are two possibilities:

- a) the complete comparison of the nationalisms in question; in other words checking the results obtained by applying the whole analytical model to each of the cases (dimensions, factors, interrelations etc.). Clearly it is the only one which could serve as a base for consistent explanatory models. However, it is also the least frequent, as the prior analyses tend not to be systematic enough.
- b) the comparison of only one or a few aspects of the selected nationalisms. This is more frequent for obvious reasons and, in fact, has produced splendid contributions like for example, M Hroch's for the interrelation nationalism-society in Central European "small nations", or J. Breuilly's intertypology for nationalism-State interaction. The dimensional-factorial delimitation favours comparative precision but at the same time shortens its theoretical sweep. The conclusions drawn, valuable as well-established explanatory components within their own areas, also serve as serious working hypotheses in other settings. However, this is as far as they go. Unwarranted extrapolation generates dangerous mimesis. This has happened with the

way in which the tri-phase scheme and M Hroch's (1985, pp.23-30) related typology have been used; transplanted mechanically to other fields they end up converted into a *morphology* which is potentially detrimental to the development of theory.

With regard to the third level, that of general theories, I find that its viability is very dubious at present,⁴⁵ though not for the want of candidates. I by no means wish to suggest, with this, that we abandon theory; quite the contrary. I ask that we take it more seriously. The ambition for theory is the great driving force of knowledge. But this force is not enough. We must also set a good course so as not to waste time and effort in cul-de-sacs.

Certainly, both in the past and in the present, the proliferation of "theories" which claim to state regularities for the *whole* of our object is astonishing to any observer with a minimal grasp of gnosiology or simply of common sense. There are flavours for all tastes: from the musty deductions of general philosophies of history (such as nationalist theories themselves or the evaluations of the first Marxism) to the last cry in the extrapolation of paradigms, such as functionalism or "rational choice", with absolute disregard for the specific requirements of our object. In other instances, after dimensional reductionism, prior discrimination of factors, and *a priori* hierarchization on a typologically incomplete base, have all played their part induction can give rise to theories such as that of modernization, or social communication and so on. There are even those who produce theoretical approaches which when brought to their logical conclusions would mean the radical denial of any rational explanation.⁴⁶

I believe that none of them can be considered to be anywhere near being a general theory, although some have made plausible contributions by introducing new concepts, calling attention to inter-actions until then neglected or indeed by formulating explanations which ought to be taken into account, not as theories, but

⁴⁵ Here I am completely in agreement with J. BREUILLY (1993, p. 2): «I do not develop a general theory and then apply it to cases: I am sceptical about the use of such a procedure in historical investigation (...) A general framework of analysis is only acceptable if it permits, and is shown to permit, an effective analysis of particular cases.»

⁴⁶ In 1991 W. CONNOR (1994, pp.195-209) established a «dichotomy between the realm of national identity and that of reason», which was, according to him the cause of the greatest problems for «students of nationalism», the majority of whom «inclined to seek rational explanations for the nation in economic and other 'real' forces». Apparently this is not the right road because «the national bond is subconscious and emotional rather than conscious and rational in its inspiration. It can be analysed but not explained rationally».

as working hypotheses to be tested. Nor do I believe that the path to follow is the *collage* technique tried by J. Kellas (1991). A general theory will not be produced by juxtaposing clippings from other theories, many of which are mutually incompatible.

In sum then, today we do not possess general theories and it will probably be long time until we do. It will take at least as long as the time necessary to reach a critical mass in the first and second levels. To shorten this time there is no better solution than to further the unification and improvement of method. I am convinced that, in the short term, spectacular advances are not possible in this, but rather more modest and stepwise achievements. As the Castillian saying says, *no por mucho madrugar amanece más temprano* (i.e. everything in its appointed time).

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ELITE COMPETITION AND THE ORIGINS OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM

Paul R. Brass

Two central arguments run through this paper. The first is that ethnicity and nationalism are not «givens» but are social and political constructions. That is, they are creations of elites who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent, in order to protect their well being or existence, or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups and for themselves. The second is that ethnicity and nationalism are modern phenomena, inseparably connected with the activities of the modern centralizing state.

These arguments separate my position from writers in the field who consider ethnicity and nationalism to reflect primordial identities, and who have searched the past all the way back to antiquity to find evidence of the existence of ethnic identities and nationalism.¹ My position, in contrast, is that ethnic identity and modern nationalism arise out of specific types of interactions between the leaderships of centralizing states and elites from non-dominant ethnic groups especially, but not exclusively, in the peripheries of those states. Whether or not ethnic mobilization and nationality formation occur in centralizing multi-ethnic states (and most states in the world are multi-ethnic to some degree), and the particular forms that ethnic mobilization and nationality formation take when they do occur, depend upon the kinds of alliance which are made between centralizing and regional or other non-dominant elites.

Moreover, the alliances are often not two-way but multiple. Many regions of large multi-ethnic states, such as India or the former Soviet Union or the former Yugoslavia, themselves contain a multiplicity of ethnic groups whose elites engage in conflict or cooperation with each other. In such situations, central state leaders

¹ I refer especially in this context to the works of Anthony Smith, particularly his *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) and John Armstrong's *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

may choose neutrality in conflicts between ethnic groups, or identification with elites from one ethnic group or another. Or, they may seek to divide one or both ethnic groups in order to assure the stability of their own power and support within particular regions of the country.

The important elites and the patterns of conflict differ in different times. In earlier periods, aristocratic and religious elites are most important. In later periods, educated elites become more important and ethnic conflicts are complicated by the existence of both secular and religious elites *within* particular ethnic groups. The patterns of ethnic mobilization and inter-ethnic conflict depend partly upon the role of the state, which may ally with one group or remain neutral, or may promote pluralism or assimilation.

In surveying the contemporary world even before the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, some observers became alarmed at the potential divisiveness and violence involved in ethnic group relations and the threats they posed to the very existence of some states. One school of thought, the «consociational,» associated with Arend Lijphart, has been particularly identified with these concerns and with a particular type of proposed resolution of them. I argue against the consociational perspective, whose proponents see the solutions to ethnic conflicts through the creation of systems of group representation based on the plural cultural segments of these societies. Since my argument assumes that there are no such things as fixed plural segments in multi-ethnic societies but rather that ethnic identities are always in flux, this solution constitutes to my mind nothing but the freezing of a particular system of elite collaboration and elite advantage. The logic of my position, therefore, is towards keeping the political systems of multi-ethnic societies open and in flux while attempting to decentralize the over-centralized states of the contemporary world, and to de-center ethnic group relations in the process.

I want to present this over-all argument in another way, as a set of conflicting propositions divided into two types. The first will be mistaken and dangerous assumptions, and the second will be more appropriate assumptions (that is, my assumptions).

I identify five mistaken and dangerous assumptions. The first is the presumption of primordialism, that is to say, that cultural differences among ethnic groups are objective factors—»givens«—that, following Geertz, are «rooted in the non-rational foundations of the human personality.»²

² Clifford Geertz, «The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,» in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 128.

The second mistaken and dangerous assumption is solidarity. This is the supposition that ethnic groups are monolithic, cohesive, tied to distinctive shared institutions and values—either across a whole range of values and institutions or with respect to certain crucial ones—and that their members will act unitedly to protect them against outside threats.

The third mistaken and dangerous assumption is that of mass hysteria. That is to say, it is posited that members of ethnic group also carry within themselves inter-group stereotypes and hatreds, which are deeply embedded in the minds of both elites and masses. However, it is further presumed that the untutored masses are especially prone to vent their feelings against people from other communities in spontaneous mass outbursts that are called riots.

The fourth mistaken and dangerous assumption is the necessity of the state, which is associated with the ideology of state exaltation. The argument here is that a strong centralized state is needed to maintain national unity against divisive tendencies and to protect minorities.

Finally, the fifth mistaken assumption is an anti-democratic one which is not explicit, but is often embedded in some of the literature of which I am critical. It goes as follows: because of the features of ethnic groups which I have just summarized, democracy in the adversarial competitive form is unsuitable for such societies, which instead require new forms of rule, particularly the consociational variety of elite accommodation at the center.

Now, in contrast to these mistaken and dangerous assumptions, I would like to offer alternative, more appropriate assumptions.

The first, in contrast to primordialism, may be characterized as the *variability* of ethnic identities. Ethnic identities are social constructions with more or less short life-spans, and they are always in flux. Their boundaries are always changing. Struggle is always in progress for internal control over groups members and over the right or power to define the core values of the group. These struggles are not only political but also are religious schismatic, linguistic, territorial, and so on.

The second more appropriate assumption, in contrast to that of solidarity, is what I would characterize as the pervasiveness of intra-ethnic as well as intra-class cleavages in most societies. Conflicts within groups sometimes are more severe than those with outsiders, as with divisions among Arabs and Muslims in the contemporary Middle East, just to take on obvious case.

The contrasting assumption to that of mass hysteria is the argument that inter-ethnic conflicts are promoted by elites, and abetted by state authorities. Riots are often promoted by specialists who know how to convert isolated incidents into apparently spontaneous inter-group conflagrations. Sometimes they are not even really inter-group in character, these so-called riots.

In contrast to the exaltation of the centralized state, the more appropriate view is one that accepts the idea that centralized states help to enlarge ethnic identities and boundaries, leading to struggle between large polarized groups for control over the state's leading institutions. In fact, there is a sort of «Parkinson's Law here (which will be discussed further below) concerning the expansion of ethnic boundaries to conform to the area or the site in which resources are distributed.

Finally, with regard to the question of democracy, it seems to me that while competitive democratic systems may not be ideal, they offer greater opportunities for long-term accommodations than do any other form of rule. Formal recognition of cultural rights is often awarded to groups in authoritarian systems but not political rights, which is what most people from distinct ethnic groups struggle for, especially in contemporary developing societies and in post-industrial authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes.

Now, having given these assumptions, I want to say some things about ethnic groups and nationalities, their formation, persistence, and transformation over time, and then address the role of the state in all this.

First, with regard to the formation, persistence, and transformation of ethnic identities: since ethnic identities are variable, there is nothing inevitable about the rise of ethnic identity and its transformation into nationalism among the diverse peoples of the contemporary world. Rather, the conversion of cultural differences into bases for political differentiation between peoples occurs only under specific circumstances, which need to be identified clearly. Broadly speaking, these circumstances fall into three categories.

The first category is elite competition. In my view, this provides the basic dynamic which precipitates ethnic conflict under specific conditions, arising from the broader political and economic environment rather than from the cultural values of the ethnic groups in question. The theory of elite competition is consistent with the assumption that ethnic identity is itself a variable rather than a fixed or given disposition. It is also consistent with some important work in history and the social

sciences published during the last decade, which points to the ways in which traditions are invented.³

The second important set of variables influencing ethnic identity formation relates to the relationships established between elites and the state, particularly the roles of collaborators with and opponents of state intrusion into regions inhabited by distinctive groups.⁴

There is a third set of variables emphasized by an early theorist of nationalism, Karl Deutsch, summarized under his two broad headings of social mobilization and assimilation, which in turn lay heavy emphasis on the importance of processes associated with urbanization and the development of modern means of mass communications.⁵ It has become increasingly clear since Deutsch wrote his path-breaking book, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, that political mobilization of traditional rural communities can occur in modernizing societies in the absence of fully developed systems of mass communication, notably through traditional networks of religious communication. Nowadays, of course, it is almost impossible to talk about the absence of developed systems of mass communication, which have penetrated even the most remote villages in contemporary agrarian societies. But the argument I am making is that, even before this, it was possible to mobilize rural communities politically without extensive means of mass communication.

Now, it follows from the assumption of ethnic variability and from the dynamics out of which ethnic identities are produced that the process of ethnic identity formation has consequences for the very definition of the ethnic group in question. The cultural forms, values, and practices of ethnic groups become political resources for elites who are competing for political power and economic advantage. They become symbols and referents for the identification of members of a group, which are called upon in order to create more easily a political identity. The symbols used to create a political identity also can be shifted to adjust to political circumstances and the limitations imposed by state authorities. If the authorities impose a ban on the use of religious symbols for political purposes, for example, elites may focus on the distinctive language of the religious group, if it has one. Or they may emphasize slight differences

³ I refer especially to *The Invention of Tradition*, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

⁴ An important book which takes up this theme is *Nationalism and the State*, by John Breuilly (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

⁵ See, of course, his seminal work, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953).

of dialect which would serve the same purpose of differentiating a particular group from others.

In the process of transforming cultural forms, values, and practices into political symbols, elites in competition with each other for control over the allegiance or territory of the ethnic group in question strive to enhance or break the solidarity of the group. Elites seeking to mobilize the ethnic group against its rivals or against the centralizing state authority tend to call up a multiplicity of the group's symbols in order to argue that the members of the group are different not in one respect only, but in many, and that all of its distinctive cultural elements are reinforcing. All members of the group, it is said, either do or ought to practice the same religion, speak the same language, wear the same clothes, eat the same foods, and sing the same songs. Elites seeking to challenge the authenticity of an ethnic group's claim for individuality will do the opposite, and argue that the members of the groups are divided by one or more of these several criteria, and that they share some of them with other ethnic groups.

It follows, finally, from all these points that the process of ethnic identity formation and its transformation into nationalism is reversible. It is reversible both because of the dynamics of external competition and also because of the internal divisions and contradictions that exist within all groups of people, however defined. Political and economic circumstances may cause elites to play down or discard the symbolic manipulation of cultural forms, values, and practices, and to seek instead cooperation with other groups or collaboration with the state authorities. Elites and others within the group also may resist both the political distortions of the group's culture and the attempts to impose arbitrary cultural congruities where they do not in fact exist.

The arguments outlined above clearly fall into what is called the instrumentalist, rather than the primordialist, view of ethnic identity formation. I see ethnic identity formation as a process created in the dynamics of elite competition within the boundaries determined by political and economic realities. My arguments, however, fall short of the most extreme instrumentalist views associated with some proponents of rational choice theory, who transform all choices, including cultural ones, into economic choices.

My aim is in no way to disregard or discard as unimportant the cultural forms, values, and practices of distinctive ethnic groups. On the contrary, my purpose is to show that political and economic elites who make use of ethnic group attributes

are constrained by the beliefs and values which exist within the group and which, therefore, limit the kinds of appeals that can be made. At the same time, the process by which elites mobilize ethnic identities simplifies and distorts those beliefs and values, and selects those which are politically useful rather than those which are central to the belief systems of the people in question. Insofar as political elites succeed in mobilizing an ethnic group by such means, the ethnic community or nation created in this way constitutes not necessarily an entirely new entity but one that has been transformed, whose boundaries have been in some ways widened and in other ways confined.

I would now like to consider the role of the state in this process of ethnic identity formation. I want to discuss the state, government policy, and the formation and/or decline of ethnic identities in multi-ethnic societies. My approach emphasizes the active role of the state, and the interaction between the state and elites within ethnic groups in the process of ethnic identity formation and decline. It emphasizes also the overall importance of centralizing state policies and their consequences for patterns of elite competition within and between ethnic groups.

Now, the arguments I am going to make about this are meant to apply to the experience of both post-industrial and contemporary developing societies, although, as I have indicated, I am also arguing that patterns of elite competition tend to change as state activities expand alongside the drive to industrialize. At the same time, it is also the case that the types of ethnic group relations and conflicts that I am going to discuss are especially relevant to contemporary developing societies, and to the more diverse multi-ethnic states such as the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. I believe that the reasons for this special relevance arise not from the nature of ethnicity, but from the nature of the modern centralizing European nation-state form, which since the end of World War II has been extended to every corner of the world. This extension has taken place despite the absence of nations with boundaries corresponding to the actual ethnic composition of the territories involved, and despite the rise of new movements of ethnic separatism among minorities in the older European states and the Soviet Union.

For purposes of developing my theoretical argument and to lay the basis for cross-cultural comparisons, I want to refer briefly to the period of Western colonial dominance in Asia and Africa, then come back to contemporary European experience. During the period of Western colonial dominance in Asia and Africa, the colonial powers sought to justify their rule by demonstrating that the territories over which they ruled were unfit for independent statehood because of the cultural diversities of these

societies and the antagonisms which allegedly existed among the various peoples within them. They made great efforts to count and to classify the peoples within the boundaries of the territories they ruled, fitting them into «discrete bounded groups» where before, as Southall has noted, there were often only «interlocking overlapping multiple identities.»⁶ The state authorities and Christian missionaries also sometimes created entirely new categories, some of which ultimately took hold in the form of new ethnic identities, others of which did not. European colonial authorities also tended to make status differentiations among various categories of people, favoring some groups and ignoring others.

Simultaneously with the imposition upon the peoples of Asia and Africa of these processes of identifying, counting, classifying, and defining the boundaries of groups, there developed a body of knowledge about them and a related theory known as the theory of the plural society. This theory, which is associated with Furnivall, M. G. Smith, van den Berghe, and Lijphart generally supported the colonial argument that such societies could not be viable independent states.

The new elites who led the nationalist movements of the former colonial societies and who took control of them after independence sought to counter the colonial myth with myths of their own concerning the ancient lineages of their new states. They also sought to create nations that conformed with the boundaries of the new states, adopting the slogan of «national integration.» That slogan, however, flew in the face of the existing cultural diversities and the classifications and differentiations added to them by the colonial powers—who often also attempted to manipulate ethnic differences in their struggles against the nationalist forces. Consequently, after independence, ethnic movements, parties, and leaders arose to take advantage of the greatly increased opportunities made available by the expansion of state activities that increased the «stakes of cultural competition.»⁷ Close scrutiny of the methods used by the colonial state to identify, describe, and virtually « charter » ethnic groups supports the idea that it is often a mistake to think of cultural categories in multi-ethnic societies as givens. Moreover, the use of such methods indicates clearly the differentiating role of the modern state which divides some ethnic groups and seeks to unify others, allying now with one elite group, now with another. This process that was reviled by nationalist leaders as a policy of «divide and rule,» continues to be followed in most post-colonial multi-ethnic states.

⁶ Aidan Southall, «The Illusion of Tribe,» *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, V, Nos. 1-2 (January-April, 1970), 36.

⁷ The quote is from Crawford Young, «Ethnicity and the Colonial and Post-Colonial State in Africa,» in Paul R. Brass (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and the State* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 74.

In the process of consolidation of colonial rule and the transition to independence, the activities of the state increase, precipitating a change in the nature of ethnic relations. In the early stages of colonial rule, the main issues are local control and the search by the authorities for favored collaborators. Elite competition and the state's search for collaborators tend at this stage to focus primarily on local aristocracies and religious elites. In the later stages, and in the post-independence period, issues of differential access by ethnic groups to new economic opportunities made available by an expanding state become increasingly prominent. At this point, issues concerning the language of education and the official state language become particularly important. Again not so much because of love of their own language, but because the language that is chosen is the language which gets jobs.

Issues of ethnic group competition for economic resources and struggles for recognition for a group's language are, however, by no means confined to post-colonial developing states. Such issues have arisen even in the post-industrial societies of the West, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s most evidently in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Elsewhere, I have made some comparisons between India and the Soviet Union, particularly with regard to the development of ethnic group competition and language conflicts,⁸ which I will not repeat here, but my argument is that ethnic group conflicts in these two states have not affected all groups equally and at all times. There is nothing given, natural, or inevitable about the rise of ethnic group conflicts in either the Soviet Union or India. Like ethnic conflicts elsewhere, their prominence at particular times among specific groups requires contextual rather than teleological explanations.

The factors that I would emphasize in this regard are the relations between the centralizing state and regional ethnic elites, and the extent to which the state leadership recognizes the cultural, linguistic, and religious rights of minority ethnic groups or seeks to deny such rights or intervene in local ethnic group conflicts for its own political advantage. Of particular importance in the rise of ethnic group conflicts in multi-ethnic states are changes in the political context and in the balance of center-periphery relations which arise especially under three types of circumstances: during transfers of power from colonial to post-colonial states, during successions struggles, and at times when the center of power appears to be weakening or the balance in center/periphery relations appears to be changing. At such points, the relationships between the center and particular regions of the country may be re-negotiated and new alliances may be formed with particular ethnic group elites.

⁸ Paul R. Brass, «Language and National Identity in the Soviet Union and India,» in *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison* (New Delhi: Sage, 1991).

It follows from the explanations for ethnic mobilization and conflict that have been given here that conflict resolution in multi-ethnic states must focus on center-regional relations and elite group interactions. Policies of state centralization which at the same time select regional collaborators from among particular ethnic group elites will ultimately produce counter-elites within the regions to challenge their regional rivals, and to challenge the centralizing state allied with them. Under some circumstances, such counter-movements may turn secessionist. Consequently, state leaders who wish to avoid such movements will have to consider decentralization of power and economic decision making, and the de-centering of ethnic group relations rather than intervening directly in them.

It is here that the link between assumptions about the nature of ethnicity and nationalism, explanations for ethnic group mobilization and inter-ethnic conflict, and modes of conflict resolution become clear. Those who begin with assumptions concerning the «naturalness» of ethnicity and the inevitability of ethnic group conflict in multi-ethnic societies will naturally reach different conclusions concerning their resolution. This is most evident in the school of conflict resolution for deeply divided societies which goes by the name of consociationalism. This school of thought proposes a new principle of representation for such societies as an alternative to the predominant, liberal, adversarial system of representation based on the principle of open competition of individual interests. The consociational principle, in contrast, is based on the idea that identity and not interest is the mainspring of political behavior, and that conflict of identities is dangerous. Therefore, it is better to freeze and accommodate differences between groups than to permit their resolution through competition.

The model for consociationalism was built from the experiences of the Netherlands and Belgium where, it is argued, ethnic conflict have been settled through various devices of group representation. Covell, however, has shown that ethnic conflicts in Belgium, like those in contemporary developing countries or in the former Soviet Union in the 1980s and 18990s, have primarily been about access to resources for groups.⁹ The consociational devices in Belgium were not developed to resolve «violent identity conflicts» but were rather mechanisms by which elites «defended their own position and not that of their following.»¹⁰ In fact, elites have used these mechanisms for competitive purposes when necessary to pursue their own interests.

⁹ Maureen Covell, «Ethnic Conflict, Representation and the State in Belgium,» in Brass, *Ethnic Groups and the State*, pp. 228-261.

¹⁰ Covell, «Ethnic Conflict, Representation and the State in Belgium,» p. 255.

In other words, the group representation and consociational devices adopted in Belgium were not designed to resolve conflicts but to pursue interests and gain control over resources. Consociationalism, therefore, like the theory of the plural society from which it derives, suffers from the deficiencies of its own assumptions. It reifies ethnicity, treats it as a given, assumes the solidarity of group identities, and therefore arrives at the conclusion that ethnic conflicts cannot be resolved except in a political order based on group representation. If, however, one takes the view that these assumptions are wrong, then consociationalism appears as a mystification of ethnicity and ethnic group conflicts which accepts at face value the justifications used for its adoption by those who stand to benefit from it.

Now, I want to make some summary statements about the sources of ethnic and cultural political mobilizations and conflicts, and return to the question of centralization versus decentralization. If one looks at the sources of ethnic and cultural political mobilization and conflicts, it seems to me they fall into five categories.

One source arises from state recognition of preferences for particular groups. We see this in the United States in the affirmative action policies originally designed for Blacks, but which then became foci for the mobilization of other disadvantaged groups seeking similar preferences and for privileged white groups aggrieved by them. In colonial societies, state recognition of particular groups for purposes of granting them preferential political treatment or differential advantages in resource distribution may arise out of a desire to promote a policy of collaboration, to find some groups who will provide support for the colonial state. It also may arise out of more noble motives, which have also occurred in the colonial states and in the United States as well. They are often the only possible way, for example, of helping severely disadvantaged groups, such as Blacks in the United States or the lowest castes in India. But it needs to be noted that when the state recognizes and gives preference to a particular group, this may provide an impetus for ethnic and cultural mobilization and then precipitate counter-mobilizations.

Other sources of ethnic and cultural mobilization, or precipitants of them, may revolve around specific policies and political strategies pursued by a particular state. Whether a state pursues pluralism or assimilation, whether it adopts a strategy of intervention for protection of minorities or whether it intervenes for manipulative purposes (to gain political support), also matter. There are also different kinds of pluralist strategies which may affect ethnic group mobilization. Pluralism on the basis of equality as in India, or pluralism on the basis of inequality as in South Africa, have

different consequences.¹¹ My point is that each type of state strategy has specific consequences for the maintenance of group identities and the possible strategies that a group may use to protect group and individual interests in response.

A third broad source of ethnic and cultural mobilization and conflict is unevenness in rates of social change among different social groups, leading to imbalances in relative access to jobs, educational advantages, and political power.

A fourth source is competition between persons from different ethnic and cultural groups for the same niches in the division of labor in society.

Finally, the fifth source is the tension between policies of state centralization and desires and tendencies towards regionalism and decentralization in multi-ethnic countries. Here I return to the idea of a kind of Parkinson's Law, which I would formulate as follows. Elites try to expand/contract group identities to a size or level which corresponds to the level at which resources are provided, to maximize their number, effectiveness, and advantages. This fits in with my argument about the variability of ethnic identities. My argument here is that ethnic groups will tend to try to expand/contract their boundaries to conform to the boundaries of the relevant political unit in which they are operating.

Let me try to provide two brief examples of how all this works, one from the developing world and one from contemporary Europe. I will use Sri Lanka for the former and Yugoslavia for the latter.

Sri Lanka provides a case of two distinct minorities of Indian origin confronting a politically dominant majority, the Sinhalese, which has been bent on creating a centralized Sinhalese-dominated state. The two minorities are Indian Tamils and Sri Lankan Tamils. (The population is about 75 percent Sinhalese, 12-13 percent Sri Lankan Tamils, 5-6 percent Indian Tamils, and the rest mostly Muslims.) The Sri Lankan Tamils are an indigenous population in Sri Lanka, as indigenous as the Sinhalese themselves. There is another group of *Indian* Tamils whose members came in the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth century to work on the tea estates started by the British.

The Indian Tamils and the Sri Lankan Tamils had little to do with each other in the past. Sri Lankan Sinhalese political elites, however, wanted to eliminate Indian

¹¹ These terms are derived from Benjamin Akzin, *State and Nation* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1964).

Tamils from citizenship and from the country in order to maintain Sinhalese ethnic dominance. So, the first thing that the government of Sri Lanka did after independence was to say, «Let's get rid of these Indian Tamils. They don't belong here. They are not citizens of Sri Lanka and they shouldn't have voting rights.» Because if they did, the size of the Tamil minority would be considerably expanded. The Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian only by distant origin, were more educationally advanced, and held important positions in public service and the economy during British rule, which was resented by the Sinhalese. In the post-independence period, and especially after 1956, the Sinhalese government practiced systematic discrimination (occasionally counter-balanced by more moderate policies) to rectify this situation through its language and employment policies, establishing Sinhala as the sole official language of the country, and practicing systematic exclusion of Tamils from the exercise of political influence in the centralized state and at the local level as well.

Now Brass's variation on Parkinson's Law, of ethnic group creation, expansion and consolidation, went to work here leading to the artificial creation of two polarized groups, Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils, out of the multiplicity of territorial, caste, and communal groupings that had historically existed on the island. Moreover, it also ignored the historic cultural and religious intermingling between Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese. As a consequence of Sinhalese discrimination against both groups, the boundaries between Indian Tamils and Sri Lankan Tamils have eroded. Increasing consolidation of the two communities was accompanied by increasing incidents of violence, so-called riots, which in fact were pogroms of Sinhalese against Tamils, with the increasingly direct involvement of the army and police authorities. (The army and the police, as a consequence of forty years of systematic discrimination against Tamils, have of course been nearly exclusively Sinhalese domains.)

The exclusivist drives of the Sinhalese politicians to dominate a centralized state have finally led to the creation of an equally destructive counter-movement aimed at creating a Tamil state, and to regroup the entire Tamil population of the island into it. State-supported discrimination against a minority in a centralized state has, therefore, precipitated minority terrorism, which in turn evokes state terrorism against the minority, and the circle goes on and on.

I want to consider now the disintegration of Yugoslavia and its descent into an even more brutal ethnic war accompanied by atrocities not seen in the heart of Europe since World War II. As a South Asia specialist, I must here rely entirely upon the works of others who have written on Yugoslavia and on the news reports on this ghastly carnage which have been featured in the Western press for the past year.

Much of the Western media coverage and some of the statements of government officials in the United States have resorted to the easy, standard, residual explanations for the new Balkan wars containing all five of the assumptions I have characterized as mistaken and dangerous. The image conveyed is of the resuscitation of «age-old,» «irrational» hostilities among peoples who have hated each other for centuries. Since the removal of the Slovenes from the conflict, the number of these peoples has also been reduced to three presumed solidary groups: Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. The decline of the Titoist state has made it only natural and inevitable that these three groups which have always hated each other should now be killing each other with such ferocity. The President and the Secretary of State of the United States, resting their analysis upon these assumptions, have publicly declared that it is not our place to become involved in such a morass of tribal hostilities.

Yet, the Serbs, in whose name the struggle for dominance of the rump Yugoslav state and for control of as much of its former territory as possible is being waged, have also been characterized as being culturally among the most internally diverse peoples of southern Europe.¹² Nor was it even clear initially that the Serbs in Croatia cared much about the plight of Serbs in Kosovo in whose name Milosevic launched his campaign for Serbian unity.¹³ From this point of view, the Serbian participation in the war in ex-Yugoslavia has not arisen out of the spontaneous movement of a united Serb nation to maintain its dominant position, but has been promoted by a Serbian political leadership seeking to «foster the homogenization of Serbs» throughout the former Yugoslavia.¹⁴ Moreover, such homogenization of the Serbs through warfare in the cause of a Greater Serbia serves the interests of the ex-Communist elites who seek to maintain their own power in a Serbian-dominated state.

Though the demographic pattern and the multiplicity of ethnic groups involved is greater in Yugoslavia than in Sri Lanka, the logic of elite competition for control over a centralized state apparatus is evident here as well. The conflict in Yugoslavia has arisen in one of the three changed political contexts which I have argued are danger points in the relations between the centralizing state and regional ethnic elites. Clearly, this is a set of conflicts which arose at a time when the center of power in Yugoslavia had been weakening for several years in the aftermath of the death of Tito and when the balance in the relations between the center and the regions was

¹² Ivo Banac, «Foreword: The Politics of Cultural Diversity in Yugoslavia,» in Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. ix-x.

¹³ Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (New York: Penguin, 1993), p. 33.

¹⁴ Ivo Banac, «Foreword: The Politics of Cultural Diversity in Yugoslavia,» p. x.

changing. The simultaneous opening up of the Yugoslav political system to mass participation and multiple parties threatened with political extinction the old Communist party and bureaucratic elites all over the Union. In a multi-ethnic society, no more convenient bases for large-scale political mobilization can be found than appeals to the communal sentiments of large language, religious, and cultural groups. Clearly, this is what most of the ex-Communist elites and their rivals out to displace them set out to do.

In contrast to Sri Lanka, however, no ethnic group in Yugoslavia was large enough to assert a right of dominance over the entire territory. Although the Serbian leader, Milosevic continued to proclaim his belief in a united Yugoslavia in which, of course, the Serbian ex-Communist elites would continue to predominate, it was evident that only in a truncated Yugoslavia could the Serbs, the largest ethnic group, hope to dominate. The elimination of Slovenia from the federation made possible such a claim for the Serbs, whose proportion to the remaining population of the state was thereby increased. The departure of Croatia would then seem to provide the necessary next step for the creation of a Serbian-dominated centralized state dominated by ex-Communist elites. However, again in contrast to Sri Lanka, there was no single majority pitted against one principal minority group, but a set of interspersed minorities in all the remaining regions of Yugoslavia.

The existence of interspersed minorities, however, offered an opportunity to the ex-communist elites under Milosevic—by most accounts an utterly ruthless and unprincipled demagogue—to stake their claim to continued rulership by exploiting this very fact insofar as the Serbs were concerned. Serbian nationalist symbols were revived and Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia stood forth as the protector of the minority Serbs in Croatia, Kosovo, and, of course, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croatian leadership made the task of Milosevic easier by openly discriminating against its large Serbian minority, expelling them from the government jobs they held under the previous Communist regime. Aside from the natural resentment such a move was bound to create, it also helped the Serbian political leadership raise the specter of the rise of a new fascist, Ustasha regime, which would threaten minority Serbs in Croatia with physical extinction as well. Nor did it help when the Croatian regime made its intentions towards the Serbian minority still clearer through the jejeune and provocative act of announcing the intended elimination of Cyrillic from street signs, leaving the names only in the Latin script.¹⁵ In this conflict between the two principal rival ethnic elites, one defending its control over the bastion of the remnant of the

¹⁵ Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, p. 14.

centralized Yugoslav state, the other asserting its primacy in a single region, there was no place for a third independent force, for the Muslims of Bosnia or for that considerable minority in Bosnia which continued to consider themselves neither Serb nor Croat but Yugoslav and for whom Sarajevo represented enlightened, cosmopolitan life free of primitive ethnic antagonisms.

Now the question is: how to get out of this vicious circle of state discrimination against minorities evoking minority terrorism in turn evoking state terrorism, as in Sri Lanka, or evoking full-scale war as in ex-Yugoslavia. In these types of situations, it is the centralizing state that is the source of the problem, along with its associated European-derived idea that one nation must be dominant in each state and all other nations are merely ethnic groups relegated to the category of minorities. The direction for a solution is therefore decentralization combined with retention and recognition of cultural diversities of all sorts, resistance to all efforts to force people into considering themselves members of broadly-defined, embattled cultural categories in a life-and-death struggle for control over the same territory, and the establishment of international procedures for the protection of those groups classified as «minorities» in so-called «nation-states.»¹⁶

¹⁶ Cf. Banac, «Foreword: The Politics of Cultural Diversity in Yugoslavia,» p. xiii.

Culture, doctrine, politics: three ways of constructing nationalism

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1. Defining terms

The first problem we confront is what we mean by nationalism as well as cognate terms such as nation. A major difficulty in the way of clear debate is that different theorists and historians mean different things by the term.

Very broadly we can refer to nationalism in terms of what people think or say, what they feel and have in common, and what they do collectively. These three categories can be labelled as *doctrines*, *sentiments*, and *politics*.

In all three cases the object which is referred to is that of the nation. I leave aside the question of whether nations are «real» entities which give rise to nationalist doctrines, sentiments or politics. Later, however, I will return to the important issue of whether the characteristics claimed as belonging to the nation in nationalist discourse should be seen as primarily reflecting pre-existing characteristics or rather as in some sense actually constituting those characteristics.

2. Doctrines

«Nationalism is a doctrine invented at the beginning of the 19th century». This is the striking sentence with which Kedourie begins his book on nationalism. Few writers on the subject would, I think, dispute the validity of this sentence provided it is understood in a narrow way. Anthony Smith, for example, even when arguing for the proposition that characteristics associated with the «nation» (at least, that is, with the ideal type of the nation which can be constructed from the discourse of nationalists) can be discerned in ancient and medieval societies, also concedes that movements which proclaim a nationalist ideology (i.e., that nationalist discourse) cannot really be traced back much beyond the late 18th century.

Again, it is fairly easy to agree on how we should identify that class of doctrines which are termed nationalist or the central terms of discourse that we would identify as nationalist. Smith's notion of a «core doctrine», in my view, covers the main points although with certain modifications: there is a nation (the issue of *identity*); this nation has a unique value (the issue of *commitment*); this nation should possess as much freedom as possible (the issue of *autonomy*).¹

Furthermore, one can go on to look at the various claims made about, and on behalf of, the nation by nationalists in order to see what distinguishes a nation from any other social category. Common origins and history, a shared sense of identity, a homeland - these are usually the major such characteristics. Of course the forms that these take are very different in different nationalist doctrines. A shared sense of identity might be constituted primarily through language but in other cases it might be common elite participation in certain institutions which is regarded as crucial. In turn this will affect the kinds of claims that will be made about *commitment*. It might be based upon the standardization and diffusion of a common language or upon the reform of political institutions or upon racial purification. Finally there can be different kinds of political goals - ranging from mild forms of autonomy under broader federalist arrangements to full independence not merely in terms of statehood but also in terms of economic and cultural independence.

The problems with Kedourie's claims arise when one seeks to extend them beyond the narrow field of nationalism as doctrine.

There are a number of moves which are possible here. The first is to argue that nationalism is *essentially* doctrine. This argument can be sustained on two grounds - one persuasive but limited, the other much more ambitious but less persuasive.

The limited claim is that to *define* something which ends in the suffix «-ism» is to define it as a doctrine or at least as some kind of an intellectual or ideological position. To say that nationalism is to be defined as certain forms of collective behaviour - be that of a cultural, economic or political kind - would appear in itself incoherent. Rather one would have to say that there are certain kinds of collective

¹ My main modification is the first proposition. Smith argues that a nationalist is someone who claims that the world is divided into a number of unique nations and on that basis makes certain claims on behalf of his/her nation. That means Smith has to deny the term «nationalist» to someone who claims that there is a nation (i.e. his/her nation) but does not feel the need to make any claims about anyone else's nation, let alone to ascribe values to nations other than his or her own. I find this unduly logical and restrictive.

behaviour which orient themselves towards the ideas disclosed in nationalist discourse. Nationalism is doctrine first and foremost.

However, defining something is not the same as explaining or attributing significance to something. Clearly an account of why nationalist discourse came to be more prominent from the late 18th century may give much greater weight to matters other than the work of those who construct this discourse. Equally, one might wish to argue that nationalism, so long as it remains no more than doctrine, is of little interest to the historian and only becomes significant once it becomes something to which cultural, economic or political collective movements orient themselves.

Yet there is an approach which begins with treating nationalism as doctrine and which tries to claim a special significance and/or explanatory role for doctrine in more general accounts of nationalism. Kedourie is a case in point. He begins with doctrine not merely for definitional reasons. He goes on to claim a special significance for those who formulate the nationalist doctrine - the intellectuals. He links the rise in significance of such intellectuals to the breakdown of traditional patterns of life and of authority. In the consequent vacuum people search for new, more satisfying explanations of who they are, to what they should be committed, and what kinds of autonomy they should enjoy. For various reasons the answers which nationalist intellectuals furnish to these questions are regarded as more satisfactory than most others. The answers also serve the particular interests of such intellectuals who are thereby raised in prestige and power by their association with nationalist movements. Nationalism as doctrine, therefore, stands in some kind of causal relationship to nationalism as sentiment or as collective action. It is the successful extension of nationalism from an idea into a sentiment and a goal of political movements that is at the heart of historical accounts of nationalism.

I think this position is untenable. First, it is clear that there is no clear correlation between the formulation and elaboration of nationalist ideas and the strength of nationalism as sentiment or action. In many former colonial territories there was very little opportunity for nationalist doctrines to be elaborated or disseminated before a nationalist collective movement arose and took power from the imperial authority. In some countries, most notably England, there can be discerned a strong sense of national identity without the formulation of explicit nationalist doctrines. In many parts of Europe nationalist intellectuals formulated doctrines but only very much later, and sometimes not at all, did there develop any widely diffused sense of nationalist sentiment or collective movement. In other words, nationalism as sentiment, or as collective action, can take on strong forms in the absence of any strong or elaborate

development of nationalism as doctrine or *vice versa*. This takes us back to the narrow definitional point - all we can safely argue is that some minimal intellectual position (there is a nation to which one should be committed and which should have autonomy) is required as a definitional starting point for identifying nationalism as sentiment or collective action. Beyond that one should not make sweeping or general claims for the power of nationalist doctrine to make nationalism significant or to bring nationalist sentiments or collective movements into existence.

What this means is that in general terms the study of nationalism as doctrine should be pursued as a specific kind of intellectual history. It is of value to identify and analyse the formulation of nationalist doctrines. In each particular case it is also of value to identify and analyse the formulation of nationalist doctrines. In each case it is also of value to see if, and how, the formulation of such doctrines stand in relation to the development of nationalist sentiments or politics. But one should not seek to construct a general position on nationalism from the specific interest in nationalism as doctrine.

A final point can be noted. Students of nationalist doctrine are almost wholly in the «modernist» camp - that is to say there is general consensus that such doctrines are modern. It may be that some will argue that this is not an important point - that nationalist doctrine is but a variant on other ideologies which identify friends and foes, or that nationalism is the equivalent of other, pre-modern doctrines. The more committed modernist will, by contrast, argue that nationalism points to a different kind of sensibility than that disclosed in pre-modern doctrines and that the identity of the group defined as the «nation» and the nature of the commitment to, and the autonomy claimed for, the nation are different in very important respects from pre-modern notions of identity, commitment and autonomy.

3. Sentiments

From this approach nationalism is seen primarily in terms of the development of national(ist) sentiments, or «national consciousness» within elements of the broad population identified loosely as the «nation».

Here there is much more of a «perennialist» / «modernist» debate than in the case where nationalism is regarded as doctrine. A sense of common origin, of a shared identity, of a homeland is something which various ancient and medieval historians claim to be able to identify in some of the peoples they study. What is lacking is that

this is not necessarily summarized into a nationalist doctrine or does not give rise to political movements seeking autonomy for the nation.

Again this position can be understood in a broader or a narrower way. The narrow way is simply to identify core characteristics of national sentiment or consciousness and then to try and ascertain whether these can be found diffused more or less widely within a particular population. There is nothing wrong with such a procedure and one must be fairly open-minded as to whether such characteristics can be located in populations in the ancient and medieval as well as the modern world.

It is perhaps worth noting, however, that even those who claim that such characteristics can be found in pre-modern populations stop short of making certain empirical claims. In almost all pre-modern cases only two kinds of institutions are identified as channels through which national sentiments are developed - dynasties and churches. Clearly in modern times such institutions have also played an important part in constructing and diffusing sentiments of nationality. However, in modern times other institutions have played as great, if not greater, a role. The association of national sentiments with systems of law, with certain institutions other than monarchy (e.g., parliaments), and with a range of special cultural institutions (museums, universities, schools and so on) all appears peculiarly modern. Again it is open to debate as to whether these specifically modern features of nationalist sentiment are just a variant on pre-modern features or represent something significantly different. My own view is that, so long as one focuses on the *institutional* forms in which national(ist) sentiments are constructed and diffused, rather than regarding national(ist) sentiment as something developed outside institutions (e.g., through speaking the same language of living the same ways of life), then the pre-modern/modern distinction will appear to be a very great one.

The broader view of nationalism as essentially sentiments, as really a feature of culture, involves making the same kinds of moves as the broader view of nationalism as doctrine makes. First, it might be argued that nationalism in this sense has to be taken as having priority over nationalism in other senses. Nationalist doctrine is merely the making explicit of such sentiments, it might be claimed. It would be incredible to imagine intellectuals «inventing» nations; certainly one would not envisage such inventiveness getting very far or achieving much appeal if it did not already have «something» to go on. Nationalists of course argue this. Again, it might be argued that nationalist political action can only succeed if it can persuade significant elements of the «nation» to support it and these will only do so if they already accept the premises of the nationalist movement - that is, that there is a nation to which one

should commit oneself and which should attain some kind of autonomy. Again, nationalist politicians would argue this. At most the nationalist intellectual or politician is merely making more explicit what already exists.

Again I would argue that this is an untenable position. The argument is precisely the same as I made in relation to nationalism as doctrine: empirically one cannot correlate closely the existence of national(ist) sentiments with the existence of strong or elaborate nationalist doctrines and/or of significant nationalist political movements.

What this means is that one should develop this construction of nationalism as a general but fairly narrow kind of history. It is certainly worth studying the «myth-symbol» complexes of which Anthony Smith writes. It is also very worthwhile studying changes, especially in the modern period, in elite and popular culture, which point to a growing significance of national sentiments. Studies of the development and intensification of new forms of communication (e.g., the extension of literacy and its institutional forms) and of social exchanges (e.g., as a consequence of industrialization and urbanization) would be part and parcel of this branch of historical inquiry. Personally I think such inquiry is most illuminating when linked to some conception of the modern - e.g., Gellner's notion of the breakdown of the social divisions of agrarian empire and the new kinds of social and geographical mobilization associated with industrialization, or Anderson's identification of a new kind of sensibility, at least at certain elite levels, related to the growth of «print capitalism». However, it is not essential that such a conception be employed.

What is important is to leave open the question of how far historical accounts of this kind can be associated with the kinds of intellectual history which are concerned with nationalism as doctrine. Only a study of actual connections in particular cases can deal with that question.

4. Politics

Finally nationalism can be considered as collective action. In my own work I have been concerned with this understanding of nationalism and therefore I see no need to elaborate this position very far. Nationalism here refers to political movements which claim to base themselves upon national identity and which seek to develop the commitments and autonomy associated with the nationalist position.

Again, this position can be constructed narrowly or broadly. The narrow construction simply begins with trying to identify such movements and asking why they arise and why they have more or less success in achieving their objectives. In principle it should be accepted that the answers to these questions might give far more weight to other factors than the development of nationalist doctrines or the degree to which nationalist sentiments already existed within the population to which the politicians appeal. In my own approach I have attributed particular significance to the way in which the existing state wields power and also, especially for understanding the degree of success, the nature of the international political system.

There are two moves one can make to go further than this. One is just the same as the move made by those who regard doctrine or sentiment as at the centre of our understanding of nationalism generally. That is to say that in some sense nationalism as politics is prior to, stands in a causal relationship to, nationalism as doctrine or sentiment. For example, one might argue that nationalist doctrine is only really elaborated or at least diffused to a wide part of the «nation» once this is regarded as an important task by a nationalist movement. At that point, it might be argued, nationalist doctrines acquire a different character and a greater significance than they did before. One might argue that national sentiments are usually very weakly developed prior to nation-state formation. It is the nation-state itself which plays the major role in developing new institutions (legal systems, parliamentary and/or bureaucratic state institutions, education establishments, etc.) which actually make national sentiment something widespread and almost «natural». «We have made Italy, now we must make Italians» is the most famous formulation of this sequence, but it is also captured in the title and argument of Eugene Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen*.

I am attracted to such arguments, and certainly subscribed to them in the first edition of my book *Nationalism and the State*. I would be more cautious today (as I hope will be seen in the second edition of that book). Significance is not merely political significance; doctrines are not solely the work of political movements; senses of cultural affinities are not solely the work of state institutions. Generally I do think certain ways in which nationalist doctrine is formulated (especially when it is put in politically precise terms) and certain kinds of national sentiments (e.g. as developed through state led literacy movements) do give rise to distinct forms of nationalist doctrine and sentiment. But they do not give rise to all forms.

Therefore, I would draw the same conclusion as I did in the previous two sections. To treat nationalism as politics is to engage in one general kind of inquiry - a different kind of inquiry from that of intellectual historians concerned with doctrine

or from that of social, cultural and economic historians concerned with sentiments. Here it is the nature of state institutions, the patterns of political organization and mobilization, and the international political system which are at the centre of the historian's interest. Only then, on a case by case basis, can one see what are the actual connections between nationalist politics, doctrines and sentiments.

I would, however, make one more definite claim. That is, that nationalism as a distinct kind of political movement only really can be identified from the early 19th century; that this can be associated with the development of specifically modern kinds of political action; and that these kinds of political action are closely connected to the development of a new kind of state.

5. Conclusion

This paper is little more than a warning against over-ambitious attempts to understand nationalism. Nationalism covers a wide range of objects. I think it is best to be clear about the major kinds of objects to which the term refers and to study each of these kinds of objects, in a general way, with separate and appropriate methods of inquiry. I do not think any general theory is available which will command assent as having either provided a meaningful and general definition of nationalism as one kind of object or as having established that nationalism as one kind of object provides the key to understanding nationalism generally.

I would, add one further point. It seems to me that nationalism as doctrine and nationalism as politics can be claimed to be peculiarly modern. I would argue, furthermore, that this peculiarity is a very significant one, not just a trivial variant on a more general theme. It also seems to me that nationalism as sentiments, insofar as one is concerned with institutional embodiments of sentiment, also exhibits peculiar and significant modern features.

The search for general understanding should, in my view, therefore proceed from a conception of modernity rather than a particular conception of nationalism. In different ways, and ways which do not lead to uniform or even necessary connections in any particular case, modernization generates nationalist doctrines, sentiments and politics. Modernization is a very general term and process and the ways in which nationalism of these different kinds are generated are often only very indirectly related to one another. All we can hope for, therefore, is a broad framework within which to pursue our different kinds of nationalism then seek to make connections between them.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONALIST IDEOLOGICAL SYSTEM¹

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I. A sociological perspective on nationalism

From a sociological standpoint the nation, as a subject of study, constitutes a particular definition of the social reality which establishes a differentiation, a border, along a historically incubated geographical and cultural continuum. The expression «definition of reality» is used in order to focus attention on the fact that the nation is more than simply just an administrative division of territory, based on political or economic interests, since it entails processes of cultural differentiation which, as expressed by Giddens (1987), ontologically affect the social actors involved. In other words, the construction of the nation is a process of construction of a collective identity sustained by a new definition of reality which struggles to impose itself as «the preponderant social evidence» in the face of an alternate socially dominant definition.

Thus, in the Western context, historically we may refer to two processes by which the national idea emerges. First is the national definition of the community sponsored by the bourgeoisie from the emerging Modern State, with the purpose of founding a reference for legitimation of power in opposition to the preceding social evidences and their forms of legitimation. In this fashion the nation is constructed to fit the State (now already a Nation-State), and is circumscribed by its territorial limits, being built upon the existence of certain preexisting static elements that define the community's internal borders (of identity). The second process refers to those sociohistorical phenomena in which the national definition of the community is hurled against the Nation-State in defense of a community which feels its existence threatened (negated) by that State. For this reason it defends a new cultural and spatial definition

¹ This text is a synthesis of the results obtained in a recent investigation published by the author with the title *La nación como discurso*, (Madrid, Siglo XXI - CIS, 1992). Here an attempt has been made to present the theoretical and methodological model used, illustrating at the end with some of the results obtained. The interested reader may deepen in the subject by consulting the works cited.

* Translated: Daniel Blanch.

(delimitation) within the context of state domination, claiming for itself the right to self-government. Its legitimation is none other than the community itself, defined on the basis of pre-existing diacritical features.

These two phenomena coincide in seeking their legitimation through recourse to the national community; but differ both in their genetic dimension and in the political logic which dominates them. Genetically the «internal» (or peripheral) Western nationalisms are built upon a pre-existing national structure, providing evidence in this manner for a certain crisis of the Nation-State from which they emerge. One would say that the success of peripheral nationalisms is inversely proportional to the success achieved by the State in its national legitimation (Pérez-Agote 1989), at least within that portion of its area. Thus two different political logics have been defined. In the construction of the Nation-State the national definition of community, as the context of its legitimation, is carried out from the standpoint of the State itself, from the exercise of power. In contrast, peripheral nationalisms must build and disseminate their national idea as a step prior to political demands for self-government. We may thus differentiate analytically the concepts of Nation and State, understanding the former as the ideological dimension of legitimation of the latter, which exists either *de facto* or as a project of future self-government.

This ideological period and dimension implies the construction of a differential identity with a hegemonic vocation both in the case of the Nation-State, as well as of the peripheral nationalisms. We can thus state that the nation may be analyzed as a phenomenon of collective identity, that is, as a specific definition of the reality defined by a human group as social evidence (Pérez-Agote 1984). This does not mean that the nation is a fiction or an invention. Quite the opposite, it is a social reality and to that extent is the result of a process of historical sifting. Therefore it may be considered a social fact in the Durkheimian sense. That is, the nation consists in making objective the social relations generated by men, with a capacity to impose itself on individuals, determining their thoughts and conduct.

From this perspective a dual approximation to the understanding of the national phenomenon is possible. First of all is the historical consideration of the conditions in which the phenomenon emerged, that is, the study of its historical genesis. In conjunction with this inescapable perspective, however, a knowledge of the sociological dimension of the national phenomenon is also necessary. That is, assuming that the nation is a collective identity phenomenon resulting from a process of construction of the social evidence, it is important to know how and why the social actors arrive at a categorization of the social reality in that manner, and what

consequences result from it (Pérez-Agote 1984). From this sociological perspective, the question of interest is to find out in what measure the statements that declare the community's national character have social success, to what extent they determine the behavior of the actors, and by what mechanisms and in what conditions the statement is produced and reproduced. This implies adopting a phenomenological-genetic methodological perspective (Pérez-Agote 1989). The phenomenological dimension insures that the social definition of the reality assumed by the actors will be studied as particular «readings» carried out on the social reality, without adopting judgements on the scientific status or veracity of the images and beliefs that determine the behavior of the actors. Thus one is adopting the Theorem of Thomas, according to which: «if the actors define situations as real, they are real in their consequences». In addition, the genetic perspective, impedes the adoption of any idealist perspective in that it seeks objective means of determining the social representations and their mechanisms of production and reproduction.

The present work is centered principally around the phenomenological perspective. It attempts to show the internal logic that dominates the production, transmission and consumption of the nationalist ideological meanings; that is, the nucleus, or prototype, that determines the construction of an alternative definition of the social reality, a new «social evidence», a collective identity, in this case the national one.


II. Understanding the ideological system

Upon the assumption of what already has been proposed, we may consider the nationalist ideological process as one of production, transmission and consumption of ideological meanings in the midst of social communication, in which an ideological system is established. Thus ideology is understood as «a system of semantic rules for generating messages» (Verón 1971), and the ideological system as «a subset of language (which) limits the range of what can be said» (Ibáñez 1986). Or in the formula of Verón, it is a «finite or closed model which expresses the restrictions to which is subject the emission of any message that forms part of that set». Expressing the restrictions is nothing other than making explicit the set of rules that allow the articulation of a discourse that is characteristic of that ideological system. Thus the pertinent feature of an ideological system, which distinguishes it from others, is precisely its rules. In other words, the ideological system is at work at the level of its «competence» and not of its «performance». It follows then that it is not possible to achieve understanding of an ideological system from a denotative level of analysis

only. This is one of the traditional errors of sociological studies on ideologies, which limit their study to certain «performances» and do not ask themselves whether there is a need for constructing a model of the «competence» (Verón, 1971; Provost-Chaveau 1971; Ibáñez 1985a).

Developing the model of the «ideological competence» in which an ideological system consists means working at a more complex level which implies the reconstruction of the logic and functioning of the observed ideological system, understood as a complex system. It therefore implies understanding the system of rules that permit the emergence of discourses characteristic of a certain ideological system. In the words of Verón: «it is the study of a competence, of a productive capacity, that is, to engender an indefinite number of propositions recognized as manifestations of that system» (1971). At the ideological systems level of analysis the competence is not understood as a capacity of the actors, in the manner of generative-transformational linguistics, which would take us back to the consideration of ideology as internal systems of the personality. Rather it is an analogy with the plane of «language» in Saussure, sociologically understood as an institution, as something above the individual, although restoring in the individual the missing dynamic dimension. Thus the generative models are understood as referring to a real process of production and consumption, intimately linking the levels of «competence» and «performance» in the analysis of the ideological processes.

Verón builds upon these suppositions a model which presents a dual division between the «conditions of production» of the ideological meaning and its «manifestations» (Graph 1). The first part of this articulation includes the «mode of production» and «social practices» on the one hand, and «ideological systems» on the other. These two blocks are articulated into two structures, «deep» ones and «superficial» ones. The first refers to semantification and the second to articulation of meaning. So, the mode of production constitutes the deep structure, while the ideological systems are the superficial structures of the ideological meaning. The ideological systems in turn present a division into deep structures and superficial ones. Again, the first are the depositories of the basic meaning of the ideological system, its semantic level, while the latter carry out the function of articulating this semantification. The deep structures allude to genetic models of the ideological meaning while the superficial ones allude to genetic models of communication, and therefore of consumption. In that respect a certain correspondence is established between the elements of each of the articulations. Thus, one may expect that the deep structures of the ideological systems, which generate social communication, will make explicit or at least indicate the form of production as generator of meaning. In other



Graph 1: levels of ideological meaning.

words, the deep meaning of an ideological system will be telling us about the mode of production that generates it. Understanding an ideological process consists precisely of that: gaining access to the deep meaning of an ideological system, which opens the doors that lead towards the social practices that generate it.

The last level of the model refers to the manifestation, that is the externalization of meaning. This is the external element of the ideological process, the one by which we have access to the deep structures. Verón points out three clearly distinguished fields: the «texts», the observable social action processes, and the «objects». Now, at the manifestation level it is possible to distinguish also between deep structures (depositories of meaning) and superficial ones, which are more external and

immediate, always taking into account that we are moving within the field of manifestation, and therefore, the meaning will refer to the «message» to be communicated (Cabrera 1992). Again the correspondence between the various levels will occur: the deep structures of the manifestation correspond with their reciprocal partners in the ideological systems, and these with the social practices. In the same fashion a correspondence will take place between the superficial structures at the plane of manifestation and those of the ideological system. This correspondence is understandable if we consider that we can only separate «analytically» the two elements that constitute the conditions of production, in that the ideological systems and modes of production are difficult to isolate. Nor can we isolate the manifestation of the ideological system that generates it, or at least makes it possible. That is, the three levels of the context of the manifestation represent the channels of access that the social scientist possesses to study the ideological processes. Evidently one is forced to begin with the elements of the manifestation, which are analyzed using methodologies that permit a gradual access from the lowest levels of meaning to the most complex ones.

The ideological system, as any system, constitutes three differentiated levels: «the level of the elements, the level of relationships between elements (structure), and the level of relationships between structures -relationships between relationships- (system)» (Ibáñez 1986). We may thus state that in the textual context, the «lexical» level (whose element, or unit of analysis is the word) and the «semantic» level (occupied with the relationships of meaning), are integrated in a higher level of meaning represented by the «semiotic» dimension: «the science which studies the production and consumption of meanings» (Verón 1971). We would thus say that the semiotic dimension allows access to the deep structures of ideological systems, while the semantic and lexical levels allow access to superficial structures.

If the objective is to study the ideological system in depth, analyzing carefully all the elements of the context of manifestation, and making explicit the logic of the complex system that it consists of, then it is necessary to advance from the more superficial to the deeper structures. For this purpose the study must be articulated into successive stages: lexical analysis, semantic analysis and semiological analysis.

III. A methodological model for the study of the ideological system


Methodologically, the application of the model requires a comparative perspective. It may consist of the comparison of various sources characteristic of the

different ideological systems or a comparison of various sources in the context of the same ideological system. The first case involves describing the differential elements of various systems, a comparison which therefore must be thematically focussed around a point of interest to the investigator. In the second approach the deep structure of a specific system is described and discovered from the particular textual modulations of each of the sources chosen as representatives of the system. In both cases the object of study must maintain a certain unity around some element which permits the control of both the discourse's social conditions of production and the identity of the elements of comparison. It may consist of diachronic study of the sources, by correctly coding them and studying their temporal evolution, or of a synchronic study in which the objective is centered on the system and the sources are articulated around the elements upon which it is proposed.

The theoretical model sustains, as pointed out, that an ideological system is nothing but a set of restrictions that define the limits within which any discourse that defines itself as belonging to that system must express itself. This implies that any discourse will be articulated on the basis of a «foundational nucleus» that is common to any particular discourse. This nucleus constitutes the deep, connotative structure of the ideological system, consisting of a closed semiological model that describes the «restrictions» to which any particular articulation will be submitted. For this reason the constitutive elements of that foundational nucleus will not have any discriminating value between the sources of the ideological system, since they constitute the common ground of the whole discourse itself. The various articulations of discourse, which are the object of comparative analysis, will take place exclusively at the statement level. Consequently one must build upon the hypothesis that the deep structure of the ideological system will be expressed semiologically in similar terms in all the sources by the presence of certain elements and the absence of others, while the overdetermination among those elements will be the same. This is logical if it is assumed that this foundational nucleus is the performative base of meaning for the whole system, though it may be expressed lexically and semantically in different manners. Therefore, the analysis of the superficial structures of the various sources' discourses will have as its objective the establishment of differential typologies between them based on the lexicon used and the semantification of the key words chosen. Its result will be the determination of the modulations present in the ideological discourse as manifestations, and therefore the consumption of the ideological system analyzed (the manners of stating and consuming the foundational nucleus).

It may be assumed that if the model is constructed correctly, it will be possible to establish a clear typological correspondence between the lexical and semantic stages and a confluence of these into the semiological dimension. Although the foundational nucleus establishes the restrictions which affect any particular discourse (nationalism), diverse statements (modulations) are possible within it which will appear reflected in various semantifications (radical, moderate, inclusive, exclusive, etc.). In turn these semantifications play a role similar to that of the foundational nucleus by establishing restrictions upon the lexical universe used, so that within it diverse lexical relationships appear (historicism, economism, substantialism, etc.) which summarize the lexical specializations of each source.

The three analytical stages imply different methodological perspectives: the first (lexical) demands a «distributional» perspective, while the remaining two (semantic and semiological) require the adoption of a «structural» characteristics perspective. Consequently each results from a different analytical technique, although those that



Graph 2: Integrated model of the techniques of analysis.

refer to the «lexicon» and «semantics» belong to one same methodological body, lexicology (Graph 2).

The lexicological method forms a set of techniques designed to measure and analyze the vocabulary that constitutes a discourse and its particular structuring (Matoré 1953). It attempts to detect the «lexical constants» and the discourse's various fields of semantic notions. Its function is to describe faithfully the terms upon which a certain ideological assumption or a particular construction of reality is stated. It is therefore a quantitative study of the discourse's number and notions taken in its material sense. We may consider the lexicological methodology under two differentiated but complementary perspectives: «lexicology out of context», used in lexical analysis, and «lexicology in context», destined for the study of semantic structures.

A) The analysis of the lexical dimension is carried out by lexicometric techniques. The study of the lexicon consists of the analysis of the most external and de-contextualized layer of the discourse's manifestation. Lexicometry provides an exhaustive statistical description of the components of the discourse by various distributional analyses carried out on the frequency tables of the lexical forms which constitute the corpus of the various discourses. These techniques, as established by Guiraud, Muller or Benzécri and developed by Dubois, Prost or the ENS of Saint-Cloud, provide data of great value, among which may be highlighted:

The common vocabulary, at the base level, «situationally» common to all the senders; the original vocabulary (present only in a source); and the specific vocabulary of each sender. With this analysis we may discover which are the characteristic elements used in the particular ideological performances (Cabrera 1987 and 1992).

However, this is not sufficient. The degree of lexical affinity which exists between the various sources must be determined. That is, determining if elements exist which group certain sources apart from others (based on their lexical specifics) and to what extent this occurs. In other words, the various lexical relationships are discovered which exist between the sources considered. This study takes place by recourse to multivariate analysis (Dubois 1962, Prost 1974, ERA'56 1978, Cabrera 1989 and 1992).

Along with the characterization of the senders, lexicometric analysis permits the extraction of the small set of specially significant words from this information, which constitute the center around which the various lexical typologies are ordered.

These are to be considered as «key words» (Matoré 1953), also known as «witness words». They are the lexical and semantic attraction «poles» which dominate the particular performances. These poles will be the center of attention in the post-analytical stage: lexicology in context.

B) Semantic-conceptual (structural) stage. If lexical analysis is conducted without considering the context in which its units appear, semantic conceptual analysis will attempt to establish the meaning of the discourses around the key words that have been isolated at the prior stage. For this purpose it seeks the context of the phrase or trans-phrases and attempts to establish the semantic networks of these words based on their contextual uses. This is done by semantic-conceptual analysis. This work implies, as pointed out by Maingueneau (1980), three key concepts of structural semantics: «value», «use» and «connotation». The general principles that orient them are:

- i) Non-transparency of the text (Provost 1971). This implies, from a Saussurian perspective, renouncing the identification of the word's meaning with what it «signifies», in order to search for the meaning in the complex framework of relationships in which it exists.
- ii) Seeking the meaning of a word by the totality of uses and contexts (Benveniste 1966). This does not consist of defining the meaning in terms of its signification (relationship between a sign's signifier and its signified) but rather by its use, as noted by Wittgenstein in his «Philosophical Investigations».
- iii) Going beyond the lexical level by conceptualizing the discourse as a system in which all the units maintain relationships of association and opposition among themselves (Dubois 1962). This is simply the study of their syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships with other linguistic units within the strict limits of the discourse being considered (Maingueneau 1980). For this purpose, according to the mentioned works, the following types of relationships have been distinguished: associations, oppositions, networks of qualifications, equivalences. These are actions carried out by the subject of the phrase and actions suffered by the subject considered as patient (Robin 1973).

Behind all these operations of segmentation and reconstruction of the various texts' meaning will be established the «association and opposition networks» for each sender's key word. That is, their semantic fields will have been reconstructed, represented in the characteristic networks of association and opposition; which clearly show not only the key constituting elements of each type of particular articulation of

discourse (denotation), but also the set of «power ideas» (compact symbols) upon which the foundational nucleus of the ideological system, the deep structure, is constructed, which is very important for the next step of the analysis. Now all that remains is to semiologically reconstruct the system of overdeterminations established between them, to discover the connotative mechanism of the ideological system.

C) Semiological (structural/systemic) stage. Finally, access to the ideological system's deep structure of signification is carried out by going beyond the denotative system characteristic of the linguistic stage and accessing the connotative or semiologic stage. «The question is raised to the extent that the statement is made that ideological meanings are transmitted by connotation more than by denotation (...) In this sense, a rather close relationship exists between the study of ideologies and the general problematic of semiology, since one might say that semiology, which investigates discourses (the `semiotic objects` whose subject matter is language), begins where linguistics ends» (Verón 1971).

IV. The production of the nationalist ideological discourse

The ideological process consisting of the construction of a national identity, implies the definition of internal frontiers (based on certain diacritical elements) which mark off the extent of the nation, a social and formal codification of the national community and a political strategy for restoring or defending the nation. This is the task of nationalism, responsible for making the community concrete as a «national community». It is not the existence of the nation which provokes the appearance of the nationalist movement, but nationalism which «constructs» the nation as a generalized manner of naming the community to which it refers.

Nationalism thus consists of the ideological-political practice that defines the nation upon a set of people based on something which is common to them. Its vocation is to extensively establish the defended social evidence, that is, the reception of the national message by the majority of those to whom it is directed. The center of the message will be occupied by those elements defined as proper of and exclusive to it. They, in turn, mark the range of that which is «common». It consists of nationality defining elements (History, land, language, etc.) which appear articulated within totalities of discourse, in which they experience an «overdetermination». This occurs in such a manner that they no longer designate factors which are supposedly objective, «but rather meanings conferred by the ideologists to certain cultural, spatial and temporal properties as well as to the interaction between them» (Máiz 1986b).

Therefore the success of the nationalist project, which in sum determines the success of the national claims, will be based on the efficacy of the message and its communicative ability (Recalde 1982, Bourdieu 1982). The ideological proposal, the constitution of the nation, implies political action, a nationalist membership whose goal is to achieve that some men, the nationals, adopt the national identity and acquire the mechanisms for self-government.

In this task, the articulation in discourse of the nationalist message occupies an axial place and its support, its communicators, do also. In any nationalist formation process the role of the leadership is fundamental and in peripheral nationalisms, those that arise within the Nation-State, this leadership falls upon groups of intellectuals whose work consists of making the nation explicit. Indeed, if we understand the nation as a «work of construction» carried out by nationalism on certain given social relations, then the ideological plane appears highlighted as one of the fundamental pillars upon which the nationalist process rests. Nationalist ideology is responsible, by cultural and political practice, for giving the name «nation» to one specific sociopolitical community, elevating it above others. It is thus a process of communication between ideologists (image makers) and the members of the community, the «nationals». It is a genetic process of production and consumption of ideology. In this communicational project of nation construction, in the peripheral nationalist processes within modern Western states, two basic types of nationalist leaderships are found to be involved. In effect, the slow construction process of these peripheral nations basically adopts the form of a slow ideological transformation of the «nationals'» conscience in a long nationalist historical process that will cross several stages, more similar to a collective self-conscience phenomenon of an already constituted reality than to a fast process of revolutionary construction. Some will be characterized by strictly political activity, tending toward massive mobilization of the population in favor of national claims: this is the political leader's moment. In others the sociopolitical conditions only allow for the slow and obscure labor of cultural construction of the nation: this is the intellectual leader's moment. The various nationalist movements historically slide between these two extremes. It is a long range process that combines the intellectual labor on the national mode of organization, in order to clarify and convert it into common heritage, with the political-ideological practice that hopes to mobilize the population in order to achieve institutional transformation, taking as baseline the knowledge acquired about it.

In this process the intellectuals play a hegemonic role, «they are specifically destined» -says Weber (1922)- «to propagate the national idea». They are the ones that «discover» the national cultural and ideological values, giving them political

connotations so as to forge and spread the national conscience. Nationalism precedes the nation as a manifestation of the political will for self-determination. The origin and development of these nationalisms is clearly linked to the intellectual leadership, which could be called political-intellectual leadership. Therefore, the understanding of the ideological-political processes upon which the national fact is articulated implies the study of the formulations carried out by the various intellectual leaders who shape the national sentiment. Far from being constrained by the circumstantial conditions in which the activity of the organized political forces is developed, it is an especially privileged field in which the national discourse manifests itself plainly as a detailed ideological-political discourse that struggles to transform consciences and to become the new «social evidence». As a consequence of what has just been said, it is easy to understand that the discourse generated by those political intellectuals must reflect their dual leadership (intellectual and political), presenting two fundamental planes of discourse. One is foundational, defining the nation, making explicit by ideological overemphasis the differential elements common to the whole population to which it referred. This implies marking off the context of the nation and establishing an internal frontier. This is a culturalist moment of historical and ethnologic character. The other, this time political, consists of making explicit those diacritical elements in a political message that can be assimilated by the population to whom it is directed, and carrying out the diffusion of it. The first is a connotative moment of great performative power, generating the reality which it names, while the second is denotative, mobilizing, paraenetic, and appeals to action (within the new framework of meanings generated in the first).

V. The study of the ideological system of present Galician nationalism

The preceding model was applied to the analysis of the ideological system of Galician nationalism (Cabrera 1992). For this purpose work has been carried out on the «texts» produced by a group of twelve outstanding Galician nationalist intellectuals in situations of focussed interviews (Merton et al. 1956). It is an attempt to obtain material which combined, in an interplay of externalization and internalization, the production of a nationalist discourse and its simultaneous incarnation in a subject that consumes this very ideological system. For this purpose the sample of intellectuals interviewed has been constructed with attention to the following criteria: From a synchronic plane an attempt was made to cover the entire nationalist ideological spectrum, beginning with formulations favorable to autonomy, all the way to those of a radical independentist character. From a diachronic perspective representation of the temporal evolution of Galician nationalism was sought by representing the

various generations participating at that moment. For this purpose we took as extremes the direct heirs of the Galician nationalism of the II Republic, who even today continue to exercise real leadership and, at an opposite pole, the young ideologues of the various nationalist families whose roots are founded in the process of reconstruction of the nationalist ideology under the difficult conditions of the Franquist régime.

In accord with the diachronic axis formerly mentioned we divided our interviewees into three blocks (born before 1929, between 1930-1939 and from 1940 on). The synchronic or ideological axis classification, based on their political self-location, classified them along an «axis of nationalist radicalness» whose lowest level would be located at liberal centrist nationalism, and the highest level at independence. This axis was used in the course of the investigation as an organizing element that permitted us to understand the various elements of discourse that were analyzed.

Our investigation followed the steps described in the proposed model. Starting at the lowest level of the context of manifestation (the word) we advanced towards the semantic structure and from there to semiology. For obvious reasons we cannot reproduce here all the steps taken and the detailed commentary of the results obtained at each stage. We will limit ourselves to indicate the basic elements of the analysis of the first stages in order to focus on the third.


V.1. The superficial structure

The first step consisted of studying the distribution of lexicon among the various senders by contrasting frequencies. Thus an initial map was obtained of the specialization of each one of them in certain lexical contexts (Political-institutional, Political-strategic, Socioeconomic and Cultural). Then all the lexical information was submitted to an analysis of the «principal components» which, after extracting four factors, allowed for clarification of the sender's lexical relationships (Graphs 3 and 4).


In turn the work of reconstruction of the semantic-conceptual fields that are described in each discourse has permitted the determination of the semantic-conceptual contexts of association and opposition of the various senders, around the key word «Galicia» (which is not only the thematic nucleus of the discourses, but also the lexical form which with most frequency appears in the analyzed corpus, combining in this fashion the analytical interest with the statistical relevance of the first analytical stage). The construction of a similar typology has also been carried out based on the theoretical model already proposed (Graphs 5 and 6).

The analysis of these two initial stages allowed us to advance in the determination of the characteristics of the various dominating discourses. Thus we were able to certify that there is a clear lexical and semantic distinction between the senders based on the axis of nationalist radicalness, forming clearly differentiated types. In addition the semantic-conceptual analysis allowed the detection of the terms of basic semantification carried out on Galicia. That is, the elements were detected which «substantially» connote Galicia and which form a compact block of associations. They could be considered an initial indicator of the foundational nucleus of the ideological system, of its deep structure.


For all senders the first and most foundational association consists in the national proclamation of Galicia, leaning on other associations as its pillars. Thus Galicia appears with the connotation of an ethnic group, understood culturally and opposed to any sort of racial statement. This ethnic group appears as a historical substance in autonomous relationship with the rest of the Spanish State, which would explain, according to our senders, the survival of a characteristic identity and culture.




Graph 3: Both lexicons



Graph 4: Lexical relationships



Graph 5: Network of semantic associations




Graph 6: Network of semantic oppositions

V.2. The deep structure

In agreement with this basic semantification we began the third part of this work. Just as the lexical analysis defined the key word upon which to work in the second part, the semantic-conceptual analysis indicates the elements to consider in an initial approximation of the deep structure, that is, the triple identification of Galicia=Nation=ethnic group. For this reason we began by analyzing the position of each sender around the national vision of Galicia, and reconstructing the ethnic universe that dominates it.

But as stated, the intention at this point in the investigation was to uncover the internal structure of the foundational nucleus of the nationalist discourse in Galicia. For this purpose, and following Barthes' semiological model for the interpretation of myths (Barthes 1957), we had the opportunity to describe the semiotic logic that rules the constitution of that foundational nucleus at present. This is structured as a «secondary semiological system», that is, it is built upon a previously existing semiological chain (Graph 7). To synthesize, one would say that the semiological

logic that dominates the production and consumption of myths is based on an overdetermination that the «concept» (the meaning of the second articulation) carries out upon the «form» (signifier of the second articulation consisting in the sign of the first emptied of its historicity, taken in its pure form), thus naturalizing it.



Graph 7. Source: Barthes, *Mitologías*, p.206.

The concept is understood as the motive for the formation of the myth. One would say that it consists in the «signifier will» which, in this case, is translated as «nationality» (understood as the will for national signification, used in the same manner as «rationality» or «modernity»). The form is constituted upon emptying it of a previously given meaning; the concept distances any contingency and historicity from the meaning and retains only the pure form, the letter. In this analysis it was possible to verify that the scientific term «ethnic group» was overdetermined from the concept that emptied it of its original meaning (historical), naturalizing it and taking it as its legitimizing dimension, as a «compact symbol». It is in this constant interplay between the concept overdetermining the form and the form legitimizing the concept, that the myth is constituted, the «meaning of the second semiological system». In this interplay of semiological overdetermining the concept is able to invert the genetic order and create the appearance that the form is the basis for the concept, and, consequently, of the meaning, the myth. This is the nationalist argument: we know that nationalism (the concept in our scheme) precedes the nation (the myth), that it is the former which proclaims the latter. However in its argument the nation appears as «already existing» and nationalism as its consequence.

In this manner, the myth is taken by its consumer as a factual system, since any secondary articulation consists of a value system. This provides the connotative force to the myth, which gains in empathic capacity what it loses in depth.

The myth prevails thanks to its functionality. As stated the ideological process is understood as the production, communication and consumption of meanings. Its success depends on its being broadly received. In this sense the political myth carries out three principal functions (García Pelayo 1981, Laplantine 1974, Barthes 1957):

- a) «Clarifying», the myth makes concrete and summarizes in one image the confused complexity of that which is «real», simplifying it and presenting it as «natural». It thus establishes a «universe of meaning» which integrates the totality of interpretive schemes necessary for the «reality» to appear coherent and unquestionable. This «social evidence» includes as its references a complex set of diacritical elements that constitute its «mythologem» and the base for the various stereotypes.
- b) «Integration», resulting from the collective consumption of the myth and the internalization of the features characteristic of the «mythologem». In-group identification is thus produced, with its characteristic sociological phenomenology, based upon the «universe of meaning» generated by the myth.
- c) «Mobilization». The empathic capacity of the myth, whose consumption «ontologically bases» the subject, and provides faith, strength and hope for its defense and claims. The mythical message communicates the carrying out of a «mission», so that the mythical discourse always has a strong paraenetic component.

The deep structure of the nationalist ideological system was analyzed upon these suppositions. That is, we have considered that the foundational nucleus of the nationalist discourse is formally structured as a myth and that this explains its connotative capacity, thus generating reality.

We thus saw how the nationalist meaning, the nation, is the result of the mentioned interplay of overdetermination and legitimation established between concept and form. The foundational nucleus of present Galician nationalism has two elements articulating it: the ethnic group, taken as «form» and which is expressed in the elements of the ethnic «mythologem» (diacritical elements, or structural genetic ones, hailed as belonging to the community: language, land, *volksgeist*, tradition, differential history, etc.) and the nationality, understood as a concept, that is, as the


will for national signification. We were able to ascertain that, far from presenting itself as «political will», it adopts the form of «social ethics» resulting from the «discovery» of the «national evidence», of the internal frontiers. In this manner it hides behind the naturalized ethnic group (which appears as the cause of the will) and itself suffers a similar process of naturalization, reification. The nation «already is», its manifestation is the ethnic group, and the will (in political reality) is presented as a militancy, as a commitment to the nation, transforming itself into the (ethical) «ethnic will».

Among the various components of the ethnic «mythologem» we were able to ascertain that one of them, the differential history, plays a preponderant role in giving articulation to the national myth. History, conceptualized always as «differential or autonomous history» carries out a triple internal function in the mythical logic that dominates the concrete national conception of the community (Graph 8).

In the first place it «is the foundation» for the ethnic group: the diacritical features are historically constituted and manifested from time immemorial; while at the same time the historical differentialism is manifest precisely in those features (reality effect). A vicious circle, or tautology, is thus produced between these two concepts. For this reason history must necessarily be «autonomous history», since it is exclusively the history of internal borders, subject only to endogenous causes (any external agent will be conceptualized as a historical contingency that does not affect the «substantiality» of the nation). History gives credence to the perennial nature of the diacritical elements and these serve as legitimizing elements of differentialism.

In second place history provides a fundamental element of «authority» to the communication of the national message. Those who proclaim the national myth do it with the «authority» that the height of historical consideration gives. If the will for national signification (the concept) was hidden behind the form (ethnic group), with the causal chain inverting the meaning, it now disappears totally by recourse to history. It is no longer a voice guided by a sense of «ethics» or commitment which proclaims the myth. Now it is History (with a capital H) which speaks in the discourse, and is already considered «objective». The nationalist discourse is thus authorized.

Finally History legitimates the mythical meaning, the nation itself, the myth. The nation is such because it is constituted along a millenarian differential history. It thus loses its political content and appears as a given, perennial and primordial at the same time, which one only has to «discover».



Graph 8: Centrality of History in the semiological structure of the nation-myth.

V.3. The foundational nucleus: the nation myth

The conception of the nation, transformed into myth, as observed, forms what may be called the «foundational nucleus», or «hard nucleus» (Máiz 1986b) of the national conception common to all these senders, and common to any nationalism of the same type, with the corresponding discursive differences. We would say that it is a primordial assumption, the starting point at which all coincide; and it therefore constitutes the primordial ideological nucleus of the nationalist discursive formation. However, this foundational nucleus also makes explicit the restrictions to which any message that claims to be «nationalist» is submitted in its transmission. This is the connotative, deep structure of the ideological system, which vouches for the «competence» of any sender who wants to generate recognizable and recognized propositions within the nationalist ideological system (Verón 1971).

As a starting point this ideological process installs itself in that nucleus. It is the assumption of a viewpoint from which every other social reality is ordered with «one» meaning. This assumption is carried out under the form of consumption: remembering that an ideological process is defined as «a process of production, transmission and consumption of ideological meanings» and that the myth, as a

manner of meaning and system of communication, is constituted by its consumption (Barthes 1957). For this reason, the myth is neither invented nor built for those who ideologically inhabit it. For them the myth, in the form of primordial reality, is «discovered» as something «real» which now is manifested as completely evident. The myth is installed and indwells the one who proclaims it, generating a new perspective or confirming the one already adopted, constituting that which is «real». This is done by the adoption of that which is «discovered as real», by the consumption of the myth as a nucleus generating meaning (in which causal inversion is experienced, presenting the form -the ethnic group- as a cause that demands the concept -will for national signification-, and the nation as «already existing», in a «natural» representation of the social evidence in which the political stage appears as subsidiary to the ethnic one). Thus, in its consumption, the myth can only present itself as a «discovery of that which is real». This evidence makes it perfect and indisputable. It thus becomes the nucleus that «shines upon» a new reality full of meaning. In this manner it becomes a «compact symbol» that integrates the totality of elements that constitute the reality it names. Its contents can be variable but its acceptance or consumption does not admit variation. Only by this means can it accomplish the three functions that we formerly pointed out: clarification, integration and mobilization. It is that character of «discovery» which converts it into an irrefutable «firm nucleus» (Lakatos 1971). This particular manner of constituting that which is real is clearly reflected in the articulation of the nationalist discourse. The assumption of the national myth establishes a particular understanding of the social reality, with an evident and irrefutable character. The nationalist discourse will attempt to communicate its definition of the community to the greatest number possible (which implies its consumption on the part of those who carry it out), attempting its massive «consumption» and, in that fashion, pragmatically generating the reality it names. The national definition, the favored «social evidence», thus adopts the form of a «self-fulfilling prophecy», in the context of social beliefs (Merton, 1949).

However, this massive adoption of the identity reference, or its social extension, can only be effective to the degree in which the national myth «gives meaning» to the diverse and varied social and ideological situations in which the various potential consumers find themselves. It must function, then, as a «floating symbol», able to give meaning and feed upon any situation. This is only possible to the extent that it moves away from historical contingency and consecrates itself as pure «form». Later the nationalist discourse will divide into various currents of thought whose differences will be based precisely on the interpretation of those contingencies. However at the foundational discursive stage of national declaration, this declaration is all that counts. Nationalists are those who simultaneously proclaim and consume the national myth.

For this reason in this initial stage the nation must move at its most elevated level of abstraction, at its mythical level. For this reason also the arguments, the rhetoric of the declaration, must be totalizing and self-relying.

The «firm nucleus» founds a new framework of comprehension of that which is social and, as a privileged context, does not admit questioning, it is irrefutable. As Barthes points out the myth is a value, and thus, no «objective» knowledge can judge its veracity or pertinence. One may say that the assumption of the national myth constitutes an «incurable assumption»: «The assumption of a common shared world does not work for its subjects as a descriptive assertion. It is not falsifiable. Instead it functions as an incurable specification of the relations that exist in principle between the experiences of a community of perceivers with respect to what they consider an identical world» (Pollner 1974). This is because the discourses of this type are dominated by «reflexivity». That is, they are discourses that not only transmit information, but also generate the context in which this information can appear (Wolf 1982); a discursive context which is identified with the reality «created» by the myth: «The mythological description is in principle monolingual; the objects of this world are described through *that same world constructed in the same and identical manner*» (Lotman and Uspenskij 1973). For this reason no external judgement of its context can place in doubt the assumption, because any such attempt to refute it belongs to another evidence, to another universe of meaning, to a different «value». As Lotman and Uspenskij point out: «The mythological conscience is, in principle, *untranslatable* into a description of another plane, it is closed upon itself, and is understood therefore in no other way than from the inside and not from the outside». In the case of a confrontation with a contradictory judgement, the discourse founded on an incurable assumption proceeds to transform this contradiction into justification for its own assumption. There precisely lies its incurability, «in the use of justifications which the adherence to the assumption impose and makes possible, and the use of which reflexively sustains the assumptions in whose name they are mobilized» (Pollner 1974).

Now, the broad consumption of the national myth, as we have developed it here, is necessarily parallel to the general «context» of emergence. Therefore that which is national, the nation, is not lived out as an «invention», but as a «discovery», as the recognition of something evident which until the time of its adoption had remained hidden. Therefore, as pointed out, it consists of the assumption of a «value» and as such is the result of a «revelation» and not of «demonstration». The national statement, the assumption of the myth, produces, from this perspective, a discourse which generates the very «context» in which the nation may appear and only from

this context can the «national reality» be affirmed and legitimated. The nation is «assumed», or «discovered» and, thus, is unquestionable, «irrefutable».

In this manner the foundational ideological nucleus of the nationalist argument, the deep structure of the nationalist ideological system is established. The nationalist discourse can only develop from the total assumption of this firm nucleus, since it is the very assumption which generates the context in which that which is national can appear. It is in reference to this that the statement is made that nationalism «creates» the nation and not the inverse. And this is the reason for its performative character: to create the ideological conditions in which that which is national, as an ideological system, may emerge and to found the nation as «real», allowing the constitution of a new «social evidence». It is a collective identity which will radically determine the behavior of those who adopt it. In this manner the ideological system of the national myth is founded and is incessantly reproduced without any possibilities for questioning it by confrontation with another «social evidence» or «existential judgement». This would only be possible by negating the prejudice, the foundational value, the myth itself. To the extent that the national myth generates a universe of meaning in which «that which is real» is established, the consumer of the myth also crosses over to form part of that particular «reality», in a process of identification and cohesion, becoming thus «trapped» in the «social evidence» adopted. In this aspect nationalist ideology is distinguished from other political ideologies. The former implies «necessarily» an existential commitment of ontological character, while the others do not, or at least not necessarily. As Giddens states: «Nationalism is in large part a psychological phenomenon, which encompasses needs and dispositions, in contrast with the Nation-state, which is an institutional phenomenon. To grasp its importance we must take into account the needs it satisfies. The meaning of nationalism in the modern world is absolutely clear if we see it in respect to the decline of tradition and the fragmentary character of daily life in which lost traditions are partially retaken. This applies both to modernizing societies as well as to those that are suffering cultural problems or conflicts. These circumstances turn fragile what Laing calls the «ontological security» upon which daily life is based. Ontological security means the security to maintain routines that are felt to be guaranteed, which give a sense of continuity to existence. In traditional cultures the sustaining structure of ontological security is well insured by the continuity of local community practices. But in large scale societies, in which establishment of routine has substantially substituted for tradition -where moral meaning and self-realization have been pulled back to the margins of that which is private- the feelings of commonality of language and belonging to a national community tend to form a base that contributes to the maintenance of ontological security» (1987, p.178). In this sense the nationalist

ideology and practice agree with the Weberian ideal-type of axiological rationality, while those proper of the internal framework of the rationalized post-industrial state would be in accord with the final rationality. For this reason the comparison established by some authors between nationalism and religion, to the extent that it refers to the assumption of primordial values, does not appear entirely unfounded.


VI. Review

It was pointed out at the beginning that the sociological investigation of the national phenomenon was especially interested in knowing how and to what extent the assumption of the nationalist ideology determines the behavior of social actors. The proposed model has demonstrated its capacity to account for this, at least in regard to its phenomenological aspect. It is true that the adopted perspective is not exhausted here and that it is necessary to analyze the social mechanisms (social practices) of production and reproduction of ideology. In another place I have addressed this question (Cabrera 1991 and 1992).


In conclusion, I would like to review succinctly what has been proposed according to the logic of production of the ideological meaning; inverse, as was observed, to the logical analysis that was followed.

The knowledge of the foundational nucleus of the nationalist ideological system (semiological stage) has made evident the reflexive logic that dominates the assumptions of the national myth, and which for this reason ontologically conditions the subjects, determining their conduct. In addition it has allowed access to knowledge of the restrictions to which any significant message considered proper of the system is submitted. These restrictions define the context of what can be said, but within them there can be differentiated discursive articulations. Thus the various semantifications present in today's Galician nationalist discourse (the semantic stage) were pointed out. Finally, these semantifications determine the lexicon susceptible to being used. We were thus able to observe how the various semantic-discursive strategies defined the principal lexical articulations.

All this was referred to at the beginning as the elements of an ideological system. Based on the competence which its consumption provides nationalism develops its paraenetic strategies of national claims (Graphs 9 and 10). The limits to the present work do not permit entering into detailed analysis of them. The interested reader may examine the text which contains extensively the results of our investigation (Cabrera 1992). A summary in two schematic graphs will be the extent possible here.



Graph 9: Discursive strategies



Graph 10: Paraenetic strategies.

Finally it should be pointed out that the articulation coincides with the various levels of analysis of the superficial structure (lexical, semantic and paraenetic) based on the axis of nationalist radicalness. This confirms the chain of overdeterminations carried out within the ideological system: of the foundational nucleus (deep structure: «that which is said»), upon the semantification («how it is said»), this upon the lexical structure («with what it is said») and all of it manifested in the paraenetic strategies (proclamation and appeals for the defense of the nation).

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Translator's Glossary:

Mythologem: this word has been put into English from the Spanish «mitologema». The word originally comes from Kerényi & Jung, *Einführung in das Wesen der Mythologie*, Zurich (1951: 11). It was originally a German neologism from the Greek. For the Spanish use, see M. García Pelayo, *Los Mitos Políticos*, Madrid: Alianza (1981:20).

Overdeterminations: this term refers to the process of emptying a word of its former meaning and imbuing it with a new content for a new purpose.

Competence: for an explanation see J. Cabrera, *La Nación como Discurso*, Madrid: CIS (1992:5, footnote 1). This Saussurean concept has been translated into English as such in the works of Noam Chomsky.

Performance: see Competence.





Violence as an ethnic border.

The consequences of a lack of distinctive elements in Croatian, Kurdish and Basque nationalism

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As widespread nationalist violence forces people to choose or consolidate their ethnic identities, ethnic leaders may consciously or unconsciously encourage violent conflicts in order to reinforce national boundaries. Hapless individuals are often attracted into the orbit of conflicting groups without being fully aware of it. This paper will discuss two main hypotheses: first, that nationalist violence is more likely to occur in conditions of cultural similarity between two groups, than in conditions of cultural dissimilarity; second, that state repression is the main external catalyst in the transformation of an underlying conflict -originally restricted to elites - into an open ethnic war. Three groups are taken as examples to illustrate this: the Kurds, the Basques and the Croats (their respective stateless, semi-state, and state- nations being Kurdistan, Euskadi and Croatia).¹ All of these have experienced -and are experiencing- difficulty in differentiating themselves from their respective dominant groups. Serbo-Croat is regarded by most international linguists as a single language, rather than two languages as claimed by Croatian and Serbian nationalists. Most Basques and Kurds no longer speak their mother tongue after centuries of assimilative pressures. Hence, the populations of these three groups overwhelmingly speak the same dominant language as their 'oppressors' and have scarcely any other means of visible self-differentiation.² Finally, I will also consider the Catalan case as a 'positive' counter example where a robust cultural tradition makes violence superfluous and unlikely.

* **Acknowledgements.** This paper has profited from the critique of several scholars. First of all, I have to thank Professors William Douglass and Joseba Zulaika of the Basque Studies Program, University of Nevada, Reno, for their extensive comments and insights. As I was unable to apply many of their substantial comments, the views expressed herein are mine alone. Secondly, I wish to acknowledge the perceptive contributions of Dr. Tom Gallagher (Bradford) and Cameron Watson (Liverpool), most of which I have incorporated into the text.

¹ In the case of the Croats, I will also constantly refer to the Serbs.

² While no reliable statistics on the spread of Kurdish in Turkey are available, plenty of data is available on the Basques in Spain.

When two communities share too many cultural features, it becomes more difficult for political elites or proto-elites to create some form of national unity out of this. If we accept Benedict Anderson's (1983) definition of the nation as an 'imagined community', the consequences also vary according to the two ideal types: it becomes easier to imagine oneself as being part of a whole when there are objective cultural markers which differentiate your whole from another whole. In contrast, the imagination needs an extra boost when no tangible elements of differentiation are shared by the majority of the populations in the would-be nations. This boost is often provided by violent conflict. Wars, civil strife and government oppression deeply affect the collective psyche, moulding shared memories, ethnic identities and national myths (Smith 1981). When there is a paucity of cultural markers, only violence can make communities 'real' as well as 'imagined'.

In order to understand this first hypothesis, we have to comprehend the essential character of nationalist movements. Their major aim is to emphasize an 'us-them' dichotomy and to conceptually separate their group -which they conceive of as a whole- from another group. Hence, nationalism aims at border creation, at least as much as it aims, internally, at border elimination. But no nationalism can emerge from a vacuum. Ethnic elements of distinctiveness - which contribute to differentiating one group from another- must be available and widespread among the people to be mobilized, if the movement is to be successful (Smith 1986). When a nationalist movement attempts to construct a common identity in a situation in which there are no clearly defined common cultural features, it will resort to violence and radical forms of struggle are more likely than in cases where cultural distinctiveness is the norm. This also implies that, when there are too many shared elements between the dominated group and the dominant group, political violence is more likely to be used as a cohesive strategy. Through violence and conflict, an uncertain identity can take visible form and delineate clearer borders for a nation, by emphasizing an us-them opposition. But, is violence always conducive to ethnic cohesion? Or, does it lead to the internal disruption of the ethnic community?

Here the second variable, state repression, comes in. State repression, generally occurring where basic freedoms are lacking, can be singled out as a major factor in initiating the spiral of confrontational violence which is required for radical nationalism to emerge. Francoist violence was necessary for ETA to step up its violent campaign against dictatorship. The Turkish army's massive anti-guerrilla campaign was also crucial in encouraging larger and larger sections of the population to support the local separatist guerrillas. Finally, the Serbian invasion of large chunks of Croatia and Bosnia was needed to create a strong bond of solidarity within the two dominated groups, Croats and Muslims, against the dominant Serbs.

The title and orientation of this article are inspired by the seminal work of Frederick Barth (1969). One of Barth's main contributions is the distinction between *ethnic boundaries* and *ethnic contents*. He observed that the boundaries defining a group's identity may be maintained independently from the culture they enclose. In particular, cultures may change, but the boundaries themselves are more durable. Hence, it is the boundary between groups, and not their cultures, which is the focal point of analysis. The implicit conclusion is that assimilation does not bring about identity shifts. Identities may be equally strong in cases where the unique cultural traits have vanished. Ethnic groups perceive themselves as independent and autonomous, yet it is precisely their inter-dependence which is the origin of their identities, self-perception and differential plans. «Groups tend to define themselves, not by reference to their own characteristics, but by exclusion, that is, by comparison to 'strangers'» (Armstrong 1983: 5). *Opposition* is then the source of ethnic and national identity.³

However, Barth's playing down of culture does miss the key point in the construction of identities: identities are not given but, more often than not, constructed. In order to be constructed or manipulated, identities must rely on the diffusion of shared symbols and cultural elements, as well as on memories of a shared past and myths of a common destiny. Nationalist mobilizations offer an interesting case in point to test this statement. Weak identities, too, are often reinforced through conflicts and wars. Mass mobilization make people ideologically homogeneous and obedient to authority. While the defense of ill-defined cultural values can remain a minority enterprise, an external threat demands mass mobilization. Thus, weak programmes of 'cultural regeneration' can be replaced by assertive programmes of 'national reawakening'. This is what the leaders of our three movements have at some stage chosen to do.

Before we start our comparison, we have to put forward an obvious distinction: Croatia is now an independent state with its own army and international profile, although it does not exert complete control over its disputed territory. Croatia has also experienced statehood previously, albeit intermittently and in the form of a puppet state. Finally, it had a clearly defined territory within Yugoslavia, which was granted large autonomy in line with the Titoist 'federative' principles. Unlike Croatia, Euskadi (the Basque Country) and Kurdistan have never achieved statehood in the modern sense.⁴ The nationalist struggle amongst the Basques and the Kurds has been articulated

³ Independently from Barth, Spicer (1971: 797) defines the *oppositional process* as «the essential factor in the formation and development of the persistent identity system».

⁴ The short-lasting Republic of Mahabad (1945) was located in Western Iran and did not concern our area of study, Turkey. In this paper only the Basques in Spain and the Kurds in Turkey will be considered.

around several organizations, two of which have gained prominence in the media: ETA (*Euskadi 'ta Askatasuna*, Basque Country and Freedom) and PKK (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan*, Workers Party of Kurdistan). Both were -and are- devoted to armed struggle. As a consequence of state censorship against more moderate organizations, and of their media visibility, they have dominated very important phases of national 'reawakening'. While autonomy was granted to Euskadi in 1980 by the new democratic state, nothing similar is foreseeable for Turkish Kurdistan at the time of writing. All three nationalist movements had to face overwhelming odds in their struggle against a central state which did not hesitate in using the most sophisticated tools of repression.

Kurdistan

In contrast with the two other case studies, the area of Eastern Turkey inhabited by the Kurds is the poorest and least developed in the country. At the same time, the modern processes of urbanization and modernization have contributed to a heightened ethnic consciousness (Nisan 1991: 41). However, the primary motive for action and insurrection was not merely economic. As in the case of ETA, the founding fathers of the PKK have declared that their main concern was the eclipse and disappearance of their people. The PKK «originated in 1974 when a small group of Kurdish university students in Ankara organized the Ankara Democratic Patriotic Association of Higher Education. Their original activities focused primarily on gaining official recognition for Kurdish language and cultural rights» (Entessar 1992: 94). The PKK was formally established in 1978 by Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan, a former political science student at Ankara University. Ocalan confesses: «It was my idea alone. At first there were no sympathizers with it, even among the Kurds».⁵ He was bewildered that «Kurds no longer saw themselves as Kurds, no longer believed in themselves. And that was why Ocalan saw the changing of the Kurdish personality as an even greater challenge than the physical liberation of Kurdistan».⁶ Hence, the motivating ideal was a thorough regeneration of Kurdish identity and self-esteem.⁷ The PKK's first members were detribalized educated youth from poor backgrounds. Given the fact that many Kurds were assimilated and had rejected their previous way of life, this self-esteem could only be provided by a radical challenge.⁸ The new Utopia could only be found in

⁵ 'The men who would move mountains', *The Guardian - Outlook*, Saturday 28 March 1992.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ On the PKK's birth and development, see Gunter (1990).

⁸ Several other factors determined the PKK's Marxist choice: the staunch American support for the central regime in Ankara (which, if anything, has increased in the post- Cold War era), despite the latter's

an independent and socialist state, a promised land where the Kurds would finally be freed from the double curse of cultural repression and economic exploitation. Unique among other successful present-day ethno-nationalist movements, the PKK adopted a strict Marxist-Leninist programme of national liberation.⁹ The PKK launched its armed campaign on August 15, 1984.

In a state like Turkey, where not even the word 'Kurd' was publicly allowed, such a challenge could only bring about massive retaliation by the state.¹⁰ This was not an unexpected outcome. Kurdish guerrillas were prepared for the worst, for which, alas, they had been prepared for by centuries of persecution (Bozarslan 1992).¹¹ Given the enormity of repression to which they were subjected, their demands were naturally maximalist, aspiring to the 'best' possible solution: namely, independence. In retrospect, Ocalan's «radical new idea» has

taken on something of the aura of prophetic revelation. This was his realization that the only way the Kurds could achieve self-determination was to aim, from the very outset, at the maximum. This meant eschewing minimalist, fragmentary solutions of the 'autonomy-in-one-country' type... He would not define the precise boundaries of a state which would rank as the largest and most strategically located in the Middle East.¹² ...Whatever his secret the upshot is that the Kurds, instead of collaborating on a large scale with the Turkish government, were now flocking to his banner 'with all their heart'.¹³

We shall observe several interesting parallels between Kurdistan and Euskadi. As in the Basque case, the Kurdish upper classes have been culturally and politically assimilated. Disregarding their Kurdish heritage, they ended up considering themselves

traditional disregard for human rights; the influence of Left wing ideologies brought over by the Kurdish diaspora scattered over Europe; a parallel search for international legitimacy; the belief that Marxist-Leninist ideology is more tolerant towards the right of self-determination than other ideologies; the persisting memories of long-gone Third World struggles for national liberation, Vietnam, Cuba, and Algeria.

⁹ In the Basque case, ETA has been constantly shifting from Marxist, even Trotskyist, postulates to more inter-class positions. For a comprehensive overview of ETA's internecine struggles and ideological debates during the 1960s, see Jaúregui (1981) and Ortzi (1991).

¹⁰ Until recent times, the very word 'Kurd' and any reference to Kurdistan were banned in the Turkish media, the use of the Kurdish language was forbidden even in casual conversation, village names have been changed and people have been arrested for calling themselves Kurds on census forms (Helsinki Watch 1988). Kurds were only referred to as 'mountain Turks' (Gunter 1990: 8, Kreyenbroek 1992: 73).

¹¹ The word *peshmergas*, or guerrilla fighters, is literally translatable as 'those who face death' (Laizer 1991: 3).

¹² McDowell's (1992a, 1992b) estimate puts the total number of Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia at 19.7 million.

¹³ 'The men who would move mountains', *The Guardian - Outlook*, Saturday 28 March 1992.

as Turks (Chaliand 1993a, 1993b, Kreyenbroek 1992, McDowell 1992, Van Bruinessen 1992). As in the Basque case, even committed nationalists were unable to speak or write in Kurdish, whilst only the most motivated of them learned to be literate in it (Kreyenbroek 1992: 74). As in the Basque case, the nationalist revival occurred against the background of a violent confrontation with the state: «mass imprisonments, torture, forced migration, with a permanent pall of intimidation hovering over Kurdish society» (Nisan 1991: 42).¹⁴ Hence, the all-pervasive rationale for choosing violence was the dramatic record of human rights abuses by the Turkish state (which far surpasses Franco's dismal one), and a sense of utter desperation in an environment which silences any cultural aspirations.¹⁵ Forced Turkification, with periods of peaks and troughs, has been a constant policy in modern secular Turkey (Van Bruinessen 1992: 191, 274 and 282). This was generally accompanied by mass deportations, resettlement schemes, elimination of tribal chiefs and intellectuals, indiscriminate killings, torture and all sorts of prohibitions (Bozarslan 1992). These same 'final solutions' were applied to other minorities living throughout Turkey.¹⁶

However, the state was not the only factor in determining the choice of political violence. Another set of factors were endogenous and all related to the lack of internal cohesion. Not only tribal loyalties, but also linguistic fragmentation, has been a challenge for Kurdish nationalism. A plurality of dialects have precluded the development of a unitary Kurdish standard, and two standard languages have emerged instead: the northern *kurmânji* (written in Roman scripts) and the central *sorani* (written in Arabic scripts) (Kreyenbroek 1992: 71).¹⁷ The Kurds also profess to a variety of religions which is unique in the Islamic world: Yezidism, Alevism, Yârsânism, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Bâbism and various Sufi mystic orders flourish together

¹⁴ «From listening to Kurdish music tapes to engaging in nationalist party activity, the crimes of the Kurds pile up and the military prisons fill up, with no end in sight. A glimpse of the Kurdish plight was conveyed in the film *Yol...*» (Nisan 1991: 41).

¹⁵ The reports by Amnesty International (1989) and the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (1992) give detailed accounts of the tragedy of the situation. Recently, things have begun to slowly change in Turkey. But the situation is still too polarized to allow the emergence of a middle-ground moderate Kurdish party. According to Zubaida (1992), only an internationally supervised agreement can prevent a general onslaught.

¹⁶ The well-known genocide of the Armenians was not an isolated case (see Dobkiwski and Walliman 1992 for a comprehensive update). For the destruction and continuing harassment of the Greek community, see Helsinki Watch (1992).

¹⁷ The former has evolved almost entirely in exile. According to Izady (1992: 170), the two major vernaculars of Kurdish, *Kurmânji* and *Pahlawânî*, «like French and Italian, now qualify as two *bona fide* languages, and not dialects of the same language. Their variation are by far too great by any standard linguistic criteria...». Hence, at present, language can hardly become a bridge between the various Kurdish communities, although much of the intelligentsia has begun to focus on language as a core value (Kreyenbroek 1991).

with Sunni and Shi'a Islam (Izady 1992: 137-66). For this reason, religion cannot be a central factor in the national struggle and the influence of religious fundamentalism is limited to the more Westernized urban centres; hence the militantly secular character of Kurdish nationalism. Even the choice of Marxism-Leninism as the PKK's driving credo can be linked to the need to preserve this delicate balance of ancient cults and religions, while forging a common national consciousness. This leads some authors to question «whether the region is sufficiently coherent linguistically, culturally and religiously so as to come within the definition of a 'people' for purposes of self-determination» (Connors 1992: 90).

The concentration on the figure of Apo-Ocalan gave the Kurdish movement a charismatic leader which was absent in ETA, whose leadership underwent continual renewal, because most of its cadres disappeared through exile, prison and death.

Euskadi

Since its inception at the turn of the century, Basque nationalism has been internally fragmented and opposing views of Basque identity competed with each other (Conversi 1990, 1993a). Only the authoritarian personality of its founder, Sabino de Arana (1865-1903) could keep them together. Arana himself focused on language revival at one stage of his life, but he eventually became more concerned with race and religion as central axioms of his programme (Elorza 1981, Corcuera 1977). Since Arana's death, Basque nationalism has never known a leader of similar stature. However, in the 1960s a whole organization inherited such a charismatic role. Founded in 1959, ETA was originally conceived as a instrument for the revival of Basque culture.¹⁸ Faced with a constituency split between Basque- and Spanish-speakers, and then between natives and immigrants, the leaders and militants slowly moved away from cultural nationalism, increasing their political radicalism. Hence, internal cultural and political fragmentation created the conditions for the emergence of a radical leadership determined to counteract the centralist state using any means possible.

However, another external element was needed in order to turn the conflict into a violent one, encompassing new sections of the population: this element was

¹⁸ On ETA's origins as a cultural movement, see Jauregui (1981). See also Conversi (1989, 1990, 1993a) and Clark (1979, 1981). Similarly to the PKK, ETA had its origin in the work of about five students in Bilbao, who in 1952 set up a discussion group and published a newsletter called *Ekin*.

provided by the state, firstly, by embracing the destruction of Basque culture, and, secondly, by trying to repress the nationalist movement.¹⁹ The Francoist state imprisoned, tortured and executed Basque nationalists by the hundred.²⁰ Indeed, the second factor of our analysis, state repression, is even more important than the first one, the original lack of shared elements. There are plenty of marginal nationalist movements where cultural fragmentation and assimilation have made popular mobilization nothing more than an elites' dream. But in most such cases the state has not engaged in violent repression against them. Violent repression is facilitated by conditions of dictatorship, although repression may also occur in democratic regimes when the ethnic movement is perceived as a serious threat to the state. As recent examples have shown (Eritreans, Tamils, Kashmiris, etc.), only after large scale repression does mass support for the nationalist movement materialize.²¹

In the 1960s, the main ideological inspiration of Basque nationalism was provided by Third World anti-colonialism (Conversi 1993b). Anti-colonial language has been used by all three movements: Basque and Kurdish 'liberation struggles' have been painted in anti-colonial colours by their leaders,²² and even Croatia has been defined as an 'internal colony'.²³ When ETA was founded, the Algerian struggle was at its height and international public opinion was outraged by the the atrocities perpetrated by French troops.²⁴ Working in an hospital in Algiers, the Black writer Franz Fanon (1925-1961) observed the human tragedy of colonial repression and the sheer determination which it inspired in the victimized people.²⁵ Franz Fanon's theory of violence as an instrument of nation-building (Fanon 1961, 1964) was adapted to Euskadi shortly after its publication in France, where most Basque exiles were living. According to the so-called «theory of the cycle of action/ repression/ action», any form of resistance would instigate government retaliation that in turn fed an escalating spiral

¹⁹ An increasingly vast literature is now available on Madrid's past attempts to destroy regional cultures. See, for instance, Ferrer i Girones (1985), Benet (1973), Roig i Rosisch (1992), Clark (1978).

²⁰ The literature on Francoist repression in the Basque Country is too vast to be mentioned. In English, see Clark (1979, 1984).

²¹ For a comparison between Eritreans and Basques, see Khatami (1990).

²² See van Bruinessen (1988, 1992: 316-7), Conversi (1993b), Entessar (1992: 94-5) and McDowell (1992a, 1992b).

²³ See Karlovic (1982). Vukovic's (1987) rebuttal essay advances a critique from a more 'pro-Yugoslav' viewpoint.

²⁴ Ahmed Ben Bella's FLN (*Front de Libération Nationale*) began its struggle in 1954 and Algeria's independence was achieved in 1962.

²⁵ Fanon, himself a man unable to get rid of his French culture (Burke 1976) saw violence as the only means for liberating the oppressed from the yoke of an all-pervasive colonialism. He represented the single most important theoretical source in ETA's 'thirdworldist' phase (1962-1968 circa, see Conversi 1993b).

of violence and counter-violence.²⁶ The conditions of ruthless dictatorship in Spain gave a formidable boost to the radicals' plan. As predicted by Fanon, state violence generated a widespread 'national awareness' which was unprecedented in the history of the 'oppressed'. Identifying the Basques as a colonized 'wretched of the earth', their leaders vowed to fight against dictatorship by using its very tools.²⁷

It is true that under Francoism and in its aftermath, the Basques have developed a much more inclusive and open identity. However, this new identity has been formulated at the cost of a more moderate brand of nationalism. It was the overall confrontation with the Spanish state which molded an identity in which blood-type and surnames no longer mattered. It was the continuous situation of emergency, which created an all-pervasive aura of solidarity between all sections of the population. This was also a consequence of the fact that nationalist leaders saw the Basque nation as verging on extinction. In the end, in particular during the Transition to democracy when the illegitimacy of the state reached its zenith, all kinds of social issues, from class struggle to women's lib and the environment, were subsumed under the umbrella of radical nationalism.²⁸ Below this situational unity, Basque culture remained divided and only started to recover a public space in the mid-1980s.

The Basque language (Euskara) is spoken by little more than 24% of the population (Eustat 1884, 1988), this percentage having changed only slightly since the birth of nationalism (Nuñez 1977). The cultural scenario is traditionally fragmented: Euskara is divided into seven main dialects and only recently has it been unified: a standard Basque norm, the *batúa*, was proposed in 1964, accepted by the Basque Language Academy in 1968 (Sarasola 1976: 23), and later adopted as Euskadi's co-official language alongside Spanish. Ever since, albeit not without resistance, this unifying norm has spread through the media, the schools and the administration, contributing to create a shared identity based on language, rather than on any of the previous shifting and divisive values. Such developments have contributed to delegitimizing terrorism by inspiring an alternative, creative vision of Basque identity which does not depend on frontal opposition. However, previous to this happening the nationalist struggle operated as an over-riding ideology which, at certain points, had partially subsumed other kinds of beliefs, memberships and divisions.

²⁶ The Algerian epic struggle is also a key point for other recent nationalist movements, in particular the Corsican one. Not accidentally, the main clandestine separatist group of the island (which emerged in May 1976) was named FLNC (*Front de Libération National Corse*) after its Algerian eponym

²⁷ See Douglass and Zulaika (1990: 244-5), Ortzi (1991: vol. 2: ch. 2: sections 51 and 58) and Jauregui (1981).

²⁸ For further elaboration on this point, see Ibarra Güell's paper in Section V.

In both the Basque and Kurdish cases, there is a direct relationship between repression and cultural assimilation. Indeed, both nationalist movements were fighting against the very state which they blamed for the loss of their culture. Thus, they shared a powerful legitimizing grievance for waging their struggle. The underlying claim was that «the violent, intolerant and mono-ethnic character of the state not only denies our existence, but prevents any peaceful solution to our problems and needs». This put the Basque and Kurdish movements in a different position from that of the Croatians. At least until recently, the Yugoslav state could not be blamed for cultural genocide. Although non-Serbs in former Yugoslavia did in the past lament Serbian attempts to gain cultural and political hegemony,²⁹ they nevertheless enjoyed a high degree of cultural and political autonomy (certainly higher than in most of the former Soviet Republics). But this delicate balance of power, held together by Tito and his non-aligned socialist politics (Rusinow 1977), has not survived the leader's death and the emergence of aggressive Serbian nationalism. Hence, it was precisely Yugoslavia's march backward towards the re-assertion of a Serbian-dominated centre which caused its own break-up (Drakulic 1993, Magas 1993a, Stone 1993, Thompson 1993).

Croatia

In spite of the vociferous declaration that Croatian is a distinct language from Serbian, this belief is disputed by many non-Croat linguists. Any such insinuation may be an anathema and deeply offensive to most Croats because of the suffering they have undergone to achieve independence. However, to exaggerate the existing differences would be to ignore the facts and to overlook a relatively recent history of common standardization. In 1850, Serbs and Croats signed a literary agreement accepting the *stokavski* dialect for a standard orthography while incorporating spelling reforms to draw the two written varieties as close together as possible (Kalogjera 1985).³⁰ The Bosnian Vuk Káradjic (1787-1864) proposed his Hercegovinan mother-tongue, a variety of *stokavski* close to both Serb and Croat, as a standard. The Croatian writer Ljudevit Gaj (1809-1872), who was the main inspirer of the Illyrian movement for the reunion of all Southern-Slavs (Yugo-Slavs) in a unified state (Despalatovic 1975:

²⁹ According to some authors (Anderson 1990: 45, Cohen 1989, Magas 1993a, 1993b), Kosovo Albanians were in the grip of a colonial-like situation: local Serbs, who made up less than 10% of the population, dominated all aspects of society, economy and the government, whilst Albanians were seriously underrepresented in all these sectors. This situation can be described as a *de facto* apartheid.

³⁰ Thus, the other two Croatian dialects, *kajkavski* (spoken in an area of Northern Croatia contiguous to Slovenia) and *čakavski* (spoken in Istria and the islands of the Dalmatian coast), which were less similar to Serb, were marginalized (Banac 1984: 77-81, Despalatovic 1975: 93).

79-95),³¹ agreed to this reform. The unity of Serbo-Croat was not officially questioned until very recently. Indeed, the 1974 constitution of Socialist Yugoslavia recognized only three official languages for the federation: Slovene, Macedonian and Serbo-Croat (Connor 1984, Hondius 1968, Tollefson 1980, 1993).³²

What separates Croat from Serb is the alphabet, Latin in the first case and Cyrillic in the second. This situation is described in sociolinguistics as *digraphia* (Dale 1980). The difference is originally due entirely to a religious factor, the Croats being mostly Catholic and the Serbs mostly Orthodox. Hence, the spoken language is forced apart by the written language with religion as the line of demarcation (Trager 1974). Yet, even this distinction is sometime blurred, as «only the Montenegrins use Cyrillic exclusively; the Serbs use both alphabets with a tendency toward greater usage of the Latin alphabet; the Moslems in Bosnia favour the Latin alphabet; the Croats rarely use Cyrillic...» (Magner 1985: 6-7).

Religion was also an important factor in the construction of the two national identities, as the respective Churches provided shelter for the patriots and symbols of nationhood in times of trouble. This has forced previously mixed identities into one field or another. But how far can religion be an important factor in a thoroughly secularized society like the Yugoslav one? Religion today plays a largely symbolic role, as 40 years of state-sanctioned atheism have succeeded to a great extent in erasing religious beliefs. Official atheism has impressed a strong secular mark on Yugoslav society and the nationalists are no exception.³³ Moreover, religion is not an unquestionable differentiating factor, since there are Catholic Serbs and Orthodox Croats, albeit in small numbers.³⁴ Yet, religion has become the most widely shared

³¹ An opposite operation was carried out in Macedonia, where local writers rejected their own urban languages, which were similar to Serbo-Croat, and went to the remotest rural areas in search of words and structures separate, as far as possible, from Serbo-Croat. In this way, they built what is today standard Macedonian (Lunt 1953, 1959). According to Pavlowitch (1988), one of Tito's historic achievements has been the creation of a Macedonian identity which to a large degree had solved the problem of how to keep within the federation the Macedonians, who saw themselves as partially Bulgarians and who were in the past harshly repressed by the Serbs. However, «the concept of Macedonian nationality and literary language was already clearly defined by the beginning of the century and not created *ex nihilo* by Yugoslav fiat in 1944, as is sometime claimed even in Western sources» (Friedman 1975, 1985: 34).

³² Still today, the 'federal' Constitution of Serbia-Montenegro mentions Serbo-Croat as the official language, while the Serbian Constitution speaks simply of Serbian.

³³ It has been pointed out that, in the case of Bosnia, «religious affiliation has very little, or rather nothing, to do with any theological content or doctrine...To put it bluntly, [it is] a war between *Catholic atheists*, *Orthodox atheists* and *Muslim atheists*, though of course none of the participants in the fighting would admit to such a designation» (Hjärpe 1993: 212, italics in the original).

³⁴ For instance, Seton-Watson (1977: 134) mentions a small community of Catholics in Southern Dalmatia who considered themselves to be Serbs.

of all possible binding elements which can differentiate Serbs from Croats. Religion is the strongest of a series of possible weak borders, nevertheless in secular Yugoslavia its strength is often merely symbolic and devoid of content.³⁵ The question has become much more complicated in Bosnia, since those now called Muslims were formerly identified as either Serbs or Croats, or some combination of the two.

History and memories of statehood are also a shallow criteria, since most Montenegrins, who experienced a long-lasting independent state before the creation of Yugoslavia, have shown their allegiance to Serbia.³⁶ To confuse matters further, different conceptions of what it means to be a Croatian, a Southern Slav, a Serb, etc., have been competing over the years. The 'Great Croatia idea' espoused by the racist Ante Starcevic was a re-interpretation of Gaj's Illyrian idea in Croatian ultra-nationalist terms.³⁷ Differences between Serbs and Croats were alleged to be inherently biological.

Paradoxically, however, as soon as a Serb accepted Croat national consciousness, such differences would no longer matter.... Starcevic [and other authors] both included Serbs in the Croat nation and branded them as an inferior race. In both cases this ambiguity reflected the authors' implicit admission of the fundamental similarity of the two people (Trifkovic 1992: 365-6).

Several other Croat nationalists emphasized the allegedly huge biological difference between Serbs and Croats. As in similar cases, such stress on race (which in the Balkans is coupled with a seedy and debased interest in historical revision) served to compensate for the absence of clearly defined cultural markers between the two groups. As a consequence, nationhood was to be both inclusive and exclusive: «The Croatian nation should include those who, in the course of time, had become Orthodox or Muslims...It was possible to speak of those who lived in the region known as Serbia as 'Serbs', but it was wrong to speak of Serbs as a nation» (Seton Watson 1977:134).³⁸ This proto-fascist vision was in contrast to the Yugoslav one expounded

³⁵ Applying Barth's (1969) distinction between ethnic borders and ethnic content, it can be said that religion in former Yugoslavia functions far more as a border than as cultural content.

³⁶ However, also this allegiance has recently shown signs of strains (Brajovic 1992).

³⁷ It is significant that a square in Zagreb was named after Ante Starcevic in 1990 as part of a wider revisionist plan (Trifkovic 1992, Drakulic 1993). This was one of a host of semi-conscious choices implemented by Franjo Tudjman's nationalist government in order to 'invite' Serbian repression. This argument can be reinforced by considering the Croatian government's «willingness to collaborate with its erstwhile tormentor in destroying a neighbouring state, Bosnia, against whom the Croats have few grounds to feel aggrieved. Carving up Bosnia makes it very difficult for the Croats to press their claims for Krajina on the basis of the old internal Yugoslav borders» (Tom Gallagher, personal suggestion).

³⁸ The role played by opposition is crucial in the construction of both Serb and Croat national identities. As Trifkovic (1992: 366) points out, even to an Ustasha (supporter of the Nazi-puppet state created during World War II) 'the Serb' was «an integral part of his Croatness. Without him, Croatdom could not be defined, let alone practiced».

by the bishop Iva Juraj Strosmajer (1815-1905). The latter «recognised that Croats and Serbs were different, but believed that they were fraternal nations, belonging to a great Southern Slav (Yugoslav) community...The main task was to liberate South Slavs from Ottoman rule» (Seton Watson 1977:134).

Tito attempted to smooth these ambiguities by restraining Serbian chauvinism and drawing all Yugoslavs into a common front against Fascism. But confusion over historical definitions and identities remained and was reflected in daily life. Furthermore, years of regional mobility between the Republics have created many mixed marriages, where the partners -and often their offspring too- do not consider themselves as either Serbs or Croats, but simply as Serbo-Croats, Bosnians, or even Yugoslavs.

In 1991 everything changed. Since the conflict erupted, mixed couples and individuals of mixed identity have been increasingly compelled by the events to choose and to stick to one field and one identity only. In a pattern that recurs in all three case-studies, national belonging has been forced on common people as a result of violence. In ethnic enclaves and border areas, artillery shelling and aerial bombardments by the Yugoslav army have done their best to forge a committed Croatian identity even among formerly 'mixed' families. People of Serb descent have 'become' Croats -some of them extremely militant- and have been accepted as such by the community. The opposite process is also -to a much lesser extent- true.

Take the following examples from a reporter's first-hand account of the war:³⁹

Who is a Serb, after all, and who is a Croat? Essentially, they are one race. They may even share the same religion, because not all Serbs are Orthodox and not all Croats are Catholics.

I met a young woman wearing a T-shirt that said 'Croatia is my country'. I was surprised to learn that she was a Serb, married to a probation officer of mixed Serb-Croat parentage.

At the Croatian headquarters in Sisak the first two volunteers I met described themselves as Serbs, not Croats. One of them was dressed in black fatigues and wore a menacing head-band with insignia he claimed belonged to the Black Legion, the elite force of the Ustashe. I noticed that he carried the hallmark crucifix of the Croatian Guardsmen, and he said he was indeed a Catholic, and his mother was a Croat. He still considered himself a Serb. Was he lying, I wondered, and if not, what did it mean to be a Catholic Serb fighting Serbs?

³⁹ Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, 'Of brothers in bloodshed', *Daily Telegraph*, Monday 16-9-1991.

This report can either mean that we are facing a purely civic (non-ethnic) nationalism or that new ethnic borders (as distinct from political borders) are being framed where previously no clear-cut border existed. The former possibility can be discarded by considering the fact that Serbia, at least, has waged an ethnic war in the name of Pan-Serbianism and hence does not espouse a civic vision of the conflict. The methodical ruthlessness of attacks on defenseless people, aimed at creating a new geographical space for Serbs only, is the opposite of a 'territorial' or civic kind of nationalism. Croats are more 'territorially' or civically oriented insofar as they strive to keep the borders of their Republic intact. Yet, an ethnic component underlies all their present struggle and it would be inappropriate to say that Croats propose a civic form of nationalism, as opposed to the ethnic one of the Serbs.

Thus, the question of a previously confused definition of ethnic borders remains the only credible interpretation of the above report. Previous definitions of what was a Serb, a Croat, a Serbo-Croat, a Yugoslav,...are being drastically altered. From the inception of the war, most people began to feel exclusively Serb or exclusively Croat, and nothing else. Mixed and uncertain identities have been erased.

The most relevant difference between the Yugoslav case and our other two cases is that Serbian nationalists were also intent on defining new borders out of a borderless situation, at least as much as Croatian nationalists were. Milosevic's undeclared aim has been, not the preservation of Yugoslav unity, but the strengthening and cohesion of the Serbian nation. The rhetoric defence of Yugoslav unity was mainly a device in international relations propaganda. This policy has been particularly ferocious in those areas where mixed marriages and centuries of multi-ethnic cohabitation rendered ethnic borders highly flexible. The result has been the notorious policy of ethnic cleansing (*cisjenje*) with the help of the so-called 'federal' army. Hence, with the decisive contribution of the state apparatus, Serbia achieved in a few weeks what normal guerrilla movements achieve in years. No guerrilla group could have aimed at nation-building on such a scale.⁴⁰

The following statement by a Croat scholar who recently returned to his war-torn country is paradigmatic:

Some of my friends are still living in the United States and, until yesterday, we had so many things in common. Now I am living in a country at war, and they don't understand

⁴⁰ The implication is that we find a state in the midst of Europe which employs on an unprecedented scale the methods used by a plethora of small terrorist bands. As a response, other terrorist states and groups may emerge in the area. Already defined as 'the Palestinians of Europe', Bosnian Muslims will not easily surrender the territory in which they lived for centuries.

me anymore. How can they understand that in the last year, being a Croat became my destiny? How could I explain to them that in this war I am defined by my nationality -and my nationality only? This is what the war is doing to us -reducing us to one dimension... it is not only Serbs and federal army troops who look at me like that; it is hard to be anything else in Croatia itself. I can only regret that awareness of my nationality came to me in such a painful way, through death, destruction and the suffering of people, and through reduction, accusations, suspicions and extreme homogenisation... National consciousness, perhaps even nationalism, has been forced on people like an ill-fitting shirt. You may feel that the sleeves are too short and the collar too tight. You might not like the colour, and the cloth may itch. But you wear it because there is no other. In fact, it would be an injustice to tear it off, because of the people who are being slaughtered just because of their Croat nationality. So no one is allowed *not* to be Croatian, and our attackers are to blame for removing our freedom to be firstly persons and citizens, and then Croats (Drakulic 1991: 3).

The phrase «nationality came to me in such a painful way» confirms that nationalism is the great victor of this conflict, perhaps the only winner. It succeeded in binding together peoples and persons who before had scarcely anything in common. In no other circumstances could such unity have been forged. The Yugoslav case confirms that nationalism, when viewed from within, is essentially a binding and unifying force. Hence, the role of the state as an aggressive 'external' power is crucial in creating unity out of fragmentation.

The process of Serbian and Croat nation-building has been relatively rapid, thanks to the fact that aggressors and victims, pro-state and anti-state forces, shared the same aim, namely a strengthening of the two nations through mutual exclusivity. One of the main theoreticians of 'ethnic cleansing' was a man who had relevant contacts with British 'progressive' circles, the Serbian writer Dobrica Cosic, until 15 October 1992 a staunch supporter of Milosevic. He claimed that «we can only live in peace if we draw frontiers between us».⁴¹ This and other statements implied that the existing frontiers were not clear enough and they needed further strengthening. Hence, «those frontiers are to run between wife and husband, next-door neighbours, and scattered small communities. The result: the chaos... and insane bloodshed upon people who have lived in peace for 50 years and more».⁴² The deployment of Serbian

⁴¹ Quoted in Milos Vasic: 'God save us from our leaders', *The Independent*, 19 May 1992. The *de facto* non-recognition of Bosnia by the international community (arm embargo, treatment of the Bosnian government as a 'warring faction', proposed cantonization, tacit acceptance of ethnic cleansing, permanent media focus on its leading perpetrators, etc.) has encouraged the bloodshed, as it did previously in Croatia (Thompson 1993, Magas 1993a).

⁴² Milos Vasic: 'God save us from our leaders', *The Independent*, 19 May 1992.

snipers shooting on pacifist demonstrators in the streets of Sarajevo was the first step in this plan.⁴³ Its final conclusion was the pillage, rape, assault, expulsion and murder of former neighbours and friends.⁴⁴

The war has so far brought about some kind of unity among the Serbian winners scattered in different Republics and abroad. The fact that in 1993 most Serbs perceived themselves to be the victors - and not the victims, as they love to describe themselves to credulous Westerners - may have contributed to this 'success'. But has violence achieved the same goal in Croatia? Like their Serbian counterparts, the Croatian diaspora has been thoroughly mobilized in support of the defence effort (Drakulic 1991, 1993). A foreign menace has the potential to reunite a disaffected population around a moribund nomenklatura. However, in order for the regime to be revitalized, the foreign menace must be met successfully. This has hardly been true for Croatia: unrecognized till the last moment and unable to defend itself, Croatia was militarily defeated by Serbia, with large chunks of its territory occupied under the UN blessing. Defeat in war often has the opposite effect of that envisaged by military nationalists, as it can lead to further fragmentation. Indeed, a recent symptom of disaffection against Zagreb has been the upsurge of regionalist parties, especially in Dalmatia, Istria and Rijeka (Zakosek 1993).⁴⁵

The main casualty of the Yugoslav war has been multi-ethnic coexistence. Wherever pre-war identities were in doubt, the war has worked as a powerful moulder and tool of identity formation. Not that the war has achieved anything in further differentiating the combatant peoples *per se*. People are at least as similar to each other as they were in the past, and, if anything, the war has brought about further uniformity, standardization and conformity. What has changed is the perception of the self, and of the border surrounding the self. Identities have been strengthened, not culture.

⁴³ «After Bosnia voted for independence, it took only a few incidents to undermine the whole structure of society... In Sarajevo, a small number of Serbian snipers controlled by Radovan Karadjic induced terror on the streets and brought about a total breakdown in law and order within 40 hours. In the villages, radicalised, often drunken, Serb gunmen called upon local Serbs to expel or murder their neighbours. If those Serbs refused, they were executed by the visiting gunmen. Those executions were of course blamed on the hapless neighbours. In the meantime, a parallel Serbian police force...would take over the administration of justice... In a newly violent society where there is no underpinning, people are left with no effective option but to fragment back to ethnic groupings». Paul Harris, 'The dirty tricks that led to ethnic cleansing', *Scotland on Sunday*, 16 August 1992.

⁴⁴ 'Rape thy neighbour', *The Observer*, 21 February 1993. 'Muslim women gang-raped by Serbs', *The Independent*, 10 August 1992, p. 1.

⁴⁵ Regionalism is a problem which has traditionally beset Croatian nationalism since its inception (Gross 1982).

Indeed, national culture has been destroyed, as the shelling of historical cities has demonstrated. Hence, one of the end results of this war will have been to make the two countries more similar to each other than they were before, except by means of formal differences and legal niceties. Croatia has managed to issue its own currency, stamps, passports, to build its own army, etc., that is, the same things that all other states in the world already have. Political nationalists may be the winners of this battle as great chunks of their population are subjected to their aims, but cultural activists have lost. Culture itself is one of the great losers in any war. Native minds have been wasted in military training or have been mobilized away from creative enterprise and scientific achievement. Traditions have been shattered. Entire communities displaced. Harmless old folk massacred by nationalist Young Turks.

The media became a formidable ally in the lust for erecting barriers.⁴⁶

In the four years immediately before the outbreak of the wars... the authorities in Belgrade, led by Milosevic, engaged in a propaganda campaign designed to exploit latent fears in the population and to reawaken old, bitter memories which had largely healed. In one particularly crass operation, the skulls and bones of Serbs killed in [World War II] by Croatian and Bosnian fascists were disinterred under the lights of the TV cameras. This was part of a planned process of preparation for war: the deliberate building up of walls of mutual distrust and antagonism. It was not a case of ancient hatred suddenly resurfacing. A war psychosis was actually created through the skillful manipulation of the state-controlled media.⁴⁷

Here history has been used in order to revive or 're-create' latent ethnic memories of hatred, threat and danger, in an obvious effort at 'border creation'. This also occurred in tandem with the enemy. In a recent paper, Cynthia Enloe (1993) has shown that the Serbian military had to use historical arguments in order to impel their soldiers to rape Muslim women and children: they very successfully convinced their troops that the reason for their suffering stemmed from the heritage of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, mass rape was justified on historical grounds.

One of the results of the conflict is that, if in 1988 «a majority of Yugoslavs would accept the need to live in the political community of a Yugoslav state» (Pavlowitch 1988: 155), the opposite is now true and only a negligible minority would see any future in a political arrangement called Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia can be

⁴⁶ Tom Gallagher concurs that the role of the media in erecting barriers and identifying enemies has been pivotal (personal suggestion).

⁴⁷ Paul Harris, 'The dirty tricks that led to ethnic cleansing', *Scotland on Sunday*, 16 August 1992, is an outstanding analysis of the violent creation of new ethnic boundaries through state-sponsored communal strife.

compared to a miniature Austro-Hungarian empire, which was once defined as an 'experimental laboratory of world history' (Adler, cited by Alter 1989: 134). It was «the German nationalism of the Austrians which brought old Austria to ruin» (Baumgartner et al. 1988: 24).⁴⁸ Likewise, Serbian nationalism has destroyed the Yugoslav federation. The only difference being that it has moved fast to the Third Reich model in the wake of its dissolution.

A positive counter-example: Catalonia

In order to complete our theory, it is necessary to contrast our three 'negative' cases with positive ones.⁴⁹ In the industrialized world, we have several examples of thoroughly successful and peaceful mass nationalism: Quebec, Catalonia, the Baltic states, and even Slovenia.⁵⁰ Several other cases can be found all over the world. In all these cases, a sturdy regional culture has survived centuries-long assimilation campaigns.

Catalonia is perhaps the only example in Western Europe of a stateless nation with a blooming cultural life. Catalan nationalism has a mass appeal and is able to mobilise supporters of all ages, classes and regional origins, whenever the key symbols of nationhood are under threat. It is a form of civic nationalism with a strong cultural-linguistic component. Notwithstanding its evident power, Catalan nationalism has

⁴⁸ Obviously, it may also be pointed out that it was Hungarian intransigence, rather than the German nationalism of the Austrians, which destroyed the Habsburg Empire. The murder of the heir to the Austrian throne which triggered off World War I in 1914 was carried out by a Serb from Bosnia and, paradoxically, the war ended up with the creation of Yugoslavia. In turn, the assassination created a myth of the Serbs as a superior warrior race able of determining the fate of mankind. The 'imposition' of Yugoslav unity as a consequence of post-war agreements was hence deeply resented by many Serbs who wished to live in a state firmly dominated by their own kin.

⁴⁹ I do not use the terms 'negative' and 'positive' in an evaluative sense, but rather to underline two different modes of nationalist mobilization: the former through opposition and negation of the other, the latter through positive creation and inclusion of the other. Obviously, these are two 'ideal types' and can hardly be found as such in the real world.

⁵⁰ In the latter case, external aggression has been successfully met avoiding major violence. Traditionally, the Slovenes were the only group that the central government did not accuse of nationalism and 'bourgeois' deviation since the times of Tito. Blessed with a flourishing economy and a distinctive culture, the Slovenes had hitherto shown more allegiance to the federation than any other non-Serb nationality (Alter 1989: 134). Unfortunately, the rise of Milosevich has convinced even the most anti-nationalist and pro-Yugoslav Slovenes that independence was the only solution.

Whilst Croatian, Bulgarian, and Serbian national identity was based on long-standing memories dating back to the Middle Ages, Slovene national consciousness emerged only in the 19th century. «Since the ideological underpinning of these new Southern Slavs nations were seemingly incomplete without

seldom resorted to violence. The only relevant guerrilla group existing in the country has never killed anyone directly and has recently dropped armed struggle altogether.⁵¹

A crucial difference between Euskadi and Catalonia is that, in the former, centuries-long assimilation policies have brought about the gradual loss of the national culture, but, in the latter, they have failed to do so. Hence, policies of nationalist opposition in Catalonia have focused on cultural resistance, rather than armed struggle. In a condition of oppressive dictatorship like in Franco's Spain, there were only two possible strategies for nationalist elites: cultural resistance or armed struggle. Cultural nationalism and attempts to revive the national culture have been significant features in both countries, yet in Euskadi they could not overcome the stage of a nostalgic cult for the local folklore, as the Basque language was not spoken in the cities. Language could not work as the main support and carrier of nationhood and it was impossible to mobilize large sectors of the population through cultural nationalism. In particular traditional Basque nationalism could not envisage the mobilization of crucial urban strata such as the hegemonic classes of the cities, the students, and the industrial proletariat -for the most part made up of immigrants. Hence, as cultural nationalism was not a realistic option and political nationalism was thoroughly hampered by the dictatorship, only military nationalism could supply the driving force for a revival of national consciousness. *Cultural nationalism* must be kept distinct from *political nationalism*.⁵² Cultural nationalism is an important ideological force regularly adopted by an expanding intelligentsia as a political option against the state. It aims at the 'moral regeneration' of the nation. However, the strength of cultural nationalism depends on the strength of the local culture: a vigorous local culture can produce a permanent movement of cultural nationalism. If, as in the Basque case, the local culture is poorly developed and urban elites are thoroughly assimilated, cultural nationalism may be very ineffective. It will then have to yield to political nationalism most of the initiatives of political reawakening and 'moral regeneration'. In the study of violent movements, it is necessary to distinguish a third form of nationalism, *military nationalism*. This latter develops its autonomous dynamics and follows its own route,

a state tradition, modern Slovenes therefore looked upon the early seventh-century Carantanian principality as their prototypical state and the proof of their continuous nationhood» (Banac 1984: 23). Nevertheless, linguistic nationalism was more successful in Slovenia in determining the borders of a distinct linguistic community (Paternost 1985). So, despite their more recently constructed identity the Slovenes found it easier to differentiate themselves through language. It can be said that, looking upon language, the Slovenes found therein the legitimacy and anchor of their national identity, rather than attaching excessive importance to memories of independence.

⁵¹ One of the reasons given for this abandonment of armed struggle was the noteworthy influence exerted by the peaceful Baltic independence movements, especially Lithuania (Conversi 1993b).

⁵² For the distinction between *cultural nationalism* and *political nationalism*, see Hutchinson (1987, 1992).

rather than alternating with the other two. Military nationalism purports to fulfill the role of national re-awakening and 'moral regeneration' normally played by cultural nationalists.

The military option was both unnecessary and unworkable in Catalonia. Underlying the entire process of national re-awakening was a deeply felt optimism about the survival of the Catalan nation, through the maintenance and even the spread of the Catalan language. Postwar Catalan intellectuals defined their nation as a *terra de pas* (land of passage), as a *passadis* (corridor) and as a melting-pot into which all foreign elements could be integrated without destroying Catalan identity and, to a certain extent, without coercion (Vives 1984). The Catalan language has thus an integrative power which contrasts with most other minority languages (Conversi 1988). Having developed its own assimilative force, Catalan was not successfully subjected to assimilation by the state language, Castilian. With Catalan identity so fully centered on language, and language so fully developed and widespread, Catalonia certainly had the possibility to develop a thriving cultural nationalism.⁵³ But in Euskadi a widespread separate identity has violently manifested itself only as a consequence of state repression and nationalist counter-violence.⁵⁴

COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Our first argument claimed that ethnic violence is positively correlated to cultural similarity, rather than to cultural dissimilarity. This was complemented by a second argument which stressed the role of state repression in triggering -either directly or indirectly- ethno-nationalist violence. The former argument runs counter to widespread assumptions that cultural differences and language barriers are responsible for misunderstanding and, hence, for conflicts and wars. Our comparative focus has shown instead that in present-day multiethnic societies all policies turning to assimilation fail on one of two counts: firstly, if they succeed, as in the Basque and

⁵³ In two separate papers, I described how language has been the crucial component of contemporary Catalan nationalism throughout its history (Conversi 1990, 1993a). I also expounded the theory that pre-existing cultural conditions deeply affect the development of nationalist movements. By pre-existing cultural conditions, I mean particularly the degree of language maintenance.

⁵⁴ The use of the term 'counter-violence' is meant to underline that the state is normally the prime mover and overwhelming force in the use of violence. Indeed, Weber's definition of the state as that institution that enjoys the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence fully applies to state repression in our three case studies. Moreover, since nationalists envisage the creation of their own state, they also use violence as a psychological weapon to undermine the self-proclaimed legitimacy of the state as the guarantor of social peace. By attacking the state, they deny its monopoly of legitimate violence.

Kurdish case, they bring about a violent reaction amongst nationalist leaders and a violent change in their strategies; secondly, even without a policy of overt assimilation, as in the Yugoslav case, the simple fact that nationalist leaders have to confront themselves with permeable and weak borders is a harbinger of disastrous conflicts. Such lack of definition is often a crucial element in determining these elites' strategies of violence as a replacement for culture.

Another crucial element which has emerged is the distinctive character and function of political, cultural and military nationalism. In all the three cases, the political movements were preceded by or accompanied by a cultural revival and a period of renewed self-expression in the 1960s. In Kurdistan, the period from 1962 to 1968 saw a surge of renewed interest in Kurdish identity, with new publications, bilingual periodicals, a play, a grammar and a Turkish-Kurdish dictionary (Kreyenbroek 1992: 74). In Euskadi, the movement of the *ikastolas* (Basque language schools) and other cultural initiatives began to emerge in the 1960s (Tejerina 1992: 129-37). In Croatia, a nationalist movement rapidly expanded when semi-open activity became possible from the late 1960 until the end of 1971 (Karlovic 1982).⁵⁵ All three cultural revivals were crushed by abrupt clamp-downs which reestablished the grip of censorship. In Euskadi, the campaign against ETA provided the government with an excuse to attack and further outlaw all independent cultural activities (Clark 1979). In Kurdistan, most publications were banned as soon as they appeared. In 1967, all Kurdish publications and recordings were openly forbidden (Bozarslan 1992). In Croatia, the movement was doomed in December 1971 by violent suppression by the Tito regime, acting at «the behest of the Serbian-dominated army» (Lendvai, cited by Karlovic 1982). During the 1970s Croatian nationalists made up the largest single ethnic group in Yugoslavia's political prisons and labour camps.⁵⁶

These phases of limited re-awakening and subsequent repression are important in order to explain the timing of the violent explosion. During such phases, the nationalist movement(s) tested the strength of popular support, while the masses came into contact with the evil nature of the state. A highly promising revival of national identities was hampered by the strong arm of centralism. By unmasking the repressive character of the state, the nationalists permanently damaged the state's legitimacy. Furthermore, by debarring the movement when it was already popular, the state

⁵⁵ «In the span of a single year, 1970-1, for example, a Croatian cultural society, ...*Matica Hrvatska*, which was to provide an organisational framework for the articulation of an increasingly cohesive nationalist platform, expanded its official membership from 1,200 to 30,000» (Karlovic 1982: 280).

⁵⁶ The now President Franjo Tudjman himself spent the period 1972-77 in prison.

revealed its moral bankruptcy. In all three cases, the legitimacy of the existing governments rested on their purported defence of 'national' (i.e., state) unity and territorial integrity. For instance, the hyper-centralist state emerging from the Spanish Civil War was legitimized by virtue of its commitment to preserving social order and territorial integrity.⁵⁷

In this paper we have focussed on the relevance of language or other shared values in the development of nationalism. In the modern era, culture has been largely defined on the basis of language, while national identity has been conceived as deeply related to the existence of a separate vernacular. Although many forms of nationalism do not rely on language, its importance is undeniable.⁵⁸ Various theories have tried to explain why language is today so central to the definition of a nation.⁵⁹ One of the consequences of this is that if you do not have a shared language, you have somehow to 'invent' it. Only when this 'invention' is sufficiently credible, and it is turned into a 'tradition' (Hobsbawm 1983), could the nation be legitimized as such. Hence, if the language is extremely different from the dominant one but dying out, or if the language is alive but insufficiently differentiated from the dominant one, nationalist elites are faced with a dilemma: either 'force' a hyper-differentiated norm, or drop language altogether as a core value of nationhood. However, the latter choice must be supplemented by the selection of other elements or tools. In the Basque case, the central elements of nationhood chosen by the nationalist leaders oscillated from race to religion and territory, but they all proved -for different reasons- to be unsuccessful in mobilizing the entire population (Conversi 1990, 1993a). In the Kurdish case, tribal divisions and linguistic fragmentation, together with the central state's policies of acculturation, added further obstacles to nationalist mobilization (McDowell 1992b, Van Bruinessen 1992). In all three cases, mass mobilization erupted

⁵⁷ Both communists and separatists were the *bêtes noires* of the regime. Ironically, ETA came later to subsume both trends in itself.

⁵⁸ The big debate within most nationalist movements is whether the national culture could be transmitted in the dominant language or not, without diluting the national soul. Obviously, since culture is bound up with language, it becomes problematic for any nationalist movement to define a national culture outside a national language. A few nationalist movements, such as the Catalan and Quebecois, have been able to avoid this impasse through an undisputed emphasis on language. It is felt as an ever present polemics made up of passionate debates. This was only possible because in both countries the national language was spoken by the majority of the populations. A few other cases, such as Scotland, have also been unified around a non-linguistic sense of nationhood, although informal patterns of accent or dialect are also relevant in the self-definition of 'who is a Scot'. No nationalist movement has hitherto proposed a full normalisation of Scottish Gaelic, although a broad campaign for its promotion has been upheld.

⁵⁹ For a general overview, see Fishman (1972, 1985). Both Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1983) relate language to economic and technological change brought by modernization.

when state violence and nationalist counter-violence moved towards a spiral pattern of increasing popular involvement.

Aggressive behaviour or violence from an external power classically reinforces solidarity bonds within victimized communities. 'External' aggression is often invoked by community leaders in times of internal crisis, both at the state and non-state level. Outward violence has been instinctively, and sometimes rationally, used as a means of internal cohesion in fragmented or threatened societies since time immemorial. Functionalist anthropologists have demonstrated that inter-tribal warfare serves the purpose of tribal unity. Urban sociologists, criminologists, and best-selling movies have shown how inter-racial gangs in suburban America are often united only in terms of their violent confrontations with other gangs.

Nationalism is an intrinsically homogenizing force. However, its unitary trend clashes with the pluralistic or ill-defined make-up of many stateless nations (as well as many dominant ones). This lack of shared values is often the result of centuries-long assimilation processes. When nationalism erupts, the result can vary depending on the level of inter-group differentiation. Where there are clearly differentiated and bounded ethnic communities, accommodation and compromise are more likely to emerge.⁶⁰ In contrast, assimilated, un-differentiated and un-bounded groups, are more exposed to violent evolution resulting from their internal fragmentation and lack of definition *vis-à-vis* the dominant culture.

Language is not a daily-used and visible means of differentiation for the three groups considered. In the Serbo-Croat case, we have spoken of digraphia, rather than bilingualism. Basque and Kurdish are spoken and written by minorities in their own countries, even within nationalist milieux.⁶¹ As in other instances of language decay (Ireland, etc.), language assumes an affective symbolic character, but this affection is rarely translated into practice even within the most radical groups which advocate separatism.⁶² Thus, members of ETA normally communicate between themselves in

⁶⁰ By 'clearly differentiated', I do not mean overall difference in language structure. Euskara in Spain and Kurdish in Turkey are sharply different from their respective state languages. Indeed, Euskara is the last remnant of pre-Indo-European tongues confronting Indo-European Spanish, while Kurdish is an Indo-European language of the Persian group confronting Turkish, which in turns belongs to the •Ugro-Turkic family. The problem lies in the fact that Basque and Kurdish cultures are internally fragmented as a result of cultural assimilation. In this sense, they are not 'clearly differentiated' from mainstream ones, sharing this condition with Serbo-Croat which, as we have seen, is a single language with two alphabets.

⁶¹ Once Euskadi was granted autonomy under the terms of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, Euskara became a co-official language alongside Castilian. This does not impair our theory, since when violent nationalism erupted Basque language was strictly forbidden and not commonly spoken.

⁶² This is a well-known phenomenon in sociolinguistic studies of minority languages: in some cases, even the nationalists' discourse on the minority language is carried on in the dominant language, reflecting the intractable persistence of diglossia (Gardy and Lafont 1981, Lafont 1986).

Spanish.⁶³ Likewise, the common language in the guerrilla training camps of the PKK in Lebanon's Beeka Valley was Turkish, rather than Kurdish.⁶⁴

Whether the communities under study are internally fragmented, insufficiently differentiated or simply assimilated, the root problem remains the same: a lack of clear-cut borders. The main hypothesis of this paper was that a borderless situation is more likely to generate violence than a situation in which clear-cut borders do exist. In the former case, violence itself creates the ethnic borders and, finally, *becomes* the ethnic border. Lacking shared cultural elements, the nationalist drive to separateness can often be supplied only by violence. Attempts by the state at cultural assimilation have made this lack of clear-cut boundaries even more explosive. Nationalists also purport to save the nation. In order to be saved, the nation must be contained in a safe and well defined space. In turn, nationalist ideology claims that this space can only be protected by the state, and that such a state should be controlled by the 'nation'. Any space must then be defined and, hence, it requires clearly demarcated borders. The main rationale of nationalist violence is to create or enforce such borders.⁶⁵

The limiting factor on nationalist wars and guerrilla movements is that they tend to end up in a vicious circle. They bring about more destruction, and, in turn, this destruction, with its trail of endless resentment, makes future hatred and wars more likely, but does not necessarily help to build a distinctive community.⁶⁶

Without rejecting instrumentalist approaches, this paper has implicitly followed Smith's (1984, 1986, 1991) theory that memories and myths are what found collective identities. Indeed, the shared memories I focus on are very recent: instead of being the bequest of remote ages, they are present tragedy for some of the groups analysed. Yet, the underlying argument remains valid: as national identities are based on shared memories and myths, violence, by definition, weighs heavily on collective memory.

⁶³ See Jauregui (1981). Clark (1984) notes that most ETA activists come from Basque-speaking areas. However, he is referring to the late 1970s-1980s, whilst the first ETA militants and the founders of the organisation were themselves raised in urban non-Basque speaking milieux.

⁶⁴ 'The men who would move mountains', *The Guardian - Outlook*, Saturday 28 March 1992.

⁶⁵ As for the Kosovo issue, the border question is framed in demographic terms. In this case, the 'other' represent a threat not because it competes with me over certain symbols and values, but because it simply invade my space, trespassing some established borders.

⁶⁶ It is not by chance that nationalist hatred is stronger today in those Eastern European countries which have been most thoroughly destroyed by bombardments in World War II, and/or by decades of Communist 'urban planning'. In Poland, Eastern Germany, Slovakia and Serbia, nationalism tends to be more exclusive and aggressive than, say, in Scandinavia, the Czech Lands, Slovenia, Italy, countries that have been able to keep their culture and heritage of historical monuments more intact.

Myths of ethnic foundation are based on discourses and records of *recent* or *past* collective sufferings. Images of resistance are constantly re-evoked and cast against images of eternal oppression, where the people is the hero and the state the villain. My contribution to Smith's theory adds four further points: a) ethnic memories can survive over the centuries in spite of assimilation; b) assimilation, without erasing collective memories, makes ethnic borders and national identities more vague, fragmented and less easy to mobilise; c) this assimilation *cum* fragmentation carries in itself the seeds of a possible violent evolution, once a nationalist movement is superimposed on this context; and d) a second variable, state repression, is necessary for this violent potential to fully emerge. When state repression *interacts with* a lack of shared culture and values, the potential for violence is likely to materialize.

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THE PAST IN THE PRESENT: THE SEARCH FOR ROOTS IN CULTURAL NATIONALISM. THE SPANISH CASE.

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1.- Introduction

This paper analyses the development and institutionalization of a scientific discipline - archaeology - from the point of view of its involvement in the construction of the national identities which exist in Spain. This review of the history of Spanish archaeology up to the present attempts to understand how the past is perceived and understood today and, therefore, what importance it is given by the public, professionals and state institutions.

We live in a world which is impregnated with visual images of the past. Our cities and landscapes are patterned with signs which point to centuries-old ruins and each summer the press reserves a small space for news of archaeological excavations. Archaeologists, under the protection of local government, have become the nightmare of construction companies. But the past which surrounds us is not only real but often imaginary too. Cars are advertised in a futuristic/prehistoric context, there is a brand of cigarettes called Celts and even a football team with this name in Vigo. Adventure books, stories, novels, films, comics - all lead us, via Asterix, Jabato, Cleopatra or Vicky the Viking to a past which never existed but which is nevertheless strongly evocative and, in a certain way, international. The past thus maintains a subtle but notable presence in the modern world.

None of this existed at the end of the eighteenth century, although the seeds of everything which came later were already there. Since the *Crónica General de España* (*General Chronicle of Spain*), by Florian de Ocampo or the *Historia de España* (*History of Spain*) written by Padre Mariana in 1598, references to Tubal, Saguntum, Viriatus, Numantia and Sertorius have been oft repeated. The concept of a nation was already beginning to appear in them. Cervantes is another good example: in his play *La Numancia* (1584) he formulated the history of the Spanish nation. After referring

to antiquity with the Phoenicians, Greeks and Romans, he explained that it was the Goths, people from remote nations, who conquered the Romans, taking revenge for the fall of Numantia, giving new life to Spanish heroism, bringing the Christian religion and thus becoming the direct ancestors of the Spaniards. He described a Spanish stereotype based on religiosity, honour and valour, values which he continuously stressed in his work, especially the last two. Finally, he emphasized the unity of Spain achieved by King Phillip II (Cervantes 1962: 623).

The mounting crisis in which the Spanish Empire foundered was an important factor in the decline of this first surge of protonationalism. Only in the eighteenth century, and then under French influence, did a similar movement re-appear. It can be found in the *Teatro crítico universal* (*Universal Critique Theatre*) of Father Feijóo, or in the *Historia crítica de España y de la cultura española* (*Critical History of Spain and of Spanish Culture*) by Juan Francisco de Masdeu. The word 'nation' also appeared repeatedly in the *Cartas marruecas* (*Moroccan Letters*) written by José Cadalso between 1768 and 1774, and in his account of ancient Spanish history the description of the events which occurred in Numantia and Saguntum occupied an important part of the work. «The Romans,» explains Cadalso (1988: 83-84), «wanted to crown their power and glory with the conquest of Spain; but they met a resistance which seemed as strange as it was terrible (...) Numantia, a single city, cost them fourteen years of siege, three armies and the reputations of their most famous generals, until the Numantians, reduced to choosing between surrender or death, and with their nation in ruins, few survivors and streets full of dead bodies (without counting those who had served as food for their countrymen after provisions ran out), burnt their houses, threw their children, women and old people to the flames and came out to die on the battlefield with their weapons in their hands (...) If the Romans knew the *valour* of the *Spanish* as enemies, they also experienced their virtues as allies. Through the Romans fault Saguntum underwent a siege [by the Carthaginians] which was equal to that of Numantia(...)» (my italics). This Spanish national stereotype was accompanied by a whole host of lesser, complementary identities (see, for example, Juaristi 1992 or Simón 1993).

But what caused history to become an academic science in the nineteenth century, with archaeology as one of its most fundamental subdivisions?

2.- The nineteenth century: the first development of the national past

The concept of the political nation which grew out of the French Revolution, had as its root the right of citizens to show their wishes regarding the type of government they wanted (Kedourie 1988: 43). But, it was rapidly taken up and transformed by a line of thought developed in the eighteenth century by philosophers such as Johann Gottfried Herder. This was based on the cult of diversity, in the belief that each nation possessed something which made it unique and irreplaceable. If this were so, history as a narration would have to change its objective to search for the steps which had led to the formation of each nation. History would thus acquire considerable political importance. The movement for change in the historical sciences began in Prussia with a classics student, Barthold Georg Niebuhr (1776-1831), followed later by Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) and Theodore Mommsen (1817-1903). In order to create a nationalist history, this group of researchers attempted to institute the historical-critical method, in which history was only possible via the critical analysis of material historical sources. Against the positivism of Auguste Comte, they underlined the particularism of all human phenomena, of individuals or cultural institutions.

One of the first consequences of the new national history was the preparation of the General Histories of each nation, such as that of Spain by Modesto Lafuente, published between 1850 and 1867. This work was of great importance in the formation of a Spanish national historical consciousness (Jover 1984: 10). It stressed the figures of Viriatus, Saguntum, Numantia and Sertorius in Antiquity. Viriatus, leader of a rebellion against the Romans in Lusitania, which ended after his death, was considered a symbol of courage and pride, one of the «unschooled warriors which Spanish soil has always bred» (Lafuente 1850: 22). The inclusion of this person as a Spanish national symbol might appear strange, since Lusitania is a region normally identified with Portugal. The choice might be explained by two factors. First, by the fact that nineteenth-century Spanish nationalism included Portugal as one region more, maintaining that the Iberian Peninsula, like Italy and Germany, should unit in a single nation. Second, and I think more importantly, by the influence of the *Historia de España* (*History of Spain*) by Father Mariana, in which Viriatus was included, since at that time (1580-1640) Portugal effectively belonged to the Spanish empire. Lafuente dignified Saguntum, a city allied to the Romans but betrayed by them when it was besieged by the Carthaginians, as «the most heroic city in the world» (Lafuente 1850: 19), due to its decision to resist to the end, even though this meant its material and human destruction. Numantia, the Celtic-Iberian city which managed to resist the Romans for more than 20 years and which finally opted, as in the previous case, for

its destruction rather than fall into enemy hands, was praised because it had proved «with its example what nobody would have believed possible - to exceed the heroism and glory of Saguntum» (Lafuente 1850: 22). Lafuente maintained a contradictory attitude towards Sertorius, the fourth symbol, who stands out from the rest of the group. This person was a Roman who, persecuted by the courts, came to Hispania and tried to organize the natives of the peninsula against the power of Rome. Lafuente explains his feat thus: «Later Sertorius, a Roman fugitive, sought asylum in Spain, studied the character of its people, which could not be tamed by harsh measures but could only be won over by sweetness, and, finding them irritated by Rome's injustices, he cultivated them, kindling their national pride, showing it to be just and fair, and captured their affections, causing them to rise up *en masse* against a man (...) [who would have turned Spain into a second Rome]. If Sertorius didn't finish his work it was because he had the virtue and defect of not becoming fully Spanish and not ceasing to be Roman» (Lafuente 1850: 24). Finally, he saw the Roman occupation of Hispania as an interruption of the Spanish personality, which only reappeared in the Middle Ages (Lafuente 1850: 28).

When this vision of history was translated to the visual arts it gained far greater propagandistic force. From the eighteenth century on, following the French example, the painting of historical themes became obligatory for the students in the *Real Academia de Bellas Artes* (Royal Academy of Fine Arts). This situation resulted in the selection of a relatively short list of possible subjects (Reyero 1989: 16-17), most of them related to antiquity. Nevertheless, only in the nineteenth century, and above all in the second half, after the opening of the National Exhibitions in 1856, did these acquire clear nationalist implications. Viriatus, Saguntum, Numantia and Sertorius were depicted over and over again (Reyero 1989). Some early examples are those of Juan Antonio Ribera (1779-1860) and José de Madrazo (1781-1859). The former painted the destruction of Numantia in 1802 (Díez 1992a: 71). Madrazo thought of painting four nationalistic pictures during his exile in Italy following the invasion by Napoleon: the death of Viriatus, his funeral, the Megara forcing the surrender of the Romans and the destruction of Numantia. Only the first was completed (Díez 1992b: 124-131). Literature was less inclined to take up the nationalist call. Although a widely popular literature on classical subjects existed (see Olmos 1992a), Spanish and foreign writers looked to the medieval period to create an imaginary national past.

The diffusion of this version of Spain's history was influential in the decision of the *Real Academia de la Historia* (Royal Academy of History) to sponsor the excavations of Numantia between 1861 and 1866 (Mélida 1922: 106), almost in the same period in which the Emperor Napoleon III ordered the undertaking of excavations of Celtic ruins to search for the French national past (Trigger 1989: 148).

It is important to emphasize that Modesto Lafuente's version of ancient Spanish history was the most influential during the second half of the nineteenth century. Even today, it is the events which it depicts which are uppermost in the public mind, even though Lafuente's interpretation was contradicted by the professional academics after the development of prehistoric and ancient archaeology and its introduction into the universities in the second half of this century. The medium for the diffusion of the vision of Spanish history created in the nineteenth century has been, and still is, books of children's stories (Olmos 1992a: 20, Hernández 1988), the *cromos culturales* of the 1930s, a type of post cards on which national events were illustrated and explained (Olmos 1992a: 20), the mass reproduction of nineteenth century historical paintings in text books, etc.

As Jover (1984: 13) points out, the nationalism portrayed in the General Histories was a satisfied nationalism. Only the fear of social revolution and the appearance of regionalism in the 1880s would disturb it. In the first Spanish nationalism, developed in the early nineteenth century, the regions had a minor role since Spain was identified with Castile. Following the French example, the nation was based on the region in which the capital was located. Nevertheless, unlike Paris, located in Europe's main economic heartland, Madrid was a small, isolated city, the capital of a state whose economy was still backward; thus industrial capitalism and a bourgeoisie developed not so much in the centre of Spain, in Castile, but in those areas where it was easy to cross over to Western Europe (excepting Portugal). These were the coastal zones of Catalonia and the Basque Country, regions which had not been treated particularly well in the creation of the ancient myths of Spanish nationalism, not for any special reasons but because no event similar to Saguntum or Numantia happened to have occurred in them which was as much to the taste of the nineteenth century. Certainly Tubal was mentioned, and the Basques as the first Iberians, and Indibilis and Mandonius as another example of the bravery and desire for independence of the proto-Spaniards, but these images fell into the background when compared to the more evocative and impressive collective suicides of Saguntum and Numantia.

The structural imbalance between Catalonia and the Basque Country and the interior of Spain, together with the linguistic differences, helped the growth of peripheral nationalisms, which formed an alternative to Spanish nationalism. In Galicia, the third region in which Castilian (Spanish) was not spoken, a proto-nationalist movement developed despite the lack of industrialization, although it did not reach a political phase until the twentieth century.

In his doctoral thesis, Jordi Cortadella i Morral (1992) describes and analyzes the different theories which Catalan intellectuals have developed in the creation of the Catalan past. Common features which stand out are the identification of the Iberians as the proto-Catalans, the glorification of the gesture of Indibilis and Mandonius as a demonstration of the Catalans' eternal search for independence, the consideration of the Roman domination as a catastrophe for the Catalan nation, and its recovery in the Middle Ages (Cortadella i Morral 1992: Chapter 6). Nevertheless, not all these interpretations were monolithic from the political point of view since they were given regionalist, regionalist/nationalist (that is, those who favoured an autonomous Catalonia within the Spanish state) and independent nationalist interpretations.

Alternative versions of the Spanish past were also formulated in Galicia. The nationalist/non-separatist Manuel Muguia saw the Celts and the Swabians as the racial ancestors of the contemporary Galicians (Murguía 1865 in Beramendi 1981: 51). Some intellectuals such as Saralegui y Medina, who in 1867 published a book on the Celtic period in Galicia, developed an interest in Celtic remains in order to construct the Galician past. Nevertheless, unlike in Catalonia, Galician nationalism and its interest in the past was never more than the preoccupation of a small group of intellectuals.

Basque nationalism arose in the last third of the nineteenth century, based on language and race. Unlike the rest of Spain, Catalonia or Galicia, where racial homogeneity was difficult to demonstrate, the specialists confirmed that the Basque race seemed to be a homogenous group which could be studied separately (Barandiarán Maestu 1987). The anthropological studies carried out in France by Broca, Quatrefagues and Collignon, and in Spain by the Basque Telesforo de Aranzadi (who published the book entitled *El pueblo euskalduna* (*The Basque People*) in 1889) caused the Basques to be regarded as authentic living fossils of pre-Aryan race. A result of this was that one of the main objectives of archaeology became the exhumation of prehistoric human remains. Ricardo Becerro de Bengoa explained in 1879 that «the skulls of the pure race are different because of their geometrical configuration from those of all the other peoples of Europe; and the flint objects found in various prehistoric collections are exactly the same as those which archaeologists have found in their prehistoric investigations. The race and language are conserved pure, isolated, independent, due to a singular phenomenon of their history which teaches us that across the centuries all peoples have been mixed, have had their characters adulterated and are completely different to what they were, apart from the Basque people.» (quoted in Ayarzagüena Sanz 1992: 269).

This renaissance of history linked to national character would not have progressed further than in the previous centuries (Caro Baroja 1970: 71-101) if it had not been accompanied by a new element: the institutionalization of culture and knowledge. This is reflected in Spain in the creation of the *Comisiones de Monumentos* (Monuments Commissions) in 1844 (copying the French Commissions set up in 1830) which organized provincial museums, the *Museo Arqueológico Nacional* (National Archaeological Museum) in 1867, and from 1856 by the new importance acquired by the *Academia de la Historia* (Academy of History) and by the creation of the *Escuela Superior de Diplomática* (Higher College of Diplomacy) (copying the French *École de Chantres*), in which archaeology and numismatics were taught. Congresses, mainly international ones on prehistoric anthropology and archaeology, also served as a communications channel between researchers in different countries. Hence, it is not surprising that the growth of a particular institution in France, culturally the most influential country at the time, should be followed by its immediate appearance in the rest of Europe, and that certain nationalist and patriotic attitudes were shared amongst all European archaeologists.

As well as this institutionalization, a new element made itself necessary for the crystallization of the nationalist feeling: its popular base. This can be seen in Catalonia, where excursion societies developed in the last decades of the century in a manner unlike that found in the rest of Spain. They all showed an interest in archaeology. In Catalonia, for example, Lluís Marià Vidal i Carreras exhorted the members of the *Centre Excursionista de Catalunya* (Catalan Excursion Centre) to place special interest in its search: «Let me recommend to our colleagues in the association, which has done so much good in the area of archaeology, initiative and constancy so that the archaeology of our land may be considered worthy of attention. Let me also recommend that you, my colleagues, investigate and expound all that may shed some light on this matter, for only by investigation and study can we know the phases through which, from the beginning, the history of man has gone in our country.» (Vidal 1894, quoted in Cortadella i Morral 1992: 234, my translation).

The alternative visions of Spain created by the peripheral nationalist movements and in the centre by the regenerationist movement -a movement that aimed to regenerate Spain- were a reflection of a growing discontent which exploded in 1898.

3.- The twentieth century: Continuation, breakage and current situation

1898 was a crucial year for Spanish nationalism. The loss of the last colonies - Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines - meant the end of the Spanish Empire, one of the very pillars of the national image. Given the identification of Spain with Castile, this defeat gave a new impetus to the peripheral nationalism (Serrano 1984: 118-127), which in turn influenced a tightening of Spanish nationalism. Some historians, such as Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurúa (1990), even state that it was only at this moment when this arose as a reaction to the threat of the peripheral national identifications organized in the last third of the nineteenth century by the Catalan and Basque elite, and thanks to a process of national assimilation and integration which created national market and an educational system, urbanization, and the expansion of mass communications media (Fusi Aizpurúa 1990: 132).

The 1898 reaction was in reality the crystallization of a process which had begun earlier and which brought with it a strong desire to regenerate and modernize Spain, to make it more scientific, to bring it closer to Europe. The regenerationist ideas were implanted into archaeology by Joaquín Costa, one of the main representatives of this movement. This author denounced the backwardness with respect to other countries which was apparent in research into the past. As early as 1881 he exclaimed: «The truth cannot be hidden: we Spaniards are, as in almost everything, in a lamentably backward state in historical studies. We lack university education and adequate libraries. Our universities teach neither philology, nor ethnography nor mythography and we have no special studies in history either ancient or modern.» He saw the need for specialized studies, better libraries and specialized magazines. He perceived his work as an attempt to ensure that Spain would no longer be «an embarrassing exception in the middle of the scientific Europe of the nineteenth century» (Costa 1881: VI-VII). From 1877 until his death in 1911, Joaquín Costa wrote an important group of articles and books on the Celtic-Iberians and even planned to write an historical novel based on the figure of Viriatus (Chayne 1972: 14).

The 1898 disaster confirmed to a certain extent the regenerationist theories and provoked the appearance of an intense desire for change which covered all aspects of Spanish life and especially university education. Attempts were made to bring it closer to the European (or at least French) model, which had been reformed in the last third of the nineteenth century. Thus in the first years of this century the universities were transformed, at least theoretically, into centres of research. The *Escuela Superior de Diplomática* (Higher College of Diplomacy) was closed in 1900 and its studies

transferred to the universities (Peiró y Pasamar 1991: 147-8). There were also other changes which affected archaeology, such as the progressive loss of the influence of the Academy of History due to the creation of other institutions dedicated to promoting and organizing research. Without doubt the most important was the *Junta de Ampliación de Estudios* (Council for the Enhancement of Studies), created in 1907 in the image of the French *École de Hautes Études* (Castillejo in Pasamar Alzuría 1991: 44). From this arose the *Escuela Española* (Spanish School) in Rome for Archaeology and History, of short duration due to the First World War, and in 1912 the *Comisión de Investigaciones Paleontológicas y Prehistóricas* (Commission for Paleontological and Prehistoric Research), and from the twenties, the archaeological section of the *Centro de Estudios Históricos* (Centre for Historical Studies). The changes also affected archaeology from a legal point of view. The law of archaeological excavations was published in 1911 and after it came into force in 1912 the *Junta de Excavaciones y Antigüedades* (Higher Council for Excavations and Antiquities) was created to control archaeological work.

The changes also influenced the creation of regional nationalist institutions, especially in Catalonia. Here the *Servei d'Investigacions Arqueològiques* (Centre of Archaeological Research) was created in 1915 in the *Institut d'Estudis Catalans* (Institute for Catalan Studies); in the Basque country in 1921 the *Seminario de Prehistoria Ikuska* (Ikuska Prehistory Group), to be replaced in 1925 by the *Centro de Investigaciones Prehistóricas* (Centre for Prehistoric Research); in Galicia the «Prehistory» and «Archaeology and History of Art» sections were created in 1923 in the *Seminario de Estudos Galegos* (Galician Studies School); in Valencia in 1927 the *Servei d'Investigacions Prehistòriques* (Prehistoric Research Service); in Andalusia in 1927 the *Servicio de Investigaciones Prehistóricas* (Prehistoric Research Service), etc.

The result of these changes was that archaeology moved out of the public sphere and became increasingly restricted to a small group of academics. Their work was regulated and knowledge of the national past was finally institutionalized. But archaeologists continued to describe a past which the public wanted to hear, that is, a national past.

Despite the institutional changes, most archaeologists at first retained a vision which was very similar to that of the nineteenth century. This was partly due to the fact that the renovation of the institutions was not accompanied by a similar renovation of the professionals as a body, since they were simply moved (for example, the first professor of archaeology in the University of Madrid, Juan Catalina García, had held the same post in the *Escuela Superior de Diplomática* (Higher College of Diplomacy).

From the early twentieth century, as Borja de Riquer (1990: 122) affirms, this nationalist discourse, in fact, became the preferred territory of the most anti-democratic, reactionary and socially most regressive ideological options. These took over the concept of Spain as a monolithic cultural unit which arose in the mid-nineteenth century. This could be seen within the archaeological profession. Thus, the most important representatives of archaeology in Madrid typically held conservative ideologies: from the Carlist Marquis of Cerralbo to Hugo Obermaier, chaplain to the Duke of Alba and from 1922 the first professor of prehistory in Madrid, to the conservative José Ramón Mélida. It was, for example, no accident that the latter was charged with continuing the excavations at Numantia, of which he said: «Numantia is a glorious name in history (...) the spectacle it offers, as well as moving and eloquent, teaches much about remote times, *renewed in the present with identical fundamental characteristics*» (Mélida 1922: V-VI, *my italics*).

As against this traditionalist position held in Madrid, a new perspective grew up in the two main peripheral regions. The great changes in archaeology which took place in them were closely linked to two personalities: Pere Bosch Gimpera and José Miguel de Barandiarán y Ayerbe. It comes as no surprise to learn that both worked mainly in the field of prehistory, since the Roman period was perceived as degrading by many of the Spanish nationalists, and the investigation of the Middle Ages was for historians, not archaeologists.

Pere Bosch Gimpera undertook post graduate studies in Germany. He was awarded the Chair of Ancient and Medieval History at the University of Barcelona in 1916. As a Catalan nationalist one of his main duties was to denounce the «orthodox» version of the mono-cultural history of Spain (Bosch Gimpera 1937: 11-12). He tried to find the origins of the current peoples of the Spanish state in the diverse archeological records of the Iberian Peninsula, writing works such as *Assaig de reconstitució de la Etnologia de Catalunya* (*Essay reconstructing Catalan Ethnology*) in 1919, and *La etnologia de la Península Ibèrica* (*The Ethnology of the Iberian Peninsula*) in 1934. Bosch Gimpera argued that Spain had been ethnic and culturally diverse since prehistoric times. For example, in a conference entitled *Spain*, given at the University of Valencia in 1937 he stated that probably «the peaceful and warlike relations between the Phoenicians and Carthaginians [had contributed] to the increased importance of the aristocracy over the lower classes» in Andalusia, or, perhaps, the «democratic sense of life» of the Catalans originated in their relations with the Greeks at Ampurias (Bosch Gimpera 1937: 22).

Similarly, in the Basque Country Father José Miguel de Barandiarán y Ayerbe used archeology to justify the ancient roots of the Basque people. Despite his great influence, Barandiarán did not create a school, as he was outside the university system.

The conservative reaction which dragged Spain into the Civil War resulted in the dictatorship of Franco, which lasted almost 40 years. Franco imposed the idea of a unified culture on Spain, and, given that prehistory was a period in which a homogenous past could be justified with difficulty, archaeology never achieved an importance similar to that in Nazi Germany (Arnold 1990, Díaz-Andreu 1993). The change of regime also brought about great changes in archaeology. The most influential persons of the first third of the century were replaced, since Barandiarán, Bosch Gimpera and Obermaier were exiled. Nevertheless, none of the substitutes reached the top of the regime's cultural and educational institutions (Pasamar Alzuría 1991).

The institutional network created in the first third of the century was changed and adapted to the new regime. In archaeology, the *Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas* (Higher Council for Scientific Research) was created in 1940 in place of the *Junta de Ampliación de Estudios*. Its institutes and sections for historical research «were managed by professors whose loyalty to the regime [was] beyond doubt, for they showed it constantly» (Pasamar Alzuría 1991: 50). On the other hand, all the regional institutions involved in archaeological research were dismantled or changed in nature (Díaz-Andreu 1993: 78-79).

Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla, the main representative of prehistorical archaeology in Madrid, concentrated his efforts on dismantling the vision of Spain built by Bosch Gimpera, calling it untenable (Martínez Santa-Olalla 1946: 20) and substituting for it in turn a perception of Spanish prehistory which was sub-divided into large archaeological cultures covering the entire Iberian Peninsula, thus homogenizing it from its most remote times.

Martín Almagro Bosch, professor in the University of Madrid since the 1950s, also defended this unified vision of Spanish prehistory. In his 1958 booklet *Origen y formación del pueblo hispano* (*The Origin and Formation of the Spanish People*) he attempted to analyze «how the people of today who, completely fused, inhabit the Iberian Peninsula, were created (...). It is difficult to comprehend the spirit of the race without digging deeply into its formation over the dark, but decisively influential centuries as it was during that time that the events occurred which marked the mileposts and components of our ethnic formation» (Almagro Bosch 1958: 7). Like

Martínez Santa-Olalla, faced with the diversity of Iberian prehistory which was popular before the Civil War, he favoured great cultures which formed the peninsular's race as a whole.

But it was not only the archaeologists of Madrid who helped to promote this unified Spanish cultural identity but also those in other regions, such as Catalonia. Thus Luis Pericot, in the prologue to the translation of Schulten's *Geschichte von Numantia* (*History of Numantia*), states that «few subjects could be so pleasing to the Spaniard as that of Numantia (...). This is so evident that [it was unnecessary] to justify the fact that a work of history published in Spain began with a volume dedicated to Numantia above all else» (Pericot 1945: VII-VIII).

With the relative opening of the regime after the post-war period, certain freedoms began to be allowed. In 1952 the same Luis Pericot gave a conference on the roots (note the use of the plural, he was not speaking about a single root) of Spain (del Pino 1978: 58). Barandiarán returned from his exile in 1953 and in the same year published his book on *El hombre prehistórico en el País Vasco* (*Prehistoric Man in the Basque Country*). Nevertheless the political demobilization of the Spaniards in the 1950s (Tusell Gómez 1990: 51) and, on a world-wide scale, the lesser impact of nationalism since the end of World War II up to the 1970s (Smith 1981) was reflected in the apparent depolitization of archaeology. Although Catalonia, the Basque Country and other regions continued to be chosen as subjects for study (for example, Barandiarán 1953, Tarradell 1962), almost nobody dared to relate these prehistoric ethnic origins with a political demand for autonomy or independence, as had been done in previous times.

During the 1970s, nevertheless, archaeology underwent a profound change in its objectives and in its vocabulary. What Juan Vicent (1982) called «pragmatic reformism» was adopted, meaning that one only arrived at reality via scientific knowledge using an exhaustive, meticulous and impartial observation of the data. Thus the main objective of archaeology became the placing of data in order and describing it. Progress in knowledge was achieved through the increase in information (Vicent 1982: 31-32). This turned academic archaeology into a narration comprising interminable lists of objects described down to the last detail, boring typological descriptions in search of a precise dating and, above all, it moved it even further away from the public than before. From the point of view of nationalist feeling, it must be stressed that this is the moment when archaeologists, like the other humanists, stopped thinking of their academic work as patriotic: its legitimization was purely scientific.

After the death of Franco in 1975 and the preparation of the 1978 constitution, the regions had another chance to request self-government. As Andrés de Blas Guerrero (1990: 240-244) emphasized, the confusion of the governing party, the centralist UCD, after the first general elections caused the almost federal division of Spain into 17 autonomous regions, not all of them justified from the nationalist point of view. As well as the historical nations - Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia - and others with a growing national identity - Valencia and the Canary Isles - where there was a real demand for autonomy, it was only the political elite which demanded autonomy in the rest of the Spanish regions. The result of all this is that the present situation leaves Hroch's three phases (1985: 22-24) incomplete, since the regions of Spain which never requested autonomy have only developed a sense of political identity after receiving it.

The new Spanish administrative set up has greatly affected archaeology in various ways. With regard to nationalism, it is worth noting that archaeology was one of the first subjects to be transferred to the autonomous governments. Nevertheless, as already explained, the current degree of sophistication to which this human science has risen (technical language, obsession with dating, meticulous analysis of objects, etc) has distanced research archaeology from the public and given it zero political profit. This has led to the intensification of three phenomena (González Morales 1992: 21-22). As grants depend on the autonomous governments, only local research is promoted and it is almost impossible to obtain finance for more general projects. The autonomous governments are also, logically, giving preference to projects whose ideology is closer to that maintained officially by each government, i.e., one which uses the past to justify its own existence. Today the autonomous governments are also reluctant to publish scientific works, since these have no political value, while they do publish work which is of lesser importance but is more accessible to the public, especially if it legitimates the autonomous regions. As an example of this last phenomenon in Catalonia, about 85% of excavations carried out between 1981 and 1991 have not been published and apparently will not be, given the decision of the *Director General de Patrimoni* (Director General of Heritage) not to publish any more (Dupré 1991: 312).

As a result of this situation, a conflict has arisen in the last few years between, on the one hand researchers in universities and centres of research and, on the other, those professionals or amateurs who work in the archaeological departments in each autonomous government (González Morales 1992: 23). The lack of interest by the latter group in research which is not nationalist/regionalist has also caused the sponsoring of rescue archaeology against research archaeology (González Morales

1992: 26), through which the local governments try to appear active in the eyes of the voters. This comprises the excavation of ancient ruins in danger of imminent destruction, undertaken by archaeology graduates with no particular degree of experience required in the period being excavated. This conflict has also arisen in the language in which scientific work is published. While I referred elsewhere to the use of Catalan, Basque and Galician in scientific papers, cultural policies, such as the «linguistic normalization» in Catalonia, must be taken into account. Because of this policy the Catalan government will not support anything not written in Catalan; Catalan archaeologists have therefore been forced - sometimes against their will but probably voluntarily in most cases - to publish in the Catalan language.

Despite their sophistication, archaeologists continue to express their nationalist/regionalist ideas, although the form in which they do so had changed. A good example is the object of study. If we concentrate on a subject which has acquired a certain importance in the last decade, the historiography of archaeology, we find that - by no means accidentally - it is the Catalan archaeologists who stand out from the rest with their interest in their own archaeology (for example, Cortadella i Morral 1992, Guitart y Riu 1989 or Marc-7 1986a, 1986b and 1986c), with a somewhat more than discreet amount of space being devoted to it in the workshop magazine *L'Avenç*. In other autonomous regions, the interest is not so great. Researchers in Madrid have also shown a similar interest, although in this case their studies (and this one could be included amongst them) refer to the entire Spanish territory (Arce y Olmos (ed) 1991, Ayarzagüena Sanz 1992, Díaz-Andreu 1993 and forthcoming, Martínez Navarrete 1990), something extremely rare for researchers based outside Madrid, although there are exceptions (Peiró Martín and Pasamar Alzuría 1989-1990, and González Morales 1993). This appears to indicate that the dichotomy between Spanish and periphery nationalism still remains latent.

In recent years a debate has arisen regarding archaeology and its social dimension. There are growing accusations regarding the elitism of archaeology and a demand to reinforce the interaction with the public. This I believe to be a complex problem, since although the request for greater communication between professionals and society appears correct, this does not mean that the professionals must slavishly follow public taste. If archaeologists have a use, it is not to fill museums and warehouses with ruined objects in an attempt to thus confirm our view of the present in the past, but to contribute to the debate regarding the understanding of the world in which we live. To also attempt in this case to make it understood that, if a map of France is shown on the front page of one of those incomparable Asterix comics, it is not because the Gauls identified themselves with it, nor necessarily because they

had their own identity which made them feel Gauls, but because we, men and women of the present society, translate the past with our own schema, and order our landscapes with reference to their antiquity (and, thus our own), although in other times there were others ways to identify and other forms of horizons which had nothing to do with national horizons.

Acknowledgements

This paper was written in May 1993 during my post-doctoral period in the Department of Archaeology at the University of Southampton (Great Britain), thanks to a Fleming grant from the British Council and the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science. I would like to thank Angel Smith for his comments on this work; and to Peter Rodwell for the translation of the paper.

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Historiografía reciente sobre el nacionalismo en Alemania y Francia

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Entre los parámetros que definían a las historiografías alemana y francesa, la relación entre ambas sociedades se hallaba, si no entre los más conocidos, sí entre los más decisivos. Desde comienzos del siglo XIX, los estereotipos no sólo han determinado en gran medida la imagen respectiva que cada uno de los países poseía del vecino, sino que también fueron utilizados y reelaborados en obras históricas. Ya en la época de la lucha por la unidad alemana, Ernst-Moritz Arndt formulaba en una conocida poesía, «Des Deutschen Vaterland» (La patria del alemán), una contraposición absoluta con Francia:

«Das ist des Deutschen Vaterland
Wo Eide schwört der Druck der Hand,
wo Treue hell vom Auge blitzt,
und Liebe warm im Herzen sitzt.
Das ist des Deutschen Vaterland,
wo Zorn verfliegt den welschen Tand,
wo jeder Franzose heißet Feind,
wo jeder Deutsche heißet Freund, da soll es sein»¹

En la manipulación de antiguas características nacionales no sólo fueron creados estereotipos nacionales que continuaron vigentes a través del período anterior a 1848 (*Vormärz*), el Imperio y la República de Weimar, enriqueciéndose con nuevos

* Traducción: Xosé M. Núñez.

¹ E.M.Arndt, «Des Deutschen Vaterland», en A.Lesson/W.Steffens (ed.), *Arndt Werke in 12 Teilen. 1. Teil*, Berlín, s.f., p.126 ss.[«Esta es la patria del alemán/donde la presión de la mano pronuncia el juramento/ donde la fidelidad se alumbra brillante en el ojo/ y el amor se aloja con calor en el corazón./Esta es la patria del alemán/ donde la ira ahuyenta el oropel francés/ donde todo francés se llama enemigo/ donde todo alemán se llama amigo, ahí debe ser»]. Vid. también G. Noiriel, «Transferts culturels: l'exemple franco-allemand. Entretien avec M.Espagne», *Genèses*, 8 (1992), 146-54; M.Christadler (ed.), *Deutschland-Frankreich. Alte Klischees - Neue Bilder*, Duisburg, 1981; M. Jeismann, «Was bedeuten Stereotypen für nationale Identität und politisches Handeln?», in J.Link/W.Wülting (ed.), *Nationale Myten und Symbole in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Stuttgart, 1991, 84-93.

contenidos nacionalistas, y construyéndose con ellos modelos de desarrollo; sino que aquéllos también sirvieron para la delimitación propia frente a otros pueblos, sobre todo frente a Francia.² Aunque todavía conocemos poco sobre la evolución de este proceso en Francia, sí existen indicios que señalan que, tras una fase en la que fueron valoradas sobre todo una serie de características sociales como elementos de exclusión e inclusión, como p.ej. en la obra de A.Thierry, F.Guizot, J.Michelet, después de 1870, y en la obra de F. de Coulanges, E.Renan y H.Taine, esos elementos se convirtieron en puntos centrales para una delimitación clara frente a las herencias revolucionarias por un lado, y frente a los vecinos alemanes por otro.³ Por lo tanto, en la conformación de las definiciones del «yo» y del «enemigo» nacional surgieron una serie de «conceptos opuestos asimétricos» (R.Koselleck), que fueron transmitidos gradualmente de modo parcial a la Historiografía y a la publicística mediante la formulación de posiciones, juicios de valor y métodos.⁴ Un análisis más preciso de las concepciones que fueron difundidas en cada lado para marcar las diferencias entre el grupo nacional propio y el contrario podrá servir no solamente para investigar ajustadamente el horizonte de referencia de cada uno de los grupos y sus iniciadores, sino también para poder deducir la *complementariedad de las afirmaciones* que fueron elaboradas en su día. Por ello, una utilización ingenua de valoraciones individuales queda excluida por sí misma.

Al intentar determinar las diversas fases de la preocupación historiográfica por el nacionalismo tras 1945, se pueden diferenciar claramente cuatro grandes olas. La primera se vinculó claramente con una orientación predominante de Historia del pensamiento político, y más concretamente tenía como objetivo el integrar la transformación del nacionalismo exacerbado en el nacionalsocialismo en una línea evolutiva lineal de desarrollo histórico. En sus trabajos, tanto C. Hayes como H. Kohn diferencian antes de la instrumentalización nacionalsocialista del nacionalismo varias versiones del sentimiento nacional: jacobina, liberal, conservadora e integral.⁵ En una segunda dirección se situaron en el centro de interés la dimensión social, programas políticos y articulación organizativa de los diferentes movimientos nacionalistas. Las

² Vid. ante todo W.Leiner, *Das Deutschlandsbild in der französischen Literatur*, Darmstadt, 1989.

³ Vid. las observaciones de G.Noiriel, *La tyrannie du national: le droit d'asile en Europe (1793-1993)*, Paris, 1991; del mismo autor, *Population, immigration et identité nationale en France XIXe-XXe siècle*, Paris, 1992, especialmente p.10 y ss.

⁴ R.Koselleck, «Zur historisch-politischen Semantik asymmetrischer Gegenbegriffe», en id., *Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten*, Frankfurt a.M., 1979, 211-59.

⁵ C.J.H.Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism*, New York, 1926; id., *Nationalism: A Religion*, New York, 1960; H. Kohn, *Die Idee des Nationalismus*, Frankfurt a.M., 1962; id., *Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789-1815*, Princeton, 1967. Sobre el desarrollo de la investigación histórica es todavía útil H.A.Winkler, «Der Nationalismus und seine Funktionen», in id. (ed.), *Nationalismus*, 1978, p.7 y ss.

organizaciones nacionalistas fueron analizadas consecuentemente con criterios similares a los utilizados con partidos políticos o grupos de interés. En este sentido, son dignas de mención las investigaciones surgidas en la Universidad de Colonia alrededor de Theodor Schieder.⁶ Una tercera orientación fue la inaugurada por las tesis de K.W.Deutsch, y tendía a interesarse por el proceso de construcción de la nación (*Nation-building*), en relación con los procesos de comunicación y modernización social.⁷ En los últimos tiempos, se ha situado finalmente en el centro de interés la cultura del nacionalismo, es decir: la cuestión de dilucidar de qué modo las construcciones y teorías estatales, las estrategias de dinamización social y de organización de intereses políticos se han transmitido al sistema de valores de la población, siendo aceptado así el hecho nacional como un fundamento de la colectividad.⁸

Al plantearse la cuestión de en qué medida participaron de estas tendencias de la investigación histórica tanto la historiografía francesa como la alemana, no deja de sorprender la diferencia existente entre ambas historiografías. Mientras en la RFA estuvieron representadas las cuatro tendencias, ofreciendo resultados respetables sobre todo la segunda y cuarta,⁹ falta en Francia de modo casi absoluto —dejando aparte los innovadores estudios sobre cultura del nacionalismo— una preocupación explícita por esta problemática. De modo que aquél que quiera acceder a una visión general sobre el nacionalismo francés tendrá que contentarse con la antología, precedida de una introducción, de Raoul Girardet, a no ser que prefiera el más reciente trabajo de G. Noiriel titulado *Immigration, territoire et identité nationale*.¹⁰ Faltan todavía

⁶ Vid. la reciente selección de artículos de T.Schieder (O.Dann y H.U.Weher, eds.), *Nationalismus und Nationalstaat*, Göttingen, 1992; id. (ed.), *Staatsgründungen und Nationalitätsprinzip*, Munich, 1974; id. (ed.), *Sozialstruktur und Organisation europäischer Nationalbewegungen*, Munich, 1971.

⁷ K.W.Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1953; id., *Der Nationalismus und seine Alternativen*, Munich, 1972. O. Dann trabaja con el modelo alemán: vid. id. (ed.), *Nationalismus und sozialer Wandel*, Hamburgo, 1978..

⁸ Vid. M. Jeismann, *Das Vaterland der Feinde. Studien zur nationalen Feindbegriff und Selbstverständnis in Deutschland und Frankreich 1792-1918*, Stuttgart, 1992; también son de interés E.Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1789. Programme, myth, reality*, Cambridge, 1990. En este contexto se encuadran también los trabajos sobre monumentos y conmemoraciones nacionales: vid. M.Hettling/P. Nolte (ed.), *Bürgerliche Feste. Symbolische Formen politischen Handelns im 19. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen, 1993.

⁹ Vid. la nota 6; así como, sobre todo, el innovador estudio de C.Tacke, *Das Denkmal im sozialen Raum. Das Nationaldenkmal in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert*, Tesis doctoral, Instituto Universitario Europeo (Florencia), 1993.

¹⁰ Vid. R. Girardet (ed.), *Le nationalisme français, 1871-1914. Textes choisis*, París, 1966; id., «Pour une introduction à l'histoire du nationalisme français», *Revue Française des Sciences Politiques*, 8 (1958), 505-28; el libro de M. Winock, *Nationalisme, antisemitisme et fascisme en France*, París, 1990, solamente ofrece una recopilación de artículos.

estudios franceses sobre cuestiones centrales de la historia del nacionalismo en la propia Francia, pues aquéllos surgieron en su mayoría de historiadores extranjeros. Así, p.ej., el artículo «Nation» en el Diccionario de conceptos básicos histórico-políticos es de la autoría de E. Fehrenbach. La cuestión nacional en los cuadernos de quejas de la Revolución (*cahiers de doléances*) fue investigada por G.Hyslob, mientras Eugen Weber ha abordado el tema de la construcción del Estado nacional en la Francia de la segunda mitad del siglo XIX; el *revival* nacionalista anterior a 1914 fue estudiado por G.Ziebura, y la Action Française encontró su primer historiador en E.Weber. En un coloquio reciente sobre nacionalidad y nacionalismo en Francia, los autores franceses quedaron en franca minoría frente a los anglosajones.¹¹ Igualmente, fases centrales del proceso de construcción nacional (*Nation-building*) e importantes teóricos y protagonistas del nacionalismo, o bien han sido objeto de interés fuera de Francia, o bien aún no han sido estudiados. El nacionalismo jacobino, que dejó importantes huellas en el siglo XIX a través de su asociación con ideales políticos, realizaciones y conciencia de misión propagandista, no ha sido objeto de tesis doctoral alguna, al igual que el nacionalismo de los políticos orleanistas y liberales, o el nacionalismo de los comienzos de la IIIª República.¹² Autores como M.Barrès han sido estudiados por Z.Sternhell, pero todavía hoy faltan estudios completos sobre E.Renan, J.Michelet, o el nacionalismo de R.Poincaré. La instrumentalización de temas nacionalistas y la movilización de lealtades nacionales en la política cotidiana de los partidos existentes —un objeto importante de la investigación histórica en la RFA— constituye todavía un tema reciente para el ojo del investigador, por lo que las variaciones chauvinistas del nacionalismo en Francia han sido escasamente estudiadas. Así, todavía se echan de menos trabajos sobre Déroulède, al igual que el nacionalismo de Déats no ha sido analizado de modo sistemático.¹³

¹¹ E.Fehrenbach, «Nation», in R.Reichardt/ E. Schmitt (ed.), *Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680-1820*, Munich, 1986, 75-107; B.F. Hyslob, *French Nationalism in 1789 according to the General Cahiers*, New York, 1934; E.Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*, Cambridge, 1976; G.Ziebura, *Die deutsche Frage in der öffentlichen Meinung Frankreichs 1911-1914*, Berlin, 1955; E.Weber, *L'Action Française*, París, 1964; R. Tombs (ed.), *Nationhood and Nationalism in France. From Boulangism to the Great war, 1889-1918*, Londres, 1991. Una excepción es ofrecida por el trabajo, ciertamente poco tenido en cuenta, de J.P.Rioux, *Nationalisme et conservatisme. La ligue de la patrie française 1899-1904*, París, 1977.

¹² Vid. la observación en F.Furet/ M.Ozouf (ed.), *Dictionnaire critique de la Révolution française*, París, 1988, p.801 y ss.; sobre la relación entre nacionalismo y liberalismo en el período de la Restauración vid. H.G.Haupt, *Nationalismus und Demokratie. Zur Geschichte der Bourgeoisie in Frankreich der Restauration*, Frankfurt a.M., 1974.

¹³ Vid. Z.Sternhell, *Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français*, París, 1972; id., *La Droite révolutionnaire*, París, 1984; vid. también los recientes trabajos de J.F.Sirinelli/ F.Vigne (ed.), *Histoire des droites en France*, París, 1993, 3 vols., y M.Winock, *Histoire de l'extrême droite en France*, París, 1993.

Las causas de esa escasa capacidad de atracción del tema radican sin duda en el propio desarrollo histórico de Francia, por un lado, y por otro en las tendencias predominantes en la historiografía. Al haberse constituido en fecha relativamente temprana como una Nación política, el proceso de construcción nacional no ha provocado en Francia tanta atención como en Alemania. En una sociedad que ha vivido la problemática nacional de modo menos intenso que la alemana, estaba ausente un estímulo adicional para la investigación. En la medida en que el Estado se fundaba sobre la Nación política y soberana, y ésta se convertía en el mito fundacional de la Francia liberal y, posteriormente, republicana, bastaba sobre ello una evocación de las tradiciones, sin registrarse ningún análisis diferenciado.¹⁴ En este aspecto, en el abandono de la investigación sobre el nacionalismo se reflejan ciertas tendencias de la historiografía francesa. De modo notorio, ésta ha buscado mucha menos inspiración en otras ciencias sociales que la alemana, y en su aceptación o rechazo del marxismo ortodoxo predicado por el Partido Comunista su oposición al nacionalismo no jugaba ningún papel. Además de ello, en los paradigmas de la escuela de los Annales la Historia Contemporánea ocupó un lugar muy escaso, quedando menospreciados los estudios sobre ideologías en general.¹⁵ Y los estudios acerca de la estructuración del Estado se llevaban a cabo preferentemente en las Facultades de Derecho, con lo que en Francia estuvo ausente una preocupación específica por la historia del Estado nacional. Una ruptura de los elementos descritos que provocaban el bloqueo de la investigación sobre el nacionalismo tuvo lugar en el momento en que elementos centrales y determinantes del modelo nacional de Francia fueron puestos en cuestión, y se introdujeron una serie de cambios historiográficos. Con las dudas acerca del carácter progresista de la historia de Francia, la búsqueda de sus aspectos sombríos y la pérdida de la condición de gran potencia, el modelo hasta entonces incuestionado y aceptado de lo que era Francia se quebró, o, como afirmaba P. Nora, «Un precipicio de recuerdos sobre la Historia, sobre un mundo, en el que se tienen antepasados, un mundo con una relación casual con el paso de una historia totémica a una historia crítica. Este es el momento de los lugares de memoria. Ya no se festeja la Nación, sino que se estudian sus momentos de celebración».¹⁶

Más importante sin embargo que esta comparación de las investigaciones disponibles ha sido el diferente significado que ha cobrado la Nación en ambas

¹⁴ Vid. J. Kayser, *Les grandes batailles du radicalisme*, París, 1962; C. Nicolet, *L'idée républicaine en France*, París, 1974.

¹⁵ Vid. una visión general en G. G. Iggers, *Geschichtswissenschaft im 20. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen, 1993; J. Le Goff et al. (ed.), *Die Rückeroberung des historischen Denkens. Grundlagen der neuen Geschichtswissenschaft*, Frankfurt a.M., 1990.

¹⁶ P. Nora, *Les lieux de mémoire*, París, 1984.

historiografías, sobre todo en la época actual. En contraste con la historiografía alemana, en Francia la relación entre sociedad burguesa, burguesía y nacionalismo ha sido ampliamente minusvalorada. El nacionalismo y la idea nacional apenas son analizados y desarrollados sistemáticamente como expresión, medio y resultado de intereses y condicionamientos de carácter burgués, situándose por el contrario — fuera de escasas excepciones — dentro de un enfoque preferencial de historia de las mentalidades y de las ideas, y por ello mismo su análisis social ha sido muy impreciso. En este aspecto, la investigación histórica francesa se distancia claramente de la alemana, que justamente ha preferido conceptualizar el papel del nacionalismo en la actuación política de los movimientos liberales burgueses, así como el papel de la idea nacional en la propia concepción y representación del dominio burgués.¹⁷ En Francia, el estudio del nacionalismo de los siglos XIX y XX no solamente quedaba separado del de la burguesía, sino que también la historia de la propia burguesía se llevaba a cabo sin incluir la consideración del hecho nacional, lo que se muestra claramente en los grandes trabajos sobre la burguesía francesa de A. Daumard, J.P.Chaline y C.Charle.¹⁸ A este respecto, tampoco debe excluirse que esta diferencia de tratamiento signifique asimismo una diferente evolución histórica real, pues aunque la burguesía liberal del período de la Restauración y de la Monarquía de julio se servían para su propia diferenciación respecto a la aristocracia de definiciones y lemas nacionalistas, no otorgaban a éstos ninguna proyección o utilización agresiva como consecuencia del reinante miedo a la revolución.¹⁹ Al menos debe quedar abierta la siguiente cuestión: si el escaso conocimiento histórico del papel de las asociaciones y círculos burgueses en la conformación de la Nación francesa durante el siglo XIX obedece a un reflejo fiel de la realidad, o si es únicamente una consecuencia de las tendencias historiográficas reinantes. En las comparaciones históricas es necesario plantearse cuanto antes la cuestión de si las diferencias que saltan a la vista son realmente interpretables como diferencias reales.

El grueso del interés sobre el nacionalismo en la historiografía francesa se ha concentrado en general sobre el «*état national unitaire*», sobre el Estado nacional. Este foco de atención se revela claramente en los *Lieux de mémoire* de Pierre Nora, cuyo punto de partida no fueron los diferentes grupos sociales, sino los «lugares» del Estado republicano, constituido como una unidad; así como las fases de la conformación de la identidad política de Francia.²⁰ Los tipos de recuerdo colectivo, que son tratados

¹⁷ Vid. el último trabajo de O. Dann, *Nation und Nationalismus in Deutschland 1770-1990*, Munich, 1993, p. 73 y ss.

¹⁸ A. Daumard, *La bourgeoisie parisienne de 1815 à 1848*, París, 1963; J.P. Chaline, *Les bourgeois de Rouen: une élite urbaine au XIXe siècle*, París, 1982.

¹⁹ Vid. la nota 12, así como S.Englund, «The Ghost of National Past», *Journal of Modern History*, 64 (1992), 299-320.

²⁰ Vid. P. Nora (ed.), *Les lieux de mémoire*, París, 1984 y ss., 5 vols.

exclusivamente en la obra, se desarrollaban desde la Memoria real pasando por la Memoria-Estado hasta la Memoria ciudadana, y permanecían así dentro del ámbito de las construcciones estatales. También Maurice Agulhon investiga la iconografía nacional y la simbología en su significación para el proceso de formación de la República francesa y la Nación constituída políticamente. Finalmente, Gérard Noiriel combina, en un artículo aparecido recientemente sobre la historia social de lo nacional, su enfoque con los procesos de identificación y asimilación dentro del Estado nacional, cuya existencia, sin embargo, se presupone, y por ello mismo no es problematizada.²¹ Es decir, son más bien los problemas del nacionalismo antes que el propio nacionalismo como problema lo que continúa siendo el centro de atención. De modo análogo, el regionalismo político ha sido entendido incluso como un ataque contra, o bien como un síntoma de diferencia o debilidad del Estado nacional, el cual rechaza en sus variantes republicanas la existencia de esferas intermedias. La historiografía también ha tendido a seguir parcialmente esta valoración.²² Pero ha supuesto un importante avance que en los últimos años hayan sido investigadas más en detalle las dinámicas particulares de la construcción de conciencias e identidades regionales específicas, y que la Región, que de ningún modo necesitaba ser idéntica a las antiguas provincias, sea interpretada como una construcción basada en un conjunto heterogéneo de notables, clero e intelectuales, como se ha mostrado en el caso de Bretaña.²³ La tendencia teleológica y la obsesión por el Estado nacional tampoco están ausentes de la historiografía alemana, y en ella fueron incrustadas con frecuencia igualmente reflexiones emparentadas con las teorías de la modernización. La opinión de que el desarrollo histórico ha de discurrir necesariamente sobre la base de la fundación de un Estado nacional no solamente era compartida por Karl Marx y los liberales: también lo será por tendencias historiográficas de lo más heterogéneo en Alemania tras 1945.

Una de las dicotomías conceptuales ampliamente extendidas en ambos países es la contraposición entre «Nación cultural» y «Nación política-Estado nacional», la cual se ha introducido en la historiografía sobre el nacionalismo a menudo sin

²¹ M. Agulhon, *Marianne au pouvoir*, París, 1989; G.Noiriel, «La question nationale comme objet de l'histoire sociale», *Genèses*, 4 (1991), 72-94.

²² Vid. M.Agulhon, «Conscience nationale et conscience régionale en France de 1815 à nos jours», in J.C.Boogman/ G.N. van der Plaats (ed.), *Federalism. History and Current Signification of a Form of Government*, La Haya, 1980, 243-66.

²³ C. Bertho, «L'invention de la Bretagne. Genèse sociale d'un stéréotype», *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, 35 (1980), 45-62. Sobre la construcción del concepto de Región, vid. también J.Y. Guiomar, *La Nation entre l'histoire et la raison*, París, 1989; H.G.Haupt, «Die Konstruktion der Regionen und die Vielfalt der Loyalitäten im Frankreich des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts», en G.Lottes (ed.), *Region, Nation, Europa*, Heidelberg, 1992, 121-26.

discusión alguna. Como es sabido, Friedrich Meinecke estableció en su libro *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*, aparecido por primera vez en 1907, la diferencia entre Francia, que habría fundado su conciencia nacional sobre el «espíritu de 1789, la teoría de la libre determinación y la soberanía de la Nación», y Alemania, en la que el criterio de pertenencia a la Nación sobre la base de una cultura, idioma e Historia común.²⁴ En una extensión de su tesis, se ha establecido una contraposición entre el nacionalismo europeo-occidental, basado en el criterio de pertenencia subjetiva, y el concepto de Nación propio de Europa Central y Oriental, considerado como «objetivo».²⁵ Ciertamente, estas categorías han sido objeto continuo de numerosas críticas, ya que han sido deducidas de modo casi exclusivo a partir de la historia de las ideas, y excluían situaciones en las que se combinaban ambos tipos; sin embargo, se han mantenido como dos grandes polos de referencia central. Pero ha encontrado acomodo la idea preconcebida de que esa diferencia constituía una realidad impuesta a la investigación histórica, en vez de una propia construcción de la historiografía. Incluso en las horas iniciales del nacionalismo francés, es decir, en la Revolución francesa del año 1789, estrechamente la idea de comunidad nacional basada en la voluntad y en la lucha común fue vinculada estrechamente a otros factores, p.ej. la defensa de la unidad idiomática y de las fronteras naturales.²⁶ En las primeras décadas del siglo XIX, por tanto, realzar la idea de la Nación basada en la participación voluntaria se convirtió en un motivo común de una visión liberal de la sociedad y la Historia, mientras que los pensadores y políticos conservadores y contrarrevolucionarios preferían poner el acento en los fundamentos objetivos de la Nación. Incluso Ernest Renan puso en discusión el significado de la raza, idioma y condicionantes naturales para la conformación de un sentimiento de comunidad nacional en su famosa conferencia en la Sorbona del 11 de marzo de 1882, en la que reducía la Nación a un plebiscito de todos los días.²⁷ Aún así, es necesario por lo tanto determinar las condiciones políticas e intelectuales en las que se desarrolló, reformuló y aplicó esa dicotomía conceptual. Una instalación cómoda en una diferenciación entre la experiencia alemana y la francesa concebida como otra vía particular tiene bien poco sentido.

²⁴ F. Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat* (1907), in id., *Werke*, vol.5, Munich, 1962. Vid. también la reciente visión crítica de D.Langewiesche, «Reich, Nation und Staat in der jüngeren deutschen Geschichte», *Historische Zeitschrift*, 254 (1992), 341-81.

²⁵ Vid. ante todo las influentes aportaciones de H.Kohn, *Die Idee...*, pp. 309 y ss. Una crítica en H.Mommsen, «Nation und Nationalismus in sozialgeschichtlicher Perspektive», in W.Schieder/V. Sellin (ed.), *Sozialgeschichte in Deutschland*, Göttingen, 1986, vol.2, 162-85; vid. también F.M.Barnard, «National Culture and Political Legitimacy: Herder and Rousseau», *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 44 (1983), 231-53.

²⁶ Vid. una aproximación en D.Richet, «Frontières naturelles», in Furet/Ozouf, op.cit., 742-50.

²⁷ E. Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*, París, 1882.

Sobre los análisis del discurso político, será preciso preguntarse por la trascendencia histórica de los modelos discursivos, en este caso por la dicotomía entre la Nación objetiva y subjetiva. En consecuencia, también es necesario averiguar si estos modelos interpretativos hallan una corroboración a finales del XIX y comienzos del XX en el discurso de los contemporáneos o, en su caso, en otros puntos de vista.²⁸ Independientemente de su proceso de génesis, sería preciso también conocer e investigar cuál es la validez y utilidad de las concepciones de Nación cultural y política, en qué situaciones políticas, por qué grupos y con qué objetivos fueron aquéllas utilizadas. La capacidad operativa de la diferenciación era establecida también por Meinecke en base a que permitía la conformación de tipos y con ello una utilización adecuada de los mismos para la comparación histórica. En base a ellos fueron utilizadas construcciones de historia de las ideas de todo tipo, pero sin embargo en ningún caso fueron elaborados una serie de principios interpretativos de la cuestión nacional que estuviesen diferenciados según su virtualidad operativa en cada sociedad. En la confrontación de las experiencias alemana y francesa se descubrió a menudo como causa de las diferencias existentes aquella dicotomía fabricada que se les presentaba, y que fue mantenida desde entonces como una suerte de comodín para la explicación de todas las divergencias.

²⁸ O. Dann, «Der Durchbruch der modernen Nation. Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich», in J. Schlobach (ed.), *Médiations/Vermittlungen. Aspekte der deutsch-französischen Beziehungen vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, Berna, 1992, 47-50.



¿SABEMOS SUFICIENTE SOBRE EL «NACIONALISMO»?

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Comenzaré comentando algunos conceptos fundamentales. Siempre he entendido la nación como un gran grupo social, como un hecho sociológico, y ni siquiera las teorías más recientes han podido convencerme de que las naciones sean un producto del nacionalismo, es decir, una «invención» de intelectuales nacionalistas¹. Prescindiendo del hecho de que sólo en casos excepcionales existe una investigación empírica detrás de estas teorías, el concepto de nacionalismo es, en las distintas lenguas y para los diferentes autores, tan diverso que apenas es utilizable² como instrumento de investigación empírica. Por ejemplo, E. Gellner, al definir el nacionalismo como «una teoría de la legitimación política»³, ha de concluir que una parte esencial de los procesos de formación nacional europeos no han tenido nada que ver con el nacionalismo, puesto que, en la fase decisiva del movimiento nacional, sus defensores no pensaron en ninguna legitimación política. Del mismo modo, aquellos modernistas que ven la nación como una «invención» e incluso como una «ficción», probablemente tendrán problemas para explicar por qué unas «ficciones» tienen éxito y otras no, sin tener en cuenta la actuación real de las naciones, la incidencia de los «intereses nacionales», etc.⁴

Con esto no quiero decir que concebir la nación como un gran grupo objetivamente existente sea un concepto carente de problemas. Es cierto que la evidencia empírica nos permite afirmar que todas las naciones modernas se han formado al hilo del proceso de transformación social(y económica y cultural) que

* Traducción: Pablo González.

¹ Para una reciente aproximación crítica a este concepto, vid. A. SMITH, «The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed ?» en *Journal of International Studies*, 1991, vol. 20, nº 3, pgs. 353 y ss.

² El comienzo de un análisis semántico comparado, que hace ya casi treinta años abordó la historiadora finlandesa A. Kemiläinen, no ha encontrado, hasta donde yo sé, ningún continuador sistemático; vid. A. KEMILÄINEN, *Nationalism. Problems concerning the Word, the Concept and Clasification*, Jyväskylä, 1964, especialmente el capítulo II.

³ E. GELLNER, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca, Londres 1983.

⁴ Entre otros muchos, la lista de autores va desde E. Renan hasta B. Anderson y P. Brass, pasando por H. Kohn o E. Kedourie.

implica el tránsito de una sociedad feudal a una sociedad burguesa. El proceso de configuración nacional ha sido un componente fundamental del «aburguesamiento» (*Verbürgelichung*) de la Sociedad. Pero esta realidad, a la que llegamos por inducción, no resuelve la cuestión de las relaciones causales.

El camino hacia una sociedad burguesa definida en términos nacionales es impensable sin una actividad orientada y consciente de los individuos, igual que sucede con las demás dimensiones de las transformaciones burguesas. Las personalidades que se adhirieron a la idea de «Nación» y la dotaron de atributos éticos fueron decisivas, pero su éxito no dependió únicamente de su entusiasmo y su compromiso personal. Las circunstancias objetivas (esto es, independientes de sus deseos y aspiraciones) jugaron aquí un papel decisivo, con lo que se nos plantea la primera cuestión de importancia.

Al igual que en otros procesos sociales, en el de construcción nacional, también el cambio social se hizo patente como el resultado de las interacciones entre las diferentes aspiraciones individuales (en nuestro caso de los activistas con conciencia nacional) por un lado, y por otro, los procesos y transformaciones sociales independientes de sus esfuerzos. Este proceso es impensable sin una serie de decisiones individuales, por lo que se debe también plantear la cuestión colateral de si dichas decisiones fueron racionalizadas y formuladas. Si solamente suponemos que estas decisiones no eran necesarias y que tenían única y exclusivamente el carácter de una «elección racional»⁵, y al mismo tiempo suponemos que no seguían ningún modelo específico establecido con anterioridad, entonces nos encontramos ante la cuestión de qué puede hacer el historiador ante las motivaciones no expresas. ¿Pueden suponerse motivaciones de tal tipo en el proceso de formación de los grupos?. En mis investigaciones hasta hoy he respondido a esta pregunta positivamente, y en este sentido, he interpretado también «la oposición de intereses relevantes desde un punto de vista nacional». Los resultados alcanzados por este camino fueron acogidos, en su mayoría, muy positivamente, y sin embargo contienen por lo menos dos puntos débiles, que hasta hoy han pasado casi desapercibidos:

1.- A la hora de interpretar reacciones negativas a los procesos de agitación nacional, ¿podemos trabajar con modelos explicativos de reacciones positivas?. Con otras palabras: sabemos poco sobre la motivación de aquellas personas, que bajo condiciones similares (por ejemplo un «non dominant ethnic-group»⁶) optaron por una

⁵ Vid. por ejemplo: M. HECHTER, «Nationalism as group solidarity», en *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 10, 1987, pg.416 y ss.

⁶ En inglés en el original (N. del T.).

solución nacional diferente. Sería una valiosa labor investigar si, por término medio, la posición de esas personas «anacionales» se diferenció esencialmente de aquellas que optaron por la movilización nacional (en el sistema de la «*social communication*» (comunicación social), o, en la oposición de intereses nacionales relevantes).

2.- ¿Puede suponerse que individuos de zonas alejadas entre sí, con tradiciones culturales diferenciadas, situadas en distintos niveles de desarrollo social colectivo reaccionaron según modelos de conducta similares y se decidieron por el mismo tipo de identidad nacional?. Este es evidentemente un planteamiento antropológico de la cuestión que, sin embargo, no debe dejar indiferente a los historiadores. Relacionada con esto, se encuentra la cuestión (poco investigada por lo general, y en absoluto en perspectiva comparada) que plantea si los diferentes movimientos nacionales y sus programas, al utilizar las mismas palabras y términos (como por ejemplo, Nación, patria, patriotismo, «patria chica»...), entendían lo mismo con ellos.

Hay además otra laguna en el análisis de la movilización nacional de las masas. Mi investigación se concentró en los procesos de formación nacional, en la situación del movimiento nacional, es decir en el camino que va desde el «non dominant ethnic-group» hasta la nación moderna⁷. El resto de los procesos de construcción nacional quedaron excluidos, pues constituyen un tipo absolutamente diferente (por ejemplo el caso de las naciones francesa, sueca, rusa o alemana)⁸. Sin embargo si tomásemos en consideración como base para un análisis comparativo el factor «conciencia nacional», y en general el de identidad nacional, para los dos tipos básicos de construcción nacional, los frutos serían notables.

Tomemos como ejemplo sólo un aspecto parcial de semejante comparación: el ritmo diferencial de la movilización nacional de las masas. Según el clásico y citado trabajo de Eugene Weber⁹, se supone que las masas populares, principalmente campesinas, necesitaron un largo período de tiempo para identificarse con la nación moderna. Según esta idea, pasó más de un siglo entre la «invención» de la nación por los «nacionalistas» y su expresión social masiva. Sin embargo si comparamos los

⁷ M. HROCH, *Social Preconditions and National Revival in Europe. A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*, Cambridge U.P., 1985. He modificado en parte el modelo desarrollado en ese libro; vid. M. HROCH, «From National Movement to the Fully Formed-Nation. The Nation-Building Process in Europe», en *New Left Review* 198, 1993, pg. 3 y ss.

⁸ El más reciente, ambicioso y ampliamente seguido intento de comparar los «nacionalismos» de las naciones dominantes ignora también el componente social; vid. L GREENFIELD, *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge/Mass. 1992.

⁹ E. WEBER, *Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France*, Londres, 1979.

resultados con el desarrollo de los movimientos nacionales, llegamos a la conclusión de que aquí apenas se encuentran analogías. En la mayoría de los movimientos nacionalistas se consiguió muy pronto atraer a la población campesina hacia la identidad nacional. A veces, ya en la fase de agitación nacional, los campesinos se convirtieron en el principal apoyo. ¿Deben buscarse las causas simplemente en una dinámica más fuerte del movimiento nacional? ¿Jugó algún papel la inacabada estructura social? ¿o acaso debe intentarse un paralelismo con la obra de Barrington Moore¹⁰? Esta reflexión nos lleva a otro problema, comparativamente menos investigado: la interrelación entre el proceso de construcción nacional y la revolución política burguesa.

Sin embargo, no quisiera convertir este artículo en un simple catálogo de cuestiones. Por ello, mi exposición se concentrará en adelante en tres bloques de cuestiones agrupadas:

- 1- Las circunstancias que han acompañado, y en su caso causado, el paso de la fase A a la fase B (es decir de agitación nacional).
- 2- El papel de los «mitos», o mejor dicho del pasado y de su percepción, en la conciencia histórica del movimiento nacional.
- 3- La estructura y desarrollo de las reivindicaciones y de los programas nacionalistas.

1- La agitación nacional, la difusión de la identidad nacional, del «Nacionalismo» entre los miembros de un «non dominant ethnic-group», se estudia más como un simple proceso acumulativo que como la difusión de una identidad «viviente» en un entorno «amorfo», carente de ella. Sin embargo, la realidad pareció ser otra.

Ya antes de la aparición de aspiraciones nacionales, hay razones para suponer la existencia de otras identidades. Podía tratarse de una identificación con el Estado (simbolizado a través del rey), con el Land, con la región, con la ciudad, etc. En la mayoría de los casos, este tipo de identidades quedó fuera del centro de atención de la investigación sobre el nacionalismo. En los casos en que se mostró un interés en las identidades más antiguas, éste quedó limitado a la identidad étnica, cuestionándose hasta qué punto la existencia de un grupo étnico se refleja en sus

¹⁰ B. MOORE jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Boston, 1966.

miembros. A veces tenemos la impresión de que la investigación sobre el nacionalismo rechaza tan radicalmente el «primordialismo», que no toma nota de la existencia, en la Edad Media y en la primera Edad Moderna, de una conciencia de identidad, definida incluso como «nacional»¹¹. Pero esto nos llevaría muy lejos de nuestro tema; volveremos sobre ello relacionándolo con el papel desempeñado por la conciencia histórica.

Aquí sólo nos interesará la cuestión relativa al papel jugado por las viejas identidades en la conversión de la primera generación de precursores nacionales, es decir el paso de la fase A a la fase B. Hasta aquí hemos tratado esos procesos de conversión sólo en el plano de lo individual: en la motivación que condujo a los primeros activistas a extender a otros miembros de su «non dominant ethnic-group» una nueva identidad nacional (la cuestión del éxito o fracaso de esta agitación debe ser por ahora dejada de lado).

Estas motivaciones y la naturaleza de sus objetivos diferencian perfectamente a los activistas de los patriotas intelectuales de la fase A que investigaron con gran interés, y a menudo con pasión, la lengua, el pasado y las mentalidades de su propio grupo étnico. Estos patriotas, como Dobrovsky en Bohemia, Porthan en Finlandia, Kopitar en Eslovenia, Bernolák en Eslovaquia etc. apenas muestran interés en extender la conciencia de identidad nacional entre las masas. La actitud de los jóvenes patriotas que les siguen es muy diferente.

Sin embargo, una alusión al cambio generacional no es suficiente. En algunos casos el «cambio generacional» no tuvo lugar inmediatamente (por ejemplo, en el caso del movimiento eslovaco, e incluso en el catalán), mientras que en otros se mezclaron ambas generaciones. Además esta observación tan sólo traslada el problema a otro plano, y no explica la relación causal. De un defecto similar adolece también la tesis de que en un principio esto era sólo una «juego» teórico de intelectuales ilustrados que, más tarde, sin que ellos lo hubiesen premeditado, fue tomada en serio por otros. De ser así, ¿por qué unos se han tomado el «juego» en serio y otros no?

Una interpretación todavía frecuente de nuestro problema es la que se refiere al influjo de las ideas de Herder. Según ella, los precursores se habrían inspirado en

¹¹ Vid. J. SZÜCS, *Nation und Geschichte. Studien*, Köln, Wien, 1981. O. DANN, *Nationalismus in vorindustrieller Zeit, Studien zur Geschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, München 1986. A. BORST, *Der Turmbau von Babel: Geschichte der Meinungen über Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen der Völker*, 1.-6., Stuttgart 1957-63.

las lecturas de Herder, y habrían actuado en nombre de sus ideales. Naturalmente el influjo de Herder no se puede negar, sobre todo en la esfera teórica. Ciertamente, es bastante difícil explicar de forma convincente por qué J. Jungmann en Bohemia alrededor de 1800, J.V. Snellman en Finlandia y L. Stur en Hungría a comienzos de los años cuarenta del siglo XIX, el letón Ch. Woldemars en los cincuenta y el lituano J. Bassanavicius incluso más tarde, hubieron de inspirarse todos en Herder. Nos falta todavía por lo demás un estudio comparado de los ecos de Herder en Europa: las investigaciones hasta ahora publicadas adolecen de una búsqueda selectiva de pruebas positivas de esa influencia y son clasificables más como acumulación de ejemplos que como una verdadera explicación. Además, en la mayoría de los casos, las influencias herderianas se investigan aisladas de otras influencias intelectuales¹².

Podríamos objetar argumentos similares contra otra interpretación de la movilización nacional de intelectuales, frecuentemente repetida, y que vincula aquélla al efecto de la Revolución francesa. En este caso los grandes retornos temporales en la irrupción de la fase B debido al efecto de la Revolución son también difícilmente interpretables, ya que naturalmente las ideas de igualdad y libertad burguesas se expanden por todas partes. En este caso, más que de efectos inmediatos, se trata las más de las veces de influencias indirectas. Además esta interpretación habrá de enfrentarse con una dificultad añadida: con el hecho de que muchos de los primeros activistas de la fase B tenían claros sentimientos antirrevolucionarios. A pesar de que todo esto son objeciones legítimas, se deberá contar con la Revolución en el modelo de explicación de las raíces de la fase B, sin concebir su efecto de una forma simplista, sin concebirla como una inspiración a la que imitar positivamente¹³.

Llegamos así a la formulación de las siguientes posibilidades de investigación para el análisis de este problema. La una se nos presenta más teórica, mientras que la otra se cimenta de modo empírico e inductivo.

El análisis de tipo teorizante habría de construir más motivaciones posibles, que después deberían ser comprobadas. Este análisis empieza con la cuestión relativa a qué transformaciones y agitaciones vivió cada una de las diferentes sociedades hasta el momento en que en ellas diese comienzo la fase B. Como hipótesis de partida puede

¹² Vid. H. KOHN, *The Idea of Nationalism. A Study in Its Origins and Background*, New York, 1944. L.L. SNYDER, *The Meaning of Nationalism*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1954. E. LEMBERG, *Nationalismus I. Psychologie und Geschichte*, Hamburg, 1964. Para una crítica de esta interpretación véase igualmente A. KEMILÄINEN, op. cit., pg. 72 y ss.

¹³ Sobre esto, J. DINWIDDY, O. DANN (eds.), *Nationalism in the Age of the French Revolution*, Londres, 1988, especialmente el artículo de J. Godechot.

suponerse que en épocas de crisis era cuando la activación nacional, esto es una mayor reivindicación de la nueva identidad nacional se produjo entre los intelectuales. La convicción de la energía salvadora de la idea nacional puede ser fortalecida mediante la pérdida de los viejos vínculos sociales, es decir gracias al derrumbe de las identidades seguras hasta ese momento. Además, es necesario cuestionarse cómo reaccionaron los intelectuales ante las crisis y alteraciones concretas, hasta qué punto éstas fueron percibidas como tales, puesto que en esas situaciones la opción por la agitación nacional no ha de ser considerada como la única salida posible.

En la mayoría de los casos, esta hipótesis aparenta ser prometedora. Así, la crisis política de la monarquía de los Habsburgo, provocada por las reformas josefinas y las reacciones a la Revolución Francesa, se sitúa muy cercana en el tiempo del comienzo de las fases B checa y magiar, mientras para la fase B de Noruega fueron más eficaces las guerras napoleónicas. La crisis política y social de la monarquía rusa tras la Guerra de Crimea coincide en el tiempo con el comienzo de los movimientos nacionalistas en Estonia y Letonia, mientras que en muchos otros movimientos nacionales la crisis del año 1848-49 desempeñó quizás un papel importante (Ucranios, Eslovenos, Eslovacos).

La otra línea prima un método de investigación empírico-biográfico. Los intentos prosopográficos (descriptivos) hasta la fecha se han limitado a las grandes personalidades y han intentado, en el mejor de los casos, considerar esos casos individuales como «característicos». Así podríamos considerar por ejemplo las ofensas y agravios sufridos por el checo Jungman o el estonio Jacobsen como un motivo decisivo para la agitación nacional. Sin embargo, éste sería un camino falso.

Carecemos de un número más amplio de investigaciones prosopográficas aplicadas que, centradas en el ámbito de la desición individual, incluyesen informaciones biográficas sobre el mayor número posible de los primeros activistas y fuesen clasificadas con fines comparativos. Es preciso investigar no sólo la procedencia social y regional, sino ante todo el proceso de admisión y las experiencias vitales relacionadas con él. Las relaciones personales y las lecturas también deberían ser estudiadas en detalle desde un punto de vista socio-psicológico.

2- La mayoría de los teóricos de los movimientos nacionales -desde Otto Bauer a Anthony Smith- están de acuerdo en afirmar que tanto un pasado común, como un destino compartido de la población constituye uno de los rasgos básicos de la Nación moderna. Las diferencias de opinión comienzan cuando se pregunta cómo se percibe ese pasado común por cada uno de los miembros individuales de la

comunidad y cómo encuentran una traducción teórica dentro del movimiento nacional¹⁴.

¿Se trata simplemente de un pasado común, más o menos continuado, de un grupo étnico, esto es, nacional ya desde finales de la Edad media y principios de la Edad Moderna? ¿O respondió sin embargo al mito de las raíces comunes, de una ficción, construida artificialmente a lo largo del siglo XIX y que actuó de forma integradora, pero sin corresponder en modo alguno a la realidad histórica? Con otras palabras: el conflicto consiste en dilucidar si ese pasado común fue descubierto y analizado científicamente o si por, el contrario, fue inventado de una forma arbitraria y presentado al pueblo como una verdad en la que creer. Ambas posiciones, naturalmente con multitud de variables intermedias, son mantenidas con una sorprendente espontaneidad, y son, en su versión más simple, difícilmente sostenibles. Unos no toman en consideración una realidad elemental: que hubo realmente un pasado históricamente comprobado. Los otros, por su parte, no investigan cómo y a través de qué vías ese pasado se introduce como «Memoria colectiva» en la conciencia de aquellos que se comprometen en ser miembros de una nación en proceso de formación.

Para los historiadores es una realidad natural que la nación francesa posee una continuidad histórica desde la Edad Media. Del mismo modo ocurre con las naciones sueca o polaca. Más complicados son los casos en los que la nación moderna no surge de una transformación directa del sustrato medieval, porque en ellos el movimiento nacional no se podía vincular directamente a la continuidad del Estado medieval. Así ocurrió por ejemplo con checos, noruegos, catalanes, croatas, serbios, irlandeses... Y sobre todo, es complejo el estudio de aquellas naciones que no podían remitirse a ninguna tradición estatal en el pasado: finlandeses, estonios, eslovacos, letonios...

Esta clasificación muestra en principio que la postura «modernista» trabaja con tipos muy distintos de naciones «inventadas». Ello no implica que la interpretación «aborigenista» (apenas sostenida hoy entre la comunidad científica) de que la nación existe desde la Edad media sea hoy aceptable. Me atrevo a afirmar que esta polémica entre modernistas y aborigenistas es irrelevante, dado que ninguna de las dos posiciones dispone de argumentos plenamente satisfactorios.

¹⁴ E. HOBSBAWN, T. RANGER, *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, 1983. A. SMITH, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford, 1986.

Carecemos además de estudios sobre algunos aspectos decisivos para el análisis del proceso de formación de las naciones modernas: por ejemplo, la cuestión de los «mecanismos de transmisión» entre el pasado realmente existente y el presente de los «non dominant ethnic-groups» que se encuentran en la evolución de los movimientos nacionales, bien sea en la fase de agitación, bien sea en la fase del movimiento de masas. ¿Cómo se relaciona el presente de la nación en proceso de formación con el pasado del «non dominant ethnic-group»? Si deseamos como insostenible la idea de una comunidad de sangre, debemos entonces suponer la existencia de algunos canales de comunicación, tanto informales como establecidos.

Los mejor conocidos son algunos canales institucionalizados de transmisión, esto es, de continuidad, como son algunos estamentos que ya arrancan desde la Edad media, que a veces incluso utilizaron el término «natio» y lo transmitieron con sus equivalentes correspondientes a las distintas lenguas nacionales. ¿Cómo se presentó a las distintas capas de la población del «non dominant ethnic-group» ese pasado nacional, anteriormente sostenido sólo por algunas estamentos, como su propio pasado nacional? Se puede recurrir naturalmente a distintos modelos de corte psicologista o sociológico (y ya se ha hecho), pero éstos se quedarán en meras construcciones teóricas mientras no dispongamos de investigaciones empíricas sobre cómo circularon esos mensajes entre los miembros del «non dominant ethnic-group».

Sólo en pocos casos hubo una continuidad de la tradición oral, la cual transmite directamente la información sobre «cómo éramos»- p.ej. las sagas islandesas o las cantos heroicos balcánicos. En ambos casos, e igualmente en el caso del Epos Kalevala finlandés, esta tradición debió renovarse en las épocas más recientes. Es aquí donde la mitología posee un campo de acción extraordinariamente amplio, constituyendo un fenómeno posteriormente muy generalizado. Sin embargo, es erróneo considerar estos casos excepcionales como «característicos» en lo que al papel de la Historia y de la conciencia histórica en el proceso de construcción nacional se refiere.

Cuando nos acercamos a la otra cara de la relación pasado-presente y nos preguntamos cuáles fueron los aspectos del pasado que tuvieron importancia en la agitación nacional, la situación parece más diferenciada. La mitología constituye sólo uno de los dos polos extremos de los campos diferenciados de mensajes y conocimientos que nosotros, agrupándolos, definimos como conciencia histórica. Como polo opuesto a la mitología se encuentran los resultados de la investigación científica- esto es, conocimientos que, desde la Ilustración y sobre todo, desde la

llegada de la moderna Ciencia Histórica en el siglo XIX, pueden apoyarse sobre la autoridad de la verdad científica y «objetiva»¹⁵.

La influencia real del pasado en el desarrollo del movimiento nacional debe ser buscada e investigada en el amplio espectro en el que se mezclan estos dos polos: allí donde los conocimientos científicos se encuentran, se mezclan o, eventualmente, chocan con la cultura mitológica.

En razón de estas reflexiones hipotéticas, establecemos (también hipotéticamente) que la transmisión de información desde el pasado se desarrolló a través de cuatro vías fundamentales, cada una de las cuales podría ser investigada comparativamente:

- 1- La tradición familiar: ¿qué ha recibido el niño en casa sobre «su», esto es, «nuestro» pasado? Las diferencias sociales jugaron aquí un papel muy fuerte: la visión transmitida es muy diferente según se trate de una familia aristócrata, de una pequeño burguesa o una campesina. La investigación empírica se encuentra aquí con una barrera heurística: la tradición familiar de las capas medias y bajas de la población sólo puede incluirse tardíamente en razón de la escasez de fuentes, de forma que para la época en que se desarrolla el movimiento nacional sólo podemos recurrir a datos indirectos, o debemos extrapolar resultados de investigaciones antropológicas actuales. No es de extrañar que en este terreno nuestros conocimientos se basen sobre todo en suposiciones.
- 2- La formación escolar, para la que las fuentes disponibles son mucho mejores. En este campo se realizan ya algunas investigaciones, pero los resultados parciales esperan todavía una investigación comparada que nos permita establecer generalizaciones.
- 3- La publicística, periódicos y revistas. Su lectura fue con seguridad, especialmente durante la fase C, un factor muy efectivo de educación nacional, en la que la Historia es un componente muy importante. En este caso la escasez de datos comparables tiene otras causas: las fuentes son tan amplias que un tratamiento sistemático exige grandes esfuerzos que son impensables sin un trabajo en equipo. Del mismo modo resulta peligrosa y conducente a error la práctica de presentar como realidades objetivas

¹⁵ M. SALEWSKI, «Nationalbewusstsein und historisches Selbstverständnis oder: Gibt es neue Wege historischen Erkennens?» en O. HAUSER (ed.), *Geschichte und Geschichtsbewusstseins*, Göttingen s.a., pg. 26 y ss.

meras suposiciones, que se basan normalmente en algunos ejemplos escogidos de forma arbitraria.

- 4- La literatura histórica (junto con la poesía y el arte dramático) fue especialmente efectiva como transmisor de conocimientos y valores; en un primer momento, se limitó a las clases instruídas para ir influyendo cada vez más en las capas medias de la población. Su análisis con respecto a la formación de una conciencia histórica nacional relevante no puede pasarse por alto de una forma arbitraria: es a la vez realizable, aunque metodológicamente compleja, y los primeros resultados que nos proporcionó la investigación comparada parecen convincentes y prometedores¹⁶. A pesar de ello, estamos todavía lejos de disponer de una visión comparativa satisfactoria.

De cara a la investigación futura de estas cuatro corrientes, es de señalar que sin embargo, en el terreno teórico, nos falta todavía una condición previa: nosotros no sabemos realmente desde cuándo, esto es, bajo qué condiciones sociales y políticas pudo ser eficaz la transmisión de un mensaje determinado sobre «nuestra» Historia. Dicho de otro modo: ¿cuándo estuvo la gente en condiciones de concebir su propio pasado como una comunidad de destino del grupo étnico, esto es, nacional? La vinculación a una conciencia nacional cada vez más extendida resulta cuando menos ambivalente. Por un lado, difícilmente puede extenderse la conciencia histórica sin un umbral mínimo de conciencia nacional; por otro, la reconstrucción más concreta de la Historia nacional permitió a sectores sociales más amplios tener una representación más concreta de la Nación a la que pertenecían.

3- Es propio de todo movimiento social y político- y también de todo movimiento nacional- tener un objetivo y programa claros y articular, en torno a ellos, una serie de reivindicaciones. Por lo general, se puede considerar que todo movimiento nacional aspira a la superación de aquellos «déficits» que impiden a un determinado grupo étnico no dominante alcanzar una existencia nacional «plena». Estos «déficits» varían y se complementan en el transcurso del tiempo entre el inicio del movimiento nacional, es decir en el momento en que los «protagonistas» del «non dominant ethnic-group» se comprometen con la identidad nacional, y la fase de movimiento de masas propiamente dicho. Por la vía de esas reivindicaciones, los

¹⁶ M. HROCH, *Die historische Belletristik als Vermittlerin des bürgerlichen Geschichtsbewusstseins. Deutsches und tschechisches Geschichtsbild im Vergleich*, Bielefeld, Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung, Preprint 1987.

activistas del movimiento nacionalista intentan acelerar el proceso de construcción nacional (*Nation-building*), y dotarlo en la medida de lo posible de los atributos propios de una nación plenamente desarrollada. En este tipo de formulación, la cuestión de la fijación de objetivos en los movimientos nacionales parece aparentemente irrelevante.

La cuestión se complica si atendemos a los contenidos concretos de las reivindicaciones programáticas. La primera dificultad metodológica surge de la ausencia de criterios aceptados con carácter general, a través de los cuales poder establecer qué ha de ser estudiado bajo el ámbito de los objetivos y programas de los movimientos nacionales. Está muy claro que las formulaciones expresadas por instituciones y las tomas de posición colectivas son propias de este campo, pero menos claro resulta ya cómo ha de tomarse el papel de los pequeños grupos de interés o de determinadas personalidades individuales. ¿Deben considerarse, como ocurre con frecuencia, como un programa nacional las ideas de Palacky en Bohemia, Bleiweiss en Eslovenia, Sabino Arana en el País Vasco o Bassanavicius en Lituania? Debemos contrastar la dimensión y relevancia sociales de esas ideas, pero esta labor es heurísticamente difícil, como lo es también la búsqueda de objetivos expresos en el activista medio de la agitación nacional cotidiana.

Sólo en un período posterior participan los miembros de la Nación en formación en elecciones, de modo que podamos servirnos de la información electoral como información relevante acerca de la eficacia de los distintos programas. Los escépticos podrían preguntarse si es realmente tan importante investigar los contenidos y reivindicaciones concretas de los programas, así como su relevancia. Para ellos sería suficiente, como lo es para muchos estudiosos (en especial los que no son historiadores), afirmar que se trata simplemente de un producto del «nacionalismo»¹⁷. Esta generalización escéptica sería lícita si de hecho las reivindicaciones nacionales fuesen totalmente uniformes. Sin embargo, los datos empíricos muestran lo contrario; los fines de los diversos movimientos nacionales fueron tan diferentes que, subsumirlos a todos bajo la denominación genérica de «nacionalismo» resultaría falto de valor. Mencionemos algunos ejemplos.

Cuando los flamencos, en el año 1840, exigieron la introducción de la lengua neerlandesa en su región, realizaban un tipo de reivindicación totalmente distinto al realizado por los representantes noruegos en el año 1814, que reivindicaban un Estado noruego independiente. Esto era a su vez totalmente diferente del hecho de que los

¹⁷ E. GELLNER, op. cit., pg.126 y ss.

patriotas estonios en los años 1870 quisiesen fundar el primer Liceo en el que se impartiese clase en estonio (y recaudasen dinero para ello), o del hecho de que los patriotas húngaros en la revolución de 1848-49 se pronunciasen en favor de la independencia de Hungría. Asimismo, cuando los irlandeses en el programa Home Rule pedían una reforma agraria justa o, por otro lado, cuando los finlandeses exigían en la misma época la suspensión de la «Constitución» zarista de 1809, no constituían realidades susceptibles de ser simplificadas bajo un mismo término. Ejemplos de este tipo podrían citarse muchos.

Con esto no quiere decirse que los objetivos de los diferentes movimientos nacionales fuesen tan dispares que no sea posible compararlos entre ellos y, por lo tanto, no sea posible construir tipologías y categorías. Se pueden diferenciar claramente tres niveles de objetivos y reivindicaciones: las políticas, las lingüístico-culturales y las sociales, naturalmente con muchas superposiciones intermedias en los casos concretos.

Todos los movimientos nacionales se preocuparon de construir una identidad nacional: se quiso construir una cultura diferenciada, o desarrollarla en el caso de que ya existiese con anterioridad. En la mayoría de los casos, no siempre, esto conllevaba el esfuerzo por cimentar la especificidad de la cultura nacional sobre la base de un idioma nacional. La lengua era concebida como un «valor en sí mismo» y como tal era cultivada, por lo que no parece tan esencial distinguir si se trataba de una modernización y continuación de la antigua tradición del idioma literario, o de una reformulación de la propia lengua.

En todos los movimientos nacionales se formuló como objetivo, más tarde o más temprano, el organizar la nación como una comunidad dotada de una estructura social acabada, plena. Esto suponía «conquistar» todos los grupos y clases sociales correspondientes al grado de desarrollo, incluso a aquellos con una estructura social propia de una nación dominante. Se creía que sólo por ese camino sería posible alcanzar el mismo status que ésta.

En tercer lugar, en todos los movimientos nacionales se llegó a la formulación de ciertos objetivos políticos. En primer lugar se planteó la necesidad de transformar al territorio del «non dominant ethnic-group» en una unidad administrativa. A partir de esta reivindicación práctica que no ponía en cuestión el poder del Estado, se formulan objetivos más radicales de entre los que la soberanía sólo constituyó un tipo extremo.

Además el proceso de construcción nacional no discurrió de modo aislado al desarrollo del conjunto de la sociedad: este proceso estuvo, hasta cierto punto, casi siempre relacionado con las transformaciones burguesas. Esto nos lleva a un nuevo problema hasta ahora poco tratado. Asumiendo que esos cambios burgueses, anhelos de reformas y revoluciones, fueron movimientos que persiguieron asimismo objetivos concretos, surge la cuestión correlativa acerca del grado en que los objetivos de la burguesía están incluidos en las tres categorías antes mencionadas.

Así, las iniciativas lingüístico-culturales podrían estar relacionadas con la lucha por la igualdad de derechos de los idiomas; si todos los ciudadanos han de ser iguales, habrían de serlo sin tener en cuenta las diferencias étnico-culturales, y los miembros del «non dominant ethnic-group» deberían poder recibir su formación en su lengua materna, y asimismo poder servirse de ella ante las autoridades. Esta es sin embargo una mera especulación teórica: realmente sabemos muy poco cómo, en el caso de que lo hicieran, los argumentos «burgueses» sirvieron de vehículo para la fundamentación de reivindicaciones lingüístico-culturales.

Del mismo modo podemos preguntar por el programa social del movimiento nacional, hasta qué punto el esfuerzo por alcanzar una estructura social completa de la propia nación está relacionado con la lucha por la abolición de los privilegios feudales (cuyos beneficiarios pertenecerían a la nación dominante). Esto es válido tanto para la «liberación» del campesinado como para la superación de las ordenaciones gremiales.

Y por último, la cuestión quizás más esencial: ¿Cómo se incluyeron los «clásicos» derechos burgueses dentro de las reivindicaciones nacionalistas de los diferentes movimientos nacionales? Con esto no me refiero sólo a la libertad de expresión, reunión y prensa, que además no siempre (ni en todas partes) fueron traducidas políticamente (o no pudieron serlo), en los programas nacionales. Las relaciones con el programa del liberalismo, cuyos defensores se encontraban en la mayor parte de los casos entre los políticos de las naciones dominantes, o con el propio programa de las reformas democráticas, fueron más complejas.

Aunque podemos mencionar muchos ejemplos de integración de reivindicaciones burguesas, en el estado actual de nuestros conocimientos no podemos responder de modo afirmativo o negativo a la siguiente pregunta: ¿fueron los objetivos burgueses realmente integrados en lo fundamental con los nacionales? ¿O se trató, como suponen muchos críticos del «nacionalismo», de dos corrientes independientes que sólo ocasionalmente chocaron o coincidieron? El carácter «antimodernista» de

los movimientos nacionales, frecuentemente mencionado, merece ciertamente una investigación sistemática.

Por último, hemos de abordar tres problemas de carácter tanto metodológico como gnoseológico. Ante todo, se ha de repetir una cuestión ya planteada al comienzo: ¿cómo se puede reconocer realmente una reivindicación nacional? ¿dónde terminan los objetivos y los fines que la investigación define como «nacionales»? ¿Deben limitarse a aquellos que han sido expresamente definidos como tales, o pueden incluirse también en el plano de lo nacional aquellas reivindicaciones articuladas en base a identidades regionales? Los historiadores mejoraron en la consideración y el análisis de aquellas reivindicaciones que sólo o mayoritariamente han surgido en el centro. Queda por estudiar el papel dentro de los programas nacionalistas de aquellas reivindicaciones locales que, al mismo tiempo, se reclamaban de Nación.

Otro problema es el constituido por las fuentes. Mientras los movimientos nacionales permanecieron en su fase de formación intelectual o en los inicios de la fase B, la falta de fuentes constituye un problema que hace al investigador tomar precauciones. Con la expansión y masificación del movimiento nacional, la serie de artículos, folletos, informaciones, tomas de posición o informes institucionales... se vuelve tan inabarcable, que se vuelve muy difícil, cuando no imposible, un análisis comparado sistemático y riguroso. Carecemos no sólo de conocimientos, sino también de métodos con los que tratar tal cantidad de fuentes.

El análisis comparado de los movimientos nacionales no se halla en condiciones, por el momento, de abordar, metódicamente, el hecho de que los diferentes movimientos estableciesen contactos entre ellos, bien recíprocos o bien unilaterales. Los «patriotas» sabían que sus esfuerzos eran similares a los de otros, pero al mismo tiempo estaban convencidos de su propia singularidad. Sin embargo, sabemos muy poco acerca de cómo, en el caso de que ocurriese, esa comunicación se transformó en influjo. Cuando hablamos de movimientos nacionales, el hecho de que haya formulaciones similares no implica que haya habido inevitablemente una adopción de uno por parte de otro: en circunstancias históricas parecidas, pueden surgir reivindicaciones similares y al mismo tiempo independientes entre sí en diversos sitios. El desarrollo asincrónico hace que las posibles interrelaciones sean todavía más difíciles de percibir. ¿Qué préstamos políticos pudieron tomar en los años ochenta del siglo XIX los «patriotas» letones o lituanos de los checos (con los que tenían contactos regulares), si éstos se encontraban en una fase totalmente diferente?

En relación con este hecho se sitúa otra dificultad metodológica: aunque las distintas reivindicaciones nacionales utilizan con frecuencia las mismas palabras, no se puede asegurar que realmente quieran decir lo mismo. Términos centrales como «Nación» o «Nacionalismo» poseen, como es sabido, connotaciones distintas en las diversas lenguas. Establecer hasta dónde llega la similitud o diferencia de contenido en las reivindicaciones expresadas de una forma idéntica o similar, es una de las tareas básicas del análisis comparado.

La mayoría de los autores, sobre todo en el campo de las ciencias sociales, utilizan el término «Nacionalismo» sin tener en cuenta si el discurso proviene de una «gran» nación dominante o de un movimiento surgido a partir de un «non dominant ethnic-group». Con ello, se oculta una posible esfera de análisis comparado: la comparación de las reivindicaciones y programas de esos dos tipos básicos del proceso de Nation-building. Estas reivindicaciones tienen en cada uno de los dos contextos un valor muy distinto; existen grandes diferencias en lo que a implantación y dimensión sociales se refiere. Por el contrario, se han investigado menos las diferencias relativas en los planos ético, de contenido real de los programas y en el de la Historia de las mentalidades. A veces se ha establecido una distinción entre el carácter «ofensivo» de unos planteamientos y el carácter «defensivo» de otros¹⁸. Sin embargo, esta distinción es totalmente superficial. Las reivindicaciones de un movimiento nacional (se entiende, sin Estado) pueden ser también formuladas del modo «ofensivo»; todo depende de la fase en la que se encuentre (véanse los casos en los que fue reclamada la independencia). Siempre ha existido aquí una diferencia de relación de fuerzas (comunidades nacionales fuertes y débiles) y en la «dirección» de las reivindicaciones (de «abajo» a «arriba» y viceversa). Carecemos, hasta hoy, de una comparación empíricamente fundamentada.

La lista de cuestiones pendientes puede dar la impresión de que la perspectiva crítica y autocrítica del autor es quizás demasiado abultada. La investigación sobre el nacionalismo ha alcanzado, gracias a la labor de numerosos especialistas, un nivel tal que debe plantearse objetivos más amplios. Estamos en el umbral de una nueva fase de la investigación. Para continuar, no sólo debemos conocer las lagunas, sino también reconocer y superar algunos obstáculos de la época pionera en la investigación sobre el nacionalismo:

1- La limitación del investigador a su propia historia nacional, que encierra dos prejuicios que, aunque excluyentes, paradójicamente conviven: la asunción de la

¹⁸ E. LEMBERG, *Nationalismus II. Soziologie und politische Pädagogik*, Hamburg, 1964, pg. 69 y ss.

absoluta especificidad de la propia nación por un lado, y por otro el hecho de considerar su caso particular conocido como característico y representativo del fenómeno general del proceso de construcción nacional. Detrás de ello se oculta el convencimiento de la imposibilidad de comparar a la «propia» nación.

2- La idea de que el único problema verdadero es de índole teórica, a resolver de forma deductiva, y en el que los datos empíricos tienen un papel de mero ejemplo ilustrativo.

3- La idea de que la Historia tiene como única función legitimar el presente.

4- La transposición, con fines políticos o morales, de categorías éticas actuales hacia el pasado, como si la labor del historiador fuese ejercer el papel de juez distinguiendo lo bueno de lo malo en el pasado nacional.

Si queremos que el estudio de las relaciones causales pueda continuar, entonces deberemos tomar precauciones contra estos y otros prejuicios(nacionales y antinacionales).



ON NATIONALISMS IN SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT (REFLECTIONS FROM THE BASQUE CASE)

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1. The formation of reactive national identities in a world of nation-states

It is very rare in the West that a nation-state's territory coincide, in the historical phase in which it is created -end of the eighteenth century and first half of the nineteenth in America and Western Europe, second half of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century in Central and Eastern Europe- with only one ethnic-territorially based historical collective. The norm is the existence of several collectives of this type in the space circumscribed by the state's borders.

But the process of selection of one of them as a cultural -and political- base for the «nationalization» of the civil society of the state is a forced process, imposed by three distinct types of causes. In the first place, every nation-state develops, as the foundation for its legitimacy and as the basis of its school system, a state culture. And the culture and language of the collective which will serve as its support, are chosen in an almost automatic fashion: they are those of the collective whose trajectory has been most tied to that of the prenatal state, normally that which possesses a «great language» which includes a written system -or which has shared it with a family of «great languages»- and which has developed an abundant literature of its own. The nation-state magnifies the distance between the pedagogic actions of the dominant state's culture and those of the non-selected collective's culture, limiting the pedagogic work of these to the family environment and reducing them to the category of slang, «patois», dominated linguistic-cultural systems¹.

Secondly, the creation of a market-nation within the limit of the borders of the nation-state will progressively dispossess of social meaning the territories of the various

¹ Pierre Bourdieu. «La reproducción. Elementos para una teoría del Sistema de Enseñanza». Editorial Laya. 1978. Pp.44 and ff.

collectives. The state consumes its own internal space, and becomes an agent of internal Imperialism².

Thirdly, and in spite of the fact that human identities are multiple and concentric, the state promotes a type of identity, the «national» identity, which soon reveals itself as being incompatible with and the devourer of the remaining group identities³. This is because it is not based on the «we» of the members of the community identities, but on a process of getting citizens to identify with the state political society. The state political identity does not compete on a level playing ground with the remaining identities, but perpetuates the infantilism and inferiority of the others, thus relegating their remaining sentiments of community belonging to a position of secondary and subordinate importance⁴. Therefore the possibility of harmonious coexistence of loyalties within the nation-state would require a state configuration entirely different from that of the present nation-states.

This triple hierarchy of languages and cultures, of territories and identities, that generates the disregard of the non-selected territorial collectives as a basis of «national unity», can lead in exceptional cases to the disappearance of these as collectives. However the usual process is that of fixation, in a state of subordination, of the features of its historical personality.

But the dynamism and interconvertibility of their elements is precisely what permits group identities to recognize each other throughout their various phases⁵. Thus, the nation-state's action consists in impeding the dynamism of the elements of the community identities, claiming the monopoly of all dynamism for the «national» civil society and creating the conditions which enable this to occur. By this the nation-state separates the ethnic-historical personality of these collectives from their group identity. The predominance of the personality over the identity, accompanied by the total disappearance of the identity in the most successful operations of the nation-state, leads to the «picturesqueness» of the collectives. The features of its historic personality, inoffensive and innocuous towards the national civil society, and established once and for all in its prenatal appearance, appear «painted» before the national society. These features can be deliberately stigmatized as inferior; but it does not always occur

² See Henry Lefebvre. «La vie quotidienne dans le monde moderne». Gallimard, 1968.

³ See René Gallissot, «Je ne crois pas en un seul peuple», in *Pluriel-Debat*, n.6, 1976, p.11

⁴ See René Gallissot, «Espaces communautaires», in *Pluriel-Debat*, no.30, p.126.

⁵ See Jacques Berque, «Identités collectives et sujets de l'histoire», in «Identités collectives et relations interculturelles», Editions Complexe, 1978, p.13

this way. Often what takes place is a process of overcompensation in evaluating such features. Customs, costumes, and scenery are described in praising terms and become incorporated as museum exhibits in the central imagination of the nation-state. In these cases, the scheme consists precisely in the praised description of the «picturesqueness» of such features. (This process occurred from the French Revolution until the 1960's, regarding the Northern Basque Country in the context of the French nation-state).

But in certain cases, the group identity of the collectives in the West -and this occurs whenever the historic personality of these is found in an advanced phase of the process of destruction or immobilized fixation of its features-reacts by adopting a position of antagonistic acculturation against the culture of the state⁶, producing movements of a nativist sort of identity, seeking the «authenticity» of the group and conscious return «to the origins». Or movements arise that formulate community utopias, accompanied by the will to put forth the resources necessary to achieve them. Both types of movements demonstrate a political nature, since the polar countertype of the antagonist acculturation is always the culture of the state, and frequently, the state itself. The selection of new identity marks is conscious and political; and since its opponent is the State, these movements amplify their radius of action to the political arena and propose to act concerning the political society of the nation-state. They promote in its midst the formation of political parties that present a dual nature: the community nature which belongs to its origins and the societal one of every political party.

Thus, the creation of socio-political communities in the heart of the dominated collectives relegated by the nation-state presents itself as the only manner of impeding paralysis of its personality features and disassociation between personality and identity. They are the guarantee of the continuation of the dynamism of its elements, and thus of the very subsistence of its identity. (What Lefebvre describes as «particularity» would therefore be the ethnic personality immobilized in its archaic features by the nation-state; and what he calls «difference», the group identity recovered through this process)⁷.

In the European nineteenth century, nativist movements crushingly predominated over utopian ones. But it would be entirely sterile to establish mechanical parallels

⁶ See Georges Devereux, «Etnosychanalyse complémentariste», Flammarion, 1970, pp.201 and ff.

⁷ See Henri Lefebvre, «De l'Etat dans le monde moderne», Union Generale d'Editions, 1976, Vol. III, p.206.

with the nativist reactions -much more thoroughly and abundantly studied- of the colonized societies of the Third World, and to use terms that only correspond to them, such as that of messianism -which describes a certain type of political-religious movement consisting in placing one's hope, in imitation of the whites, in the person of a Messiah- and even more so that of millenarianism, which is the term that defines with complete precision a socio-religious utopia (and not a nativism) of the Middle Ages. Basque nationalism as protagonized by Sabino Arana, in the end of the XIXth Century, which seeks the preservation of the Basque group identity through the recovery of the symbolic capital of the Basque society of orders when it has already disappeared in Vizcaya, is a specific case, but not exceptional, of nationalist nativism.

It is impossible to predict what features of the ethnic-historical personality will be selected as identity marks by these nationalisms. However it can be stated that, within the range of community elements, the selection of these marks is determined in large part by the societal contents of the socio-political communities which they generate. In effect, contrary to a large number of colonized societies, European non-state nationalisms arise in the midst of a nation-state which contains a civil society already formed or in an advanced state of formation, divided thus into social classes; and the groups into the midst of which these movements are born are themselves stratified into classes.

The antagonistic acculturation of these groups is not, therefore, of one single direction, nor is it directed exclusively against the state culture: the form of community reaction and the choice of identity marks depends on the position which the group -or the predominant sector of the group- occupies as a social class in the civil society of the nation-state. The counter-acculturation, in addition to reacting against the culture of the state, can also react against the hegemony of the socially dominant bourgeois class (when it is possible to distinguish it from the culture of the state, which is the case in the Basque Country). It can also adopt the form of ethnic group struggles (or «war of races»), wherever the emigration induced by industrialization places in contact groups of different ethnic origin; and can even consist of a reaction against the socialist-communist utopia present in sectors of the working class (especially when this is represented in immigrant sectors of a different ethnic origin from that of the community group).

These different forms of antagonistic acculturation occur in fact in the first Basque nationalism, which reacts not only against the culture of the state and Spanish nationalism of the Restoration -already essentialist and impregnated with militarism- but also against the social hegemony of the Vizcayan protectionist oligarchy (which

should be distinguished from the state culture) and against the «utopian» socialism of the Vizcayan worker organizations. The Basque socio-political community not only becomes conscious of its difference by reaffirming its «race» and its «moral excellence», but also takes up positions in the group struggles by developing a racism of exclusion towards Spanish immigrant workers -the «maketos»- whatever their ideology might be.

At the same time, the initial Basque nationalism is tributary to the social class -or more precisely, to the class sectors- that are predominant in the group. The communitarian reaction consisting of the selection of identity marks from the imaginary collective of the Basque society of orders and from the idealized rural society is defined by the condition of urban «notables» of the directing members of the dominant sector and by the influence on them of the Carlist and above all traditionalist past, of which Sabino Arana is the charismatic personality. But its societal conduct is determined by another sector, born in the Basque civil society; that of the free-trade industrialist «euskal herriakos»-grouped around the shipping merchant Ramón de la Sota- whose purpose, in no manner nativist, is to confront the Vizcayan iron and steel protectionist oligarchy with another project of construction of the Basque civil society, and even of the Spanish nation-state, and with another alternative of economic development, equally bourgeois.

The nation-state reacts towards these movements of creation of nationalist socio-political communities by stigmatizing them. However, this attitude is no longer unconscious, and of course does not present any of the features of compensatory overvaluation which usually accompanies the picturesque: the stigma is voluntary, and is translated into repression carried out by the state coercive apparatus.

Let us examine the mechanism of transformation into the figure of internal enemy of these sociopolitical communities by the nation-state, and the historical process of this transformation. For this it is useful to analyze beforehand the meaning of the concepts of domination, legitimation and coercion in the thought of Max Weber, Habermas, Gramsci and Althusser.

Max Weber defines domination as the possibility of finding specific people willing to obey an order of specific content⁸ and legitimation as the consent of those dominated to the domination.

⁸ Max Weber, *«Economie et Société»*, Librairie Plon, Paris, 1971, p.56.

But legitimation of domination can enter into crisis in a state. This, in Habermas' opinion, can occur for two reasons: either because the system cannot sustain, satisfying the imperatives of regulation which it has received from the economic system, the loyalty of the masses at the necessary level; or because the socio-cultural system does not provide the necessary quantity of sense to motivate to action⁹. Precisely, in the processes of counter-acculturation characteristic of all anti-state nationalisms, the socio-cultural system (or state culture) not only is not approved as giving sense, but is in fact vigorously rejected. In consequence, the domination of the state over the group is not accepted as legitimate, and the violence implicit in the institutions is liberated, falling upon the group.

This violence has a statist nature. But to the extent that, in the universally known definition of Max Weber, the state is characterized by the successful exercise of the legitimate monopoly of violence, it is also the legitimacy of this monopoly of violence which is contested by the nationalist community¹⁰.

State oppression thus becomes state repression (both are manifestations of state coercion, although completely differentiated from each other); and repression becomes a generating process for the choice of new identity marks by the nationalist community, and can even produce the appearance of a nationalist movement with a new kind of anti-repressive character, along side of, or opposed to, the older movement (such is the genesis of ETA –Euskadi ta Askatasuna, Basque Country and Liberty– in the 50's and 60's, as the fruit of the Franquist repression against Basque nationalism and even against the Basque people as such for being Basque).

State domination presents, in effect, a double aspect of legitimation and of physical compulsion. Gramsci identifies the former with hegemony, and the latter with physical coercion: in his conception, the state is civil society plus political society, «the ironclad hegemony of coercion». The less consent there is to the hegemony, the more coercion predominates¹¹. Althusser establishes a parallel dichotomy between the repressive State apparatus (composed of Government, Administration, Armed Forces, Police, Courts, Prisons) and the various Ideological Apparatuses of the state, both insuring the reproduction of the relations of productions.

According to Althusser, hegemony is insured predominantly by the Ideological Apparatuses, with the repressive apparatus serving as protective shield. But wherever

⁹ Jürgen Habermas, «Raison et légitimité: problèmes de légitimation dans le capitalisme avancé», Payot, Paris, 1978, pp.70 and ff.

¹⁰ Max Weber, *op.cit.*, p.56.

¹¹ Gramsci, «Cahiers de prison», Editions Gallimard, 1978 and 1983.

the ideological apparatuses do not show themselves capable of insuring the hegemony of the leading class -or group-, the repressive apparatus manifests itself as pure physical violence¹².

This violence may fall on an inert mass of isolated individuals; it then is oppression, which may occur with non-organized sectors of the working class. But the consubstantial aspect of nationalist socio-political communities is that of being cohesive and resisting the violence of the state. Oppression then becomes repression; and the responses to repression (the anti-repressive manifestations) are internalized and elevated to the rank of identity marks by the repressed nationalist community. The characteristic of group identities is organizing interaction. But precisely this type of anti-repressive identity is unanimous and of a strictly antagonistic character, so that interaction with other groups becomes very limited¹³, and communication with the polar countertype, the State, is by definition denied. We are thus in the presence of the process which Devereux describes as the stripping off of all concentric identities, except one, the anti-repressive one. These types of communities present disfunctionalities in their behavior as well as a closed character. Seen from outside, their conduct may appear rather unhealthy, and the organic ideologists of the State do not hesitate to say so; but the agent causing the sickness of these communities is the nation-state itself. The nationalist community in question is thus excluded in some fashion from the national civil society (of the nation-state).

Within the community occurs a case that Hannah Arendt studied concerning the groups of expatriates which formed between the two world wars: that of the loss of the national minority's human rights. According to Arendt, in effect, inalienable «human rights» refer to abstract humans; but, in contradiction, only if a people becomes emancipated and constitutes a nation-state would there exist an authority capable of assuring its people the enjoyment of «human rights». Therefore expatriate groups did not enjoy these rights, and the conviction was born in the midst of the minorities that the loss of national rights was identical with the loss of human rights¹⁴. But such a condition occurs in a similar fashion with the nationalist socio-political communities ejected or self-ejected from the «people» of a nation-state, those who do not accept the legitimacy of the state domination and who are denied in consequence and in a systematic fashion individual rights such as the right to their own image, and collective ones such as rights of gathering and association.

¹² Louis Althusser, «Les appareils idéologiques de l'Etat» in «Positions», Editions Sociales, 1976.

¹³ Fredrik Barth, «Los grupos étnicos y sus fronteras», Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1976, p.47.

¹⁴ Hannah Arendt, «L'Imperialisme», Fayard, 1982, pp. 272-275.

Nationalist movements are thus often configured as the «internal enemy» of the nation-state's society, potentially becoming the object of a social sort of violence which is added to the political repression. It is in the nature of the nation-state to generate psycho-sociological processes among citizens of its national civil society that result in the formation of the projection of an internal enemy image and in the selection of groups that bear this image and can be pursued as such. Minority nationalist movements fulfill all the requirements necessary to play this role.

One must refer to the relationship established by Marcuse between the formation of the figure of internal enemy and its identification with the minority groups. According to him «there is a flagrant contradiction between, on one hand, the technological transformation of the world, which allows liberation, the achievement of a free and happy existence; and on the other hand, the intensification of the struggle for existence; this contradiction engenders, among the oppressed, a diffuse aggressiveness which, unless focused on some pretended national enemy whom it can combat and hate, will attack any objective: white or black, autochthonous or foreign, Jew or Christian, rich or poor...Its violence is that of the established order, and it is directed against all who, with or without reason, seem different. The mobilization of this aggressiveness renews archaic psychic forces, placing them at the service of the political-economic necessities of the system»¹⁵.

It is evident that, to the degree that the object of the aggressiveness that proceeds from the masses -even from its humble layers-, aggressiveness thus of a social type, consists of that which is different and marginal in the midst of the nation-state. The nationalist socio-political communities contain to perfection, in concrete historical phases of concrete States, the requirements that permit their configuration as the «internal enemy».

This configuration as «internal enemy» can stem from a source that is not contrary but different. The military, the backbone of the coercive apparatus of any nation-state, has a specific conception of the social reality and its own form of legitimation, which stems from the friend-enemy dichotomy. This conception can partially or totally impregnate the State nationalism, depending on whether it is the military which assumes the power of the state, or whether its corporative interests and historical trajectory are felt at the pinnacle of the state. The configuration of Basque -and Catalan-nationalism as the «internal enemy» of the Spanish nation-state towards the end of the nineteenth century, stems more from the weight of the military apparatus

¹⁵ Herbert Marcuse, «Vers la liberation». Editions de Minuit, 1969, pp.71 and 102.

within the state, and of the head-on opposition of the Military to «that which is Basque» in general, cemented by the confrontation which has opposed Basque popular masses with Spanish military men in the two Carlist wars, than from the mechanism described by Marcuse (which however bore fruit in late-Franquism and post-Franquism).

The nationalist socio-political community is not only stigmatized in its communitarian aspect, but in addition its pretensions to join the civil society through a political party are considered -explicitly or by embarrassment- as illegitimate. Let us place this process in its initial historical moment. The collectives which are able to preserve in a reactive fashion their group identity become transformed into nationalist socio-political communities in the phase which coincides with the essentialist state nationalisms, last third of the nineteenth century, first third of the twentieth. (As we will see, this coincidence is historical, but is not in any way -contrary to the statements of a current of organic ideologists of the nation-state-either perpetual or consubstantial; sub-state nationalisms of anti-repressive character, for example, are no longer essentialists).

Essentialist nationalism is that which selects a national factor as «essential», or as a genealogical source, of the nation-state. The anti-state nationalism(s) configured as internal enemy, become thus the anti-factor of state nationalism, and unite in a negative fashion the national «community» which it desires to generate.

However, even though this character of countertype is always present in sectors of the public opinion, in the shape of stereotypes, the rationalizations of the non-legitimacy of the political form which these nationalist communities adopt when they transform themselves into political parties stem from national images prior to the essentialist one: that of «democratic» rousseanian nationalism and that of «rational» economist-marxist nationalism. Thus in addition to the accusations that specifically come from the essentialist nationalism (that of the anti-patriotism of the nationalist parties), are added two others: that of being «anti-democratic» and that of being «irrational».

The program of these nationalist parties is always one of self-determination, to the degree that it constitutes a reaction against the hetero-determination of the nationalist community by the nation-state. «Self-determination», says Bourdieu, «is nothing but the negation of heterodetermination, and does nothing but reproduce the stigma, but under an inverted form»¹⁶. The various legal forms that the self-

¹⁶ Pierre Bourdieu, «L'identité et la représentation», in «Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales», n.37, Nov. 1980, p.70.

determination program can contain -autonomy, federation, confederation, independence-, are in direct relation to the degree of formation of the civil society of the nationalist community, to the degree of physical violence which the nation-state exerts on it and to the difference in the cultural capital of it in respect to the culture of the state. The more developed the nationalist civil society is, the more different its culture from that of the state and the greater the state violence exerted against it, the higher the level of formal separation required by it, until it reaches the point of demanding independence.

In the process of self-determination of these nationalisms it is thus necessary to distinguish three factors; one concerns the nation-state: hetero-determination as stigma and violence. Another has to do with the nationalist community and its group identity (according to Marcuse, «the self-determination begins for each «I» and for each «We» that the «I» chooses»)¹⁷, whose content is the civil society which the community shelters, and its limits, the identity marks that react against the state stigma and violence, which are the limits of self-determination.

The third factor to take into account is the system of states, and «globalization» - in the expression of Lefebvre¹⁸, of modern political phenomena, which define the conditions of viability of self-determination programs. The possibilities of existence of new independent states are derived from the conjunction of three factors: they are maximal when, in the state system, the nation-state that stigmatizes and represses the nationalist community does not belong -or its interests are contrary- to the dominant state's block (but the imaginary interests of the nationalist community do coincide with those of the dominant block of states). They are minimal, in contrast, in the contrary case.

The access of groups of states to independence tends to occur thus in waves, in moments of rebuilding of power relations in the world state system; which coinciding with or following great martial conflicts, or which are the fruit of the decomposition of a type of political regime which had universal prevalence. The four waves which the world has known are, respectively, that which occurred in Western and Central Europe in the mid-nineteenth century in the name of the «principle of the nationalities» (whose ambiguous defender was Napoleon III); that which followed the First World War in Central and Eastern Europe, directed against the central empires in name of the principle of nationalities and the right to self-determination, both

¹⁷ Herbert Marcuse, «Vers la liberation», op.cit., p.70.

¹⁸ Henri Lefebvre, «De L'Etat», op.cit., Vol.I, p.34.

declared by President Wilson, as well as by the bolsheviks; the de colonization process that followed World War II in the Third World, against the small European imperialisms, in name of the right to self-determination under the auspices of the United States, with some reservations, and that of the Soviet Union, and the recomposition of the national-state map in Eastern Europe, fruit of the decomposition of the Soviet and Yugoslav federations. The combination of the three factors mentioned has not reached in any of the waves the sub-state nationalisms of Western Europe, and it does not appear that such a phenomenon will take place soon.

2. Phases of the formation of the armed nucleus and of the community which legitimates it. Interpretations of political violence

Let us examine the most extreme cases of antagonistic acculturation in the midst of the reactive nationalisms facing the State: the processes of emergence of a political violence of nationalist character whose protagonist is an armed nucleus. Four phases may be distinguished. The first phase is that of the production of social violence as a defensive-aggressive «response». The second phase, the appearance of an armed nucleus, is the product of the dual process of fusion and totalization. The third and fourth phases develop in parallel: the transformation of the armed nucleus into a group-state, imitating the nation-state, and the formation of a nationalist socio-political community of anti-repressive character which legitimates the group-state accepting it as such.

Erich Fromm¹⁹ distinguishes between defensive aggressiveness and aggression, which in turn adopts two manifestations, benign and malignant (whose extreme expressions would be sadism and necrophilia). Defensive aggressiveness is that which is integrated into animal and human brains, having as a mission the defense of vital interests in the face of the threats that stalk them. Biologically adaptive and favorable to life, benign aggression is only characteristic of man; it is distinguished from the defensive aggressiveness of animals in that the range of vital interests that it defends in man is much broader, and contrary to animals, along with real dangers also defends against imaginary or induced dangers (such as moral threats to liberty or to the

¹⁹ Erich Fromm, «Anatomía de la destructividad humana», Siglo XXI Editores, Madrid, 1975, pp.191 and ff. Collective processes of defensive aggressiveness and of destructive vengeance born in a context of ethnic, social or political struggles (processes which combine several forms or all of them at once), always precede the formation, by a process of fusion-totalization, of the armed group which dynamizes a constant violence; but they do not necessarily result in the formation of such a group (and, in fact, this evolution seldom occurs).

assaulted individual or group identity). Between benign and malignant aggression would be vindictive destruction. This consists of a spontaneous reaction to unjustified suffering inflicted upon a person or group; it is unleashed long after the damage has occurred to the recipient, and its intensity is much greater than that of benign aggression. The violence which arises in the midst of an ethno-national group suffering the repression of the nation-state (that is, that which was experienced by the Basque nationalist complex at the hands of Franquism), liberated in the course of a process of negative acculturation, would respond to the characteristics of vindictive destructiveness. But the goods which it defends and whose injury provoked the destructive impulse are not only physical, but also include those which have to do with the identity of the group. Thus, vindictive destructiveness of a national type- as well as benign aggressiveness- is from the very first instant more intense and consistent than violence of a social type, since it conceives of itself as the defender of the identity marks and of the historical memory of the group which, in a real fashion -as is the case with Franquism- or in an imaginary way, it considers to be endangered.

Michel Wiewiorka reviews the different currents of interpretation of community violence²⁰. The first of these, which this author puts in relation with functionalist sociology, explains collective violence as a product of crisis, anomie or exclusion. According to this theory, unsatisfactory mobility of certain population groups or the denial of their access to certain legitimate goals may result in a violent revolt. In the midst of this current, the theory of «relative frustration» of the American sociologist Ted Robert Gurr should be highlighted. When a collective passes from a situation of total deprivation to a more tolerable relative deprivation, violent situations can paradoxically occur: social demands whose satisfaction appeared before as inconceivable now present themselves as achievable; but when they continue to remain beyond the grasp of the collective in question, the separation between its aspirations and possibilities of satisfaction generates anxiety and anger. The greater the discontent and the broader the diffusion of this frustration is in the midst of the population, the more intense and larger the scale of violence. This hypothesis appears to be verified towards the end of the 50's and the beginning of the 60's in Euskadi: the strong take-off of economic development in Euskadi, generated profound sentiments of frustration, since

²⁰ Michel Wiewiorka, «Sociétés et Terrorisme», Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1988, pp.468 and ff. Situations of «collective frustration» explain, as Wiewiorka says, the emergency situations of a process of violence, but not its inescapable character. However, it should be added that violence as a result of «collective frustration» occurs less in the initial moments of this sentiment, but rather in the final moments, when it has become clear that the satisfaction of aspirations or necessities that seemed within reach will not now be possible; these phenomena of violence coincide in sum with what J.P. Charnay describes as phenomena of «declining hope».

it was unaccompanied -but just the opposite- of the appropriate correlative political, social and national liberalization. (However, as well indicated by Wiewiorka, such a theory only explains the possibilities of emergence of violent reactions. An unbreachable distance between the collective aspirations and their satisfaction can lead -and has led historically- not to situations of violence, but to a generalized state of despair and apathy).

The spontaneous reactions of nationalist social violence do not lead necessarily to the construction of an armed nucleus. This process, when it occurs, corresponds to a second phase, that of fusion-totalization (which Wiewiorka refers to citing Jean Paul Sartre). By fusion, the groups which pass over to armed struggle elaborate syncretic discourses that incorporate into a new totality the varied social, cultural and political meanings transported until that point. Totalization is the necessary condition for present or future violence. (But the analyses of Wiewiorka, though often brilliant, make no reference to the state as a model and reference for the mimetic processes of violence of the ethno-national groups. In his analysis, the nation-state is the great absentee. Therefore, the process of «fusion» of the groups appears as the fruit of an «inversion», that is, the result of the separation of the violent groups from the experience of those segments of the population in whose name they act. In the same way, the phenomena of antagonistic acculturation -which for authors such as Roger Bastide mean the recovery of ethnic dignity- for Wiewiorka are identified with the so-called «anti-movement», which results from the inversion of the three dimensions of a social movement. (In the anti-movement, the principle of identity stops referring to a real social force in order to begin referring to an antagonistic essence. The principle of opposition, which defines the social adversary, is transformed into the image of war; and the principle of totality, which situates the present society in the field of historicity, passes on to be projected towards the future in the form of communitarian utopia). Once the reference to the model which the groups in question counter-imitate (the nation-state) is eliminated, the different phases of its evolution cannot but be described as a constant decline in respect to the primitive social movement.

J.P. Sartre²¹ analyzes the formation of the group in the process of fusion and describes the two paradoxical components that always accompany it, liberty and

²¹ Jean Paul Sartre, «Critique de la raison dialectique», Gallimard, 1960, pp.428 and ff. The dual nature of the group in fusion described by Sartre, based on liberty and terror, explains the opposite perspective from which phenomena of this type are contemplated: from the inside (for example, from the nationalist community that legitimates an armed state-group, resulting from a fusion process) this phenomenon is perceived as the recovery of liberty; from the outside (from the perspective of the nation-state of the armed combat group), the same phenomenon is conceived as terror.

terror. The first phase of formation of the group in fusion implies a sudden resurrection of liberty, which is almost always manifested in the form of explosion and turmoil. According to Sartre, it is not born only from the members of the group becoming conscious of the alienation and impotence in which they live; but normally a group of historical circumstances are necessary, which appear in the form of risk of death or disappearance of the collective. Sartre considers violence as the seed that generates groups, and states that the liberty of the group in fusion uses violence (as counter-violence) in its fight against the enemy; and that the group also makes use of a perpetual internal violence to reorganize itself, even reaching the extreme of crushing its own members. The essential structures of the revolutionary group are thus hope and terror. Fraternity is, according to him, the most immediate and constant form of terror. Sartre states that no environment is warmer than a party which is constantly threatened from outside, and which for this very reason transforms itself into authoritarian within.

This phase corresponds to the mimesis of the state, but not of the nation-state. In post-industrial societies, in which the worker movement, devoid of subversive substance, appears institutionalized, violent groups which pursue exclusively social ends are incomparably more vulnerable than those who have a national content; and not only because their violence can almost never incorporate the defense of any collective historical memory, but rather, above all, because it cannot reach the latter phase, which is that of imitation of the nation-state. In the cases of historical consolidation of an armed group in the middle or long run, its birth has never been due to the unfolding of a political party and its armed branch; but rather to processes of fusion-totalization in which a pre-existing armed nucleus has generated the formation of a nationalist community which has legitimated it as its own and legitimate state. In Euskadi, an anti-Franquist social violence of national character links the first post-war era with that of the 50's and beginning of the 60's. But the formation of an armed group, which gives shape to ETA, occurred in 1959; and the elaboration by it of a syncretic ideology that mixes vanguard and third world theories with the defense of the marks of national identity in the common imagination of «revolutionary war» only took place later, in the years 1963-64. The period of formation of an anti-repressive community which legitimated the armed group extends from 1968 -that of a tough Franquist state of emergency-passing on to the Trial of Burgos of 1970, through to the years 1972-73. The access of the members of ETA's Military Front to the category of group-state, which began in the mentioned years, consolidated itself between 1971 and 1974²².

²² Francisco Letamendía, «Euskadi, patria y nación» (El nacionalismo radical vasco: organizaciones políticas y formaciones armadas, 1951-1984) Ed. Kriselu, 1990.

Wiewiorka criticizes -and rightly so- the limitations of the «instrumental» interpretation of violence, which he labels in any case as leftist, contrasting it to the functionalist interpretation, which would be of the right. According to his theory, violence is an instrument which the group acquires to achieve its ends in a rational manner, understanding it as either a way to create, or exacerbate, a revolutionary situation, or as a revealer of the true repressive nature of the state²³. This theory, indicates the author, is unable to offer a global explanation of the phenomenon of collective violence, since it ignores the work of the group actor on itself. But Wiewiorka includes (in my opinion inappropriately) the theory of action-repression-action cycles in the context of this «instrumental» interpretation. Once again, he ignores the role that can be played by the repressive action of a concrete nation-state, in the environment of the armed nucleus, in accelerating the formation of an anti-repressive national community that legitimizes it.

The theory of action-repression-action, formulated by ETA since 1965 in its «Theoretical Bases of the Revolutionary War», anticipated in a realistic fashion the process which would occur in the following ten years (that is, until the death of Franco), in a society like the Basque one in which many citizens suffered the repression of Franquism as members of an inert collective, and which the catalyzing action of ETA was going to turn during these years into a cohesive subject-group around two axes: that of a group of anti-repressive identity marks, and that of their identification-legitimation with ETA as state-group. (The fact that the Franquist repression was to affect in a real way a great majority of the Basque population explains why the degree of physical violence exerted by ETA during Franquism was very low - the number of mortal victims until 1974 can be counted on a single hand -with that low degree sufficing to catalyze the formation of an anti-repressive community of Basque national character. The situation changed radically when after 1977-79 ETA confronted a state which was no longer Franquist, but rather a parliamentary democracy, and became isolated from a majority of the Basque nationalist population who considered legitimate the political framework created by the Statute of Autonomy. The degree of physical violence which the armed nucleus needed to develop in order to maintain the cohesion of the nationalist community which legitimates it was much greater than that exerted during the era of Franquism).

²³ M. Wiewiorka, *op.cit.*, pp.474 and ff.

3. The nature of the armed group-state. Identification with it by the anti-repressive nationalist community

M. Wiewiorka states -and uses as an example the Basque case- that the more institutionalized the movements -worker or autonomic- are, the greater the violence²⁴. This statement finds a loud confirmation in the years of the first transition (1977-79), during which was approved in the State -and rejected in the Basque Country- by the majority nationalist forces, the Constitution which founded the State of the Autonomies, and in which traditional Basque nationalism reached autonomic power and thus became the legitimizing element in Euskadi of this kind of state. Mortal injuries inflicted by ETA, sporadic during the years 1974 to 76, become systematic during these subsequent years.

Hannah Arendt provides, in her analysis of the nature and the relations between the concepts of power, authority and violence, the conceptual instruments that explain this phenomenon²⁵. Power, says Arendt, is the attitude of man acting in a concerted fashion. Thus, it is never an individual property: it belongs to a group, and continues belonging to it until it divides itself; when the group dissolves, the power dissolves. The authority, of a person or institution, is its aptitude to be unconditionally obeyed by those who recognize it, without a need for compulsion. Violence (or force) is the energy liberated in the course of physical and social movements. Arendt explains that there is an inverse relation between power and violence: the situation of everybody against one is the extreme form of power; that of one against everybody the extreme of violence. Therefore, the greater the power it combats, the greater the violence will be.

The incorporation of traditional nationalism -agonizing and contradictory, but incorporation nonetheless- into the state structure, forces the armed nucleus to exert a much superior degree of violence than before to maintain united the three elements of the initial myth, created in the moment of the fusion-totalization: the national, social

²⁴ M. Wiewiorka, *op.cit.*, p.346. The institutionalization of the movement, especially if it is national, ends the instrumental nature of the action-repression-action cycle, which had converted an inert collective subject to repression in a group identified around some new anti-repressive identity signs polarized by the state-group. From this time on, the violence of the armed group quits having a function of generating the anti-repressive community, and passes on to have a maintenance function of its survival.

²⁵ Hannah Arendt, «Du mensonge à la violence, essais de politique contemporaine», Calman-Levy, 1972, pp.113 and ff. Relating this situation to that formerly analyzed, the institutionalization of a national movement which has not been accepted by all the sectors of the nationalist family strengthens in its midst the status-quo of the (autonomic) nation-state which requires a greater degree of violence on the part of the sectors (formerly more numerous, now reduced) that contest it.

and political (independence, construction of a state and social revolution), and to maintain cohesive around it the anti-repressive community which legitimates it. This decision was taken very consciously by ETA militar in the last three months of 1977, coinciding with the beginning of the application of the pre-autonomic regime and the first constitutional debates.

Two elements of an external sort made this goal viable: the fact that the Constitution did not satisfy the national and social utopias which the Basque anti-repressive society had conceived in late-Franquism, and the institutionalization and trade unionism of the worker movement characteristic of a post-industrial society in which the central location of the conflict is no longer the factory workshops. According to Harry Targ²⁶, what he labels «revolutionary terrorism» is not synonymous with a social revolutionary movement, with its importance being inversely proportional to the revolutionary potential of the workers. Targ states that terrorist acts occur more frequently in pre-industrial or post-industrial societies than in industrial ones, since the latter allows the development of reformist or mass revolutionary movements, while the other two types of societies do not. Terrorism appears, then, when social movements characteristic of an industrial society decline. According to Targ, «the social process of post-industrialism inhibits class consciousness, and transforms into inadequate the formulation of radical or revolutionary movements of social change... Thus the deviant social action is manifested in the shape of terrorism, and terrorist acts become permanent figures of the social landscape».

In a similar fashion, Frenchman J.P. Charnay²⁷ describes the phenomenon of armed violence as the product of «declining hope». «Terrorism», he tells us, «even if it expresses its vocation to encourage a revolutionary process, flows from various phenomena of declining hope... In Europe, the failure of May 1968 signaled the ebb of a hope of general, post-totalitarian, non-bloody, and possibly non-violent

²⁶ Harry Targ, «Societal Structures», in Michael Stohl, «The Politics of Terrorism», Marcel Dekker, inc., N.Y., 1979, pp.119 and ff. This analysis -more applicable to social than national violence- can be put in direct relation with the genesis of the Autonomic Commandos.

²⁷ Jean Paul Charnay, «Terrorisme et culture (pour une anthologie structurale)», Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur les stratégies et les conflits: Les Cahiers de la Fondation pour les études de Défense Nationales, supplément to n.11 of «Stratégiques», 1981, p.16. The phenomenon of «declining hope» -equivalent, as I have already indicated, to those of «relative deprivation» following, but not preceding, a social process which had awakened all hopes, can produce -or reinforce- manifestations of violence (the Spain of post-Franquism, which had a historical memory of birth in the whole state, and especially in Euskadi, of great expectations between 1970 and 1976, finds itself confronting such a situation towards the end of 1977, when the institutionalization of the national, democratic and worker movements leave unsatisfied many of the aspirations conceived); but normally produce reactions of apathy, generalized social disillusion and individualist withdrawal.

revolution. Outside the party apparatuses and the trade unions a fragmentation of political philosophy doctrines has occurred, now taking refuge in warmer and more limited environments: ethnonationalism, ecology -or terrorism- to take up anew the reins of history».

The action-repression-action spiral has been interrupted in Euskadi, and has become a circle rolling along a closed circuit. A counter-state and counter-society, the latter of numerical significance, operate with their own laws within the real state and society. The (social-democratic) Liberal State cannot see in this situation anything but irrationality and criminality; without realizing that in reality it is an imitation of the basic nucleus that sustains the armor of the present state: the nation-state form, based on the formation of a national «we» and the identification of each of the members with a being, the group-state, which is situated at a higher level than that of all the members taken individually. (Thus, combating this phenomenon from the logic of the nation-state can only lead to reinforcing the national counter-state whose elimination is sought).

In its imitation of the statist model -a model which will never admit that it is being imitated- the national counter-state eliminates all the «liberal» adherences (by which, and only by which the nation-state likes to be recognized), the fruit of the anti-absolutist thought of the Illustrated Modern Era²⁸. Wherever there existed a supposed founding social contract of political and civil society, the members of the counter-community appear identified with the force of the group-state; wherever there existed a group of monad-individuals united in the consent of the state, the indestructible «we» of the anti-repressive community and the military group in fusion emerges. Wherever it was thought that, in a hedonistic-utilitarian way, the state should pursue the individual happiness of the citizens and constitute the welfare state, the moral of abnegation and the sacrifice of the person for the good of society is implanted; wherever there was a belief in the indefinite linear progression of society, appears faith in the act of breaking with it that will produce «ex novo» a regenerated society and national state. Wherever the state apparatus should disassociate itself into three powers, executive, legislative and judicial, which should watch each other so that none of them would endanger the human rights of the natural state, the maximum

²⁸ See on the political thought of the Enlightenment, the following works which are published in Spanish: Salvador Giner, «Historia del Pensamiento Social», Editorial Ariel, 1981; Francois Chatelet, «Historia del Pensamiento Político», Editorial Tecnos, 1987; Georges Sabine, «Historia de la Teoría política», Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1987; and Jean Touchard, «Historia de las Ideas Políticas», Ediciones Península, 1987.

concentration of all the powers becomes placed in the hands of the armed group-state.

In this process, both the identification of the members of the national community with the group-state as well as the way of functioning of this counter-community experiment profound changes -but not essential ones- regarding the laws of functioning of the real nation-states. In a 1963 work titled «The Aging of Psychoanalysis»²⁹ H. Marcuse indicates that the scheme explained by Sigmund Freud in his work «Collective Psychology and the Analysis of the I», based on which the super-ego is ruled by personal images (father, chief, boss), belongs to a prior world of social relations. This situation had quit existing already in the period between the two World Wars, a period in which children became independent from their families and society began to be led not by personal bosses, but by the mass-media. In the society which was born in the 60's the I is erased by television, its moral conscience is dissolved by total bureaucratization, and its resistance is weakened by the forces which incarnate the principle of reality, very different, because of their anonymity, from the father figure. Because of this, according to Marcuse, the Freudian interpretation of the identification which was based on the projection of the I on the boss as well as the transposition of the father figure is already dated. Present rulers can hardly appear as «fathers»; and the authority of the anonymous state apparatus is what substitutes for the paternal image.

The members of the group-state are also anonymous, but their anonymity is that of people who must live in a forced clandestinity to not be recognized and arrested by the police. The power of the group-state is, and this which defines the power of the state as such, the greatest possible imaginable: that of life and death. With very few exceptions, the people that form it end up being arrested (the investigators calculate that the average period of ETA militants in freedom is about three years)³⁰, and then they go on to live the suffering life of those who are first arrested and later imprisoned. Thus, the identification of members of the counter-community with its group-state presents an incomparably more intense and emotional character than that

²⁹ Herbert Marcuse, «Le Vieillissement du psychoanalyse» in «Culture et Société» (1933-1968), les Editions de Minuit, 1970, p.249 and ff. Identification with the state does not require personalizations; and in fact, in advanced societies, the state presents itself before the citizen as an anonymous force. However, when «the national society» is likened to the «community», in processes of declared war against other states or of intense persecutions of an internal enemy within the frontiers of the state, identification with the power of the state acquires individual characteristics, and the charisma of a governor who symbolizes the state-national «community» arises.

³⁰ Robert Clark, «The Basque Insurgents: ETA 1952-1980», The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, p. 210-221.

of the citizens of the real states with their rulers; the sentiments which this identification provokes acquire a quasi-religious tone, easily explainable in the cultural parameters of a civilization, like the Christian West, in which such importance has always been given -and continues to be given- to the symbols of the Sermon on the Mount, of the death on the cross and the glorious resurrection from among the dead.

The armed group-state constitutes its adversary, the authoritarian nation-state, and in identifying it reinforces its anti-terrorist logic, which with the accompanying arrests, arbitrary measures, interruption of individual and collective rights, assures the reproduction of the identity marks of the anti-repressive nationalist community. Thus is created what authors such as Wiewiorka, Ferracutti and Ruiz de Olabuénaga³¹ - although from different perspectives - have analyzed as the subculture of violence: the anti-repressive community becomes a community of fear and perceives itself as a community at war. Community of fear characterized by the perception of intense aggressiveness, a sensation of personal or collective real danger, an identification between the recourse to violence and legitimate defense, a conception of the Basque society as victimized, and a sense of fearfulness. Self-perception as a community at war, accompanied by the psychological effects that according to Gaston Bouthoul³² go with situations of war: moral manicheism, sharpening of the notion of friend and enemy, a cult of the dead, and the inversion of the values characteristic of the combating groups, in which the most brutal qualities coexist with the most noble ones.

The group-state exerts -following J.P. Sartre in his «Critique of the Dialectic Reason»³³ -an external violence against the enemy, and an internal violence against its dissolving the group, both greater to the degree that it is the object of violence. «This violence,» states Sartre, «born against the dissolving of the group, creates a new reality, treasonous behavior»: founding the doing away with the traitor on the positive affirmation that the person has been or is a member of the group. Sartre states that the greater the external violent pressure is on the group, the greater the fraternity in its interior, but the easier the fraternity becomes terror against the smallest deviation

³¹ José Ignacio Ruiz de Olabuénaga et al., «Violencia y ansiedad en el País Vasco», Ediciones Tratalo, 1985, p.143. The concept of community of «fear» is not identical with «anti-repressive community»; the anti-repressive community (of the franquist era), being more numerous, did not suffer the social fear which the «community of fear» formed by HB and the MNLV suffers in the 80's, because of the fact that they find themselves more isolated from the principal segment of the Basque population.

³² Gaston Bouthoul, «La gerra», Okos-Thau, Ediciones, 1971.

³³ Jean Paul Sartre, «Critique de la raison dialectique», Gallimard, 1960, op.cit., p.454. This process cited by Sartre explains that, the greater the pressure received by an armed-group (and the community that legitimates it) from the outside, the warmer its interior will be, but at the same time, with that much greater intensity it will proceed to detect -and segregate-enemies within its midst.

in which its members can incur against the norms which insure the survival of the group: and thus the choice of a sacrificial victim can occur (which has occurred at historic moments of maximum repression of the Spanish and French states against ETA). René Girard describes the role of the choice of the sacrificial victim in the formation, or reinforcement, of the groups³⁴: «one sole victim can substitute for all the potential victims, all the enemies... Where formerly there were a thousand specific conflicts... a community appears anew, whole in the hatred which one of its members inspires in it: the expiatory victim». Thus, a human group will be all the more liable to find - and punish- internal treasons the greater the external political violence it suffers (as an example, the beginning of the phase of turning over refugees from French police to Spanish police initiated by the French government of Chirac preceded the death of former ETA leader Yoyes who had returned to South Euskadi).

When the group-state constitutes its adversary, this gives it both social and national cohesiveness: the state nationalism, which is the basis of the present Spanish State of the Autonomies, owes much to the existence of ETA. And not only because the anti-terrorist struggle joins in one same feeling political leaders and Spanish citizens along with the State Security Forces in one same «war in the north», but also because the detection of the internal «terrorist» enemy serves as an escape valve for not a few external and internal fears. The armed violence put into practice by the group-state is the equivalent of a war; but as stated by Casamayor³⁵, of a unilaterally declared war, in which the combatants are not, not even tacitly, recognized one by the other. Casamayor indicates that this situation «explains the anxiety of the citizens, an anxiety which has nothing to do with that which proceeds from war». The unilaterally declared armed violence exorcises the anguishes of the present era, and contributes the psychological cement which explains the rapid diffusion at a popular level of the stereotype of international terrorism, which amalgamates into one same execrable image phenomena of entirely diverse origin. In regard to the Spanish state, ETA's violence exorcises equally the fear felt by adult citizens towards the reappearance of the danger of military revolt (a fear which at certain specific moments, the years between 1978 and 1982, appeared to be founded on a real base). Given the inherent risk of linking this fear with the present Spanish Armed Forces, towards the end of the 70's, and especially after February 23, 1981, a transference of anguishes occurred, based on which hatred, fruit of the collective historical memory, felt towards those

³⁴ René Girard, «La Violence et La Sacré», Ed. Bernard Grasset, 1972, p.117. The mechanism described by Girard explains, from another perspective, the same phenomenon as that of the detection of the «traitor» by the group in fusion analyzed formerly by J.P. Sartre.

³⁵ Casamayor, «Et pour finir le terrorisme», Gallimard, 1983, p.183.

who could put an end to democratic liberties by the force of arms, transformed itself into hatred for ETA.

The story of the Basque armed groups evidences that only when one of them consciously pursues constituting a group-state and insuring the direction of a community that recognizes it as such (the story of the formation of KAS, with a culmination in the KAS Directing Block conference of 1983, is the story of the setting of this objective), only then does the nationalist movement led by it acquire cohesion and continuity. The instrumental conceptions of armed violence (whose laboratory example is that of ETA político-militar, an organization which conceived itself as a rearguard, subordinated to the directing party and at the service of the worker and popular struggles), are not viable. The theoretical conceptions on which this organization based its struggle are derived from a doubtful interpretation of political structuralism, by which the degree of violence exerted by the bourgeoisie should be counteracted in each phase of the process by a contrary degree of violence at the service of popular and worker forces. However, given that this organization had to operate on an institutional ground, occupied not only by the forces whose project it proposed to combat, but also by the very party of which it theoretically should have been the instrument (EIA-Euskadiko Ezkerra), and since the radical opposition was occupied by another armed organization, ETA P-M passed without a transition from exerting a very low level of violence to carrying out indiscriminate attacks on the civil population of an unequivocally terrorist nature, which, far from counteracting «the violence exerted by the bourgeoisie»; served to strengthen the anti-terrorist habit of the state and its popular acceptance against the radical sphere formed by ETA militar and Herri Batasuna.

M. Wiewiorka accepts also the greater consistency of the armed violence of a national character over violence of a social character³⁶. This is verified equally in the trajectory of the Autonomous Commandos whose theory of the «civil war», unviable in the institutionalized social world of the Basque Country, has led to the practical disappearance of this armed group since 1983-84.

Violent struggle between two adversaries is also a battle of stereotypes; that which for the organizations of the abertzale left is an armed movement of national liberation, for the forces of the state context -and for a majority of those within the Basque context- is terrorism. However, referring to ETA militar from an intellectual perspective, can one speak appropriately of terrorism? Or should one employ the term

³⁶ M. Wiewiorka, *op.cit.*, p.100.

political violence? Both Pedro Ibarra and Michel Wiewiorka are in favor of speaking of political violence; an opinion that I share. Ibarra³⁷ considers that both the discrediting term terrorism as well as the exalting term revolutionary violence should be avoided; it is an armed struggle, which sets political objectives of a symbolic character by means of the use of arms. In his opinion, the correct term is the contraction «armed struggle».

Michel Wiewiorka distinguishes several types of violence³⁸: social violence is that which results from tough and bloody mobilizations of social collectives, such as workers. Political violence constitutes a political conduct inspired by the social demands, but which is not joined in a direct fashion to social action. Revolutionary action is, according to the author, a combination of political violence (induced by the state) and of social action. Terrorism of the extreme left would be the inverse figure of revolutionary action; according to Michel Wiewiorka. Whereas the latter combines social action and political action, terrorism separates itself from any mass action to become installed only at the political level; but it also distances itself from political violence, in divorcing itself from popular claims and vindications. Wiewiorka concludes therefore, in his analysis of the nature of ETA, that this organization cannot be classified as terrorist. «Its armed struggle,» he says, «is tied to the radical face of popular protests, to vindications exacerbated by the economic and cultural crisis, to a social anger, not entirely disconnected from the foci of meaning of those of whom it proclaims itself as the expression... Although this may sound shocking, one must conclude that the violence of ETA, as a whole, is not sociologically terrorist».

Wiewiorka defines terrorism as a degradation of the three principles of the social anti-movement, which in turn is derived from an inversion of the three principles which constitute a social movement³⁹. In the anti-movement, the principle of identity, contrary to what occurs in the social movement, returns to an abstract essence. The principle of totality projects itself toward a more or less elaborated beyond; and the principle of identity transforms the adversary into enemy. In terrorist actions the three principles of the anti-movement would be found; but on the one hand, according to Wiewiorka, they are more degraded, and on the other they function folded over upon themselves, exerting a violence which contains its own logic, and not that of the collective from which they started. The principle of identity leads to an exacerbated subjectivism and to the total commitment of the people who assume it; the principle

³⁷ Pedro Ibarra, «La evolución estratégica de ETA (1963-1987)», Kriselu, 1987, p.10.

³⁸ M. Wiewiorka, *op.cit.*, p.461 and ff.

³⁹ M. Wiewiorka, *op.cit.*, p.95, and ff. However, in my opinion, this scheme contains a flaw from the very beginning, identifying the antagonistic acculturation, a positive process, with the social anti-movement, a negative process.

of opposition gives way to a figure of the enemy which becomes an objective to be destroyed; and the principle of totality is entirely dissolved in a rupture which is a struggle to the death, in which utopias do not exist, with the important thing being not to create a new society, but to destroy the present order. Terrorism, conceived as the inversion of the anti-movement, based on which the terrorist agent is separated from the experience of those groups or causes in whose name the person acts, is the kingdom of suspicion, of self-destruction and of the loss of sense. Given that its various elements gain their own logic, terrorism carries within it the cause which makes it fragment into several armed organizations. This allows, in the case of the dissolving of one armed nucleus, when this one is not the only one -although it might be the most important-, that its fragmentation produce «orphaned» armed groups.

The national cause which the armed nuclei operating in the Basque Country claim -or from whose heat they have risen- is the reason that these phenomena have not occurred in the hegemonic group-state (that of ETA militar) and to a weaker degree in the other groups. Thus, the «experience lived» by the terrorist actor, that Wiewiorka describes, is not applicable to the Basque armed militants, at least to those belonging to ETA militar. According to J.P. Charnay, «committing oneself to a subterranean life means to break with professional, personal, family relations... The terrorist lives...a fragmented time, which is often divided between two activities, one visible, daily, banal, another hidden, relating to the combat. That is to say, it is an accelerated time: that of action, which gives rise in turn to fear, attraction and dedication». Wiewiorka adds that the «terrorist is only exceptionally a hero or a gentleman of the shadows; often the terrorist drags along in the miserable existence of a small civil servant of death... The experience of clandestineness, isolating the actor in a group, keeping him or her in a circle that dictates the most personal, intimate acts, creates mentalities that develop certain features of the personality and atrophy others».

However, the «experience lived» by the «legal» militants of ETA (that is, those unknown to the police) is that of the members of the anti-repressive community in which they live (without the community, of course, knowing of their true active militancy), a community in which one may live without problems, since it constitutes 15 to 20% of the population of the Basque Country. All the sociological investigators on the militancy in ETA militar (Robert Clark, Pedro Ibarra and even those responsible for counter-insurgency) coincide in affirming that the relations of these with their loved ones are normal and free from any pathology, to the point of being banal. There are only two possible exceptions: that of the imprisoned militants, whose peculiarities are due to the fact that they constitute a collective which suffers an intense daily repression; and that of the refugee militants residing in the French State, specifically in North Euskadi.

It is only possible to accept the term «terrorism» if one accepts without problems -which obviously is not the case- that of «terrorism of the state», and if one conceives of the first as imitator of the effects of the second. When confronted by the need to combat a phenomenon of political violence, especially if it claims a national cause and thus acquires social roots, states put into action counter-insurgency plans and assume an anti-terrorist logic which ends up modifying them profoundly. And since counter-insurgency is not only a police war against the armed nucleus, but also a psychological war against the social sectors which legitimize it. Their political ideas, their electoral opinions, their socio-communitarian structure and even their way of life are combated, so that the terror of the state falls upon the anti-repressive nationalist community. This terror suffered by the civil sectors is expressed at times in the form of physical violence, but affects especially the sphere of meanings; the informative treatment which these social milieu receive responds to the laws of stereotyping. (Stereotypes, according to Jean Maisonneuve⁴⁰, do not exist as such beyond being amply extended within a group or population. They are simple, the images and representations which they create are poor, they almost always contain some physical features that are caricaturized, and they present above all a socio-functional character). The transmitters of stereotypes are frequently ignored as such, being considered independent and objective: even though they resort at times to «black propaganda»⁴¹, to the conscious creation of false news which falsifies and distorts the image, not only of the armed group, but also of the «sympathizer» group. These sort of operations have been described in the Special Zone of the North (ZEN) plan, put into practice by the Spanish government in 1983.

Friedrich Hacker⁴² explains how terror is used by the powerful -that is, by the state-as an instrument of domination and intimidation. He also explains how terrorism

⁴⁰ Jean Maisonneuve, «Introduction à la psychosociologie», Press Universitaires de France, 1973, p.149. Stereotypes appear invariably in any situation of national conflict, whether violence is part of it or not. At times, it is easy to dismantle them. The quality of second-rate historian, whose renown has political motives, with which Xosé Manuel Seixas attributes me on p. 16 of his English book handed out to the participants of the Santiago Conference, is based on my so-called Ph. D. thesis "Euskadi, nation et idéologie" (Paris, Toulouse, 1990), which is, in fact, written and published by the CNRS researcher José Forné.

⁴¹ Edward Mickolus, «International Terrorism», in M. Stohl, «The Politics of Terrorism», Marcel Dekker inc., N.Y., 1979, p.71 and ff. Mickolus includes «black propaganda» destined to create false news in a group of measures susceptible to being used by the government in the anti-terrorist struggle, which includes the exercise of violent actions that discourage the terrorists, emergency measures, the organization of «death batallions», and public declaration of being unwilling to negotiate with terrorists.

⁴² Friedrich Hacker, «Terreur et terrorisme», Flanmarion, 1976, p.21 and ff. This author is one of the few theoreticians that use the theoretical notion of «mimesis» -although not mentioned at any time- to describe the phenomena of «terrorist» political violence as a counter-imitation of its model, that is, the terror of the state.

is the imitation of the methods of terror, by those who are not (or at least not yet) in power, used by those who feel scorned and that believe that terrorism is the only way to be taken seriously. Hacker explains that the terror propaganda of the state takes advantage of paranoid explanation schemes, destined to maintain combativeness against a powerful enemy, who is said to have powerful and secret allies, and who represents nothing but the visible tip of a huge iceberg. On the anti-state group's side, according to Hacker, the collective identity is set above simple interest or even reason, and so it segregates and produces its own morals. Thus, the collective identity of the group founds the community in the name of and defense of which one should and ought to be aggressive, without feeling remorse. Belonging to the group which decides everything, which imposes obligations and responsibilities, incites the individual to disinterested dedication and heroic sacrifice. The group thus becomes the symbol in the name of which the individual can satisfy elementary desires for power and externalization of repressed aggressiveness.

Returning to the Basque case, the phenomena of «inversion» -as described by Wiewiorka- of the armed violence, may have occurred -and always in an individual fashion-possibly in «orphaned» groups of the extinguished organizations of ETA político-militar and the Autonomous Commandos; but it can be said that they are inexistent in the sphere of ETA militar. Cases of «inversion» have been much more frequent in other latitudes; and they appear linked to phenomena of social-political violence without national adherences.

4. The doubtful instrumental character of armed violence. A study of the present Basque situation

Radical anti-institutional Basque nationalism has been structured, after a complex process of implosion begun in 1977-78, into a nucleus that acts as a group-state (ETA militar) and a community which legitimizes it (the Movement of Basque National Liberation, MNLV, whose electoral expression, defined as People's Union, is Herri Batasuna). This group has become a rejection front into which flow the alternative movements characteristic of post-industrial societies; although the nature of them resulted in a hierarchical character due to the military vanguard, ETA, which is the indisputable reference of the group. The strategy of the MNLV of negotiation of a program of national democratic rupture with the state has become interfered with, and obstructed, by the requirement that the negotiating spokesperson on the Basque side be ETA, perceived as focal motor of the revolutionary process.

If the objective of the Basque nationalist left is that of achieving the sovereignty of the Basque people by the exercise of the right to self-determination, seeing the obtaining of a change in the political framework as indispensable for it, then the accumulation of powers necessary to create a change cannot come by any other means than acceptance by the majority of the Basque people of the necessity for such a change. Because of this it seems highly unlikely that the armed struggle, rejected by a growing majority of this people, should today be a valid instrument for accumulation of strength. In addition, is it a viable objective that the discussion of change be under the sine qua-non condition that the speaker be an organization which carries out the armed struggle? The Spanish government has been giving unequivocal signs since 1988 that the objective sought after when beginning conversations with the armed organization was that of obtaining the surrender of its arms in exchange for personal solutions offered to its members, making use of these conversations -and this is obvious- to attempt to open cracks in the heart of the MNLV. The forces of the Pact of Ajuria-Enea have also actively and passively reiterated that they do not recognize the legitimacy of ETA as speaker in any political negotiation: the language of the Pact states that the political questions should be discussed by the representatives of the popular will.

Can the continuation of the armed struggle break these resistances? Nothing, either in Euskadi, or in the Spanish state, or in the international sphere, would give this impression.

In the Autonomous Community, the deployment of the Ertzaintza (Basque Police), conceived since October of 1987 as a progressive substitution of the State Security Forces, although in a situation of coordination with them -and in spite of its enormous limitations- deprives the ETA armed struggle progressively of its symbolic character against foreign forces of occupation. Although the repression exerted by the mentioned state forces has continued using illegal methods, such as harsh treatment (whose existence has been both disavowed governmentally and ratified by international organisms) this repression has been ruled by the principle of «precision»: which means that it has not surpassed, save by involuntary error, the sociological limits of the MNLV. In this manner, a majority of the Basque population has tended to see the link between armed struggle and repression as a foreign problem, as a war that did not concern it. A growing sector of this majority has even changed sides, giving its support to the measures of force against ETA and the MNLV. This is fruit, since 1987-88, of the second level of configuration of the MNLV as «internal enemy» of the statutory forces, with the consequent implication of the Ertzaintza in the police battle against ETA and implication of the forces of the coalition government (Basque

Nationalist Party, PNV, and Spanish Socialist Workers Party, PSOE) in the politics of public order and of prison dispersal-reinsertion.


The political impossibility of the MNLV of replying with armed measures to the offensive of the Ertzaintza has moved the bulk of the armed struggle outside Euskadi. The lack of infrastructure has led to emphasis on attacks of a type that are difficult to control, such as those carried out by car and letter-bombs, causing a growing number of civil victims. In addition, in recent years a growing number of children are included among the victims. The objective inhumanity of such results has incremented the unpopularity of the activity of ETA, not only in the state, but also -and maybe especially- in Euskadi, and even among sectors of the abertzale left. The armed struggle not only has not achieved the accumulation of forces desired, but has even weakened the internal cohesion of the MNLV.

At the international level, the Western States -and leading them France, in spite of the reservations which the question of Iparralde (North Basque Country) should create- encourage now with no secrecy the total war of the Spanish state against ETA. And this not only by interstate solidarity in its combat against what has now substituted for all the former images of evil, that is, the stereotype of «international terrorism»; but also because the repercussions on the public opinion of the national conflicts of Eastern Europe, and specifically, those of the ex-Yugoslavia, are an easy pretext which allows one to argue that «the exacerbated nationalisms», especially if they have armament at their disposal, are factors of chaos and cruel internal wars.

Police pressure on ETA militants in Iparralde has caused a decrease in the fire power of the armed organization which, contrary to other occasions, appears to present itself as irreversible data, (although on the other hand, nothing allows the prediction that it will technically disappear in the short or medium range by purely police methods). The temptation to compensate for these insufficiencies by horizontal dispersal of a «social violence of response» administered by civil organisms other than ETA would make the achievement of a negotiated end to the violence even more difficult.

Formations of a Basque context such as PNV or EA (Eusko Alkartasuna) have repeatedly stated that the armed struggle is the factor that keeps them from reaching deeper political agreements with Herri Batasuna. Even taking into account whatever this argument might have of excuse, the road by which HB might negotiate the change of the Basque political context with the mentioned forces, although difficult, is not in principle closed (contrary to what is happening on the course which leads to the demands for ETA to be the speaker in the political negotiation).

Can a consistent strategy be put into place which initiates in one of the two Autonomous Communities of south Euskadi (that of the Vascongadas) a constituent process that would seek to propitiate national territorial unification and self-transformation of the statutory framework into a new federal or confederal one, based on Basque sovereignty, as a step preceding the exercise of self-determination? Can this process overlap with another parallel process tending towards the achievement of an agreement between the state and the armed organization for a dialogued end to both side's violence? It seems evident that the social agreement which the mentioned dual political process would put into motion would need to be lubricated with the encouragement of the Basque society that had quit being mainly anti-terrorist to become mainly anti-repressive. For this, an indefinite truce on the part of ETA, declared or de facto, would be an indispensable requirement.





National Self-Determination: Dilemmas of a Concept

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The principle of national self-determination has been haunting the world since the French Revolution. There may be no other term in modern political discourse which is used with more emotion and passion. Recent history has known many wars fueled by conflicting interpretations of self-determination. Woodrow Wilson thought the implementation of the principle of self-determination would lead to a better world -a world without wars and «safe for democracy». His secretary of state, Robert Lansing, had his doubts. He suspected the concept of self-determination to be «loaded with dynamite»¹ and capable of causing even more bloodshed because it «will raise hopes which can never be realized».²

This paper deals with the intellectual roots of the principle of national determination, with the basic difference between nationalist and liberal-democratic interpretations of national self-determination, with conflicting definitions of the «self», with the various goals of self-determination, and with the mechanisms and timing of «determination». It analyses the connection between national self-determination and the right of secession, as well as questions of the optimal size of states, the viability of small states, the domino theory and the contradiction between national self-determination and other international norms and principles. The final topic is the double standard which has accompanied the principle of self-determination since the French Revolution.

The principle of national self-determination as a moral issue dominated much of Europe's politics during the latter half of the nineteenth century. In World War I, Woodrow Wilson led the United States into war in order to make the world safe for democracy and national self-determination, while Lenin led the Soviet Union out of

¹ R. Lansing as quoted by M.Pomerance, *Self-Determination in law and practice*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982, p.74.

² R. Lansing as quoted by A.Cobban, *The Nation-State and National Self-Determination*, New York: Thomas Crowell, 1970, p.62.

war proclaiming the principle of nationalities as a new guiding principle for a socialist world order. Later the principle of self-determination was universalized and legalized. While in the post-World War I era people talked only about the *principle* of self-determination, after World War II, international conventions established the *right* of peoples to national self-determination. Today, many international jurists agree that national self-determination is no longer solely a moral demand and a political principle, but in many circumstances, a legal right recognised by international law. Indeed, national self-determination appears after 1945 in all important documents relating to the organization of the international community. The United Nations Charter speaks about «the principle of equal rights and of self-determination of peoples», while the International Covenant of Human Rights says that «all peoples and all nations shall have the right of self-determination».³ The ambiguity and ambivalence contained in the principle of self-determination are best shown by the fact that opposing sides in many international conflicts often justify their positions by resorting to it. They can do so because there is no agreement on what is «national», what is the «self», and on what «determination» means. The principle has thus acquired almost universal acceptance, but the interpretations to which it is subjected continue to be widely divergent.

Before we proceed to dissect the principle into its components let us be aware that there are *principles* of national self-determination, not *one* principle which applies to all situations. We have to differentiate between «external self-determination» («the right of every people to choose sovereignty under which they live») and «internal self-determination» («the right of every people to select its own form of government»)⁴. External self-determination may also mean the right of a nominally independent state to true independence, while internal national self-determination may also refer to minority regimes, regional autonomy schemes, or federalism within an established state. That means that one may talk about two varieties of external self-determination — true independence for a state (e.g., the former GDR) and internationally recognised independence for a people (e.g., for the Basques). In addition, there would be three varieties of internal self-determination — democracy in a homogeneous state (e.g. Holland), autonomy or federalism for a distinct people within a democratic state (e.g., the Québécois and the Intuit in Canada), or autonomy/federalism for a distinct group within a nondemocratic system (e.g., the Kurds in Iraq, or Hong Kong in post-1997

³ R. Emerson, *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization*, Cambridge (Ma.): Harvard UP, 1964, p.27.

⁴ M.Pomerance, p.1. See also A.Kiss, «The People's Right to Self-Determination», *Human Rights Journal*, VII:nos.2-4 (1986), 165-75.

Communist China).⁵ The distinction between states and nations (or peoples, nationalities, ethnic groups, or any other distinct population) with regard to national self-determination is a crucial one. While there are 1500 nations in the ethnocultural sense on the globe — all *potential* candidates for external sovereignty or internal autonomy — there are less than 200 sovereign states and only about 15 states in which state and nation completely overlap.

Sometimes external and internal self-determination are completely interwoven and cannot be separated. For example, the choice given to Puerto Rico since the 1960s involved both external and internal self-determination (independence or no independence) and internal self-determination (statehood or associated status). The choice given to Hawaii, namely, incorporation into the United States (the external sovereign) as a state (the internal sovereign), was also a combination of both varieties of self-determination. Socialists talk about internal economic self-determination — the emancipation of the working-class from the exploitation by the capitalist owners of the means of production — while nationalists may talk about external economic self-determination. An example of the concept of external economic self-determination is the clause in the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights which says that «the right of people to self-determination shall also include permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources»⁶. The concepts of internal or external economic self-determination have more far-reaching implications than «political self-determination,» which aims only to establish external sovereignty or an internal constitutional framework without insisting on socio-economic changes. Also different from political self-determination is «cultural self-determination» — the right to teach and study in one's own language, to develop an autonomous culture, and to resist assimilation by a dominant power.⁷ In the twentieth century Third world, there is also a crucial distinction between «colonial (or better, anti-colonial) self-determination», which is the liberation of Asian or African peoples in a colony from European colonial rule, and secessionist self-determination, which represents a peoples aspirations to break out of the post-colonial state and achieve liberation for one African or Asian people from rule by another African or Asian people.

We may simplify all these distinctions by establishing a dichotomy between 'grand self-determination», whose object is true internationally recognised sovereignty

⁵ R.Lapidot, «Autonomy», *Law and Government*, 1:1 (1992), 37-39 (Hebrew), and G.F.Werther, *Self-Determination in Western Democracies*, London: Greenwood, 1992, xv-xxxvi.

⁶ Lung-Chu Chen, «Self-Determination as a Human Right», in M.Reisman & B.H.Weston (ed.), *Towards a World Order and Human Dignity*, New York: The Free Press, 1976, p.216.

⁷ J.Faust, «Self-Determination: A Definitional Focus», in Y.Alexander & A.Friedlander (eds.), *Self-Determination - National, Regional and Global Dimensions*, Boulder: Westview, 1980, p.6.

and «small self-determination», which deals with the internal structure and politics of the state. Grand self-determination is more external, political, or secessionist, while small self-determination is more internal, economic and cultural. We should keep in mind that reality is more complex and also includes internal political self-determination and external economic self-determination.

Among politicians and scholars there is no consensus as to whether national self-determination means national government (a *French* government in France), democratic self-determination (an *elected* government in France), or a combination of the two (an elected and French government in France), National government need not be democratic (France under Marshall Petain), while democratic government need not be national (Brittany is part of democratic France, but it is not ruled by a national Breton government).

The democratic school defines national self-determination as government by consent of the governed and not as national government per se. The nation according to the national democratic school is defined by territory and not according any ethnocultural criteria. National self-determination was perceived in essence as the principle which allowed «people of a given territory to determine their own government»⁸. National self-determination was equal to democratic self-government. Hans Kohn argued that the American concept of national self-determination is based on democratic rather than purely national claims. Its major ingredients — the «inalienable rights of man», «consent of the governed», and «no taxation without representation» — were more democratic than national.⁹ In 1776, there wasn't any distinct American nation to fight for national statehood. The Americans fought for democratic rights by demanding the people's right to self-determination. Only after self-determination was achieved did they become a nation.

Elie Kedourie, too, regards the Anglo-Saxon definition of national self-determination as inherently democratic. Kedourie thinks the post-World War I Versailles system in Europe was based on a «misunderstanding» between the democratic version of self-determination of Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George and the East European variety which stressed «national» rather than «self-determination»¹⁰. For the Anglo-Saxons, dictatorial government is government foreign to the people — whether the rulers are real foreigners or local usurpers of power. for that reason,

⁸ H.S.Johnson & B.Singh, «Self-Determination and World Order», in Alexander & Friedlander, op.cit., p.354.

⁹ H.Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, New York: Collier, 1967, p.12.

¹⁰ E.Kedourie, *Nationalism*, New York: Praeger, 1960, p.132.

Wilson's fourteen Points talked about granting the peoples of Austria-Hungary the «freest opportunity for autonomous development» and not about an automatic establishment of nation-states by the nations of the former Empire.¹¹ In a recent article Amitai Etzioni also makes the point that in the decolonization era «the driving force behind wars of liberation was the desire for democratization and a responsive government».¹²

The national school of self-determination defines the achievement of independence as the goal of national self-determination. National self-determination is perceived as fulfilled as long as the citizens of the nation are ruled by their «kith and kin». In fact, most states in the world are independent but not free in the democratic sense. Many nationalists have cut the principle of national self-determination from its democratic roots. They are willing to accept «less autonomy with more flag»¹³. Hans Kohn conceded that these nationalists fought for liberty, but the «liberty (which was) worshipped was not so much individual freedom but freedom from foreign government»¹⁴. National self-determination according to the nationalist point of view is compatible with dictatorship as long as it is national. Polish and Hungarian nationalists who fought for national self-determination before World War I saw nothing wrong in establishing national dictatorships after gaining independence. For German nationalists, freedom consisted in national sovereignty and not western democracy. When the Sudeten Germans in 1938 overwhelmingly supported a return to the Reich in the name of national self-determination, they in fact opted to leave democratic Czechoslovakia, where they had all the democratic rights, in order to join Hitler's Nazi Germany. For them, national self-determination meant to be ruled by fellow Germans rather than to live in a democratic state. Etzioni accuses some of the «self-determinists» in the former Soviet Union of sacrificing the chances for more democracy within a multi-ethnic state for the sake of «ethnic self-determination»¹⁵. Coulmas also says that although national self-determination was in the past associated with freedom and democracy, by now it is an ethnic tool to dismember multi-ethnic states.¹⁶

The shift from national self-determination as a formula for democracy to national self-determination as a prescription for a non-democratic nation-state can proceed

¹¹ U.O.Umozurike, *Self-Determination in International Law*, U.P.: Ardross Books, 1972, 18-19.

¹² A.Etzioni, «The Evil of Self-Determination», *Foreign Policy*, No.89 (Winter 1992-93), p.23.

¹³ D.Ronen, *The Quest for Self-Determination*, New Haven: Yale UP, 1979, p.23.

¹⁴ H.Kohn, as quoted by D.Ronen, p.27.

¹⁵ A.Etzioni, op.cit., 23-24.

¹⁶ P.Coulmas, «Das Problem des Selbstbestimmungsrechtes», *Europa Archiv*, 48:4 (1993), p.89.

even further. It can start from a proposition that the people have the right to decide in which state they will live, even if that state is internally dictatorial (e.g. the decision by plebiscite of the Saar Germans in 1935 to join Nazi Germany), and it can reach a point where a national elite «determine» to what nation-state a specific people belongs, without ever talking to the people involved (e.g. the 1940 declaration by Nazi Germany that all the people of Alsace-Lorraine were Germans and part and parcel of «Greater Germany»). This completes a full circle from an arbitrary state-system determined by kings and armies, via national self-determination and a state system based on the people's will, to arbitrary «national determinism» by self-proclaimed national elites.

The confusion as to what constitutes national self-determination has its roots in the past association between democracy and nationalism, for both had in common the goals of popular sovereignty and participation. Later on, the conservative opponents of democracy and socialism discovered the potential power of nondemocratic nationalism for undermining mass support for democrats and socialists through «populistic» appeals. For example, in 1848, liberals and socialists fought alongside others in Germany for German unification. Their fiercest enemy was the oppressive kingdom of Prussia. Later in the 1860s and 1870s, Bismark adopted the goal of German unification and achieved it through «blood and iron». That enabled the conservative and monarchical forces to do away with the liberal and socialist threat for more than half a century. Thus, the two notions of what constitutes national self-determination first diverged with the split between democratic and anti-democratic nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century.

In addition to the two definitions of national self-determination which emphasize either democratic self-government or national independence, there is a third way to define national self-determination by combining the aspects of democracy, rejection of foreign rule, and national independence. E.H. Carr, for instance, sees the democratic and national aspects as interlocking: «If every man's right is recognised to be consulted about the affairs of the political unit to which he belongs, he may be assumed to have an equal right to be consulted about the form and the extent of the unit»¹⁷. In recent history, those who fought for national self-determination very often fought for both national independence and democracy. The Atlantic Charter of 1941 also linked both aspects of self-determination by establishing the right of peoples to have a say in the type of sovereignty under which they wanted to live and by stressing their right to have a democratic form of government. Plamenatz goes so

¹⁷ E.H.Carr, *Conditions for Peace*, New York: Macmillan, 1942, p.39.

far as to argue that the whole notion of foreign rule as illegitimate has its roots in an era when «democracy and individual freedom became common ideas»¹⁸. The question may be raised of why democracy alone does not appear to be sufficient for those who want freedom? Why do they aspire to have both national and democratic self-determination? The answer is that in a stable and functioning democracy, the minority must have the feeling that it may sometime become a majority. In a multinational and heavily polarized democracy, the minority nation feels it has no chance ever to rule the whole country or to participate in government. The Irish felt that way in nineteenth century Britain, and therefore, they fought for secession, although as individuals they had all the democratic rights in the United Kingdom. For a minority nation living in a nation state which is firmly identified with a dominant nation and where the dominant nation may exploit its numerical preponderance and disregard aspirations of the minority, the democratic state may not mean true freedom. For that very reason, John Stuart Mill regarded national self-determination as a precondition for political freedom. He supported the nation state to achieve democracy and supported democracy to achieve the nation-state.¹⁹

National self-determination assumes the presence of a «natural self», but what is a natural self? the UN Charter declares that «all peoples have the right to national self-determination», but who is to decide what a people is and who are «all» the peoples? One may say a nation, or a people, has to be a «distinct self», but who is going to determine what is distinct? Were the Americans in 1776 a distinct people from the British? Are the Germans distinct from the Austrians? There are no easy answers, but we can agree that «the determination of which 'self' is entitled to 'what', and 'how' remains the central question»²⁰. The problem with the concept of national self-determination has much to do with the lack of consensus as to what constitutes a true national self. Conflicting views of this question have led to many bitter struggles and bloody wars.

The British who opposed Irish independence recognized only one British national self, while the Irish nationalists regarded themselves as a separate nation. Lincoln believed in the unity of one American nation, while the Southerners identified themselves as a Southern nation. Corsican nationalists believe in a Corsican nation while French nationalists regard Corsicans as one integral part of the Nation Francaise. The conflicts in Great Britain (Ulster, Scotland), Spain (Basque Country, Catalonia),

¹⁸ J.Plamenatz, *On Alien Rule and Self-Government*, London: Longman, 1960, p.1.

¹⁹ J.S.Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, Indianapolis: Liberal Arts Press, 1958, 229-37.

²⁰ I.Jennings, *An Approach to Self-Government*, Boston: Robertson, 1975, p.42.

France (Corsica), the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, Canada (Quebec), India (Kashmir), Iraq (Kurdistan), Cyprus, Sudan, Ethiopia (Eritrea, Ogaden, Oromia) and China (Tibet) have all something to do with different definitions of the national self.

The emergence of a national self occurs — at least in the formative stages — through a process of differentiation from an opposing group. The formation of an American nation was linked with opposition to the British. The concept of a Pakistani nation does not make any sense without its differentiating stand against the Hindu-dominated Indian nation, and Kurdish identity can only be defined by opposing it to Arab-Iraqi, Turkish, or Iranian nationhood. The definition of the nation is intimately tied to the «struggle against foreign rule»²¹. By deciding who is foreign, the nationalists decide also what is the national self.

The national self in much of Asia and Africa is most frequently defined as the former colony in its colonial boundaries. An overwhelming majority of the African and Asian political establishment affirms the importance and even decisiveness of colonial history in the building of nations. Anti-colonial nationalism, in most cases, was a struggle for the independence of colonies as territorial units within their colonial boundaries. The governments of India, Pakistan, Burma, Sri-Lanka, Nigeria, Zaire, Kenya, Angola, Mali, Niger and the Ivory Coast fought secession by sanctifying the territorial integrity of the post-colonial state within its colonial boundaries.

African and Asian leaders would agree that in many independent states, there are not yet national selves in the ethnocultural sense, but they will insist that the current states are the means to achieve true nationhood. The insistence that the African or Asian state within its colonial boundaries is the appropriate unit for national self-determination is reflected in the semantics of post-colonial nationalism. European colonialism called the ethnocultural groups in Africa and Asia «tribes», a concept with racist connotations of primitiveness. In fact, there is no objective reason to call the few hundred thousand Basques a nation, and the ten million Ibos, who possess a well-defined territory, language and culture, a tribe. The notion that the Europeans form «nations» and the Africans, and Asians, «tribes» was simply a reflection of colonial racism which became a moral rationale for colonial rule. Enlightened public opinion could accept colonial rule of tribes and yet be faithful to the Wilsonian principle of self-determination of nations. It is striking that many African and Asian leaders continue to talk about tribes in spite of the colonial-racist connotation of the word. The reason

²¹ A.D.Smith, *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford: Robertson, 1975, p.42.

may simply be that it is also psychologically and intellectually easier for them to deny national self-determination to tribes than to nations who should be accorded the right to national self-determination.

A different kind of self for whom the demand for national self-determination is sometimes voiced is the ethnocultural group. The ethnocultural group is difficult to define. For many people ethnicity evokes strong emotions and dominates their collective identity and solidarity. To Rothschild, «the ethnic group is somewhat analogous to Robert Frost's definition of home — the place where when you have go there, they have to take you in»²². The ancient Greeks were fully aware of the distinction between polis and ethnos. The ethnocultural self may be based on language, religion, racial differences, or the more vague concepts of culture, tradition, and way of life. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the nation-state, as a state where state and nation overlap, became a universal ideal. There are two basic ways to achieve the nation-state: one is by amalgamating through «integration nationalism» different cultural selves within an existing state (as was done historically in Western Europe), and the other is to achieve independence through «separatist nationalism» for a pre-existing ethnocultural self (as was done between 1820 and 1920 and again in the 1990s in the Balkans and Eastern Europe). Thus, not all ethnocultural groups develop a nationalism with demands to be defined as nations which have the right to self-determination. Some ethnic groups will gradually assimilate and integrate in a given state. But some will not, as long as the ethnocultural selves exist, they have the potential to switch from integration nationalism to separation nationalism.

Very often, the nationalism of an ethnocultural group (nationalism with a nation) can more easily mobilize a pre-existing, underlying mass sentiment than a state-based nationalism devoid of ethnocultural content (nationalism without nation).²³ Today, as in the nineteenth century, and in the Third World, as well as in Europe, «ethnic nationalism proposes a radical alternative legitimization and rationale for the world political system to the prevailing statist framework»²⁴. The tension between statist national self-determination and ethnic national self-determination follows the nineteenth century European pattern of conflict between states (e.g. Austria-Hungary, Czarist Russia, the Ottoman empire, and Great Britain) and nations (e.g., Italians, Czechs, Serbs, Poles, Greeks, Irish).

²² J. Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics. A Conceptual Framework*, New York: Columbia UP, 1981, p.6.

²³ A.D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, New York: Harper & Row, 1971.

²⁴ A.D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981, p.xii.

As in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe, the majority principle is ill equipped to deal with the problems of a state containing dissatisfied ethnocultural groups who demand the right of national self-determination. Arend Lijphart has observed that «majority rule works well when opinions are distributed unimodally and with relatively little spread... when there is considerable consensus and majority and minority are not far apart»²⁵. Where there are permanent ethnocultural majorities and minorities, the majority has no incentive to allay the minorities' grievances, and the minority will be disillusioned with a principle which condemns it to permanent exclusion from the levers of power and influence. Nordlinger says that the application of the majoritarian principle in a plural society may even contribute to conflict exacerbation rather than facilitate conflict regulation.²⁶ If a minimal national consensus is missing, as it was in Czarist and Soviet Russia, Yugoslavia, Austria-Hungary, and pre-1921 great Britain, the preconditions for majoritarian democracy do not exist.

A variant of ethnocultural self-determination is «communal self-determination», which is defined as the aspiration of a communal group to determine the sovereignty of an area which contains other communal groups without absorbing them within the national self. While, for example, in Spain the ruling majority recognised Basques and Catalans as part of one Spanish nation, the same was not true in Czechoslovakia, Cyprus or the Baltic States. In inter-war Czechoslovakia, the Sudeten Germans were not regarded as part of the Czechoslovak nation, but nevertheless the Czechoslovaks did not accord them the right of national self-determination as a separate nationality. In Cyprus, prior to 1960, Greek-Cypriot nationalism denied that Greek and Turkish Cypriots were one people but nevertheless supported *enosis* which would have made the whole island part of Greece. In Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia the ethnic Russian 'settlers' were not recognized as a legitimate part of the ethnocultural self appropriate for self determination. Most Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians regarded the Russian residents of their states as settlers who were moved there by the Soviet state in order «to solidify conquest».²⁷

Another self for which self-determination, independence, and reunification is demanded is a «historical national self», whether real or mythical. Most nineteenth century European nationalists understood the nation they fought for as a traditional-historical community. That is certainly true for traditional nationalists who conceived

²⁵ A.Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, New Haven: Yale UP, 1977, p.28.

²⁶ E.Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1972, p.12.

²⁷ L.Brilmayer, «Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation», *Yale Journal of International Law*, 16:177 (1991), p.200.

of the nation as a historical personality linking past present, and future generations and as a group whose members share a «common cemetery»²⁸. For conservative nationalists, a nation was characterized by institutions and customs which represented the accumulated historical wisdom and experience of past generations.²⁹ Liberal nationalists also defined the nation as a historical community — as a community which has «done great things together» and has led «common memories, sacrifices, glories, afflictions and regrets»³⁰. The nationalists understood very well that «you cannot instill in a people a sense of kinship and brotherhood without attaching them to a place they feel is theirs, a homeland that is theirs by the right of history»³¹. The historical definition of the national self was not only characteristic for nationalists of all shades and persuasions but was also shared by non-nationalists like Hegel, Acton, and Marx. The demand for national self determination in the name of an historic self was a powerful ingredient of German and Italian nationalism in the nineteenth century and of Polish, Czech, Hungarian, and Croat nationalism after World War I. In all these cases, the demands for the restoration of an historic state within its historic boundaries, would have led to an expansion of the state beyond the ethnocultural boundaries.³²

Sometimes the national self is at least partially determined by geography. In many nationalisms, territory plays a pivotal role. Belief in natural frontiers like seas, rivers, and mountains facilitates the crystallization of a national identity. A good example is Ireland: the fact that Ireland is an island facilitated the consolidation of a strong national identity. Sometimes geographic distance contributed to the creation of new nations by accelerating differentiation in culture, life-style, ideology, and economic interests. The growth of an American and an Australian nation are two striking examples. In Latin America, geographic distance and natural barriers between population centres encouraged the development of different nations in an area relatively homogeneous by language and culture.³³ The feeling that geographical enclaves «naturally» belong to the surrounding nation and state is another example for the impact of geography on the perception of the national self. Thus for Indians

²⁸ M.Barres, as quoted by C.Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, New York: Macmillan, 1948, p.192.

²⁹ See for example H.R.Treitschke, *Politics*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Company, 1968.

³⁰ E.Renan, as quoted by F.Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics*, London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1957, p.28.

³¹ A.D.Smith (ed.), *Nationalist Movements*, London: MacMillan, 1976, p.3.

³² See B.Shafer, *Nationalism. Myth and Reality*, London: Gollancz, 1955, 25-26; S.Bloom, *The World Nations - National Implications in the Works of Karl Marx*, New York: AMS Press, 1967, 43-45; Lord Acton, «Nationality», in *Essays on Freedom and Power*, New York: Meridian, 1965, 141-70.

³³ B. Neuberger, «What is a Nation? - A Contribution to the Debate on the Palestinian Question», *State, Government and International Relations*, (Hebrew University), No.9 (May 1976), 90-108 (Hebrew).

Goa was part and parcel of the Indian national self and the specific will of its inhabitants was regarded as irrelevant. That is also the way Spain also feels about Gibraltar and China about Macao and Hong Kong.

Nationalists very often regard the «national-self» as something permanent and indivisible. The German nationalist Heinrich von Treitschke rejected any notion of self-determination for Alsace Lorraine; what mattered was the «higher right» of self-determination of the German people as a «whole».³⁴

The notion that the nation is indivisible, which is common to many nationalists — whether American, French-Jacobin, Arab, Indian or Ethiopian — stands in startling contrast with historical-empirical reality. The perception of nations as indivisible is based on the fallacy that nationhood is something permanent. In reality, nations come and go, and national identity may expand, contract or disappear. Perhaps the reason for the sanctity of the indivisible nation is rooted in the hidden knowledge that all nations are divisible.

Another problem area with regard to who is the self concerns the differentiation between «natives» and foreign «settlers». In 1918, the French rejected a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine because between 1871 and 1918 there was an exodus of French natives and an influx of German settlers. The Turks perceived the Greek Cypriots as settlers on an island which they regarded as an extension of Turkish Anatolia. Most recently, the Third World majority in the UN refused to grant the inhabitants of Gibraltar and of the Falklands the right to self-determination because it saw them as foreign settlers on native Spanish and Argentinian territory. It is interesting that these standards were not applied to the Fiji Indians or the Chinese in Singapore. They were also settlers in foreign lands, but because they did not come from European-colonial countries, their right to self-determination (in the case of Singapore) or their right to share in self-determination (in the case of Fiji) was recognised as legitimate.

Who is a settler with no legitimate rights to be included in the self, and who is not? An important question is to determine whether there is a «critical date». When does a settler cease to be a foreigner with no rights to national self-determination and become a native part of a self with full rights to national self-determination? Time is important, but on the question of the critical date there is no agreement. The Gibraltarians who have inhabited the colony for 250 years are considered settlers by

³⁴ H. Kohn, *Nationalism - Its Meaning and History*, New York: Van Nostrand, 1956, p.6.

the UN, while the much more recently settled Fiji Indians are accepted as part of the Fiji self.

Sometimes people confuse self-determination and independence. The 1960 UN Resolution on Colonialism mentioned independence, free association, and integration as possible and legitimate goals of national self-determination, but Portugal's misuse of these options during the 1960s and 1970s (when it argued that its African colonies chose integration with Portugal as overseas provinces) caused the UN to view national self-determination and independence as synonymous. Although national self-determination has, since World War II, mostly led to independence, it has sometimes led to different patterns and formulas.

Self-determination, of a colony for example, may take the form of independence, unification with another territory, attachment to an independent state, some form of association or complete integration with the mother country, and preservation of the colonial status. The examples are numerous: In a free referendum (most recently in November 1993), Puerto Rico voted for association with the United States, thus granting its inhabitants U.S. citizenship, democratic rights, an elected governor and legislature, and the option to vote for independence at any time. Alaska and Hawaii opted for statehood within the United States. Greenland and the Faeroes have chosen autonomy under the Danish Crown. The Falklands and Gibraltar voted to remain British colonies and the populations of the dependent territories of Surinam, the Cook Islands and the Northern Mariana Islands have rejected independence. Until 1958, French Africa's leaders almost unanimously opposed independence and supported a federal or confederal French-African community as the proper goal of the right of self-determination. They wanted *liberte*, *fraternite*, and especially, *egalite* for the Africans as French citizens within one political community. We may conclude that «any political status freely determined by the people constitutes modes of implementing the right of self-determination»³⁵. Another problem of self-determination is the «choice of choices»: what alternatives are offered to the people in a plebiscite? Cyprus, for example, achieved self-determination in 1960, but it could only choose independence, not *enosis* (unification with Greece). In the «consultations» in West Irian in 1969, the Papuans were given the choice of integration or non-integration with Indonesia. The independence option was never offered. In 1960, the British Cameroons might have voted for independence rather than for amalgamation with Nigeria or Cameroun; but the UN supervised plebiscite offered only two options: fusion with French Cameroun or integration with Nigeria. The same was true with British Togoland. The 1956

³⁵ A.Kiss, op.cit. (note 4 above), p.168.

plebiscite in this trusteeship territory offered only two alternatives: integration with Ghana or continued British rule. Two other realistic options, unification with the former French Togoland or independence, were ruled out.³⁶ The 1993 plebiscite in Eritrea was on the question of independence. Alternative options to independence and the status quo (being a province of Ethiopia), like federal or confederal arrangements were not permitted. Most historical or ethnocultural selves within the colonies were never offered any real choice in the beginning. Their choice was limited from the beginning between willingly acceding to independence within colonial boundaries, unwillingly resigning themselves to such boundaries, or taking up arms against imposed post-colonial state. They never had the option of separating, or of joining a neighbouring state by free vote.

Another question concerns the ways of ascertaining the wishes of a population. Plebiscites in a clearly delimited territory are one tool for achieving national self-determination. They were widely used in Europe, especially after the French Revolution (in Avignon, Comtat Venaissin, Savoy, Nice, Belgium, and the Rhine Valley), during the unification of Italy between 1848 and 1870, after World War I (e.g., in Schleswig, Upper Silesia, and the Saar), and most recently in Eritrea.

What should be asked in a plebiscite? Who should supervise the plebiscite? Should it be UN observers, or should the administration of the plebiscite be trusted to the administering power? Should the military and the administration of the occupying power stay during the plebiscite? Or should they be withdrawn and replaced by neutral forces?

Another method of achieving self-determination is through representative institutions or institutions claiming to be representative. Independence was granted to many colonies on the basis of an official request by the territory's Legislative Council. Such was the case in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan. Sometimes non-independent governments made the decision to ask for national self-determination and independence. Most Francophone governments did so in Africa in 1960. The decision to secede was taken by the regional government of Eastern Nigeria, and the provincial government of Katanga. The same is true for the governments of the Soviet Republics in the early 1990s. The government's determination was, in some cases, controversial in the seceding area (e.g., Katanga), but in other cases it enjoyed almost total support in the population (e.g., Biafra).

³⁶ A.R. Sureda, *The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination*, Leiden: A.W. Stijhoff, 1973, p.51.

Liberation movements themselves are often recognized as legitimate representatives of the national self. They are never elected to do so in any formal sense, but prove themselves to represent «the people» by waging an efficient political and military campaign. That holds true for SWAPO in Namibia and the ANC in South Africa as it did earlier for the FLN in Algeria, FRELIMO in Mozambique and the EPLF in Eritrea. Some observers disputed the representativeness of some of these guerrilla movements. Though there is no point in refuting their representativeness, it is important to emphasize that their recognition is based on popular support gained by armed struggle, not on elections and plebiscites.

Another way to effect self-determination is by sending investigation commissions. The Big Powers (in 1948) and the UN (in 1950) sent commissions of inquiry to Eritrea. In 1961, the UN did the same with regard to Ruanda-Urundi. Similar consultations were also conducted in West Irian and Bahrein, Sabah and Sarawak. The British sent commissions of inquiry to the Kenyan NFD in 1962 and to Rhodesia in 1972 in order to consult the population of those territories. These commissions ascertained the wishes of the population through public hearings, meetings with delegations, and written petitions.

There are numerous other ways of achieving self-determination. One is self-determination by petition, as done in Eulpen-Malmedy in 1920. Another is self-determination by a ruler who supposedly reflects the wishes of the people. In 1947 in India, that was how the traditional rulers of the princely states decided whether to go to India or Pakistan. In Kashmir and Hyderabad, this procedure led to bloody conflicts.

In most cases, the carrier of the struggle for national self-determination is the population, or part of the population, of the national self *per se*. But, sometimes, third parties have a decisive say. Such is also the case when national independence comes through military conquest by a third party (e.g., the Indian intervention in Bangladesh in 1971). In the case of Libya in 1949, the UN had a decisive say in Libya's becoming independent as «one whole». In many of the irredentist cases the major champion of national self-determination is as much the neighbouring state as the population in the specific territory. Examples are Somalia and the Ogaden, Pakistan and Kashmir, Turkey and northern Cyprus, Togo and the Victoria region of Ghana.

It is possible to differentiate between self-determination «from below» by elections, plebiscites, or a mass-based guerrilla movement and «self-determination from above» by rulers, oligarchies, non-representative parliaments and elitist

movements. One may also start a guerrilla war with a small band from above and end up with mass support from below. How many people have to support self-determination to be considered true representatives of the popular will? There is no ready-made formula or answer. Demands for national self-determination may often be countered by arguing that the proponents of self-determination are an unrepresentative minority. All governments opposed to secessionist national self-determination argued that way.

In the twentieth century, many nations gained independence through separatist self-determination (e.g., Poland, Norway, Ireland, Iceland, Czechoslovakia and Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia, the former Soviet Republics, Panama, Pakistan, Eritrea and Bangladesh), while many other movements for separation were defeated by the power of the state (e.g., southern Sudanese, Kurdish, Sikh, Tatar and Tibetan).

It has always been disputed whether the principle of self-determination contains the right of secession. In the early twentieth century, there was an interesting debate on the issue in the socialist movement. Lenin's pre-1917 writings strongly supported the right of secession,³⁷ while Karl Renner, Otto Bauer, and Rosa Luxemburg argued for national «internal self-determination» *within* existing states.³⁸ For Lenin, self-determination could not have any other meaning besides «political self-determination, political independence, the formation of a national state»³⁹. Here lies the ideological root for the constitutional peculiarity of the USSR which in its 1924, 1936, and 1977 constitutions, included the right of each Union Republic «to freely secede from the USSR». What may have been lip service in the past made it easier for the Republics to realize the right of secession in the early 1990s.

Jefferson and Lincoln were in favour of the fullest democracy but opposed secession by self-determination. Many scholars argue that even Woodrow Wilson opposed separatist self-determination and that his Wilsonian principles were only intended to democratize the multinational states and to prevent territorial changes without the consent of the population involved. Thornberry says that to this day the American position is that «the existence of a sovereign and independent state possessing a representative government effectively functioning as such to all distinct peoples within its territory, is presumed to satisfy the principle of equal rights and self-

³⁷ V.I. Lenin, *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*, New York: International Publishers, 1951, p.112.

³⁸ O. Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, Vienna: Volksbuchhandlung, 1924, p.291.

³⁹ W. Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Practice*, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984, p.40.

determination as regards those people»⁴⁰. Communist China opposed any right of secession of its minorities by bluntly declaring that the right of self-determination is «that of national majorities and not minorities»⁴¹. *Statist* nationalists opposed *ethnic* separatism, arguing that the national self, which they defined as the nation-state, is an indivisible organism. Documents published about the San Francisco Conference in 1945 reveal that those who drafted the UN Charter, which declares «the right of all peoples to self-determination,» did not support secession by self-determination. There was an understanding that the right to self-determination conformed to the purposes of the Charter «only insofar as it implied the right of self-government of peoples and *not* the right of secession»⁴². The 1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries talked about «the right of self-determination of all peoples», but it regarded it as incompatible with the UN Charter to discuss «any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country». The 1970 UN Declaration of Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States says that «the territorial integrity and political independence of every state is indivisible» and that nothing should be done «to dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity and political unity of sovereign and independent states»⁴³.

«Maximalist self-determination», which includes the right of secession, is opposed by the *statists* and supporters of the status quo as undermining international order and stability by legitimizing revisionism in international politics.⁴⁴ Secession is sometimes also rejected because it may lead to «trapped minorities» in relatively homogeneous states and «stranded majorities», when wealthy regions secede in order not to share their wealth with less fortunate regions.⁴⁵ Another argument against separatism through national self-determination is that «no truly objective criteria exist for establishing the identity or limits of the nation, or even for ascertaining unambiguously the national will». For this very reason, «it is impossible to distinguish in general terms between those secessionist or irredentist movements whose rebellions against the established order are justified and those that are not»⁴⁶.

⁴⁰ P. Thornberry, «Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments», *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, vol.38 (1989), p.876.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.880.

⁴² R. Emerson, «The Problem of Identity, Selfhood and Image in New Nations», *Comparative Politics*, April 1969, p.300.

⁴³ J.F.Murphy, «Self-Determination - United States Perspectives», in Alexander & Friedlander, *op.cit.*, 45-46.

⁴⁴ For an excellent summary of all the arguments against the right of secession see A. Buchanan, *Secession. The Morality and Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec*, Boulder: Westview, 1991, 87-125.

⁴⁵ L.C.Buchheit, *Secession. The Legitimacy of Self-Determination*, New Haven: Yale UP, 1978, p.30.

⁴⁶ J. Mayall, «Self-Determination and the OAU», in I.M.Lewis (ed.), *Nationalism and Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa*, London: Ithaca Press, 1983, p.89.

There is no question that the doctrine of states' rights has become a central principle of the international legal order, but it remains equally true that «nationalists have been destroyers of states as often as they have been associated with the construction of states»⁴⁷. Supporters of the right of secession argue that the right of national self-determination without the right of secession is like democracy without elections. They believe that the democratic values which underlie the right of self-determination contain the right of a people to withdraw from a state if they wish to do so, particularly if they have faced discrimination and oppression in the state from which they want to secede. Arend Lijphart would argue that in plural societies where assimilation is resisted and elite cooperation («consociationalism») is impossible because of historical enmity, partition or separation become the only viable alternative.⁴⁸ The right of secession is seen as a variant of the right of self-defense from an oppressive system and as such it can convincingly mobilize traditional democratic principles like the social contract, the consent of the governed, and the right of rebellion. Representative of this attitude is Connor Cruise O'Brien who attacked the «sovereign legitimism, which treats the boundaries as more sacrosanct than the lives of stigmatized peoples»⁴⁹. Many supporters of the right of secession concede that not *all* groups can be granted the right of secession, but that should not be a reason to oppose all groups who seek secessionist self-determination. In Buchanan's words: «one doesn't have to allow everything just because one allows something»⁵⁰. They would not deny that the separatist self-determination of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, Hungary, the Baltic States, and Ireland in Post-World War I Europe has left many minorities in the newly created nation-states, but they would argue that it makes a difference whether sixty or twenty million people regard themselves as oppressed minorities. The same holds true for the recent independence by self-determination of states like Slovakia, the Ukraine, Moldavia, Kazakhstan and Eritrea. Usually, the supporters of the right of secession will limit this right to cases where there are «compelling reasons» to secede. Nevertheless, they totally reject the concept of the indivisibility of nations and the notion that the integrity of the state is an absolute value. There can be compelling reasons for secession such as if the physical survival or the cultural autonomy of a nation is threatened, or if a population would feel economically excluded and permanently deprived. Michael Walzer would go further and grant the right of secession to any distinct community whose fight for separation enjoys overwhelming popular support.⁵¹ There are even some scholars who regard all talk

⁴⁷ C.J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1963, p.565.

⁴⁸ A. Lijphart, *op.cit.*, p.102.

⁴⁹ C.C.O'Brien, «The Right to Secede», *New York Times*, 30.12.1971.

⁵⁰ A. Buchanan, *op.cit.*, p.102.

⁵¹ M. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, New York: Basic Books, 1977, p.93.

about anarchy and instability brought about by the right of secession as cynical rationalization of statist power interests.⁵²

It is unclear whether self-determination and the right of secession are two sides of the same coin or different principles. Many attempt to reconcile the right of national self-determination with an insistent, though not always consistent, rejection of the right of secession. The «establishment approach» is strongly statist-conservative and opposed to secession.

National self-determination is often perceived as a positive principle, while separatism has a reputation for being negative and disruptive. For this very reason, that which is positive national self-determination for one party frequently becomes negative separatism for the other. During the Algerian war, for example, the supporters of *Algérie française* called the Algerian nationalists separatists, while the FLN guerrilla regarded themselves as freedom fighters fighting for national self-determination and liberation. They did not perceive themselves as separatists because they did not regard Algeria as an integral part of France.

One way to support self-determination but to oppose secession is simply to deny the logical connection between the two. Others go so far as to see in secession a distortion or even a negation of the principle of self-determination, because it destroys the «national reality». Another more practical way to avoid the intellectual embarrassment of opposing self-determination is to deny that the demand for secession is raised in the name of the majority and therefore to oppose the demand as a distortion of true self-determination.

Emerson wrote that «the sword of self-determination is sharp when severing the colony from its metropole. However, its reverse side is blunt and unavailable when minorities within the former colonies seek either their own independence or union with more desirable brothers across the frontier»⁵³. Leaders who oppose secession by self-determination do so without rejecting the principle of national self-determination. They argue that one may be loyal to the idea of liberty, democracy, and self-determination without being compelled to recognize the right of secession. As always, some are sincere and some are cynical about the possibility of reconciling self-determination and opposition to secession, but self-determination is too legitimate a value to be openly challenged.

⁵² J. Forbes, «Do Tribes Have Rights - The Question of Self-Determination», *Journal of Human Relations*, 18:1 (1970), p.677.

⁵³ R. Emerson, «The Problem of Identity», op.cit., p.300.

Some leaders have come to the conclusion that the right to national self-determination may well mean or include the right of secession. A major argument for secession is based on the notion that a people, who did not consent to be included in a particular state, has the moral right to decide by itself and for itself whether it wants to stay within the imposed boundaries. Another related rationale for secession is the denial of participation in government to a particular group. Albert Hirshman suggests the alternative of «voice» and «exit» for groups in a state. Those who have no voice may very well insist on their right of exit.⁵⁴ The Southern Sudanese, for example, insist that their right to national self-determination and secession is moral and justified because «they have never been consulted in a free referendum to decide to be part of the north»⁵⁵. The Southern Sudanese Dunstan Wai insists that the fate of the Southern Sudanese Africans to be part of independent Sudan was sealed by Egyptians, Northern Sudanese Arabs, and the British.⁵⁶ This is «other determination», not self-determination.

Separatism everywhere has been justified as a legitimate response to oppression. Such was the case in Ireland, Poland, the American colonies, colonial Africa, Kurdistan, and Bangladesh. One can argue quite logically that a group would not «wish to go through the very considerable trouble of disrupting the unity of a state» if it is not oppressed in one way or another.⁵⁷

A major issue in the debate on national self-determination is the minimal or optimal size of the nation-state. Political philosophers since *Plato* have been divided over their preferences for large or small states. Mazzini and Marx thought that only large nations should have the right to national self-determination. For Mazzini, only a large nation could have a distinct mission, while for Marx, only a large nation based on a sizeable market and rapid capital accumulation could create economic progress. Others presented opposite views. Kant and Rousseau, for instance, denied that liberty and equality could be achieved in a large state. They argued that only in a small community could decision making be democratic and the *volonte générale* ascertained. The basic disagreement between advocates of large and small states is reflected in attitudes towards the interpretation and implementation of national self-determination. Many opponents of the right of secession through self-determination

⁵⁴ A. Hirschman, «Exit, Voice and the State», *World Politics*, 31:1 (October 1978).

⁵⁵ B. Malwal, *People and Power in the Sudan*, London: Ithaca Press, 1984, p.100.

⁵⁶ D. Wai, «Sources of Communal Conflict and Secessionist Policies in Africa», *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol.1, No.3 (July 1978), p.305.

⁵⁷ H. Beran, «A Liberal Theory of Secession», *Political Studies*, 32:1 (1984), p.23.

argue that to confer the right of independent statehood to every people, however small, would create thousands of non-viable states. Basically, the opponents of small states argue that mini-states lack the military power to defend themselves, have insufficient political standing to make their independence meaningful, and cannot use the economics of scale to achieve development and wealth. Boris Yeltsin argues that way against the secession of the ethnic minorities (e.g., Tatars, Chechens, Ingush) from the Russian Federation by saying the «people cannot live by sovereignty alone»⁵⁸. In his eyes, a host of mini-states will perpetuate instability, dependence, and poverty. There are presently dozens of mini-states (e.g., Barbados, Bermuda, Brunei, Kuwait, San Marino, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Malta and Luxembourg), and their proliferation is a nightmare for many supporters of big states.⁵⁹ They talk about the dangers of infinite divisibility and are haunted by «epidemic» separatism. Anthony Smith confirms that «there is a demonstration effect of other successful ethnic nationalisms»⁶⁰. The Pakistani UN delegate, who, in the Bangladesh debate of 1971, warned that «there will not be a Bangladesh only in Pakistan, there will be a Bangladesh everywhere» represents this epidemic point of view.⁶¹ The opponents of secession approvingly quote Col. Edward House, Woodrow Wilson's advisor during the post-World War I peace conferences, who recalled that «no tribal entity was too small to have ambition for self-determination»⁶². Woodrow Wilson himself conceded that «when I gave utterance to these words (that all nations had a right to self-determination), I said them without knowledge that nationalities existed which are coming to us every day»⁶³. Basically, the opponents of secession who want viable states say that once «things fall apart», and the «center cannot hold», «mere anarchy is loosed upon the world»⁶⁴.

There is, however, a different point of view which says that small homogeneous states have done quite well in history. The «small is beautiful» school of thought would see in large states more alienation, bureaucratization, and repression, and in small states, more potential for genuine self-government, participation, and spontaneity. In their study *Size and Democracy*, Dahl and Tufte came to the conclusion that there is no correlation between size, economic viability, and political survival.⁶⁵ To

⁵⁸ P. Coulmas, *op.cit.*, p.85.

⁵⁹ P.W.Blair, *The Ministate Dilemma*, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967.

⁶⁰ A. D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, *cit.*, p.151.

⁶¹ L.Buchheit, *op.cit.*, p.106.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p.65.

⁶³ A. Cobban, *op.cit.*, p.65.

⁶⁴ W.B.Yeats quoted by C.Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1976, p.460.

⁶⁵ R.Dahl & R.Tufte, *Size and Democracy*, Stanford: Stanford UP, 1973.

demonstrate how the viability argument may indeed be questionable, one could go back to Alfred Cobban's classical work, *The Nation-State and National Self-Determination*, published in 1944. In his book, Cobban presented the examples of Iceland and Malta to show the absurdity of self-determination for non-viable entities. Today, both are legitimate members of the international community, as are dozens of other states of a similar size. Forbes represents an even more extreme point of view that even mini-states like Monaco, San Marino, and Andorra do no harm to anyone. He regards the call for «viable» states as irrational and insincere and as based on the power interests of larger powers and on their reluctance to grant their minorities the right of secession.⁶⁶ There is no doubt that nationalists have frequently rationalized expansionism and have planned to «swallow» small nations by resorting to the slogan of «viability». In the nineteenth century, German nationalists like Fichte, List, and Treitschke thought a united Germany could only be viable if it included sizeable territories of Germany's neighbours. Hitler's Germany rationalized expansionism as a quest for *Lebensraum* (living space), and so did Tojo's Japan.

The United Nations was ambivalent on the issue of state size. On the one hand, the UN, in principle, favours national self-determination for the Pitcairn, Tokelau, and Nieu Islands who have a few thousand inhabitants, but it rejects it for the Kurds or Southern Sudanese who number millions.

The viability argument also serves opponents of secessionism in another way. They may argue that the whole is not viable if the part secedes.

The secessionists, as a rule, reject the non-viability of their homelands and peoples. They also reject the domino theory implied in the concept of 'balkanization'. They argue that the domino theory had been used by imperialists (Churchill had used the same rationalization to defend his opposition to India's independence). Supporters of secessionist self-determination also refute a major ingredient of the domino theory that says that one secession will necessarily lead to an endless chain of secessions. They empirically refute the domino theory of secession by citing the examples of successful secessions like Norway (1905), Ireland (1921), and Iceland (1944). In none of these cases was secession a precedent for additional secessions; there was no chain reaction of falling dominoes.

Nevertheless, even the minimalists accept the need for a required minimum size of territory and population. They also have to face the question of how small is small

⁶⁶ J. Forbes, op.cit., 670-79.

and how small is too small? Otherwise, one may reach the *absurdum* of self-determination for two individuals. To demand a minimal viability is quite logical; the problem is that it is a sheer impossibility to reach consensus on the viable minimum. Kamanu, an African scholar not opposed to secession, agrees that «like individual freedom, collective freedom has its limits. The right to self-determination cannot mean the freedom of every self-distinguishing ethnocultural group to secede»⁶⁷. That means that even the most generous interpretation of the principle of national self-determination leaves out small peoples. The UN Charter promises national self-determination for all peoples, but all peoples will never have the right to self-determination.

Another question inherent in the concept of national self-determination is whether self-determination, once decided upon is a «one shot affair»⁶⁸, or a «plebiscite de tour les jours»⁶⁹. Is the decision of a people to belong to this or that nation and nation-state reversible or irreversible? A recognized right to reversibility may bring about constant changes in the international state-system, an unending chain of border adjustments, and may prevent the consolidation of a stable world order. The right of reversibility will also immediately raise the question of how often the population of a territory will have the opportunity to reverse its decision: once in a century, every decade, every year, every day? If reversibility is denied for the sake of order and stability, self-determination for one generation may well mean the denial of self-determination for future generations. If a people's decision is irreversible, does that people not become a prisoner within legitimate, self-determined boundaries with no way to escape once the conditions have changed? Kedourie cannot resist asking if the right of national self-determination without the right of reversibility is not, from the point of view of future generations, as arbitrary as conquests and secret diplomacy.⁷⁰ In fact, it is not easy to argue that in an age where «divorce is permitted, employment relationships can be terminated and governments can be voted out of office» that people should not have the right from time to time to reconsider under what sovereignty they want to live.⁷¹

In general, the status quo powers insist in irreversibility of self-determination, while the revisionists demand reversibility. From 1792 to 1793, France annexed Nice, Savoy, Avignon, and Venaissin after plebiscites were held in these areas. Once they

⁶⁷ O. S.Kamanu, «Secession and the Right of Self-Determination - an OAU Dilemma», *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 12:3 (1974), p.360.

⁶⁸ M. Pomerance, p.75.

⁶⁹ E. Renan, *Qu'est ce qu'une nation?*, Paris: Calman Levy, 1882, p.58.

⁷⁰ E. Kedourie, *op.cit.*, 62-91.

⁷¹ H. Beran, *op.cit.*, p.25.

became part of France, it was deemed a crime punishable by death to call for a reversal of that decision by a new plebiscite. In the American Civil War, the North opposed the secession of the South because it regarded the decision by the states to form a federal union as irreversible. In 1871, German nationalists denied the population of Alsace Lorraine the right of self-determination because what mattered for them was that, in the past, the population had made an irreversible decision to attach to the German empire. Whether this historical decision is true or fictitious is debatable, but what is clear is that, for the German nationalists, the wishes of the people in 1871 were irrelevant.

Another problem area is the relationship between the principle of national self-determination and other basic norms and values of international politics. Even the staunchest supporters of the right of peoples to self-determination do not claim that the right of self-determination is necessarily superior to other rights and principles in all instances.

Both the UN and OAU Charters contain an inherent contradiction between the principle of national self-determination and the right of states to preserve and defend their territorial integrity. The UN Charter calls for the «right of self-determination of peoples» and states its opposition to «any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country»⁷². The conflict between the right of states to territorial integrity and the right of nations (or peoples) to self-determination has its roots in the beginnings of modern nationalism in the late eighteenth century. Two hundred years after the French Revolution, this basic contradiction between states and peoples remains a fundamental problem of the international community, whether we speak of the Arab World, Russia, India, China, Spain, the former Yugoslavia, Canada, or Great Britain.

Sometimes, the very existence of the state — not only its territorial integrity — is invoked as a higher value than national self-determination. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Hungarian nationalist leader Kossuth told a Rumanian delegation, which came to plead for national self-determination for the Rumanians in Hungary, that their demands were unacceptable: «Shall Hungary not then be a state? Shall each of the nations inhabiting it demand a separate state on its own account? With such principles either Hungary will break up or the sword will decide»⁷³. How similar do African

⁷² L. Buchheit, *op.cit.*, p.86.

⁷³ C.A. McCartney, *National States and National Minorities*, London: Oxford UP, 1934, p.117.

leaders sound when they declare separatism to be a mortal danger not only to integrity but also to the very survival of states.

Another international principle which may conflict with the right of peoples to national self-determination is the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. The norm of non-interference clearly conflicts with external support for secessionist self-determination. Supporters of the principle of national self-determination and the right of secession argue that every people has to gain its own liberation without outside interference. No people, however, can achieve secessionist self-determination without a certain amount of outside support ranging from full military intervention (as in the case of India's invasion of Bangladesh) to international diplomatic recognition (as in the case of Syria which seceded from the Egyptian-led United Arab Republic and achieved instant recognition by the big powers). Without some outside intervention, the peoples of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires would not have gained their freedom, the oppressed peoples under Nazi rule would not have been liberated, and the process of decolonization would never have succeeded. The denial of outside support for secessionists fighting for self-determination constitutes support for the central government in its suppression of secessionist movements. This kind of non-interference is thus directly opposed to the principle of self-determination, at least in the eyes of the peoples fighting for secessionist self-determination.

The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of state has always been of doubtful morality. Non-interference may have meant continued oppression whether in Hitler's Germany, Pol Pot's Cambodia, Amin's Uganda, or Apartheid South Africa. In the nineteenth century it was regarded as perfectly legitimate for Palmerston's and Gladstone's England to assist peoples in the Balkans who rose up in arms against Ottoman oppression. Non-interference may not only conflict with national self-determination, but may actually mean the abandonment of peoples to an oppressive fate. Walzer has the moral sensitivity to justify intervention in cases of «enslavement and massacre»⁷⁴. Secessionists fighting for independence can often rightly claim to have suffered enslavement and massacre.

Sometimes, the principle of national self-determination is pushed aside because it conflicts with the security of a particular state or with the requirements of international peace and stability. After World War I, self-determination was not granted to the Southern Tyrolese, Sudeten Germans, and the people of Alsace-Lorraine because the territories involved were regarded as vital to the security of Italy, Czechoslovakia,

⁷⁴ M. Walzer, *op.cit.*, p.90.

and France. The Soviets opposed, after World War II, any idea about granting the Baltic States the right to self-determination because they insisted on the proven strategic importance of the Baltic for the defence of the USSR. In general, the right of nations to self-determination is very often diametrically opposed to the internationally recognized right of states to self-defense. Austria was denied the right to join Germany because a «Greater German» was perceived as a threat to international peace and security. For the sake of regional peace between Turkey and Greece, Cyprus was denied the right to choose unification with Greece in 1960. Events in central Europe in the 1930s illustrate the fact that national self-determination may indeed be exploited to undermine international peace and security. In the name of national self-determination, Hitler ordered his troops into the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Lloyd George said it bluntly: «We should not push the principle of self-determination so far as unduly to strengthen any state which is likely to be a cause of danger to European peace»⁷⁵.

In Africa, one could very well argue that the anti-secessionist domino theory is based on the assumption that further balkanization of Africa has to be avoided for the sake of continental stability, peace, and security. While Herder, John Stuart Mill, Mazzini, and Woodrow Wilson believed in peace by national self-determination, the domino theory of the Organization of African Unity is better defined as peace or self-determination. When it perceives ethnocultural self-determination as conflicting with a peaceful and stable world order, the OAU follows the UN. As *organizations*, both are committed to oppose the right of secession.

Other principles which may collide with the right to national self-determination are non-use of force and the principle that international agreements have to be observed (*pacta sunt servanda*). In almost all separatist cases, the people fighting for self-determination can expect success only by resorting to violence against the military, the police, the courts, and bureaucracy of the central government. Kedourie's argument that any attempt to change the political map according to the principle of national self-determination of ethnocultural selves may be a «brutal and sanguinary affair» is certainly accurate. Sometimes, the wish to homogenize the population of a territory and to conform *pro forma* to the principle of self-determination may lead to expulsions of peoples from territories with mixed populations («ethnic cleansing»), thus changing the boundaries of peoples instead of the boundaries of states. Robert Lansing was right that the principle of national self-determination has caused «enough despair, enough suffering and enough anarchy». The question remains whether without the principle

⁷⁵ U.O. Umozurike, op.cit., p.16.

there would not have been even more violence and oppression. Separatists are rebels against the legally recognized *status quo*. They are revisionists in the sense that they want to revise the legal order, including laws, constitutions, and international conventions. Their revisionism has to run counter to the *pacta sunt servanda* principle of international law. For example, one of the first acts of independent Somalia, in 1960, was to abrogate all international treaties which accorded international legal legitimacy to the boundaries which divided the Somali people.

Above all, the principle of national self-determination often entails a denial of the same right to a competing self. Claims for national self-determination most frequently conflict with claims of other selves for national self-determination, rather than with qualitatively wholly different claims.

Finally there is the problem of the double standard. Using a double standard means applying different criteria to situations which are so similar that they merit equal treatment. Lloyd George once observed in despair how «small nations who have hardly leapt into the light of freedom begin immediately to oppress their minorities»⁷⁶. Emerson, too, became quite cynical about the use and misuse of the principle of national self-determination: «My right to self-determination against those who oppress me is obviously unimpeachable, but your claim to exercise such a right against me is wholly inadmissible»⁷⁷. There is no doubt that the right of national self-determination is indeed a «chamelonic right».

Revolutionary France granted the right of self-determination to those who wanted to join *la patrie* and denied it to those who wished to secede. Napoleon conquered Europe in the name of self-determination, but ruthlessly suppressed who took up arms against French occupation, whether in Prussia or Haiti. Barere proclaimed «liberty and equality — these are our rights, unity and indivisibility — these our maxims»⁷⁸. Whenever it was opportune, liberty was granted; otherwise, indivisibility was proclaimed.

Mazzini demanded ethnocultural self-determination for Italy and all of Europe but in order to transcend the linguistic boundary, and to claim German speaking South Tyrol for Italy, he invoked Roman history and declared that the landscape speaks Italian. When a Slovak delegation approached the Hungarian freedom fighter Kossuth

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ M.Pomerance, p.61.

⁷⁸ C.Hayes, op.cit., p.53.

to ask for autonomy for Slovakia, Kossuth told them that his map did not show any Slovakia.⁷⁹ The liberal German nationalists who gathered in the *Paulskirche* in 1848 proclaimed German unity and democracy, but refused to grant Danes, Poles, Czechs, and Slovenes the right to secession.

Marx supported self-determination for the Irish in order to weaken the British ruling class and for the Poles in order to weaken Czarist Russia. He opposed national self-determination for Serbs, Croats, Slovaks, Czechs, and other small «reactionary» Slavic peoples because the political independence of the Southern Slavs would have strengthened Russia, the prime enemy of the Revolution.⁸⁰ Lenin proclaimed the right of peoples to self-determination and secession, but left the possibility open to deny this very right because «the proletariat ... evaluates every national demand, every national separation from the angle of the class struggle of the workers»⁸¹. On another occasion, Lenin explained that «our unqualified recognition of the struggle for the right of self-determination does not commit us to support every demand for national self-determination».⁸² In the policy of the Soviet Union, this ideological flexibility provided the legitimacy for opportunism. In principle, the Soviets recognized the right of secession, but after 1917 they put an end to the independence of Armenia, Georgia, the Ukraine, Buchara, Azerbaijan, and the Baltic states by force of arms. Stalin supported the unity of all Ukrainians and Byelorussians but always by annexing territories to the Soviet Union, never by allowing secession from the Soviet Union. The Soviets were also strong supporters of anti-colonial self-determination, as long as it was far away from home. They insisted on true national self-determination for the five thousand inhabitants of Nauru, but agreed only to fictitious independence for fifty million Ukrainians. A dramatic change in Soviet Policy occurred only in 1991 after the downfall of communism.

The Chinese and Vietnamese communists were no better. For thirty years Mao Tse Tung promised the Tibetans, Mongols, Uighurs, and Chuang the right of self-determination and the right of secession. When he seized power in 1949, he proclaimed the minority areas «inalienable parts» of China.⁸³ The fighting Viet Minh made the same promises to the Muong, Meo, and Khmer, but independent Vietnam, according to its constitution, is «one and indivisible», and in 1975, even the regional autonomy of the minorities was abolished.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ McCartney, op.cit., p.117.

⁸⁰ S.Bloom, op.cit., 40-45.

⁸¹ V.I. Lenin, op.cit., p.265.

⁸² V. I. Lenin, «The National Question in Our Programme», *Selected Works*, vol.2, Moscow: Cooperative Publishing Society, 1935, p.322.

⁸³ W. Connor, op.cit., pp.75, 88, 233-35.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 109-10, 116.

The American Declaration of Independence is based on the right of self-determination and secession from the orbit of the British Empire. Later on, the United States fought against Southern secession in the name of «unity» and «indivisibility». After the Civil War, the United States became an opponent of secession (e.g., in the cases of Biafra, Southern Sudan, or Bangladesh), but when it suited its regional or global interests, as in Panama in 1903, in Tibet in the 1950s, and in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1960s, the United States encouraged separatism.

In 1917, Woodrow Wilson became the champion of national self-determination for subject peoples and proclaimed the principle to be the cornerstone of a just world. The British Prime Ministers Asquith and Lloyd George proclaimed that Britain was fighting the war for «the rights of smaller nationalities»⁸⁵. At the same time, they signed secret treaties with Russia and Italy in which they committed themselves to the transfer of Austrian, Greek, Albanian, Croatian, and Turkish territories and populations to Italian and Russian rule. In Ireland, Egypt, and India, people who fought for national self-determination were imprisoned and executed. In the post-World War I peace settlement, the principle of self-determination was only applied where it weakened the enemy states (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey), but was disregarded where it would not have been favourable for the Allies (e.g., in the cases of Southern Tyrol, the Sudeten, Danzig, Alsace-Lorraine). Wherever the Allies would have lost a plebiscite, there was no plebiscite. In Eastern Europe, the Czechs, Serbs, and Poles succeeded in establishing themselves as independent and dominant nations in newly independent states, but they refused to grant the right of self-determination to the Croats, Slovenes, Slovaks, and the Ukrainians.

During World War II, Churchill and Roosevelt issued a call for self-determination in the Atlantic charter, but Churchill refused to apply it to India and the colonies of the British Empire. In the Indian subcontinent, India denied self-determination in Kashmir, but fought for the self-determination of Bangladesh, while Pakistan insisted on self-determination for Kashmir and denied it to Bangladesh. Indonesia, which fought for the incorporation of West Irian in the 1960s and proclaimed that national self-determination is applicable only within colonial boundaries, went beyond these boundaries in 1975 and swallowed the former Portuguese Timor by armed force.

⁸⁵ McCartney, *op.cit.*, p.192.



MODELO FENOMENOLÓGICO-GENÉTICO PARA EL ANÁLISIS COMPARATIVO DE LA DIMENSIÓN POLÍTICA DE LAS IDENTIDADES COLECTIVAS EN EL ESTADO DE LAS AUTONOMÍAS

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El objeto de nuestro programa de investigación es la comparación entre las identidades colectivas de las diferentes comunidades autónomas que conforman el Estado de las Autonomías, de las que en esta primera investigación hemos seleccionado cinco¹. Nos interesan aquellas identidades colectivas que dentro del abanico de las existentes en la demarcación social en cuestión tienen relevancia directa en relación con la legitimación política del Estado.

Las vertientes de la identidad colectiva que nos interesan a la hora de la comparación son las que vienen definidas por el doble momento metodológico de nuestra investigación, el fenomenológico y el genético.

Desde el punto de vista fenomenológico nos interesa, en cada comunidad autónoma, la descripción de la conciencia colectiva en una serie de aspectos puramente internos a los actores sociales. Se trata de conocer la conciencia de identidad en la triple dimensión definida por Tajfel² para todo grupo de pertenencia: la dimensión cognitiva, la dimensión evaluativa y la dimensión emotiva.

En primera instancia es la dimensión cognitiva la más directamente detectable al observador aunque no solamente se trate de conocimiento reflexivo, sino también de niveles más prácticos de conocimientos que permanecen en un estado prerreflexivo³.

¹ Comunidad Autónoma Vasca, Navarra, Cantabria, Murcia y Castilla-León.

² H. Tajfel, "Grupos humanos y categorías sociales", Barcelona, Herder, 1984.

³ Cfr. los niveles de legitimación que establecen P. Berger y T. Luckmann en "La construcción social de la realidad", Buenos Aires, Amorrortu, 1968, pp. 122 y ss.; y también los distintos niveles de conocimiento que establece Schutz en A. Schutz y T. Luckmann, "Las estructuras del mundo de la vida", Buenos Aires, Amorrortu, 1977.

Partimos del supuesto de que las imágenes, definiciones de las realidades colectivas e, incluso, los sentimientos que estas realidades inspiran a los actores no son la simple proyección subjetiva de una realidad objetiva. Más bien ocurre que a través de las múltiples interacciones de la vida social los actores interiorizan maneras de definir la realidad social (y no social) y a través de esta interacción las definiciones se impregnan de afectividad. No todos los actores son iguales a la hora de producir y mantener las relaciones sociales. Como todo, o casi todo, en la sociedad, la capacidad para producir o cambiar las definiciones y el sentido de la realidad no está igualmente repartida. Por estas razones se hace necesario un momento de la investigación, el genético, en el que el sociólogo descubra cómo y quienes producen una determinada definición de la realidad y cuales son los mecanismos sociales a través de los cuales esta definición tiene éxito social al convertirse en conocimiento compartido.

1. Aspectos fenomenológicos

Desde la perspectiva fenomenológica nos interesa conocer los elementos en los que los actores, en cada una de las comunidades autónomas objeto de nuestro análisis, se basan para caracterizarse a ellos mismos y también nos interesa hacer una caracterización de cada identidad colectiva, atendiendo a una serie de dimensiones de la identidad.

1.1. El contenido de la identidad: los elementos caracterizadores

Quienes se sienten partícipes de una identidad colectiva emplean para diferenciarse de los otros una serie de elementos diferenciadores. Pero estos elementos no son todos del mismo orden. Sin ánimo de precisar totalmente, podemos decir que hay dos elementos genéricamente constituidos que son el territorio y la historia o si se prefiere en términos de Eliade⁴, el espacio y el tiempo sagrados. Mauss habla, por un lado de la sensación del espacio y del territorio social, y, por el otro, de la noción de descendencia común, que forma el mito⁵. Un tercer elemento que podemos llamar genéricamente constitutivo sería precisamente la utilización por parte de los actores de algún elemento sobre el que definir su diferencia, la llamada a algún rasgo con el que diferenciarse de los otros, y, en particular, de los otros más cercanos. En relación

⁴ M. Eliade, "Lo sagrado y lo profano", Madrid, Guadarrama.

⁵ M. Mauss, "Essais de Sociologie descriptive", París, Minuit, 1969, pp. 100-1.

con esta cuestión mención especial merece la lengua, ya que como es obvio un “nosotros”, una identidad colectiva no puede constituirse sin la posesión de un lenguaje común que permita la comunicación colectiva. Esto es verdad, pero de ello no puede deducirse que la lengua sea elemento necesario y suficiente para la constitución de una identidad colectiva. Ni tampoco que la posesión de una lengua común convierta a ésta necesariamente en signo diferenciador.

Y es que la dimensión lingüística de la identidad colectiva puede presentar aspectos paradójicos. Toda identidad colectiva tiene necesariamente que presentar alguna forma simbólica de comunicación y participación. Cuando hablamos ya de identidades colectivas con proyección política estamos pensando en identidades colectivas con una cierta complejidad y persistencia en el tiempo, y en el sentido de que son identidades colectivas con cierta permanencia histórica y con elementos cognitivos algo elaborados, lo suficientemente reflexivos como para atribuir a esta identidad colectiva un papel cierto en la legitimación o en la ilegitimación del poder político. Ello implica, este desarrollo cognitivo en el tiempo, que se debe dar una estructura comunicativa algo compleja y que normalmente puede estar constituida por una lengua común. Esta lengua común, si es diferente de la lengua o las lenguas circundantes puede constituirse en rasgo diferenciador al que los miembros de esa identidad colectiva atribuyen significación diferenciante. Pero esta situación últimamente descrita puede ser más compleja y paradójica.

En ciertas situaciones de contacto lingüístico una lengua puede convertirse en dominante y producirse un proceso histórico de pérdida progresiva de valoración social, por parte de los hablantes de la lengua dominada, de esta lengua dominada y, de ahí, generación tras generación, puede producirse una pérdida de función comunicativa de la lengua dominada, medible por el cada vez menor porcentaje de hablantes en la lengua dominada y por el cada vez menor número de escenarios sociales en los que los aún hablantes de la lengua dominada continúan expresándose en ella. Ello puede constituir un proceso poco traumático, al interiorizarse y aceptarse la situación en términos de atribución de valores positivos a la lengua dominante. Pero puede (lo que quiere decir que no tiene necesariamente que) llegar un momento histórico en que la conciencia de pérdida de capacidad comunicativa de la lengua sea traumática y la pérdida sea tematizada y valorada en términos negativos, y se reaccione a la sobrepresión social y política en términos de atribución de significación diferenciante de la comunidad. Pero, ¿de qué comunidad? ¿De los que son actualmente hablantes o de todos cuantos “debieran” ser hablantes de no haber existido la presión social y política?.

Por tanto, incluso teniendo presente el carácter especial del elemento lingüístico, podemos decir que los actores, a la hora de diferenciarse de los otros, toman rasgos diferenciales para hacerlo, considerándolos como características propias de su grupo, o, lo que es más, considerando su identidad como la proyección subjetiva de ese rasgo pretendidamente objetivo. De manera que se puede decir que un elemento constitutivo de segundo orden es aquel que los actores escogen en concreto para diferenciarse. En relación a este rasgo que los actores utilizan para autorreconocerse y diferenciarse de los otros y siguiendo dentro de la coordinada fenomenológica (interioridad de la conciencia de los actores) podemos decir que los actores utilizan rasgos "objetivizables". Es decir que para ellos debe existir una frontera clara y visible, objetiva, de la identidad con respecto a los otros. En este sentido podemos ver cómo el objetivismo más sustantivo (siempre para el actor) es el biológico y después el cultural. Dentro del objetivo cultural el rasgo más claramente diferenciador es la lengua.

En relación al elemento genéricamente constitutivo, de segundo orden, que es la historia, cabe señalar el carácter necesariamente mítico que tiene, dado que estamos en el momento fenomenológico de la investigación. Los actores necesariamente, para afirmar la objetiva existencia de su identidad colectiva, deben por la vía de la afirmación de la existencia de la identidad ya en el origen, borrar el carácter arbitrario que significaría el reflexionar sobre el hecho de que es un producto histórico. La identidad colectiva es afirmada como existente desde el origen y por ello se construye la historia del grupo. De ahí que en los grupos que se dicen nación se construya la historia sagrada de la nación existiendo ya desde el origen. De ahí que Nietzsche que consideraba que el conocimiento no está hecho para saber sino para destruir, para dar tajos, para destruir los presupuestos necesariamente irreflexivos de la existencia del grupo, nos dice que la historia será efectiva en la medida en que introduzca lo discontinuo en nuestro mismo ser, ya que lo que se encuentra en el origen histórico de las cosas no es la identidad aún preservada del origen, es la discordia de las otras cosas, es el disparate⁶. Como vemos, Nietzsche-Foucault se sitúan en situación de total exterioridad (momento genético), lo que nos sirve, como contrapunto, para construir nuestro momento fenomenológico.

1.2. Alteridad, compatibilidad y conflictualidad de la identidad colectiva

De la misma manera que el individuo adquiere la conciencia de su individualidad en función de la existencia de un tu, la identidad colectiva se forma

⁶ M. Foucault, "Microfísica del poder",

también en la alteridad. Un nosotros se forma y se experimenta individual y colectivamente en función de los otros, en función de un ellos, o de varios ellos.

En relación con la alteridad encontramos otros dos aspectos de la identidad colectiva que son la incompatibilidad y la conflictividad entre identidades colectivas.

Cuando analicemos una determinada identidad colectiva deberemos establecer el cuadro de alteridades, de compatibilidades e incompatibilidades, y de posible conflicto con otras identidades.

Una identidad colectiva puede estar en relación de alteridad con otra, siendo en principio incompatible con ella, pero pudiendo en ciertas situaciones darse una cierta subsunción de ambas en una identidad colectiva común de orden superior que implica el paso a la latencia de las dos identidades colectivas en relación de alteridad y la puesta en funcionamiento de otra identidad colectiva de superior orden que subsume a las dos primeras, y posiblemente a otras. El momento en que la nueva identidad de orden superior se pone en funcionamiento significa que otra nueva alteridad se ha puesto también en funcionamiento. Pensemos en dos identidades colectivas correspondientes a dos comunidades autónomas con una cierta alteridad en su definición y en la posible subsunción en la identidad colectiva nacional, española. O pensemos también en el sentido cierto de pertenencia común que surge entre los miembros de dos pueblos geográficamente cercanos que están en cierta relación de histórico enfrentamiento, cuando se encuentran fortuitamente en la calle de una lejana población extranjera.

En principio, el hecho de que dos identidades colectivas sean subsumibles en una de orden superior no les priva de su relación de incompatibilidad.

En relación con la identidad es preciso diferenciar los conflictos entre identidades diferentes de aquellos conflictos sobre la identidad. En definitiva, podemos diferenciar las identidades en conflicto de los conflictos de identidad.

En principio todo conflicto social lleva implícito un cierto problema de identidad. Todo conflicto social tiende a convertirse en un conflicto entre dos partes. Cuanto mayor sea la intensidad del conflicto mayor será la cohesión en el interior de cada una de las partes y, viceversa, cuanto mayor sea la cohesión interna de las partes mayor será la conflictividad. En este sentido todo conflicto social es, o tiende a convertirse en, un conflicto entre identidades.

Dentro de los posibles tipos de conflictos sociales hay algunos cuya definición se da principalmente en términos de identidad social o, si se prefiere, de identidad étnica. Como ejemplo podemos pensar en un conflicto racial entre blancos y negros en una ciudad norteamericana. Si nos fijamos podemos observar cómo este conflicto racial sigue siendo un conflicto entre identidades y no un conflicto de identidad. Están muy claras en el panorama social las dos identidades colectivas que, en esos momentos históricos en que este conflicto polariza la vida social, están en conflicto. Es más, el conflicto es un mecanismo, dentro de cada identidad colectiva, de mútuo reconocimiento interno y de reconocimiento de la identidad de los otros; es decir, que el conflicto entre identidades es una importante forma de objetivación social de la identidad colectiva. Lo que añade estos conflictos específicos entre identidades al carácter de conflicto entre identidades que tiene cualquier conflicto social, es que su definición social se hace directamente en relación con la identidad, en términos de identidades colectivas.

Pero todavía hay otro tipo de conflictos en relación con la identidad que plantean problemas específicos. Y son, justamente, aquellos conflictos sociales que versan sobre la identidad. Son los conflictos de identidad. Por el momento podemos decir que son conflictos sobre la definición de una realidad social que comprende a las partes contendientes. Cada parte mantiene la existencia de una identidad colectiva que comprende a los miembros de esa parte y a los de la otra, y que es incompatible con la identidad colectiva cuya existencia es mantenida por los miembros de esta otra parte. El ejemplo clave que podemos poner es el del conflicto que sobre la identidad colectiva se da en un territorio periférico de un Estado-Nación en el que existe un nacionalismo periférico. El conflicto se da entre quienes mantienen que la realidad colectiva existente en ese territorio constituye una nación en sí misma y quienes mantienen que ese territorio es una parte de la nación correspondiente al Estado. En rigor podemos decir que este conflicto sobre la identidad contiene en sí mismo un conflicto entre identidades, pues quienes defienden cada postura mantienen una solidaridad colectiva frente a los que mantienen la otra; es decir que el conflicto sobre la identidad lleva implícito un conflicto entre identidades políticas; en nuestro caso éstas estarían formadas por los “nacionalistas periféricos”, por una parte, y por los “nacionalistas estatales” por la otra.

Esta cuestión pone de relieve el tema de la inclusividad de las definiciones sociales de las realidades colectivas. Aparte de que toda definición de identidad social lleva implícita una categorización en términos de inclusión-exclusión, la inclusión a veces es definida como comprendiendo no sólo a quienes mantienen la definición en cuestión, sino también a otros que no están de acuerdo con ella. Este fenómeno

es socialmente posible por el hecho de que los actores definen su identidad colectiva haciendo llamada a características objetivas que, para ellos, van más allá de la posible existencia de conciencia de identidad. En una palabra, los actores intentan perfilar objetivamente el límite de su identidad colectiva, más allá de que todos los que posean esa característica tengan conciencia de identidad. Como otros no comparten esa definición y mantienen su propia definición objetivante, puede darse un conflicto sobre la identidad. Este caso es muy frecuente cuando se dan definiciones territoriales de la identidad colectiva, porque puede que entre los individuos que viven en ese territorio no se de unanimidad en la definición de la identidad colectiva, compitiendo dos o varias definiciones en términos de identidad colectiva de la entidad territorial.

1.3. La dimensión política de la identidad colectiva

En una realidad social determinada existe una indefinida variedad de identidades colectivas; muchas de ellas no tienen referencia política alguna, pero otras sí. Tanto más si estamos hablando de sociedades cuya forma fundamental de legitimación política es la democrática, pues la democracia es, desde el punto de vista que ahora nos interesa, la atribución a una específica identidad colectiva de la capacidad de legitimación política del centro de poder existente sobre el territorio, con exclusión de toda capacidad de legitimación a cualquier otra identidad colectiva posible y a cualquier otra fuente de poder. De manera que, en términos rigurosos, la democracia excluye cualquier fuente (simbólica) de poder que no sea la comunidad nacional y la capacidad de cualquier otra comunidad de mayor o menor tamaño para legitimar el poder sobre el territorio del Estado.

De manera que la legitimidad democrática implica una cierta incompatibilidad en la pertenencia a diferentes comunidades políticas y, por tanto, plantea la incompatibilidad de identidades colectivas políticas del mismo nivel. Aquí se pueden establecer las diferencias entre lo que podemos denominar regionalismos y nacionalismos periféricos (en relación al Estado-Nación).

En el interior del Estado-Nación la idea y el sentimiento de una identidad colectiva nacional en la periferia es incompatible con la idea de la nación propia del Estado-Nación. Los nacionalismos periféricos ponen en tela de juicio la legitimidad del Estado central. Y ello porque la afirmación de una comunidad nacional supone la afirmación de la necesidad de existencia de un centro de poder, con exclusión de cualquier otro, correspondiente a la dicha comunidad. Son compatibles las comunidades que no tengan una proyección política nacional, es decir, aquellas -por

supuesto- que no tengan proyección política y aquellas cuya proyección política no alcance el carácter excluyente propio de la nación. Estamos refiriéndonos fundamentalmente al modelo típico ideal de Estado Unitario, que es preciso no confundirlo con Estado monoétnico. Es perfectamente posible la existencia de un Estado pluriétnico y unitario en términos nacionales. Lo que queremos decir es que nación es una identidad colectiva mono o pluriétnica (usando el término étnico en su sentido más culturalmente objetivo, como demarcación objetiva de una cultura) que tiene un elemento cognitivo específico para los actores: legítima, con exclusividad, un centro político existente o posible.

Una comunidad regional, por contra, es una identidad colectiva compatible con la identidad colectiva de la Nación del Estado. Lo que exige esta identidad colectiva regional no es la constitución de un centro exclusivo de poder sino la constitución de una delegación del poder central en el territorio regional. Regionalismo lleva implícita una descentralización del poder, pero no son la misma cosa. El regionalismo para legitimar el poder central exige que se descentralice territorialmente. De manera que regionalismo es más que deconcentración, pues exige descentralización territorial y es más que pura descentralización territorial, pues es exigencia de descentralización territorial por razones políticas que afectan a la propia legitimidad del Estado. Pero no exige un centro excluyente de poder sobre su territorio.

Nuestro análisis de la solución política ensayada en España tras la muerte de Franco tiene que poner especial interés en las formas de las identidades colectivas periféricas y en la compatibilidad o incompatibilidad de ellas con la identidad colectiva española. Y, lógicamente, dentro de cada comunidad autónoma, puede darse un panorama múltiple y complejo en las definiciones políticas de la identidad colectiva.

En la actual coyuntura histórica, puede ayudarnos a desentrañar el carácter de las identidades colectivas con proyección política, la concepción que se tenga dentro de ellas de la integración europea, ya que puede darse desde la idea de una integración de la comunidad autónoma en cuestión a través de la integración española general hasta la concepción de que la integración europea borre, o al menos difumine, la entidad de los actuales Estados. Lo que aquí nos interesa no es tanto cómo realmente se está construyendo Europa, sino cómo se plasma la idea de Europa en las identidades colectivas con relevancia política, porque nos puede decir mucho sobre el carácter de estas identidades colectivas.

2. La exterioridad de la identidad colectiva: genética y mantenimiento

2.1. Ámbitos de actuación de la identidad colectiva con dimensión política

Es cuestión importante saber en qué ámbitos de la vida social se pone de manifiesto, es actuante, una identidad política concreta.

Creemos que la distinción más importante, de este punto de vista, es la que se hace entre la esfera pública, como esfera de las relaciones políticas y administrativas, y la esfera privada, entendida ésta como ámbito de la interacción privada.

Es sabido que la distinción entre esfera pública y esfera privada no es clara. En primer lugar porque existen varias tradiciones intelectuales en la cultura occidental que contienen visiones no diametralmente opuestas pero sí diferencias en el punto de vista y en los horizontes de actuación de la citada distinción. Probablemente la tradición mediterránea y la tradición anglosajona sean los focos de estas distinciones. En segundo lugar, la distinción no es clara porque hay esferas de la vida, como la profesional y económica, que no está muy claro a qué esfera pertenecen y porque hay instituciones sociales de fuerte relevancia en ambos ámbitos, como son las instituciones educativas.

Pero nos basta, por el momento, en una tradición más bien anglosajona hacer la distinción entre la actividad en las instituciones políticas y administrativas y la vida en privacidad (quedando la esfera económica navegando entre dos aguas). La esfera profesional de la política, por supuesto, tiene incidencia en el ámbito privado, aunque no sea más que a través de la difusión de la representación política (en el sentido teatral y también en el político) que se realiza a través de los medios de comunicación y que penetra en el mundo privado de los actores sociales. Pero las relaciones entre esfera política y privacidad pueden ser más complejas, cuando se dan identidades políticas problemáticas.

La identidad colectiva con proyección política tiene relevancia fundamental en la esfera pública, ya que por definición estamos hablando de la dimensión política de la identidad colectiva. Pero puede ocurrir, principalmente en los casos en que se da un conflicto sobre la identidad y que por lo tanto coexistan al menos dos definiciones políticas de la identidad colectiva, que una de las definiciones sea políticamente dominante y que, no dándose un sistema democrático de libertad de confrontación política, el aparato del Estado se empeñe en la negación oficial de la

otra definición de la identidad. El resultado puede ser, como fue la situación en Cataluña y el País Vasco durante el Franquismo, que una de las definiciones de la identidad, la dominada, se retire total o parcialmente al ámbito privado de la vida social⁷. La imposible utilización de medios públicos de mantenimiento de la identidad colectiva hace que los mecanismos privados entren en funcionamiento, lo que acarrea una sobredeterminación afectiva del sentimiento de la identidad colectiva públicamente negada, pues, por una parte, la familia -mundo por excelencia de la afectividad- se convierte en un lugar privilegiado de la identidad política y, por otro, la negación pública de la identidad colectiva familiarmente protegida significa la negación pública del universo familiar. Y la sobredeterminación privada, familiar, de lo público puede implicar una cierta predeterminación de posiciones violentas en quienes sufren la negación.

Esta situación que se ha dado por lo menos en Cataluña y el País Vasco durante el Franquismo ha originado en el Postfranquismo una cierta dificultad en la implantación de la forma democrática de organización política no sólo por los problemas de legitimación política que plantean los nacionalismos periféricos en sí mismos, sino por las dificultades -más marcadas aún en el País Vasco- de reconducir toda la vida política a la esfera institucional, no sólo por la existencia de la violencia política, sino por la constitución de la calle como espacio de expresión política de las relaciones intersubjetivas y asociativas a partir de 1970⁸.

De manera que hoy por hoy, al menos en las comunidades autónomas mencionadas, la identidad política tiene un fuerte impacto en el mundo privado de las relaciones sociales y, además, la vida política no se reduce a la vida institucional, permaneciendo parte de ella en lugares sociales más cercanos a la privacidad de los individuos. Y por otro lado, el mundo de los partidos políticos de tipo nacionalista, que tienen una visión interclasista de la sociedad, mantienen estructuras de plausibilidad que hacen que los locales del partido se conviertan en lugares privilegiados de encuentro de lo público y lo privado.

Pero además, como ya hemos dicho, la vida institucional y con ello la dimensión política institucional de la identidad colectiva se introduce en los mundos privados a través, fundamentalmente de los medios de comunicación.

⁷ Cfr. para Cataluña, H. Johnston, "Tales of Nationalism: Catalonia, 1939-1979", New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1991; para Euskadi, A. Pérez-Agote, "La reproducción del nacionalismo. El caso vasco", Madrid, Siglo XXI, CIS, 1984.

⁸ Cfr. A. Pérez-Agote, "La reproducción del nacionalismo. El caso vasco", op. cit.

2.2. Génesis y desarrollo de la identidad colectiva

En primer lugar debemos distinguir entre el modelo descriptivo de la fundación de la identidad colectiva y el modelo de posterior mantenimiento, refundación y transformación de la identidad. Probablemente, los mecanismos sociales que funcionen en las distintas etapas sean diferentes.

Con respecto al modelo de la fundación conviene a su vez distinguir entre lo que es la producción y lo que es la difusión de la identidad colectiva. Conviene recordar que el fenómeno social de la identidad colectiva es, como ya se indica al caracterizarlo así, algo que pertenece primariamente al mundo de los actores y que, como tal, comienza a ser sociológicamente interesante cuando alcanza una cierta difusión social. Es desde la difusión general cuando se hace relevante sociológicamente la producción fundacional de la identidad colectiva. En general se puede decir que también aquí se puede esperar que los mecanismos sociales sean diferentes en la producción, donde los intelectuales y aquellas instancias relacionadas con la producción (no la reproducción) simbólica tendrán un papel privilegiado, y en la difusión, que pondrá en funcionamiento mecanismos de difusión de la identidad ya producida. Es preciso poner de manifiesto con respecto a la producción fundacional que esta suele hacer llamada para la producción del discurso a elementos culturales históricamente preexistentes.

Con respecto al modelo del mantenimiento son precisas algunas observaciones. En primer lugar, se trata de una situación posterior en el tiempo, en la que ya se encuentra la identidad difundida y se mantiene mediante unos mecanismos más o menos normalizados. Por supuesto no se puede establecer siempre una separación tajante entre fundación y mantenimiento. En segundo lugar lo que significa la distinción entre fundación y mantenimiento es la necesidad de prestar atención al paso generacional, entendiendo tanto en términos familiares, sobre todo cuando la identidad colectiva afecta con intensidad al mundo privado, como extrafamiliares. En tercer lugar, es fácil comprender que el mantenimiento de la identidad implica refundación, pues se requiere la rememoración mítico-ritual de la fundación, pero también transformación, en el sentido de que a través del mantenimiento ocurren también transformaciones de la identidad en el devenir histórico.

2.3. Mecanismos sociales y mecanismos sociológicos

La diferenciación que hacemos entre mecanismos sociales y mecanismos sociológicos es, una vez más, relativa. Hace referencia al diferente grado de

abstracción sociológica. Cuando hablamos de mecanismos sociales nos referimos a instituciones sociales claramente visibles y detectables. Y cuando hablamos de mecanismos sociológicos nos referimos a un segundo nivel de abstracción pues son más bien procesos inferibles que instituciones detectables. Hay que agregar que muchos mecanismos sociales forman parte de mecanismos sociológicos, lo que hace la delimitación más imprecisa. Pero recuérdese, que el presente modelo tiene una finalidad analítica y que se inscribe en un marco de investigación más amplio cuya finalidad es el entendimiento de los procesos de identidad colectiva y sus similitudes y diferencias en los diferentes casos estudiados.

Entre los mecanismos sociales de producción, reproducción y cambio se nos ocurren como más importantes los siguientes:

- Familia.
- Grupos inter pares.
- Sistema educativo.
- Religión e Iglesia.
- Mundo asociativo.
- Empresa⁹.
- Intelectuales.
- Medios de comunicación.
- Partidos políticos.

Como se puede ver, algunos son claramente más actuantes en el ámbito público mientras que otros lo son en el privado. Pero recordemos que toda realidad macrosocial pública tiene también una dimensión micro que puede estar muchas veces cercana al ámbito de lo privado. Con anterioridad nos hemos referido a la posiblemente importante dimensión privada del sistema educativo y de los partidos políticos.

Entre los mecanismos sociales de producción, reproducción y cambio podemos citar los sistemas de liderazgo y élites, las relaciones generacionales y el conflicto

⁹ Recientemente Edward A. Tiryakian en una alocución en el curso del XIV Congrès International de L'AISLF (Lyon, 6-10 Julio 1992) lanzaba la idea de que se dan en nuestra contemporaneidad nacionalismos socio-económicos más que políticos. Y citaba los casos de Japón, Corea y Singapur. En un también reciente artículo, R. Dore consideraba que uno de los éxitos de la economía japonesa en los mercados internacionales era, precisamente una nacionalismo económico: el hecho de que las firmas comerciales japonesas no representaban nunca en el exterior como en competencia entre ellas sino como japonesas, simplemente. R. Dore.

social. Como se puede ver, las relaciones generacionales tanto familiares como no familiares están directamente relacionadas con mecanismos sociales, así como los sistemas de liderazgo y élites lo están con los intelectuales, los medios de comunicación de masas y los partidos políticos, entre otros.

Como ya hemos dicho, la separación de todos los mecanismos no es nítida, pero puede ayudarnos a una disección analítica de la realidad que nos interesa: el complejo entramado de mecanismos de producción, mantenimiento y cambio de una identidad colectiva en su devenir histórico.

2.4. Los componentes simbólico, mítico y ritual de la identidad colectiva

La identidad colectiva implica un agregado social¹⁰ el de quienes conocen y sienten que son esa identidad colectiva. Pero como ya hemos destacado al hablar de los componentes cognitivos hay identidades colectivas mantenidas por agregados sociales que definen, con ánimo de objetividad, una identidad colectiva como existente más allá de la conciencia de identidad y que por tanto, puede incluir a individuos que no se sienten pertenecientes a esa identidad.

En todo caso el agregado social que soporta la identidad colectiva, se corresponda o no exactamente con ésta, puede ser lo suficientemente grande para que no pueda darse interacción entre sus miembros, de tal manera que estos no puedan reconocerse personalmente, por lo cual necesitan la posesión de símbolos comunes.

Como el agregado social que ahora nos interesa es el que soporta una identidad colectiva que puede en sus elementos cognitivos comprender más individuos de los que la sustentan, los símbolos del agregado social se refieren a la identidad colectiva y, por tanto, para los miembros del agregado social estos símbolos representan "objetivamente" a todos los definidos por la identidad colectiva y tratan de imponerlos a aquellos que no los sienten como suyos pero que para los miembros del agregado social "son objetivamente" miembros. Toda identidad colectiva "sobre-inclusiva" comprende aspectos relativamente agresivos con respecto a los miembros que no se sienten pertenecientes a ella pero que están definidos por ella. En el caso de un

¹⁰ Utilizamos la noción de agregado social de Nisbet, quien nos dice que el agregado social es el agregado estadístico en el que se da la conciencia mutua de pertenencia entre sus miembros. R. Nisbet, "El vínculo social", Barcelona, Vicens-Vives, 1975, cap. 5.

nacionalismo periférico, en el espacio en donde este se da, las dos definiciones de la realidad colectiva vigentes sobre él son sobre-inclusivas y, por tanto, se dan entre los correspondientes agregados sociales operantes en el ámbito territorial periférico concreto ciertos aspectos agresivos.

En este apartado se trata de poner de relieve los aspectos simbólicos, míticos y rituales. Los tres aspectos están íntimamente imbricados entre sí, pero conviene separarlos con propósitos analíticos, aunque su observación pueda y deba en muchos casos realizarse en las mismas situaciones sociales. Tratemos ahora de separar analíticamente los aspectos en cuestión.

En primer lugar habrá que prestar especial atención a la simbología de la identidad colectiva y, lo que también es importante, a las formas y usos que se hagan de ella. Habrá que fijarse no solamente en los símbolos sino en la simbólica de la situación, en la utilización de ciertos símbolos y de otros no, en la compatibilización o no de los símbolos de la identidad colectiva con los correspondientes a otras identidades colectivas.

Podrán ser relevantes las formas y elementos decorativos en general y en particular la génesis y sentido del himno, la bandera y el escudo de la comunidad autónoma.

En relación con los elementos míticos, habrá que prestar especial atención al discurso o discursos existentes sobre la historia de la identidad colectiva. Puede ser de particular relieve la distinción entre el discurso fundacional y el vigente en la actualidad. Habrá que prestar especial atención al discurso oficial sobre la historia que esté socialmente objetivado. Dentro de las objetivaciones sociales del discurso histórico merecen destacarse las que hacen relación a la socialización de niños y adolescentes, futuros ciudadanos, como los libros escolares y publicaciones ad hoc. También podrá encontrarse una cierta objetivación del discurso sobre la identidad y su origen histórico en el material producido ad hoc para generar una imagen para el exterior: publicaciones históricas, turísticas, etc.

Sobre el discurso histórico conviene estar atentos al sistema de referencias empleado:

- Referencias intelectuales: personas, vivas y muertas y sus ideas.
- Referencias culturales: literatura, música, arte en general y folklore.
- Referencias lingüísticas o dialectales.

- Hitos o acontecimientos históricos fundamentales.
- Rasgos directamente tomados como diferenciales.
- Proyección política atribuida a las referencias.

Con respecto a los elementos míticos-históricos puede tener interés el comparar este discurso objetivado con el percibido en el otro nivel de la investigación, el fenomenológico-cognitivo, para poder inferir el grado de vigencia del discurso oficial.

Por último, es preciso decir que la utilización del término “mitológico” no tiene ningún sentido peyorativo ni de necesaria falsedad, sino que lo que interesa fundamentalmente de la historia desde nuestro punto de vista es su vertiente legitimadora de la identidad.

Con respecto a la dimensión ritual de la identidad colectiva habrá que dedicar especial atención al análisis del entramado social y a la observación de: fiestas, celebraciones sociales, rituales electorales y manifestaciones culturales, folklóricas y deportivas.

2.5. Momentos clave de la identidad colectiva

La determinación de momentos clave en el devenir de la identidad colectiva puede ser interesante en función, en primer lugar, de poder establecer una cierta periodización en ese devenir, y, en segundo lugar, de poder observar, fundamentalmente a través de los medios impresos de comunicación de masas la variedad de discursos que son socialmente mantenidos sobre la identidad en cuestión.

3. Finalidad de este modelo

Este modelo está destinado a la comparación. Tras su utilización en las comunidades autónomas mencionadas se realizará una comparación con el fin de establecer tipologías de identidades en cuanto a su contenido, su forma y sus mecanismos de producción, mantenimiento y cambio. Por último tras la comparación podrá realizarse una revisión de este modelo, para hacerlo más complejo y productivo.

4. Esquema general del modelo

4.1. ASPECTOS FENOMENOLOGICOS:

- 4.1.1. Definiciones territoriales.
- 4.1.2. Mito fundacional, historia de la comunidad.
- 4.1.3. Cuestiones lingüísticas.
- 4.1.4. Elementos caracterizadores diferenciales.
- 4.1.5. Alteridad de la identidad: frente a quienes se construye.
- 4.1.6. Compatibilidades e incompatibilidades.
- 4.1.7. Conflicto de identidad, identidades en conflicto.
- 4.1.8. Dimensión política de la identidad: nacionalismo, regionalismo, inexistencia de dimensión política.
- 4.1.9. Proyección europea de la identidad.

4.2. ASPECTOS GENÉTICOS:

- 4.2.1. Ámbito público y privado de la identidad.
- 4.2.2. Fundación y mantenimiento: periodización de la historia de la identidad.
- 4.2.3. Mecanismos sociales:
 - 4.2.3.1. Familia.
 - 4.2.3.2. Grupos inter pares.
 - 4.2.3.3. Sistema educativo.
 - 4.2.3.4. Religión e Iglesia.
 - 4.2.3.5. Mundo asociativo.
 - 4.2.3.6. Mundo empresarial.
 - 4.2.3.7. Intelectuales.
 - 4.2.3.8. Medios de comunicación.
 - 4.2.3.9. Partidos políticos.
- 4.2.4. Mecanismos sociológicos:
 - 4.2.4.1. Sistema de liderazgo y élites.
 - 4.2.4.2. Relaciones generacionales.
 - 4.2.4.3. Conflicto social.
- 4.2.5. Componentes simbólicos:
 - 4.2.5.1. Simbólica de situaciones claves.
 - 4.2.5.2. Himno, escudo y bandera: génesis y sentido.
 - 4.2.5.3. Compatibilidades e incompatibilidades simbólicas.

4.2.6. Componentes mítico-históricos:

4.2.6.1. Discurso fundacional y vigente sobre la historia.

4.2.6.2. Objetivaciones del discurso:

- Educación.
- Historia.
- Turismo.

4.2.6.3. Sistema de referencias en el discurso histórico:

- Intelectuales: personas e ideas.
- Culturales: literatura, música, arte, folklore.
- Lingüísticas o dialectales.
- Hitos o acontecimientos históricos fundamentales.
- Rasgos tomados como diferenciales.
- Proyección política de las referencias.

4.2.6.4. Comparación entre discurso histórico y conciencia histórica de los actores.

4.2.7. Componentes rituales:

- Fiestas.
- Celebraciones sociales.
- Rituales electorales.
- Manifestaciones culturales.
- Manifestaciones folklóricas.
- Manifestaciones deportivas.

4.2.8. Momentos clave de la identidad:

- Determinación de momentos más expresivos.
- Periodización de la historia de la identidad colectiva.

4.3. ASPECTOS COMPARATIVOS.

4.4. CRÍTICA DEL MODELO.



Nationalist Movements in Advanced Societies: Some Methodological Reflections

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Nationalism as a research topic for the social sciences has markedly grown in visibility and significance in recent decades, emerging from a period of benign neglect in the quarter century that followed World War II. This attention is not, of course, confined to academics. A larger public has been sensitized by the mass media to the potent force of nationalism in mobilizing populations overseas. On balance this force has contributed greatly to the global democratization process, nowhere more dramatically seen in its results than in the structural transformations of the Soviet system which just a few years ago was seen as an immovable totalitarian system. No less significant, though less dramatic is the East Asian economic nationalism (Scalopino 1991/92), which has been very effective in making global economic competitiveness the arena of mobilization. To be sure, nationalism is not only taken as a positive factor in East European «velvet revolutions» and East Asian «manufacturing miracles,» it is also viewed as a mobilizing (or more appropriate perhaps, a destabilizing) factor in severe conflicts, such as in the Caucasus, in the Middle East, and most visibly, in various regions of ex-Yugoslavia.

For Americans, it would be shortsighted to view contemporary nationalism only as an overseas phenomenon. Nationalism is also of great relevance in the United States' relations to the outside world, manifested in the mobilization of the American population to support such different activities as the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles, the 1991 Gulf War (whose military success and civilian backing was heralded by American leaders as ending the «Vietnam» syndrome of shame, defeatism and disunity), and in recent «Japan-bashing» and demands to «buy American» as reactions against growing Japanese economic power (albeit at local and state levels there is an eagerness to encourage Japanese capital investments). At the same time, of all the complex industrial nation-states with pronounced ethnic and regional cleavages, and with important upsurges in ethnic awareness and mobilization, the United States in this century has had the fewest manifestations of the sort of internal nationalist

movements that have lashed a number of both democratic and authoritarian polities. In this paradox lies another aspect of American exceptionalism.

In this essay, I will neither probe what underlies this paradox nor seek an extensive review and summary of the recent social science literature on contemporary nationalist movements. Rather, the emphasis will be a methodological critique of approaches which underlie how different generations of scholars have treated the phenomenon of nationalism in relations to modernity. This may prove a frame of reference that is as illuminating about the study of nationalism as the phenomenon itself.

Although in the classic sociological tradition Weber (1958) and Mauss (1969) gave passing attention to *nation* as a sociological topic, attention to the topic received scant rigorous sociological analysis until the 1970s. In terms of substantive definition, the seminal essay of Renan (a historian of religion, not sociologist) delivered at the Sorbonne in 1882 (1970), in which he lists a variety of objective and intersubjective factors that taken together comprise national solidarity, has not been improved upon, and indeed may even be viewed as heuristic for contemporary setting. Among key points, Renan pointed out that nationhood entails a «moral consciousness» for a large aggregate (1970:83), that «nationhood» and «statehood» have different referents (1970:68), and that historicity is an essential feature of the construction of national identity — not only what the collective memory remembers but what it also forgets in the process of forging national identity.¹

There is one further point to Renan's discussion that bears mention. However much nation is an historical construction,² Renan also emphasizes that it is «a daily

¹ «...the essence of a nation is, that all its individual members should have many things in common; and also, that all of them should hold many things in oblivion» (Renan 1970:67). It follows from this that a strategy of an established state in a polyethnic country is to make peripheral groups forget as much as possible historical markers of group identity by celebrating (remembering) other collective events that reinforce solidarity with the national state. A difficulty may arise when what is remembered as a state event, or by élites in power, is in fact an event of domination by the ruling élites over the élites of a peripheral (subordinated) ethnonational group.

² And historical reconstruction. Recent sophisticated treatments of the historical development, in the sense of an unfolding from the past to the present, of ethnic and national identity are to be found in Armstrong (1982) and Smith (1987). But in a complementary fashion, national identity is also continuously interpreted and defined in terms of a reconstruction/interpretation/imagination of the past (Anderson

plebiscite» (1970: 81). The crucial implication of this, to which I shall return later, is that the question of national identity implies a voluntaristic principle of collective action: actors' identity of nationhood in advanced societies is not an ascribed status but an achieved one. Or as Hall has recently put it for ethnic (read here, national) identity: «Identity is always in the process of formation» (Hall 1991: 47).

If I stress this, it is because today on the contemporary scene, at least the European scene, national identity is in a very dynamic stage of structural and intersubjective transformation. In the West, the emergence of the European Community as not only a huge modern *Zollverein* but also as an emergent transnational political and cultural community may well recast in the next generation the identity and identification of actors with existing nation-states (Wilterdink 1990, Smith 1991).

In the East (that is, Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR), the implosion of the Soviet empire in an extremely condensed time period is propelling the question of nationhood and national identity to the forefront of political issues, and this in two phases of center-periphery relations. First, the relation of what had been de facto «satrap republics» (or quasi colonies) within and outside the USSR to the Soviet state: in this phase, we have demands for national autonomy **from** the state, with the August 1991 failed coup sealing a successful outcome for this phase. Second, the problematic of center-periphery relation within newly autonomous republics, in instances where there are important ethnic minorities— e.g., Russians outside of Russia— and particularly where the ethnic minority held a dominant if not hegemonic place in the previous, de fact imperial regime. It might be noted in passing that the question of national identity has been abruptly thrown on the Russians both inside and outside Russia. What does it mean to be a Russian in the Baltics (or elsewhere in the former Soviet empire)? Yesterday, there were no Russians in terms of Soviet ideology, yet Russians were **de facto** colonizers and bearers of the empire; they felt at home, as privileged elites, wherever the Soviet flag flew. Today, they find themselves identified as «Russians,» as «strangers in the land,» a conspicuous minority. And what can even ask, what does it mean to be Russian in Russia? Yesterday they could identify with pride the core of the people who framed first the Tzarist empire then its successor, the Soviet empire; today, they are bewildered as to the fall of the empire, the misery and agony of what is happening to Russia and its rapid decline as an imperial center.

1983). The emerging national debate about the meaning of America's «discovery» in 1492 is a case in point; Ozouf's fascinating discussion of the 19th-century debate in France as to *which* July 14th (1789 or 1790) should be celebrated is another (Ozouf 1984).

It is a situation analogous to the problem of Spanish national identity that faced «the generation of 98».

The relative neglect of modern nationalist movements by sociologists until quite recently is the more surprising because in the post-war world alone there have been three major waves of nationalist movements. Obviously, the cluster of nationalist movements in the former Soviet empire has had great visibility since 1989. But, going backwards in time, related to and part of the new social movements of the late 1960s/early 1970s, there was a wave of regional movements of autonomy directed against the hegemony of Western states long associated with democracy (e.g., Canada, Great Britain, France), or states that had made commitments to democratization (as in the case of Spain). Finally, one may speak of yet an earlier cycle of nationalist movements arising in the Third World countries, and regions against the colonial state as such and/or perceived Western domination (e.g., Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea, the Maghreb countries, Iran and Guatemala). This movement crested in the early 1960s, though with later resurfacing, as in the case of revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua.

There are several notable aspects about these post-war nationalist movements. In terms of a major concern of this conference, it is remarkable that **quite contrary to some images of nationalism** the three sets of nationalist movements were in the great majority of instances successful in achieving basic aims **without prolonged or extensive military conflict**. And where there has been armed conflict—as in the cases of Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka—the conflict has been contained within the contested areas without neighboring countries and broad regions being pulled into the conflict.³ The breakup of the Soviet Empire and the acceptance of the rights of republics to declare their independence would surely have seemed impossible short of a nuclear war ten years ago!

It is also remarkable that nationalist movements within advanced liberal capitalist societies of the West and within advanced socialist societies of the East have taken place in major clusters pretty much at the same time. In the case of the second wave, the wave of nationalist movements seeking autonomy from liberal states, they began more or less around 1968 in terms of new or reinvigorated political parties,

³ The case of Israel/Palestine is, unfortunately, an exception. Unanswered Palestinian demands for autonomy and Israeli claims to occupied territories as part of the Biblical patrimony of the homeland have served as occasions for regional conflict involving other states. In terms of the sets of nationalist movements that have dotted the global landscape since 1945, the Israel/Palestine situation of two nationalisms clashing with each other, falls in between the cracks of Third World movements and movements of autonomy against democratic states.

and they ebbed in terms of political mobilization ten years later.⁴ In the case of the most recent wave, that of Eastern Europe and the USSR, the clustering is double (the socialist republic outside the USSR, and those inside the USSR), but both may be said to have taken place in two years.

It is essential for the sociological imagination to deal with clusterings or sets of comparable phenomena, rather than with just individual cases in isolation. So part of the challenge of dealing with Nationalism/nationalist movements in advanced societies is to seek an understanding of why they have occurred in sets, in cluster, and beyond that, what is the relationship of one cluster to another? We have as a task, I would propose, to make meaningful comparisons within and between clusters. The latter entails as an agenda item how to go about interrelating nationalist movements of advanced societies, in one instance *advanced industrial (liberal) societies* and in another instance *advanced socialist (centrally planned) societies*. To provide historical labels for these, let me designate the first set of movements against the liberal state as movements of «1968,» and the second set of movements against the advanced socialist state as the movements of «1989.»

That agenda item, and other suggestions for collaborative research, will be taken up in the closing section of this paper. In the middle section, I discuss some of the more recent (i.e., post-1968) interpretive schemes/models/images of nationalist movements and nationalism. However they differ methodologically and theoretically, they represent as a whole an important generational shift in viewing nationalism and nationhood, a shift which I think is for the better in terms of accuracy and analysis. This point merits amplification.

Just as nationalist movements as historical events have had several phases, so has their study. Essentially I would propose there have been three generations of modern scholars.⁵ The first generation is that of historians such as Carleton Hayes, Hans Kohn, Boyd Shafer and E. J. Hobsbawm. This «long» generation is one that is to be thanked for providing some pioneering studies, and it is one that has left what

⁴ From the point of view of those seeking autonomy, the two relatively successful outcomes have been the case of Spain, whose 1978 constitution grants major regions a substantial degree of political and economic autonomy, and the case of Switzerland in the creation of the Jura canton.

⁵ I differentiate between scholars who study nationalism as a phenomenon and those intellectuals who have been involved in the theory and practice of nationalism. From Herder and Fichte to the present, intellectuals have been closely identified with the formation of nationalist consciousness and with political leadership of nationalist parties in all parts of the world, including most recently in the USSR (Dorbizheva 1991). However, I am not dealing in this paper with activist intellectuals, only with those who study nationalism with «detached» curiosity.

I have elsewhere called «the dark legend» of nationalism (Tiryakian 1988). A second and now an emerging third generation — predominantly social scientists— have developed approaches to nationalism and nationalist movements that are more theory-driven and or more analytical, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, utilize a greater variety of empirical data (e.g., survey data, participant-observation data, field interviews) which may be analyzed qualitatively or quantitatively.

Before going over the newer approaches, it is worthwhile to discuss some underlying orientations in the first generation of historians. This is because the discourse of this generation contains presuppositions and metatheoretical elements which have framed the study of nationalism, and which indirectly, have something to do with unpreparedness of scholars vis-à-vis the resurgence of nationalist movements in advanced societies. To extend the point, I would propose that certain images of the historical past and of modernity are common to this generation of historians, within which cognitive frame «nationalism» is viewed ambivalently as a powerful source of collective action, an often anti-progressist social force that can derail the project of modernity.

The ambivalence is shown in several authors who essentially belong to this generation. Hans Kohn, for example, in associating nationalism with the nation-state, concludes his overview for *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1968) by stating:

«...It is a divisive force in a world growing more and more interdependent, a force capable of producing bitter tensions...that threaten the rational solution of international conflicts. On the other hand, nationalism is an important factor in preventing any one or two of the strongest powers from establishing their hegemony over the whole globe...» (1968: 69).

Kohn saw the post-war Third World nationalisms as similar to those of central Europe in the 19th century and of east-central Europe in the early twentieth century. Boyd Schafer in his equally valuable overview intended for historians emphasized more the differences within and between «old» Western and «new nations» Third World nationalisms, and counseled against monocausal explanations of the rise of modern nationalism (1976: 28). Like Kohn, and like Nairn (1977: 141), Schafer briefly acknowledged the role of nationalism in the modernization of the nation and the national state. But his evaluation is mingled with negative imagery and his discourse suggests his own preference for a post-nationalist phase of international relations. Note for example the following passages:

Nationalism, then, is a modern, learned response to an individual's internal needs for security and social acceptance and to external stimuli for conformity and public service...The nationalism of some individuals undoubtedly arises out of frustrations and traumatic experiences... That nationalism, intolerant as it often is, may limit both the material development and the creative possibilities of people no one can deny, but this is not its chief danger. Nationalism has often led to conflict between peoples...[Nationalism's] attraction is powerful because it offers or seems to offer security, freedom, and hope to citizens of nations. Any wider loyalty— to world state or world religion— will have to be based upon realities that offer as much to citizens of the world (1976: pp. 31–42, *passim*).

The negative images manifested in the above are those of the costs of nationalism in terms of interstate conflict, exclusion of certain groups of individuals from societal participation (racism, tribalism, etc.), and at the personality level drawing upon and reinforcing psychological maladjustment.

For the liberal historian, the thinly-disguised hope is the transcendence of nationalism to an open-ended internationalism if not a «world state or world religion.»

A more recent historical overview is provided by E. J. Hobsbawm (1990), based on lectures he gave the year Gorbachev came to power. It is a lucid analysis of three major phases in the past two hundred years of nationalism and national movements (with an emphasis in the early modern Western period up to about 1870 on the development of nationality and national patriotism by the modern state rather than the sequence being the other way around). In his penultimate chapter, Hobsbawm traces and interprets the evolution of nationalism in its «apogee,» the period 1918–1950. The «apogee» for this distinguished Marxist historian, one may infer, is not the development of «militant» nationalism, alternatively mentioned as «exclusive nationalism of states or right-wing political movements which substitutes itself for all other forms of political and social identification» (1990: 145). Rather, Hobsbawm proposes it was the emergence of «antifascist nationalism,» one that was particularly activated during the Spanish Civil War (1988: 147), though its basis reached back earlier:

If we accept that class consciousness in practice had a civic-national dimension, and civic-national or ethnic consciousness had social dimensions, then it is likely that the radicalization of the working classes in the first post-war Europe may have reinforced their potential national consciousness (1990: 145).

Hobsbawm notes that the discourse of national emancipation from the 1930s to the 1970s was essentially a discourse of the left, and that right-wing discourse (for

example that of *Action Française*) became discredited and delegitimated because of its association with fascism, and later with colonization.⁶

Hobsbawm's concluding chapter is devoted to his reflections on nationalism in the remainder of our century. Bearing in mind that he wrote these words in 1989, he states that the phenomenon of nationalism today differs from earlier phases because «it is no longer a major vector of historical development» (1990:163). Obviously the keenest historian was no more prescient about the impending implosion of the soviet Empire than anybody else. The imagery that follows this statement shows much affinity between Hobsbawm and Shafer. Hobsbawm sees as characteristic of the late 20th century nationalist movements that they are «essentially negative, or rather divisive...most of them are...rejections of modern modes of political organization, both national and supranational... they seem to be reactions of weakness and fear, attempts to erect barricades to keep at bay the forces of the modern world,» (1990: 164). And as illustration he proposes that the case of French Canada «may illustrate this combination of an intensified petty-bourgeois linguistic nationalism with mass future shock... Quebec nationalism is that of people in headlong retreat before historical forces which threaten to overwhelm it» (*ibid*).

Decrying as unfeasible the formation of new nation-states based on ethnic-linguistic criteria, Hobsbawm seems to engage in a rare bit of Marxist romanticism when he proposes that

it was the great achievement of the communist regimes in multinational countries to limit the disastrous effects of nationalism within them. The Yugoslav revolution succeeded in preventing the nationalities within its state frontiers from massacring each other... (1990: 173).

By that token, one might suppose, imperial and royal administration of other advanced societies should also be praised for curtailing nationalist divisions and ethnic conflict within multiethnic territories!⁷

⁶ Indeed, national liberation discourse in the Third World in the period 1950-1970 made effective use of Marxist-Leninist ideology, but also of left-wing Christian and other social philosophical doctrines (e.g., Mounier's personalism, existentialism), in mobilizing independence movements. In Western countries, there is a similar shift within the leadership of regional movements, from right-wing cultural autonomists to more social democratic nationalists. This is a generational phenomenon that merits comparative research.

⁷ The November 1991 visit of Grand Duke Vladimir Kirillovich to ancestral St. Petersburg at the invitation of the Mayor and the president of the Russian republic suggests that the present tide of nostalgia is more with the czarist era than the Stalinist era. But of course nostalgia is never fixed.

As final illustration of this generation of scholars, Conor Cruise O'Brien recently discussed the topic of nationalism in an essay in the *New York Review of Books*. Defining it as a «conglomerate of Emotions,» his thrust is to distance it as much as possible from democracy as a system of government (1991: 19). The latter relates to modern liberal values — the rule of law, freedom of expression, adult suffrage— values which, from his discussion, do not derive from feelings or emotions but from rational practices.

Drawing upon the complexities of the country he knows from birth (he was born in 1917 in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, which broke up into two states four years later), O'Brien views nationalism as an anti-democratic force that is ironically released by democratic movements in multinational polities (1991: 30). Converging with Hobsbawm, he views communism as having in the USSR and Yugoslavia become « a wonderfully flexible instrument for the governance of a multinational polity» (1991: 31). However, as the sedation wore off,

...nationalism woke up again, and disintegration of multinational polities set in. The early stirrings of nationalism appeared to be democratic, but later manifestations were more disquieting (*ibid*).

O'Brien does not pretend to have a better crystal ball than the rest of us in contemplating what will happen near-term in Eastern Europe, and he makes some cautious pre-coup prognostications, some of which already appear dated.⁸ What he is emphatic about, though, is that democracy and nationalism run on contradictory courses. More than that, the specter of nationalism for O'Brien is that short-term economic malfunctioning is more likely to undermine democracy than it is to undermine nationalism, since it is easier for the latter to find scapegoats (1991: 31).

* * *

If this introduction has given a fair amount of coverage to a cluster of well-known historians of nationalism, it is to draw attention to a frame of reference concerning nationalism that not only characterizes much of the historical study of the subject matter but also that has provided a great deal of the presuppositions or the metatheory of nationalism and nationalist movements in public discourse. Broadly

⁸ «The Baltic Republics, if permitted to leave the Soviet Union, would probably be democratic, but I would now rate their chances of being allowed to leave as high. As regards Yugoslavia, both Slovenia and most of Croatia seem likely to extricate themselves from the wreckage of the present federation» (1991:31).

speaking, I have used the metaphor of the «dark legend» of nationalism to summarize the tacit imagery of nationalism. Let us take another look at what underlies this imagery.

Nationalism from this perspective is viewed as a mobilizing force that was progressive in the formation of modern nation-states; it was, after all, a derivative of the revolutionary faith of 1789 (Billington 1980). However, after this «creative moment,» nationalism is either taken as regressive when it is used to dismantle or attack nation-states from within (i.e., in secessionist movements, such as the case of Quebec nationalism) or as a threat to civil society by excluding some groups from participation or, finally, as an international threat by provoking territorial claims and conflict with neighboring states. In brief, nationalism is a major destabilizing force used to mobilize the masses. To put it in Parsonian terms, it is a value orientation of anti-modernity that gives primacy of «particularism» over «universalism» (although dialectically, it appeals to universalism against particularism: the national community «über alles»; «America first,» etc.).

The authors that I have cited together represent the images of vintage liberal and Marxist thought, which, however they may differ in many respects, do converge in their negative evaluation of nationalism as anti-democratic, anti-progressive, and ultimately a fundamental threat to interstate relations.

From a sociology of knowledge perspective, it might be posited that for this generation of scholars the European situation between WWI and WWII was critical for molding the assumptive framework of their interpretations. Particularly, the fascist experience in Germany, Italy and several countries in Central Europe, in which nationalist sentiments were effectively mobilized against «alien» populations within the state and for the pressing territorial claims outside the existing boundaries of the state, left lasting scars on intellectuals who grew up on European soil in the interwar period. Most of these scholars of that generation never recovered from the scars of that variety of nationalism. They have left us with invaluable documentation of modern historical nationalist development, particularly in the case of Europe. But for research on the contemporary scene the more analytical, comparative and judgment-free approaches of the past 20 years are more heuristic in understanding the complex organizational and motivational factors that have given nationalist movement unexpected vitality and viability in advanced societies no less than developing societies.

It may be appropriate to close this section with mention of another distinguished historian who belongs to the same generation as those just discussed, Sir Isaiah Berlin. In a recent interview he first observed that recent events in Europe (notably the toppling of the Soviet Tower of Babel) indicate that nationalism, like racism, never died, both being «the most powerful movements in the world today, cutting across many social systems,» (Berlin and Gardels, 1991: 19). But he sharply differentiated aggressive from non-aggressive nationalism, tracing the latter to Johann Gottfried Herder and his opposition to the universalism of the French Enlightenment. Berlin seems to suggest that it is high time to recover the intention of Herder, of cultural nationalism not based on race or blood but on language, common memories, customs and soil. Berlin is far from a utopian in espousing a cultural pluralism within a common culture, since as an historian he knows how fragile have been polyethnic states. Fragile but also creative, as in the case of turn-of-the-century Austria-Hungary, or as Berlin also notes, as was the case of the Middle Ages with the universal Church and a common Latin language providing a basic cultural community within which communication was possible between major ethnic segments in spite of frictions.

We can't turn history back. Yet I do not wish to abandon the belief that a world which is a reasonably peaceful coat of many colors, each portion of which develops its own distinct cultural identity and is tolerant of others is not a utopian dream (1991: 21).

II

During the 1970s and the 1980s the social science study of nationalism as a phenomenon of modernity worth studying empirically came into its own in the hands of a second generation of scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. Two major aspects of this development should be noted. First, there was a marked increase in the number of sophisticated, multidisciplinary empirical studies using a variety of models and tools of analysis in order to make sense of the seeming anomaly of the recrudescence of nationalism in our contemporary setting. These empirical studies were complemented by new socio-historical studies (Armstrong 1982; Breuilly 1982; Smith 1986) that stretched the time frame of nationalism and its linkages to other features of the social order much further back than the late eighteenth-century matrix associated with the rise of French and German nationalism.

A second feature is an equally striking *qualitative* shift in the treatment of nationalist phenomena by the new generation of social scientists. Modern, contemporary nationalist movements have been studied behaviorally and

organizationally, and their actors treated as rational in seeking redress from situations of weakness and in expressing solidarity based on criteria other than functional specialization in the market place. If the new social science study of nationalism does not go as far as some of the sociological studies of what before had been taken as «deviant behavior,» still the new approach in this period is tacitly a much more understanding approach than the general perspective characterizing the first generation. Stated differently, whereas the import of the «dark legend» is to view nationalism and its social movements as atavistic and anti-modern, the newer social science approaches by and large take the same phenomena as part and parcel of the process of modernization.

Both the increase in Social science studies and the shift in orientation in dealing with nationalism have to be related to the late 1960s. At the societal level, a new generation of university students, the «baby Boom generation,» came of age in a climate of cultural and political upheaval, challenge to established authority, empathy with the «oppressed,» rejection of «the establishment» and its system of power (i.e., the established order, whether of society or of academia), and an acute contesting of the values of modern, large-scale, industrial, capitalist, impersonal society. In brief, the very same endogenous and exogenous factors which brought about the massive wave of student protest movements in the 1960s and their later derivatives (e.g., the feminist movement, the environmental movement, the anti-nuclear movement, etc.) were also operative in bringing forth a new wave of nationalist movements.

Rather than nationalist striving of the established «center» for aggrandizement at the expense of outlying regions in neighboring countries, the nationalist movements were much more likely to be of regions having certain cultural and economic characteristics that differentiated them from the «center.» The regions were not simply a distinct geographical enclave, but rather a demarcated territory whose inhabitants could lay claim to being a «nation» by virtue of history, culture, and institutions. For numbers of persons in these areas, the time had come (again) to organize either inside or outside the electoral process in order to regain the political, economic and cultural autonomy owed the nation; often, the claims were based on the grievances of a collective memory (Anderson 1983). These nationalist movements sought varying degrees of redress or autonomy from the center. To differentiate them from the nationalism of established states or those movements which successfully led to the establishment of modern states, they have been designated by various terms such as «minority nationalism,» «subnationalism» and «ethnonationalism.»

This last term has several possible connotations. On the one hand it may suggest that the demands of, or autonomy of, say, Catalans, Bretons or Welsh are more particularistic and of lesser significance than those of multiethnic or polyethnic units. On the other hand, the new nationalist movements may be said to have benefited by being associated with the unexpected emergence of and legitimacy given to ethnicity and ethnic demands for resources. What this has involved is a rejection of assimilation and cultural homogenization in favor of a multicultural society. If nationalism for the first generation of scholars was tainted with a «guilt by association» with fascism and the tyranny of a national majority trampling a cultural minority, it might be said that nationalism in the 1970s and 1980s greatly improved its standing in the academic community because its recent forms can be more readily associated with ethnic and other minorities seeking a rightful place in the sun.

Ideologically the discourse used by leaders and militants of these movements was in part very similar (and often in explicit reference) to anti-colonial nationalist rhetoric of the Third World, notably in invoking the them of the land, its people, its resources, and its culture as a dependent, oppressed «colony» needing to be «liberated.» It also utilized the them of «alienation» which gained currency in the West in the 1960s and made an important contrast in values between the authentic «community» which is the nation with the unauthentic «individualism» of late industrial society. This discourse might seem linked with the «romantic» nationalism of the right (say, associated at the turn of the century with the French writer Maurice Barres). In fact, the discourse of the nationalist leaders and spokesmen of the 1970s (e.g., Evans 1975; Levesque 1979; Wolfe 1973) is much closer to, if not part of, a general social democratic/left wing discourse that emphasizes social justice and communitarian values in a reconstructed social order that questions hierarchy and centralization. This general discourse, I would suggest, links the nationalist leaders who emerged in the late 1960s with seemingly different figures such as liberation theologians in Latin America, and Robert Bellah (1975), Tod Gitlin (1987), and Tom Hayden (1988) in the United States.⁹

In brief, the 1970s and 1980s saw an interesting social science «transvaluation» of nationalist movements. No longer being stigmatized as swept by irrational forces

⁹ The themes of colonialism, imperialism and alienation are frequently invoked in the various analyses of French ethnoregional movements in a special issue of Sartre's *Les Temps Modernes* (Person 1973), while Hechter made use of the notion of «internal colony» (1975), which had been used earlier by Blauner in reference to American racial minorities and by Lafont in reference to the French South (or «Occitanie»).

which in the hands of charismatic leaders could threaten democracy, the «new» nationalist movements, like social movements in general, have implicitly become viewed more as guarantors and regenerators of democracy in a «post-industrial» age (Osmond 1977; Touraine 1981).

* * *

Two major nodal points provide common denominators to the second-generation literature on recent nationalist movements. The first relates to modernization and modernity; the second to rationality. Although the recent literature has generated a good deal of internal controversy as to which model best accounts for the emergence of nationalist movements, it is important to note that there is a growing consensus that such movements, like other new social movements, are to be viewed as both modern and as rational. In this context, the statement of McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1988) about changes in the perception of social movements applies equally well to the recent study of nationalist movements, albeit the authors do not mention such movements:

To a new generation of sociologists, the many popular and clearly political movements of the 1960s and 1970s seemed incompatible with and poorly explained by the traditional perspectives on social movements... In contrast to earlier classical formulations, both perspectives (resource mobilization and political process) attribute rationality to movement participants and posit a fundamental continuity between institutionalized and movement politics. (1988: 697)

The «traditional» perspective involved in the case of the emergence of nationalism is one that sees the process of modernization as centered on the primacy of economic development, one having consequences for political and cultural change. Over time, regional cultural and other ascriptive differences should lose their functional significance for actors as the imperatives of the modern industrial system serve to integrate larger and larger units (eventually becoming a «world system»). Group and personal identity, by extension, become increasingly functions of the position one occupies in the division of labor or in the market place. Not only will regionally based or other ascriptive differences tend to disappear over time within a country, but with further development in late (really, very advanced) capitalism, national differences will tend to diminish as well, reflecting the globalization of production (e.g., «commodity chains») and consumption patterns.

The second generation of scholars dealing with nationalism have not rejected the notion of modernization; rather, they typically view the emergence of nationalism as interrelated with and even conducive to major features, such as socioeconomic development. Gellner (1983) argues against seeing nationalism as the awakening of what some have termed «primordial elements,» deep-seated, primitive psychic elements which might be related to what Durkheim termed «mechanical solidarity.» Rather, Gellner views modern nationalism as «the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state,» (1983:48). Nationalism is a major force which «determines the **norm** for the legitimacy of political units in the modern world,» (1983:49). Nationalism is functional to modernity, then by legitimating the high cultures which Gellner sees as arising in the age of industrialization. It is not a constant force of modernity, however: nationalist fervor is most pronounced at an early stage of industrialization when under the impact of an industrial center, peripheral territories need to develop into larger aggregates to resist and survive. The nationalist state functions as «not the protector only of a culture, but also of a new and often initially fragile economy,» (1983: 112).

In a related vein is the provocative analysis of Nairn (1977), a critical sociohistorical examination of fracturing tendencies in Great Britain. Like Hobsbawm he is a Marxist, but unlike Hobsbawm, Nairn makes use of Gramscian arguments in providing a sympathetic understanding of peripheral nationalist movements. Nairn's extensive discussion of the Scottish case highlights the role of nationalism as «the forced mode of socio-economic, and political, evolution» of peripheral regions; nationalism offsets the uneven development generated by capitalist core centers by fostering mobilization along broad cultural lines of ethnicity, language and other *differential*. There is a certain dialectic relating nationalism to modernity since via nationalist development «the typical backward region or ex-province has levered itself forward into modern times with the help of its own past— in effect, by a curious sort of regression» (1977: 141).

The case of Scotland presents an interesting anomaly for Nairn. He argues nationalism lay dormant until recently as a consequence of Scotland having been incorporated into the British state before the great period of industrialization. Other countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which developed nationalism did so, in effect, as either a compensatory reaction to retardation or as a means of rapid mobilization in order to catch up to the new industrial giants. Scotland, however, was part of the giant, hence its bourgeoisie and intellectuals which in other countries spearheaded nationalist development had already become part of a larger establish-

ment. It is only in recent times when Scotland's scarce resources (especially oil) are being exploited by non-Scots and when its development (like Wales) is allowed by Westminster to stagnate relative to that of England that Scottish nationalism has added a political dimension to its cultural identity. What has facilitated the rise of «neo-nationalism» in Scotland is also the lack of competitors: on the one hand, bourgeois modes of domination have wilted, and on the other, socialism at the state level has been ineffective (1977: 179).

Complementing Nairn's analysis of modernization and nationalism in Scotland, but from a non-Marxist perspective, is the detailed sociohistorical study by a political scientist, Jack Brand (1978).

A central argument of Brand in accounting for the rise of the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), which he traces back further than Nairn, is that it deserves to be seen as «a modernizing movement... as a determination to work for a technologically advanced, prosperous, modern, small nation state,» (1978: 23). The theme of alienation plays its part in accounting for an upsurge in SNP organizational strength, but Brand, converging with Nairn, stresses that alienation is not atomization of the «mass society» image but the loss of identification with the traditional major national parties (Labor and Conservative).

This theme finds an echo in a more recent analysis by Pulzer (1988), who traces cycles of ethnic protest in Scotland and Wales in the 1960s and 1970s to defects of established parties in appealing to peripheral voters, particularly younger voters. Essentially, Pulzer sees ethnoregional parties as surrogates for (British) third-party voting in rallying voters who are not solidly integrated into traditional parties, such as younger voters (Pulzer 1988: 348). The nationalist party's appeal to youth is not some romantic idealization of the past (although the association of 19th century nationalism with youth, as in cases of «Young Italy,» «Young Turks,» etc., merits a separate study). It is based, rather, on the nationalist party being viewed as more responsive to the needs of its constituents. Fluctuations in electoral strength reflect the varying degrees of attention given by major institutional parties and the state to the periphery.

III

Where do we go from here? The question has two interrelated aspects. The first aspect, very broadly put, is the fate of the «national question» including nationhood,

national identity, and nationalism in regard to modernity? I think it best to view nationalism as a set of ideas and goals that define and redefine the boundaries and purposive striving of the societal community; these striving are proactive as well as reactive relative to the broad environment of the societal community. In this perspective, nationalism may be seen not as the least nor as the most of modernity but as an integral feature of dynamics of advanced societies both in terms of intrastate and interstate relations. This perspective does not mean that nation-states are the final end-point of sociopolitical development and sociopolitical collective identity. By now the well-documented fact that a one-to-one correspondence of nationhood (in the sense of ethnic homogeneity and collective cultural identification) and statehood is the exception in the world (Nielsen 1985; Ra'anani 1990) should be taken as a caution of the finality of the nation-state, even if there were no global constraints operating against the autonomy of the nation-state. Arrangements that have made the modern nation-state viable in the past, including the cultural hegemony of an ethnic group which has constructed the identity and institutions of the nation-state in its formative stage, are not definitive. They are contingent on various factors that make for effective control, including stable if not rising standards of living, and identification with and commitment to a national culture that provides symbols of unity and identity.

The fulfillment of these factors in recent years has become problematic in various countries, whether these have market or planned economies. This is compounded by the demographic fact that in advanced societies the hegemonic group is a declining percentage of the total population. The internal tension that can be compounded by a dwindling majority, faced with the awareness of its becoming an endangered species, is conducive to producing a new round of neo-conservative nationalist movements within advanced societies: movements on behalf of «majorities» have a new «siege mentality» (witness the appeal of demands to curtail immigration and limit the entitlement rights of «foreigners»), in the face of demands by «minorities» for greater if not equal participation in the public sphere. Ethnic Russians in the Baltic as well as Central Asian republics face this sort of nationalism, but so do South Asians and West Indians in England, Algerians in France, Turks in Belgium and German, etc. Again, we should not think this is limited to overseas, since in the United States the same demographic situation prevails alongside a stagnant economy; the recent efforts in several communities and states to make English the sole official language is indicative.

At another level, the advent of the European Community is an important «defining moment» in the evolving course of modernity, quite beyond its immediate economic consequences of an immense free trade zone for «insiders.» Its actualization

may well produce a pan-European identity that will be both a return to «tradition,» in the sense of the appealing image of the cultural and interpersonal unification of Europe in the High Middle Ages (as Berlin noted, the Church, Latin, and we may add, the guild system), and an advance of modernity in terms of new institutions, economic, juridical, political, and educational (e.g., the Erasmus project). Within the very broad European Community framework that may eventually have two major interactive socioeconomic systems — an enlarged EC based in Brussels, and a renovated and democratized Soviet Union confederal system (at present, the Commonwealth of Independent States) — multiple options of collective identities, including multi-ethnic regional identities, cross-cutting the boundaries of traditional nation-states, may well prevail.¹⁰

In brief, one may view the next half-century as the restructuration of collective national identity in Europe. In an unguarded moment of optimism, I think that one scenario for the year 2050 may be that of an integrated European economic system framed by a political confederation that would allow for both an enlarged pan-European identity based on political rights and regional-cultural identity. European integration will also require new institutions and institutional arrangements, and new symbols and mechanisms for integration and differentiation. Easier said than done, obviously, but this would be a new state of modernization along the lines of the development of the nation-state in the 19th century, a development which called for the transformation of collective identities as much as the transformation of economic and political structures. Perhaps, just perhaps, our children will see a new «Concert of Europe» that will eclipse in productivity and human benefits its 19th-century forerunner.

Of course, the question of national identity in advanced societies has to go beyond the case of Europe. The possibility that European integration may have appeal or act as a stimulus beyond Europe is manifest in talks of new inter-state regional economic associations, such as the North American free trade integration scheme. Central America and East Asia, respectively, have a sufficient common cultural base, respectively, to envisage the possibility of an emergent regional identity based on common economic interests in the world economy. However, beyond Europe (and even beyond the present European Community and its immediate developmental

¹⁰ Wiltedink (1990) has made an interesting study of national differences in the emergence of identification with Europe as an economic, political and cultural unit. In general there seems to be a growing receptivity towards European integration as long as this does not threaten the maintenance of national integrity (1990:79).

phase after 1992), the crystal ball gets much too cloudy to discern patterns in the global kaleidoscope of the 21st Century.

On a note of sobriety, to make predictions about nationalism and nation-states in the next decades is tempting but the track record has been rather dismal. So, for example, Hechter in 1975 in what still remains perhaps the most important extensive study of ethnic nationalism using sophisticated historical and quantitative methods of analysis, concluded by affirming:

It may be expected that socialist states are placed at an advantage, relative to capitalist states, in coping with the problems of internal colonialism. This is not to suggest that internal colonialism is any less likely to develop in these societies; but, rather, that once these patterns, occur, they may be more easily addressed by socialist regimes. (Hechter 1975: 350).

And likewise, Sathymurthy less than ten years ago contrasted Yugoslavia as a «paradigmatic case of a multiethnic nation» in contrast to the divisiveness of Nigeria and Bangladesh (cited in Weiss 1984).

I could go on and traverse further the graveyard of fallen predictions about the fate of nationalism in the modern world. In the 19th century, the withering of the state was an image of the future common to both Marx and Spencer, but strong states have been very much major actors of the twentieth century. Predictions of the withering of nationalism in advanced societies may suffer the same fate as we near the end of the century, and certainly nationalism was an unexpected lever in the dismemberment of the Soviet empire.

Where we go from here also entails what practical agenda items we as social scientists undertake on nationalism.

I have suggested that at the theoretical level there is need to collate and codify materials of the various recent waves of nationalist movements. That is, we need to work out a comparative-analytical framework relating nationalism to modern societal development. In the first section I mentioned with illustrations from the generation of historian scholars that the relevance and significance of nationalism as a topic of social science inquiry has been limited by ideological considerations. Fortunately, this should no longer be seen as a limitation, judging by recent excellent scholarship on the part of a younger generation of comparativists, such as Brubaker (1990) and Greenfeld (1992). It would be a logical extension of recent scholarship to relate the

movements of the late 1960s–1970s against the nation–state within advanced liberal societies to the movements of 1988–1991 against the nation–state in advanced socialist societies; both may be viewed as challenges to authority and demands for autonomy which characterize «new social movements.»

Here, then, the study of nationalism may interface with the vast literature of the past twenty years dealing with social movements (for an overview, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald: 1988). The latter has dealt with a great number of «new,» «post–industrial» social movements such as ecology, the women’s movement, minority rights and the like (Offe), but except for Touraine (1981) it has not incorporated nationalist movements seeking autonomy from nation–states. Scholars dealing with nationalist movements and nationalism in advanced societies have under utilized the social movement approach and its two major poles (the «resource mobilization» pole and the «new social movements» approach stressing cultural identity).

A second broad avenue of research is to examine on a comparative basis the state strategies of coping with demands for autonomy. There is a whole range of options open to a state faced with such demands, and of course part of the strategies will depend upon the extent of autonomy sought. Accommodation is one possibility, as in the case of the Jura, but the state has many more sophisticated ways of neutralizing demands for autonomy, as was shown in the late 1970s in several referenda campaigns in Great Britain and Canada. Ultimately, a state may use force to repress demands if economic arguments and economic incentives do not succeed, and this line of investigation would suggest bringing into the analysis of specific recent and contemporary cases in Eastern Europe and the USSR models of rational choice and collective action (Olson 1990).

A third line is to give much greater attention to demographic variables involved in nationalist movements. First, a nationalist movement within a state territory may involve a previous ethnic majority in the territory (but a minority at the state level) becoming threatened (the perception of threat is all important) by a state–sanctioned immigration from outside territory. Second, demands for autonomy may also reflect a shrinking population due either to emigration or falling birth rates, leading to fears of the disappearance of the collectivity and its culture. The demographic variables have many combinations but the point I wish to make is that this general focus is also under utilized and that rises and falls in nationalist activity and sentiments may well reflect demographic changes as much as anything else. Much fruitful descriptive analysis has been undertaken in this direction in dealing with Eastern Europe (Besemeres 1989; D’Encausse 1978; Drefelds 1990–91; Guboglo 1990–91) but now is an occasion to treat it more systematically and more comparatively.

A fourth line of approach is what I will call a phenomenological approach. Actors in the same territory have multiple perspectives on the nation and the nation's relation to the state. Elsewhere (Tiryakian and Rogowski 1985) I have suggested a typology of nationalism reflecting that collective identities of the nation may relate it to the existent state, to the traditional community which needs to be restored, or to the state that needs to be created. Which actors hold what conceptions, where they stand in the social structure and in terms of political participation, and what demographic variables differentiate them (e.g., by generation) are the sort of questions that need to be asked in empirical research.

The situation in central and Eastern Europe, and in the former USSR today is obviously appealing in terms of research. To be sure, we should not overlook that the questions of nationhood, national identity, and nationalisms, if more «dormant» in the West in the sense of posing a less immediate threat to mass violence, are equally present and particularly in a period of economic recession, witness various incidents against foreign immigrants in Germany. But what makes the situation in «the East» so appealing is that so much has happened so quickly and so recently that as a whole it is a prime laboratory for the comparative analysis of intrastate and interstate nationalist movements, a comparative analysis of collective action and mass mobilization, of movement leadership and elite studies, and of state strategies in coping with demands for autonomy.

Moreover, part of the appeal is that such studies can be conducted today with the active collaboration of social science scholars in those territories. The research on national identity is not only topical for Western social scientists but it is of existential interest in the various components of the former Soviet Empire. In a sense, one may say that this is the «Spring» season for social science research, not only in Prague but in almost all of Eastern Europe and the former USSR, and the topic of national identity–ethnicity–nationalism is one of great collaborative interest. Given the multiple aspects of nationalism and national movements, multiple kinds of data, from micro levels of interaction patterns to macro levels of interstate relations and international aspects of political economy, utilizing all conventional methods from participation–observation to survey research, have to be sought and are being sought.¹¹

What are the implications of the factor of nationalism in modern advanced societies? I think that partly depends on identifying **which** form of nationalism is

¹¹ This is what we are undertaking in collaboration with colleagues in Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. As part of his comparative study, university students in these countries will be asked various items pertaining to nationhood and national identity.

operating, and what trajectory is sought in demands for autonomy. Moreover, it is not negligible that in a world growing more interdependent outcomes of nationalist movements and demands in one part of the world may have an important impact on another part. Nationalist movements of the the Third World in the 1950s played a role in the various protest movements in Western societies in the 1960s and in turn these movements spawned or provided important stimuli for the regional autonomist movements of the 1970s. I view the 1988–91 wave of nationalist movements in much of Eastern Europe as a delayed reaction to the events of 1968 (which did have a temporary effect in Prague and Warsaw then). Perhaps the Yugoslavia situation, in all its tragedy, will benefit Eastern Europe by being the deterrent to inter-ethnic conflict that before 1989 the nuclear bomb was to major powers conflict. But perhaps also, the ability of the Baltics to win their independence (and yet keep an economic association with the USSR) may provide autonomists in Quebec and other parts of the developed West, such as Scotland, with a model for further national development in keeping with demands for «sovereignty association.»

I would like to terminate with two propositions. The first is that this is perhaps the most exciting time to study nationalism and national identity because of its global relevance. We are living in a **decentered world**, where the collective identities of a «socialist bloc» and a «free world bloc» have lost their meaning. The multidimensional process of globalization «which cannot be reduced to a single economic dimension» may be thought of as a new macro phase of modernization, though not having a single axis of modernity. Globalization, if not making overnight for a «frontierless» world, is nevertheless undermining the significance of the state as an international unit, not only politically and economically but also culturally. At the same time, social and ethnic heterogeneity as features of modernity, amplified by large-scale migrations of population, are pressing endogenous factors making for social change. The transformations of institutions and identities, as well as bases of social power, in this period are generative of new bases of social conflict as well as new bases of social aggregation. Problems of national goals, national purpose, and of defining what actors are part of the national community are therefore general problems, though answers and solutions will take on specific forms in different countries and different regions. But this is precisely what makes the interdisciplinary study of ethnicity, nationalism and bearing on citizenship so timely and so crucial. In a nutshell, the end of this decade is witness to many **new nations** seeking to come out of the cocoons of **old states**.

My second proposition is related to Rogowski's concluding observation in going over the various essays that comprised our joint volume (1985). After summarizing what has been established about nationalism (a summary well worth reading), he

concludes that to really deal with nationalism, we must be beyond it: «our theorizing and testing will profit most from eventual dissolution into a general, parsimonious, elegant and well-supported **theory of political cleavage**» (Rogowski 1985: 384). I would propose that to really deal with nationalism we should treat it as a recurrent phenomenon of modern society and to do justice to it, we further need to interrelate the periodicty of nationalism in modern society with the periodicity of both religious cycles (McLoughlin 1978; Barkun 1985) and political cycles (Burklin 1987; Weber 1987), for both of these have a persistent appeal in social mobilization, well beyond what liberal and Marxist models would suggest. I suspect that these cycles are interrelated in attitudes and striving of redefining, restructuring and reinterpreting the societal community as the boundaries of the latter are disrupted whether from within or from without— and in some instances, the disruptions may well be provoked by one nationalism impinging on the autonomy of a collectivity. If we can through comparative analysis get a bit closer to interrelating the **dynamics** of these phenomena, we might just be able to understand a bit better the course of modernity.

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APUNTES SOBRE EL GENERO COMO CATEGORIA DE ANALISIS PARA LA HISTORIA DEL NACIONALISMO. EL CASO VASCO DEL PRIMER TERCIO DE SIGLO

Mercedes Ugalde

Hace ya mas de 20 años que la Historia de las Mujeres empezó a tener un lugar importante en el panorama historiográfico norteamericano y europeo, mas allá del ocupado hasta entonces por la historia de algunas mujeres ilustres. La Nueva Historia Social, y su preocupación por reconocer el protagonismo histórico de los sectores oprimidos, fue el marco en el que encontró audiencia el desafío epistemológico lanzado por el movimiento feminista desarrollado a partir de los años sesenta, que formulaba inquietantes preguntas sobre la discriminación social basada en el sexo, sobre sus causas y sus mecanismos de funcionamiento, y sobre las vías para encontrar su superación. Una de las manifestaciones de esta discriminación, puesta de manifiesto con singular evidencia por el feminismo, era el silencio de la historiografía respecto al papel que correspondía a las mujeres, a todas las mujeres, como sujetos o co-sujetos de la Historia; silencio que, por otra parte, era compartido también por otros sectores sociales.

Durante estos años, este silencio ha sido sustituido ya por numerosas voces. En lo que se refiere a las mujeres, los trabajos de investigación en este ámbito de la Historia se han multiplicado progresivamente en número y calidad, y han sido reconocidos en el mundo académico e incluidos en los planes de estudios de numerosas universidades¹.

¹ Sobre el desarrollo en el mundo occidental de este apartado de la investigación histórica véase NASH, Mary: "Nuevas dimensiones en la Historia de la mujer" en NASH, Mary (ed.): *Presencia y protagonismo. Aspectos de la historia de la mujer*, Barcelona, Serbal, 1984, págs. 9-50 y RIVERA GARRETAS, Milagros: "Corrientes historiográficas en el análisis de la presencia de las mujeres en la historia", *Lagaia*, nº 12, 1988, págs. 7-12. Para el caso de España puede verse CARBONELL, Montserrat, NASH, Mary y RIVERA, Milagros: "La Storia delle donne in Spagna", *Quaderni Storici*, nº 63, diciembre 1986, págs. 995-1008; NASH, Mary: "Dos décadas de historia de las mujeres en España: una reconsideración", *Historia Social*, nº 9, invierno 1991, págs. 137-161; CASTAÑO, Lola (Coord.): *Estudios de las mujeres en las universidades españolas: década de los ochenta*, Valencia, NAU Llibres, 1992.

En su desarrollo, esta investigación ha ido marcándose unos objetivos cada vez mas ambiciosos, pretendiendo, no solo restituir a un sector social, el de las mujeres, el co-protagonismo histórico que le correspondía, sino hacer además una aportación al conocimiento de la Historia en su conjunto, de interés para todos sus protagonistas. Con este propósito ha dedicado especial atención a la búsqueda de unos instrumentos de análisis que permitieran iluminar aspectos de la experiencia humana que permanecían ocultos. Uno de los hallazgos instrumentales en este sentido ha sido el concepto de *género* como manifestación de una realidad socio-cultural y como nueva categoría de análisis.

El contenido dado al concepto de *género* hasta los años setenta no iba mas allá de su utilización gramatical. Fue en esos años cuando empezó a contar con un significado nuevo que progresivamente se ha ido enriqueciendo. Las aportaciones del psicoanálisis y el rechazo del determinismo biológico sexual, manifestado desde la sociología y la antropología por especialistas en estudios sobre las mujeres, estuvieron en el origen de este proceso, que no ha tenido una evolución lineal y que se ha desarrollado al compás de un debate, que no está cerrado, en torno a formas diferentes de entender y utilizar esta categoría. En algunos casos su empleo ha tenido y tiene lugar en estudios históricos de carácter descriptivo, que no pretenden poner al descubierto unas relaciones sociales desiguales. Pero otras investigaciones se han servido y se sirven de esta categoría para tratar de desentrañar los mecanismos de funcionamiento de las relaciones de poder existentes entre mujeres y hombres. Esta segunda línea de investigación ha ido progresivamente enriqueciendo sus aportaciones teóricas, utilizando el *género* desde distintos enfoques: la teoría del patriarcado, el feminismo marxista (ortodoxo y heterodoxo) o la teoría psicoanalítica con sus diversas escuelas: la angloamericana de las relaciones-objeto y las escuelas francesas estructuralista y postestructuralista².

El contenido de esta categoría ha alcanzado así un gran desarrollo, aunque su elaboración exige resolver aún importantes interrogantes que están impulsando un interesante debate en la actualidad. Debate que gira en torno a temas como la articulación existente entre el *género* y la anatomía sexual³, la forma en que se

² Véase SCOOT, Joan W.: "El género: una categoría útil para el análisis histórico" en AMELANG, James S. y NASH, Mary: *Historia y género: Las mujeres en la Europa Moderna y Contemporánea*, Valencia, Alfons el Magnànim, 1990, págs 23-56 y RIVERA GARRETAS, op. cit.

³ ¿Dónde empieza y dónde termina lo innato y dónde lo culturalmente construido?. Interesantes estudios como el de Tomás Laqueur (*Making sex. Body and gender from the greeks to Freud*, Harvard College, 1990) han puesto al descubierto que lo culturalmente construido llega mas allá de lo que creíamos y alcanza a las mismas diferencias anatómicas. Como ha demostrado Laqueur, la existencia de dos

producen los cambios a través del tiempo en las relaciones de *género*, las conexiones existentes entre relaciones de *género*, sexualidad y el sentimiento de identidad personal, o el nexo entre las relaciones de *género* y heterosexualidad u homosexualidad⁴.

Pero al margen de este debate, que no es el objeto de esta comunicación, el *género* como categoría de análisis tiene ya la suficiente definición como para sernos extraordinariamente útil, e incluso imprescindible, en el análisis de cualquier realidad social. Vamos a considerarlo aquí como una construcción cultural que, utilizando como excusa las diferencias sexuales innatas, atribuye a estas otros elementos de diferenciación aleatorios (roles y espacios sociales, normas de comportamiento, valores...) basándose en los cuales se estructura un sistema de relaciones jerárquico, de supremacía masculina, entre individuos de distinto sexo. Estos elementos de diferenciación que conforman el *género* y dan lugar a la creación de las identidades masculina y femenina, impregnan todos los ámbitos de la vida social, condicionada en todos sus aspectos, públicos y privados, por unas relaciones que hasta hace poco quedaban fuera del análisis⁵.

La utilización del concepto de *género* así entendido lleva a la elaboración de una Historia que no solo ilumina para esta disciplina la vida y la experiencia de las mujeres, sino también la vida y la experiencia de los hombres en cuanto tales, que también permanecía oculta y escondida hasta ahora, como la de las mujeres, para la investigación histórica.

Se abre así un amplio campo de investigación para la Historia, que consiste en indagar cómo han sido contruidos los *géneros* en cada sociedad y momento histórico, cuales han sido las características de las relaciones establecidas entre

sexos anatómicamente diferenciados es una consideración relativamente reciente en Occidente. Hasta el siglo XVIII se consideraba que existía un único sexo con un único grupo de órganos, situados en el interior del cuerpo (en el caso de las mujeres) o en el exterior (en el caso de los hombres). Y la variación de esta consideración no fue debida al avance de los conocimientos anatómicos, sino que intervinieron al parecer factores diferentes.

⁴ Véase FLAX, Jane: "Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory", *Signs*, vol. 12, nº 4, summer 1987. Cifra: NAVARRO ARANGUREN, Marysa: "Mirada nueva. Problemas viejos" en G. LUNA, Lola (Comp.): *Mujeres y sociedad. Nuevos enfoques teóricos y metodológicos*, Barcelona, Universitat, 1991, pág. 106.

⁵ El *género*, por tanto, no es únicamente necesario para estudiar temas históricos específicos restringidos al ámbito de la familia, la sexualidad, la vida privada o las mujeres, sino que los abarca todos. Sobre el concepto de *género* utilizado aquí véase SCOTT, op. cit., y BOCK, Gisela: "La historia de las mujeres y la historia del género: aspectos de un debate internacional", *Historia social*, nº 9, invierno 1991, págs. 55-77.

hombres y mujeres a través del tiempo, cómo han vivido unos y otras su pertenencia al grupo social delimitado por el *género*, cual ha sido el engranaje que ha trabado el sistema de relaciones de *género* con los otros sistemas de relaciones (de clase, de raza, de nacionalidad...) con los que le ha tocado coexistir en cada momento, o cuales son los factores del cambio histórico en toda su complejidad.

Esta nueva metodología se ha introducido ya en la Historia del Nacionalismo, comenzando a poner en evidencia la importancia de las relaciones de *género* en toda construcción nacional y la necesidad de profundizar en su conocimiento para comprender mejor los mecanismos de funcionamiento de los diversos nacionalismos. Prueba de que este camino ha sido emprendido ya hace unos años es la presencia de este ámbito de la Historia en la Segunda Conferencia de ISSEI (International Society for the Study of European Ideas) celebrada del 3 al 8 de septiembre de 1990 en la Universidad de Leuven, Bélgica.

En esta Conferencia, que llevó por título **Comparative History of European Nationalism: Toward Europe of 1992**, la perspectiva de *género* fue utilizada no solo en los estudios presentados en las dos secciones de la Conferencia que se referían expresamente a la Historia de las Mujeres, tituladas: **"Women's Rights and Human Rights"** y **"Feminism and Nationalism"**, sino también en otras dos secciones cuyo tema era de carácter mas general, tituladas: **"Race and Nation"** y **"Romanticism and Nationalism"**.

En las dos secciones de la Conferencia referidas a la Historia de las Mujeres la variable *género* estuvo presente, explícita o implícitamente, en relación con otras categorías utilizadas en el análisis del nacionalismo, como el concepto de ciudadanía⁶, el de clase social⁷ o el de individualismo⁸, e iluminando nuevos aspectos de la Historia del Nacionalismo, como la diferente incorporación y pertenencia de hombres y

⁶ FAURE, Christine: "Les constituants de 1789 avaient-ils la volonté délibérée d'évincer les femmes de la vie politique?", *History of European Ideas*. Official Journal of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas, volume 15, number 4-6, august 1992, págs. 537-542. En este trabajo se ponía de manifiesto la creación, desde su origen, de una ciudadanía ("à deux vitesses") que no tenía un carácter universal, y a la que hombres y mujeres estaban adscritos de manera diferente. Sobre el carácter no universal de la ciudadanía, las restricciones y diferencias a su ejercicio y el nexo entre ciudadanía y nacionalidad, véase: SARACENO, Chiara: "La estructura de género de la ciudadanía", *Mujer y realidad social*, II Congreso Mundial Vasco, Bilbao, Universidad del País Vasco-Gobierno Vasco, 1988, págs. 123-141.

⁷ O' NEILL, Kevin: "Feminism, Nationalism, and Class Interest in Ireland, 1910-1937". Comunicación no publicada.

⁸ BUSSEMAKER, Jet: "Feminism and the welfare state: on gender and individualism in the Netherlands", *History of European Ideas*, cit., págs. 655-661.

mujeres a los movimientos y a las comunidades nacionales europeos, la aportación a la defensa de los derechos humanos generales que supone la defensa de la participación diferenciada de las mujeres⁹, la tensión entre los objetivos nacionalistas y feministas, generadora de conflictos pero también de acuerdos y alianzas¹⁰, o la importancia de las relaciones de *género* en la construcción histórica de la identidad nacional y en el funcionamiento de las comunidades nacionales europeas¹¹. Por otra parte, en la sección **"Race and Nation"**, dirigida por la profesora Mary Nash, catedrática de la Universidad de Barcelona, una de las conclusiones a las que se llegó fue la necesidad de integrar el análisis de *género* en los estudios sobre la raza, a fin de conocer las manifestaciones históricas del racismo y el sexismo interrelacionados, y sus implicaciones con el nacionalismo¹².

En las Conferencias posteriores de ISSEI (en las que ya el nacionalismo no ha sido el tema central) la categoría analítica *género* ha sido oficialmente reconocida como tal, hasta el punto de contar con una sección expresamente dedicada a trabajos relacionados con ella. En la Tercera Conferencia celebrada del 24 al 29 de agosto de 1992 en la Universidad de Aalborg, Dinamarca: **European integration and the**

⁹ STETSON, Doroty McBride: "Women's rights and human rights in contemporary Europe", *History of European Ideas*, cit., págs. 549-556.

¹⁰ OFFEN, Karen: "Nationalizing feminism-Feminizing Nationalism: Gender and politics in Early Third Republic France". Comunicación no publicada. COVA, Anne: "Féminism et natalité: Nelly Roussel (1878-1922)", *History of European Ideas*, cit., págs. 663-672.

¹¹ VARIKAS, Eleni: "National consciousness, Gender Relations and Greck Feminism in the 19th-20th centuries"; PROTROVSKA, Marija: "Feminism and Nationalism in Bohemia"; Comunicaciones no publicadas. ENDERS, Victoria L.: "Nationalism and feminism: the Sección Femenina of the Falange", *History of European Ideas*, cit., págs. 673-680. UGALDE SOLANO, Mercedes: "The discourse of gender and the basque nationalist movement in the first third of the 20th century", *Ibidem*, págs. 695-700. Las otras comunicaciones a las secciones citadas que pueden consultarse en el mismo lugar son: F. RITCHIE, Gisela: "Visions of a united Europe: European emancipatory women of the 19th and early 20th centuries"; AKKERMAN, T.: "Nationalism and feminism: the unknown soldier and the new Heloise"; HEKMAN, Susan: "Jhon Stuart Mill's *The subjection of women*: the foundations of liberal feminism"; SHIRAI, Atushi: "Nationalism and feminism in Yukichi Fukuyama, the most influential leader of enlightenment in modern Japan"; CRITCHFIELD, Richard: "Toni Sender: feminist, socialist, internationalist".

¹² Las comunicaciones presentadas en la sección *Race and Nation* que emplearon el *género* como instrumento de análisis fueron: NASH, Mary: "Social eugenics and nationalist race hygiene in early twentieth century Spain" y LEYS STEPAN, Nancy: "Race, gender and nation in Argentina: the influence of Italian eugenics", *History of European Ideas*, cit., págs. 741-756. Véase también el comentario sobre las comunicaciones presentadas a las tres secciones citadas, realizado en la sesión de clausura del Congreso por NASH, Mary: "Race, Fascism, Feminism and Nation", *History of European Ideas*, volume 16, number 4-6, january 1993, págs. 991-998. En este mismo volumen (págs. 299-305) se publicó también la comunicación de JONES, Vivien: "Femininity, nationalism and romanticism: The politics of gender in the revolution controversy", presentada en la sección *Romanticism and nationalism*, y la de MURPHY, Cliona: "Sufragists and nationalism in early twentieth-century Ireland" (págs. 1009-1115), autora lamentablemente fallecida, y cuyo trabajo correspondía a la sección *Feminism and Nationalism*.

European mind: cultural hegemony or dialogue of cultures, una de las secciones llevó por título **"North-South, East-West: women and the historical construction of gender"** y en la Cuarta, que tendrá lugar del 22 al 27 de agosto de 1994 en la Universidad de Graz, Austria: **The european legacy: toward new paradigms**, hay otra sección con el título **"Cultural heritage, gender discourse and the european legacy"**. En estas conferencias el tema del nacionalismo en relación con el *género* ha seguido estando presente¹³, y esperemos que lo siga estando.

Sin embargo, en general, la atención que en las investigaciones sobre nacionalismo se dedica a las relaciones de *género* es mínima todavía. Resulta sorprendente que los historiadores (hombres y mujeres) hayamos tardado tanto, y seamos todavía tan remisos, en empezar a buscar una explicación al carácter profundamente sexualizado del lenguaje y la simbología nacionalistas, por ejemplo; o al contenido de su discurso sobre la jerarquía sexual, la masculinidad y la feminidad, o el estricto reparto de papeles y espacios sociales basados en el sexo. Esta falta de curiosidad ante unos hechos tan palpables nos lleva a constatar una vez mas que nada hay mas difícil de ver que lo que consideramos obvio, ya que esta consideración nos impide hacernos preguntas y profundizar en el conocimiento de cualquier realidad.

Las relaciones entre mujeres y hombres están, siempre han estado, formando parte del nacionalismo desde su mismo nacimiento, y atrayiesen su historia, constituyéndola y conformándola hasta nuestros días. Esto es innegable. Y también es innegable ya, que unas relaciones consideradas hasta ahora como "naturales", y por tanto ajenas al análisis histórico, deben ser consideradas como relaciones sociales, es decir, cultural, política y socialmente construidas, en un espacio y un tiempo determinados, y por tanto objeto de este análisis. Un análisis que lleva consigo un cambio en el enfoque que aplicamos al estudio del nacionalismo, y un cambio también en la valoración atribuida a los distintos agentes sociales que en él intervienen.

En lo que se refiere al cambio en el enfoque con el que analizamos el nacionalismo, o cualquier realidad social, la consideración de las relaciones de *género* aporta lo que en fotografía sería un incremento de la profundidad de campo. Introducir la variable del *género* en este análisis supone, por ejemplo, considerar la existencia de nuevos protagonistas y nuevas estrategias en la lucha por el poder, presente siempre en toda relación social. Esta lucha se considera establecida únicamente entre hombres-

¹³ UGALDE SOLANO, Mercedes: "Identité féminine et nationalisme basque". Comunicación a la Tercera Conferencia de ISSEI. De próxima publicación.

hombres cuando las relaciones de *género* no se tienen en cuenta, pero cuando éstas están en el punto de mira también, la lucha que se pone de manifiesto para el análisis es, además, la que tiene lugar entre hombres-mujeres y mujeres-mujeres, y el ámbito en el que esta lucha se establece se abre para abarcar tanto los espacios públicos, como aquellos que se ha convenido en llamar espacios privados. De esta forma, el punto de vista masculino, que prima el análisis de la rivalidad entre hombres-hombres, se ve enriquecido por el punto de vista femenino, cuya sola presencia plantea preguntas nuevas e introduce nuevos dibujos en el diseño de las relaciones de poder. La visión de conjunto de éstas relaciones, así obtenida, es mucho mas rica y completa que la que obteníamos sin contar con esta nueva categoría.

Junto a esta modificación en el enfoque del análisis del nacionalismo, la utilización de la categoría *género* trae aparejada a su vez una nueva forma de valorar la experiencia histórica de hombres y mujeres, hasta el punto de considerar ambas experiencias importantes y recíprocamente complementarias para comprender la realidad en toda su complejidad. De esta actitud de los historiadores sobre lo que es importante y lo que no lo es, a la hora de elegir las líneas de investigación y de reflexión sobre la Historia del nacionalismo, depende que progrese o se estanque entre nosotros esta nueva vía introducida por la categoría de análisis que hemos dado en llamar *género*. Una vía de investigación que, como todas, exige la participación continuada de numerosos investigadores. Sólo así podremos contar con los trabajos monográficos necesarios para poder hacer estudios comparativos y de conjunto, y para apoyar, sobre una primera base empírica, la elaboración de una teoría sobre la forma en que opera el *género* en el nacionalismo y viceversa. A falta de un número suficiente todavía de estas monografías, me limitaré de momento a hacer una somera aproximación de carácter general y algunos comentarios sobre un caso concreto, el del nacionalismo vasco del primer tercio del siglo XX.

La reelaboración de la diferenciación sexual y la construcción de las naciones

Las profundas transformaciones económicas, sociales, políticas y culturales puestas en marcha en la transición del feudalismo al capitalismo, impulsadas después por la revolución industrial y que han ido desarrollándose hasta conformar nuestra sociedad actual, fueron las que hicieron posible, como ya es bien sabido, la cristalización de las naciones modernas y la aparición de la problemática nacional en Occidente. Estas mismas transformaciones fueron también las que crearon las condiciones del inicio del proceso de cambio, que llega hasta nuestros días, en las

funciones sociales y en las relaciones entre hombres y mujeres, proceso de cambio que llevó aparejada una nueva definición de la diferenciación basada en el sexo, es decir, del contenido dado a los *géneros*. Ambos procesos, nacional y de *género*, estuvieron, y están, estrechamente implicados entre sí.

El feminismo y los nuevos modelos de género

Los cambios económicos y sociales, junto con los descubrimientos científicos y los avances tecnológicos, trastocaron completamente la base sobre la que se sustentaba la organización de la sociedad y modificaron a la vez la base sobre la que estaban construidas las relaciones de *género*. La familia, unidad básica de producción-reproducción en la sociedad pre-industrial, dejó de ser el ámbito de las tareas productivas, que fueron progresivamente alejadas de su entorno, impidiendo que las mujeres participasen en ellas como habían hecho anteriormente, sin solución de continuidad con sus funciones domésticas y reproductoras¹⁴. La división sexual del trabajo establecida hasta entonces, por tanto, junto con la distribución del espacio social en función del sexo, experimentó un proceso de adaptación a los cambios generales que estaban teniendo lugar, y fue reelaborada en el discurso y reconstruida en la práctica, abriendo un profundo y artificial abismo entre la vida pública y la vida privada, ámbitos de actuación que fueron adjudicados discursivamente a cada *género*, dejando a las mujeres recluidas en el ámbito privado.

La aparición de las clases sociales, a su vez, incidió de forma determinante en la reelaboración de la división sexual del trabajo, en la distribución sexual de espacios sociales y en el conjunto de las adaptaciones y de los cambios que se fueron produciendo en el contenido paradigmático de los *géneros*, así como en su concreta plasmación social.

Las mujeres pertenecientes a familias de la burguesía y de las clases medias emergentes fueron quedando encerradas en el ámbito doméstico, convertidas en "ángeles del hogar", cumpliendo al pie de la letra, por tanto, con la normativa que

¹⁴ SCOTT, Joan W. y TILLY, Louise A.: "El trabajo de la mujer y la familia en Europa durante el siglo XIX"; LYIN DOUGLAS, Mary: "Mujeres trabajadoras durante la revolución industrial, 1780-1914"; MCBRIDE, Theresa M.: "El largo camino a casa: el trabajo de la mujer y la industrialización"; ALEXANDER, Sally: "La mujer trabajadora en el Londres del siglo XIX; un estudio de los años 1820-50", en NASH, Mary (ed.): *Presencia y protagonismo. Aspectos de la historia de la mujer*, Barcelona, Serbal, 1984, pp. 51-199. Sobre este tema véase también un trabajo posterior de SCOTT, Joan W.: "La mujer trabajadora en el siglo XIX" en DUBY, Georges y PERROT, Michelle: *Historia de las mujeres*, Madrid, Taurus, 1993, v. 4, pp. 405-35.

se había establecido respecto al espacio social que les correspondía ocupar en razón de su *género*; mientras numerosas mujeres pertenecientes a familias de la clase obrera y campesinas salían de sus hogares, obligadas por las necesidades de subsistencia de sus familias y estimuladas por las demandas de mano de obra barata procedentes del nuevo sistema económico. El trabajo de estas mujeres fuera del hogar dejaba en entredicho en la práctica el modelo de mujer que trataba de imponerse uniformemente a todo su *género*, dificultad que el sistema de *género* resolvió, desde el discurso y en la práctica, mediante una subdivisión sexual del trabajo, en este caso fuera del hogar, que adjudicaba a las mujeres únicamente ciertos trabajos no cualificados y mal pagados, en determinadas condiciones de subordinación respecto a los varones, y con carácter transitorio (antes de casarse, o de tener hijos, o en el caso de muerte o incapacidad del marido para cumplir su papel de mantenedor de la familia); subrayando de esta manera la función doméstica femenina, que sólo excepcional y temporalmente podía dejar de ejercerse en exclusiva¹⁵.

También las mujeres de clase media se vieron en la necesidad de salir de sus hogares en busca de un trabajo retribuido; mientras los varones de su clase retrasaban el matrimonio a la espera de hacer fortuna, o cuando éste no llegaba a hacerse realidad ni tenían la alternativa del convento que la Iglesia Católica ofrecía en determinados países. Pero en este caso su entorno social les exigía llevar a cabo un trabajo de cierta cualificación para mantener el estatus en el que habían nacido, y esto llevaba aparejado el acceso a ciertos niveles de la educación que -con otro tipo de discriminaciones pero sin límites de *género* al menos- les estaba reservada a los hombres¹⁶.

Existían, por tanto, condiciones objetivas en la nueva sociedad industrial, derivadas de las mismas necesidades económicas, para que las mujeres pusieran en cuestión la reelaboración de los modelos de *género* tradicionales que se estaba llevando a cabo para adecuarlos al contexto cambiante, concretamente el modelo de mujer, mantenida por el varón y limitada a las labores del hogar, al margen de todo lo que tenía lugar en el mundo público: cultura, trabajo retribuido, administración

¹⁵ La salida del hogar para acceder al trabajo asalariado no era nueva, ni se desarrolló linealmente, ni fue la única forma utilizada por las mujeres de familias económicamente necesitadas para resolver su manutención y la de sus familiares, aunque es la que nos interesa aquí. Muchas de estas mujeres colaboraron también a la subsistencia familiar sin salir del hogar, manteniendo la reclusión doméstica establecida, obteniendo dinero a través de la ampliación a otras personas del trabajo doméstico que realizaban, sin compensación monetaria, en beneficio de su familia. Véase un ejemplo concreto en PEREZ-FUENTES HERNANDEZ, Pilar: *Vivir y morir en las minas*, Bilbao, UPV, 1993.

¹⁶ EVANS, Richard J.: *Las feministas. Los movimientos de emancipación de la mujer en Europa, América y Australasia. 1840-1920*, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1980, p. 23.

de la propiedad, política etc. Tal cuestionamiento fue llevado a cabo por las mujeres desde el primer momento, primero de forma individual y después de forma colectiva, en una movilización que ha llegado hasta nuestros días. Pero no todas las mujeres contaron con las circunstancias favorables para hacerlo, ni lo hicieron de la misma manera.

Las mujeres de la aristocracia gozaban todavía de privilegios que les hacían sentirse compensadas por otras carencias. Y lo mismo les ocurrió a las mujeres pertenecientes a familias de la gran burguesía. Por otra parte, las mujeres de la clase obrera y las campesinas pobres debían concentrar todas sus energías, junto con las de sus familiares varones, en sobrevivir.

Fueron las mujeres de clase media las que pudieron percibir antes y con mayor claridad su desventaja frente a los hombres de su clase, a los que la sociedad ofrecía los medios para acceder a la propiedad y a la riqueza con su esfuerzo y su trabajo, mientras ellas, en una situación económica delicada, quedaban reducidas a la inactividad, indefensas por tanto y totalmente dependientes de la paternalista protección de los varones. Estas condiciones económicas, cuando coincidieron con un entorno ideológico liberal y de religión protestante, basado en los principios de la Ilustración, permitieron a estas mujeres contar con el impulso suficiente y los argumentos adecuados para intervenir en el proceso de reelaboración de la diferenciación sexual, tratando de encontrar un nuevo modelo para su *género* mas de acuerdo con sus intereses que el que se estaba diseñando. El individualismo racionalista y religioso, eje de su ideología liberal y la de sus familias, les permitió afirmarse a ellas también como individuos dotados de razón, capaces de progresar con su propio esfuerzo si se les daba acceso a los instrumentos adecuados para ello (educación, información, propiedad...) libres para elegir su destino, no predestinado desde su nacimiento, y responsables por tanto de su bienestar terrenal y de su salvación escatológica¹⁷.

En tal empresa encontraron aliados importantes entre los hombres liberales, pero la mayoría opusieron también una fuerte resistencia -como los que no compartían esta ideología- al nuevo modelo de mujer que ellas empezaban a esbozar, y que con el tiempo iría adquiriendo mayor definición: independiente, propietaria de bienes de fortuna, informada de la cultura y la ciencia de su tiempo, ocupada en el ejercicio de una profesión e interviniendo en la política. Un modelo que no sólo suponía la

¹⁷ ANDERSON, Bonnie S. y ZINSSER, Judith P.: *Historia de las Mujeres: Una historia propia*, Barcelona, Crítica, 1991, vol. 2, pp. 400-405. EVANS, op. cit., pp. 7 y ss.

modificación del contenido dado al *género* femenino sino que ponía en cuestión también el modelo masculino. Si las mujeres eran también individuos sujetos de derechos como los hombres, estos dejaban de ser el prototipo de individuo ilustrado y liberal, monopolizador de la cultura y del poder político y social, y dueño de su destino y del de su familia.

Apoyándose en sus aliados y tratando de eludir la oposición que encontraban, las mujeres de clase media utilizaron distintas estrategias para lograr lo que se proponían, escribiendo sobre su situación, introduciéndose en la enseñanza y en la actividad profesional, participando en las revoluciones y en los movimientos sociales (antiesclavista, de regeneración moral, a favor de la templanza, nacionalista) y creando, en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX, a falta de resultados prácticos de sus intentos anteriores, un movimiento social propio, que logró agrupar en pos de la igualdad de derechos a miles de mujeres.

Las mujeres de otras clases sociales se sumaron también, en mayor o menor medida, a la redefinición femenina fuera del hogar, y para llevarla a la práctica utilizaron diversas vías, como las organizaciones filantrópicas y de caridad o las organizaciones del movimiento obrero.

En el seno de este último, las mujeres rechazaron el feminismo liberal y se alejaron de él, debido a que, a pesar de los esfuerzos de algunos sectores feministas por evitarlo, unía la defensa de los intereses de *género* a los de las clases medias, ofreciendo a las obreras una vía de emancipación que suponía su desclasamiento, y no tenía en cuenta la defensa de los intereses de la clase obrera. En su caso, estas mujeres creyeron que la defensa de sus intereses de *género* podía encontrar la vía de salida adecuada en el socialismo que, llevando a cabo el desarrollo lógico de las ideas liberales, reclamaba una igualdad de oportunidades para todos, no sólo para un sector restringido como en la práctica hacían los liberales, y que concebía un individuo cuyo valor, a diferencia del concepto liberal, estaba basado en el trabajo y en la colaboración mutua, no en la propiedad y la competencia.

Entre los hombres socialistas, como entre los liberales, las mujeres encontraron importantes aliados, pero igualmente una fuerte oposición, que sólo cedía cuando las mujeres aceptaban defender ante todo los intereses de la clase obrera, posponiendo hasta la consecución de la revolución socialista todas aquellas reivindicaciones de *género* que no coincidieran exactamente con los intereses de clase.

Como habían hecho las liberales durante el siglo XIX y siguieron haciendo durante el XX, las mujeres del movimiento obrero utilizaron su propia estrategia dentro de éste para defender sus intereses de *género*, participando en sus organizaciones sindicales, en sus partidos políticos y en sus movimientos revolucionarios, y creando también en su seno sus propias organizaciones.

Las organizaciones liberales de mujeres y las del movimiento obrero siguieron por lo tanto cada una su propio camino, quedando así dividido su *género* por la clase social a la que cada grupo estaba adscrito. En pocas ocasiones colaboraron. Unas y otras vieron condicionada su lucha y la consecución de sus objetivos por los propios objetivos de las fuerzas sociales y políticas con las que se sentían afines, y por la cambiante coyuntura socioeconómica y política¹⁸.

En el desarrollo de su lucha las mujeres impulsaron otro modelo de mujer junto al que las feministas liberales habían empezado a delinear anteriormente. En este caso se trataba de una mujer que desconfiaba de la bandera de la igualdad con los hombres en sentido estricto, que afirmaba su identidad de género -diferente a la del hombre, y basada en su maternidad y en el papel que le correspondía en la familia- y que en razón de esta maternidad y este papel reclamaba el acceso a la educación y al trabajo retribuido en determinadas condiciones (protegido en el caso de la obrera), así como una equiparación legal de sus derechos civiles con los de los hombres.

Se trataba de un modelo a mitad de camino entre el que habían empezado a diseñar las feministas liberales decimonónicas (mas acorde quizás el de éstas con las aspiraciones de las solteras que con las de las casadas) y el modelo que el propio sistema de *género* dominante masculino había reelaborado para adaptarlo a los cambios socioeconómicos sobrevenidos con la industrialización. Su divulgación tenía probablemente algo que ver con la búsqueda de una salida ante la oposición que el camino emprendido por las feministas liberales había suscitado en los hombres, y también, seguramente, con los intereses de las mujeres casadas y con hijos; pero, sobre todo, su elaboración guardaba relación con el deseo de las mujeres, casadas o solteras, de defender su propia identidad frente a los hombres. Defensa que llevaba aparejada la reclamación de la valoración social positiva, no de la igualdad, sino de la diferencia que existía entre ambos, y su reflejo en las leyes de forma que tal diferencia no fuese utilizada como instrumento de descalificación y subordinación¹⁹.

¹⁸ Sobre la movilización de las mujeres durante el siglo XIX y principios del XX puede consultarse EVANS, op. cit.; ANDERSON y ZINSER, op. cit., v. 2, pp. 379-554; DUBY y PERROT, op. cit., v. 4 y 5.

¹⁹ Sobre las dos grandes corrientes feministas y sus diferentes representaciones de la mujer puede verse KÄPELI, Anne-Marie: "Escenarios del feminismo", en DUBY y PERROT, op. cit., v. 4, pp. 498 y ss.;

Este modelo de mujer basado en la maternidad era mucho mas fácil de asimilar por el conjunto de la sociedad, y su existencia permitió a las mujeres conseguir logros parciales, asumidos por el sistema de *género* con el fin de eludir el modelo liberal de mujer independiente. La existencia de éste fue, sin embargo, determinante para conseguir tales logros, y para alertar sobre el peligro de que el modelo de la mujer madre terminase sirviendo, no a los intereses de las mujeres, sino a los del sistema establecido y a su inercia a mantenerse fundamentalmente igual.

El liberalismo tuvo por tanto una influencia decisiva en la aparición y desarrollo del movimiento feminista durante el siglo XIX, ya que sirvió de caldo de cultivo en el que las mujeres de las clases medias pudieron tomar conciencia de las condiciones de subordinación de su *género*, empezar a formular una alternativa para salir de ella y provocar la movilización de las mujeres de otras clases sociales en defensa, por unos medios o por otros, de sus intereses de *género*.

Así mismo, el liberalismo estuvo también en el origen del fenómeno nacional, conformándolo y orientándolo. Por tanto, este mismo componente ideológico y social fue compartido por el feminismo y por el nacionalismo, estuvo presente tanto en el arranque del proceso de cambio consciente en el contenido y en las relaciones de *género*, como en el inicio del proceso consciente de construcción de las naciones modernas.

La aparición de las naciones y los distintos modelos de nacionalismo

Las naciones fueron el resultado de procesos que duraron siglos, pero su concreción como tales naciones no se inició hasta que la quiebra de la sociedad medieval y la revolución industrial las hizo posibles. Su primer hito fue la constitución de las primeras naciones en Europa y en los EEUU de América, con la revolución francesa y la independencia de los EEUU como su momento fundacional. Es entonces cuando emerge el ciudadano como una nueva forma de ser, de estar y de relacionarse en la sociedad nacional que se estaba construyendo. Un ciudadano definido como el individuo libre del modelo liberal, capaz de mantenerse a sí mismo y a su familia y de prosperar, e integrado en una comunidad nacional en la que sus relaciones con los demás ciudadanos, reguladas por el estado, estaban basadas en el paradigma ilustrado de igualdad universal ante la ley. Un paradigma cuya pretendida

universalidad dejó de cumplirse en la práctica desde el primer momento, ya que se aplicó a unos ciudadanos que para serlo debían ser varones, propietarios, cabezas de familia y de raza blanca, quedando por tanto excluidos de la ciudadanía, y del disfrute de sus derechos, muchos varones, y todas las mujeres sin excepción²⁰.

Desde el primer momento, por tanto, la aparición de la nación supuso la creación de un campo abonado para el desarrollo de distintos conflictos de intereses, entre mujeres y hombres, entre clases sociales y entre razas, a los que hay que añadir los conflictos que enfrentaron a los distintos nacionalismos. Conflictos que, aun teniendo cada uno de ellos un carácter específico, formaron entre sí un complejo entramado, de tal forma tejido, que no podía desarrollarse cada uno de ellos sin implicar necesariamente a los demás.

A medida que las naciones seguían surgiendo en el espacio y en el tiempo, las características de su construcción fueron diversificándose y haciéndose mas complejas, con las aportaciones de la lucha anticolonial del siglo XIX, el surgimiento de las naciones en los pueblos subdesarrollados, y la problemática nacional europea posterior, puesta esta última de manifiesto en distintas etapas durante el siglo XX hasta la actualidad. El estudio de este complejo desarrollo nacional ha dado lugar a la elaboración, por parte de los estudiosos, de una variada tipología de nacionalismos, en la que aún está pendiente incluir la que resultará del estudio de las relaciones de *género* en relación con sus implicaciones en los distintos nacionalismos. De la tipología ya elaborada quiero destacar aquí dos clasificaciones del fenómeno nacional. Una de ellas pone de manifiesto las diferencias entre procesos de construcción nacional lentos y rápidos; la otra distingue el nacionalismo contractual o popular del nacionalismo esencialista o suprapopular.

Los procesos lentos de construcción nacional son procesos históricos que se desarrollan con independencia de la voluntad y la consciencia de los individuos que intervienen en ellos. La nación, en este caso, es resultado del proceso histórico y el nacionalismo es la toma de conciencia de una realidad ya constituida que se pretende revitalizar o regenerar, no la voluntad de hacer realidad algo nuevo. En los procesos rápidos de construcción nacional, en cambio, es la voluntad de los nacionalistas la que opera sobre el contexto histórico en el que surge, impulsando la constitución de una nación donde antes existía una dependencia respecto a otra u otras unidades políticas, y para la que los nacionalistas deben inventar un contenido inexistente hasta entonces. Ejemplo de proceso lento sería la formación de la nación española y como

²⁰ SARACENO, op. cit.

ejemplos de procesos rápidos podemos citar la independencia de Polonia o de Hungría o la creación de las naciones como resultado de la descolonización²¹.

¿Qué ocurre con el género en estos diferentes procesos nacionales? ¿Tienen algo que ver estas diferencias con el discurrir, en la continuidad o en el cambio, de las relaciones entre hombres y mujeres?. Aunque la respuesta a estas preguntas precisa un estudio en profundidad podemos adelantar la hipótesis de que, en principio, los procesos nacionales rápidos ofrecen a las mujeres las oportunidades propias de todo momento de renovación y de cambio consciente. Es entonces, cuando la vieja organización de la sociedad se pone voluntariamente en cuestión para construir otra nueva, previamente delineada, cuando los grupos sociales que aspiran a un cambio en su situación tienen la oportunidad de intentar aprovechar la coyuntura para llevarlo a cabo, integrando sus reivindicaciones en la construcción del orden nuevo y negociando esta integración con los rectores del cambio, necesitados para lograr sus fines del mayor apoyo popular posible.

Las mujeres intentaron aprovechar desde el primer momento las oportunidades de cambio surgidas en la construcción consciente de las naciones, y se sumaron activamente a ella, mientras en los nacionalismos de proceso lento encontraban distintas vías, generalmente ajenas al nacionalismo, para su movilización. Los logros obtenidos a través de la vía nacionalista rápida fueron, en cualquier caso, muy desiguales. Es paradigmático el chasco que experimentaron en la revolución francesa, cuando vieron frustradas sus expectativas de ingreso en la ciudadanía en condiciones de igualdad con los demás ciudadanos²². Su frustración se repitió posteriormente allí donde el nacionalismo decidió prescindir de la alianza con el feminismo y trató de crear una barrera frente a él, como en Alemania o en Hungría. Hubo, sin embargo, ocasiones en las que el desarrollo del movimiento feminista fue estrechamente unido al del nacionalismo, e incluso fue impulsado desde éste, como en el caso de Bohemia o en el de Finlandia, país este último que fue el primero de Europa en reconocer el derecho de las mujeres al sufragio (en 1906), como consecuencia de la imbricación de ambos movimientos²³.

²¹ Es necesario advertir, sin embargo, que en muchos casos ambos procesos están presentes como fases distintas de la construcción de una nación. La creación de los EEUU de América, por ejemplo, se inició en forma de proceso rápido, pero tuvo después una etapa de formación que guarda mas relación con las naciones de proceso lento. RECALDE, José Ramón: *La construcción de las naciones*, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1982, p. 35 y ss.

²² Véase un estudio muy interesante sobre este tema en FRAISE, Geneviève: *Musa de la razón. La democracia excluyente y la diferencia de los sexos*, Valencia, Cátedra, 1991.

²³ EVANS, op. cit., pp. 282 y 79.

Los procesos rápidos de construcción de las naciones, por tanto, a pesar de ser procesos de cambio, solo a veces ofrecieron a las mujeres condiciones favorables para lograr sus aspiraciones, debido a diversos factores que en cada caso es necesario analizar. Entre ellos tiene importancia sin duda el origen atribuido por cada nacionalismo a la nación y a su legitimidad política, origen en unos casos de carácter contractual y democrático y en otros de carácter esencialista y opuesto a la democracia liberal.

El nacionalismo contractual o popular, característico de la construcción de las naciones en su momento inaugural, y reelaborado mas tarde por el socialismo, consideraba la creación de la nación como resultado del acuerdo de los individuos integrantes del pueblo para dotarse de una organización política, basada en la representatividad de los ciudadanos y en una ley elaborada por ellos mismos, ante la que todos eran iguales en derechos y obligaciones. La capacidad de decisión de los individuos y la democracia eran por tanto sus pilares principales y estas bases ofrecían a las mujeres, y a los grupos sociales que a pesar de estos principios quedaban marginados, la posibilidad de reclamar su lugar entre los iguales y en el juego representativo, enfrentando a los dirigentes nacionalistas con la contradicción que suponía proclamar la igualdad y la democracia como fundamentos de la nación y excluir de ella a una parte importante de la misma.

Pero los principios de igualdad y democracia, tan útiles en un primer momento a la burguesía ascendente para conseguir el apoyo de las clases populares contra el Antiguo Régimen, dejaron de ser operativos en etapas posteriores, cuando la burguesía, ya asentada en posiciones de poder o emergente en competencia con otra fracción de la burguesía, se enfrentó a sus antiguos aliados y se alió con las clases añorantes del Antiguo Régimen. Esta alianza fue un factor de desarrollo muy importante para una nueva concepción nacionalista, de carácter esencialista, en la que la nación era considerada como una realidad suprapopular, independiente y situada por encima de la decisión de los individuos. Los integrantes de la nación, en este caso, no estaban unidos por una ley libremente pactada, sino por la ley de la sangre, de la lengua, de la historia o de la religión²⁴. Fue en Alemania y en algunos países del este europeo donde este tipo de nacionalismo arraigó con mayor fuerza.

La capacidad de maniobra que el nacionalismo esencialista ofrecía a las mujeres para cambiar por vías directas el contenido dado al *género* era nula. Tal nacionalismo no propugnaba el cambio, sino la conservación de un legado procedente de unas

²⁴ RECALDE, op. cit., pp. 211 y ss.

instancias cuyas decisiones eran inapelables, y del que las relaciones de género de predominio masculino formaban parte. Una parte de importancia excepcional, ya que eran utilizadas como base sobre la que se asentaba la nación y el resto de las relaciones sociales de poder que se establecían en ella. Dado que la conformación de los estereotipos femenino y masculino, es decir, los roles, funciones, espacios sociales y valores diferentes que se asignaban a mujeres y hombres, eran atribuidos a una determinación de la naturaleza, sus relaciones y su entidad misma eran la mejor pauta, el modelo mas apropiado, para cimentar el poder sobre bases naturales -incuestionables por tanto- en el resto de las relaciones sociales, y para subrayar el origen natural -igualmente indiscutible- de la nación y de los lazos que unían a sus integrantes.

Es significativa en este sentido la utilización como símbolo de la nación de la figura de una mujer. Dada la identificación que el discurso de género dominante hacía de toda mujer con su función de madre, este símbolo servía para hermanar a todos los integrantes de la nación como hijos de una misma madre, y para apuntalar su integración en la nación con los fuertes vínculos de la sangre, al margen por tanto de su voluntad. La nación aparecía así como una gran familia en la que sus integrantes proyectaban las mismas relaciones de su familia de procedencia, caracterizadas por su estructura jerarquizada, la valoración asimétrica de género y su origen innato.

La proyección de las relaciones familiares era evidente en las alusiones a la madre-nación, los padres de la patria o los hijos de la nación, y la utilización de la valoración asimétrica de género aparecía de forma recurrente en las referencias a la virilidad para calificar positivamente los comportamientos patrióticos o para impulsar la lucha tras los objetivos nacionalistas, y en las alusiones a la feminización de los adversarios de la nación o de todos aquellos a los que se pretendía descalificar.

Aunque por necesidades analíticas debemos establecer una clara diferenciación entre el nacionalismo contractual y el esencialista, en la práctica la tentación esencialista y antidemocrática alcanzó también desde los primeros momentos a nacionalismos que se apoyaban sobre bases contractuales y, a la inversa, también encontramos elementos pactistas en nacionalismos de carácter esencialista. Desde la época fundacional los distintos nacionalismos incorporaron, en mayor o menor medida ambos factores. Un ejemplo del primer caso podemos encontrarlo en Francia. Allí se inició la construcción de la nación apoyándose en un pacto entre las clases populares que dependía de la libre decisión de los que participaban en él y de su conveniencia, pero se incorporaron también elementos que no dependían de la voluntad de los individuos, entre los que se incluía el género como factor integrador

y movilizador. Prueba de ello es la elección de una mujer como símbolo de la República, con las connotaciones esencialistas y los presupuestos de *género* que esta elección suponía.

El predominio de los caracteres contractuales o esencialistas dio a las mujeres, en cada caso, unas posibilidades mayores o menores de maniobra para introducir cambios en las relaciones de *género*, determinó las distintas estrategias elegidas para lograrlo -mas directas y con mayor capacidad de ruptura en el nacionalismo contractual- e influyó también en la elección del modelo alternativo de mujer, que en unos casos se decantó por el modelo del feminismo liberal y en otros por el modelo materno, mas o menos reelaborado. A continuación podemos verlo en un caso concreto.

El caso vasco

El nacionalismo vasco, como es bien sabido, nació a finales del siglo XIX como alternativa a la crisis de la sociedad vasca tradicional, profundamente traumatizada por los cambios derivados de la revolución industrial. Entre ellos ocupaba un papel muy importante la inmigración masiva de trabajadores procedentes de Castilla, portadores de una cultura y una lengua diferentes que desplazaban a la cultura y a la lengua vasca tradicionales. El contenido y la celeridad de estos cambios indugeron a la población autóctona a percibirlos de forma negativa, como algo ajeno y perjudicial para el País Vasco y su identidad cultural, no como consecuencia de su propio desarrollo.

La alternativa que Sabino Arana, el fundador del nacionalismo vasco, ofreció a esta situación conflictiva y crítica fue el rechazo a los cambios tal como se estaban produciendo, y su reorientación hacia la construcción de una nueva nación, la nación vasca, sustrayendo así al pueblo vasco de su integración en el proceso lento de construcción de la nación española y poniendo en marcha otro proceso distinto de construcción nacional. Esta nueva nación debía construirse a partir de un modelo, opuesto al modelo liberal, que era proyección y evocación romántica de la sociedad tradicional, en una época idílica en la que supuestamente había gozado de todo su esplendor. Sus características principales eran: la religión católica, la raza, la lengua, las leyes y costumbres tradicionales y una historia mitificada cuyo rasgo principal era la lucha siempre victoriosa de los vascos por su independencia. Estas características

quedaron sintetizadas por Sabino Arana en el anagrama JEL (Jaungoikua eta Lagi-Zarra, Dios y Ley antigua)²⁵.

En este nacionalismo esencialista no había sitio para la expresión de la voluntad individual. En él la nación vasca estaba definida de antemano, y al margen del parecer de sus integrantes, por instancias de autoridad indiscutible como Dios (el Dios católico no reformado), la naturaleza (de la que dependían los rasgos raciales) y la historia (entendida como patrimonio de un pasado que debía proyectarse inalterable sobre el futuro). En tal concepción las relaciones de *género* formaban parte del legado cultural vasco a preservar -no eran por tanto susceptibles de cambio- y, además, servían de base y articulación al conjunto del edificio nacional.

Durante el primer tercio del siglo XX²⁶ el nacionalismo vasco se convirtió en una de las fuerzas sociales y políticas principales del País Vasco, arraigando fundamentalmente en los sectores de la población autóctona perjudicados económica y culturalmente por la crisis de la sociedad tradicional, y en la pequeña y media burguesía en ascenso, que trataba de arrebatar el poder político y social a la gran burguesía vasca, a la vez que sometía a una clase obrera fuerte y luchadora, en gran parte inmigrante, que se rebelaba contra la explotación a la que se veía sometida²⁷.

La confluencia de estos distintos sectores sociales e intereses dio lugar a que, junto a los factores mas esencialistas y conservadores del pasado, figuraran también otros que pragmáticamente abrían paso a ciertos cambios y que respondían a un talante liberal²⁸. Ambos factores jugaron un papel muy importante en la dinámica

²⁵ Sobre el primer nacionalismo vasco véanse los estudios ya clásicos de CORCUERA ATIENZA, Javier: *Orígenes, ideología y organización del primer nacionalismo vasco (1876-1904)*, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1979; ELORZA, Antonio: *Ideologías del nacionalismo vasco*, San Sebastián, Haranburu, 1978; SOLOZABAL, Juan José: *El primer nacionalismo vasco*, Madrid, Tucur, 1975; LARRONDE, Jean Claude: *El nacionalismo vasco: su origen y su ideología en la obra de Sabino Arana-Goiri*, San Sebastián, Txertoa, 1977.

²⁶ Debido a que todavía no se ha realizado un estudio en profundidad de las relaciones de *género* en el nacionalismo vasco durante épocas posteriores, voy a referirme únicamente al primer tercio del siglo XX.

²⁷ La familia Sota, perteneciente a la gran burguesía, militó también en las filas nacionalistas, pero constituyó una excepción. Sobre la base social del nacionalismo vasco véase MEES, Ludger: *Entre nación y clase. El nacionalismo vasco y su base social en perspectiva comparativa*, Bilbao, Fundación Sabino Arana, 1991.

²⁸ En los años treinta, además, llegó a crearse un pequeño partido nacionalista (ANV) desgajado del tronco central liderado por el PNV, que se caracterizaba por su laicismo y su liberalismo, y que ya había tenido algunos antecedentes dentro del nacionalismo vasco. Dado su abandono de algunos de los elementos esencialistas de éste -la primera parte de JEL entre ellos- las mujeres tenían en él menos cerrada la vía de la defensa de su individualidad (en teoría podían pertenecer al partido como un afiliado

de las relaciones de *género* de esta época, permitiendo la introducción en ellas de algunos cambios en la práctica, a pesar de la fuerte resistencia ejercida desde la ideología. Para poder acercarnos al conocimiento de esta dinámica tenemos que preguntarnos cómo operó el *género* en la construcción ideológica nacionalista -en la elaboración de sus símbolos, de sus conceptos normativos y de sus valores- y qué ocurrió en la práctica, cómo se reflejaron estos modelos ideológicos en las relaciones entre mujeres y hombres, cómo repercutieron en el conjunto de las relaciones sociales y qué posibilidades existieron para el cambio en ellas en algún sentido.

El mundo simbólico y normativo nacionalista

En la construcción ideológica de Sabino Arana y sus seguidores el *género* y la raza fueron extraordinariamente operativos para dotar a su doctrina de un carácter esencialista, y para orientar el futuro con los presupuestos del pasado que mejor podían servir a sus intereses. De esta operatividad da buena cuenta la utilización de la familia tradicional asentada en el caserío vasco, como referente simbólico de las relaciones de *género* y de las características raciales que debían ser el fundamento de la nación.

La nación que los nacionalistas vascos se propusieron construir, o reconstruir según su propio enfoque, no tenía como célula básica al individuo, soporte del nacionalismo liberal, sino que estaba basada en una idea de comunidad. Una comunidad racial de la que estaban excluidos los inmigrantes, es decir, la parte mas numerosa y rebelde de la clase obrera asentada en el País Vasco. Esta exclusión era uno de los objetivos del énfasis puesto en la importancia de los caracteres raciales y servía a los intereses de las clases autóctonas, de la burguesía (pequeña y media) fundamentalmente.

Además de su carácter racial, las líneas maestras de esta comunidad fueron trazadas siguiendo un modelo dual de *género*, a partir del estereotipo de la comunidad familiar rural, eje de la sociedad tradicional antes de la revolución industrial.

mas) pero, por la misma razón, la pérdida de importancia de los elementos esencialistas, su papel no tenía tanta relevancia. Esto, unido a su pequeña implantación, hizo que atrajera a un número reducido de mujeres, mientras la inmensa mayoría de las nacionalistas se sumaban al nacionalismo *jelkide* (defensor de JEL) al que vamos a referirnos aquí fundamentalmente en lo sucesivo. Sobre ANV véase el estudio de GRANJA, José Luis de la: *Nacionalismo y Segunda República en el País Vasco*, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1986.

En este modelo racial y de *género* el hombre aparecía como prototipo de la raza, en él estaban reunidas todas las virtudes de ésta y en sus manos estaba depositada la dirección de la comunidad. La mujer, por su parte, era el instrumento de perpetuación de la raza y de las señas de identidad de la comunidad. A través de su maternidad, la mujer era el nexo que unía a la nación con la naturaleza y con los orígenes trascendentales que se perseguían, la que establecía el puente entre el pasado añorado y el futuro que se pretendía construir a partir de él, la que podía hacer que la raza se perpetuara.

La importancia de este nexo para la construcción esencialista de la nación vasca llevaba a sumar, a la identificación entre mujer y maternidad, realizada por el discurso de *género* dominante, la identificación entre mujer-madre y nación. Esta doble identificación no era patrimonio del nacionalismo vasco, sino que la compartían también distintos nacionalismos y otras ideologías -contemporáneas y de épocas anteriores- cuando recurrían a elementos esencialistas para mantener inalterable, sin posibilidad de discusión, una normativa o realidad social (nacional, de clase, de *género* o, como en este caso, las tres al mismo tiempo).

En el caso vasco, la identificación de la mujer-madre con la nación (y con la raza que era a su vez parte inseparable de ella para Sabino Arana) era una proyección de la identificación tradicional de la mujer-madre con la tierra, sustento de la casa troncal y del linaje, uno de cuyos símbolos, la mujer sin nombre de la batalla de Arrigorriaga, fue recogido por Sabino Arana de la tradición foral y reelaborado como símbolo de la nación²⁹.

Pero si la maternidad, en la elaboración que de ella hacía el discurso nacionalista como depositaria del pasado y del futuro de la raza, era extraordinariamente útil para dar consistencia al carácter esencialista de la nación vasca, también suponía que las mujeres, a través de su maternidad, biológica y socializadora de la primera infancia, tenían en sus manos la esencia misma de la nación, su sangre y su espíritu, y esta capacidad debía ser controlada.

²⁹ La mujer sin nombre de la batalla de Arrigorriaga, uno de los relatos legendarios en los que Sabino Arana basaba la defensa de la independencia de los vascos, aparecía en el campo de batalla en un momento crítico y, como la Judit bíblica, contribuía al triunfo de los vascos cortando la cabeza del jefe enemigo. Véase UGALDE SOLANO, Mercedes: *Mujeres y nacionalismo vasco: Génesis y desarrollo de Emakume Abertzale Batza (1906-1936)*, Bilbao, Universidad del País Vasco, 1993, pp. 46 y 47; ARANZADI, Juan: *Milenarismo vasco*, Madrid, Taurus, 1982, pp. 317-346. Figuras simbólicas semejantes pueden encontrarse también en otros discursos nacionalistas. Agustina de Aragón es un ejemplo en este sentido en el caso del nacionalismo español.

Para ejercer este control sobre la capacidad de decisión de las mujeres, los nacionalistas crearon modelos difusores de una normativa específica de *género*, utilizando para ello figuras como la de Libe³⁰, con la que pretendieron dictar el papel que las mujeres debían desempeñar en la comunidad nacionalista.

Libe, personaje literario creado por Sabino Arana, evocaba la visión dicotómica de la mujer difundida por doctrinas como la católica, en la que aparecía como fuente de perdición cuando era dejada a su libre albedrío (Eva) y como fuente de salvación a través de su maternidad sumisamente aceptada (María).

Como Eva, Libe se convirtió en una amenaza para su patria cuando decidió casarse y mezclar su sangre, la sangre de su raza, con un extranjero. Pero, como María, contribuyó a la salvación de los suyos cuando, arrepentida de haber ejercido su libertad individual, se presentó en el campo de batalla dispuesta a cumplir sus deberes patrióticos y, como la mujer de la batalla de Arrigorriaga, evocó ante su pueblo a la madre patria empujando a sus hijos a la victoria³¹.

Durante el primer tercio de siglo Libe fue un referente simbólico y normativo constante para las mujeres nacionalistas³². Como la Libe seguidora de Eva, muriendo arrepentida después de la batalla, ellas debían hacer morir también su individualidad, y como la Libe seguidora de María, debían cumplir su deber con la patria, que no era otro que rechazar los matrimonios con quienes no fueran de su raza, asumir su función maternal y ser los instrumentos de reproducción y conservación de la raza y del conjunto de las esencias vascas.

Figuras como la mujer de Arrigorriaga o Libe (Eva/María), reelaboradas a partir del material extraído de la tradición foral y de la doctrina católica, contribuían a diseñar la identidad colectiva del *género* femenino y a controlar la maternidad en la

³⁰ ARANA GOIRI, Sabino: *Obras Completas*, Bayona-Buenos Aires, Sabindiar-Batza, 1965, pp. 122-135.

³¹ Antes de la creación de Libe, Sabino Arana había creado a Anita, personaje semejante al de Libe pero sólo en su primera faceta, aquella en la que, evocando a Eva, se convertía en vía de perdición para la raza vasca. La obra de la que este personaje era protagonista fue descubierta para la historiografía por el profesor de la Granja y, posteriormente, el hallazgo del manuscrito, escrito de su puño y letra por Sabino Arana, ha venido a corroborar su autoría, tal como afirmaba de la Granja. GRANJA, José Luis (edición y estudio histórico de): *Sabino de Arana Goiri. De fuera vendrá...*, San Sebastián, Haranburu, 1982.

³² La exposición sobre las nacionalistas vascas realizada aquí está basada en la investigación reflejada en UGALDE SOLANO, op., cit. Remito a ella en lo sucesivo. Puede consultarse también: UGALDE SOLANO, Mercedes: "Evolución de la diferenciación de género e identidad femenina", en CAMPOS, Arantza y MENDEZ, Lourdes (ed.): *Teoría feminista, identidad, género y política*, San Sebastián, Universidad del País Vasco, 1993, pp. 117-145

comunidad nacionalista, completando la pauta de las relaciones de *género* ofrecida por el arquetipo familiar tradicional.

De la visión idealizada de la familia tradicional se extraían, en cualquier caso, los rasgos de *género* fundamentales que se pretendían conservar: una diferenciación de funciones sociales en función del sexo, y una jerarquización de *género* de predominio masculino establecida sobre esa diferenciación. Esta jerarquización era clave para mantener el control de la maternidad, control que, como queda dicho, era básico en la construcción nacional racial que se perseguía.

La legitimación de tal jerarquía procedía de la tradición vasca y de la voluntad divina. Ambas instancias sancionaban el predominio masculino. La primera era interpretada directamente por Arana y sus seguidores aprovechando el discurso foral; la segunda, interpretada por la Iglesia Católica, se manifestaba en el Génesis, en el conjunto del mensaje bíblico y a través de la doctrina de los llamados padres de la Iglesia, y era incorporada también a la doctrina nacionalista.

A estos presupuestos básicos (diferenciación de funciones y jerarquización) ofrecidos por la familia tradicional vasca, los nacionalistas incorporaron también los contenidos que el sistema de relaciones entre mujeres y hombres había rehecho para poder adaptarse a la nueva sociedad industrializada. Así, manteniendo la jerarquización sexual, a la diferenciación de funciones se sumaron una diferenciación de espacios sociales y una división del trabajo nuevas, determinadas por el establecimiento de una drástica división -inexistente en la sociedad de Antiguo Régimen- entre el ámbito doméstico y el extradoméstico, el trabajo doméstico y el mercantil, la vida privada y la pública. A las mujeres correspondía el ámbito y el trabajo doméstico, el mundo de los sentimientos y de los afectos considerado propio de la vida privada y de su función maternal. Mientras los hombres debían salir de casa para ser el sostén económico de la familia -de la que ostentaban también su dirección- para ejercer una profesión, hacerse cargo de la política y moverse en el mundo público en general, un mundo que supuestamente se regía sobre todo por la razón y en el que se encontraban los principales resortes del poder colectivo.

De esta manera, un modelo procedente del pasado y cuyo origen estaba en la antigua sociedad rural ahora en declive, era reelaborado y utilizado por los nacionalistas en una sociedad completamente distinta, en proceso acelerado de urbanización y de cambio, y servía para construir en ella una nueva comunidad nacional basada en unas determinadas relaciones de poder. Relaciones de poder en las que el género, la raza y la clase social se estructuraban mutuamente.

El juego de las astucias³³ y de las resistencias

El nacionalismo *jelkide* vasco, que podemos considerar clasificado entre los nacionalismos de proceso rápido y de carácter fundamentalmente esencialista, debido a este último carácter precisamente, no ofrecía a las mujeres ninguna fisura en su doctrina que les permitiera situarse y argumentar a favor de una ruptura con los modelos de *género* establecidos.

Frente al individualismo y los principios liberales, que habían permitido aquella ruptura a otras mujeres, las nacionalistas vascas se encontraban inmersas en un contexto en el que lo importante no era el individuo y su libre albedrío, sino la comunidad (familiar y nacional) y la fidelidad a unas esencias incuestionables de las que los modelos de *género* formaban parte.

La fuerza de estos modelos, y su capacidad para perpetuarse, residía en la función que cumplían como estructurantes de la identidad colectiva de la nación, y de las identidades de todos y cada uno de sus integrantes. Poner estos modelos en cuestión suponía poner en cuestión estas identidades, tanto la nacional como las personales. Por esta razón, el feminismo liberal aparecía como una realidad amenazante, tanto para el nacionalismo en su conjunto, como para la identidad sexual y de *género* de hombres y mujeres nacionalistas, y fue rechazado por unos y por otras.

Sin embargo, entre las mujeres situadas en el entorno nacionalista, pertenecientes en gran número a familias de las clases medias urbanas y de la burguesía, existían aspiraciones a unos horizontes mas amplios que los del hogar y a una consideración social de sus múltiples valores, y se movilaron para satisfacerlas utilizando para ello la propia vía nacionalista.

La importancia central de la maternidad para el nacionalismo les dio la oportunidad de alcanzar a través de ella la valoración y el reconocimiento social que no podían encontrar como individuos, y de utilizarla para salir del estrecho reducto del hogar, ampliar su información y sus conocimientos y participar en la vida pública.

Si en un entorno nacional-liberal, las mujeres habían buscado afirmarse como individuos y habían defendido su derecho a la educación, al trabajo remunerado y a la actividad política, utilizando argumentos del propio discurso liberal, en un entorno

³³ JULIANO, Dolores: *El juego de las astucias. Mujer y construcción de modelos sociales alternativos*, Madrid, horas y HORAS, 1992.

nacional-esencialista recurrieron al propio discurso esencialista, y esgrimiendo la trascendencia de su maternidad precisamente, y una contribución mas eficaz a la causa nacionalista mediante la proyección de su función maternal fuera del hogar, trataron de lograr nuevos espacios de actuación y de influencia.

La movilización de las mujeres, impulsada por sectores nacionalistas tanto de mujeres como de hombres, estableció durante el primer tercio del siglo XX una tensión dentro del movimiento nacionalista, entre los que consideraban los beneficios que esto podía reportar a la consecución de los objetivos nacionalistas y los que temían los cambios que la movilización de las mujeres podía producir en los modelos de *género*, con el consiguiente peligro para el modelo nacional que trataban de llevar a la práctica.

Una segunda tensión se produjo en las mismas mujeres, entre sus aspiraciones a nuevos horizontes de actuación y a una participación mayor y mas diversificada en el movimiento nacionalista, y el temor a que estas aspiraciones entrasen en contradicción con su identidad de *género*. Este problema tenía un correlativo en los hombres, que sentían amenazada su propia identidad ante cualquier variación de la identidad femenina. En el caso de las mujeres la tensión se resolvió de distintas maneras, dependiendo de su procedencia social: a favor de las actitudes mas conservadoras en las procedentes del mundo rural y pesquero; y a favor de abrir nuevos caminos y posibilidades, en las procedentes de las zonas en las que mas repercutía el proceso acelerado de urbanización y modernización que estaba en marcha en el País Vasco.

Las resistencias surgidas en el seno del movimiento nacionalista a la movilización de las mujeres obligaron a éstas a utilizar estrategias indirectas, replegándose cuando el momento no era propicio y aprovechando las coyunturas políticas favorables. Así, desviaron hacia la beneficencia sus propósitos de crear una organización nacionalista propia cuando vieron que todavía no existían condiciones para ello, la crearon cuando el interés de ciertos sectores nacionalistas lo hizo posible, y aprovecharon la instauración de la II República, abierta a las reivindicaciones de las mujeres, para desarrollar su organización, convertirla en una organización de masas, ocupar espacios muy importantes de la vida pública nacionalista y lograr el reconocimiento de sus derechos, equiparados con los de los hombres, en el seno del Partido Nacionalista Vasco.

Alcanzaron estos logros sin perseguirlos directamente en la mayoría de los casos, insistiendo siempre en que lo que buscaban era prestar su contribución mas

eficaz a la causa nacionalista, reafirmar su función maternal proyectándola también fuera del hogar, y marcar sus diferencias con un feminismo rupturista como el liberal.

Sin embargo, el feminismo liberal, y el feminismo socialista que era una reelaboración del liberal, jugaron un papel determinante en la estrategia de las nacionalistas. La gran influencia que alcanzaron ambos en el contexto internacional repercutió también en España, donde, a pesar de su relativa debilidad, pudieron capitalizar la fuerza con que contaban fuera de ella, y lograr, en los años treinta, el reconocimiento del derecho al voto de las mujeres, y un salto cualitativo en el proceso de su incorporación a la vida pública. En este contexto, las nacionalistas, con su estrategia de movilización específica, pudieron incorporarse a este proceso, llevando a la práctica un modelo de mujer que, aunque no asumía la reclusión hogareña, tampoco seguía las pautas del feminismo liberal. Sin las conquistas de éste las nacionalistas no hubieran podido obtener los frutos que obtuvieron dentro de la comunidad nacionalista, pero para lograrlos fue imprescindible también su distanciamiento de él, como contramodelo frente al que podían realizar su propio modelo.

El nuevo modelo de mujer puesto en práctica por las nacionalistas, suponía su identificación con una función maternal que no ejercían sólo en el hogar, sino también en la vida social y profesional, e incluso en la política. Este modelo fue siendo asumido progresivamente, no sin profundas contradicciones y polémicas, por la comunidad nacionalista, a medida que el nacionalismo atemperaba su carácter esencialista y entraba en un proceso de modernización y democratización, que culminaría en los años treinta con la apertura del partido, aunque con restricciones todavía, a los inmigrantes y a las mujeres, y con la decantación hacia el lado de la República durante la Guerra Civil.

Estos cambios, sin embargo, asumidos en el terreno político debido a su alta rentabilidad para los objetivos nacionalistas, encontraron resistencias muy sólidas en el ámbito de la ideología, que no varió fundamentalmente, y que utilizó diversos recursos para mantener sus presupuestos y no modificar sus modelos nacional y de *género*, a pesar de los cambios llevados a cabo en la práctica. Entre estos recursos estaban: 1) La definición del nacionalismo como una entidad no-política, perteneciente al mundo de los sentimientos -el amor a la patria- en el que las mujeres debían moverse de acuerdo con la normativa de *género*; 2) El carácter excepcional de la actividad pública femenina, exigida coyunturalmente por unas circunstancias de excepcional peligro para la construcción nacional; y 3) El encubrimiento de la jerarquía de *género* mediante la difusión del mito de la igualdad originaria entre

mujeres y hombres vascos. También las mujeres participaron en la elaboración de estos elementos ideológicos ("Tene" Mújika, Juliana Azpeitia, Jule Gabilondo...) . En su caso, puede considerarse que se trataba de subterfugios, que les permitían lograr sus aspiraciones sin oposición.

No cabe duda, que el mantenimiento de los presupuestos ideológicos en relación con el *género*, suponía una amenaza de involución para los avances conseguidos por las mujeres en la ocupación de nuevos espacios sociales; pero también parece cierto que no era fácil encontrar otra salida, como no fuera la autoexclusión del nacionalismo, dada la impermeabilidad a los cambios de toda construcción ideológica esencialista, y la escasa implantación del sector nacionalista menos esencialista (ANV). Las nacionalistas asumieron por tanto este riesgo, y utilizaron a su favor el modelo femenino establecido (ampliando sus ámbitos de aplicación) y el discurso de *género* dominante (como justificación de esta ampliación). Si con ello consiguieron algunos logros propios, los beneficios obtenidos de su contribución por el nacionalismo fueron considerables, tanto en el terreno político como en el sindical y en el cultural, y sobre todo, en la cohesión lograda por la comunidad nacionalista, a través de los lazos afectivos que ellas mismas crearon y alimentaron.

Consideración final

Estos apuntes, lejos todavía de poder tener una visión sintética sobre la poco conocida relación *género*-nacionalismo, van encaminados a señalar el interés de hacer avanzar el estudio de esta relación en dos sentidos sobre todo:

1. El *género* como componente de las relaciones de poder establecidas en toda comunidad nacional; y como principal factor estructurante de los elementos esencialistas y antidemocráticos presentes, en mayor o menor medida, en los distintos nacionalismos. En este sentido es necesario analizar cómo opera el *género* en la construcción de los símbolos, de los valores, de los conceptos normativos, de las identidades nacionales y personales y de las distintas ideologías nacionalistas en su conjunto. Y también, cómo opera en la práctica, en la estructuración de las relaciones sociales que se establecen en las distintas comunidades nacionales.

2. El nacionalismo como marco específico de las relaciones de *género*. Aquí es interesante conocer la existencia o no de movimientos de mujeres, sus características, los modelos de *género* alternativos que ofrecen y sus relaciones con

los distintos movimientos nacionalistas. Todo ello en su contexto específico y en su evolución, para llegar a conocer, en su conjunto, cuales son las circunstancias y los factores que intervienen, dentro del ámbito nacionalista, en la continuidad o en el cambio de las relaciones asimétricas de *género*.

El estudio de la relación *género*-nacionalismo es, por tanto, doblemente útil. Por una parte para la historia del nacionalismo, puesto que, como el caso vasco demuestra, el componente *género* es de importancia fundamental en su construcción. Y, por otra parte, para la historia de las mujeres, o más exactamente para la historia de mujeres y hombres, en sus conflictivas y poco exploradas relaciones.



Section II

Nation-Building and Nationalisms in the Multinational Empires

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How Empires Rise and Fall: Nations, Nationalism, and Imperial Elites

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The collapse of the USSR's «external empire» in Eastern Europe and the progressive decay of its «internal empire» in the non-Russian republics has pushed the study of empire closer to the center of scholarly theorizing about the rise and fall of states. Two recent conferences testify to this renewed interest in empire: the first, held at the University of Minnesota in April 1990, dealt with an explicit comparison of the Soviet Union with Habsburg Austria-Hungary; the second, at the Naval War College in August, discussed continental empires in decline across the whole span of history.¹

Robert Gilpin, Paul Kennedy, and other scholars have contributed greatly to the discussion of the rise and fall of great powers, but their arguments are of relevance to imperial decline only if empires are understood as a species of states.² But why empires decline as states is a very different question from why empires decline as relationships between centers and peripheries. While most of the debate has focussed on the great power attributes of empires — their ability to compete with other states and to survive on the international arena — the question of why the internal arrangement of empires decays or collapses has, with only some exceptions, remained unexplored.³ Naturally, these two processes — external decline and internal decay — may reinforce each other, but to state the problem in this manner is to recognize that at least two distinct theoretical questions are involved and that establishing a connection between them is, of course, a third.⁴

¹ «Great Power Ethnic Politics: The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union», April 26-28, 1990, Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota, «Continental Empires in Decline», August 3, 1990, Center for International Affairs (Harvard University), Naval War College.

² Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981; Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, New York: Vintage, 1989; Michael Mann (ed.), *The Rise and Decline of the Nation State*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.

³ See, for example, Michael W. Doyle, *Empires*, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1986.

⁴ See Alexander J. Motyl, «From Imperial Decay to Imperial Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Empire in Comparative Perspective», in Richard Rudolph (ed.), *Great Power, Ethnic Politics: The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union*, Minneapolis: Center for Austrian Studies, forthcoming.

Unfortunately, not only does the literature on the rise and fall of empires largely approach the issue from the great-power perspective, but it also tends to overlook the conceptual subtleties involved in the study of empire—an unsurprising fact in light of the general tendency in political science to leave conceptual questions unexplored and to plunge immediately into either theory or fact collection.⁵ As we shall presently see, however, such subtleties are especially numerous with respect to empire as a type of internal arrangement, my topic in this paper. And insofar as the conceptual underpinnings of empire and of the ways in which they rise and fall are obviously of critical importance to coming to grips with the reasons for their emergence and decline,⁶ explaining why empires rise and fall requires identifying how they do so and knowing what they are. My goals in this essay are, thus, necessarily pretheoretical: to examine the conceptual issues involved in the study of imperial emergence and decline. Inevitably, therefore, I shall be concerned with three themes: defining empire rigorously, illustrating how the definition connotes the forms in which empires emerge and end, and proposing how this typology of imperial emergence and decline affects theoretical approaches to explaining how empires rise and fall.

I. Defining Empire

What, then, is empire? There are several definitions that I shall reject before suggesting my own. The first is that of empire as an entity that engages in imperialism, which, to quote William V. Harris, may be defined as «the behavior by which a state or people takes and retains supreme power over other states or peoples or lands».⁷ Such an entity is imperialistic, of course, but, at the time that it is expanding, it is not yet an empire. It is only after the expansion ceases and territories have been incorporated that such an entity may be termed an empire. Thus, although established empires may obviously engage in imperialism, empire *per se* involves not the acquisition of territories, but something in the nature of their actual possession.

Relatedly, it is incorrect to claim that empires are the products of imperialism, inasmuch as it is logically inadmissible to define an entity, be it empire or anything else, in terms of its presumed cause and not on its own terms. To propose such a

⁵ These issues are discussed in greater detail in Alexander J. Motyl, *Sovietology Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Terms with Nationalism in the USSR*, New York: Columbia UP, 1991.

⁶ See Giovanni Sartori, «Guidelines for Concept Analysis», in Giovanni Sartori (ed.), *Social Science Concepts*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984, 15-85.

⁷ William V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 B.C.*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985, p.4.

definition is to violate a cardinal rule of defining and to incorporate synthetic propositions involving cause and effect into analytic statements, such as definitions.⁸ This reasoning obviously suggests that there need be no logical connection between empire and imperialism. Indeed, we should expect empires to emerge even in the absence of imperialism.

Is empire a particular type of entity, say, a domain or a state ruled by a self-styled emperor? Such a definition, which corresponds to ancient notions of empire,⁹ merely begs the question of what makes an emperor distinctly imperial and not just regal. Just as the divine right may make kings, but not emperors, so, too self-designations merely reveal the pretensions of rulers or elites and not the genuine status of some entity. Specifying that, say, absolute rule is the central defining characteristic of emperors is also unhelpful, as absolutist rule logically does not imply the possession of territories outside the absolute ruler's immediate realm.

Finally, it is equally *inutile* to define empire as a type of state. The historical experience of many nomadic empires or of ancient empires, such as those of Athens or Sparta, makes using the *state* — especially if it is defined in Weberian terms as a political organization with a monopoly of violence in some territory¹⁰ — with reference to all of them exceedingly problematic. Anthony Giddens rightly distinguishes between modern and premodern states on the basis of the former's exerting continuous bureaucratic and military control over some territory.¹¹ The distinction not only is valid, but it also suggests that using the same term for both political entities may be an instance of concept stretching, which we would be wise to avoid.¹² No less problematic is that by rejecting the possibility that conceptual differences may underpin semantic distinctions and by defining empires as states, we learn nothing specific about empires. Of course, we could follow convention, especially that of international relations theorists, and see the *state* in all modern and premodern political entities that exert military control over territories, have some kinds of administrative apparatuses, and

⁸ For an extended discussion of these issues, see Alexander J. Motyl, «Concepts and Skocpol: Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Study of Revolution», Unpublished manuscript, 1990.

⁹ See George Lichtheim, *Imperialism*, New York: Praeger, 1971; Roger Scruton, *A Dictionary of Political Thought*, New York: Harper & Row, 1982, p.145.

¹⁰ See H.H.Gerth and C.Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York: Oxford UP, 1958, 77-78.

¹¹ Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and violence*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, 35-60; Charles Tilly appears to disagree with this distinction. See his *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*, Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990.

¹² Giovanni Sartori, «Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics», *American Political Science Review*, n.4 (December 1970), 1033-53.

extract resources from population inhabiting the territory they control. We would then speak of the Athenian state, the Persian state, and the Mongol state in the same breath as we would refer to the Nazi state, the French state, or the Soviet state — a practice that, alas, probably confounds as much as it clarifies. One solution to this problem might be to deny imperial status to earlier (or later) forms of empire, but this seems excessively restrictive. Another might be to distinguish between premodern and modern empires — a distinction that does little to resolve or even to address the question of empire itself.

Clearly, the above approaches to defining empire have brought us to an impasse. If empire is not an imperialistic entity, the product of imperialism, the domain of a self-styled emperor, or a type of state, when what is it? As I suggested above, empire is *possession*, and in that sense it is the relationship between possessor and possessed. It takes two, therefore, to make a relationship and it is the special relationship between the two — the relationship of possession — that makes an empire.

Possession is a curious relationship, as it implies both absolute control of the possessed by the possessor, as well as the continued autonomy of both. To possess something is not only to have it, but also to control it, to determine its destiny. To possess a thing means to be able to dispose of it as one wishes. But swallowing or destroying or merging negate possession, as they obliterate the possessed and thereby end the relationship. Possession is, thus, a relationship between two distinct entities, of which one, the possessor, is endowed with sovereign control, while the other, the possessed, is bereft of it. Not surprisingly, Harris refers to «supreme power», Michael Doyle speaks of the «control» by one state of the «effective political sovereignty of another political society,» while George Lichtheim writes of hegemony and domination. Whatever the manner in which an imperial relationship arises, it seems evident that it must involve something in the nature of supreme, power, hegemony, control, or absolutist rule by the possessor over the possessed.¹³

Translating these somewhat abstract remarks into more intelligible social scientific terms is not difficult. We need two distinct entities and we require that one exert sovereign control over the other. Let us call the possessor the *core* and the possessed the *periphery*. Empire, in these terms, is the relationship of absolute control exerted by a sovereign core over a nonsovereign periphery. We know from the previous enquiry that the core cannot be a state. The periphery cannot be a state as well, inasmuch as the concept of state involves sovereignty, and the periphery, as the

¹³ Harris, p.4; Doyle, p.45; Lichtheim, p.5.

possessed, must lack sovereignty. If the core must possess sovereignty but cannot be the state, who or what, the, is the possessor? All we are left with is *elite*, the individual or set of individuals who rule the core society and polity while controlling, or ruling absolutely, the periphery, the possessed.¹⁴ States, from this point of view, are the instruments of what Alfred Stepan calls the «strategic elites» in their quest to acquire territory or to exert imperial control.¹⁵

Historical experience suggests that there is much to be said for this interpretation. After all, despite Louis XIV's assertion, «L'état c'est moi,» Louis was but the ruler, albeit absolute, of an enormous state. Catherine the Great of Russia, like Maria Teresia of Austria, were not the Russian or Austrian states respectively, but merely the «heads of state.» Naturally, strategic elites cannot be strategic without something in the nature of a state supporting them. But it is the elites, and not the bureaucracies and armies, that exert imperial control. States, thus, are instruments of possession and not the possessors themselves.

What, then, is the periphery? It is surely more than a spatial concept only, denoting the geographic edge of something.¹⁶ Neither is it sufficient to define the periphery only in terms of its nonpossession of state power, as this characteristic does not help us to distinguish between imperial and nonimperial peripheries. Nor is it helpful to think of the periphery as being merely some people or territory, inasmuch as peoples and territories are no less characteristic of states in general and multiethnic states particular. Clearly, for the concept of imperial periphery to be meaningful, we must insist that it has manifest characteristics that would not be found in run-of-the-mill multiethnic states. Two such features come to mind: first, that the periphery consists of a society distinct from that of the center, and, second, that the periphery possesses an elite distinct from that of the center and excluded from the exercise, although not necessarily from the administration of state power. To insist on a distinct society is to emphasize that the periphery cannot simply be unpopulated territory, that the population inhabiting this territory must be somehow different religiously, ethnically, or otherwise — from that inhabiting the core territory, and that it must be sufficiently advanced socially to constitute a society, here defined as, minimally, an economically

¹⁴ Following Scruton (pp.143-44), we may define elite as «any body of people who act in concert, whether or not knowingly, to maintain a shared position of social and/or political privilege». The study of elites has, of course, a long tradition, going at least as far back as Plato's *Republic*.

¹⁵ Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective*, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1978, p.xii.

¹⁶ For a discussion of these issues, see Jean Gottmann (ed.), *Centre and Periphery*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980.

differentiated and hierarchically organized collectivity. Inasmuch as the peripheral society is hierarchically organized, it necessarily possesses an elite.

Empire changes this elite fundamentally; indeed, empire emasculates the elite without destroying it or the bases of its elite status. Empire deprives the elite of its directive capacity by transferring the locus of all sovereign decision making from the peripheral territory to the core. In an imperial relationship, therefore, peripheral elites are deprived of their elite function, without losing their capacity to play such roles. They are suspended in mid-air, as it were, becoming both the object of core policies of domination and partners in their administration and execution. In sum, the periphery is a nonsovereign elite. It must be a set of individuals with all the requisite socioeconomic and intellectual characteristics of rulership minus one — the capacity to make sovereign decisions. The periphery is, thus, an elite that cannot function as an elite. A politically emasculated elite, the periphery is an elite *manqué*, an economic or social elite that could, in nonimperial circumstances, also function as a political elite and exercise sovereignty. The relationship between core elite and peripheral elite is, as a result, one of possession, inasmuch as the former controls the latter absolutely.

It is important to underline that, just as distinct societies must continue to remain the objects of imperial rule in peripheries, so, too, peripheral elites, whatever their function in the local administration, must also continue to exist as distinct peripheral elites for empire, as a relationship of domination between core and periphery, to continue to obtain.

Thus, if societies lose their distinctive character or are annihilated, or if peripheral elites are coopted into the core or lose their sense of peripheral identity, then empire can no longer be said to exist.

The ideal typical imperial relationship thus involves the exercise of state power by some core over some periphery without the periphery's having any say in the manner in which that power is exercised. This does not mean that no representatives of peripheral elites may be coopted into the core state, but only that their involvement in the core state is as individuals and not as representatives of the periphery. Were they coopted into the core state as peripheral elite, and were their status as such an elite the prerequisite of their co-optation and involvement in the core state, then it would be impossible to argue that an imperial relationship exists. Naturally, no state can exercise its power in some territory without the involvement, to some degree, of individuals from that particular territory. If, therefore, these coopted individuals represent and remain a distinct territorial elite, and if their involvement in the exercise

of state power is limited to administration in the territory, then we are justified in saying that imperial rules is in fact involved.

We see now that empire can be explicitly defined as a relationship of absolute control by a core elite and state over a peripheral elite and distinct society. Empire, then, must involve the following elements: 1) a core elite and state, 2) absolutist rule over the periphery, 3) distinct societies in the center and in the periphery, and 4) distinct elites at the core on the periphery. This minimal list of defining characteristics will serve as the basis of our exploration of the manner in which empires emerge and fall.

One additional distinction has to be made before we proceed with our inquiry, and that is to discuss the elements of the periphery and their relationship, in terms of size, to the core. With regard to the subunits populating the periphery, we can agree that empire can be said to exist as long as there is a least one peripheral unit? — one distinct society with a distinct elite — that is the object of imperial domination by the core. There may of course, and probably will be, more, but empire comes into being with the existence of one such unit. This distinction is reasonable enough; rather more problematic is the question of size. Does any subordinate periphery, no matter how small, meeting all the requirements of such a periphery transform any core, no matter how small, meeting all the requirements of such a periphery transform any core, no matter how large, into an imperial core and the core-periphery relationship into empire? Must we insist, for instance, that the United States' relationship with Puerto Rico or, say, with the Virgin Islands is imperial, even if it were to fulfill all our criteria for an imperial relationship? Conceptual consistency demands «yes» for an answer; fortunately, so does logic. There is no reason why core states must be larger or smaller than their peripheries, all that we expect is for them to be stronger — say, in power capabilities. If the disparity in power is minimal, then imperial relationships may never emerge or will be brittle. If, on the other hand, this disparity is enormous, then the relationship is all that more imperial and solidly so. Naturally, the more imperial geography is coterminous with the core state, the «smaller» the empire and the less significant do imperial relationships appear on the international arena, inasmuch as the core state can act virtually as a nonimperial state with all the advantages and disadvantages that such behavior may entail. In contrast, the less imperial geography is coterminous with the core state, the «greater» the empire and the more significantly do imperial relationships affect the core state in its dealings on the international arena. These observations may explain why we are disinclined to think of the United States' relationship with some island as imperial. Nonetheless, notwithstanding the virtual irrelevance of this relationship to American policy toward other states, the relationship

surely can be imperial and would, as such, be of vital interest to the island concerned, if not to Washington.

II. How Empires Rise

It is generally assumed that empires come into existence as a result of imperialism — or activity involving the extension of core state power over some periphery. This view, even in its usual emphasis on military expansion, is not entirely incorrect, yet, as I suggested above, it is far from correct. Naturally, a core elite can extend its monopoly of violence and administrative rule into some periphery in traditional imperial manner — via military campaigns, wars, and subsequent conquest. The history of the world is rife with examples of just this sort of military expansionism and of the empires to which it then gave rise. Augustus, Darius, Peter the Great, Napoleon, and Hitler all expanded this way.

But military conquest is obviously not the only manner in which core elites can expand the scope of their sovereignty. History offers just as many examples of dynastic unions between powerful and weak monarchs resulting in the incorporation of the latter on an imperial basis. Poland swallowed the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in this manner¹⁷; so, too, the Habsburg empire would not have grown as it did without strategic marriages between Hapsburgs and the rulers of the crown lands¹⁸. Empires can also be the products of partitions of weaker states, perhaps even of empires, by stronger ones: the partition of Poland and the expansion of imperial relationships involving Russia, Austria, and Prussia, immediately comes to mind. Finally empires can be bought, as the United States did by means of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. All of these techniques may of course be considered examples of imperialist activity or behavior, but only one involves massive application of force, while the rest are grounded in diplomacy, be it aimed at buying land, marrying titles to land, or establishing new state boundaries.

These examples of imperial emergence involve the extension in some manner and form of core state rule to a periphery. As suggested above, however, empires can also emerge as a result of changes involving the other three defining characteristics of empires: Absolutist rule, a distinct peripheral society, and distinct peripheral elite.

¹⁷ See Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.

¹⁸ Robert A. Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.

Logically, there is no reason why states cannot be transformed into empires by virtue of emergence of absolutist rule between distinct cores and peripheries heretofore ruled in a nonabsolutist manner, the emergence of distinct peripheral societies in states with absolutist regimes, or the emergence of distinct peripheral elites in states that may or may not have absolutist regimes and core-periphery relationships of any kind.

In the first instance, empire would emerge on the ruins of a nonabsolutist relationship between a distinct core and distinct periphery. A multinational state, whose core is identified with some society, need not be imperial if the political relationship between core and periphery is based on the meaningful participation in central decision making of peripheral elites as peripheral elites. If, however, peripheral elites come to be excluded from access to and influence on the core state, then the core's relationship with the periphery may be said to have become imperial, despite the fact that core elites may legitimately insist that imperialism was never on their minds. Stalin's exclusion of non-Russian Communist elites from the core and his simultaneous extension of totalitarian controls over peripheral society arguably represents such an instance of imperial emergence.¹⁹

Naturally, if a distinct periphery emerges within a state characterized by some form of absolutist rule — say, due to modernization or uneven development, the sort of changes Michael Hechter had in mind when writing *Internal Colonialism*²⁰ — then «internal colonies» can transform the state into an empire, despite, once again, the possible protestations to the contrary of core elites. Peripheries may acquire an ethnic identity of their own, develop a religious fervor contrary to that of the core population, or acquire territorial patriotism or class-based solidarity. The form of the distinction does not matter, as long as some such distinction emerges and marks the periphery as a periphery distinct from the center. Thus, The creation of distinct Belorussian nation, by Soviet policy no less, has effectively transformed Moscow's relationship with her western borderlands into a distinctly imperial one.²¹

By the same token, were peripheral elites to emerge in distinct social collectivities — perhaps as a result of missionary training, modernization, or state education — and subsequently be denied access to core decision making, then their territory would also acquire imperial status and they, more likely than not, would begin

¹⁹ Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984, 533-64.

²⁰ Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

²¹ Nicholas P. Vakar, *Belorussia. The Making of a Nation*, Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1956.

speaking the language of nationalism and calling for some form of self-determination for the collectivities that they now believe themselves to be leading. As John Breuilly amply illustrates, the history of nineteenth century Europe and of twentieth century Africa and Asia is rife with examples of this process.²²

Broadly speaking, therefore, empires emerge by means of the expansion of core states into peripheries or by means of the transformation of states into cores and peripheries. There are as few logical grounds for insisting that empires be the products of imperialism only as there are for building imperialism into the definition of empire. If empire is a particular relationship, then the manner in which such a relationship emerges is irrelevant to the definition. Unfortunately, as I noted above, we tend to think only of those relationships as being imperial that involve core states openly expanding their power into peripheral areas. That is to say, we by and large agree that only self-styled imperialist states are empires. In reality, the emergence of empire is a much more complicated affair, one that can, but need not involve, international activity by a core elite or internal political, social, and economic processes within the state.

Looking at the various means by which empires emerge cannot explain their emergence of course, but it can give us a better sense of why empires tended to emerge where they did and why as well as suggest what the future for imperial emergence are likely to be.

The external factors were war, dynastic marriage, division of spoils, and purchase. The internal factors are rather more numerous, but they can be grouped into the following broad categories: The establishment of absolutist regimes, such as totalitarianism and variants of authoritarianism, such as fascism, dictatorship, and military rule, political, social and economic processes that accelerate or create elites in remote or backward parts of states.

Despite some fluctuations, most of the international sources of empire have decline in importance over the last two centuries. Land purchases became virtually impossible after the division of the world into a system of coextensive states, dynastic unions became irrelevant with the introduction of effectively nonmonarchical regimes in all states, the carving up of states has more or less gone out of fashion since the end of World War II. Realists and their detractors may disagree on the continued importance of war in the modern world, but one thing seems certain, that the

²² John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester: Manchester UP, 1985.

international community's acceptance of the legitimacy of acquisitions of territory due to war has decline radically, if not always consistently.²³ The international rules of the game — especially now, after the transformation of the USSR into a status-quo power and the possible regeneration of the United Nations after the Persian Gulf Crisis²⁴ — are clearly such that land-grabbing of the sort that was manifestly tolerated in the early part of the twentieth century has now become an object of censure, if not indeed of sanction. Other things being equal, the decline in importance of traditional imperialism suggests that empires are unlikely to emerge in this manner in the foreseeable future.

But will empires stop emerging? Although the above arguments suggest «yes,» expanding our analysis to include the internal sources of imperial emergence suggests that the answer is far from certain. Totalitarian rule seems to be an unlikely option for elites in light of Communism's ignominious collapse in Eastern Europe in 1989 and progressive degeneration in the USSR. But, as Samuel P. Huntington implies, authoritarianism still seems quite likely in countries suffering from unstable democracies (which is to say the vast majority of democratic states), enormous economic and social problems (probably most states outside of the OECD countries), and few polyarchal traditions or democratic cultures (again most states).²⁵ It seems unreasonably optimistic to think that ongoing transitions to democracy herald a golden age, far more likely, I suggest, is that the transitions literature will soon lose out in relevance to the breakdown literature.²⁶

The second internal source of empire — societal differentiation — is even more likely to continue in the near future. all the things modernization is supposed to entail — industrialization, education, urbanization, and so on — no only transpire unevenly, thus creating pockets, if not whole areas, of backward development, but also lead to growing societal differentiation, as modernization theory led us to expect, as well as to a growing awareness of the distinctions engendered by modernization, as modernization theory did not lead us to expect.²⁷ The theory is arguably muddled,

²³ See John J. Mearsheimer, «Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War», *International Security*, vol.15: 1 (Summer 1990), 5-56; Stephen Van Evera, «Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War», *International Security*, vol.15: 3 (Winter 1990/91), 7-57.

²⁴ Robert Legvold, «The Gulf Crisis and the Future of Gorbachev's Foreign Policy Revolution», *The Harriman Institute Forum*, vol.3:10 (October 1990).

²⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, «Will More Countries Become Democratic?», *Political Science Quarterly*; Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy*, New Haven: Yale UP, 1971.

²⁶ In particular, Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1978.

²⁷ For a critique, see Hechter, 3-14.

but the rapid growth in recent times of ethnic assertiveness, regional patriotism, and communal identities suggests that, as greater numbers of distinct peripheries emerge in various circumstances, the chances for imperial emergence will grow accordingly.

These very same arguments suggest that the growth of peripheral elites will also accelerate as modernization continues. The capacity of the democratic state to absorb such elites and thereby transform them into peripheral representatives of core elites is obviously of central importance, especially if we assume that authoritarian states, which may enjoy rosy futures, will by definition be disinclined to integrate peripheral elites. In principle, although democratic states should willingly incorporate emergent peripheral elites, there are two reasons for doubting that such states are capable of being so responsive. First as Karl Deutsch argues, the contemporary state, whatever its regime, may be in crisis, that is to say, its capacity to resolve the issues that it has claimed for itself may be insufficient and declining.²⁸ Second, and no less important, it is uncertain how successful democratic states can be incorporating ethnically based peripheral elites. Their virtually ubiquitous tendency to politicize ethnicity not only challenges the principle of one man—one vote,²⁹ which is supposed to be at the heart of democratic rule, but it also imposes enormous strains on a state already stretched to the limit by the demands of interest groups and constituencies, and forced, as neo-Marxists argue, to stumble into all manner of crises by the demands of the ruling class.³⁰

These remarks do not of course constitute a theory of imperial emergence, but they do suggest that, although the sources of empire have undergone a major shift in the last century or so, the emergence of empire is unlikely to be affected in any substantive way. Although the international sources of empire have declined, the internal sources are not only present, but arguable, have assumed far greater salience in the last one to two hundred years. The collapse of dynastic rule has opened, among other things, the door to other to other forms of authoritarian rule, while modernization and all that it entails has only begun taking off in the last two centuries. It is impossible to determine which trend will prove stronger, but it is evident that empires in everything but name will continue to exist for some time to come.

The proposition that empires can emerge «silently» — without noisy campaigns or bombastic proclamations of manifest destiny — will appear more persuasive when

²⁸ Karl Deutsch, «The Crisis of the State», in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (eds.), *Comparative Politics*, Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1986, 44-55.

²⁹ For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics*, New York: Columbia UP, 1981.

³⁰ For a sampling of such theories, see Martin Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory*, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984.

we consider the manner in which empires end. As the next section illustrates, imperial collapse can come about as the result not only of war, diplomacy, and revolution, but also of political, social, and economic processes internal to the empire. Were this not the case, we could not explain, I submit, the emergence of nation-states in Western Europe.

III. How Empires Fall

Once again my analysis focuses on an empire's defining characteristics: a core elite and state, an absolutist relationship, a distinct peripheral society, and a distinct peripheral elite. We should not be surprised to discover that the fall of empires can proceed along lines very similar to those of the rise of empires, involving both externally and internally generated relationships, peripheral societies, and peripheral elites.

First on the list, although not necessarily primary in importance, is of course warfare. Empires, evidently, collapse as a result of «national liberation struggles» in the periphery or as a result of wars with other great powers, which defeat imperial states, thereby facilitating or sparking national liberation struggles, or crush them completely, thereby dismembering the empire and perhaps annexing some or all parts of it. Why national liberation struggles emerge, why wars are fought and lost, and why some empires — such as Poland in the late eighteenth century — suffer complete dismemberment are questions that do not concern us, although they would obviously figure highly in any such theory. No less salient for any theory of imperial decline and collapse would be the issue of relating internal strife, such as national liberation struggles in the periphery, with external war and the possibility that one feeds into or facilitates the other.³¹

Empires do not collapse only as the result of armed struggle, of course. As in the case of imperial emergence, diplomacy can also play a role. Although dynastic unions can lead to the separation of some periphery from one empire and its annexation to another, it is hard to imagine that core elites would ever permit all peripheral elites to marry out of the empire. On the other hand, parts of empires *can* be sold, and the example of the Louisiana Purchase, which I adduced earlier as an instance of imperial expansion by the United States, is also an instance of imperial

³¹ Gary B. Miles, «Roman and Modern Imperialism Reassessment», *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1990.

contraction by the French. The sale of Alaska to the United States by Russia would also qualify as self-conscious imperial dismemberment. But here, too, it is hard to imagine that an imperial elite would ever willingly sell all of its peripheral territories: Not surprisingly, there are no instances of such behavior in history. Diplomatic connivance, on the other hand, can dismantle empires just as easily as it can create them; indeed, every instance of empire-building by means of diplomacy re an instance of empire-destroying as well. In most cases, of course, only provinces are withdrawn from one empire and granted another: the continual wrangling among the Russian, Habsburg, and Ottoman empires over the Balkans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries typifies this sort of activity.³² But diplomatic connivance can also spell the end of empire, just as, for that matter, it can spell the end of core states. Poland was dismantled in the late eighteenth century by virtue of the mutual agreement among Vienna, Moscow, and Berlin.

Just as the gradual emergence of a despotic relationship between core and peripheral elites can transform a multinational state into an empire, so, too, the gradual or sudden demise of a despotic relationship between core and peripheral elites can transform an empire into a multinational state. If something in the nature of a democratic regime replaces the former absolutist regime, or alternatively, if the despotic regime becomes inclusive as opposed to exclusive, thereby incorporating peripheral elites into the decision making process, then the former exclusion of the peripheral elites from state power obtains no more, and, with their inclusion, empire can no longer be said to obtain. England's relationship with Scotland may reflect this pattern, while South Africa's ongoing «transition to democracy» may, from this point of view, be more accurately labelled a dismantling of an imperial relationship between white possessors and black possessed.

No less important, empires cease to exist if and when peripheral societies lose their distinctiveness and become integrated into the imperial society. If the periphery undergoes ethnic assimilation to the core society? If it becomes converted to the core religion, if it loses its sense of local distinctiveness, or if it gets absorbed into the overall division of labor within the empire and thus ceases to be a «colony,» then a necessary condition of the existence of empire — a distinct periphery — falls away, and empire no longer exists. In contrast to the conditions that accompanied the emergence of empire, politics can play an equally important, if not greater, role as social, economic, and other societal processes. To be sure, industrialization,

³² See Alan Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815-1918*, London: Longman, 1989, 239-69.

education, urbanization, and social and geographic mobility can lead to the intermixing and assimilation of peoples, a process discussed by many students of ethnicity;³³ nevertheless, the nature of the political arena, as manifested in the fact that certain peoples are politically dominant and others are not, can also play a major role in inducing subordinates to assimilate into mainstream society.³⁴ No less important, the direct actions of the core elite — such as forcible assimilation or imposition of a religion, the planned settling of a territory by core individuals, and, finally, the destruction of recalcitrant members of the peripheral society or, indeed, genocide — have historically played a major role in transforming imperial peripheries into mere regions of multinational states.³⁵ As I suggested above, the creation of nation-states in Western Europe, or for that matter in North America, would be inexplicable without reference to such actions on the part of core states and their strategic elites. The growth of the French state in the fourteenth through the seventeenth centuries was no less imperial than that of Muscovy or England; yet, in contrast to the latter two, which did not eradicate the distinctiveness of peripheral societies, the French did, so much so that what was at first an empire became what appeared to be a French nation-state in the nineteenth century when the various peasants ruled by Paris were converted, as Eugen Weber tells us, into Frenchmen.³⁶ The process of nation-state formation, or nation-building as it came to be called, was especially prominent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when core states assumed the functions of mass education and thereby could inculcate their subjects with the proper values and sense of national identity. Germanhood was no doubt rooted in a variety of ethnic *mythomoteurs*, as Anthony D. Smith reminds us, and the ethnic roots of the German nation were hardly imaginary, as John Armstrong tells us;³⁷ by the same token, Ernst Gellner and Benedict Anderson are no less correct to insist that the German nation was also created by elites, who drew upon existing myths, traditions, and ethnic solidarity to craft a genuine nation out of the disparate groups that populated the German Reich.³⁸ In contrast, the Russian empire pursued a policy of assimilation both belatedly, toward the end of the nineteenth century, and inadequately, in light of the

³³ For the classic statement of this view, see Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966.

³⁴ See Alexander J. Motyl, *Will the Non-Russians Rebel? State, Ethnicity, and Stability in the USSR*, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987, 88-106.

³⁵ Joshua Fishman, «Language Maintenance and Ethnicity», *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, n.2 (Fall 1981), 229-47.

³⁶ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, Stanford: Stanford UP, 1976.

³⁷ Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988; John A. Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982.

³⁸ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso, 1983.

opposition that was created by modernization and the spread of nationalism.³⁹ In still greater contrast, meanwhile, the Soviet empire actually enshrined ethnic differences in its state structure, thereby formally transforming what could have been a mere multinational state into a bona fide empire.⁴⁰

The final means by which empires can collapse is by the elimination of peripheral elites as distinct elites. Recall that I insisted that peripheral elites must remain for empires to maintain; indeed, they must be in a position of political subordination vis-à-vis the core elite, while retaining social and economic status. Where there are no peripheral elites *per se*, there can be no empire. Of course, if peripheral elites are integrated into the state as peripheral elites, then empire ceases insofar as despotic relations of exclusion have been replaced with inclusionary relations. By the same token, if elites are assimilated, uprooted, or totally coopted, thereby losing their peripheral identity, or alternatively, if they are physically destroyed, then, too, empire as a relationship between central and peripheral elites ceases to exist. As in the previous instance involving the eradication of societal distinctions, the elimination of peripheral elites historically has been a commonplace means of transforming empires into multinational states. Once peripheral elites are removed, societies lose their hierarchical status and become distinct ethnic or religious communities subject to the power of the core elite and state in no different manner than other communities within the territory of the state. It was this tactic that the Russian tsars tended to pursue throughout the centuries. Peripheral societies were largely left alone, while peripheral elites were generally coopted into the center and/or destroyed. Thus, Ukrainian elites were brought *en masse* to Petersburg in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, lost their Ukrainian character, and were thus effectively transformed into Russian elites.⁴¹ Other elites, such as the Zaporozhian Cossacks, were eliminated and destroyed in the late eighteenth century.⁴² Although the society of the Ukraine remained distinct, that is to say Ukrainian, throughout, it was only with the reemergence of excluded Ukrainian elites in the late nineteenth century that the Ukraine's relationship with Petersburg became imperial again. In contrast, the Soviet core elite, despite having subjected republican and East European elites to purges approaching genocidal proportions, always insisted on retaining peripheral elites given the task of carrying out central policies and administering, though not partaking in, state power.⁴³

³⁹ See Edward C. Thaden (ed.), *Russification of the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914*, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981.

⁴⁰ Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, New York: Atheneum, 1974.

⁴¹ Marc Raeff, *Understanding Imperial Russia*, New York: Columbia UP, 1984, 18-24.

⁴² Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy*, Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1988.

⁴³ See Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980, for an extended discussion of these issues.

If we examine the totality of means by which empires end, we note that they, too, involve war, diplomacy, a variety of socio-economic processes such as modernization, and explicitly political interventions on the part of the core elite. Indeed, the most important difference between the means by which empires come into being and those by which they come to an end is that the latter involve far more forms of core elite behavior aimed at eradicating peripheral distinctions, absolutist rule, or peripheral elites. By and large, multinational states do not go out of their way to create peripheral societies or peripheral elites without providing for outlets for peripheral elites to take part in the political process in the center. In contrast, imperial centers engage in this sort of politically motivated social and political engineering on a regular basis? We come to a paradoxical conclusion: contrary to our expectations, the actions of the core elite fulfill only one of many functions that lead to the emergence of empire, while politics appears to play a far more important role in the demise of empires. Core elites may of course explicitly act to prevent distinct societies and elites from emerging, but their role in the process tends to be largely reactive; in contrast, imperial states tend to implement particular plans, if not indeed blueprints, for transforming empires into multinational states.

That core states act in this manner seems to be testimony to the recognition on the part of their strategic elites that, as Gilpin, Douglass North, and Joseph Tainter argue, empire is a less efficient means of political organization than a multinational state or, better still perhaps, a nation-state.⁴⁴ Of course, not all elites act in this manner, and it is important to emphasize that premodern empires were generally content to leave peripheries alone, while modern empires are not. Why then do the strategic elites of the former act so differently from the strategic elites of the latter? The answer, clearly, lies in the fact that premodern states largely represented military machines and extractive apparatuses, while modern states are also continuous administrative apparatuses. There is no need for the populations of a premodern empire to be homogeneous or for peripheral elites to be integrated or destroyed, as the only goals of the premodern state were 1) to extract resources, a process that can at best only be facilitated by the existence of a non-included peripheral elite given the task of tax-collecting — in the manner of Moscow vis-à-vis the Golden Horde — and that is not obstructed by the continued existence of distinct peripheral societies, and 2) to control territories militarily, a condition that requires only efficient tax-collecting and the ability to impress soldiers from various parts of the empire. Here again, peripheral

⁴⁴ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*; Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, *The Rise of the Western World*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1973; Joseph A. Tainter, *The Collapse of Complex Societies*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990.

elites can help. Naturally, premodern empires may also embark upon or be subject to processes of peripheral assimilation, but the point is that they need not engage in such behavior in order to exist as core states with empires.

In contrast, Modern states are premised on the extension not only of military control and extraction to all parts of the territory they rule, but also to the extension of administrative rule and the concomitant interference by state bureaucracies in the economy and society. Once we posit such a state — and recall that I am not concerned with explaining how or why such a state emerged — then it follows that core elites within modern empires will find it in their interest to assimilate peripheral societies and elites, or alternatively to destroy them. Administration proceeds more efficiently if populations speak the same language, a point emphasized by Gellner,⁴⁵ and if local elites lose their local character and are absorbed into the administration as individuals, and not as elites. Ironically, inasmuch as assimilation furthers the effective administration of empire, core elites have a direct, if perhaps unwitting, interest in the demise of the very empires they rule.

The continuity of denseness of the contemporary state, which stand in such stark contrast to the qualities of the premodern state, are probably the most important factors militating against the continued existence, perhaps even rise, of empires in a future populated by such states. (Naturally, if the modern state really is on the way out, as some theorist suggest, then all bets are off).⁴⁶ As we have seen, wars, diplomacy, changes in regime, and a variety of transformative social and economic processes can all create and destroy empires. But inasmuch as imperialism via warfare and diplomacy is the object of sanctions by the international system of states, and is likely to remain so as long as territorially continuous entities such as modern states continue to exist; inasmuch as socioeconomic change can lead both to the emergence and decline of empires; and inasmuch as state action can hasten and indeed bring about imperial decline, while there is little reason for a multinational state elite to transform its territory into an empire — then the fact of the modern state's administrative aspirations suggests that, *ceteris paribus*, empire has indeed become a thing of the past. As noted above, there are a variety of tendencies, some leading toward the continued creation of empire via internal processes, some militating against such a route. But the fact that state expansion on the international arena is largely off limits in contemporary circumstances,

⁴⁵ Gellner, 29-38.

⁴⁶ Suggestions of this view are evident in James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990; Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989; Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia UP, 1986.

both due to the existence of international norms and to the division of the world into continuous states, while state actions towards ethnic populations — short, of course, of genocide and forced assimilation — can legitimately include societal assimilation as a goal and arguably must include elite inclusion as a goal — once again due to the existence of international rules of the game and to the desire of modern elites to run their state administrations efficiently — means that powerful objective and subjective forces are working against empire.

Do such developments herald the end of empire? For better or for worse, the answer is «no». To be sure the modern state and the international system of states militate against empire on the level just discussed. At the same time, however, they facilitate empire on another level. As I noted above, although the modern estate may have a direct interest in the elimination of empire, there is no guarantee that it can either achieve this goal or attempt to do so in a manner that will not increase or perhaps even create center-periphery tensions. No less important, the international system's current disdain for the partitioning of states means that inefficient states will not be able to dispose of imperial burdens by granting independence to peripheries or, alternatively, that national liberation struggles will acquire the requisite international support (as, for instance, in Lithuania). Indeed, the above remarks even suggest that, on balance, the silent emergence of empires, in conjunction with the incapacity of inefficient states to cope with such a condition, will become a growing trend in world politics. Such entities will not be called empires, but, by meeting my definitional requirements, they will be just that. Paradoxically, therefore, although imperialism may belong to the past, empire may belong to the future.

IV. Implications for Theory

As it is in the nature of relationships to change over time, empires necessarily are moving targets — a proposition that is unlikely to appeal to scholars in search of absolute certainty. Empires can emerge and they can fall in any number of ways, only some of which involve out and out imperialism or warfare; as a result, the same territory, with the same core state, may or may not be termed an empire at various times in history, regardless of how it emerged, of whether imperialism was involved, and of whether or not core elites actually had imperial intentions. although a one-dimensional theory of the rise and fall of such complex entities as empires would therefore seem to be logically impossible, it is nevertheless the case that the multivariate theories must devote pride of place to the central feature of all empires — the relationship of core and peripheral elites. In the final analysis, empires emerge

if and when, for whatever reason or by whatever means, two elites are involved in a dominant–subordinate relationship. By the same token, empires fall when one or both elites abandon that relationship. As we saw such a relationship may be established in a variety of ways, just as it may be abandoned in a variety of ways. Nevertheless, the key variable seems to be the maintenance or the abandonment of a dominant–subordinate relationship by the relevant elites.

If we look at the problem from this point of view, then theories of elite interaction, resource mobilization, ethnopolitics, and nationalism may be most relevant to explaining the rise and fall of empire? Note again that, as I am not so much interested in why elite engage in wars or annex territories, as I am interested in why they create, perpetuate, or abolish imperial relationships with cores or peripheries, realist or other theories of international relations are not very helpful.⁴⁷ There is, after all, in principle no reason why states that win wars must annex the losers or annex them in an imperial fashion. By the same token, as theories of neo–imperialism remind us,⁴⁸ there is no reason for economic exploitation, if that is indeed the goal of states and their strategic elites, to necessitate political domination. Why states act as they do vis–a–vis one another is therefore of less immediate relevance than why elites act as they do vis–a–vis other elites within the territories they control. Naturally, the systemic interaction of states can suggest what the structural limits and constraints are within which elites must interact.

If these observations are valid, then how we proceed to explain the rise and fall of imperial relationships is a question that can be answered by any number of theories that, minimally, can accommodate elite interaction and share at least two assumptions, namely, that elites are key actors in the political process and that elites act to maximize their power by utilizing resources to appeal to the mobilize potential constituencies. To argue in this manner is, of course, to argue in the mode suggested by Charles Tilly in *From Mobilization to Revolution* and other scholars.⁴⁹ Insofar as the dominance of the core rests on its possession of a monopoly of violence and administrative rule in some distinct periphery, then clearly, such resources as force, ability to shield the local population from the core's extractive appetites, and the capacity to appeal to or even create the sense of otherness of the periphery — in other words, the coercive, instrumental, and normative resources discussed by Amitai Etzioni⁵⁰ — must figure highly in the power–maximization strategies of peripheral

⁴⁷ See Gilpin and Clark.

⁴⁸ Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism*, New York: Random House, 1980.

⁴⁹ Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, New York: Random House, 1978.

⁵⁰ Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations*, New York: The Free Press, 1975.

elites. From this point of view, systemic changes, cataclysmic wars, modernization, and the like serve only to structure the «playing field» and to change the distribution of resources between core and periphery. In sum, we may paraphrase Tilly and suggest that, just as such forces do not breed revolution, so, too, they cannot, on their own, breed imperial rise or fall.⁵¹



⁵¹ Charles Tilly, «Does Modernization Breed Revolution?», *Comparative Politics*, n.3 (April 1973), 425-47.



Discussion

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Now that Professor Pearson has summarized the paper of Alexander Motyl, I, as your discussant, have the pleasant task to select and discuss a few of the methodological and conceptual problems the papers raise. In so doing, I hope to offer a critical analysis of some issues involved and thereby stimulate our following discussion.

Since January 1, 1993 - almost 75 years after the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy - each nationality of the old Austrian-Hungarian Empire has found itself within the borders of its own distinct state. After introducing his paper with this observation, our colleague Arnold Suppan offers us the following assessment of this process: All nations and nationalities within the borders of the long-gone former Empire regard themselves as «state-nations» and as «nation-states». The formula «Cuius regio, eius natio» holds true.

This process of nation-state building was determined by national demarcation, exclusion, and assimilation (Suppan describes this in detail). This process, today, is however not yet complete. As has often been the case in the construction of such nation-states, there exist larger and smaller national minorities within them. This renders the picture much more complicated.

We are all contemporary witnesses to the end of communism as a ruling ideology and the disintegration of the Soviet Empire, Yugoslavia, and even Czechoslovakia. One look at the wars in Croatia, Bosnia, or the Caucasus reveals the terrifying prospects of this transformation: We experience again the building of «state-nations» with the demarcation and exclusion of minorities. Will we see an unending process of «nation-state» construction with more borders drawn every day? «Cuius regio eius natio» from the Adriatic to the Urals, even to the Pacific? In the former Soviet Union there had been 128 ethnic groups or nations.

Suppan has called on scholars of nationalism to place the problems of national demarcation, exclusion, and assimilation in the center of their inquiries, both in theoretical investigations as well as concrete case studies. As examples of this approach, he cites the newer works from Piotr Wandycz, Jan Krenec, Béla Köpeczi/Zoltan Szász and Ivo Banac. Furthermore, he dedicates his present conference paper to this theme: something like the costs of modern nationalism.

Miroslav Hroch's name does not appear here. Naturally, that's because his work is so classic. The value of his contribution to our understanding of nationalism - he himself avoids the label «nationalism» for his work, *National Consciousness and Nation Building Processes* - is his use of comparative methods to examine the development of «small» nations or non-dominant ethnic groups in Europe. How he implements this approach is also clear in the paper he prepared for us today, «Integrating and disintegrating circumstances in the Czech and Slovak movements». Above all else, his periodicization of nationalist movements is well-known and widely applied: Phase A - Scholarly interest on the part of individuals in language and history; Phase B - agitation of a patriotic group; and Phase C - the development of a political mass movement.

Hroch's description of the Czech nationalist movement, for example, follows accordingly: There is no doubt that the Czech national movement was a successful one. It began very early and developed methods, arguments, and categories which were even employed by later national movements. It also formed the model for Hroch's archetype of national movement, especially for the other movements of Slavic and Baltic nations, such as those of the Slovaks, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Slovenes.

On the basis of this description, Hroch develops from the Czech model the category «belated success» for the Slovakian nationalist movement. The Czech nationalist movement, he maintains, exhibited the following two primary grounds for success:

1. The high level of social communication (in the sense of Karl Deutsch) - a high level of literacy, established market relations, the use of the Czech language in the churches and elementary schools - as well as vertical social mobility.
2. Social conflicts were articulated not only at the social level appropriated to them, but also articulated in the form of national claims and demands.

While Hroch's thesis about the model character of a nationalist movement based on the Czech example has been, as far as I know, widely accepted and adapted by those writing on nationalist movements, I would nevertheless like to point out briefly what I consider the limits of Hroch's methodological approach. Most importantly, his analysis - and he would perhaps concede this himself - focusses exclusively on the nation in its development of various models of nationalist (patriotic) movements. The impact of this can be seen in three different contexts:

1. Hroch compares and contrasts the nationalist movements of the non-dominant ethnic groups in and of themselves. Thereby he structurally excludes from the analysis the relationship between dominant and non-dominant nationality. It is this relationship, however, which is so central to our investigation. Indeed, the nationalities conflict is the «burning question» of the inquiry into the nature of nationalism, and one must hope and expect that scholars take this issue into account. The latest works from Wandycz, Kren, Köpeczi/Szász and Banac, which I mentioned before, do meet this challenge.

2. Hroch reduces the dominant nation in his theoretical construction to one invariable size. All that remains variable is its potential for repression. In his framework, the factor of class struggle comes into play even when the nationalities conflict plays out within a single class or group (for example, the educated petty bourgeoisie, the capital-owning class, or the proletariat). Because Hroch's model fails to consider nationalism as an ideology in and of itself, it consequently offers no real critique of nationalism per se.

3. Hroch's model of analysis fails to take into account the question of the state's constitution: Instead, the state is depicted in Hroch's theory as the ruling nation's unchanging instrument of repression: the more power it has, the more use it makes of its potential for repression. This generalization ignores, however, decisive differences which existed between the various multinational empires. For example, the beginning of phase C (the mass movement phase) in the Czech nationalist movement - which brought the clear distinction between Czechs and Germans - was also influenced by the external factor of Austrian liberal constitutionalism, codified in the February Patent of 1861, the Local Government Law of 1863, the Law for Clubs, Parties and Pressure Groups (Vereinsgesetz) of 1867, and the December constitution of 1867.

This broader context, while disregarded by Hroch, does appear in the contributions from Koralka and Suppan. In the words of Arnold Suppan, liberal

constitutionalism, and even more so Schmerling's Local Government Law, «opened up for the Czech bourgeois nationalist movement a completely new platform for representative political action», a movement which heralded the «dramatic take-off of the Czech clubs and pressure groups movement».

Jirí Koralka addresses alternatives to ethnic nation building. He thematizes, in a much more systematic manner than does Hroch, the possibility of «supra-ethnic nation building» (in Austria).

In response, I would like to pose Koralka the following question: What does the failure of such alternatives mean? To get at an answer, we need to look more closely at what exactly is implied by «alternative national developments». In his publications, Koralka identifies for Bohemia five «tendencies» of alternative group (national) identity. This prompts the following question: How do we understand the real possibility of double or multiple identities? Can we speak of mass loyalty to Austria - paradoxical loyalty at that - among many members of the so-called non-dominant ethnic groups in Cisleithania up through the First World War? Yes, we can. But where is the place of this phenomenon in our theoretical framework of national movements?

Here we see interesting cross-connections:

a. Krzysztof Zydomicz notes in his paper, «Polish Nationalism until 1919», that in 1870 «approximately 30-35 % of Polish language speakers began to share [the idea of national loyalty] consciously and based on clearly understood national identity ... The national future of the remaining 65-70 % ... was yet to be decided.» Especially the farming population remained on the threshold of Polish national consciousness, a threshold they would cross only over the course of the next 50 years.

It is well worth asking the author where these figures come from. At the same time, notions of a-national, pre-national, and other - religious, regional - identities are indispensable for devising models for the origins of modern nations.

Zydomicz demonstrates how the dividing powers increasingly differed in their rule of Poland after the mid-nineteenth century. «In Austria ... the Poles enjoyed a wide range of self-government and nationalism did not find an easy target. The major enemy of the movement became not the Austrian government, but the Ukrainian national revival, posing a threat to hitherto Polish political domination in autonomous institutions.» (I would add that for the Jews, Galicia also represented that part of the former Polish state with the greatest relative freedom.)

Indeed, it would appear a promising research approach to compare systematically the policies of the multinational empires toward their non-dominant ethnic groups. This would certainly add considerably to our understanding of comparative nationalism.

b. References to Koralka's alternative tendencies can also be found in the case study from Laurence Cole concerning «cultural identity in the Tyrol». In his paper, Cole attempts to answer the following question: Did the German-speaking population in the Tyrol before 1914 consider itself German, Austrian, or simply Tyrolian?

The results of his analysis are as follows: The Tyrolian identity performed an important function for the German-speaking population in the Tyrol during a particularly intense period of social and economic change. «Landesbewußtsein» or «provincial consciousness» represented an integral part of that process ... «Vaterland» or «fatherland», meaning the Tyrol or Austria, was ambiguous in meaning ... National identity was achieved through the region («Heimat»). While pan-German organizations (such as the Turnvereine) and a secessionist Schönererian sentiment certainly existed in the Tyrol, these either became assimilated or remained marginal: Indeed, to quote Cole, «There is no reason why national consciousness should affect dynastic loyalty.»

I am naturally aware that such findings for non-German nations in the Habsburg Monarchy cannot be directly applied to other peoples or regions. Nevertheless, provincial consciousness, national identity, and dynastic loyalty are not mutually exclusive elsewhere.

Methodologically fruitful is the comparison, based on Hroch's model, of the «successful» national movement of the Slovenes with the «failed» national emancipation of the Bretons. The social stratification as well as the linguistic and cultural positions of the two ethnic groups were remarkably similar to one another in the second half of the eighteenth century. Peter Vodopivec investigates the bases for the very different results of their development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Both ethnic groups claimed independent identities on the basis of their distinct languages. The «patois» of Brittany - the product of the original Celtic Bretonian having long since become mixed with French - could not maintain its position against High French («langue d'oui»). An independent social and national Bretonian elite did not develop. In contrast, the Slovenian language developed during the nineteenth century into a modern language form with its own literature, and Slovenia into a nearly full-fledged (complete) national society.

As one explanation for these two distinct paths of development, Vodopivec cites the often invoked theory of socio-economic «retarded development» and the backwardness of Middle and Eastern Europe in comparison with Western Europe. I have my doubts about the universal validity of this commonly held topos. This thesis explains - and here Karl Deutsch and Miroslav Hroch are my witnesses! - neither the success of the Slovenian national movement nor the lack of nationalist success in Brittany. What I miss here is the empirical (concrete) connection between «nationalism and social communication».

Literacy in the native language provides us a good example of this problem: The degree of Literacy of the Slovenians was significantly higher than that of the lower classes in France, including the Bretons. The Slovenian language, furthermore, was the language of instruction in the elementary schools, attendance of which was mandated. Was there anything comparable in Brittany in 1780, 1820, or 1860?

In his useful summary of «National-building in the Baltic Countries», Alksander Loit notes the mid-nineteenth century Baltic people's «high degree of literacy, 70-80 % - as high as in England, for example». Here we can learn that the model of the belated «take-off» does not work here. Literacy figures were sometimes higher in North and Central Europe than in the West. According to Loit, «this was an effective tool for patriotic propaganda». It would certainly be interesting to compare these figures with those of other non-dominant ethnic groups, including the Slovenes and Bretons.

The paper from Xosé M. Núñez on «National Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe and the Internationalization of their Rights, 1919-1939» summarizes in an informative way the results of contemporary research, including his own, on the topic. The protection of minorities in the inter-war era - on the one hand within the framework of the League of Nations, on the other hand through organizations and alliances of the minorities themselves - hardly offered convincing solutions to the burning questions which still exist today. The «Personalitätsprinzip», or «the Principle of Personality», developed by the Austrian Marxists at the turn of the century, addresses the legislation for minorities in Estonia on the basis of cultural autonomy. In his paper, Núñez draws attention to the contradictions and limited application of this concept of «cultural autonomy».

And now, let me take stock of our conclusions: Of the multinational empires under consideration, the Habsburg Monarchy and minority politics in the inter-war era - both within and outside the League of Nations, and especially the Baltic example (Estonia) - offer the most instructive European experiences with the regulation of

nationality conflicts and the protection of minorities. The Habsburg Monarchy and then the experiences inside and outside the League of Nations during this (the inter-war) era constituted two large workshops. In these workshops, generations of accumulated experience combined and collided with the most varied of political approaches to the era's nationality conflicts and desire to protect minorities. Neither the reality of continued national repression (domination) and discrimination - nor the fact that both of these workshops failed - detracts from the value of their example. This was something like an enormous brain-storming about national conflicts and their regulation from the Vormärz to World War II - a whole century! As historians, we have no better, no more fertile ground for exploring problems of nation-building and nationalism.

It is perhaps justified to close here on a somewhat resigned note. As Arnold Suppan has pointed out, the sum total of a good 100 years of national and nationalistic politics is the far-reaching homogenization of nations in nation-states and the drastic reduction of national minorities. Obviously, this trend appears to hold true for Europe after 1989 as well.

As historians, we should nevertheless keep Xosé M. Núñez's hope in mind: «This history can probably show us some of the mistakes and contradictions to be avoided in the future.»



NACIONALISMOS EN EL IMPERIO OTOMANO

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Más de seis décadas después de su desaparición, la herencia del Imperio otomano todavía no se ha acabado de repartir. Tal es la conclusión a la que llegaba Georges Corm (Corm, 1992), pro-árabe, tras la Guerra del Golfo y... antes de la desmembración y la guerra de la ex-Yugoslavia. En efecto, esas dos regiones muestran con fuerza la persistencia de problemas llamados nacionales, y de las dificultades existentes para las construcciones nacionales o estatales a lo largo del antiguo marco geográfico del Imperio otomano. Por lo demás, no son en ningún caso los únicos ejemplos. Desde los Balcanes a Oriente Medio, pasando por el Cáucaso, está en ebullición toda una región con pueblos heterogéneos, con fronteras disputadas o mal asimiladas, marcada por nacionalismos en competencia y ambiciones estatales. Ni las tentativas para crear Estados-Naciones, ni las soluciones leninistas han bastado, seguramente, para acabar con la famosa «Cuestión de Oriente».

¿Asistimos, sin embargo, a una vuelta a los antiguos parámetros? ¿Debemos mantener una visión cíclica de la historia? Conviene medir las palabras. Ciertamente, el resurgimiento de ciertas posturas y de dinámicas étnicas y nacionales, después de decenios de «congelación», no ofrece duda alguna. El siglo que ha comenzado con una guerra balcánica amenaza seriamente con terminar con problemas en la misma región. Desplazado en una geografía que le era en principio marginal, el problema armenio continúa marcando la «cuestión de Oriente». A pesar de la explosión del Imperio otomano, el «problema árabe» está lejos de ser resuelto. El problema kurdo, del que sólo se hablaba de modo marginal a principios de siglo, se ha alimentado considerablemente a lo largo de los años en varios países del Oriente Medio. Los Estados-Unidos se han sumado a los protagonistas occidentales «tradicionales» de la «Cuestión de Oriente». El porvenir de esta región, que sufre un imposible retorno al statu quo que regulaba las relaciones interestatales en las pasadas décadas, preocupa más que nunca al sistema internacional. Sin embargo, a pesar de esta persistencia de

* Traducción: Xosé M. Núñez.

«dinámicas profundas», es de rigor constatar una diferencia de dimensión entre los dos períodos: si a fines de nuestro siglo, las tentativas de Estado-Nación o de federaciones se saldan con fracasos en ocasiones sangrientos, a comienzos de siglo, por el contrario, asistimos a una formidable efervescencia de movimientos nacionalistas y a la disolución de una de las mayores entidades supraétnicas que ha conocido la Humanidad. Desde el movimiento de independencia griega hasta la disgregación del Imperio al concluir la Primera Guerra Mundial, salieron a la luz decenas de Estados. Cada nacionalismo no ha podido dar lugar de modo similar a un Estado, como muestran las experiencias kurda, asirio-caldea, y en parte la armenia. Además, incluso cuando los nacionalismos estaban en la base de las construcciones estatales, numerosas minorías tuvieron la desgracia de encontrarse al otro lado de la frontera «buena». Los Estados fundados en ocasiones a consecuencia de decisiones arbitrarias de los «political officers» de la época, no eran homogéneos ni desde el punto de vista étnico ni desde el confesional, lo que contribuyó a exasperar las pasiones. Finalmente, la Turquía republicana, principal heredera del Imperio, elevó un nacionalismo exacerbado al rango de doctrina oficial. Pues no solamente el tono ultranacionalista del discurso y los tabús que lo rodean fueron incapaces de ocultar las dificultades del proceso de construcción nacional, sino que además nacionalismo y democracia aparecieron como conceptos totalmente incompatibles.

I- Las «naciones» y la visión otomana del mundo

El discurso nacionalista, especialmente cuando se convierte en doctrina oficial, a imitación de más de una experiencia post-otomana, es necesariamente de una débil textura teórica, como indica con autoridad B.Anderson al analizar el nacionalismo de un modo general (Anderson 1991). Existe en efecto una relación desproporcionada entre la fuerza movilizadora de ese discurso y su solidez teórica. Es preciso ciertamente admitir que, si a menudo precede a la nación por cuya construcción apuesta, el nacionalismo, doctrina de élites occidentalizadas en la mayoría de los países no-occidentales, no puede reducirse al rango de simple fruto de la imaginación. Se alimenta de hechos reales o míticos, arraigados tanto en la Historia como en el dominio de la antropología. Criterios extra-nacionales *a priori*, como la confesión religiosa, contribuyen igualmente a definir la *distinción* y a interpretarla como lo suficientemente importante para poder justificar la creación de una sociedad a partir de ella. Estas características son, naturalmente, igualmente válidas para los pueblos que habitaban el Imperio otomano cuyos nacionalismos no son más *sui generis*. Otros rasgos vinculan asimismo las experiencias otomanas o postotomanas con el resto del mundo: también en este caso el nacionalismo ponía en funcionamiento un doble

mecanismo de justificación. El primero, referente al pasado, tendía a elaborar una filiación transhistórica, a revelar la misión innata y metahistórica de una nación dada, por lo tanto de una entidad particular. La doctrina intentaba dar así un sentido a la historia a través de una cadena de racionalización del pasado. El nacionalismo era considerado como la última etapa en la que se realizaría esta misión. No obstante, por otro lado -y he aquí un segundo mecanismo-, imbuido de esta misma historicidad, intentaba adquirir el derecho a la universalidad. El aporte a la Humanidad y a la civilización efectuado por el individuo en el pasado, por la misión que le había sido confiada por la Historia, le daba el derecho a la universalidad y le permitía legitimar su reivindicación de contar como un miembro a partes iguales del mundo «civilizado».

Sin embargo, cualquiera que sea su capacidad movilizadora, es necesario constatar que la legitimación del particularismo por lo universal no se produce sin dar lugar a tensiones; por otro lado, tanto en el Imperio otomano como en otras entidades heterogéneas, ni los nacionalismos ni las naciones datan de la noche de los tiempos. La reinterpretación «nacional» del pasado no debe inducirnos a error en ningún caso y llevarnos a aceptar los discursos nacionalistas como necesariamente fundados, incluso si su legitimidad entre las poblaciones que pretenden representar no ofrece ninguna duda.¹ Un imperio no es nacional por definición, y la conciencia de la distinción étnica, incluso de la superioridad o de la inferioridad, no es en ningún caso sinónimo de un proyecto nacionalista.

El Imperio otomano no constituye una excepción a esta regla; por el contrario, es el ejemplo típico que la confirma. De una extrema heterogeneidad étnica y religiosa,² responde a dos aspiraciones que lo preceden y de las que asume sus herencias: islámico en el sentido de la legitimación espiritual del orden terrenal; y romano, con la idea y la realización del *imperium*. Ni el Islam ni la tradición imperial son indiferentes al hecho étnico, yuxtapuesto a menudo a la confesión religiosa, como elemento de distinción, hasta de administración, de conquista, etc. Intentan entonces inventar mecanismos con el fin de regirlos. Del Islam, los otomanos heredaban a la vez el principio de la legitimación teológica del orden terrenal y una concepción coránica, que consiste en reconocer, proteger y otorgar vía libre a los pueblos del libro en el *Dar-ul-Islam*, bajo ciertas condiciones (sobre todo, el pago del impuesto llamado *dimmi*), la codificación de su estatuto y de sus relaciones con el Centro). Fieles

¹ Con el término legitimidad no pretendemos en modo alguno introducir un juicio de valor, sino que entendemos como tal la adhesión, más o menos fuerte, de poblaciones a un discurso y a un programa nacionalistas. Esta adhesión, por sí misma no es autosuficiente y no es ahistórica, como muestra el estudio de Hroch (Hroch, 1985).

² Todavía hoy en día, Turquía cuenta con más de 47 grupos étnicos (Andrews, 1989).

al Corán, se convierten en los portaestandartes de la unidad de la *'umma* y; en principio, no admiten distinción entre los Musulmanes. Pero los otomanos son a la vez conscientes de que los turcos, despreciados por el Palacio imperial que los tiene por unos *reaya* del mismo modo que a los demás súbditos, constituyen el elemento dinámico de la «otomanidad» y no vacilan, en línea directa con las experiencias de los Imperios islámicos, en reconocer y legitimar a los *assabiyya* periféricos, mediante la atribución de ciertos privilegios o por la integración en el centro. De la idea de *imperium*, mantienen naturalmente la utopía de Daniel, el cumplimiento de una misión universal. El establecimiento del orden universal lleva así, a su vez, a estratificar a los súbditos, impulsados por «intereses personales» y conflictos, para hacerlos sentarse «a cada uno en su lugar, haciéndoles desempeñar las funciones que les son propias» (Tursun Beg, s.d.: 22-23).

En lo que se refiere a la gestión de las diferencias étnicas, las dos herencias convergen para dar nacimiento al *millet*. Este sistema, muy parecido a un mosaico, no conduce de ningún modo a una fusión de las diversas entidades étnicas, sino que legitima por el contrario la distinción comunitaria a partir de criterios de confesionalidad. Incluye también el reconocimiento de ciertos derechos, incluidos los educativos y jurídicos,³ supraterritoriales (dicho de otro modo, una amplia autonomía supraterritorial), aceptando incluso el derecho de supervisión por un tercer país (Francia, los principados italianos, o también Rusia), en primer lugar sobre las colonias latinas *apátridas* existentes en el Imperio, y en segundo lugar sobre las comunidades cristianas otomanas. En este sistema comunitario, solamente los musulmanes, independientemente de las distinciones lingüísticas, tienen el derecho de llevar armas y de acceder a los puestos de responsabilidad. Sin embargo, los «convertidos», en tanto que individuos o colectividades, llegan a integrarse dentro del sistema, y además la diplomacia otomana se halla en amplia dependencia de elementos no-musulmanes que acceden a numerosos puestos de responsabilidad a partir de la época de los *Tanzimat*.⁴ Por lo demás -lo que era signo suplementario de la flexibilidad del sistema- aunque eran consideradas como integrantes de la gran *'umma* islámica, poblaciones musulmanas periféricas como los kurdos o los árabes disfrutaban de una amplia autonomía, en ocasiones hereditaria.

La visión otomana del mundo impide, por lo demás, que la religión juegue un papel político mucho mayor. El Islam existe esencialmente como fuente de

³ El tribunal del Sultán, Divan-i Humayün, no intervenía en los asuntos que afectaban a los no-musulmanes, salvo que éstos lo solicitasen o que estuviesen en litigio con súbditos musulmanes.

⁴ Época de las primeras reformas otomanas (1839-1876), que introdujeron la libertad individual y una igualdad de estatus entre los musulmanes y los no-musulmanes.

legitimación y de invención de tradiciones. En ningún caso permite transformar el Estado en una teocracia, pero constituye la garantía divina del orden establecido. El Islam no es la razón de ser o el fin del Estado, puesto que es posterior a él, pero constituye uno de los sesgos que le dan un sentido, y que lo perpetúan. Por el contrario, como lo había comprendido Ibn Jaldún, pensador del siglo XIV, y como han mantenido los otomanos, el Estado tiene otros fines, otras razones de ser. La *asabiyya* turca, que no tiene nada que ver con las *asabiyya* tribales del Norte de África descritas por Ibn Jaldún, precede a la islamización de los turcos y permite la existencia de los Estados. Lejos de convertirse en un fin en sí mismo, sin embargo, le otorga los medios para retomar la antorcha del *imperium* después de la caída de las dos primeras Romas.

Se comprenderá que el nacionalismo no puede tener un lugar en el corazón de un sistema que así reconoce, legitima e integra el hecho étnico dentro de un sistema mosaístico. Por el contrario, como observaba acertadamente Hans Kohn de modo general para los Imperios: «the universalism from above, the system of local and occupational autonomy from below» (Kohn, 1946:85), permitía a los otomanos el regir las distinciones étnicas desde el gobierno. La irresponsabilidad jurídica del Sultán-padre y la ausencia de derecho a la rebelión en la cultura política musulmana eran factores que facilitaban sin duda la tarea del Centro. No obstante, estos dos hechos no le dejaban las manos libres por igual en todos los dominios, ya que el Palacio, que no reconocía el derecho positivo, debía legitimar las leyes consuetudinarias en forma de *kanunname* y llegar a un contrato tácito con las periferias.

¿Cómo, cuando, y por qué han fracasado estos mecanismos, que no han bastado ciertamente para alejar las resistencias contra el centro, ni las revueltas y las represiones violentas, pero que siempre han dejado vía libre al statu quo y al contrato tácito? ¿Cómo, de una coexistencia de diversas comunidades, ciertamente no igualitaria, se llegó a considerar al régimen otomano como «turco» o «musulmán», y la dependencia del centro como una sumisión insoportable? ¿Cómo ha llegado el elemento turco del Imperio, a su vez, a considerar como separatistas y peligrosas las resistencias, pasando del otomanismo a la «turquidad»?

II- El surgimiento de los nacionalismos: causas y efectos

Los nacionalismos otomanos, que conviene nombrar en plural, son un producto del siglo XIX o de principios del siglo XX. La ola nace en los Balcanes, principalmente, con la insurrección griega, pero no se desarrolla siguiendo unos ejes geográficos bien definidos. Se observan por el contrario una serie de olas sucesivas, afectando cada

una de ellas a una categoría de población, comenzando por los nacionalismos balcánicos y cristianos (en el sentido de poblaciones en las que la identidad étnica se yuxtaponía ampliamente con las distinciones confesionales). Tras los griegos, vendrá el turno de sumarse a la escuela del nacionalismo para los «yugoslavos», los búlgaros y los armenios. Ciertas aspiraciones comunes enlazan estos nacionalismos entre ellos, como el hecho de oponerse conjuntamente al Imperio otomano. El elemento religioso contribuye a que sientan el orden otomano como un yugo y no como el pilar de un orden universal. Las ideas de libertad, la voluntad de vivir por sí mismos gozando de igualdad y de ciudadanía, de honrar su pasado preotomano, les unen en la lucha contra los otomanos. Lejos de abrir un territorio homogéneo y definido, estos nacionalismos se encuentran sin embargo en conflicto entre ellos, pues la «tierra», elevada a un grado de sacralidad, legitima la lucha a una escala cada vez más reducida. Esta postura, privada de toda relación con la concepción de la nación como sociedad civil, explica las luchas mortíferas entre los *Komitaci* (más de 1000 muertos en Macedonia, en 1908), la desconfianza «interbalcánica» y las «limpiezas étnicas» que observamos en nuestros días.

En una segunda etapa, a comienzos de este siglo, asistiremos al surgimiento del nacionalismo turco. Discreto y difuso, cultural y «civilizacionista» al principio, este nacionalismo, que hace estragos entre los Jóvenes Turcos, se convierte en doctrina de Estado a partir de 1908, fecha del *pronunciamiento** unionista. Tiende a homogeneizar ciertas partes del Imperio, especialmente Anatolia, a reforzar el Estado y a crear un Imperio turánico que realizase así la unificación de los turcos de Anatolia con las demás poblaciones de carácter turco. Se convertirá rápidamente en un arma de estado temible contra los pueblos no turcos de Anatolia, y se encargará de homogeneizarla desde el punto de vista religioso durante y después de la Primera Guerra Mundial. También será la doctrina oficial de la República turca que funda Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) en 1923.

Finalmente, el último período, que podemos hacer comenzar en los años 10, está marcado, a pesar de ciertos antecedentes, por los nacionalismos de los pueblos musulmanes no-turcos: el árabe (en el que el elemento cristiano árabe juega un papel primordial), el albanés y el kurdo. Esta tercera ola muestra claramente que tras la «otomanidad», el vínculo religioso no será suficiente desde entonces para la coexistencia de los diversos pueblos..

En general, se tiene la tendencia a explicar estos movimientos por la influencia de la revolución francesa. Es cierto que ésta jugó, con las guerras napoleónicas y la

* En español en el original (*N. del T.*)

propaganda de la Francia revolucionaria en Oriente, un papel decisivo en la formación de los nacionalismos de los pueblos cristianos, como muestra claramente la insurrección griega (Maschopoulos, 1931). No obstante, estos nacionalismos son cronológicamente diferentes y exigen una matización de una explicación en exceso simplista y globalizante. En efecto, los nacionalismos europeos, tendentes a identificar un grupo dado con una sociedad política, y en los que las ideas consisten en descubrir y llevar a término las «misiones nacionales», el romanticismo exaltador de las virtudes innatas de los pueblos, etc., en suma toda una serie de fenómenos post-revolucionarios, juegan un papel más importante que los simples lemas de 1789.

Por otro lado, otros factores como el paneslavismo tienen también algo que decir en la formación de los nacionalismos balcánicos. Esta doctrina no permite unificar a los pueblos eslavos, ni tampoco crear un eje operativo entre los Balcanes y Moscú, pero se convierte sin embargo en un vector importante de la contestación al centro, especialmente durante y después de la guerra ruso-turca de 1876. El modelo de los *komitaci*, temibles guerrilleros que inventan los Balcanes, determina muy pronto un tipo de acción que asocia la propagación de las ideas nacionalistas y una protesta social. Entre los armenios, la diferenciación religiosa, la conciencia de una superioridad cultural y el impacto del socialismo ruso se constituyen en un modelo autosuficiente. Los movimientos nacionalistas armenios se conciben como el elemento motor de una lucha por el progreso en el corazón mismo del Asia Menor. La presencia de comunidades armenias en Europa desde el siglo XVII, el sentimiento de pertenencia, real o imaginaria, a la Europa cristiana y las actividades de los misioneros son otros tantos factores que contribuyen a la aparición de este nacionalismo, que es el que ha experimentado un desenlace más trágico.

En el caso de los turcos, el nacionalismo no se desarrolla bajo la protección de la Revolución francesa, sino que lo hará en fecha mucho más tardía, con el impacto de la experiencia alemana, en particular la guerra de 1870-1871. Esta guerra se sitúa en el origen de la invención de un «modelo alemán», privado sin embargo de toda referencia filosófica. Por otro lado, es de señalar que ese «modelo» llega al Imperio otomano a través de intelectuales de derecha, como Gustave Le Bon, y que asume, desde el comienzo, un tono ferozmente antihumanista y antiuniversalista. La preocupación por establecer un Estado fuerte, de asegurarse la supremacía en el Imperio otomano y de «turquificarlo», empuja a nacionalistas turcos como Tekin Alp, Y. Akçura, H. Cahit Yalçın o Z.Gökalp a detestar y después excluir a los elementos cristianos; pero también, más tarde, a los islámicos no-turcos.

En el seno de los pueblos musulmanes no-turcos, los factores que determinan la aparición de un nacionalismo son múltiples. Ante todo, el nacionalismo turco, que emana de la élite de un pueblo considerado en otros tiempos como la vanguardia del Islam y de su fraternidad religiosa, hace tambalearse al contrato religioso. La tuquificación de la enseñanza, la utilización del término de «Gobierno joven turco» en el lugar de Sublime Puerta, el tono agresivo del discurso de Unión y Progreso son otros tantos factores que llevan a los árabes al nacionalismo. Pero también es preciso recordar que los intelectuales árabes, en contacto directo con Europa, y entre los que se cuentan numerosos cristianos, están influidos por las ideas nacionalistas. La presencia británica en Egipto, las actividades de los misioneros, etc., explican también la resistencia. Los años de la guerra y un apoyo exterior importante permiten al movimiento nacionalista árabe separarse del Imperio, pero para volver a caer bajo el mandato de las dos grandes potencias y para vivir disgregados en varios Estados. Los albaneses, por su parte, están influidos por las experiencias de otros países balcánicos, pero contestan igualmente al centro: el advenimiento del Unionismo pone punto final al estato de periferia privilegiada de que gozaban bajo el Sultán Hamid. La experiencia ultranacionalista y ultracentralizadora de un Comité Unión y Progreso determinado a «aplicar la ley» al pie de la letra en todas las regiones otomanas todavía los exaspera más. En el paso de los Kurdos a la oposición activa, finalmente, la doble preocupación por salvaguardar sus privilegios en relación con el centro y la población armenia juega un papel primordial. La política centralizadora puesta en marcha por Palacio a partir de los *Tanzimat*, así como el nacionalismo armenio, determinan el surgimiento del nacionalismo kurdo.

En un principio, los movimientos nacionalistas que no eran balcánicos no reivindicaban la independencia. Podemos decir incluso que hasta la Primera Guerra Mundial, el deseo de independencia de hecho o *de jure* está limitado a los Balcanes. Los armenios, que han visto en el *pronunciamiento* de 1908 la repetición de la Revolución francesa en Oriente, reivindican esencialmente la igualdad, incluyendo también una reforma administrativa y, eventualmente, la reunificación de las dos Armenias. Lo mismo se aplica a los griegos del Imperio otomano, mayoritarios en ciertas partes al Oeste de Anatolia, que no demandan la integración en Grecia. Igualmente, el movimiento nacionalista árabe no reivindica la independencia en una primera época, sino más bien que el Imperio otomano evolucione hacia la forma de un Imperio bicéfalo, a la manera de Austria-Hungría. Los kurdos, finalmente, intentan salvaguardar el estatuto que en otros tiempos les permitía ser parte integrante de la mayoría musulmana.

III- Soluciones otomanas al nacionalismo

Los otomanos del siglo XIX sufrieron una pérdida territorial importante hasta el punto de que la «patria», noción que emerge tardíamente entre ellos, cambia de geografía al hilo de las generaciones. Las guerras con las diferentes potencias que están en el origen de estas pérdidas, y después el movimiento de independencia griega, seguido por otros movimientos nacionalistas, desplazan el problema hacia el interior. El efecto de estos desafíos externo e interno se hace sentir inmediatamente en el Imperio, pues a medida que se desmorona el modelo imperial, los otomanos pierden confianza en su misión «universal». Aquéllos se dan cuenta en efecto de que la idea de *imperium* ya no es suficiente para convertirse en universal, incluso para mantenerse, aunque sea en una posición de debilidad, frente a las potencias occidentales. La solución que proyectan no consiste en elaborar, a la manera de los rusos, una nueva misión, sino por el contrario en imitar la otra, en occidentalizarse. Esta política, que se traduce en la eliminación física de los Jenízaros y la marginación de los *ulemas*, dos fuerzas vitales para el equilibrio del sistema, reviste con frecuencia una brutalidad extrema. Los otomanos intentan mitigar las carencias de la sociedad civil mediante la creación de un ejército moderno (y de un cuerpo de oficiales), y la formación de una *intelligentsia* que, a su vez, amenazan a Palacio. La occidentalización en todas las direcciones va al paso con la búsqueda de un nuevo modelo, en el que *civilización* y *nación*, dos términos desconocidos para ellos, ocuparían el lugar principal. Mientras que la «civilización» es concebida como el único medio, para los otomanos, de permanecer en Europa, incluso como la nueva misión del Imperio en Oriente y en Asia, uno de los jefes de fila de los *Tanzimat*, Keçecizade Fuat Pasa, no vacilaba en constatar que «es preciso crear una nación a la que pertenecerá el Estado» (Citado en Eliçin: 1970:172). Estas dos posturas, a saber: la «civilización» y la «nación», son por otro lado inseparables, pues la supervivencia del Estado depende de ello. Esta ecuación que iba a determinar a las generaciones futuras suscita sin embargo cuestiones inevitables: ¿Cómo cambiar de «civilización», y a partir de qué base «crear» una «nación»? ¿Cómo justificar la existencia de una nación, por lo tanto de un elemento particular, en la civilización? En definitiva, ¿Cómo dirigir la relación entre el Islam, al que el Libro pone explícitamente en guardia contra la imitación de cristianos y judíos, y la civilización occidental? Visto bajo este ángulo, se comprenderá fácilmente que los desafíos lanzados a los otomanos eran en cierto modo más graves que para los rusos o los austro-húngaros.

Ni la tradición imperial, ni la cultura política otomana, ni la extrema heterogeneidad del Imperio le permiten inventar la ciudadanía, y todavía menos impedir que la lucha por la ciudadanía no se traduzca en la aniquilación de la

civilidad, necesaria por la lógica del sistema de los *millet*, como lo explica de una manera bastante convincente J.Leca (J.Leca, 1991). Sin embargo, la voluntad no faltaba. Deseosos de ser reconocidos por Europa, los hombres de los *Tanzimat* aspiraban a crear una nación otomana en la que el soberano sólo distinguiría la religión de «sus súbditos» en la mezquita, la iglesia o la sinagoga. Esta voluntad se revelaba vana. Desde arriba, en la buena tradición otomana, los *Tanzimat* se contentaban con otorgar ciertas libertades individuales, pero nunca libertades políticas, y estaban lejos de pasar de la noción de súbdito a la de ciudadano. Más un sobresalto para salvar al Estado que una transformación radical de un Imperio multisecular, las reformas eran medidas a medias: lo suficientemente radicales para los pueblos musulmanes que deseaban salvaguardar el *statu quo* en su favor, no iban lo bastante lejos como para satisfacer a las comunidades no musulmanas. Aquéllas significaban, sobre todo para las comunidades que tenían fuertes lazos territoriales, el establecimiento del control del centro y el final de las ventajas que les aseguraba el sistema de los *millet*. Así, desprovistos de base social sólida, los *Tanzimat* se revelaban incapaces de detener la propagación de los movimientos nacionalistas que se iban intensificando, al hilo de las guerras, de la competencia con la Rusia zarista, y de la creciente ingerencia europea, especialmente en el campo de la economía.

La experiencia de la Primera monarquía constitucional (1876) marca a la vez el fin de los *Tanzimat*, cuyas experiencias eran irreversibles, y la victoria de la oposición que engendró. Esta oposición, compuesta por una *intelligentsia* reciente esparcida en general por diversas ciudades europeas, intenta ciertamente llevar más lejos las reformas ya emprendidas, sobre todo en el campo de las libertades, de la Constitución y de la Asamblea representativa. Sin embargo, asimilando la noción de la civilización, se orienta a erigir como paradigma el modelo de Mahoma y de los primeros musulmanes. La Asamblea que se instituye lleva la carga de sus contradictorias aspiraciones, y desemboca en una definición de los *millet* como categorías políticas en el sentido de que las comunidades cristianas están representadas a menudo como tales. Pero esta asamblea es de corta duración, ya que fue abolida al comienzo del reinado del Sultán Hamid. La política hamidiana se centra en las regiones musulmanas periféricas para garantizar la unidad del Imperio, no dudando en conceder privilegios a las élites locales tanto kurdas como árabes o albanesas, y en instrumentalizar la propaganda religiosa.

Sería erróneo, sin embargo, reducir la experiencia hamidiana a una simple política panislamista. Su reinado está marcado sobre todo por la voluntad de convertir a Anatolia en reino de la «Turquicidad». El elemento túrquico es descrito desde ahora como el elemento más importante y el más civilizado de Asia Menor, siendo erigido

en modelo (Kushner, 1977). La política hamidiana en lo que se refiere a Armenia, incluso si la responsabilidad directa del Sultán en las masacres de 1895-1896 parece discutible, muestra su voluntad de cambiar las coordenadas del problema otomano. Además, es cierto que desde esta época los Balcanes escapan ampliamente al control de Estambul y que el problema armenio se convierte en el elemento clave de la que se denomina «cuestión de Oriente».

El panotomanismo y el panislamismo constituyen las dos etapas sucesivas que llevan a los turcos al nacionalismo. Ambos encierran en su seno ese objetivo a plazo más o menos largo. El segundo, sobre todo, marca el estrechamiento de la noción de «nación», excluyendo a los elementos no islámicos. En efecto, la obra de Cevdet Pasa, uno de los intelectuales *ulema* más eminentes de la época pre-hamidiana y hamidiana, es importante desde este punto de vista, ya que acentúa a la vez el carácter turco y la islamidad del país y subraya que la combinación de la *asabiyya* religiosa y de la *asabiyya kawmiyya* permite la existencia del Imperio.

IV- Tendencias surgidas de la oposición de los Jóvenes Turcos

El nacionalismo turco en tanto que doctrina de Estado sucede al panislamismo y al reinado de Abdül Hamid. Encuentra en primer lugar un terreno propicio en la oposición joven turca en Europa antes de poder dotarse de una formulación organizativa y política en la capital otomana.⁵ Sin embargo, sería injustificado caracterizar a esta oposición como nacionalista en su totalidad, pues bajo esta denominación genérica encontramos tanto grupos musulmanes hostiles al Sultán Hamid como las oposiciones de las minorías cristianas, especialmente la armenia. Los turcos, al igual que los armenios, participan activamente en los congresos Jóvenes Turcos organizados en París en 1902 y 1907. Además, esta oposición reagrupa desde el comienzo a corrientes religiosa, liberal y nacionalista entre los turcos. Todas estas oposiciones, extremadamente heterogéneas, proclaman como reivindicación la libertad. Sin embargo, se trata para ella de un último intento desesperado para salvar

⁵ «En la época, en Europa, la idea de nacionalidad se fundaba sobre el principio...de la Gran Revolución francesa que se apoyaba más en la voluntad de las conciencias que en la descendencia y la raza. El Sultán Mahmud y sus sucesores se dejaron engañar por ese principio...y buscaron los medios de transformar en una única nación, en la libertad y la igualdad, en la seguridad y la amistad mutua, súbditos racial y religiosamente diferentes. Cuando el principio de las nacionalidades fue comentado, de manera más conforme a los hechos reales (sic!) en base a la raza y, como para probar la superioridad de esta interpretación, Napoleón III y el Imperio francés fueron vencidos en la guerra de 1870-1871, la idea política que se llamaba la nación otomana perdió su único apoyo» (Akçura, 1903-1976 : 20).

a la patria. Otros rasgos vinculan igualmente a estos movimientos de oposición: interpretan ciertas nociones coránicas y las «nacionalizan», sufriendo ampliamente la influencia de las experiencias no-musulmanas. Una dialéctica de odio y admiración se instaure entre el musulmán o el turco por un lado, y Europa y el cristiano por el otro. La Europa cristiana constituye, en numerosos aspectos, un modelo de virtud y de pureza para los islamistas. Para los liberales que, bajo el influjo de la escuela de Le Play, predicaban la iniciativa privada y la descentralización como las dos claves de bóveda de la reforma otomana, los elementos no-musulmanes del Imperio constituyen el ejemplo que los propios musulmanes deberían imitar para progresar. En definitiva, entre los nacionalistas encontraremos numerosos militares, sobre todo a partir de 1906, los *komitaci* no-musulmanes, tanto balcánicos como armenios, representando a hermanos enemigos: hermanos bravos y que combaten un régimen tachado de «reaccionario» y «sanguinario»; «enemigos», en cuanto constituyen la amenaza principal para la patria que se intenta salvar. Es de destacar que el acto que desencadena verdaderamente la oposición de los Jóvenes Turcos es la insurrección armenia de Estambul. El Comité Unión y Progreso publica entonces un manifiesto que condena sin reservas esta «insolencia» de los cristianos, pero incitando asimismo a los musulmanes a hacer lo mismo. Otros ejemplos prueban también que los oponentes, predispuestos mentalmente para matar al «padre» que los ha deshonrado, están indignados por el hecho de que los no-turcos puedan tomar tal iniciativa.

El universo mental de los Jóvenes Turcos está determinado por la ecuación entre la nación, término bastante borroso, comprendido de un modo comunitarista, y la civilización. El darwinismo social hace estragos entre ellos, pues destaca a la vez la necesidad de reformarse para fortalecer así al Islam y a la nación, y de adaptarse al nuevo mundo, adhiriéndose a la civilización de los vencedores que son los europeos; por lo tanto, de inscribirse en una perspectiva universal. La generación de los Jóvenes Turcos lleva a su término el proceso de pérdida de confianza en sí mismos de los otomanos y pasa de un Occidente mítico a la elaboración de modelos que se revelan ricos en consecuencias: modelo liberal, identificado con la revolución de 1789; modelo alemán, reducido a su expresión militar de 1870-1871, y modelo japonés, reducido igualmente a la victoria nipona de 1905.

Los Jóvenes Turcos desean sinceramente la revolución, porque ven en ella el único medio para salvar el Estado; sin embargo, la temen por cuanto significa también desorden y anarquía. Si a pesar de todo tuvo lugar la acción violenta de 1908, fue para impedir la pérdida de la Turquía europea, intención clara del reencuentro ruso-británico de Reval. Tentativa vana, sin embargo, pues el Imperio pierde la totalidad de los territorios «yugoslavos» y poco tiempo después el resto de sus territorios

balcánicos tras la primera guerra de 1913, incluyendo Salónica, lugar mítico de Unión y Progreso y de los soldados sublevados de 1908 (una zona que englobaba también Edirne fue recuperada tras la segunda guerra). La relación entre los Balcanes y el Imperio cambia entonces de naturaleza para inscribirse en el contexto de las relaciones internacionales y de las guerras; de los vínculos centro-súbdito-desconfianza, se pasa a la animosidad pura y simple.⁶ Igualmente, los «enclaves» musulmanes del Imperio en los Balcanes, es decir, Bosnia y Albania, se pierden durante los años que siguen al *pronunciamiento*. Por el contrario, después de la euforia de los primeros días de 1908, en los que los *mufti*, los rabinos y los sacerdotes desfilaban hombro a hombro, las cuestiones «nacionales» internas del Imperio y más exactamente de Anatolia se vuelven cada día más agudas, como muestra el boicot de los comerciantes cristianos en 1909 o las masacres de Adana el mismo año. Al mismo tiempo, la cuestión de las «minorías» musulmanas que gozaban hasta entonces del estatuto de mayoría con el título de musulmanes, comienza a imponerse de modo acre. Así, paralelamente a los problemas con las comunidades cristianas, el Imperio se encuentra confrontado a la oposición musulmana, la albanesa que lleva a la independencia, la árabe y la kurda, que se intensifican en los años 10.

Sin embargo, y contrariamente a lo que se habría podido esperar, el nacionalismo turco progresa sólo lentamente en la capital otomana. A pesar del comunitarismo que reina en el ambiente y de las sucesivas pérdidas territoriales, la mentalidad otomana se libera de modo penoso del islamismo para aferrarse a una «turquicidad» abstracta. Es evidente que los elementos no musulmanes del Asia Menor se muestran muy hostiles al nacionalismo y defienden una fraternidad, incluso una suerte de división del trabajo a la otomana en la que «la fuerza de la nación» provendría de la alianza entre sus elementos campesinos y comerciantes (F. Ahmad, 1985:139). Por lo demás, no son de ningún modo favorables a la idea de abandonar su propia especificidad, cuyo respeto es, sus ojos, la condición de su otomanidad y de su buen entendimiento con los turcos. Uno de ellos exclama: «sin ser un buen griego, no me puedo convertir en un buen otomano; sin ser un buen cristiano no puedo amar a los musulmanes» (Ahmad, 1985:139). «¿Qué significa 'unámonos'?... añade otro : ¿que todos nos convirtamos en turcos?» (Ölçen, 1982:37). Pero los cristianos no son los únicos en oponerse al nacionalismo turco; numerosos musulmanes, turcos o no, comparten el mismo sentimiento.

Tres tendencias se enfrentan en la capital otomana tras el *Pronunciamiento*, proponiendo soluciones divergentes tanto para el problema de los nacionalismos

⁶ «¡Golpéanos! Oh, nuestro viejo esclavo [el griego], avergüénzanos/ No nos dejes dormir...¡despiértanos!» (Z. Gökalp, 1977: 66)

como para otros temas, yendo desde la civilización a la revolución. Para la primera de esas tendencias, descrita como islamista, el problema que plantea es doble: el nacionalismo de los pueblos musulmanes y el de los cristianos. Al primero, verdadero desgarrón de los islamistas, le conceden una cierta legitimidad en la diferenciación étnica, sobre todo cultural, pero rechazan todo derecho a la separación, a la identificación étnica. Consideran ilícita la división de la *'umma* y ven en ello un retorno a los paradigmas de la *jahilliyya* o del *chirka* (asociacionismo), la falta peor de la que un musulmán pueda declararse culpable, puesto que reduce a nada el mensaje coránico al volver a los creyentes hacia una segunda Meca. Conviene precisar aquí que los islamistas, a la defensiva, estaban ligados a la única entidad musulmana, Irán, que era independiente en aquel entonces. Tenidos durante mucho tiempo por los responsables de la disgregación y retraso del Imperio, se erigían de modo natural en los defensores del consenso interno. Pero existía una razón suplementaria para su vinculación con el Imperio: la mayoría de los intelectuales islamistas (Said Halim, Ahmed Naim Babanzade, Mehmed Akif, Said-î Nursî, por citar sólo los más importantes) no eran turcos. Enfrentándose a la vez con un nacionalismo turco agresivo y con los respectivos de sus propias nacionalidades, vivían la realidad de los problemas étnicos. Prohibían a sus semejantes el comprometerse en una lucha nacionalista, invitándolos a un combate común con sus «hermanos» de religión, los turcos, y no podían naturalmente cerrar sus ojos ante el alejamiento del Islam.

No nos sorprenderemos de ver a estos islamistas tachar a los nacionalismos musulmanes de *kufr* y de proponer, a la inversa, la creación de una *nación* islámica en la lógica de *millet-i kahira* (la nación mayoritaria). Los islamistas reivindican el legítimo ejercicio de la soberanía política por Alá, fuente de toda soberanía, lo mismo que su legislación; consideran ilícita, naturalmente, toda clase de soberanía que encontrase su fuente en el pueblo, y más en una identificación étnica.⁷

La tendencia islamista se definía como otomanista en relación a las minorías no-musulmanas, sobre todo las cristianas, y reivindicaba para ellas a la vez ciertos derechos culturales, su participación en la vida política y su representación sobre una base confesional. Esta representación debía estar reglamentada, en todo caso, por una disposición coránica, por supuesto, pero también por una interpretación comunitarista de la «democracia» que erigiría a los musulmanes, mayoría demográfica, en mayoría política. Fuese según el Corán o según la democracia, los cristianos se encontrarían

⁷ Este último se dirigía a sus compatriotas: «Tu nacionalidad era presuntamente musulmana...¿Qué significa entonces el *kawmiyye*?/ ¿Qué significa entonces Albania?/ ¿Tiene un lugar en la *Charia*?», Ersoy, 1975 : 203.

siempre en una situación de «minoría». No obstante, ciertos islamistas eran conscientes de que la libertad de los no-musulmanes era también la garantía de la libertad de los musulmanes. Así, Said-i Nursî explicaba que: «la libertad de los no-musulmanes, corolario de nuestra libertad, es el precio de la libertad de nuestra nación de un modo general y el antídoto del despotismo moral» (S. Mürsel, 508).

El liberalismo otomano, mal conocido todavía hoy, y cuyo padre espiritual es el príncipe Sabahaddin, se enfrenta igualmente a estos dos nacionalismos. Al igual que la tendencia islamista, también se opone al nacionalismo, de modo más radical. A diferencia del primero, es resueltamente otomanista, y defiende «la tradición liberal de 1908 y el principio de igualdad de las razas que ha presidido su elaboración» (Fua, 1914:22). Vinculado a los equilibrios internos y a las instituciones del Imperio otomano, el liberalismo está fuertemente influido, por lo demás, por el modelo de los no-musulmanes, es decir, por el modelo de los *millet*. Los liberales consideran que este estatuto permitió a las minorías no solamente sustraerse al despotismo de Palacio, sino también desarrollarse más o menos libremente y elaborar así un contramodelo, basado sobre el individuo, que iba en contra de las estructuras comunitaristas/funcionaristas de las poblaciones musulmanas, sobre todo de las turcas. Así, si los musulmanes quieren liberarse, deben adoptar el modelo de los cristianos. Lejos de considerar, contrariamente a los nacionalistas turcos, el estatuto de *millet* como un privilegio otorgado a las minorías confesionales, el liberalismo otomano acoge favorablemente sus reivindicaciones.⁸ El príncipe Sabahaddin admite también, *a priori*, el derecho de secesión si ninguna otra vía es posible, como en el caso de los albaneses.⁹ Este caso impulsa igualmente a los liberales a preguntarse si el Asia Menor se convertiría en una «verdadera macedonia de nacionalidades» (A.Fua, 1912). Sin embargo, es evidente que esta tendencia no acoge de modo generoso a las corrientes nacionalistas musulmanas, puesto que no duda en poner en guardia a kurdos

⁸ Sabahaddin: «Debemos acordarnos también de que hemos considerado los privilegios de los cristianos, y esto, durante siglos, no como derechos, sino como dones otorgados. Hemos vivido separadamente de las minorías. Hemos pensado por separado. Nada ha podido aproximar nuestras respectivas perspectivas sociales. Puesto que nosotros hemos marchado para conquistar su país, nos corresponde también ahora suavizar sus corazones. Nos lo pide nuestro deber y nuestros intereses» (cit. en P. Fesch, 1909: 50).

⁹ «Los albaneses nos han ayudado a derribar al Sultán Hamid. ¿Y hoy? En lugar de ahogarlos en sangre y odio, ¿no sería más correcto aceptar sus reivindicaciones en el marco de ciertos límites y realizarlas por vía de la razón? Pues váis a ver, llegará de todos modos a su objetivo. Las condiciones actuales lo imponen. Continuar con obstinación en el camino del pasado no depende más de la ignorancia sino del crimen» (Cit. por Kutay, 1982, p.129).

Por otro lado, los liberales proponen la invención de una sociedad otomana sin distinción de raza o de religión, lo que permitiría inventar también la ciudadanía y la protección de las distinciones minoritarias. Para esto, proyectan una descentralización profunda del Imperio otomano que, al satisfacer a las minorías, al menos a las que queden, podría atajar las tendencias secesionistas.

Pero esta tendencia, que tiene dificultades para encontrar unas bases sociales sobre las que asentarse, y que es mal vista además por un Ejército que la acusa de querer destruir el Imperio y la «turquicidad», fue borrada de la escena por el golpe de fuerza de 1913. Su desaparición impidió igualmente a los islamistas elaborar una estrategia independiente y evitar alianzas a más o menos corto plazo con los unionistas.

Los unionistas, en definitiva, constituían la única tendencia que se proclamaba nacionalista. Modelados a la vez por un positivismo rudimentario que les permitía realizarse como universales y que servía de antídoto a la revolución temida pero necesaria, y de un antihumanismo tomado de la derecha radical francesa, esta tendencia se orientaba claramente hacia el establecimiento de un Estado fuerte, «civilizador», corporativista y nacionalista. Rechazando la doctrina de los derechos naturales, el unionismo intentaba establecer la supremacía turca en el Imperio otomano. Uno de ellos, H. C. Yalçın explicaba que «se diga lo que se diga, los turcos son la nación dominante en el país y lo seguirán siendo» (en Aksin, 1980:168-69). Elevando la «turquicidad» a criterio de lo bello y lo noble,¹⁰ los nacionalistas condenaban la fascinación que la antigua Grecia ejercía sobre los intelectuales turcos, y hacían la apología de la barbarie regeneradora que vendría de los turcos.¹¹ Con la idea de la nación como «el único factor verdadero» que regía la vida humana, siguiendo en esto a Albert Sorel (Akçura, 1928:14), los nacionalistas no vacilaban, naturalmente, en entonar himnos al antihumanismo: «¡Abajo el humanismo internacional, hipocresía despreciable, masonería universal! Todo por la patria» (T. Alp, reproducido en Landau, 1984:143).

Ese nacionalismo que se encarnaba en el discurso de Unión y Progreso carecía sin embargo de bases teóricas. Incluía, eso sí, un variado repertorio de ideas, desde

¹⁰ M. E. Yurdakul : «La cara más bella es fea para nosotros/ Lo que nos gusta es el rostro turco/ La mejor esencia es mala para nosotros/ es la esencia turca la que queremos» (cit. en Akçura, 1928/1981: 116).

¹¹ «Tu bayoneta te pide [efectuar] ataques/ tu caballo relincha, pide ataque...Ataca...ataca...no te pares...ataca.../ Oh Europa, ¿dónde encontrarás refugio para escapar de este látigo?» (Z. Gökalp, 1977: 62)

«Has aplastado, roto, quebrado, quemado, Oh sublime Hakan (Gengis Khan), ..., pero, habrían debido transformar a la manzana roja el universo, la sangre y el fuego» (cit. en Düzdag, 1978: 236).

Comte a Fouillé y de Le Bon a Sorel. Los componentes del discurso nacionalista eran europeos, pero necesitaban una alquimia local para ser viables en la geografía otomana, plegarse a las exigencias de la práctica unionista a la vez que orientándola. Esta delicada operación correspondió a Z.Gökalp, discípulo de Durkheim según sus propias afirmaciones,¹² teórico de Unión y Progreso a partir de 1911. Su síntesis era original en la medida en que intentaba integrar diversos préstamos de las tres tendencias ideológicas, teniendo como objetivo la creación de una «turquicidad», musulmana en la civilización occidental. En su concepción, la civilización se convertía en anacional, fuera tanto del bien como del mal. Los turcos que anteriormente habían conocido las civilizaciones asiática e islámica debían entrar ahora en la civilización occidental. La opción civilizadora no pertenecía al pueblo, sino a las élites dirigentes, y en este punto, capital para reforzar el Estado, era preciso ser revolucionario sin concesiones. El Islam conservaría un lugar determinante, en tanto que elemento de identidad, en la ecuación de Gökalp. Ahora bien, como el Islam justificaba la subordinación del pueblo al príncipe, éste debía convertirse en anacional, es decir turco y apolítico. Así, al transformar este factor en un rasgo común a toda la sociedad, Gökalp llegaba a excluir automáticamente a los no-musulmanes de la nación. La Turquicidad, objetivo principal de la empresa,¹³ debía su existencia al *hars*, la cultura, o sobre todo *Kultur* en el sentido alemán del término. La cultura, inmutable, permitía que una Nación fuese fuerte, más que cualquier otro elemento: el factor que permite a una nación existir y sobrevivir es además el elemento comunitario y no el elemento civilizacional, ya que Gökalp precisa que una nación con una cultura (*hars*) fuerte y una civilización débil vencería necesariamente a una nación cuya civilización fuese fuerte pero cuya cultura (*hars*) fuese débil (Z. Gökalp, 1976 a:37). Si bien sobre este tema era preciso ser extremadamente conservador. El sistema de Gökalp, enemigo resuelto de la doctrina de los derechos naturales, preveía en definitiva el establecimiento de un régimen en el que el *avam* (el populacho) no tendría derechos,¹⁴ pero en el que los «héroes» y los «genios» que encarnaban a la nación

¹² Sin embargo, el discípulo se desvía a menudo de su maestro, sobre todo en la sustitución arbitraria de la nación por la sociedad en Durkheim. La conciencia colectiva que es «una síntesis *sui generis* de las conciencias particulares», «un objeto de investigación» para Durkheim, se convierte en Gökalp en un móvil de acción, etc. (Cf. Bozarslan, 1992)

¹³ «Un país en el que el ideal, la lengua y la religión son comunes a todos sus individuos/ Sus diputados son limpios/ Donde no hay derecho de expresión para los Bochos [diputado griego en la Asamblea otomana]/ Un país en el que turco es todo el capital que circula en el mercado/ Así como la ciencia y la técnica que guían su industria/ Sus comercios se ayudan mutuamente/ los arsenales, las fábricas, los barcos y los trenes son de los turcos/ He ahí, hijo de turcos...he ahí tu país» (Z. Gökalp, 1976 : 11)

¹⁴ «Sobre todo no digas: tengo derecho/ El derecho no existe, sólo existe el deber/ No tengo ni derechos, ni interés, ni ganas/ Tengo mi deber, y ninguna necesidad de otra cosa/ Mi espíritu, mi corazón no piensan, oyen/ siguen la vía que proviene de la nación/ cierro los ojos, cumplo con mi deber» (Z. Gökalp, 1976 : 13-14)

serían los únicos dotados para ejercer la soberanía. Con Z. Gökalp, la doctrina nacionalista llegaba a dotarse de un programa. El apoyo del ejército y el golpe de fuerza de 1913 que eliminó toda oposición antiunionista permitieron a esta «síntesis» no sólo imponer su monopolio en el dominio sociológico universitario, sino también convertirse en doctrina oficial del país.

VI- ¿Del Imperio a los Estados-Naciones?

La Primera Guerra Mundial, sobrevenida inmediatamente después de las dos guerras balcánicas de 1913, precipitó la disgregación del Imperio otomano. No solamente los proyectos de construcción, mediante la conquista, de un Imperio turánico se soldaron con un fracaso humillante para el Comité Unión y Progreso, sino que, además, la misma Anatolia, ocupada y dividida, corrió el peligro de escapar de las manos de los turcos. Al mismo tiempo, el Imperio cedía el testigo a entidades estatales que se pretendían más o menos homogéneas.

El balance de esta transición, sin embargo, fue muy gravoso. Ciertas comunidades otomanas, sobre todo los armenios, fueron literalmente aniquiladas; los griegos fueron sometidos a intercambios de población. La fragmentación de este Imperio nos sitúa entonces ante dos cuestiones: ¿por qué el paso a un Estado se convierte en «después de todo, homicida», como se pregunta M. Nishanian (Nishanian:1992)? ¿Y por qué, a pesar de todas las tentativas desde hacía más de siete décadas, los Estados surgidos del Imperio otomano no llegan a transformarse en Estados-Nación, fracasando en el proceso de «nation-building»? En busca de una respuesta, el investigador no puede hacer abstracción de los límites del «mosaico» que caracterizaba a la región. Aquéllos pueden *explicar*, pero en ningún caso *justificar* u ocultar que la voluntad de crear un Estado-Nación desemboca en un etnicismo «purificador», incapaz de edificar una sociedad de derecho, de tolerar la multiplicidad de los sentimientos de identidad *infraestatales* o incluso de inventar la ciudadanía. Si la esencia del Estado, en tanto que forma jurídica de existencia social, no es *nacional*, sino *política*, pudiendo desembocar a continuación en formas nacionales, la construcción estatal en la antigua geografía otomana quiso ser nacional en detrimento de la dimensión política y, sobre todo, del derecho. Y fracasó probablemente por haber cometido ese pecado original.

La apuesta por el Estado-Nación condujo, en el caso que nos interesa, a múltiples derivaciones. Turquía nos ha dado un primer ejemplo, pues en este caso la nación fue imaginada como *homogénea* en un sentido étnico, lo que explica que

los ideólogos kemalistas hayan pasado rápidamente del término de nación al de *raza*, y que haya habido una identificación explícita entre ciudadanía y pertenencia a la vida política, incluso a la historia y al carácter turco. Del mismo modo, el nacionalismo era proclamado como doctrina de Estado, y la no-adhesión a esta doctrina implicaba la exclusión de la nación. La fusión del partido único con el Estado en los años 30, por su lado, subordinó el conjunto de la ecuación nacionalsita a un sistema de caudillos,¹⁵ a cuya cabeza se situaban Atatürk (caudillo eterno) e İnönü (caudillo nacional). La población no-musulmana, que pasó de 3 millones en 1914 a 300.000 en 1927, descendió aún más bajo la República turca, mientras que la misma existencia de los kurdos era negada. La obsesión por probar la unidad étnica del país permitió en un primer momento la recuperación del conjunto de la herencia anatolia, y más tarde decretar el carácter turco de todas las civilizaciones y lenguas conocidas por la humanidad (Bozarslan, 1992 a).

Las repúblicas balcánicas muestran igualmente rasgos comunes con la experiencia turca, aunque en el período de entreguerras observamos una mayor apertura hacia el problema de las nacionalidades. Sin embargo, tras la II Guerra Mundial fue el «comunismo» el que, paradójicamente, dió un aliento desconocido hasta entonces a los nacionalismos locales, situándose en el origen de una serie de patinazos en Bulgaria (donde en los años 80, los turcos fueron considerados como búlgaros «asimilados» por la fuerza y fueron obligados a cambiar de nombre), en Rumanía, en Albania o, parcialmente, en Yugoslavia. Del mismo modo, durante las primeras décadas que siguieron a la Gran Guerra, el mundo árabe permaneció al abrigo de derivas como las conocidas por la Turquía kemalista, a pesar de existir una fuerte tendencia nacionalista. Pero, más tarde, la adopción del nacionalismo como doctrina de Estado por el Baas abrió la vía para derivaciones teóricas ulteriores, como se puede apreciar en la arabización e irakización de la historia de Irak (Baram, 1991), y asimismo, tanto en este país como en Siria, en experiencias políticas de una brutalidad extrema, basadas sobre el sistema del caudillaje y del partido único. La política Baasista ha conducido a esos países a costosas aventuras en el plano internacional, y a una práctica de arabización que se orientaba sobre todo contra los Kurdos. La doctrina ba'athista que prevé la subordinación del derecho a la arabidad hasta el día en que ambos elementos se fundirán en uno, como definía (Aflaq, 1977), explica en buena medida las experiencias que han llevado mucho más lejos la práctica kemalista de los años 30.

¹⁵ El nacionalismo se encontraba, bajo el régimen kemalista, en fusión con otras tendencias del partido único : republicanismo, estatismo, laicismo, etc.

La experiencia de los últimos 70 años y las convulsiones que conocen en nuestros días las regiones comprendidas entre los Balcanes y el Oriente Medio, muestran con bastante claridad que una experiencia de Estado-Nación, privada de noción de derecho, de pluralismo político, etc., no tiene ninguna posibilidad de éxito. Más allá de ello, es necesario constatar que para haber emergido en un momento dado de la Historia y en un área geográfica determinada, y pagado un precio extremadamente gravoso, el éxito de ese modelo en los antiguos territorios otomanos fue impedido también por sistemas de pertenencia y por ser las diversas sociedades un auténtico mosaico. Las ambiciones monopolizadoras y el tono tiránico del discurso nacionalista reflejan este fracaso e intentan velar la ausencia de la Nación. La politización de los términos de la ecuación gökalpina, «nación», «religión» y «civilización», el flujo inevitable entre ellos y el paso sistemático de uno a otro con fines de legitimación de los príncipes modernos, explican también la incompatibilidad del derecho positivo y las experiencias estatales en el Oriente Medio. Únicamente la despolitización de estos términos y la invención de otros modelos, que separen las pertenencias infra-públicas de la ciudadanía, parecen ser capaces de dar cabo a esta incompatibilidad, pero también a las limpiezas étnicas, de las que no son descartar nuevos ejemplos dentro de la antigua área geográfica otomana.

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Nation or Region? Cultural identity in Tirol in the years before 1914

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1. Introduction - national identity in Tirol

(i) After the formation of the German Empire in 1871, the Austrian dramatist Franz Grillparzer told the Prussians : 'You believe that you have given birth to an Empire, but you have destroyed a people... I was born a German, am I one still ?'. Grillparzer was asking a question about his national identity. Did the new nation-state of 1871 possess an exclusive claim to define what was German ? This paper asks the same question of the German-speaking part of the Austrian land of Tirol. The Tirolian up-rising against the French and Bavarians during the Napoleonic period was a reaction to outside dominance which did not draw on, or immediately produce, a German romantic nationalism. Yet a referendum held in Tirol on 24. April 1921 - without the approval of the Austrian government - produced a 98.8% result in favour of Anschluß to Germany¹. Was a desire to be part of the German state evident before 1914 ? Did the German-speaking population in Tirol before 1914 consider themselves to be Germans, Austrians or simply Tirolians ? Was there an 'Austrian' or Habsburg patriotism in the pre-war monarchy, and if so, what did this mean ?

It has, for example, been argued that 'the lack of an Austrian patriotic ideology contributed to the ultimate demise of the First Austrian Republic'². This paper therefore examines a question first raised by Hobsbawm : 'it would be desirable to see a study of the attempts by more authentically legitimate dynasties, such as those of the Habsburg and the Romanov, not merely to command the obedience of their peoples as subjects, but to rally their loyalty as potential citizens. We know that they eventually failed, but was their failure a foregone conclusion ?'³.

¹ R. Schober, *Geschichte des Tiroler Landtages im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Innsbruck, 1984) - S.402.

² A.D. Low, *The Anschluß movement 1931-8 and the Great Powers* (N.Y., 1985) - p.xiii.

³ E.J. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (Eds.), *The invention of tradition*, (C.U.P., 1983) - p.266.

(ii) Braudel suggested in his last work that national identity 'is a process, a self-induced conflict, destined to go on indefinitely'⁴. In other words, national identity must be seen as a complex and a dynamic matrix, where rival social groups are competing to produce the dominant interpretation. 'National identity' - German, Austrian or Tirolian - is not a fixed entity, but an area of cultural discourse, in which a *plurality* of different groups or individuals participate. Even if the central purpose of that discourse is usually reconciliatory - it aims to produce a cohesive and universally acceptable image of nation and society - the precise contours of the national identity are in dispute. In Tirol in the period 1850-1914, the ascendant party in Braudel's 'process of conflict' was the Clerical-Conservative, and 'Tirolian identity' can be interpreted here as that identity developed by the leading social group. This paper investigates how a hegemonic definition of identity emerged and examines the function of that identity for different social groups, by focusing on the centenary celebration of the Tirolian up-rising, held in Innsbruck at the end of August 1909.

2. Festival-building - the Tiroler Jahrhundertfeier 1909⁵

In commemorating the up-rising of 1809, the Jahrhundertfeier was designed to reinforce patriotic and dynastic sentiments in Tirol, the festival being a high-point in a broader campaign. It culminated a process begun some years earlier, with a state-sponsored promotion of shooting-associations and the production of a cult of Andreas Hofer as the national hero, which involved the rehabilitation of Hofer from rebel to patriotic hero, his removal from the Liberal to the Conservative political space and the metamorphosis of an historical individual into a symbolic political programme. A statue of Hofer - the most important leader in the 1809 revolt - was unveiled by the Kaiser in 1893 on the Berg Isel outside Innsbruck (scene of the battles in 1809) and was followed by the consecration of a chapel at Hofer's birthplace in Passeier in 1899 (again, in the presence of the Kaiser).

The 1909 festival was intended to reflect the ideal social structure of Tirol, as conceived by the Conservatives, and expressed in the triad of «Gott, Kaiser und Vaterland»: religion and patriotism were the eternal values binding the peasant population to the existing social order; immense importance was attached to celebrating in the 'traditional' manner, by holding a shooting-competition and a

⁴ F. Braudel, *The identity of France* (Vol.I, London, 1989) - p.23.

⁵ A short note on sources is given at the end of this paper; full references can be found in : Cole, L.: 'Die Tiroler Landes-Jahrhundertfeier in Innsbruck, 1909', (unpub. paper, E.U.I. / March 1992).

parade of 'Schützen' (local militia groups) - «eine Landesfeier in der *landesüblichen* Weise unter Veranstaltung eines Fest- und Freischießens und eines Schützenfestzuges»⁶; the use of traditional costume ('National Tracht') was partially subsidised by the organising committee; the parade ('Festzug') of Schützen (the embodiment of Tirolian values) was the centre-piece of the festival; Tirol in 1909 was to demonstrate itself to be exactly the same Tirol as it had been in 1809, loyal to Emperor and Church (Kaiser- und Kirchetreu), with the whole social order in Deutsch- and Italienisch-Tirol rallying with the spirit of a hundred years before⁷.

The decision to stage a commemorative festival in 1909 was taken as early as 1902, by the Conservative-dominated government in Tirol. Initial discussions in January 1904 had opted for the erection of a monument '*auf dem Berg Isel...welches zur Verherrlichung der Tiroler Nationalhelden (...) dienen soll*'⁸, but the idea collapsed due to problems with finance. By March 1904, the main decisions had been taken : to organise the Festschießen and Festzug; and to establish a patriotic fund («eine Landesstiftung für patriotische Zwecke»)⁹. It was to be a «Volksfest», «nach echt tirolischer Tradition». 20,000-30,000 Schützen were to participate - «die Veranstaltung im Jahre 1909 einen möglichst volkstümlichen Charakter tragen solle (...). Das Fest soll das *ganze Land* umfassen»¹⁰. By January 1909, funding had been secured for the main objectives - «die Errichtung von Denkmälern in verschiedenen Landesteilen, ferner die Schützenkompagnien zur Anschaffung von Nationaltrachten, in denen sie vor ihrem Landesfürsten erscheinen wollen und zur Anschaffung von Fahnen...»¹¹. Two main events - a religious service and homage ceremony on the Berg Isel, and the parade of the Schützen - took place on the 29. August in the presence of the Kaiser, and the shooting-competition lasted for the weeks before and after the main festival.

In summary : aware of social, economic and national tensions within the Empire in general, and Tirol in particular, the ruling elite in Tirol enacted positive measures aiming for patriotic social integration - «die Erinnerung an die Heldentaten und Opfer dieser Vorfahren im Kampfe gegen die Feinde der Dynastie und Oesterreichs soll bei Gelegenheit der Jahrhundertfeier wieder wachgerufen und lebendig erhalten werden.

⁶ LsA/1: (Mappe: Jahrhundertfeier Programme etc.) - Ladschreiben des Landesausschußes an die Beisitzer des Festkommittees, 23.1.1909.

⁷ 'Deutsch-Tirol' at this time consisted of the area covered today by the Bundesland Tirol in Austria and the autonomous province of Bozen / Südtirol in Italy; 'Italienisch-Tirol' was equivalent in area to Trentino today.

⁸ LsA/6: Protokoll der Landes-Komitee-Sitzung am 25.1.1904.

⁹ LsA/1: (Mappe:Jhf.Prog.etc.) - Bericht Kathreins '1909', 20.1.1909.

¹⁰ LsA/6: (F.II) Protokolle der Landes-Komitee-Sitzung, 4.10.1907.

¹¹ LsA/1: Bericht Kathreins '1909', 20.1.1909.

Der dynastische Gedanken soll vor allem in der Bevölkerung gestärkt werden»¹². This strategy included the erection of monuments, organisation of local festivals, the staging of didactic drama and even extended into the schools. The initiative for the festival came from within Tirol, but the Imperial Court and the government gave full support in ideological, financial and logistical terms (the Kaiser agreed to be the patron of the festival in April 1906). The Landesfest enabled the Habsburgs to pose as protectors of the freedom of peoples, in contradistinction to accusations that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was the 'Völkerkerker' (the prison of peoples). The commemoration was of the uprising which began the liberation of Europe from Napoleon - «welche wie ein verheißungsvoller Morgenglanz den großen Ereignissen von 1813 vorangegangen»¹³. These basic aims received greater emphasis with the victory of the Christian-Social movement ('Christlichsozialen') in the 1907 Reichsrat elections in Tirol - which challenged previous hierarchical structures of social and political organisation - and with the consequences of Habsburg intervention in the Balkans in 1908. The festival was an exemplary display to the rest of the Habsburg Empire, and at the same time a demonstration of well-being and strength to foreign opinion (particularly, the alliance partner, the German Empire).

3. Patriots for whom ?

The festival in Innsbruck was the main official celebration in 1909, but virtually every place of any size conducted its own ceremony, usually involving the unveiling of a memorial to the local hero(es) of 1809 (e.g. in Klausen to Pater Haspinger), followed by a parade of Schützen, and often in the presence of some dignitary or other (sometimes a minor member of the Imperial family). Landeshauptmann Theodor Kathrein, head of the provincial executive, felt that the main event in Innsbruck had been a success when he passed on the Kaiser's thanks to the population : «Wir haben dadurch alle zusammen das Landesfest zu einem Ehrentage in der Geschichte Tirols im vollsten Sinn des Wortes gemacht»¹⁴, and the national-liberal Bürgermeister of Innsbruck, Wilhelm Greil, was also satisfied with the outcome of the event. Yet the 1909 celebrations took place during a period when public social conflicts in Tirol were more strident than they had ever been. So the apparent success of the Landesfest requires some explanation.

¹² LsA/6: (F.IV) Kathrein an den Kanzler des Militär-Maria-Theresien-Ordens, 17.5.1906.

¹³ LsA/6: (F.II) Protokoll einer Besprechung des engeren Komitees, 28.2.1908.

¹⁴ LsA/6: (F.XIII) Zirkular Kathreins, 15.9.1909.

(i) For certain social groups (Catholic-Conservatives, aristocracy, military, upper clergy, and the highest levels of Imperial government and bureaucracy), the festival was a ritual internal confirmation and external demonstration of the type of society they believed in and intended to maintain : «ein Erinnerungsritual, das von oben initiiert, geplant und durchgeführt wird, das ein bestimmtes Geschichtsbewußtsein popularisieren und eine bestimmte Identität stiften möchte»¹⁵. Limits were in fact imposed on the committee as far as actual realisation of their intentions was concerned, but the didactic social model propagated by the elite nevertheless established a framework to which the rest of society referred.

Certain texts exemplify the elite's ideals, most of which (welcoming speeches, songs for the serenade of the Kaiser) had to be submitted for approval by the Imperial court. The organisers always avoided a discourse of nationality - the key words tend to be Heimat, Land, Vaterland and Volk ('das Tiroler Volk'). The territorial words encompassed a range of meaning, though 'Land' was the least emotionally-charged and the least flexible (the 'Land' was always Tirol). Heimat essentially refers to a specific locality - e.g. 'Pustertal seine engere Heimat ist'. But in a broad context, it may refer to Tirol - 'im Kampfe für Gott, Kaiser und Vaterland, für die teure Heimat'. Vaterland is the most ambiguous, because there were in a sense *two* Fatherlands - Tirol (possibly the more frequent usage) and Österreich. Tirol is thus more specifically 'unser engeres Vaterland'. 'Monarchie' is used to describe the Habsburg state more often than 'Reich'. Nearly all the material relating to the various celebrations in 1909 uses language in this way (as in 'unser engeres Vaterland Tirol'), though perhaps with a greater emphasis on Heimat at the lower levels. The Kaiser made one reference to the two nations of Tirol - 'vedo con viva gioia, che ambedue le nazioni cooperano in pieno accordo al bene della loro patria' - but this instance is exceptional. 'National' tended to be used in a derogatory way, particularly in the Conservative press (Italian Liberals were 'nationalists', Tiroler were patriots). Only a minority gave the nation a strongly positive connotation (the progressive - 'freiheitlich' - urban bourgeoisie).

The conservative mediaevalism of the festival was established by Kathrein's greeting of the Kaiser at Kitzbühel (the first stop on the Kaiser's journey into Tirol); the Landesfest was essentially a neo-feudal homage ceremony between the Land and the Kaiser, in his capacity as 'princely Count of Tirol'. Prior to the rendering of homage by the people in the Festzug, the religious oath of obedience on the part of the Land was renewed. Spoken on the sanctified ground of the Berg Isel and repeating Hofer's

¹⁵ I. Schneider, *Verordnete Gedächtniskultur. Das Tiroler Gedenkjahr 1984 zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit* (Beiträge zur Volkskunde in Niedersachsen, Nr.5 / Göttingen, 1989).

oath of loyalty from 1809, the oath explicitly formulated the official interpretation of Tirolian history and stipulated the nature of the bond of loyalty. The structure of authority is clearly defined, but the authority is paternalistic and benevolent ('das landesväterliche Herz unseres Jubelkaisers mit so großer Freude erfüllt'; 'Kaiser Franz Joseph ... stets wie ein fürsorglicher Vater'; 'treue Landeskinder'). Kathrein's welcoming of the Kaiser in Innsbruck referred to the thousands «aus allen Tälern» who had converged on the regional capital, a stress which indicated the predominantly rural tone of the festival. The organisers deliberately aimed the festival at the peasant population, whom they considered to be the most loyal of the Kaiser's subjects.

Distribution of medals to surviving veterans from the defence of the land against Piedmont in 1859 laid claim to the living truth of these assertions. Franz Joseph acknowledged the acts of homage through the distribution of symbolic tokens. The medal bore the Kaiser's portrait, with an inscription of his latin title. On the reverse side, was a laurel wreath (classical symbol of imperial power), an oak branch (signifying military virtues and associated with Germanic-Teutonic folklore) and the numerals 1859-1909. The medal was attached to a green-white-red-white-green band, a fusion of the Schützen colours of Tirol and the House of Austria. Past, present and future formed an eternal union : «Wir Landesverteidiger vom Jahre 1859 tragen heute bereits mit Stolz unsere Denkmünze...Diese Medaille (...) soll uns und unseren Nachkommen stets vor Augen halten, welche Pflichten wir gegen den Landesherrn und die Heimat in Zeiten der Gefahr zu erfüllen haben»¹⁶.

All the themes enunciated in the ceremonial texts were played out in front of wider audiences during the festival week in various dramatic works, which narrated the story of 1809, usually in the form of peasants' theatre (Volksschauspiel). The most important work was the official Volksschauspiel in Innsbruck, unsurprisingly entitled 'Andreas Hofer'¹⁷. It featured Tirolian dialect, a cast of around 200 (all, needless to say, in traditional costume), and consisted of short, laboriously sentimental episodes of dialogue (e.g. 'Die Freud' über die Gnad' meines Kaisers treibt miar fast 's Wasser in die Aug'n'), followed by large-scale recreations of the most poignant moments from 1809. The traditional Tirolian way of life is destroyed by oppressive foreign troops, who are then defeated by the heroic Hofer, Speckbacher and company; order and harmony are restored by Hofer's period as regent; and then after defeat in the final battle, comes the martyrdom of Hofer, whose last words are to the Kaiser ('Hoch leb' mein Kaiser Franz !'); the cast sing «Das ist mein Österreich», a portrait of the Kaiser

¹⁶ LsA/1: (Mappe:Jhf.Prog.etc.) Entwurf Kathreins.

¹⁷ Carl Wolf, *Andreas Hofer. Tirol im Jahre 1809*, (8. Aufl., 1908).

appears from nowhere, and the curtain falls. Many of the standard images in Tirolian culture appear - the Madonna, the Heart of Jesus, the Schützen, - as well as standard themes in conservative philosophy - the solidarity and good-will of the peasants, and loyalty to Kaiser and Church. No mention is made of urban life, save for a passing swipe Hofer makes towards the professors of Innsbruck (who in 1809 had shown no interest at all in the up-rising, even holding examinations while the third Berg Isel Battle was taking place). Time and again the purpose of the drama is made clear : 'Morg'n ist für Tirol a groaßer Tag, von dem nach hundert Jahr nou g'redt werd (...) Es ist ober a heiliger Kriag, den miar kämpfen, mit Gott, für Kaiser und Vaterland !' .

More specifically, *patriotism in the localities* was encouraged, as a means of giving the locality an identity that was also definitely Tirolian - local figures from the 1809 uprising were used as focal points for relating the hegemonic interpretation of Tirolian identity : «Es liegt im patriotischen und dynastischen Interesse, diese Bewegung möglichst zu fördern, weil diese Denkmäler lautgreifende Zeugen sind von den Tugenden unserer Vorfahren, und gegenwärtige Generation stets erinnern an die Pflichten gegen das Allerhöchste Herrscherhaus und das Vaterland»¹⁸. The Landes-Ausschuß subsidised the erection of statues or plaques to the most prominent figures from 1809 in the various districts and villages of Tirol. The Festzug in particular was intended to stimulate local pride - 'die einzelnen Bezirke werden ihr möglichstes tun, würdig im Festzuge vertreten zu sein'¹⁹.

The above measures were aimed at stimulating voluntary participation, but coercive action was used as well. Police prevented possible disruptions (particularly in Trentino, because a guaranteed Italian presence was necessary for the legitimization of the unitary character of Tirol). Eleven Italian workers were arrested as suspected anarchists, copies of some Italian papers were confiscated, and the police intervened to prevent petitions and protests against those leaving for the festival, particularly in Trento.

Finally, *the celebration itself was turned into an historical event* ('ein Ehrentag in der Geschichte Tirols'), thereby having its legitimacy and apparent truth validated. Distribution of commemorative medals was one aspect of this process. So was an offer of reduced-price copies of the official festival album to shooting associations and parishes, and the decision to take the cross from a specially-arranged 'Kreuz-Gruppe' in the Festzug and place it on the Berg Isel, in a consecrated chapel. The teaching

¹⁸ LsA/6: (F.IV) Kathrein an den Kaiser, 1.9.1906.

¹⁹ LsA/6: (F.VIII) Einladung zur Festzugsteilnahme.

of Tirolian history was promoted to the same end. Special attention was paid to 'tirolische Heimatkunde' in teacher-training institutions, linked to remembrance of the festival. Aside from copies of a silver medallion being sent to the leading schools in Tirol, souvenir coins were made available as prizes for pupils who performed particularly well 'in der vaterländischen Geschichte'²⁰.

(ii) The society within which this festival took place, like any society, was able to confer social recognition and provide status rewards - the organisers could benefit from the prestige of the Kaiser's visit, donation of commemorative medals or watches, the importance of the social occasion and so on. This involves everyone, but particularly those identified with the state or public life. For the religious ('kirchliche') Jahrhundertfeier held on 20. June, Kathrein issued a circular to the heads of shooting groups, parish councils, local state bureaucracy and the military, encouraging - and thus virtually obliging - officials at every level, as well as local associations to attend the events. He also wrote to the parishes and shooting associations urging them to contribute to the prize-fund for the Festschießen. 289 silver medals were distributed to prominent individuals or associations. Recipients included the Imperial house, senior members of the clergy, military, civil service and government, members of the Tiroler Landesausschuß, the mayors of Tirol, various 'Honoratioren' in Innsbruck, Landtag deputies, museums and the Catholic student associations.

It is not unexpected to find such groups playing an active part in manifestations of patriotism. The Tiroler Kaiserjäger regiments wanted to place two sculpted groups to the left and right of the Hofer statue on the Berg Isel (even if the plan was to fall through). The membership of the Andreas Hofer-Denkmal-Komitee in Meran indicates the coalition of interests involved in the patriotic enterprise - aside from four members involved solely in commercial affairs, all the members were directly involved with the state through employment, possessed some honorary attribution by the state or were members of the clergy. Four Schützen and Veteranen groups were also represented.

Orders of social precedence were carefully set out, albeit with slight changes in the choreography depending on the appropriate location. In Kitzbühel, with the Kaiser's arrival on Tirolian soil, the provincial governor (Statthalter) was the first to present himself to the Kaiser, followed by the district governor (Bezirkshauptmann), Kathrein and then the mayor. But in Innsbruck, it is the attendant Imperial Archdukes who are the first to greet the Kaiser, followed by the Ministerpräsident (von Bienerth)

²⁰ LsA/6: (F.XXXIII) Kathrein an den k.k. Landes-Schulrat, 3.6.1910.

and the commanding General in Innsbruck. Then came welcoming speeches by Kathrein and Bürgermeister Greil. Dress requirements were also stipulated.

The two big public events of the festival were the Berg Isel ceremony and the parade of the Schützen. The Berg Isel mass took place on the morning of the 29. August. A field-altar was set up in front of the statue of Hofer. Around the altar were placed all the historic flags of the companies who had fought in 1809. The social utopia depicted was that of a corporate ('ständisch') medieval society. Klerus, Adel, Bürgertum and Bauerntum were equally represented. Access to the ceremony was restricted - the area was cordoned off, military officers were assigned to various parts of the ground and the invited guests carried tickets to gain entry. Veterans from 1859 stood near the Hofer monument, and Schützen from Passeier (Hofer's birthplace) on the inner periphery of the area surrounding the statue. The columns were then organised by district for Deutsch-Tirol, with the companies from Italienisch-Tirol forming a separate group.

At the Festzug, the stands around the Kaiser's pavillion in front of the Hofburg were occupied by 'Honoratioren' - a definition which included the highest clergy (e.g. the Prince-Archbishop of Salzburg and Prince-Bishop of Brixen), ministers of state, senior civil servants and the leading local dignitaries. Immediately surrounding the Kaiser were the military - generals, active and retired officers and officials. To his left were further members of the military, and to his right, the clergy and the highest members of the Imperial court. On the opposite side of the route sat Reichsrat and Landtag deputies in one stand and civil servants in another. In most cases, the wives of these figures were present, but their status was usually always defined solely with reference to the status of their husband (e.g. Baronin Agnes Teuchert, Feldzeugmeistersgattin). Only the highest female members of the aristocracy might be accorded independent recognition (e.g. Luise Gräfin Lodrone or Baronin Elsa Hauptmann, k.k.Stiftsdame). The officially invited guests also included the Bürgermeister of Tirol, parish leaders and civil servants from the local head-offices of the state railways, telegraph and so on.

'Honoratioren' from Italienisch-Tirol also attended. The Catholic Italian Landtag deputies requested an audience with the Emperor to present various petitions. The only overt political rejection came from a few Italian Liberals and one Social-Democrat (a Reichsrat deputy for Innsbruck). The Liberals contended that official participation was incompatible with their demands for autonomy in Trentino, but nonetheless asked for an audience with the Emperor. The councils in Trento and Rovereto sent deputations to Innsbruck.

Another example of the mechanism of status creation and recognition was the elaborate use of formal language and an obsessively pedantic attention to the use of titles. The status hierarchy was not just an expression of elite ideals - nearly everyone announced who they were by virtue of stating *what* they were - General, Bürgermeister, Kaufmann, Bauer, Schützenmeister, or failing anything better, Schützenbeirat. All these aspects - spatial organisation, dress codes and forms of address - suggest that social status and honour was primarily a function of position within the state structure (military, political and administrative). It also underlines the important role of *institutions* in forming identities and in making traditions credible.

The over-elaborate Habsburg administration is not often regarded as a model of efficiency. It took Kathrein almost two years to gain approval for the distribution of silver medals to the Landesverteidiger of 1859, his suggestion being passed between ministries without any decision being taken. From the point of view of constructing a network of upwardly-competitive loyalties, however, the system had its virtues, particularly for the Monarchy's German population. Here is the irresistible rise of «der Mann ohne Eigenschaften».

(iii) The whole event had the character of a military operation. Aside from the obvious presence of the male members of the imperial family in military uniform, visiting generals and officers, military bands and the parade of the armed Schützen, the manner in which the event was organised reflected the role of the military in the social structure of the Habsburg Monarchy, which in the last analysis, «more than most great powers, was an organisation for conducting foreign policy»²¹. The main source of funding for the festival was the Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden, embodiment of the highest values of the Habsburgs. The military ethos of the state implied important social disciplines - «Patriotism, fidelity to duty, victory over oneself, these are the weapons that matter in warfare»²². The metaphor of 'Tirol in Waffen' (Tirol in arms), a unit bonded by loyalty and sacrifice - 'uns treuehorsaamste Standschützen' - served as an ideal illustration of the structure of the Empire .

When the Kaiser (always in uniform) arrived in Innsbruck, there was a guard of honour (from the elite Tiroler Kaiserjägerregiment) and this was standard practice throughout the festivities. Attendance by serving military personnel was actively encouraged. Schützen travelled at military rates on the state railways, and were treated by the organisers as a personal bodyguard for the Kaiser. Civil (i.e. non-military)

²¹ A.J.P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918*, (London, 1948) - p.9.

²² J. Hasek, *The Good Soldier Svejk*, (London, 1974) - p.752.

associations were not allowed to form part of the main body of the Festzug, nor could associations which were not part of the officially recognised defence organisations - all these groups had to march in a separate section of the parade. Kathrein afterwards congratulated all concerned for their exemplary discipline - «überaus stramme Teilnahme am Festzuge und ... tadellose und musterhafte Disziplin»²³.

It can be maintained that a large-scale celebration could scarcely function in any other way - provision of around 20,000 meals for the Schützen could most easily be provided by army facilities. But it is striking that military metaphors and behaviour were so thoroughly apparent. The military character of the festival was in fact an important technique of social control, indicating the manner in which the Conservatives conceived of society as a whole: 'the traditionalism of peasants ... was constantly praised by 19th-century conservatives as the ideal model of the subject's political comportment'²⁴. The peasantry was viewed from above as an abstract mass, their participation a token presence only, necessary to the social model. Society was actually strictly defined, its structure rigid. Included in the festivities was a large Court dinner in the Hofburg in Innsbruck, to which 40-50 Veteranen or Schützen were to be invited (preferably ones decorated in the campaigns of 1848 or 1859), but candidates were carefully vetted for their moral and social presentability. There was unease even at this temporary transgression of social barriers. In practice, access to political and social power was tightly confined, illustrated again in discussions concerning how to react to petitions from the population about the Herz-Jesu-Bund, a popular religious cult: '*Betreffs der Petitionen aus Unterinntal meine ich, daß das Landeskommittee ruhig darüber zur Tagesordnung übergehen kann. Das Landeskommittee hat doch auch verständige Leute zu Mitgliedern und bedarf nicht des Rates von Vereinsgruppen*'²⁵.

The Conservatives considered themselves as the natural and appropriate decision-makers in society and were thus left extremely confused when they discovered that that was not in fact the case. Unable to adapt when the peasant population acquired a political voice in the late 19th-century, their political philosophy still rested on a chain of subordination and obedience forming the foundation for order and harmony - 'Die Kaiserrede...ist eine eindringliche Mahnung an alle Völker der Monarchie: Seid gottesfürchtig, treu und arbeitsam, dann könnt ihr zu eurem und das Vaterlandes Heil auch Heldentaten verrichten wie die Tiroler vor hundert Jahren ...

²³ LsA/6: (F.XIII) Zirkular Kathreins, 15.9.1909.

²⁴ Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983), p.266.

²⁵ LsA/6: (F.XXXIII) Fürstbischof Altenweisel an Kathrein, 7.6.1909.

Laßt den zerstörenden Nationalhaß, rückt alle «in voller Eintracht zusammen zum Wohle der Heimat» ... Tirol war 'anno neun' und Tirol von 1909 sei auch Vorbild'²⁶. The Monarchy depended in this way on the reliability of its subjects. '«Humbly report, sir, I'm awfully happy», replied the good soldier Svejik. «It'll be really marvellous when we both fall dead together for His Imperial Majesty and the Royal Family...»'²⁷.

4. A triumphant bourgeoisie

For the leading bourgeois of Innsbruck and the main towns of Tirol, 1909 was an opportunity to demonstrate their position in the Monarchy, especially their dynamic economic role. Tirol had suffered an extended economic crisis in the second half of the 19th century (preoccupation of the political classes with the ideological struggle of the *Kulturkampf*, general European depression in agriculture, interruption of railway construction, large-scale emigration). Only in the 20 or so years before 1909 did the situation begin to improve (renewal of railway-building, spread of electrification, tourism etc.) and the local urban elites felt that this was primarily their achievement. In welcoming the Kaiser at Innsbruck station, Bürgermeister Greil made direct reference to the recent upswing in the town's fortunes.

In analysing the festival, it is necessary to distinguish between form and meaning(s). The meanings of the festival were in one sense infinite - everybody could form their own opinion. But the official, intended *meaning* was dynastic, hierarchical, patriotic, religious, rural, military, imperial - a reflection of the ideals of the *political* elite. Yet the *form* of the festival was that of idealised and invented tradition, and this reflected the *cultural* hegemony of the bourgeoisie. The search for genealogical national stories, the writing of history through the decisive role of individuals, the erection of national monuments, romantic attitudes to nature, the use of costumes, songs and so on, all reflected bourgeois aspirations or values. In other words, the cultural form of the festival was actually an example of a wider process, emerging primarily from the bourgeois milieu during the 19th-century, and whose distinctive features were (usually) political liberalism, a sense of national consciousness and the determination of 'civilised values'.

The very idea of holding a centenary celebration can be associated with bourgeois notions of the ordering of time. Frykman and Löfgren have argued that

²⁶ *Allgemeine Rundschau* (München), 11.9.1909 (TLF FB.9601).

²⁷ Hasek (1974) - p.213.

peasant / agricultural societies tend to celebrate cyclical, annual seasonal events, such as harvest feasts. In contrast to this is a future-oriented, careerist and linear ordering of time which is essentially the cultural product of a relatively narrow social strata - male, middle-class and urban-based professionals. Their highly rational and strictly formalised sense of time attaches great importance to personal landmarks and the 'magic of numbers'. The cult of the birthday celebration was almost exclusively a bourgeois phenomenon until it penetrated peasant and working-class lifestyles at the very end of the 19th century. Associations in Tirol celebrated the year of their foundation at five-year intervals, with the tenth or twenty-fifth anniversaries receiving special recognition.

The corollary of this disciplined view of time - also evident in industrial modes of production - is a nostalgic interpretation of the past, which crystallises peasant life into a colourful and unchanging lost age and which rejoices in the outwardly decorative features of that way of life: 'Die Tiroler sind keine Freunde der wechselnden Moden, welche sich um den Geist der Vergangenheit nicht kümmern und womöglich einem jeden neuen Jahre funkelneue Kostüme zurechtschneiden möchten ...'²⁸. In Tirol, the existence of what can broadly be called a 'Heimat' movement is clearly discernible, involving the identification of the local national culture - the collection of artefacts, the writing of history and the formation of scientific or cultural associations (e.g. Heimatskunde [1892], Deutscher Volksverein [1898], Volkstrachten-Erhaltungs und Schuhplattler Verein [1906]). Municipal museums were founded. Rhymes in local dialect, fairy tales and legends were collected by the educated bourgeoisie, afraid that these records of the past world were about to be lost. During the festival, there was a Trachtenschau in the exhibition hall, together with a peasant wedding, examples of peasant sports and so on. Balls combined with a Trachtenfest became part of the urban social calendar, and often artificially imitated aspects of peasant life: 'Liabi Leutlen! Jetzt warn miar halt a wieder da ünsern Ladschreib'n und tat'n Enk einlad'n. Ös sollt's zuawer giahn zun ünsern Ball'²⁹.

The surface of peasant life gave basis to a higher culture. The bourgeoisie took the form but not the substance. There was no question of a populist identification with the mass of the population. When planning the provision of a meal for members of the festival Festzug, there was a clear demarcation of social barriers, despite the affectation for peasant traditions - 'Der Preis für dieses Mittagessen muß ein möglichst geringer sein, weil an dem Festzuge auch Schützen teilnehmen, welche in dienender

²⁸ *Interessantes Blatt* (Wien), 24.6.1909 (TLF FB.9601).

²⁹ Tiroler Bergsteiger-Gesellschaft «Alpler», Ladschreiben zum Alpler Ball, Jänner 1907.

Stellung (Bauernknechte) sich befinden'³⁰. The real function of 'Heimat' nostalgia was as a 'defence against all that was foreign and changing', a response to major changes in the general socio-economic structure - 'what was recreated was not so much the landscape of peasant culture as the myth of the way it was and the dream of the way it ought to be ... a secure society with no class conflicts and no outsiders'³¹.

But the 'Heimat' is not just wishful thinking, it is also a necessity. In a society whose characteristic features were coming to be sustained, irreversible long-term economic growth, specialised production, occupational mobility and universal literacy, 'the culture needs to be sustained as a culture, and not as the scarcely noticed accompaniment of a faith'. Culture must belong to everybody - not just an elite - for such a society to function. A culture in which everybody participates, and where (in theory at least) anybody can fulfil any social and economic role (because everyone has received a standard education), consists of a framework of reference points. Even though the *content* of these references is nearly always in dispute, they must at least be recognised by everybody, and that is achieved by a process of identification and codification. It is in this sense that a nation is 'created'. Or as Gellner has argued, 'nationalist ideologies suffer from pervasive false consciousness. Its myths invent reality : it claims to defend folk culture while in fact it is forging a high culture; it claims to protect an old folk society while in fact helping to build up an anonymous mass society... It preaches and defends continuity, but owes everything to a decisive and unutterably profound break in human history'³². A set of standard idioms and symbols are identified, based primarily on language, but determined also by political values, religious beliefs, the distribution of power, social norms, the form and pace of economic change and so on. In practice, the leading social group constructing this new use of culture tended to be the bourgeoisie - the social group which defined itself by its values and virtues, not by reference to a divinely-ordained social order.

For the urban bourgeoisie nationality was an instinctive part of their cultural awareness. Innsbruck council actively promoted support for German cultural activities. Many leading members of the Innsbruck bourgeoisie organised a Bismarck fête in the spring of 1909. The Tiroler Volksbund, a cross-party group for the promotion and extension of German culture within Tirol, received a yearly subsidy of K.300, and the council invited the 'Bürgerschaft' of the town 'aus Anlaß des um 24. und 25. April

³⁰ ISA 1909/Cml.5: Zl.30728 Stadtmagistrat - Amtserinnerung an das k.u.k. Reichskriegsministerium, 21.6.1909.

³¹ J. Frykman & O. Löfgren, *Culture builders. An historical anthropology of middle-class life*, (Rutgers U.P., 1987) - p.63.

³² E. Gellner, *Nations and nationalism*, (Oxford, 1983) - p.142, 124-5.

I.J. hier stattfindenden Landestages des Tiroler Volksbundes die Häuser zu beflaggen, um so den Sympathien der Bevölkerung gegenüber dem um die Erhaltung und Förderung des Deutschtums in unserem Land ... Tiroler Volksbund sichtbare Ausdruck zu verleihen'³³. There was thus some difficulty in reconciling German cultural consciousness with recognition of the status of Italian culture within Tirol. In discussions by the festival committee, Bürgermeister Domanig (Sterzing) and Rohracher (Lienz) were in favour of a German inscription ('Tiroler Treue immerdar bewahrt') on the centenary coins, instead of the Latin «Pugnis acerbis fidem probavit Tirolis». The neutral Latin had to be defended on the grounds that the coins were also to be presented to Schützen from Italienisch-Tirol : «es (handelt) sich hier nicht um ein nationales Fest sondern um ein Fest des ganzen Landes». Rohracher persisted with suggestions for the production of separate Italian and German versions, though this was rejected by a large majority when put to the vote³⁴.

Inseparable from a sense of national consciousness was the expression of certain political and social values - religious toleration, secular education, the rule of law, freedom of trade, political pluralism etc. In discussions concerning a putative second full day of the programme, an informal exhibition was suggested, to consist of, 'Bilder der Entwicklung Tirols nach den Freiheitskämpfen in Bezug auf Wissenschaft und Kunst, Industrie und Landwirtschaft und Fremdenverkehr...'. Opposition to religious dogma was made plain when the council voted by clear majorities against issuing an invitation to decorate houses, or to issue an official greeting, for the Landeskatholikentag (a Catholic conference) in May. This was in response to a specific request by the organisers, who included prominent Conservative members of the Landtag. The main Liberal newspaper in Innsbruck emphasised alternative values to those of the Conservatives in 'Tirols Willkommengruß' to the Kaiser. It celebrated 1809 'im geklärten Lichte der Geschichtsforschung' and recalled the role of various Tiroler who had been involved in the fulfilment of liberal aims - '(die) Entwicklung der konstitutionellen Ära in Österreich'; 'die Kräftigung eines österreichischen Gesamtstaatsbewußtseins'; 'das große Prinzip der Lehr- und Lernfreiheit an den Universitäten'; 'diese werden grünen und blühen, wofern es dem Kaiser gegönnt ist, ... den Frieden zu erhalten, in dessen Wissenschaft und Künste sich entfalten, Handel und Gewerbe gedeihen und der Landmann des Segens seiner mühevollen Arbeit froh wird'. The festival was 'ein großes, schönes Familienfest ...', a secular social occasion not part of the heavenly village of the Catholic-Conservatives³⁵.

³³ ISA 1909/Cml.5: Zl.20460 - Brief-Konzept Greils, 21.4.1909.

³⁴ LsA/6: (F.II) Protokoll der Landes-Komitee-Sitzung, 4.2.1909.

³⁵ *Innsbrucker Nachrichten*, 28.8.1909.

It is perhaps predictable that there were some differences of opinion between the Landeskommitee and the municipal authorities, but it was accentuated by the strongly national-liberal sympathies of the town-council. There was friction over who was actually paying for what, and Greil and Kathrein disputed the precise obligations in an at times heated correspondence. The council was wary of paying more than its fair share of the bills, afraid that the wealth of the most productive and responsible section of society was being squandered by the irrational and antiquated elements in the Habsburg Monarchy. Though the festival was obviously an important promotion for the town, the municipal authorities did not want any unnecessary burdens : 'Vor allem aber möchte (Greil) dringend ans Herz legen, daß die *finanzielle Frage des Festes* gelöst werden ... Vor wir beschliessen, müssen wir das Geld haben. Die Stadt Innsbruck fühlt sich berufen, zum Feste ihr möglichstes beizutragen, aber nicht als einziger Faktor. Es handelt sich um ein Landesfeste, wozu Staat und Dynastie und noch in dritter Linie die Hauptstadt in Betracht käme'³⁶.

5. Sunny Tirol

A major factor in the economic upturn in Tirol was tourism. The number of visitors expanded rapidly in the last quarter of the 19th century, and the whole operation became increasingly organised. Tourism is a major point of interest for several reasons :

(i) there was a very strong *commercial* motivation to the production of a Tirolian (peasant) identity - to create something 'exotic' for foreign visitors and to provide something that, whilst being culturally German, was simultaneously accessible but quaintly 'different' for the rising numbers of German tourists. Images of Tirolian peasants were used in the marketing of tourist-related activities or for the promotion of products made in Tirol. The firm of Hibler showed a woman in national costume in its adverts for 'Tiroler Gesundheits Feigen-Caffe' around 1895. In 1909, it is possible to find advertisements for 'Andreas Hofer soap' in the local papers.

In general terms, the festival was a big commercial opportunity. It was reckoned that around 25,000 tourists would be in Innsbruck over the festival weekend. Decorative motifs for the Kaiser's brief visit to St. Anton station included winter-sport emblems. The Huber travel agency in Innsbruck used the 'Volksschauspiel' in Brixlegg as its advertising strategy for the 1909 season. Brochures from the Landesverband für

³⁶ LsA/6: (F.XXXIII) Protokoll der Landes-Komitee-Sitzung, 8.2.1909.

Fremdenverkehr extensively employed peasant images. Interspersed with the text of the guides were sanitised illustrations of the inhabitants ('Alpbach peasant', 'Costume of the Lower Inn valley', 'Interior of Tirolian Peasants Dwelling' etc.), as well as romantic pictures of still waters, ruined castles or remote summits. The mountain climate signified health, happiness, freedom, naturalness, peace and simplicity, and peasants were meant to reflect this state of affairs: 'The genuine hospitality and hearty welcome met with throughout Tirol is universally known'³⁷. The marketing of tourism was in effect re-producing a lifestyle as a commodity.

(ii) This then has implications as to 'Tirolian identities' amongst the local population, over 75% of whom were still employed in agriculture - what is the impact of this type of economic activity (the packaging of a cultural identity for foreign consumption) in a society emerging from economic stagnation, experiencing major structural dislocations (emigration, technological changes) and undergoing a period of mass political mobilisation? Arguably, it encourages xenophobic identities.

The Verein für Heimatschutz in Tirol was founded in Innsbruck in 1908, expansion in the next few years seeing groups founded in Meran, Bozen, Lana, Brixen and Reutte. The group mainly based itself on fear of the dangers of modernisation and misuse of the land by outsiders: 'Seit weltverbindende Schienenstränge durch Tirols Täler gelegt wurden und der Fremdenverkehr mit Macht in das Land hereinströmte, seit die Errungenschaften der Technik sich ausbreiteten, die weder vor unseren ewigen Bergen noch vor dem ehrfurchtgebietenden Tosen unserer Wasserstürze Halt machen, seitdem ist für Tirol eine neue Zeit angebrochen... Ueberall entstand Neues aber man kümmerte sich nicht, ob es zum Antlitz der Heimat, zum Vorhandenen und Gewordenen paßte. (...) Schützt Tirol vor der Beraubung und Zerstörung dessen, was nur ihm zu eigen ist, was es uns teuer macht, das wir mit allen Fasern unserer Herzen an ihm hängen!'³⁸. The initiative here came mainly from bourgeois circles and in this respect represented a radicalisation of what had initially been more simply cultural 'Heimat' activities. Despite not being a mass peasant association, the type of reaction is symptomatic of more general attitudes in Tirolian society. The Verein expressed the ambiguities of change - an acknowledgement of progress with a fear of the consequences - and similar feelings can be observed in peasant associations; it contributed to the formation of a defensive and xenophobic political culture, and the involvement of the small-town Mittelstand is significant in this regard.

³⁷ *Guide and Hotel Book of Tirol* (7th ed., Innsbruck, 1909).

³⁸ Verein für Heimatschutz in Tirol, Jahresbericht 1912/13, S.3-4.

Tourism made general socio-economic changes highly visible. A large number of alpine associations appeared in the 19th century - e.g. Deutsch- und Oesterreichischer Alpenverein, Oe. Touristenklub. The purpose of these varied, but the majority were urban-based and tended to embody a fixed idea of peasant existence. The presentation of 'unspoilt reality' drew on sentiments and attitudes towards nature which were part of a European-wide and basically bourgeois cultural trend: 'The well-known Peasants' Theatre at Brixlegg will give performances of the popular Andreas Hofer play. Only those who have seen these Tyrolean peasants act the parts of their forefathers can form any idea how realistic these plays really are. Heart and soul are put into every word and movement, and even the most indifferent spectator cannot remain unmoved by such pathos and feeling'³⁹. Peasants had become a source of immense curiosity and Tirol was no exception: 'Tirol ist reich an Volksbräuchen, die Jahrhunderte zurückreichen ...'⁴⁰.

Changing attitudes to nature in Western Europe are observable at least from the late 18th-century onwards, but becoming more widespread in the next century, and tourists brought these different sensibilities into the countryside. There were potentially opposing conceptions as to the use of land and nature between those people who relied on agriculture for their living, and those who were temporary visitors. These alternative conceptions essentially fell into two categories. The first viewed the mountains as a place of rest and contemplation. The increasingly prosperous Kurorte catered for the richer and more self-indulgent end of this market, though it was also possible to spend a period of rest in the mountains without having first acquired an obscure illness. Artists and writers headed for the hills to seek isolation rather than the refined society of the health salons. In contrast, a second conception of the mountains saw the Alps as offering limitless possibilities for active leisure pursuits, of varying degrees of danger and physical exertion. Walking, fishing, hunting, motoring and mountain-climbing were available for the summer tourist. From December to May, a full range of winter-sports were on offer: skiing, ski-jumping, ice-skating, ice-hockey, bobsleigh, tobogganing and so on.

Two points are important: (a) many visitors thought that the peasants did not share their own sensibilities, because it did not appear that they matched other standards of civilised life: 'Primitive and unsophisticated tillers of the soil ... (they) have not yet acquired the independence of thought and the habit of referring all events to natural causes ...'; 'Nothing could exceed the pleasant willingness of the people

³⁹ *Daily Mail Continental Edition*, 18.3.1909.

⁴⁰ *Interessantes Blatt*, 24.6.1909.

of the house; but both their accomodation and their cleanliness was limited; and besides a repulsive look, there was an unaccountable odour, about the beds, which made sleeping in them impossible'⁴¹; (b) the emergence of leisure in society was initially an urban phenomenon. Agricultural life found space for recreation as well, but long-standing patterns of work and a necessarily intense relationship with the land still dominated. On the steepest mountain-sides, men and women would sometimes themselves be yoked to the plough, and a whole series of popular myths and sayings explained the harshness of the mountain climate and the infertility of the soil. Peasants looked at the land for its productive rather than its aesthetic value.

National identities still in the process of construction are thus *potentially* in opposition to a specifically new phenomenon - large-scale tourism, where the tourists seem to represent all that is most sophisticated and modern in society. The tourist industry used images of peasants as a marketing ploy, but simultaneously boasted about the availability of the essential conveniences of civilised life - 'Bahn-, Post-, Telegraphen- und Telefon-Station, hat elektrische Beleuchtung, Hochdruck-Wasseranlage, Lawn-Tennisplatz, Fremdenkonzerte, Omnibus-Verbindung mit dem Zillertale, Fahrgelegenheit nach allen Richtungen und jeden Tag ärztliche Ordination'⁴². All this kept peasant life at an attractively comfortable distance for the comparatively wealthy visitors. At the local level, however, it often introduced changes and confronted the population with different standards and modes of living. The tourist board in Tirol issued a leaflet for rural guest-house owners, instructing them how to behave with visitors, how to lay tables etc. and encouraged sanitary improvements, such as the installation of inside toilets. The influx of seasonal strangers also occurred when more of the local population than ever before were leaving the land on a permanent basis - a situation which arguably makes Heimat-based cultural identities more resonant.

(iii) There is a definite clash of interests between those groups in Tirol actively encouraging tourism - commercial urban bourgeoisie, Christlichsozial clergy, increasing numbers of the most notable figures in the smaller localities - and those against it (above all, Catholic-Conservatives, upper clergy). Significantly, the Festtag was moved from 15. of August (the date of Hofer's triumphal entry into Innsbruck in 1809) to the 29. of August, primarily due to pressure from interest groups involved in agriculture and tourism. The Conservative historian Hirn had emphasised the

⁴¹ Rachel Harriette Busk, *The valleys of Tirol. Their traditions and customs and how to visit them*, (London, 1874) - p.11, 187.

⁴² ISA 1909/Communalakten.7: Werbung - Reisebureau Huber, Innsbruck.

importance of the historical day in the early planning stages, but after making confidential enquiries, the committee reluctantly changed the date in order not to jeopardise their chances of success.

6. Throne, altar and circuses

(i) The 1909 festival was outwardly a demonstration of the holy alliance between throne and altar, but this formal confirmation obscured far-reaching changes in the role of the Church (and to a lesser extent in the position of the dynasty). Changes in Vatican policy, above all Leo XIII's publication of the 'Rerum Novarum' encyclical in 1891, had permitted the open intervention of the clergy in politics, and in Tirol, this had led to a generational split between die-hard Conservatives and less authoritarian, reformist clergy. An important split in terms of its political consequences, its ideological significance should not be exaggerated. In Innsbruck the Christian parties were standing on the same list in municipal elections, thus foreshadowing the post-war merger (later in Tirol than other Austrian lands). For Conservatives, there was never any doubt about Socialism being the real enemy: 'Unter den vielen Gefahren, welche den Fortbestand der christlichen Gesellschaftsordnung bedrohen, ist die bedeutendste die sogenannte rote Gefahr'⁴³. The Christlichsozialen likewise had the social democrats as their main enemy ('Volks- und Staatsfeinden'). In theory (and as the Bishops argued), the undermining of episcopal authority by the Christlichsozialen threatened to undermine all authority, but in practice the latter were firmly patriotic in the period up to 1914.

In general, secular and religious authorities were in agreement about the purpose of the festival. Kathrein and Altenweisel (the Bishop of Brixen) worked closely together. The religious festival was celebrated in every parish on 20. June, feast-day of the 'Heart of Jesus', and in practice served the purpose of a trial-run for the main event. By building on the already popular cult of the Herz-Jesu, the broader patriotic message could be disseminated and the informatic position of the clergy in the villages was used to this end. Priests were asked to encourage participation by local officials and Schützen and to announce the forthcoming 'Jubelfeier'. Altenweisel stressed the patriotic and religious value of the festival in his pastoral letter for 1909.

(ii) Despite the existence of constitutional institutions in the Monarchy, the *style* of the Habsburg Empire remained that of an absolutist state. The Emperor retained

⁴³ *Neue Tiroler Stimmen*, 12.5.1909.

important powers, perhaps even increasing in significance with the paralysis in parliamentary decision-making in the years before 1914. This personalised power structure suggests that bonds of loyalty were formed with the person of the Emperor himself, rather than his imperial role.

The Kaiser's arrival was eagerly awaited, and large crowds were reported at all the stations on his journey through Tirol. The co-ordinating committee for the Schützen from the Zillertal reported that, 'das Großteil, dem es möglich ist, setzt sehr viel Gewicht darauf beim Empfange Sr. Majestät zu gegen zu sein'⁴⁴. At one point in the Festzug, a Schütze broke ranks to offer a crown to the Kaiser. The old Tirolian right to address the Kaiser by the familiar 'du' was enthusiastically reported as one unabashed youngster asked the Kaiser, «Bist du der Kaiser?»⁴⁵. Anecdotal coverage in the popular press indicates that the general population only identified with the Kaiser at the personal level («Wir sind ja schon alte Bekannte»), as in a basically 'feudal' system of power-relations i.e. a direct relationship with the immediate authority rather than an impersonalised association with the state structure: 'Es ist bezeichnend, daß viele der alten Leute die Gelegenheit benützten, um den Kaiser eine Bitte vorzutragen'⁴⁶.

At the political centre, however, it was realised that the role of the monarchy was in fact changing, and traditional characteristics were being carefully adapted to more modern requirements. The official festival album cultivated a high regard for the members of the Imperial family, including lavish portraits in the opening pages. A new photograph of the Kaiser in the uniform of the Kaiserjäger was specially supplied by the court. The central authorities attempted to promote the personality of the Kaiser - 50th and 60th (1898, 1908) jubilees were held by the government for this reason. The 50th jubilee was marked by celebrations throughout Tirol, with the inevitable Festschießen and patriotic church services, though in view of the forthcoming Jahrhundertfeier, the 60th jubilee in Tirol was more low-key.

(iii) A final point of interest is to see the 1909 festival as a new type of public behaviour (the emergence of leisure, fascination with technology, mass entertainment) which in itself has nothing to do with patriotic sentiments. At least part of the festival was pure entertainment - there were sidehows, refreshment halls, fireworks and so on. Illumination of the main streets and buildings of Innsbruck created a magical

⁴⁴ LsA/6: (F.XXII) Schützenhauptmann Zell an Landes-Obercommissär Bauer, 16.6.1909.

⁴⁵ *Tiroler Bauern-Zeitung*, 17.9.1909.

⁴⁶ LsA/6: (F.II) Protokoll der Landes-Komitee-Sitzung, 4.2.1909.

impression, large crowds simply milling about over the festival weekend. It was no exaggeration when the newspapers claimed that Tirol had never seen anything like it - exactly what the organisers had intended, «ein Festzug wie in Tirol noch nie gesehen»⁴⁷. Competition for look-out places was intense. Local civil service staff tried to reserve window-places in the Landhaus, on the route of the Festzug. 88,000 tickets were sold over the festival weekend (28.-30.August) on the local transport system, special festival editions of the various papers were eagerly taken up, and the Volksschauspiel was well-attended.

All these factors could benefit the political aims of the organisers by drawing people into the event. Contemporary photographs testify to a carnival-type atmosphere. But unlike certain types of medieval carnival, the purpose was not to allow a temporary suspension of identity by a reversal of the social order. On the contrary, it was specifically intended to produce a fixed form of identity. The organisers stipulated that designs for the festival poster should produce a meaningful impression on the broader population. A glossy 'Offizielle Festzeitung' was produced in the week before the festival, featuring details of the main events, histories and anecdotes about 1809, and a column in Tirolian dialect and so on. Commercial by-products of the festival also helped to determine the way in which the event would be recalled, and these often sought official authorisation - one painter wanted to have a provisional copy adopted as the official festival-card. Post-cards mass-produced memory. One example, commemorating the presence of the Kaiser, depicted Franz Joseph at the head of the card. Directly underneath is a portrait of Hofer, to Hofer's left a picture of Speckbacher and to the right, Haspinger. Below these, are illustrations of the Hofer-Denkmal, Hofer making the oath of loyalty and a scene from one of the Berg Isel battles.

7. Peasants into Austrians ?

(a) There is little doubt about there having been a basic enthusiasm for the festival. The usual figure quoted was that over 25,000 Schützen were present in the Festzug. That cannot be verified precisely, but it can be stated from the registration lists that a minimum figure would be 20,000. One of the most complete lists gives a figure of 21,582 (for all the Schützen companies, veterans' groups, music bands and so on). Of these, 457 were from Vorarlberg, and 1,394 from Italienisch-Tirol. As a simple proportion of the population, this looks to be a significantly high rate of

⁴⁷ LsA/6: (F.II) Besprechung des engeren Komitees, 28.2.1908.

participation in terms of the number of possible participants per household⁴⁸. 3,939 Schützen took part in the Festschießen, of which 3,428 were from Tirol and Vorarlberg.

But such a high attendance rate should not disguise the fact that there *were* challenges to the official interpretation of 1809. What can loosely be termed 'criticism from below' came from two areas. The Social Democratic movement openly contradicted the official interpretation of 1809, and did not really positively identify with the event. Its description of the festivities was mostly begrudging, sometimes scornful. It argued that the clerical parties stressed the roles of religion and patriotism in the 1809 uprising because it allowed them to overlook the political and economic injustices of the present (as well as the past). The party paper produced a radically different historical interpretation, which described the lack of freedom under the old patriarchal system, the economic background to the uprising, Austria's lack of concern for Tirol, the manipulation of Hofer by clerics and the desire of some of the leaders (including Speckbacher) for union with Switzerland. Outside of the two main towns of Tirol, however, and in terms of representation in the Landtag, the workers' movement was politically insignificant. It concentrated its activity almost exclusively in the towns and made no intelligent effort to appeal to the rural population, attacking 'die wirtschaftliche Erdrosselung der Stadt durch die Christlichsozialen'⁴⁹. The Social Democrats nonetheless had a significant political impact in terms of their position in an ideological discourse. The Christlichsozialen were particularly fierce in their self-differentiation from the marxist party, and socialist interpretations of 1809 and its commemoration were angrily rejected as 'falsche Geschichtsabsiegungen'⁵⁰. Arguments put forward by the Social Democrats concerning the activities of bourgeois 'Überpatrioten', as well as protests against poverty in Innsbruck being ignored by the festival serve as a reminder that the Tirolian identities being propagated relied exclusively on *agrarian utopias*.

The main effective challenge thus came from the mobilised peasantry. Without disputing the general framework, there was resentment towards an elitist interpretation of events. A leading Christlichsozial paper published a special festival issue which appealed to 'glaubenstreue, kaisertreue und Heimattreue Tiroler'. The nuances here are revealing - 'glaubenstreue' rather than 'kirchentreu', implying an independence of episcopal authority, and 'Heimattreue' instead of 'Vaterlandstreue'. Emphasis was on 'die Freiheit des Glaubens und der Heimat', as well as the standard messages about loyalty

⁴⁸ The 1910 population in Tirol was 950,000, 57% German-speaking. A rough estimate gives an upward-limit of 270,000 potential German-speaking male participants - a ratio of around 1:14.

⁴⁹ *Volkszeitung*, 14.5.1909 and August 1909, *passim*.

⁵⁰ *Allgemeiner Tiroler Anzeiger*, 1.9.1909.

to the dynasty and state⁵¹. The Tiroler Bauernbund's (farmers union) paper accepted the basis of the official interpretation (religion and patriotism), but claimed the events for its own - 'die Bewegung von anno neun doch in erster Linie eine Bauernbewegung war und auch das heurige Jubiläum vornehmlich unser Fest ist'. This is an assertion of an independent status within society, a demand for recognition, above all, a *refusal to be written out of history* :

'Andreas Hofer war ein Bauer, Andreas Hofer war ein Wirt. Der Führer in der Tiroler Kämpfen vor hundert Jahren war ein Bauer. Welchen Standes waren denn zumeist die Männer, die um Andreas Hofer waren ? Bauern waren es, die Andreas Hofer dem Folge geleistet haben. und wenn die Tiroler Bauern nicht vor 100 Jahren dem Rufe Andreas Hofers gefolgt wären, dann wären die Tiroler Freiheitskriege nicht möglich und ganz gewiß nicht siegreich gewesen'⁵².

A petition to erect a monument to Joseph Speckbacher, perhaps the second-most influential leader in 1809, represented a more 'populist' aspect of the revolt. Primarily interpreting 1809 as 'die Kämpfe unserer Ahnen für Freiheit und Recht', it argued that Hofer was not the only hero of the uprising. Speckbacher's bravery and achievements were at least on a par with Hofer's, but the former had not yet received the recognition of the Land : '«Es ist Zeit» Tirolervolk deinen verdientesten Sohn mit einem würdigen Monumente zu ehren !'. What is interesting is the terms in which the appeal is phrased, the more significant considering the rapid electoral success of the Christlichsozialen:

«Für Speckbacher» erzählt der Volksmund «war keine Kugel gegossen», er galt als unverwundbar wie der hörnerne Siegfried; in seinem Opferte für's Vaterland und die Freiheit ist er vergleichbar mit Wilhelm Tell, ... Speckbachers Kriegstaten nur flüchtig zu skizzieren würde zu weit führen und ist mal über flüssig, jeder Tiroler weiß ja, daß er die Seele des Befreiungskampfes gewesen ist'⁵³.

The people are 'weltgeschichtlich' too, and a Tirolian identity is manifestly being used to make this point.

From the elite point of view, Speckbacher was a more difficult figure than Hofer. Wilder and more impulsive than the pious inn-keeper, his motivation was more open to question. This is suggested by the text of a dramatic account of Speckbacher's life

⁵¹ *Allgemeiner Tiroler Anzeiger*, 27, 28.8.1909.

⁵² *Tiroler Bauern-Zeitung*, 6.8., 3.9.1909.

⁵³ LsA/6: (F.XXVIII, Pos.XI) 'Anregung und Bitte betreffs Errichtung eines Landesmonumentes für den Schützenmajor Josef Speckbacher im Jahre 1809'.

which was performed as part of the celebrations for the unveiling of a bronze statue of Speckbacher in Hall in 1908. Speckbacher symbolises freedom more than anything else (whereas Hofer embodies authority, patriotism and religion). The text of the performance attempts to reconcile a greater, but not unlimited, idea of freedom with religion and patriotism, exactly the sort of synthesis propagated by the Christlichsozial movement (references to Social Darwinist thinking are also revealing). The most important speech comes when 'Freedom' appears to the young Speckbacher whilst he is sleeping:

«Ich bin die Freiheit, bin Gottes Gut, das vom Himmel kommt. Mein Reich ist weit und hell... So frei ich bin, bin doch niemals unbegrenzt, mein Reich beschränkt das ew'ge Weltgesetz, die gottgegeben'e Bahn ...

Die Gleichheit ist meine Schwester nicht, die Gleichheit ist die Lüge, die Hochmut als Gevatter hat und die Torheit. Kein Tier ist gleich und auch kein Mensch. Soweit du schaut, hat alles Art, Stamm, alles Rasse, Wiege ... Gleich ist auch zu Gleichem nur und das ewig weite Weltgesetz weiß nichts von Menschenschemen...»⁵⁴.

In political terms, this is a firm rejection of social democracy and an endorsement of the Christlichsozial viewpoint. The use of language is also noticeably different from that used for the main Hofer-centred festival in Innsbruck in the following year.

The interests of the rural population were articulated in the planning stages, forcing a postponement of the festival. Though the difference in timing was only two weeks, the change represented a serious setback to the Conservative conception of the significance of the festival: 'Nun kommt zu meinem lebhaften Bedauern eine Agitation gegen diesen 15. August aus rein materiellen wirtschaftlichen Gründen, denen die grosse Idee der patriotischen und dynastischen Feier untergeordnet werden soll'⁵⁵. Responses by district shooting centres to confidential enquiries made by the committee in 1908 suggest how the final decision was influenced. Whilst there were important local variations - the rural population was not an homogeneous mass - the overall impression is clear. Not everyone believed that a change of date was appropriate, but Kufstein was unique in thinking that for historical reasons alone, 15. August should be adhered to. The clear majority did not hold the significant day as inviolable. Trient favoured the 15., but for different reasons - out of consideration for local conditions and 'mit Rücksicht auf den Fremdenverkehr'. Meran, Brizen, Kitzbühel and Reutte agreed for similar reasons. Glurns felt that for the majority, the

⁵⁴ LsA/6: (F.XXXIII) Skizze der lebenden Bilder (Entwurf).

⁵⁵ LsA/6: (F.XXXIII) Kathrein an den Generaladjutant des Kaisers, Februar 1909.

middle of August would be acceptable, but that for those in the side-valleys or for people involved with tourism, the start of September would be better (in the more remote parts, the tourist season could be concentrated in a 2-3 week period in the middle of August). Sterzing argued almost identically. Bozen and Lienz favoured the end of June because the harvest was later in Südtirol, and September would not therefore have been favourable. In practice, it seems that at the ground level the actual decision to go may have been taken quite late - by the 5. August, 12,253 Schützen had registered for the meal that was being offered; this rose to 20,583 by 17. August. The replies indicate that material considerations would be the first priority. Maybe that is no great surprise. More importantly, it indicates that there were new political forces capable of determining what their own interests were - a previous festival in 1863, commemorating the 500th anniversary of the union of Tirol with Austria, had been part of an exclusive ideological struggle between Conservative and bourgeois elites.

(b) More broadly, the 1909 festival and other efforts at securing social integration have to be viewed in the context of mass political mobilisation and economic change - because it does seem that for much of the *German-speaking* population, at least, a distinctive Tirolian identity was an effective means of social integration. Gellner has argued that 'in stable self-contained communities culture is often quite invisible, but when mobility and context-free communication come to be the essence of social life, the culture in which one has been *taught* to communicate becomes the core of one's identity'; 'nationalism is about entry to, participation in, identification with, a literate high culture which is co-extensive with an entire political unit and its total population, and which must be of this kind if it is to be compatible with the kind of division of labour, the type or mode of production, on which this society is based'⁵⁶. It is possible to accept the broad structure of these arguments concerning the type of changes involved in moving away from an essentially locally-identified agrarian society, whilst acknowledging Hobsbawm's suggestion that an appreciation of cultural definitions 'from below' is perhaps the major weakness in Gellner's thesis, and equally, that 'national identification and what it is believed to imply, can change and shift in time, even in the course of quite short periods'⁵⁷.

In the case of Tirol, it is possible to see a transition-facilitating regional identity receiving immediate challenges in the form of penetration from the outside. The 'myth of Tirol' implied a timeless confirmation of certain values, thereby implying that even if changes occurred, the essence of peasant life would not be taken away. Lewis has

⁵⁶ Gellner (1983), p.61, 95.

⁵⁷ E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780*, (C.U.P., 1990) - p.11.

suggested that conservative agrarianism executes an important function in terms of integration into capitalist society : 'if agriculture is to be modernised, rural life transformed on the urban pattern, and the numbers of the peasantry reduced; if these processes are to get under way in nations where the peasantry is still a distinct and numerous class ... then this can only be accomplished with the political consent of the peasants themselves'. In such a situation, 'traditionalist and anti-capitalist rhetoric appeals to and expresses the fear of social and economic change which the peasants ... feel. But by doing so, it reassures the peasants that even if they evolve, they will remain a distinctive cultural group, and that in turn encourages them to evolve'⁵⁸. Formation of a Tirolian identity at the mass level seems to have functioned in a very similar way :

'Die glaubens- und volksfeindlichen Geldmächte werden zwar alles daran setzen, um der aufstrebenden Bauernbewegung den Weg zu verlegen, doch wenn wir, wie unsere Väter vor hundert Jahren, stark sind im Glauben, kräftig in der Tat und einig im Kampfe, so wird der Erfolg sicher nicht ausbleiben'⁵⁹.

The peasantry was mobilised primarily in occupation-based organisations, but these were almost always constituted on a provincial level, thus being simultaneously a 'Tirolian' organisation - the Bauernbund, Raiffeisenvereine etc. These groups nearly always included an element of economic anti-semitism, which was an intrinsic component within the formation of Tirolian identities. Peasant savings associations expressed this sentiment in barely coded form : 'In getreuer Befolgung des obersten Grundsatzes der landwirtschaftlichen Kreditorganisationen, kapitalistische Bestrebungen zu bekämpfen ...'⁶⁰. The Bauernbund was more direct : 'In ... Hoffnungslosigkeit und Verzweiflung liegen die arbeitenden christlichen Stände Europas vor dem tyrannischen Eroberer der Neuzeit, vor dem jüdischen Großkapital auf dem Boden'⁶¹. This also suggests that the two main ideologies which emerged in the 19th-century - Liberalism and Socialism - both failed to address the peasant question in a manner which had any relevance to the peasants themselves (where they addressed it at all).

(c) Certain other points can be noted. Firstly, this process of identity-formation is not *dependent* on a process of secularisation. Even if religious structures were

⁵⁸ G. Lewis, *The peasantry, rural change and conservative agrarianism: lower Austria at the turn of the century*, *Past & Present* No.81, 1978; also, W. Meixner, *Mythos Tirol. Zur Tiroler Ethnizitätsbildung und Heimatschutzbewegung im 19. Jahrhundert*, *Geschichte und Region* H.1, 1992.

⁵⁹ *Tiroler Bauern-Zeitung*, 6.8.1909.

⁶⁰ Kundmachung der Zentralkasse der Raiffeisenvereine Deutschtirols, 5.8.1909.

⁶¹ *Tiroler Bauern-Zeitung*, 6.8.1909.

becoming more flexible (the split between Conservatives and Christlichsozialen), the major new political force - the Christlichsozialen - was based on a continued adhesion to the Catholic faith. It could even be argued that the new movement represented a strengthening of the influence of the clergy.

Secondly, construction of an identity on a larger level does not mean that previous identities (such as the valley) are discarded. When the festival organisers raised the question of contributions for the Festschießen, they noticed that : «(es) macht sich in Tirol ein bedeutender Partikularismus bezüglich der Feste und *Monumente* geltend, für welch'/letztere seit Jahren in den weitesten Kreisen fort und fort gesammelt wurde»⁶². A group of parishes from the Innsbrucker Mittelgebirge acted collectively in petitioning for a monument to Speckbacher, 'der Mann des Innsbrucker Mittelgebirges'.

Nor does this mean that occupational identities (status as Bauer) cease to be important. The rapid success of the Tiroler Bauernbund, which gathered together over 7,000 Bauern for its constituency meeting in 1904, testifies to the importance of this form of identity. And this point remains valid even when it is recognised that there may be significant *qualitative* differences between various forms of identification. As Hobsbawm has suggested, national identification 'is always combined with identifications of another kind, even when it is felt to be superior to them'⁶³.

Thirdly, the process of identity-formation is not just about increasing degrees of integration. It is also necessary to look at this process in the context of *isolation*, something which 'modernisation' theories tend to ignore. Whilst there are forces creating social integration (involvement in wider economic markets, education, introduction of universal suffrage, newspapers, military service etc.), some of these these same forces can also create forms of isolation (in the sense of loss of individual control over affairs). Examples of this would be peasant control over resources (agricultural specialisation creates dependency on the market, and removes the self-sufficient aspects of economic organisation) and the professionalisation of politics (mass political parties destroying elements of personal contact). Several reports by insurance associations stress difficulties in initially persuading peasants to join, because they feared for the loss of their independence and self-sufficiency. Tirol's atypical status with regard to military organisation is also interesting. Organisation of local militias remained a civilian institution, but at the same time, Tirol was

⁶² LsA/6: (F.IV) Memorandum Kathreins, Dezember 1907.

⁶³ Hobsbawm (1990), p.11.

incorporated into the general conscription programme of the Imperial army (the Kaiserjäger regiments). From this view, identity-formation represents a defensive reaction to the alienating aspects of new processes (a form of self-assertion in opposition to the state).

8. Tirol in Waffen

The institution of the *Schützen* is at the core of the hegemonic version of Tirolian identity : 'Den erhabenen Mittelpunkt des Festes bildet der 29. August mit der Huldigung eines großartigen Schützenfestzuges - Tirol in Waffen - vor Sr. Majestät...'⁶⁴. The Schützen were seen as the bearers and defenders of the continuing traditions and values of the land. And Schützen groups led the way in proclaiming their patriotic fervour, asking that the Kaiser visit the prize-hall for the shooting-competition on his way back from the Berg Isel ceremony.

All the Schützen activities were self-consciously presented as traditional, 'wie es ... schon seit Jahrhunderten der Brauch war'⁶⁵. In fact, many Schützen traditions had lapsed by the 19th century, with an up-swing only observable in the second half of the century. The period before 1909 saw a spate of re-foundations or creation of new companies - formations from Gerichtsbezirk Buchenstein and parts of the Zillertal were organised especially for the 1909 festival. The revival was accompanied by the codification of old uniforms ('Trachten') and the invention of new ones. The Schützen were cultivated as an extensive folkloric tradition, celebrated in literature and painting. From 1875-1905, 168 new rifle-ranges were built, and 22 re-habilitated⁶⁶.

In that this overall process received official sponsorship, the Schützen can be interpreted as mediators of the official culture. When the organisers realised that it might be necessary to change the date of the festival, they decided to use the heads of district ranges as agents for assessing the mood of the population. The Landeskommitee arranged for the selection of representatives for the parade-committee, by the local heads of the various Schützen associations, to ensure the co-operation of the whole land in the event. A large proportion of these local co-ordinators were of fairly high social status, and a significant number were employees of the state.

⁶⁴ LsA/6: (F.III) Schießenbuch des Jahrhundertfeierschießens.

⁶⁵ J.E. Bauer, *Denkschrift der Tiroler Landes-Jahrhundertfeier in Innsbruck*, (Innsbruck, 1910) - S.15.

⁶⁶ TLA/LsA A/II/6/5 Landeshauptschießstand Innsbruck, Pos.4: Verzeichnis der Schießstände in Tirol und Vorarlberg (1906).

But the problem for the committee was that this was part of a definitely German cultural tradition. Attempts were therefore made to establish Schützen groups in Italienisch-Tirol. Kathrein wanted to use some of the festival funds, to provide ranges and uniforms for the Trentino. The Festzug was meant to demonstrate how the Italian population had been incorporated into this tradition : «vogliamo mostrare che la tradizionale nostra devozione e fedeltà all'avita nostra dinastia, perdura ancora inconcussa in petto al popolo tirolese, così salda come le roccie dei nostri monti»⁶⁷.

But in addition to the general cultural difficulty, the Schützen tradition in Tirol was used during this period for specifically anti-Italian purposes, notwithstanding the fact that the population of Italienisch-Tirol had always assisted in the defence of the borders. Defence of the land in 1848, 1859 and 1866 had been in response to threats from parts of Italy (including invasion efforts by Garibaldi), and it was always assumed that any threat to Tirol was going to come from the South. Yet at the ground level, the Schützen tradition tended to form exclusively German identities : 'Es gilt «Den Kaiser zu ehren» nach uraltem Tirolerbrauch (...) Mit treudeutschem Schützen- und Willkommengruß ...'⁶⁸. The policy of encouraging the erection of monuments in every community tended to produce identification with the uprising as one of Germans against French. The parishes petitioning for the Speckbacher memorial asked the Landesausschuß to issue an appeal and to make known the 'Sammelstellen im deutschen Landesteile'. There is a strong sense of patriotism - '(die) aus ererbter Vaterlandsliebe aussprungene hier vorgebrachte Anregung' - but the patriotism identifies with Tirol as a land of German character. The majority of monuments erected were in Deutsch-Tirol. The joint celebration organised by Schlanders, Latsch and Laas was opened by the local Bürgermeister - 'Dr. Tinzl schloß seine beifällig aufgenommene Rede mit den Worten: «Wollen wir insbesondere hier in den Marken des deutschen Landes geloben, auch treue, deutsche Grenzwacht, zu halten für unser Volk, für unsere deutsche Dynastie und für den echten österreichischen Staatsgedanken. Hie gut österreichisch, hie gut deutsch alleweg»'⁶⁹.

9. The 'Heart of Jesus'

Part of the baroque religiosity accompanying the Counter-Reformation, and first receiving official recognition during mobilisation against the invading French in 1796,

⁶⁷ LsA/6: (F.VIII) Einladung zur Festzugsteilnahme der Schützen.

⁶⁸ Vorstehung des k.k. Hauptschießstandes Bozen, Dezember 1907.

⁶⁹ *Bote für Tirol und Vorarlberg*, 19.7.1909.

the Herz-Jesu-Fest had come to be an annual celebration and assumed a prominent position in the calendar of church feasts, holidays and everyday observances which performed an important regulative function in the agricultural work-cycle, a part of peasant life retaining significance throughout the 19th-century. There are several reports of peasants preferring to maintain religious processions for good harvests, rather than using newly-available chemicals. Frustrated improvers from outside lamented the difficulties in getting the peasants to change their ways. New methods and materials were adopted, fostered in particular by the Bauernbund. But use of fertilisers or concentration on one particular crop tended to occur slowly and only when the efficacy of change had been proven beyond all doubt.

The part of the 1909 festival associated with the Herz-Jesu should be seen as the part which most concerned the mass of the population. The fact that the Herz-Jesu-Fest was specifically chosen for the 'kirchliche Jahrhundertfeier' - when the Herz-Jesu-Bund was renewed at services held in every locality - suggests that the determining point was actually '(die) Wünschen der Bevölkerung, die auch den kirchlichen Teil des Festes möglichst feierlich gehalten wissen will'⁷⁰. The organisers were compelled to recognise a vital aspect of popular culture - 'vielleicht wäre es zweckmässig, um allfälliger Agitation den Weg zu versperren, wenn die hochwürdigsten Landesbischöfe sobald als möglich die Landesfeier für den Herz-Jesu-Sonntag mit Bundeserneuerung u.s.w. publizieren würden'⁷¹. Further pressure was exerted concerning the Berg Isel mass for the main festival in August, with the organisers (against their wishes) having to include a rendition of the Herz-Jesu-Lied in order to avoid possible agitation in the countryside.

From the point of view of the formation of Tirolian identities, the retention of these elements of a baroque religious culture in popular attitudes proves influential. Late Counter-Reformation beliefs sharply accentuated the divisions between good and evil, Catholic priests still vigorously propagated the certainty of eternal damnation for those contemplating mixed marriages with Protestants. Continuing beliefs in the malevolent role of the Jews in the story of Christianity and still-existing celebrations of martyrs who were supposedly the child victims of Jewish ritual murders, provided a functioning enemy-figure in the popular mind. With the mobilisation of the peasantry and the lower Mittelstand through the Christlichsozial movement, these attitudes were easily transmuted into political anti-semitism. The 'Christlichsoziale Verein in Tirol' conducted a boycott of non-Christian shops ('Kauft bei Christen !') propaganda

⁷⁰ LsA/6: (F.XXXIII) Kathrein an Sipegelfeld, 7.6.1909.

⁷¹ LsA/6: (F.XXXIII) Kathrein an Altenweisel, 29.3.1909.

campaign at Christmas 1899⁷². Attacks on «Jewish» big capital were politically effective in a poor agricultural sector that was increasingly falling into debt. Because of the nature of this type of religious identity, an especially sharp distinction came to be drawn between the (good) Tiroler and the (bad) enemy / outsider in the emerging mass political culture in Tirol.

10. Conclusion

Conservative groupings in the Habsburg Empire were *attempting* to mobilise the loyalties of the population by using national identity as an alternative to an openly populist or democratic vision of society - which represents a point that previous literature has often assumed, not proven. It has been argued that the *form* which this 'Kulturstiftung' took was in fact a product of bourgeois society. Conservatives were primarily using specific cultural forms to honour religion-centered values (adherence to the divinely-ordained patriarchal social order, dynastical patriotism and obedience to the church). The bourgeoisie was worshipping the culture itself. In Gellner's terminology, the bourgeoisie had made the culture 'visible', whilst the organising elite was using it 'invisibly'.

Was this culture regional or national ? Were the urban elites automatically contributing to the by now notorious 'collapse of the Habsburg Empire' ?

Preliminary answers would be 'both' and 'no'. Firstly, as Hroch has argued, there is no reason for assuming that national movements automatically have state-formation as their aim. The sense of 'Nation' or 'Volk' is primarily cultural⁷³. Secondly, to borrow Applegate's useful phrase, the German nation was 'a nation of provincials'. In other words, *national identity is achieved through the region* (Heimat)⁷⁴. There is no reason why national consciousness should affect dynastic loyalty - it may actually have enhanced it for Germans within the Habsburg Empire. Members of pan-German organisations (such as the Turnvereine) took part in the festivities. The claims of nationalists / irredentists in the German Empire or the Kingdom of Italy intensified the level of discourse in Tirol, but there is very little evidence for suggesting that this cultural consciousness was incompatible with support for the monarchy. The Deutscher Volksverein für Südtirol specifically disassociated itself from the secessionist

⁷² Flugblatt des Christlichsozialen Vereines in Tirol, 1899.

⁷³ M. Hroch, *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe*, (C.U.P., 1985).

⁷⁴ C. Applegate, *A nation of provincials. The German idea of Heimat*, (UCLA Press, 1990).

Schönererian position during elections in Bozen in 1908. Thirdly, Sheehan has argued that the liberal attitude to the state was always ambiguous, partly because much of the Enlightenment in Germany stressed the positive role of the state⁷⁵. In Tirol, the liberal bourgeoisie had viewed the state enthusiastically, particularly because of its centralist secularising policies during the Kulturkampf. Because the bourgeois agenda had been achieved in many areas - constitution and the rule of law, greater freedom of trade, religious tolerance and so on - there was less reason than ever to view the state as an oppressor. Lastly, Tirolian identities (again, adopting the form of idealised traditions) occupied an important function for the mass of the German-speaking population in Tirol during a particularly intense period of social and economic change. 'Landesbewußtsein' was an integral part of that process, and Tirol was identified primarily as a German land. More importantly perhaps, this occurred without any clear identification with the concept of the monarchy as a whole - the framework in which patriotism was being encouraged portrayed the bond of loyalty to the *person* of the Kaiser, and 'Vaterland' (Tirol / Austria) was ambiguous in meaning (only 'Heimat' referred to a solidly recognisable reality).

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⁷⁵ J.J. Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the nineteenth-century*, (Chicago, 1978).



LOS MOVIMIENTOS NACIONALES CHECO Y ESLOVACO EN EL SIGLO XIX Y LA IDEA DE UN IMPERIO SUPRAÉTNICO EN AUSTRIA

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¿Existió la posibilidad de una construcción nacional supraétnica en Austria?

En la evolución del Imperio de los Habsburgo durante la época contemporánea hubo dos serios intentos de centralizar los heterogéneos países y regiones de la Monarquía multiétnica situados entre Alemania, Rusia y los dominios turcos en los Balcanes, someter las tendencias centrífugas de la aristocracia y los movimientos nacionales concebidos originalmente en la esfera política y desarrollar un concepto asequible de vida común supraétnica. En ambos casos, el objetivo final, definido en manifestaciones oficiales u oficiosas, era la formación de un Estado-nación orientado a la persona del Emperador. El funcionariado estatal y los militares de diversa procedencia étnica, pero con el alemán como lengua de Estado y cultural, debían construir el apoyo social necesario para este Estado-nación supraétnico.

Los esfuerzos por consolidar una especie de conciencia del Estado nacional austríaco durante el Gobierno del Emperador José II, entre 1780 y 1790, constituyen el primer intento, anterior incluso a la proclamación oficial del Imperio de Austria, que tuvo lugar el 11 de Agosto de 1804². El vienesés Tobías Philip Freiherr von Gebler, miembro del Consejo de Estado, expresó la esencia de estos esfuerzos en Agosto de 1780, en un pasaje muy significativo:

«El Estado debe trabajar sin pausa hasta convertirse en un pueblo. Yo sé que faltan siglos y decenios, pero no por ello deja de ser una obligación. Sólo el Estado permanece y

¹ Traducción: Pablo González.

² E. ZÖLLNER, *Der Österreichbegriff. Formen und Wandlungen in der Geschichte*, Viena, 1988, pg.58-60.

el Príncipe y el servidor del Estado deben pensar y actuar según esta perspectiva, y no en función de la brevedad de sus vidas».³

Por razones de oportunidad, el alemán se utilizó como idioma unitario de la proyectada administración efectiva del Estado, pero en la escuela primaria las clases se impartían en la lengua de la población. Por su parte, determinadas leyes y decretos se publicaban en dos y hasta en tres lenguas vernáculas, según las circunstancias de cada país de la Corona. Esta política lingüística austríaca se mantuvo, e incluso se popularizó durante las décadas siguientes, pues, si bien reforzaba la independencia étnica de los grupos de población no germanohablante en el aspecto lingüístico y literario, en cambio rechazaba decididamente todas las reivindicaciones políticas nacionales. Todavía a comienzos de los años cuarenta del siglo XIX, la política austríaca confiaba en el apoyo de los movimientos eslavos del sur y del oeste para contrapesar la temida inclinación hacia Rusia de los eslavos austríacos. A pesar de ello, la lengua alemana era obligatoria en la Administración unitaria del Estado, en la cultura y en la educación superior.

El segundo y último intento de construir una sociedad concorde con un Estado-nación homogéneo en los territorios de la totalidad del Imperio austríaco, étnica y lingüísticamente heterogéneos, se produjo con las reformas neoabsolutistas de los cincuenta, tras la derrota política y militar de la revolución de 1848.

El subsecretario de Estado para Cultura y Educación, Josef Alexander Helfert, oriundo de Praga, intentó en este contexto fundamentar históricamente, desde un punto de vista político y no meramente etnográfico, un concepto de nación válido para toda Austria(*gesamtösterreichischen*):

«La historia nacional no es para nosotros la de algunos de los muchos grupos de la humanidad, diversos en lengua y color, definidos en función de la raza, sino la historia de una pertenencia política y territorial común, la de una población unida por la cuerda de una misma autoridad, vinculada bajo la protección de la misma ley. La historia nacional austríaca es, pues, para nosotros la del pueblo y el Estado común austríacos, en cuanto conjunto de partes integradas en su orgánica variedad interna, y que aparecen diferentes en origen según sus raíces históricas, formación y civilización, extendidos en unos sitios sin mezcla, en otros mezclados entre sí de diversas maneras»⁴

³ J.A. HELFERT, *Die österreichische Volksschule. Geschichte, System, Statistik. Die Gründung der österreichischen Volksschule durch Maria Theresia*, (vol. I), Praga, 1860, pg.483.

⁴ J. A. HELFERT, *Über Nationalgeschichte und den gegenwärtigen Stand ihrer Pflege in Österreich*, Praga, 1853, pg. 1-2.

Un nacionalismo de Estado sobre una base supraétnica, que quisiera tener éxito a corto o a largo plazo, necesitaría desarrollar urgentemente una fructífera política interior y exterior de Estado. Este no era el caso de Austria, ni en los años ochenta del siglo XVIII, ni en los cincuenta del XIX. Las mencionadas reformas - a menudo precipitadas - del emperador José II, cuyo fin era la creación de un Estado de bienestar y policial⁵ racionalizado, provocaron oposición y resistencia en casi todas partes. La Revolución francesa de 1789 hizo altamente sospechoso cualquier intento de actuación de las clases no nobles en la vida pública. El Imperio de Austria, proclamado durante las guerras napoleónicas, cosechó más derrotas que victorias. El neoabsolutismo de los cincuenta sucumbió, todavía más desesperanzado, en Italia del Norte, sobre los campos de batalla de Magenta y Solferino, en junio de 1859.

A diferencia de los Estados nacionales del oeste y del norte de Europa, los Habsburgo no fueron capaces de construir un núcleo estatal moderno similar. El Imperio de Austria nunca abandonó del todo la tradición universalista del Sacro Imperio Romano Germánico, y derrochó de forma imperdonable mucho tiempo en guerras estériles contra las unificaciones italiana y alemana. Hasta la descomposición de la Monarquía de los Habsburgo, no estuvo claro qué era o qué debía ser Austria, qué extensión geográfica abarcaba ese concepto ni hasta qué punto podía o debía identificarse Austria con el patrimonio común de los Habsburgo. En el caso de Austria, las ideas de Imperio y Estado territorial terminaron en conflicto en no pocas ocasiones.

Por otra parte, el Imperio supraétnico austríaco no consiguió obtener el necesario apoyo de sectores pujantes de la sociedad burguesa. Resultaba extremadamente difícil reconciliar las corrientes liberales y democráticas vinculadas al ascenso de la burguesía con la exigencia de fidelidad absoluta al Imperio y con el predominio de un «gobierno de burócratas» más o menos claro⁶. El único intento de envergadura para dotar a la «Hofratsnation» austríaca de una base mayoritaria tiene lugar al hilo del apoyo propagandístico a la guerra contra la Francia republicana y napoleónica en la transición del s. XVIII al s. XIX. En este contexto nació en 1796/97 el himno del Estado o de la Nación austríaca de carácter supraétnico, con música de Joseph Haydn, al mismo tiempo que se difundían numerosos escritos populares, canciones y poesías patrióticas de sentido similar en diversas lenguas⁷. Con el rígido sistema de

⁵ E. ZÖLLNER, *Geschichte Österreichs. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*. (7.^a ed.), Viena 1984, pg. 323.

⁶ R. A. KANN, *The Dynasty and the Imperial Idea*. En: *Austrian History Yearbook*, III/1, 1967, pg. 11-31.

⁷ En este sentido E. BRUCKMÜLLER; «Nation Österreich. Sozialhistorische Aspekte ihrer Entwicklung», Viena-Colonia-Graz 1984/*Studien zu Politik und Verwaltung*, 4/, pg. 92-95.

gobierno del emperador Francisco hasta 1835, cualquier atisbo de actividades independientes por parte de capas cada vez más amplias de la población, incluídos los notables, resultaba incompatible con la política del Estado, de forma que hasta los mejores defensores del patriotismo estatal austríaco cayeron también en desgracia. Es muy significativo que ninguna de las nacionalidades austríacas, ni siquiera los austroalemanes, estuviese de acuerdo con el Imperio supraétnico a partir del año revolucionario de 1848.

A excepción del monarquismo conservador que, con independencia de la composición étnico lingüística, estaba profundamente enraizado en gran parte del campesinado, el patriotismo de Estado (*Staatspatriotismus*) se mantuvo hasta la Primera Guerra mundial, bastante libre de cargas emotivas, y apeló mucho más a la moderación y a la razón que a las pasiones y al odio. Era pues absolutamente incompatible con el regionalismo conservador que, en clara oposición a las corrientes centralizadoras, fomentó los trajes locales y regionales, y otros elementos de la llamada cultura popular en los diversos reinos de la Monarquía de los Habsburgo. Al igual que antes, la burocracia del Estado y el cuerpo de oficiales del Imperio constituyeron - de hecho hasta la caída de la monarquía en 1918- los apoyos sociales más importantes del Imperio plurinacional austríaco (*Vielvölkerreiches*). De todos los grupos étnicos, lingüísticos y religiosos, el colectivo judío era el que estaba más vinculado al Estado común. No obstante, las tendencias asimilacionistas no eran exclusivas de los alemanes austríacos, sino que se extendían progresivamente entre los polacos en Galitzia, los magiares en Hungría y los checos en Bohemia⁸.

La construcción nacional supraétnica fracasó en el Imperio de Austria también por la imposibilidad de lograr una amplia base social para la concepción conservadora y predominantemente burocrática del Estado-nación. La constante modernización y el cambio social beneficiaron al Estado sólo en pequeña medida. Sin embargo, resultaron muy beneficiosas para los movimientos nacionales (*Nationalbewegungen*) no referidos al Estado austríaco. La propia existencia y actuación del Estado austríaco tuvieron una profunda influencia sobre todas las relaciones políticas nacionales y los procesos de nacionalización (*Nation-building*) en el centro-oeste y sur de Europa. La presencia de la Monarquía de los Habsburgo implicaba un alto grado de estabilidad en la dominación política del entorno sur y centrooccidental de Europa, principalmente porque la burocracia del Estado actuó moderando la mayoría de los antagonismos

⁸ W. A. MC GAGG, *A History of Habsburg Jews, 1670-1918*. Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1989.- J. H. KIEVAL, *The making of Czeck Jewry. National Conflict and Jewish Society in Bohemia, 1870-1918*, Oxford, 1988.

entre los grupos y corrientes nacionales, que a menudo se oponían entre sí. El extenso mercado interior de la Monarquía austríaca hizo posible un ventajoso incremento de la producción en las zonas industriales y agrícolas. Para aquellas regiones económica y socialmente subdesarrolladas el Estado procuró, en parte por consideraciones militares, inversiones nada despreciables en infraestructuras, especialmente en comunicaciones y salud pública. El sistema escolar austríaco resultaba, por su buen funcionamiento, ejemplar para la época anterior a 1914. Pero a la postre se puso de manifiesto que la construcción de un Estado complejo, multiétnico y multinacional sólo podía llevarse a cabo en tiempo de paz, y que las guerras, especialmente las guerras ofensivas, implicaban necesariamente la destrucción del equilibrio interno, y amenazaban la existencia de ese Estado.

El nation-building checo y el Estado austríaco

En comparación con otros grupos étnico-lingüísticos del centrooeste y sur de Europa, que habían iniciado el camino de su emancipación nacional en el siglo XIX en el marco de un Estado nacionalmente ajeno, los checos constituyen en cierto modo un caso intermedio, de transición. A diferencia de los magiares en Hungría o los polacos en Galitzia, los nobles de Bohemia y Moravia no forman parte de la dirección del movimiento nacionalista checo. Sin embargo, una parte importante de la nobleza bohemia asumió un patriotismo territorial (*Landespatritismus*), y con su oposición a las medidas centralizadoras austríacas ayudó al ascenso del nacionalismo checo. El peso de la tradición del Reino de Bohemia y la extensa coincidencia de intereses entre el **Landespatritismus** bohemio (entendido éste como la vinculación de la aristocracia bohemia a su tierra) y el nacionalismo checo diferencian a los checos de los eslovacos, que carecieron de ese apoyo de la nobleza. La extensión variable de los países de la Corona de Bohemia en Mitteleuropa permitía que la misma población, sin modificar su vinculación étnico-lingüística, pudiese sentirse ora parte de una mayoría, ora de una minoría nacional, según consideremos la diferente extensión de un conjunto de Estados, de un Estado, de un grupo de países, de un país o de una unión regional administrativa⁹. En el llamado «núcleo teresiano del Estado», es decir, el territorio del Imperio de los Habsburgo menos Hungría, Croacia,

⁹ En este sentido, J. KORALKA, «La nazione ceca e il problema delle minoranze nazionali dell'Impero asburgico», en *Studi trentini di Scienze Storiche* 63, 1984, pg. 231-246.

E igualmente en J. KORALKA, *Tschechen im Habsburgerreich und in Europa 1815-1914. Sozialgeschichtliche Zusammenhänge der neuzeitlichen Nationsbildung und der Nationalitätenfrage in der böhmischen Länder*, Wien und München, 1991, Schriftenreihe des Österreichischen Ost- und Südosteuropa-Instituts 18/ pg. 133-138.

las «Siete ciudades» de Transilvania, Galitzia, la Bukowina y las provincias de Italia del Norte, los checos se vieron superados en número por los austroalemanes. Lo mismo ocurría, en gran medida, en todos los proyectos de una posible Gran Alemania, como habría sido, por ejemplo, el Estado nacional alemán exigido por el parlamento de Frankfurt de 1848/49: en este caso, los checos se enfrentarían al predominio de la población germanohablante. Por el contrario, un status jurídico especial del Reino de Bohemia o de los países de la Corona de Bohemia situaría a los dos tercios de mayoría checa de Bohemia y a los tres cuartos de mayoría de Moravia, en una situación de nación mayoritaria, tal y como sucedió en realidad en la República de Checoslovaquia a partir del 28 de Octubre de 1918. En las regiones con predominio germanohablante, al norte y oeste de Bohemia, hacia las que acudieron en masa mineros, obreros, artesanos y pequeños propietarios checos (*Gewerbeleute*) a partir de 1850, éstos volvieron a encontrarse en minoría y oprimidos. En esta situación ni los checos ni los alemanes de los países de Bohemia quisieron contentarse con su status «de minoría» y se prepararon para afrontar cualquier eventualidad.

El carácter supraétnico del Imperio de los Habsburgo amparó el bi- e incluso el trilingüismo y fomentó la neutralidad política nacional, en particular en los círculos de oficiales, en la nobleza y en el funcionariado. En el siglo XIX hubo muchos checos con formación superior que, en busca de ascenso social, se inclinaron hacia los ambientes sociales y culturales de habla alemana dominantes en el Imperio austríaco. La base de la administración austríaca en las provincias del norte de Italia, en Galitzia, en Hungría (a partir de los años cincuenta), así como en Bosnia-Herzegovina a partir de 1878, estaba formada por numerosos funcionarios de origen checo que desarrollaban su labor en lengua alemana. La enseñanza pública media y superior en Bohemia y Moravia, exclusivamente en alemán, produjo una distinción étnico-lingüística hasta bien entrados los años sesenta del siglo XIX: el alemán era la lengua culta, la de la administración, el comercio y la cultura, mientras que el checo apenas si se mantenía como lengua de contacto con las clases populares más bajas¹⁰. Dos generaciones de patriotas checos se esforzaron por la renovación y desarrollo de las capacidades sociales de la lengua checa, y el rápido fomento de la escuela y educación públicas en checo contribuyeron a que el proceso de asimilación unilateral se rompiera en la segunda mitad del siglo diecinueve. Desde 1860 en adelante se observa como mínimo un doble proceso de asimilación en Bohemia, dado que la sociedad checa, muy dinámica, ofrecía buenas posibilidades de ascenso.

¹⁰ H. RAUPACH, *Der tschechische Frühnationalismus. Ein Beitrag zur Gesellschafts- und Ideengeschichte des Vormärzs*, Essen, 1939, pg. 26-27.

El grupo dirigente del nacionalismo checo, con el historiador Francis Palacky al frente, presentó ante la opinión pública austríaca y europea, en la primavera de 1848, una fundamentación jurídico-natural de la existencia de los checos como nación europea, y la idea de una unión voluntaria de diferentes naciones, grupos nacionales y religiones en el territorio comprendido entre Alemania, Rusia y los dominios turcos en los Balcanes¹¹. En contraposición a la concepción supraétnica, que rechazaba toda actividad político-nacional basada en componentes étnico-lingüísticos diferenciales, la élite política checa, desde Palacky a los socialdemócratas anteriores a 1914, pasando por Frantisek Ladislav Rieger, Tomas Garrigue Masarik o Karel Kramar, quería convertir Austria en una federación multinacional de grupos nacionales y naciones políticamente independientes. En la mayoría de los proyectos y proposiciones podía percibirse el miedo lógico a las consecuencias de una confrontación imperial en el centro de Europa, pero la capacidad y el deseo de integrarse en un orden supranacional, unidos a la lucha por la conservación nacional, pueden considerarse caracteres específicos de la tradición checa, como ocurrió en el caso del Sacro Imperio Romano medieval o en el nacimiento de la Monarquía de los Habsburgo.¹²

Desde los años sesenta del siglo XIX hasta 1914 - en la Primera Guerra mundial fue otra cosa- el ascenso nacional de los checos no encontró ningún obstáculo formal por parte del Estado austríaco, una vez que éste renunció a la idea de una Monarquía común supraétnica tras las derrotas de las guerras de 1859 y 1866. Sin embargo, la realidad histórica del Estado austríaco dejó marcas profundas en el fondo y en la forma de la sociedad checa, aunque los contemporáneos no fuesen muy conscientes de ello. De un lado, la sociedad checa asumió algunas características de la vida política y social austríaca; de otro, los rasgos propios de los checos se formaban en la oposición y la resistencia al Estado austríaco, que era percibido como algo extraño. Entre los checos, así como entre los alemanes de Bohemia, se desarrolló un amplio sistema de organizaciones económicas, políticas, culturales y de apoyo, en cierto modo equivalente a la actividad más propia de un Estado burgués moderno. El fracaso de todos los intentos de adecuación y transformación en sentido federalista, dejó a los checos en 1914 con una estructura social casi capitalista y con una vida cultural y de partidos moderna. La Primera Guerra mundial demostraría que el Imperio de los Habsburgo no estaba en condiciones de preservar su independencia tampoco en el ámbito internacional¹³.

¹¹ J. KORALKA, «Palacky und Österreich als Vielvölkerstaat», en *Österreichische Osthefte*, 28, 1986, pg. 22-37.

¹² En este sentido, K. CAPEK, «Po stopách dvouhlavého orla», en *Přítomnost*, jg.8, vol. 48 de 2-12-1931, pg. 753-754.

¹³ Para este tema, R.G. PLASCHKA y K. MACK (eds.) *Die Auflösung des Habsburgerreiches. Zusammenbruch und Neueorientierung in Donauraum*, Viena 1970/ Schriftenreihe des Österreichischen Öst und Südosteuropa-Instituts 3/.

El nation-building eslovaco entre el Estado austríaco y las reivindicaciones políticas de húngaros y checos

A diferencia de los checos que sólo hubieron de enfrentarse a la superioridad numérica, económica y de poder político de los alemanes para lograr su emancipación, los eslovacos debieron defender su «autonomía» nacional (*Eigenständigkeit*) en tres frentes. En muchas ciudades del norte de Hungría, en la actual Eslovaquia, especialmente en Pressburg/Bratislava, la influencia del alemán prevaleció hasta 1918 e incluso después, y el lenguaje administrativo alemán se convirtió en la correa de transmisión de todas las medidas centralizadoras del aparato del Estado austríaco. La oposición frente las tendencias que pretendían convertir el reino multiétnico de Hungría en un Estado nacional magiar fue la más fuerte. Pero, durante el siglo XIX, los patriotas eslovacos defendieron también su independencia frente a las reivindicaciones del nacionalismo checo que, en general, tendía a ver a los eslovacos como una simple rama de la nación checa o de la nación checoslovaca, localizada territorialmente en Hungría¹⁴.

En el aspecto religioso, la población eslovaca estaba tradicionalmente mucho más dividida que la checa. Alrededor de los dos tercios de la población eslovaca eran católicos, y un tercio protestante, la mayoría luteranos; había además eslovacos calvinistas e incluso algunos fieles de la Iglesia ortodoxa. Cuando los católicos realizaron a fines del siglo XVIII el primer intento de codificar el eslovaco escrito, apoyándose en el dialecto eslovaco occidental, los luteranos eslovacos reivindicaron la escritura en el llamado «checo bíblico» del siglo XVI, e insistieron en la idea de la unidad nacional checoslovaca. Como no era posible trazar una frontera territorial entre las dos religiones, la cuestión de la fe no constituyó un factor de integración en el *nation-building* eslovaco. Frente a la negación de la identidad nacional de los eslovacos, desde la afirmación de una nación-Estado húngara magiarizada, los activistas eslovacos buscaron apoyos, no sólo en diversas colaboraciones con el nacionalismo checo, sino también en la reafirmación del ideal eslavo. Al cabo de una década, conceptos como eslavo/eslava y eslovaco/eslovaca resultaban casi intercambiables.

La creación de una lengua escrita común eslovaca en 1843/44 por Ludovít Stur y sus seguidores, sobre la base de la tradición oral medieval, constituyó en estas

¹⁴ En síntesis, consúltese: D. SLOVENSKA, *Geschichte der Slowakei*, vol. 2(editado por Vladimír Matula y Josef Vozar, Bratislava, 1987), vol. 3(editado por Milan Podrimavsky, Bratislava, 1992), vol. 4(editado por Pavol Hapak, Bratislava, 1986).

circunstancias, el factor decisivo para la unidad nacional de católicos y protestantes eslovacos. A través de esa medida, los representantes de los eslovacos anuncian su reivindicación de convertirse en una nación independiente de otros pueblos. Fue ésta una respuesta lógica y paralela al viraje hacia el nacionalismo lingüístico de la oposición política húngara contra la Monarquía común supraétnica austríaca. En la esfera de lo político, los líderes del nacionalismo eslovaco no cuestionaron la vinculación a Hungría de los territorios habitados por los eslovacos, pero reclamaron una autonomía territorial tanto en 1848 como en 1861. La secular separación histórica de los eslovacos (adscritos al reino de Hungría) respecto de los checos (pobladores del reino de Bohemia) introdujo unas diferencias imborrables en el modo de vida y en la cultura de ambas etnias, que sólo en parte se pudieron mitigar a través de una colaboración política nacional, deseada por ambas partes.

El *nation-building* eslovaco, que hasta los años sesenta del siglo XIX había obtenido éxitos en la superación de la separación confesional, en la codificación de la lengua escrita eslovaca, en la creación de conocidas organizaciones nacionales y en el origen de tres liceos eslovacos, experimentó un fuerte retroceso tras la introducción del dualismo austro-húngaro de 1867. Mientras en los reinos y países representados en el **Reichsrat**, esto es, en la parte no húngara del Imperio de los Habsburgo, se estableció la igualdad jurídica entre las distintas poblaciones (Volksstämme) y las diversas lenguas habituales¹⁵, el sistema político en Hungría se fundamentó en la diferencia básica entre la nación política húngara «magiarizada» y las nacionalidades más o menos toleradas. Tras 1867, el ascenso social estuvo fuertemente relacionado en Hungría con la potenciación de «lo magiar». En un plazo de pocos años después de 1867, las escuelas medias eslovacas fueron prohibidas o «magiarizadas», e incluso, en el tránsito del siglo XIX al XX, se introdujo la enseñanza del húngaro en la escuela primaria. Sólo algunos intelectuales aislados y estudiantes eslovacos en la Universidad checa de Praga mantuvieron la idea de un camino común con los checos, mientras que la mayoría de los políticos eslovacos tendieron hasta 1914 a establecer sus reivindicaciones en el marco de Hungría. Las nuevas expectativas de algunos jóvenes políticos eslovacos, encabezados por Milan Hodza, estaban vinculadas al heredero del trono de Austria Francisco Fernando¹⁶, pero en Hungría la esperanza de una reforma política profunda no pasó de ser una ilusión. Por el contrario, la idea de una nación checoslovaca unitaria como base fundamental para la República checoslovaca, establecida a partir de consideraciones internacionales durante la Primera Guerra mundial, favoreció desde 1918 el moderno *nation-building* de los eslovacos.

¹⁵ G. STOURZH, *Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltungs Österreichs*, Viena, 1985.

¹⁶ R. A. KANN, *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand Studien*, Viena, 1976, Veröffentlichungen des Österreichischen Ost- und Südosteuropas Instituts 10/.



Nation-Building in the Baltic Countries (1850-1918)

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I. Introduction

National movements during the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries were part of a general European historical process which also included the Baltic countries. But as elsewhere, even in the Baltic this common process displayed distinctive characteristics due to the specific social and ethnic structure which was the result of a long period of development. The essential features in this process are presented here.

During the millenia up until about 1200 AD the southeastern area of the Baltic region was populated by Finnish-Ugric and Baltic tribes, which eventually developed into two folk; the former became the Estonians in the northern part and the latter the Latvians in the southern part. About the 1200 AD the region was reached by the German expansion eastward - partly in the form of a crusade - which resulted in the subjugation of these two folk, whose development had not yet lead to the building of their own states, to colonization. Thereafter the Estonians and the Latvians have been ruled by foreign powers until 1918 - alternately by the Germans, Danes, Swedes, Poles, and Russians. The Lithuanians, on the other hand, who are also a Baltic people, managed to preserve their freedom into the fifteenth century, when their fate was linked to that of Poland. This paper deals with the classic Baltic region, which included the areas inhabited by the Estonians and the Latvians and which under the Russian tsarist period comprised the three guberniia, Estland, Livland and Kurland; from 1918 the territory belonged to the independent republics of Estonia and Latvia. Lithuania was included in the Baltic region first after the beginning of the twentieth century.

The German conquest of the Baltic during the thirteenth century was accompanied by a number of innovations and changes in society which taken together meant that the Baltic was incorporated into the central European cultural sphere. For

the first time a state was established in the region - The Livonian Order - in the form of a conglomerate of a military organization, The Teutonic Knights, and independent bishoprics. The original agricultural population was converted to Christianity and placed under the manors that were established and owned by the German immigrants. Towns were founded for trade and administration of the country, and also the urban culture acquired a clearly German character, because the burghers were German, as was the language of the laws and administration.

In spite of the conquest of the area by Sweden and Poland (sixteenth century) and Russia (1710), the feudal social order which was founded during the thirteenth century essentially survived until the demise of tsarist Russia and the establishment of the independent republics of Estonia and Latvia in 1917-1918. Its foremost feature was that society in all areas - politically, economically, socially, and culturally - was dominated by the Baltic-German upperclass and that the dependent peasants, the propertyless, and the workers in the towns were Estonians and Latvians.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, however, cracks began to appear in the previously stable structure. With its growing need for goods and the production of these goods, mainly for the market, the increased international division of labor, industrialization and the accompanying expansion of wage labor, - all important elements in the capitalistic system - the general European development also began to weaken the feudal order in the Baltic. This development led to agrarian reforms during the first half of the nineteenth century in which the peasants were freed from serfdom and transformed to an increasing degree into free small agricultural producers. With the personal freedom and the growing economic well-being followed the need to free themselves from the tutelage of the large Baltic-German estates and the autocratic Russian state in social, political, and cultural areas as well. The emancipation, however, could only take place through the accumulation and coordination of power on a national scale. By the middle of the nineteenth century conditions existed for the start of this historical process, which was also realized; the period from about 1860 to 1885 covers the first wave of Estonian and Latvian national movements.

It was then that the Estonian and Latvian nations were born. The term **nation** indicates here an ethnic entity which in contrast to the term **folk** comprises a qualitatively new phase in the development of solidarity between people. It implies that individuals in a nation are more intensively bound to and dependent on one another and that they possess a national consciousness. The latter is both a necessary and sufficient cause for the existence of a nation. In the same way that the once new feudal system

had superseded the older ethnic entity, tribe (based on the bonds of blood), and replaced it with folk (based on a territorial principle), the increasingly dominant capitalistic relations established a new ethnic entity which was more congruent with the reigning socio-economic system, the nation.¹ Evidence that people in the Baltic were conscious then of this ongoing process is found in the fact that they began to regard themselves as Estonians and Latvians rather than as «people of the country», which they had done earlier; the Baltic Germans called the Estonians and the Latvians «non-Germans» (die Undeutsche). In the Estonian language during the 1860s there arose a new, closely related word **rahvus** (nation), alongside the old word **rahvas** (people).

The dependent feudal peasants became independent farmers, their standard of living rose and they began to see to the higher education of their children so that Estonians and Latvians now formed a new social stratum, the intelligentsia.

This was the beginning of the explicit formulation of political, economic, social and cultural aims on a national scale. Petitions with thousands of signatures were sent to the Tsar. Societies were organized mobilizing many people to become active in national questions where they obtained solid schooling in social undertakings. Nationwide song festivals were organized which became powerful national manifestations. The Baltic peoples had a specific form of national activity in the collection and recording of the massive folkloric materials that had been orally transmitted from generation to generation for centuries in which ordinary people, local enthusiasts, participated in thousands. At that time, also, political press with a nationalist bend came into existence thus ensuring a continuous stream of information on and solidarity concerning national activities.

The most active members of the national movements were the hitherto still relatively small numbers of academically educated and especially school teachers in rural areas. This phase of national movements - from the mid-1850s to the mid-1880s - witnessed the birth of the modern Baltic nations and the deciding factor in this was the awakening of national consciousness.

¹ See e.g. M. Hroch, *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas. Eine vergleichende Analyse zur gesellschaftlichen Schichtung der patriotischen Gruppen*, Praha 1968, pp. 35-36; J. Chlebowczyk, *On Small and Young Nations in Europe. Nation-Forming Processes in Ethnic Borderlands in East-Central Europe*, Wrocław 1980, passim; A. Loit, *Die nationalen Bewegungen in Baltikum während des 19. Jahrhunderts in vergleichender Perspektive*, *National Movements in The Baltic Countries during the 19th Century*, *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 2, Stockholm 1985, pp. 59-81.

After the first, very active phase of the national movements there was a lull. The primary reason was that they began to meet with increasingly strong opposition both from the Baltic-German establishment and from the Russian state in the form of a tough russification policy. At the same time the character of the national movements changed. The first wave had been a national «awakening», a seeking of roots and identity in the genuine peasant culture of the past on the basis of which an attempt was made to formulate unified, comprehensive national goals. When the second wave of the national movement began in the middle of the 1890's, a rapid development had occurred within the economy which was accompanied by a significant social differentiation in the previously rather homogenous peasant class. The new generation of leaders and activists who had established themselves was therefore also politically and ideologically less uniform. Common for all camps, however, was the fact that the national movements' primary driving force no longer lay in the traditional peasant culture, but rather inspiration was received from the general European urban culture, from professionalism and internationalism. One of the leading slogans of the time was: Let us be Estonians; but let us also develop into Europeans.

The second phase of the national movements in the Baltic countries culminated in the 1905 Russian revolution which in the Baltic countries was not only a revolt against the ruling political and social order but over and beyond that also comprised elements of national liberation.

The third and final phase in the process of nation-building of the Baltic peoples occurred around the year 1920 when actually the long struggle for political, economic, social and cultural emancipation resulted in the establishment of independent Baltic republics in 1918 - the natural outcome for most of the national movements. If it was of necessity chiefly characteristic of the two previous phases to be devoted to the creation of a national consciousness and the formulation of national goals, then this phase was a time for acting. For the Baltic republics in their infancy, it was a matter of consolidating their independence in three important respects: 1. through an armed struggle for liberation repel the threat both from the Soviet Russia and the Baltic Germans who were planning to establish a dynastic state in the Baltic region; 2. to build from ground level new legislation and administrative system as well as the economy; 3. to gain recognition by and be included in the international community of states. The breakthrough in this came in 1921 with the de jure recognition on the part of the great powers and admission into the League of Nations.

II. Socio-ethnic structures

The population of the Baltic area may be described as having a long-term tendency to increase, rising sharply during the eighteenth century and levelling off towards the end of the nineteenth century. The only immigration of significance occurred in the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, when tens of thousands of laborers from Russia came to the large, newly established factories, especially in Riga and Tallinn. At the same time a significant emigration of Estonians and Latvians to Russia took place, primarily from the landless agricultural proletariat. In 1897 it was estimated that 120,000 Estonians resided in Russia, a number which by 1917 had increased to 200,000, of whom 50,000 were found in St. Petersburg alone. From Latvia 250,000 to 300,000 people were calculated to have emigrated to Russia at the end of the nineteenth and start of the twentieth centuries.²

Table 1. Population of the Baltic Countries 1860-1913

	1860	1881	1897	1913
Estonia	780,000	880,000	960,000	1,100,000
Latvia	1,265,000	–	1,930,000	2,550,000

Sources: S. Vahre, *Eine neue Gesellschaft - neue Erscheinungen in der Demographie*, National Movements in the Baltic Countries during the 19th Century, *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 2, Stockholm 1985 , pp. 232, 235; K. Siilivask, *Socio-economic Development of the Baltic Countries at the Beginning of the 20th Century, The Baltic Countries 1900-1914*, *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 5, Stockholm 1990; T. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians*, Stanford 1987, pp. 228-231; *Istoriia Latviiskoi SSR*, Riga 1971, pp. 239-240; *Latvijas padomju enciklopedija* 5, Riga 1984, p. 116.

The ethnic composition of the region's population was the result of long-term development. It showed relative stability and a massive dominance of the region's native peoples, Estonians and Latvians. A small difference existed between Estonia and Latvia, as the proportion of Germans and Jews was larger in the latter country.

² K. Siilivask, *Socio-Economic Development of Baltic Countries at the Beginning of the 20th Century, The Baltic Countries 1900-1914*, *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 5, Stockholm 1990; E. Anderson, *The Baltic Region on the Eve of World War One*, *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 5; V. Maamägi, *Uut elu ehitamas. Eesti vähemusrahvus NSV Liidus (1917-1940)*, Tallinn 1980, p. 11; A. Plakans, *Modernization and the Latvians in Nineteenth-Century Baltikum*, *Baltic History*, Eds. A. Ziedonis, Jr., W.L. Winter, M. Valgemäe, Columbus/Ohio 1974, p. 129.

Table 2. Ethnic composition of the Population of the Baltic Countries (percent)
1881-1897

	1881		1897	
	Estonia	Latvia	Estonia	Latvia
Estonians	89.8	—	90.6	—
Latvians	—	77.0	—	76.8
Russians	3.3	5.2	4.0	4.8
Germans	5.3	11.3	3.5	8.4
Jews	—	5.5	—	5.3
Others	1.6	1.0	1.9	4.7

Sources: See Table 1, A Svabe, *Latvijas vesture 1800-1914*, Uppsala 1958, p. 548; A. Spekke, *History of Latvia, An Outline*, Stockholm 1951, p. 316.

Even in matters of religion the people of the Baltic were relatively homogenous with one dominant faith, the Lutheran. Significant differences existed, however, in the size and regional distribution of the other religions, especially in Latvia. The material below is presented in accordance with the then current administrative divisions. The members of the Orthodox faith were not mainly Russians living in the Baltic, but rather Estonians and Latvians who had converted in a religious movement which started as early as the 1840's. It should be noted that the compilation below does not include the Latvian province of Latgale with its entirely Roman Catholic population, because the area administratively belonged to the Vitebsk guberniia.

Table 3. Confessional Composition of the Population of the Baltic Countries in
1900 (percent).

	Lutherans	Orthodox	Catholics	Judaists	Other
Estonia	90.0	9.0	0.5		0.5
Latvia					
Livland	79.5	16.0	2.2	2.3	—
Kurland	76.0	5.0	11.0	7.5	0.5

Sources: *Zeittafel zur Geschichte der Baltischen Provinzen*, Riga 1908, p. 4; Vahre p. 237; Svabe p. 211.

The greatest change in the population structure during the period treated was brought about by industrialization and urbanization. In the Baltic region the process began in the middle of the nineteenth century and culminated in the end of that century and the beginning of the next. During a few decades the population of the cities doubled or reached three times their previous size. Large factories were built, primarily in the textile and metal industries, some which employed several thousand workers. There was a manifold increase in the trade in towns and cities. This development is explained by the fact that the Baltic, because of its strategic trade location, was quickly drawn into the rapid and comprehensive economic development taking place throughout the Russian Empire; the Baltic came to play an important role as the intermediary for the flow of goods between Western Europe and the Russian interior. Estonia's capital city, Tallinn, which was connected by railway with St. Petersburg in 1870, was for a time one of the leading ports for export and import in the Russian empire in the same way that Riga, Latvia's capital, became one of tsarist Russia's foremost industrial centers.

Table 4. The Urban Population

	1860		1881		1897		1913/1914	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Estonia	64,000	8.7	112,500	12.8	180,000	19.2	253,300	22.0
Latvia	187,200	14.8	—	—	535,000	29.4	1,028,000	40.0

Sources: R. Pullat, *Eesti linnad ja linlased XVIII sajandi lõpust 1917. aastani*, Tallinn 1972, p. 37; Siilivask (See sources Table 1) ; *Istoriia Latviiskoi SSR*, p. 213; Raun, p. 230.

Not only did the urban population grow in numbers, but it also changed in ethnic composition. The growth was comprised first of all of the in-migration of the excess agrarian proletariat in the region, whereby the Estonian and Latvian elements in the cities were very noticeably strengthened. This development in the long run opened up good possibilities to influence community policy in a direction that was favorable to the Estonians and the Latvians.

Table 5. The Ethnic Composition of the Urban Population 1881-1913 (percent).

	1881 Estonia	1897 Estonia	Latvia	1913 Estonia
Estonians	56.1	67	—	69.2
Latvians	—	—	45.0	—
Russians	11.1	10.9	16.0	11.9
Germans	29.3	16.3	22.0	11.2
Others	3.5	5.0	17.0	7.7

Sources: Pullat, p. 60; Raun, p. 231, Siilivask (See sources Table 1)

The development was especially interesting in the region's two leading cities, Riga and Tallinn. During a period of one hundred years the population increased nearly ten-fold. Both had been centers of Baltic-German culture throughout the centuries. From the second half of the nineteenth century, however, their proportion began to decrease considerably in the populations of these two cities. Nearly all the ground lost by the Baltic-Germans benefitted the Estonian and the Latvian groups, respectively, while the third large folk group, the Russians, largely maintained its previous position.

Table 6. Population and Ethnic Composition of Tallinn and Riga 1820-1914

	1820	1850	1863	1867	1881	1897	1913/1914
TALLIN	12.900		23.800	29.200	45.900	58.800	116.100
Estonians	34.8			51.8	57.4	68.7	71.5
Russians	17.9			11.3	11.1	10.2	11.4
Germans	42.9			34.4	27.8	17.5	10.7
Others	4.4			2.5	3.7	3.6	6.4
RIGA		61.500	77.500	102.600	169.300	282.000	520.000
Latvians		18		24	30.0	41.6	39.6
Russians				25	19.0	16.9	21.2
Germans				43	39.0	25.5	16.7
Others						16.0	22.5

Sources: Spekke, p. 316; A. Plakans, *Modernization and the Latvians in Nineteenth Century Baltikum*, **Baltic History**, Eds. A. Ziedonis, W.L. Winter, M. Valgemäe, Columbus/Ohio 1974, p. 133; Pullat, p. 58; T. Parming, *Population and Ethnicity as intervening variables in the 1905/1917 Revolutions in the Russian Baltic Provinces*, **The Russian Baltic Provinces between the 1905/1917 Revolutions**, Eds. A. Ezergailis, G.v. Pistohlkors, Köln-Wien 1982, p.3.

The great social changes which left their marks upon the Baltic during the second half of the nineteenth century and in the beginning of the twentieth affected the social structure first of all. A compilation of information for the time immediately preceding the start of the dynamic period shows the continued existence of the hierarchical order of the traditional feudal system and is suitable as a point of departure.

Table 7. The Population of Estonia in 1863 according to Estate

	Number	Percent
Nobility	7,555	1.0
Clergy	1,553	0.2
Burghers in towns	35,881	4.6
Peasants	703,133	90.4
Military	20,557	2.6
Foreigners	3,418	0.4
Others	6,096	0.8

Sources: Vahtré, p. 232.

Several decades later the social functions of the various population groups were those shown in Table 8 below. The agrarian sector shrank from 90-91 percent in 1863 to a mere 68 percent in 1897, while the urban economic occupations during the same time grew from about four percent to 25 percent, all calculated in terms of the total population.

Table 8. The Division of Labor in Estonia 1881-1897 (percent)

	1881		1897	
	No.	%	No.	%
Agriculture	330,000	77.0	670,000	68.0
Commerce and industry	67,000	15.6	247,000	25.1
Non-productive	32,000	7.4	68,000	6.9

Source: Eesti NSV ajalugu, II, Tallinn 1963, p. 121.

Note: The figures for 1881 are about one half of the population.

The population within the agricultural sector - still the largest - underwent process of differentiation, however, which is shown by Table 9 below. Because of systematic uncertainties in the primary sources and the various principles of classification used by scholars, the different elements are not automatically comparable. Certain tendencies, however, are still clear. Towards the end of the century the agrarian population, which ethnically was as good as totally made up of Estonians and Latvians, consisted of two main groups: peasants, market oriented small producers, who often employed wage laborers (ca. 30 %) and the largely propertyless, wage earning agricultural proletariat (ca. 70 %).

Table 9. The Social Differentiation of the Agrarian Population (percent).

Estonia 1857/1858		Latvia 1897		Estonia end of 19th c.	
Peasants	35-40	Peasants	31	Large peasants	10
Cottagers	25	Cottagers	5	Medium peasant	20
Farm laborers		Agricultural		Small peasants	10
on peasant		workers	43	Half proletariat	30
holdings (male		Servants on		Rural proletariat	30
and female)	25-30	large estates			
Servants on		and others	21		
large estates	10				

Sources: S. Vahre, *Eestimaa talurahvas hingeloendite andmeil*, Tallinn 1973, p. 166 ff.; *Istoriia Latviiskoi SSR*, p. 239 f.; T. Rosenberg, *Über die Ausdifferenzierung der sozialen Schichtung im estnischen Dorf in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jh.*, *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 2, Stockholm 1985, p. 254, 258.

Still in the beginning of the twentieth century the land at the disposition of the peasantry comprised only one third of the total agricultural lands. The remainder belonged to the large estates among whose owners the Baltic-Germans held the dominant position. At the time of the First World War the aristocracy still possessed about 60 percent of all land, while their position in Latvia, where the government estates played a prominent role, was somewhat weaker.

Table 10. Division of the Land by Owner Category, 1913 (percent).

	Estland		Livland		Kurland	
	Estates	Peasant	Estates	Peasant	Estates	Peasant
Germans	57.9		46.3		34.6	
Russians	2.5		2.0		4.8	
Estonians and						
Latvians	1.2	34.2	0.7	38.9	0.1	37.8
Church	1.1		1.5		1.2	
Cities	0.4		2.9		0.3	
Crown estates	2.7		7.7		21.2	

Source: Zeittafel zur Geschichte der Baltischen Provinzen, Riga 1908, p. 5.

Note: The peasant land was owned exclusively by the Estonian and Latvian peasants. The land which they leased was calculated as manor land.

In the towns the Estonians and the Latvians belonged mainly to the lower levels: laborers, craftsmen, shopkeepers, and minor civil servants. During the early phase of industrialization, which in the Baltic occurred during the second half of the nineteenth century, the factory system did not immediately ruin the craftsmen, but rather even they were able to expand. In Tallinn, for example, the number of artisans doubled during the decades around the turn of the century, 1900, at the same time that the number of industrial laborers increased sharply; it was also first at the turn of the century that the number of industrial laborers exceeded that of the craftsmen.³

The structure of industry itself is also significant for the social composition of the working class. In Estonia it had an extreme character during the first decades after the breakthrough of industrialization with the nearly complete domination of one industry, textiles.

³ O. Karma, *Tööstuslikult revolutsioonilt sotsialistlikule revolutsioonile Eestis*, Tallinn 1963, pp. 255-257; *Eesti NSV Majandusajalugu*, Tallinn 1979, pp. 107-110.

Table 11. The Structure of Industry in Estonia by the Number of Workers (percent).

	1879	1884	1890
Textile industry	78.8	74.5	70.9
Metal and machine industry	9.1	9.5	11.0
Building materials industry	5.6	8.2	7.5
Woodworking industry	1.4	2.3	4.7
Paper industry	1.4	1.3	1.6
Food industry	2.5	2.7	1.7
Other industries	1.2	1.5	2.6

Source: Karma, Tööstuslikult revolutsioonilt sotsialistlikule revolutsioonile Eestis, Tallinn 1963, p. 192.

Labor in the textile industry has generally been largely made up of women, and such was also the case in Estonia. For example, the labor force at the Kreenholm Manufactory in Narva, which was the largest cotton factory in all of Russia, numbered approximately 5,000 at the end of the nineteenth century, 28.4 % of whom were women in 1872 and 50.1 % in 1894.⁴ Because the textile industry was so totally dominant in Estonia, it suggests that a very large proportion of the industrial laborers were women.

The material presented above could provide the foundation for discussing a number of interesting questions in this context.

In the Baltic there were three significant and more numerous ethnic groups: Baltic-Germans, Russians, and the original local population - in Estonia, the Estonians, and in Latvia, the Latvians.

The **Baltic-Germans** were for centuries the leading group in the Baltic, economically, socially, culturally, and in local politics. As the upper class, the group lacked, however, a complete social structure. They were the owners of the large manors, the administrators of the estates, and the clergymen in the countryside; they were the merchants, the industrialists, the master craftsmen, and the burghers in the towns, as well as the public officials and military officers in the service of the state. Many of them had high positions in the imperial court in St. Petersburg and in the

⁴ Karma p. 196.

government and the ministries. Some were educated professionals: scientists, doctors, teachers, journalists, and performers of the fine arts. On the other hand there were no Germans in the Baltic who were peasants or agricultural workers; nor were they usually simple industrial workers. The Baltic Germans had two powerful historical institutions with corporate organization to protect their interests: the aristocratic estate owners belonged to **Ritterschaften** and the towns' burghers to one of the two **guilds** for merchants and craftsmen. Sharp conflicts of interest and struggles had existed between the Baltic German aristocracy and the German burghers, and these had not completely ceased during the period treated.

The **Russians** in the Baltic had continually moved into the area after the Russian conquest in 1710. No real colonization by the Russians had ever taken place, but rather they came or were sent to the Baltic mainly as public officials, members of the military, merchants, and, at the end of the nineteenth century, even as industrial workers. There was also a small number of noble Russian estate owners, who had received their manors from the crown as grants from the Russian emperor. In time a Russian intelligentsia also developed in the Baltic consisting of university people, teachers, journalists, and artists. In spite of that, the Russian folk group did not comprise a complete social structure. Above all, it did not include two strata that are so important for an agrarian area such as the Baltic: peasants and agricultural laborers. The Russians lived mainly in the towns and cities. Even in other ways the Russians in the Baltic were less a group than other ethnic populations. For the Estonians, Latvians, and even for the Baltic Germans, the Baltic region was home. Most of the Russians were representatives of the Russian central power in the periphery of the empire.

The **Estonians** and the **Latvians** were the original population of the Baltic. Through the German conquest of the area during the thirteenth century and the subsequent subjugation of the Estonians and Latvians as serfs in the feudal manorial system their social positions was assured for a long period of time to come. That position also hindered them from developing a complete social structure within their own groups. The start was anything but favorable.

When the feudal system later began to disintegrate and when the economic development gave the peasants a certain prosperity and consciousness, the process of social liberation also began. For the Estonians and the Latvians, who nearly had a monopoly on small agricultural holdings, it was first of necessary to free that land from the feudal prerogatives and thus also to loosen the cultivators of these holdings from their bonds to the manor. In a relatively short period of time the former feudal peasants were transformed into free small producers. In the long run, however, this

development led to a social differentiation of the agricultural population into two distinct and partially antagonistic groups: land-owning peasants and a numerous propertyless agricultural proletariat.⁵ Parallel with that development the Estonians and Latvians were leaving the agricultural sector. They settled in the cities where the majority became wage laborers or factory workers, but where some of them also became engaged in business. In time an Estonian and a Latvian intelligentsia also emerged, which came to compete with the Baltic Germans for positions within the intellectual professions.

In spite of that, the Estonian and the Latvian people still did not have a complete social structure by the end of the nineteenth century. There were certainly wealthy Estonians and Latvians, but there was no bourgeoisie of any size, and even the ordinary middle class was very weak. Within the upper echelons of the bureaucracy the Estonian and Latvian elements were thinly represented.⁶ Yet there is reason to maintain that the Estonians and Latvians were the ethnic populations in the Baltic which at the end of the nineteenth century had the most developed social structure. The Estonians and Latvians were at any rate moving towards a developed nation, which was not the case with the Baltic Germans and the Russians.

The social structures of the various ethnic groups were naturally not isolated but rather were intermingled and influenced one another, and together they comprised the dominant social structure of the Baltic region. From the middle of the nineteenth century the antagonistic, unbridgeable conflict between the feudal estates and their peasants was the most central element in this structure. When it was broken up by the encroaching capitalistic relations during the second half of the 1800's, the old feudal aristocracy was degraded from its elite position and replaced by a stratum of businessmen, financiers, and technologists, who represented the dynamic powers of the new age.

For agriculture the great transformation of society implied that the economic focus shifted to industry and trade and that capitalistic relations began to increasingly make inroads in agriculture as well. That led, in turn, to important changes in the rural social structure and class relations. Earlier social and ethnic solidarity had been

⁵ H. Strods, Veränderungen in der Agrarstruktur und die junglettische Bewegung in Lettland in den 40er-70er Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts, *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 2, pp. 215-226; T. Rosenberg, Über die Ausdifferenzierung der sozialen Schichtung im estnischen Dorf in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jh., *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 2, pp. 245-258.

⁶ E. Jansen, On the Economic and Social Determination of the Estonian National Movement, *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 2, p. 49.

identical for the Baltic peasants: the lord of the manor was German and his serfs were Estonians or Latvians. The class lines had thus differentiated the national groups, not cut across them. One interesting fact in this context is that the Estonian word for «gentleman» (**saks**) is an abbreviation of **sakslane**, which means German (originally: from Saxony). The identification of the national with the class border is thus complete. This identification ceased when the farmers freed themselves from the manor and when the social differentiation among them progressed with increasing rapidity during the second half on the nineteenth century.

A similar change occurred in regard to social and ethnic mobility, which was extremely low during the days of the strongly corporative feudal system but increased rapidly along with the system's disintegration. The aristocracy was an exclusive estate to which not even the German burghers in the cities had access. An addition of new families could take place only by means of the imperial grant of a manor in the Baltic to a Russian or an aristocrat in the service of Russia. As an estate, the aristocracy maintained its position until the fall of tsarist Russia in 1917, but the aristocrats' exclusive privilege of owning this land was not maintained in reality; through leaseholds a great deal of this property came into the hands of people from the lower strata, even well-to-do Estonian and Latvian peasants (the so-called gray barons). At the same time more and more aristocrats devoted themselves to middle class business and thus gained access to the new commercial elite.⁷ The abolition of the organization of autonomous administration in the Baltic, in which the nobles had a leading role, also strongly contributed to the decline of the noble estate.⁸

The increased social mobility among the Estonians and Latvians found its strongest expression in the transformation of large numbers from dependant peasants to free farmers by the purchase of their farms from the estates. The Estonians and the Latvians also attained an increasing number of leading positions in the expanding economic and public life in the countryside. Several reforms during the nineteenth century which facilitated the mobility of the rural population and which abolished the guilds and trade restrictions in the cities paved the way for the Estonians and Latvians to make economic and professional careers in the cities. As early as the turn of the century, 1900, about 60 % of the real estate owners in Tallinn were Estonians.⁹ As larger numbers of peasant children began to receive higher education, they broke

⁷ R. Pullat, *Eesti linnad ja linlased XVIII sajandi lõpust 1917. aastani*, Tallinn 1972, p. 74.

⁸ M. Haltzel, *Der Abbau der deutschen ständischen Selbstverwaltung in den Ostseeprovinzen Russlands 1855-1905*, Marburg/Lahn 1977, pp. 157-162.

⁹ Pullat p. 70.

their bonds with their origins and thus formed the basis for an educated Estonian and Latvian middle class, an intelligentsia which largely supported the national movement.¹⁰ In the social differentiation, which was a component of the general liberation process, however, mobility was not only upward; there were also losers. To this group belonged the landless agrarian proletariat and the lowest strata in the cities.

Before the middle of the nineteenth century, when Estonians and Latvians advanced to become artisans, merchants, officials in public administration or entered the intellectual professions, this automatically implied ethnic mobility: they were assimilated into the «higher» culture and germanified. This was both a prerequisite for and a consequence of social climbing. During the second half of the nineteenth century and increasing number of socially advanced Estonians and Latvians maintained their original nationality. However, German did not disappear from the intellectual resources of the Estonians and Latvians; rather, along with Russian - which one was forced to learn in school - it became one of the three local languages in the Baltic far beyond the realm of the educated. However, in the wake of the social mobility there was one more significant effect: an expansion of the traditional concept of «living space» and pattern of thought. This phenomenon has been called social-psychic mobility.¹¹

III. National Movements

A national movement is made up of a combination of ideas and actions. In this short presentation of the nationalist movements in the Baltic four areas of interest are kept in mind: 1.) The forms and means of expression, 2.) The leaders and the supporting groups, 3.) The goals and the program, and 4.) Reactions against the national movements.¹²

¹⁰ T. Karjahärm, Eesti rahvusliku haritlaskonna kujunemisest möödunud sajandi lõpul ja praeguse algul, *Keel ja Kirjandus* 1973:10, pp. 624-630.

¹¹ H. Garve, *Konfession und Nationalität. Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Kirche und Gesellschaft in Livland im 19. Jahrhundert*, Marburg/Lahn 1978. p. 208.

¹² For a general introduction to the national movements in Baltic countries see: National Movements in the Baltic Countries during the 19th Century (Proceedings from the 7th Conference on Baltic Studies, Stockholm 1983), *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 2, Ed. A. Loit, Stockholm 1985; *Eesti NSV Ajalugu II*, Tallinn 1963, pp. 125-157, 200-209; *Istoriia Latviiskoi SSR*, Riga 1971, pp. 217-225, 253-274; A. Svabe, *Latvijas Vesture 1800-1914*, Uppsala 1958, pp. 360-426; M. Hroch, *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas*, pp. 62-80; E. Jansen, Eesti kodanliku rahvuse kujunemisest, *Etnilisest ühendusest sotsialistliku rahvuseni*, Tartu Riikliku Ülikooli Toimetised 789, Tartu, pp. 48-63;

1. Forms and Means of Expression

The forms and means of expression of the national movements in the Baltic must be seen against the backdrop of the existing political situation, that is, what the tsarist autocracy and the local Baltic-German establishment would permit. This implies that a lot of the nationalistic activities may be regarded as «more innocent» than they in reality were.

One of the earliest forms for the presentation of the wishes of the people was petitions. These actions had their origins in larger concrete problems; through local initiative a petition was formulated for which signatures were collected, and it was later submitted to the imperial government in St. Petersburg. During the 1860's the petitions dealt with questions of principle in connection with the agrarian reforms, while a petition from 1881 demanded that the historical borders for the political divisions in the Baltic should be changed so that they followed the borders for language usage between the Estonians and the Latvians.¹³

A very central element in the nationalist activities was the formation of associations. The associations made continual activity possible; they were spread over the entire country, and they covered all the important areas of interest. There were several types of organizations: general cultural (song, music, and theater associations), economic (agricultural and fire-fighting associations), ideal (temperance and various types of aid associations), scientific-literary associations, and after 1905 also political parties and trade labor unions. The activities of associations reflected a very comprehensive mobilization of people around national questions and it gave them a good education in organized social work. The first large song festivals especially (in Estonia in 1869 and Latvia in 1873), which assembled hundreds of choruses and thousands of singers, developed into mighty national manifestations.¹⁴

Journalism played as important a role in the national movements as did the associations. Estonian and Latvian newspapers existed as early as the eighteenth century, but it was first during the national movements that a press developed in the

T. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians*, Stanford 1987, pp. 57-80; A. Plakans, *The National Awakening in Latvia 1850-1900*, Harvard University Ph.D. dissertation, 1969; *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914*, Ed. E.C. Thaden, coauthors M.H. Haltzel, C.L. Lundin, A. Plakans, T. Raun, Princeton 1981, passim.

¹³ H. Kruus, *Eesti ajaloost IX sajandi teisel poolel*, Tallinn 1957, pp. 9-12, 242.

¹⁴ E. Karu, On the Development of the Association Movement and its Socio-Economic Background in the Estonian Countryside, *Studia Baltica Stockholmensia* 2, pp. 271-282; *Istoriia Latviiskoi SSR*, pp. 257-258.

modern sense of the word. The leading newspapers began then - as far as the censor allowed - to systematically inform the readers in social questions and to agitate politically; it was part of the nature of the thing to oppose the authorities. The editions were surprisingly large; there were 10,000 subscribers to newspapers in Estonia around 1880, which means the number of readers must have been many times as great. The leading newspapers also made a great effort to have two-way communication by carrying on a dialogue with their circle of readers and organizing a well-developed network of local correspondents. In that way the press both expressed and created public opinion. Alongside the newspapers other types of publications were also important for the activities of the national movements. A necessary condition for the reception of the written word was a certain level of education. Around 1880 three years of education were compulsory in the Baltic, and at the same time 80-90 % of the adult population was literate.¹⁵

A form of nationalist activity very specific for the Baltic was the collection and recording of the rich folklore material passed on through the oral tradition for centuries, not least the folk songs. This movement was initiated by some scientists who activated students and thousands of local enthusiasts among the common people to contribute to the work, which was systematically carried out over many years. For the Estonians and Latvians, who were people without histories in the sense that they did not have had their own states, the traditional folk poetry and the work with the creation of a national identity had a strongly symbolic significance.¹⁶

2. The Leaders and the Supporting Groups

It must be stated initially that the national movements in the Baltic were genuine popular movements, which is best illustrated by the popular support for national activities. There are several investigations which permit some general statements about the actual activists, the group that bore the organizational burden within the

¹⁵ E. Jansen, *C.R. Jakobsoni «Sakala»*, Tallinn 1971, passim; J. Peegel, 'Über die nationale Frage in der estnischen Presse des 19. Jahrhunderts', *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 2, pp. 377-387; T. Raun, The Role of Journalism in the Estonian National Awakening, *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 2, pp. 389-401; E. Laul, Die Schule und die Geburt der Nation, *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 2, pp. 293-310; E. Lauk, On the Development of Estonian Journalism from 1900 to 1914, The Baltic Countries 1900-1914, *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 5, Stockholm 1990; T. Raun, The Development of Estonian Literacy in the 18th and 19th Centuries, *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 10, 1979, pp. 115-126; A. Plakans, Modernization and the Latvians in Nineteenth-Century Baltikum, *Baltic History* 1974, p. 132.

¹⁶ Ü. Tedre, Rahvaluule kogumine ja avaldamine, *Eesti kirjanduse ajalugu II*, Tallinn 1966, pp. 403-431; Istorija Latviiskoi SSR, p. 261.

movements. These studies have mainly used the membership rolls of the various organizations, lists of newspaper subscribers of the collections and support groups, and the like, and they have tried to determine the social positions of the members of the groups. The results, which apply primarily to Estonia during the first wave of the national movement and are presented here summarily, vary depending on the character of the activity investigated.

It was to be expected that the intelligentsia, people with secondary education or higher, would be found among the leaders, but it was found that other groups had strong positions and were even more prominent in some activities. Among these were the folk school teachers, who were truly the «salt of the earth.» The peasants, especially younger ones, were also surprisingly active, as well as male farm laborers, while the agricultural workers on the large estates were less active. In the cities the lower officials and artisans often took part in nationalist activities, as did the factory workers, who primarily participated in the cultural organizations.

Some difference appears to exist between Estonia and Latvia, as the academically educated played a more important role in the Latvian national movement. The center for the nationalist movement there was the big city, Riga, while the stronghold of the movement in Estonia was rather to be found in smaller places in the countryside. Common for both countries, however, was that the Estonian and the Latvian groups in St. Petersburg and Moscow at times contributed to the development of the national movements in the homelands.¹⁷

3. Goals and Program

The national movements in Estonia and Latvia never put forth collective programs. The direct cause was that they lacked a permanent and unified organization. A more deep-rooted explanation may be found, however, in the fact that Estonian and Latvian populations still did not have fully developed social structures.

The demands made in various situations naturally differed over time. In spite of the lack of a systematic program, fundamental lines may be traced in the various fragments showing their unified character. There is a common anti-feudal message

¹⁷ E. Jansen, *C.R. Jakobsoni «Sakala»*, pp. 275-320; M. Hroch, *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung*, pp. 71-75; A. Plakans, *Peasants, Intellectuals and Nationalism in the Russian Baltic Provinces, 1820-1890*, *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 46, 1974, pp. 445-475.

which is presented, that is, to pave the way for a free agricultural nation. The ideological basis for the national movement is the agrarian concept of nation.

Among the economic and social demands made in the first phase of the national movement were those for the removal of the remnants of feudalism. The free purchase of farms at regulated prices was to be facilitated, and demands were made for regulation of the leasehold with longer contracts and fixed rents. Certain circles even demanded that the state should distribute free land to the propertyless. All the privileges of the aristocracy were to be abolished, including the right of patronage. Because no reforms were carried out, the demands were renewed more radically during the revolutionary year 1905 at the All-Estonian Congress. Another notable social goal was formulated as early as the 1870's, that is, that girls should be educated, as the Estonian family depended, above all, on the degree of enlightenment among Estonian mothers. The proposal, however, echoes more concern for the nation than for equality between the sexes.

As far as the political program is concerned, it lies implicit in the nature of every national movement that the final goal is an independent sovereign state, within which all lesser goals may be realized. Such a high goal was not formulated by the Estonian and Latvian national movements, in any case not until shortly before the establishment of the free republics in 1918. The emphasis was placed instead on close problems and realistic solutions. The favored position of the aristocracy within administration and the juridical system was to be abolished, and the peasants were to gain representation in the organs for local self-government and in the larger system of government. In principle the demands were for equality with the Baltic-Germans in everything. It was first after the 1905 revolution that the nationalist circles made more extensive demands: in accordance with the October Manifesto of the tsar, to have the right to elect a national constituent assembly and be guaranteed basic civil rights. A more radical wing went even further and demanded the establishment of a temporary revolutionary organ, the expropriation of all land for public ownership, the introduction of the right to strike, and the promotion of Estonian and Latvian to languages of instruction in the schools. The separation of the school system from the church was a demand which was made during the first phase of the national movement.

Yet, at the beginning of the First World War the political demands of the Baltic national movements stretched no further than to an autonomous position for the Baltic provinces within Russia. First after the 1917 revolution were demands heard from the

nationalists for the separation of Estonia and Latvia from Russia and the establishment of sovereign states.¹⁸

4. Reactions against the National Movement

Reactions against the Baltic national movements' activities and demands came from two directions: the tsarist authorities and the local Baltic-German establishment.

One of the prerequisites for the development of the national movements in the beginning of the 1860's was the relatively liberal regime which had been introduced into Russia under Tsar Alexander II. Several of the leading nationalists in the Baltic also attempted to cooperate with the liberal circles in Russia in their struggle against the Baltic-German hegemony. When Slavophile elements and later when the real russification movement began to direct their attacks against the privileges of the Baltic-German society, the national movements in the Baltic were more positively than negatively affected. When the Russian government started to carry out reforms which abolished the privileged position of the Baltic-Germans - the so-called administrative russification - it was just what had been demanded by the Estonian and Latvian nationalists.

When the Russian government later also carried out a cultural russification, the national movements in the Baltic suffered. In the 1880's Russian was introduced as the language of the civil administration, the schools, and the university. Strict censorship was introduced, which led to the closing of several newspapers. Many Estonian and Latvian cultural organizations were forced to cease their activities. Alongside the Russian-speaking schools, the Orthodox church was a powerful representative for russification. The ultimate goal was the russification of the Baltic population. The beginning of russification in the middle of the 1880's also marks the start of a lull in the activities of the national movements. Although there was some relief following the 1905 revolution, the tough policy of the Russian autocracy continued until the dissolution of the empire in 1917.

¹⁸ E. Jansen, On the Economic and Social Determination of the Estonian National Movement, *Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 2, pp. 48-56; E. Jansen, C.R. Jakobsoni «Sakala», pp. 192-233; H. Garve, *Konfession und Nationalität*, p. 211; T. Raun, Estonian social and Political Thought, 1905 - February 1917, *The Russian Baltic Provinces between the 1905/1917 Revolutions*, Köln 1982, pp. 59-72; A. Plakans, *The Latvians, Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914*, p. 272; T. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians*, pp. 62-67.

The conflict between the corporative order of the Baltic-Germans and the Estonian and Latvian national movements concerned first of all questions of an economic and social nature. The national movements were forced to launch hard attacks against the still very vital privileged society. The Baltic-German corporations, however, stubbornly defended the established order and fought a hard battle against the Estonian and Latvian newspapers and organizations which were engaged in the struggle for liberation. With the decline of the Baltic-German establishment due to administrative reforms and the general economic development, the conflict with the Baltic national movements also weakened.¹⁹

IV. The Typology of the National Movements in the Baltic countries

After this brief sketch of the dynamics of national movements and the socio-ethnic structures in the Baltic, some comments must be made on their structure and typology. The bulk of this will be devoted to the first phases in nation-building since it was then that the Baltic nations came into existence. Three aspects will be treated: 1. The Baltic Region; 2. The fundamental character of the national movements, and 3. National identity.

1. The Baltic Region

Since ancient times, the Baltic lands formed a distinct area sharply separated from surrounding lands. This is especially true of the classic Baltic region, the provinces of Estland, Livland and Kurland. The most remarkable feature was that the Baltic region succeeded in preserving its position as a more or less autonomous region within a larger world - «eine baltische Sonderstellung» - despite centuries of foreign political domination. Thus a dual system of power was created where the overall control was in the hands of the centralized state government - situated in St. Petersburg at the time in question - and was practised by its representatives in the Baltic region, whereas the local administration, economy, social hierarchy and cultural life was dominated entirely by the Baltic-German upper-class in Estonia and Latvia, and the Polish in Lithuania.

¹⁹ *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914*, passim; T. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians*, pp. 57-80; H. Garve *Konfession und Nationalität*, pp. 207-276; H. Kruus, *Eesti ajaloost XIX sajandi teisel poolel*, pp. 172-211.

With years of far-reaching self-government behind, that the Baltic German overlordship had fought for, a historic tradition was created that even the national movements of the Baltic peoples later included in their aims.

During the time of the national movements (approx. 1850s to 1918), the Baltic region within the Tsarist empire assumed a leading position both economically and in culture. In agriculture, the main source of supply for the area, the feudal system and serfdom in the Baltic region had begun to break down half a century earlier than in Russia. Even in the question of industrialization the Baltic region was far more advanced. Riga and Reval were unquestionably top industrial and trading centres for Russia. Literacy was by far more common among the Baltic peoples than the peoples of Russia in general.

The national movements in the Baltic region consisted of three parallel but separate movements on account of language differences. The Estonian and Latvian national movements displayed great similarity whilst the Lithuanian movement witnessed some distinctive features on account of a different historical development and the difference in religion. What was common for all three, however, was that they may be included in the category of national movements of so-called small peoples, «*kleine Volk*», without their own state, with an incomplete social structure lacking their own nobility and bourgeois class.

2. The basic characteristics of the national movements

The national movements in the Baltic may first and foremost be described as **oppositional** in character. They were movements from below directed against the political system, the economic and social order as well as national suppression imposed by a foreign power.

Furthermore, the movements were **emancipatory** which aimed at the liberation of the Baltic peoples in all spheres of society. Economic and social emancipation was directed against the traditional upper-class in the region, comprising Baltic Germans and Poles. Political and cultural liberation on the other hand, was directed against the Tsarist autocracy that denied the people political rights and through its policy of Russification prevented the development of national culture. This process of emancipation culminated in local revolutions in 1905 and 1917 and in the establishment of independent Baltic republics in 1918.

In accordance with the economic structure of the Baltic region, the national movements were strongly linked to **the rural sector of society**. The movements were part of the historical process in the course of which the masses of feudal serfs were transformed into free smallproducers in the capitalist market system. Thus, the national movements functioned as vehicles for self-consciousness and political mobilization. The concept of nation had an agrarian signification.

The national movements in the Baltic region were also distinctly **secular** since the church adopted more or less negative attitude to them. The Protestant Church in Estonia and Latvia had been for centuries a «Herrenkirche» with the aim of domesticating peasants to be docile workers in the manors. The Orthodox Church stood for the interests of the Tsarist authorities. Some minor church officials from the ranks of Catholic priests in Lithuania undeniably sought to preserve the Lithuanian language and its development but the Catholic Church as such was hardly supportive of the national movement in Lithuania, especially not of its radical wing. The most widely spread Protestant Free Church in the Baltic region, the Moravians, saw the national movements only as a worldly phenomenon that had nothing in common with their religious brotherhood.

The national movements in the Baltic region took place in a decidedly **peaceful** fashion. In view of the uneven distribution of force comparing the Baltic peoples and the Russian authorities and also the Baltic nobility, no other option was really available. Only in the years 1905 and 1917 were there outbreaks of violence which were actually an expression of acute political and social conflict. The same can be said about the uprisings in Lithuania in 1830/1831 and 1863.

Since the national movements in the Baltic region affected society in its entirety, they must ultimately, therefore, be treated and studied from **a holistic perspective**. The reason for stating this explicitly is that in literature, national movements are often treated exclusively or mainly as a cultural phenomenon; at times the question is put as to whether cultural factors were more important than social ones. An approach of this type is unfruitful. Undoubtedly the cultural circumstances were of great importance for the national movements just as their progress was more evident in various cultural activities. This may be explained by the fact that in unfree Russia, it was easier and less dangerous to conduct a part of the activities of the national movements in the guise of culture. However, to see national movements only as cultural manifestations is to reduce their significance for other spheres of society. The furthest aims of social engagement were, after all, to attain proper standards of living: respect for human rights and enjoyment of political rights, equality in all that used to be reserved for the

privileged only, guaranteed social rights and integrity in culture. In this respect, there are no differences in principle between the national movements in the Baltic region 1860s and those of today.

3. National identity

It would not be unfounded to describe national identity of the Baltic peoples as particularly strong. It appears as if these small nations hope to compensate their diminutive size with respect to territory, population and economic potential by cultural distinctiveness and intensified national consciousness. With regard to the Baltic peoples, however, three concrete circumstances may be named which strengthened their national identity.

All three peoples had their **language** which was not a dialect of the language of a larger people. By the middle of the 19th century, a literary language was well-established for all three and in combination with the high degree of literacy, 70-80% - as high as in England, for example - this was an effective tool for patriotic propaganda. The vehicle of language also brought directly to the people the messages of their national folklore, in the collection of which were employed thousands of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians and this must have strengthened national identity.

Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian settlements were **ethnically homogenous**. Especially in rural areas, which were the strongholds of the national movements, the indigenous peoples were in an overwhelming majority. This facilitated e.g. that organized efforts on a national scale could be effected successfully.

The Baltic peoples were also **socially homogenous**. They formed the lower strata of society both in rural areas and towns and were in this way strictly set apart from other ethnic populations. Social mobility on an individual level proceeded for a long time at the cost of changed ethnic identity. It has generally been assumed that an incomplete social structure is an obstacle for an ethnic population like a people to develop to a modern nation. It seems that for the Baltic peoples, the lack of real class differences, at least in the initial phases, has on the contrary been advantageous to the national movements. The socially little differentiated Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian peasants were of one mind in their struggle for emancipation from the Baltic-German and Polish landlords - and in the end from the Russian empire.



National Minorities in East-Central Europe and the Internationalisation of their Rights (1919-1939)¹

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It has been repeatedly asserted, by various authors, that the border changes emerging from the defeat of the Central Empires in 1918 and the appearance of new Nation-States in the East and Centre of the continent led to new problems of nationality, of a different nature to those of the final years of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. According to this opinion, the influence of ideas associated with the nationality principle and the spread of the idea of self-determination during the First World War, emerging mainly from the Nation-States of Western Europe, led to *nationality*, which in East-Central Europe had been conceived as ethnic belonging, a *Kulturation* in Meinecke's terms, being identified with the Nation-state (that is, the *Staatsnation*). In this way, the «Western» model of Nation-State - unified and culturally uniform - became dominant in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Baltic States, and contributed to the sharpening of internal national conflicts within these recently created States, since ethnic groups previously dominated by other groups would become dominators themselves and vice versa.² This interpretation was supported by the optimistic image offered by nationality doctrines of Social democracy and other theoreticians of the pre-war Austro-Hungarian Empire, who emphasised the alleged peaceful co-existence of the different nationalities present in the multinational Empires of the pre-war period. The ideal of the Czech nationalist leader T.Masaryk in his book *The new Europe* (1918), consisting of the creation of multinational Czechoslovak State in which Czechs, Slovaks, Germans and Ukrainians would live together in peace in a kind of Central European Switzerland, later gave way in practice to the attempted imposition of the hegemony of the majority ethnic group, the Czechs, over the State. Because of the

¹ In general, this paper summarises two chapters of my doctoral thesis *El problema de las nacionalidades en la Europa de entreguerras. El Congreso de Nacionalidades Europeas (1925-1938)*, Florence, European University Institute, 1992, where a more detailed treatment can be found.

² Classic examples of this interpretation are T.Schieder, «Nationalstaat und Nationalitätenproblem», *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*, 1:2 (1952), 161-181, or E.Viefhaus, *Die Minderheitenfrage und die Entstehung der Minderheitenschutzverträge auf der Pariser Friedenskonferenz 1919*, Würzburg, 1960, 1-6.

parliamentary democratic systems established in nearly all of Eastern Europe after 1918, the majority nationality could automatically occupy the influential decision-making posts in the State apparatus, and govern and legislate in its own benefit. Therefore in practice the majority ethnic groups in each of the new miniature multinational States sought to establish a Western style culturally homogeneous Nation-State. This interpretation sees the so-called national minorities problem between the wars as the result of the forcible application of Western European models on Eastern European realities for which they were not appropriate.

Without questioning the validity of the whole, what is clear is that this interpretation is based on an over-optimistic assumption: the supposed harmony between the national groups within the pre-war pluriethnic Empires. Moreover, this theory is too much based on a rather monolithic image of the nature of national problems in Western Europe. Certainly it is true that the new nation States which succeeded Austria-Hungary hoped to impose a Western State model as opposed to the «supranational monarchy» of Austro-Hungary³. However they were also based on the development of powerful national movements created within those Empires, whose aim after reaching the phase of «mass movement» (phase C, according to the well-known classification of M.Hroch)⁴, was the achievement of the greatest possible amount of self-government, and, if circumstances permitted (as in fact they did), the creation of their own State. On the other hand, the peaceful coexistence of the different nationalities was an ideal of Austrian social democracy, but not a concrete reality as the British historian Seton-Watson could observe in his visit to Hungary at the turn of the century - which led him to abandon his original pro-Magyar position, in view of the lack of consideration shown by the Hungarian semi-State towards the other national groups living in its territory⁵. The cultural struggles in Prague and Bratislava since the end of the 19th century between different ethnic groups - including one landless group, the Jews, could be put forward as a further confirmation.⁶ The emergence of Nation-States in East-Central Europe was an objective present in the ideology and strategies of the majority of nationalist movements existing in this area, and they were simply waiting for a favourable international situation in order to accelerate the

³ The term is taken from H.Seton-Watson, «Überationale Monarchie und Nationalstaat», in R.G.Plaschka/K.Mack (ed.), *Die Auflösung des Habsburgerreiches. Zusammenbruch und Neuorientierung im Donauraum*, Vienna, 1970, 366-376.

⁴ M.Hroch, *Social preconditions for national revival in Europe*, Cambridge, 1985.

⁵ See Scotus Viator (Seton Watson), *Racial Problems in Hungary*, London, 1908.

⁶ In general, see M.Engman (ed.), *Ethnic identity in urban Europe*, New York/Aldershot, 1991. This opinion is shared, for example, by E.Gellner, «Nationalism and politics in Eastern Europe», *New Left Review*, n.189 (1991), 127-34.

process. The World War offered the appropriate opportunity, and although the Czechs achieved their nation State and the Ucranians did not, this was principally the result of the evolution of the conflict and their respective proximity and distance from the scene of the Soviet revolution.⁷

Moreover, Western Europe was anything but a mosaic of perfectly unified Nation-States free from any kind of national minority problems. In 1914-18 several nationalist movements in this area of the continent were at a similar stage of development to the Slovenes and the Czechs: in particular the Irish, but also - with some differences, which we will not analyse here - the Catalans, to a lesser extent the Basques, and also in part the Flemish.⁸ Weimar Germany also faced problems of regional separatism in the 1920s, although they were not always specifically based on ethnic-linguistic differences (Rhine separatism, in part supported by France, and Bavarian separatism, for example; also the Sorbs of Lusatia, Lithuanians and Poles in East Prussia, Danes in Südschleswig, the problematic Northern Frisians), and Denmark (Nordschleswig), Italy (German-speakers in South Tyrol, Slovenes in Gorizia, Francophones in Aosta Valley), France (the exceptional case of Alsace-Lorraine, or the Flemish in the North), and Belgium (the Germans of Eupen-Malmedy) all had problems of national minorities similar in nature, although not in intensity, to those existing in Eastern Europe. And along with these characteristic problems of national minorities separated from their *Mutterland*, from 1918 on the beginnings and growth of some other peripheral national movements can be observed, reflecting the triumph of national movements in Eastern Europe. These groups even considered themselves to be national minorities (Galicians, Corsicans, Occitanians, Bretons, Frisians, Welsh, Scottish, etc.).⁹

⁷ See G.Eley, «Remapping the nation: War, revolutionary upheaval and state formation in Eastern Europe, 1914-1923», in P.J.Potichnyj/H.Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian-Jewish relations in historical perspective*, Edmonton, 1988, 205-246; G.Schulz, *Revolutions and peace treaties 1917-1920*, London, 1972 (Munich 1969).

⁸ For a general, although unsatisfactory, view, see S. and C.Gras, *La révolte des régions en Europe Occidentale de 1916 à nos jours*, Paris, 1986; a more systematic study, applying with some adaptations the methodological proposal of M.Hroch, is that of H.-J.Puhle, «Nazionalismo periferico, regionalismo e regionalizzazione nell'Europa Occidentale nel XX secolo», in F.Andreucci/A.Pescarolo (ed.), *Gli spazi del potere. Aree, regioni, stati. Le coordinate territoriali della storia contemporanea*, Florence, 1989, 199-218.

⁹ Several of these national/regional protest movements are difficult to classify because of their lack of ideological definition as nationalists: this is the case of the powerful Sardinian autonomy movements - one of the biggest political forces on the island between 1919 and 1925 -, Valencian regionalism or the Sicilian autonomy movement, not to mention other regionalisms in Spain - Andalusian, Aragonese... The Welsh or Scottish sentiment of national difference, although strongly rooted, did not usually find expression in autochthonous political movements (apart from some minority groups) until the post-1945 period.

Therefore, problems of internal national cohesion were neither exclusive or peculiar to East-Central Europe. However, excepting the case of Ireland, it was in East-Central Europe where national conflict acquired virulent tones and incorporated the social and political tensions existing between ethnic majorities and minorities. This was for two basic reasons:

1) the development of a strong ethnic identification amongst the various peoples of East-Central Europe, determined by the slow rate of political and social modernisation compared to Western Europe which, as M.Hroch has pointed out, led to non-dominant ethnic groups in Eastern Europe articulating existing political-social contradictions and conflicts in terms of an ethnic-national conflict with the *oppressor* nation, whilst in the West the higher level of political culture and cultural assimilation made other channels of expression available.¹⁰

2) Other causes are related to historical factors, models of population settlement and social hierarchy, as we will see.

At all events, in Eastern Europe we can observe the combination of problems of national minorities with a *Mutterland* and dissatisfied national movements (such as Ukrainians, Slovaks, Belorussians, and the difficult case of the Macedonians, hesitating between the assertion of their own nationality and their links with the «mother land» Bulgaria).¹¹

The hopes that various political and social sectors in Europe had placed in Wilsonism and the *Zeitgeist* of the assertion of the principle of nationalities rapidly disappeared in 1919,¹² after the creation of the League of Nations, whose founding Statutes failed to include the principle of self-determination. During the subsequent negotiations which led to drafting of Minority Treaties, the restrictive view of the Allied Powers prevailed, first rejecting the original plan of a founding pact for the League of Nations written by Wilson himself, and secondly applying the principle of

¹⁰ See M.Hroch, «From national movement to fully-fledged nation», *New Left Review*, n.198 (1993), p.12.

¹¹ This kind of ambiguity of national or supranational definition is not exclusive to the East: in the West the cases of Alsace-Lorraine (between France and Germany), Flanders (regarding Holland), Corsica (with Italy), and Galicia (with Portugal) are worth noting.

¹² Basil Thomson declared to the British War Cabinet in December 1918 that «it is a remarkable fact that the extremists of all nations appear to have adopted President Wilson as their protagonist. He is to find himself, it would seem, the champion of British bolsheviks, of Catalan separatists, of French majoritarian Socialists, of Irish Sinn Féiners, of Indian Anarchists, in short, of everyone who has a real or imaginary grievance», quoted in M.Schwarz, *The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War*, Oxford, 1971, p.219.

nationalities in an arbitrary fashion in the restructuring of the map of Europe¹³; thirdly, in restricting the system of protection of national minorities to a number of States by not including the Minority Treaties in the founding Treaty of the League of Nations. In any case, we can observe a struggle between opposed interests and principles during the process of negotiation and creation of the system of protection of minorities, as Viehhaus has pointed out: on the one hand, the pressure groups organised by some national minorities, in particular the Jews, who established a permanent delegation in Paris, the *Comité des Délégations Juives*, headed by Leo Motzkin, with the support of Sionist organisations in America and Great Britain¹⁴; on the other, the interests of the victorious powers, represented by the Commission of New States charged with drawing up new borders and writing the draft for the system for the protection of national minorities under the international guarantee of the League of Nations. Despite the pressures of public opinion, it soon became clear that the peacemakers were unwilling to stretch the generosity of the Treaties too far, mainly because the Entente nations themselves had national minorities, or minorities likely to regard themselves as such (for example non-European immigrants), within their borders: this was explicitly pointed out by the British delegate, Headlam-Morley:

«...it would be most dangerous to allow the inhabitants or citizens of any State direct approach to the League except through their own Government. If we allow this principle to be neglected, we should get into a position in which, for instance, the French in Canada, the Jews in America, the Roman Catholics in England, the Welsh, the Irish, the Scottish Highlanders, the Basques, Bretons or Catalonians, might approach the League and complain of injustice to which they are subjected»¹⁵

So fears of a defensive nature on the part of the Western Nation-States, and the accepted prerogatives of their sovereignty prevented the victorious powers from going very far in the application of a series of principles which, after all, had only been brandished reluctantly as a strategic weapon during the War. However these powers faced the need to satisfy liberal public opinion and the European Left, who had supported the war in part because of its idealistic or even altruistic aims. Moreover,

¹³ See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 69-82; F.W.Kaltenbach, *Self-determination 1919. A study in frontier-making between Germany and Poland*, London, n.d. (1938); L.Killen, «Self-determination vs. territorial integrity. Conflict within the American delegation at Paris over Wilsonian policy toward the Russian borderlands», *Nationalities papers*, n.10 (1982), 65-79; H.I.Nelson, *Land and power. British and allied policy on Germany's frontiers 1916-19*, London-Toronto, 1963.

¹⁴ See Comité des Délégations Juives, *À leur excellences Monsieur le Président et Messieurs les Délégués de la Conférence de la Paix*, Paris, n.d. (1919); N.Feinberg, *La question des minorités à la Conférence de la Paix en 1919 et l'action juive en faveur des minorités*, Paris, 1929.

¹⁵ J.Headlam-Morley, «Memorandum on the right of appeal of minorities to the League of Nations, 16.V.1919», in Id., *A memoir of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, London, 1972, 108-109.

it was important to guarantee that the problems which at that time were seen as the cause of a devastating world war would not re-emerge in the new States replacing the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Another fear, never explicit but always in the background, was that the Soviet Union would exploit the discontent of the new national minorities in order to gain their allegiance. The defining strategy of the European system after Versailles was the containment of the Soviet revolution, and the proclamation by the Allied Powers of the right to self-determination, and later the creation of an international system for the protection of national minorities also responded to the need to establish a *cordon sanitaire*.¹⁶

I

It is almost impossible to quantify the relative size of ethnic majorities and minorities in each of the States of Eastern Europe, in view of the manipulations of population censuses in the new States, and the political importance, for the States themselves and for the minority organisations, of the figures of national minority populations and their location in the State territory. It is not surprising that one of the priorities of the German *völkisch* and *Auslandsdeutsche* circles in support of their compatriots abroad was the foundation of an Institute for Minority Statistics in 1920, set up in Vienna under the direction of the Sudeten German Wilhelm Winkler. Winkler himself wrote in 1920 that minority statistics were a weapon of decisive political importance.¹⁷ In Germany in particular many monumental works on the statistics of national minorities abroad were published; in fact, the best estimations of population were those of the German minorities.¹⁸ The European nationalities movement published also a major work of compilation and quantification of the situation of minorities in different European States, which in turn was contested by the director of the pro-Polish Warsaw Institute of National Minorities, L.Wasilewski.¹⁹

In 1918 East-Central Europe was characterised by an enormous and fragmented ethnic heterogeneity. This was added to an even greater difficulty: the dispersion of

¹⁶ See A.J.Mayer, *Wilson vs. Lenin. Political origins of the new diplomacy, 1917-1918*, New Haven, 1963; D.Geyer, «Wilson und Lenin. Ideologie und Friedenssicherung in Osteuropa 1917-1919», *Jahrbuch für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 1955, 430-441.

¹⁷ W.Winkler, *Die Bedeutung der Statistik für den Schutz der nationalen Minderheiten*, Leipzig-Vienna, 1920. See also id., *Die Statistik im Dienste der Volkspolitik*, Karlsbad, 1933.

¹⁸ See W.Winkler, *Statistisches Handbuch der europäischen Nationalitäten*, Vienna/Leipzig, 1931; id., *Deutschtum in aller Welt. Bevölkerungsstatistik Tabellen*, Vienna, 1938.

¹⁹ See E.Ammende, *Die Nationalitäten in den Staaten Europas*, Vienna, 1931; L.Wasilewski, *Aperçu critique sur «Die Nationalitäten in den Staaten Europas»*, Warsaw, 1931.

the population of the different ethnic groups, often chaotically mixed together in the same geographical areas. Moreover, in several border areas the ethnic groups of the border States were randomly distributed on either side of the theoretical dividing line, creating great difficulties in the drawing up of borders, as occurred at Versailles (two clear examples are the Hungarian-Slovak and the Austrian-Slovene borders).²⁰ The resultant ethnic map of East-Central Europe resembled a leopard-skin of national groups, making it very difficult to apply the solutions of territorial self-government tried out in Western Europe (the various formulas of Home Rule for Ireland, or the Statutes of territorial Autonomy for Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia during the Spanish Second Republic). Various historical factors contributed to the incredibly complex and random distribution of the diverse ethnic groups of East-Central Europe: wars, migrations and the ethnic «islands» of settled populations left by migratory movements (for instance the Sorbs of Lusatia); religious persecution with the same result, mass colonisation (the best example being the Germans on the Volga region), economic factors, and so on.²¹ The result of this by 1919, after centuries of population movements and changes in multinational empires, was a mixture of ethnic groups incomparable to Western Europe where, although the cultural or linguistic criterion for national classification could be deceptive (not all Welsh or Basques spoke their national languages, but this did not mean that they belonged to a diverse population group), most areas were populated by homogeneous ethnic groups. The experts at the Versailles Peace Conference, who really intended to accumulate national minorities in the new States whilst protecting their cultural rights, tended to take as a model the situation of linguistic minorities in Western Europe (for example in Wales) and were ignorant of the greater importance of organic or «objective» factors - such as race, language and history - in determining national adherence in East-Central Europe. In any case, the 1919 Peace Treaties established a system of borders that, despite its faults, was closer to reflecting the existing ethnic divisions than any other proposed in the past. In some cases, such as Greece and Turkey, a policy of population exchange was followed in the 1920s in order to homogenise the ethnic content of the two States.²²

²⁰ See A.Suppan, «According to the principle of reciprocity: the minorities in Yugoslav-Austrian relations 1918-1938», in P.Smith (ed.), *Ethnic groups in international relations*, Aldershot/New York, 1991, 235-273; see also F.Ermacora, «Die Volksabstimmung 1920 in Kärnten als Modell der Anwendung des Selbstbestimmungsrechts in der Völkergemeinschaft», in VV.AA., *Festschrift für Franz Hieronymus Riedl*, Vienna, 1917, 109-125.

²¹ An interesting vision of the history of ethnic groups in Central and Eastern Europe during the Early Modern Age can be found in C.A.McCartney, *National states and national minorities*, Oxford, 1934, 50-152.

²² See for example K.K.Koufa/C.Svolopoulos, «The compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey: the settlement of minority questions at the Conference of Lausanne, 1923, and its impact on Greek-Turkish Relations», in P.Smith (ed.), *Ethnic groups*, cit., 275-308.

In 1945, H.Seton-Watson distinguished three separate - although fairly similar - types of minority problems in the interwar period,²³ a classification which is still valid today:

1. National minorities in border regions, whose situation was determined first of all by the contradiction between the principle of nationality and historical, strategic or economic considerations. These were the great victims of the Treaties of Versailles, what in the case of German minorities were referred to as the *Grenzdeutsche*. Historical considerations played a decisive role in the case of Eastern Galitzia (annexed by Poland, despite its Ukrainian majority population) or Kosovo (with an Albanian majority). In other cases, strategic-economic interests determined the decision: Czechoslovakia absorbed into its territory the Northern fringe of the Hungarian plain because of its need for a fertile agricultural belt, whilst Rumania annexed West Transylvania - with a majority Hungarian population - in order to possess a rail link between the North and the South of the country.

2. National minorities separated from their *Mutterland* by considerable distances, and which can be described as ethnic «islands». Normally these populations had over the centuries developed good relations with the ethnic majorities of their States, and therefore their situation, in theory, was not as problematic as that of the above group. An exceptional case within this category is that of the Jews, divided into «integrationists» and Sionists (or non-integrationists). But the most paradigmatic were the Germans spread over the Danube and Eastern Europe, particularly the German minorities of the Banat and Transylvania: the latter even had traditional forms of autonomous self-government which dated back to the Early Modern Age.

3. Minorities in areas of dispersed population and ethnic heterogeneity: for example Transylvania or Macedonia.

Each one of these situations gave rise to problems of varying severity, but which were fundamentally similar.²⁴ For Germans in Transylvania, for example, irredentist

²³ H.Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars 1918-1941*, Boulder/London, 1986 (1945), 268-319.

²⁴ There are still few convincing general overviews of the situation of minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. See R.Pearson, *National minorities in Eastern Europe 1848-1945*, London, 1983; S.Horak, *Eastern European national minorities, 1919-1980*, Littleton (Co.), 1985; O.I.Janowsky, *Nationalities and national minorities (with special reference to East-Central Europe)*, New York, 1945. More syncretic and analytical studies are H.Bogdan, «Le problème des minorités nationales dans les Etats successeurs de l'Autriche-Hongrie», *Documentation sur l'Europe Centrale*, XIV (1976), 75-91 and 188-200; E.Viefhaus, «Die Nationalitätenfrage in den ostmitteleuropäischen Nationalstaaten nach 1919. Ein

claims would have been clearly unrealistic in view of their distance from Germany, so their political aspirations had been focused on the maintenance of a limited degree of self-government while remaining loyal to the Monarchy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This loyalty was transferred after 1918 to the Rumanian State, which allowed them the freedom to develop their cultural life and to maintain their traditional institutions of local self-government, the Germans offering in return an open attitude of cooperation with the ethnic majority in the Government of the State. In the case of minorities recently cut off from their original nation as a result of the border changes decided at Versailles, such as the Hungarians of Slovakia or the Germans of Polish Pomerania, irredentism was more of a temptation, and it was generally encouraged by the revisionist desires of their mother-States. The role changes in areas of mixed ethnic population, where the dominant national group suddenly became the dominated group, were also a source of resentment and desire for revenge, despite the persistence of a deep-rooted loyalty to the old dual Monarchy of Austro-Hungary in some such areas, for example Slovakia and the German areas of Hungary.²⁵ Despite the good intentions of Masaryk, decades of cultural conflict between Germans and Czechs in Bohemia, for instance, had a clear result: there were winners and losers after the World War. Moreover, in several East-Central European societies, the ethnic groups previously dominant, and now dominated, were those that occupied the centres of economic power and formed the rural property-owning aristocracy and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, such as the Germans in Bohemia and the Baltic States (landowners and commercial bourgeoisie),²⁶ or Hungarians in Slovakia (who were usually identified with aristocratic landowners).²⁷ In these cases, the economically

Übersicht», in P.Philippi (ed.), *Studien zur Geschichtsschreibung im 19 und 20. Jahrhundert*, Cologne-Graz, 1967, 147-172. For the Polish case see also K.Zydowicz, *National question in Poland. Historical research after 1945*, EUI, Florence, Working Paper ECS 92/8, 1992, 50-87.

²⁵ Bogdan, «Le problème», cit., p.82.

²⁶ There are many monographic studies of the German minorities in various East-Central European states. The most relevant are E.Lemberg, «Zur Geschichte des Deutschen Volksgruppen in Ost-Mitteleuropa», *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*, 1 (1952), 321-345; E.K.Jahn, *Die Deutschen in der Slowakei in den Jahren 1918-1929. Ein Beitrag zur Nationalitätenproblematik*, Munich, 1971; H.U.Weher, *Nationalitätenpolitik in Jugoslawien. Die deutsche Minderheit, 1918-1978*, Göttingen, 1980; V.Oberkersch, *Die Deutschen in Syrmien, Slawonien, Kroatien und Bosnien. Geschichte einer deutschen Volksgruppe in Südosteuropa*, Stuttgart, 1989; G.Castellan, «The Germans of Rumania», *Journal of Contemporary History*, 6 (1971), 52-75; R.Jaworski, «The German minority in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the interwar period», in P.Smith (ed.), *Ethnic groups*, cit., 169-185; W.Jacobmeyer, «Die deutsche Minderheit in Polen und in der Tschechoslowakei in den dreissiger Jahren», *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, n.31 (1986), 17-25; W.Kuhn, «Das Deutschtum in Polen und Litauen», in V.Aschenbrenner et al. (ed.), *Die Deutschen und ihre östlichen Nachbarn. Ein Handbuch*, Frankfurt a.M., 1967, 253-266; O.Heike, *Die deutsche Minderheit in Polen bis 1939*, Leverkusen, 1985.

²⁷ See K.Janics, «Czechoslovakia's Magyar minority: An example of Diaspora nationalism», *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, III:1 (1975), 34-44; M.Kozminski, «National consciousness and stereotypes in the Hungarian-Slovakian borderland area after the First World War», *Acta Polonica Historica*, n.50 (1984), 157-198.

dominant social class had a certain sentiment of belonging to a culturally superior nation and a powerful civilisation which, in the case of the Germans, had imposed its language as a lingua franca in Central Europe. After 1919, the Germanic colonies in Bohemia, Silesia and Pomerania, previously dominant, had become in practice second-class citizens in the new nation States, whilst for Germans who had been living under the Russian Empire or in Hungary the border changes simply meant a change in Government and dominant ethnic group. These Germans, particular those in Transylvania, generally adapted easily to coexistence with the new majority ethnic groups, and in this way achieved a certain political understanding (which was not so easy for the old dominators, the Magyars). Lemberg was right in pointing out that it was precisely the intolerance of some of the nationalities dominant before 1918 which led to the growth in the unitary conception of the State on the part of the nationalities who had been dominated; the case of the different ethnic groups under Hungarian jurisdiction, after the *Ausgleich* of 1867, is paradigmatic, since the Hungarian law of nationalities of the following year considered any cultural demands by Czechs, Rumanians or Slovaks to be contrary to the spirit of the State.²⁸

In the new national States replacing the multinational Empires, the new situation of the various national groups did not promise a future of peaceful coexistence, despite the good intentions of the Allied Powers, the minority protection system or the declarations of tolerance made by the victorious nationalist leaders. Ethnic rivalries were aggravated by two further factors of a more general nature: the poor system of government common to the whole of East-Central Europe, and the identification of the dominant national group with the State²⁹. This meant that whilst the economic situation and the consequences of poor administration were common to citizens from all ethnic groups, the imposition of a nation State dominated by a single ethnic group worsened the living conditions of the minorities, who continued to express their social discontent in terms of an ethnic conflict.³⁰ Another problem was that the proportional

²⁸ See E.Lemberg, «Die Nationalitätenfrage im Donauma auf Grund der Pariser Vorortverträge», in H.Rössler (ed.), *Ideologie und Machtpolitik 1919. Plan und Werk der Pariser Friedenskonferenz*, Göttingen, 1966, 126-166. Magyar intolerance reached its peak with the Schools Law of 1907, which established, in practice, the monopoly of Hungarian culture. On the reaction of Czech nationalism, which eventually considered the whole of Bohemia to be ethnically Czech, see E.Lemberg, «Volksbegriff und Staatsideologie der Tschechen», *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*, 8 (1959), 161-197; and J.Koralka, «La nazione ceca e il problema delle minoranze nazionali dell'impero asburgico», *Studi Trentini di Scienze Storiche*, vol.63 (1984), 231-246.

²⁹ See the brilliant report written by Lord W.H.Dickinson, *The position of the minorities in Eastern Europe*, 14.9.1921 (Archives of the League of Nations, Geneva, 41/22882/22882).

³⁰ I. Déák has even claimed that «the only people to benefit from the dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy were nationalist politicians and people profiting from the new public payrolls; these large groups entered

parliamentary system established in the majority of the new States failed to guarantee minority access to Government. An exception to this were the Sudeten Germans, who, rather than considering themselves as a national minority, saw themselves as one of the three main ethnic groups in a multinational State, and because of their economic weight, demographic potential and social prestige were able to exercise considerable influence upon the balance of power in the Czech State (through their parliamentary and political participation). This ability to defend their interests directly was the reason for the Sudeten Germans' lack of interest in international formulae for the defence of minority rights in the 1920s and much of the 1930s. However in most cases national minorities were in a less favourable position, both numerically and, excepting the case of Jews and Baltic Germans, socially. For example, most Germans in Poland and Hungary lived off agriculture (more than 70 % in the former case), as did Ukrainians and Belorussians, Ruthenians and the Magyars in Transylvania.³¹ The majority law in parliamentary elections meant that parties representing national minorities were blocked from participating in State governments.³² One way of getting round this limit to political representation, which was only relatively successful, was the creation of «minority fronts», electoral alliances between parties representing different national minorities. This formula was followed in the 1920s by non-Germanic minorities in Germany - the Poles, Lithuanians, Sorbs and Frisians set up the *Verband der nationalen Minderheiten Deutschlands* - as well as national minorities in Poland (Germans, Ukrainians and Belorussians).³³ But the general tendency in the interwar period towards the establishment of authoritarian regimes in most of the East-Central European States aggravated the situation of national minorities, often victims of openly repressive and culturally discriminatory policies.³⁴ In the 1930s, the decline of liberal democracy as a system of government in the majority of Central European States (with the notable exception of Czechoslovakia) was added to the effects of the economic crisis of 1929 and the dominance within the national minorities of a new generation of leaders

the service of the new states as bureaucrats, soldiers, or managers of the vast and increasingly important system of state-owned estates and enterprises» (I.Déak, «Uncovering Eastern Europe's dark history», *Orbis*, Winter 1990, 51-65).

³¹ See for example S.M.Horak, «Belorussian and Ukrainian peasants in Poland, 1919-1939: A case-study in peasantry under foreign rule», in I.Volgyes (ed.), *The peasantry of Eastern Europe. I.Roots of rural transformation*, New York, 1978, 133-156.

³² See E.Viefhaus, «Nationale Autonomie und parlamentarische Demokratie», in K.Kluxen/W.J.Mommsen (eds.), *Politische Ideologien und nationalstaatliche Ordnung*, Munich-Vienna, 1968, 131-141.

³³ See for example P.Korzec, «Der Block der nationalen Minderheiten im Parlamentarismus Polens des Jahres 1922», *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*, 24 (1975), 193-220; id., «Der zweite Block der nationalen Minderheiten im Parlamentarismus Polen 1927-28», *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*, 26 (1977), 76-116.

³⁴ See the overview by M.Kozminski, «Nationalism, national minorities and dictatorial regimes in East-Central Europe in the years 1918-1939», in J.Zarnowski et al. (eds.), *Dictatorships in East-Central Europe 1918-1939. Anthologies*, Wrocław, 1983, 123-146.

favouring radical and antidemocratic solutions. The formation of «parliamentary blocs» between different minorities was seen as less and less useful in Poland and Rumania, and national minorities sought to press their claims through different means, leading inevitably to a radicalisation of conflicts and even totalitarian sympathies within the minorities, seeking the support of their *Mutterländer*.

Certain legislative and economic measures decreed by the new States particularly affected the situation of national minorities and stirred up the national question. First of all, the process of nationalisation of the State administration, which implied amongst other things that functionaries of the dominant ethnic group were sent to the areas inhabited by the national minorities, aggravating the difficult relations between them and the new States. This measure was accompanied, in practice, by an increasing nationalisation of education, despite the clauses in the Minorities Treaties protecting minority cultures.³⁵ One of the most important economic measures, which from the beginning of the 1920s on became one of the main causes of conflict in relations between majorities and minorities, was the agrarian reforms followed in several States (particularly in the Baltic States, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania). These reforms had partly technical objectives - a fairer distribution of agrarian property creating a solid base of peasant-proprietors, in accordance with the generally held belief in the need for a class of small holders as an incentive to agrarian modernisation, and as a social barrier against the spread of Communism. But this latter aspect was not the only political objective; the reforms were also aimed to undermining the economic power of the national minorities in those areas where they owned agrarian property. This aim was not explicit, but it was implicit in the practical application of the reforms, which in the 1920s came to have an instrumental role in the national homogenisation of the new States. Many of the big and medium landowners in these States belonged to national minorities (the German Barons of Estonia and Latvia, the Hungarian nobility in Slovakia and Transylvania...), and the reforms were intended to deprive them of their power. In the former case, the big German landowners were expropriated without compensation, whilst in the latter, measures were taken whereby

³⁵ See McCartney, *National states*, cit., 383-389. As this author asserts: «The new states were not ideal structures but national states, and, what was more, strongly nationalist states, inevitably they seized with both hands the ample opportunities which the times offered them to reduce the minorities, not to a footing of equality with themselves, but to a state as near impotence as could then be achieved. The administration was converted as rapidly as possible. The senior posts were filled almost exclusively from the members of the new majority, while such of the junior officials as were left in their jobs had to resign themselves to the prospect of occupying subordinate positions for the rest of their careers, with the knowledge that every pretext would be taken to retire them as early as possible (...). In particular, minority officials were transferred, where practicable, to places distant from their own people. The administration of minority districts, on the other hand, was centralised and étatised as far as possible».

people suspected of «hostility» towards the dominant national group were refused compensation, or members of the minority were set a higher price to buy the expropriated land. In Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia a policy of creation of colonies for ex-combatants was followed; this meant the creation of settlements of members of the majority ethnic group in areas of national minority peasant population and in border zones (such as Polish Pomerania). At best the compensations offered to members of the minority group were almost always much less than the real value of the expropriated land. As J. Lucien-Brun asserted in 1923, «partout l'expropriation cache un vol».³⁶ The agrarian problem was to be one of the main reasons for the active intervention in these countries of States such as Germany, through a secret financing system which guaranteed the survival of German peasants in Poland.³⁷ As Carl Bruns, legal consultant for German minorities and advisor in the Wilhelmstrasse pointed out, «There is no area in which minority law is so scientifically and practically useful for the resolution of important problems as agrarian policy».³⁸

Similarly, in some States religious persecution was also used against national minorities, partly hidden within agrarian reform (the reform was directed too towards expropriating the land of non-majority Churches, thus attacking one of the most important institutions on which minority cultural identity was based, under the guise of the secularisation of the State and property),³⁹ and partly through restrictions on public worship of certain religions (as in Catholic Poland). On top of this discrimination came the open anti-semitism of some Governments: several States, such as Hungary, introduced restrictions on the access of certain ethnic minorities to higher education,

³⁶ J. Lucien-Brun, *Le problème des minorités devant le Droit international*, Paris, 1923, 199-200. There are very few comparative or specific studies on the effects of agrarian reforms on national minorities in the States of East-Central Europe. There are general references in J. Díaz del Moral, *Las reformas agrarias de la posguerra, 1919-1929*, Madrid, 1931; W. Abel/G. Franz (eds.), *Europäische Bauernparteien im 20. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart/New York, 1977. For the case of Rumania, see F. Veiga, *La mística del ultranacionalismo (Historia de la Guardia de Hierro). Rumanía, 1919-1941*, Barcelona, 1989, 34-35; D. Mitraný, *The land and the peasant in Rumania: The war and the agrarian reform (1917-1921)*, London/New Haven, 1930; for the case of Latvia, see M. Lapradelle, *La réforme agraire en Lettonie et le droit des minorités*, Geneva, 1925 and H.-J. Wolff, *Die Rechtsbrüche zum Nachteil der deutschen Volksgruppe in Lettland 1919-1939*, Berlin, 1941, 25-48.

³⁷ See N. Krekeler, *Revisionsanspruch und geheime Ostpolitik der Weimarer Republik. Die Subventionierung der deutschen Minderheit in Polen, 1919-1933*, Stuttgart, 1973.

³⁸ C. G. Bruns, «Minderheitenrecht und Agrarrecht», in Id., *Gesammelte Schriften zur Minderheitenfrage*, Berlin, 1933, 148-158.

³⁹ A paradigmatic case was that of Rumanian agrarian reform, which caused the Lutheran Church to lose two thirds of its property. This particularly affected the continuity of German Protestant schools under Church protection. The German Catholics of the Banat, for example, were better able to resist the offensive of cultural rumanisation because their Catholic Church - like the Hungarian - was able to retain most of its property. See Castellan, «The Germans», cit., 57-58.

particularly through the adoption of a *numerus clausus* restricting their direct access to universities.⁴⁰

This series of problems affecting minorities appeared to indicate the existence of shared interests, although the differences in social structure, cultural traditions, etc., made different policies necessary in some concrete cases. The internationalisation of minority problems after the First World War was made possible by the existence of a supranational organisation - the League of Nations - with (limited) competences in the protection of ethnic minority rights. This was combined with what was left of the *Zeitgeist* created by the proclamation of the principle of nationalities and by Wilsonism during the war. All that meant that a relatively new political dimension opened up after 1919, along with the idea of a pan-European solution, based on theoretical principles inherited from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which could reconcile political stability in the continent with respect for national rights. The framework chosen for the internationalisation of the minorities problem was to be the League of Nations and the international organisations which formed part of its *entourage*; this programme would involve the assertion of the principle of cultural autonomy based on individual's free belonging to a nationality, and the separation of the political from the cultural sphere. These solutions, although they were mainly conceived for the East-Central European context, also began to interest some ethnonationalist movements in Western Europe.⁴¹

II

The internationalisation of minority rights under the auspices of the League of Nations was the solution adopted after the Versailles Conference. The nationality problem and the intensification of ethnic rivalries was seen by European public opinion and Western statesmen as threatening another war if they were not resolved.⁴² At the

⁴⁰ This measure was particularly severe in the case of Jews, as anti-semitism had deep social and historical roots in both Hungary and Rumania. For this latter case, see Veiga, *La mística*, cit., 54-58.

⁴¹ See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., and id., «Il nazionalismo catalano e la diplomazia spagnola di fronte al sistema di protezione delle minoranze nazionali della Società delle Nazioni (1919-1930)», *Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali*, VI:2 (1993), forthcoming. In fact, some situations in Western Europe were very similar to those occurring in Eastern Europe. The most obvious case was Italy and its behaviour towards Slav and German minorities. See W. Adler, *Die Minderheitenpolitik des italienischen Faschismus in Südtirol und im Aostatal 1922-1929*, Phil. Dissertation, Universität Trier, 1979.

⁴² As MacCartney wrote (*National states*, cit., p.211), «...taken all in all, the number of persons left as, or made into, minorities by the Peace Treaties was probably not less than some 25-30 millions, constituting the substantial proportion of some 20-25 per cent of the populations of the States to which they were assigned (...). Together, they constituted a problem with which the Peace Conference could not escape dealing».

same time, however, the basic principle of protecting the sovereignty of States was to be respected, in order to avoid dangerous precedents which could affect the West.⁴³ The ultimate aim of the Allied Governments was a long term political aim: to defuse the nationality question, creating, at the same time, the international conditions for a gradual and peaceful integration of the various minorities within their new States, whilst maintaining a tolerant attitude towards their autochthonous cultures. The criterion of maintaining the balance of power at all costs was respected, however, and neither Italy nor Germany were forced to guarantee the rights of their own minorities. The end result was the exclusion of the rights and obligations of national minorities from the various Peace Treaties; instead specific Minority Treaties were signed separately by several East European States (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, the Baltic States). The first minorities treaty was signed by Poland in June 1919.⁴⁴ Several more followed, under the guarantee of the League of Nations, which began to establish a procedure stipulating the right of petition of the minorities before the League of Nations in questions of breach or threatened breach of the rights laid down in the Treaty, with a committee of three members named by the Council of the League for the study of these petitions. As Sierpowski points out, «the idea of including in treaties the imposition of minority obligations on individual states, whether new or considerably enlarged, should be seen as a kind of compensation for the unfulfilled hopes evoked by the idea of national self-determination».⁴⁵

The legal and political principles of an effective system of protection were subject to a certain ambiguity. On the one hand, the treaties did not recognise national minorities as legal subjects; they simply protected individuals belonging to a race, linguistic group or religion different to the majority group of the State they lived in.

⁴³ See A.Sharp, «Britain and the protection of minorities in 1918», in A.C.Hepburn (ed.), *Minorities in history*, London, 1978, 171-188; G.W.Egerton, *Great Britain and the creation of the League of Nations. Strategy, politics and international organisation*, London, 1979, 96-97.

⁴⁴ J.Zarnowski, «Le système de protection des minorités et la Pologne», *Acta Poloniae Historica*, n.52 (1985), 105-124.

⁴⁵ S.Sierpowski, «Minorities in the system of the League of Nations», in P.Smith (ed), *Ethnic groups*, cit., 13-37 (quote on p.13). On the evolution and functioning of the system, see, amongst others, R.Veatch, «Minorities and the League of Nations», in V.A., *The League of Nations in retrospect*, Berlin/New York, 1983, 369-383; C.Gütermann, *Das Minderheitenschutzverfahren des Völkerbundes*, Berlin, 1979; P.Thornberry, *International Law and the rights of minorities*, Oxford, 1991, 38-52; and S.Barsch, «Le système de protection des minorités dans la Société des Nations», in A.Liebich/A.Reszler (dir.), *L'Europe centrale et ses minorités: vers une solution européenne?*, Geneva, 1993, 37-50. A list of the different treaties and juridical instruments of the system for the protection of minorities can be found in League of Nations, *Protection of linguistic, racial and religious minorities by the League of Nations. Provisions contained in the various international instruments at present in force*, Geneva, 1927; also L.Mair, *The protection of minorities. The working and scope of the minorities treaties under the League of Nations*, London, 1928.

However, there was no additional definition of the meaning of «national minority», since the term «race» was in practice used to mean membership of a certain ethnic group, and it was assumed that religion and language were sufficient to identify a minority.⁴⁶ The States subject to the system of protection were obliged to guarantee equal and complete protection of the life and freedom of all their inhabitants, and in districts and cities where there was a high proportion of individuals whose mother tongue was not the official State language, the States were to help maintain an education system in that language. Of course in return for this the national minorities were to remain loyal to the States in which they lived, ensuring peaceful coexistence and cooperation with the ethnic majorities. The ultimate objective of the Treaties was the preservation of peace and geo-political stability in East-Central Europe. Moreover, since the authors of the Treaties studied the problem of national minorities in the East in terms of familiar realities in the West, the Treaties often contained rather vague provisions, especially in educational or linguistic matters (for instance, it was supposed that the minorities would always adopt the official language of the State for «wider spheres of activity», as in Wales or Brittany).⁴⁷

The fundamental principles of the system for the protection of minorities were very confused and cautious, but they offered an effective basis for the system to operate, as long as there was a genuine political will on the part of the member States of the League of Nations to put them into practice. This simply meant that problems of International Law acquired strongly political relevance.

The legal procedure for the system for the protection of minorities was consolidated in the 1920s, under the pressures of various States, the League of Nations movement, and the minority organisations themselves. The role of the Council of the League of Nations within the system and its procedure became decisive.⁴⁸ However,

⁴⁶ A paradigmatic case of this was the controversy provoked by several petitions from Macedonia, to which the Yugoslav Government denied the existence of a «Bulgarian minority» in the area. Between 1924 and 1933, several minorities committees dealt with petitions filed by Macedonians, avoiding any declarations on the existence of a national minority in that area. Veatch rightly states that minority rights «were defined in sweeping and unequivocal terms. In general, they required the States concerned to give their nationals equal civil and political rights, without distinction as to race, language or religion. In addition to individual rights, group rights were also protected, whereby minorities would be able to maintain their own religious, social and educational institutions, and to receive an equitable share of state funds provided for such activities» (Veatch, «Minorities», cit., p.371).

⁴⁷ See MacCartney, *National states*, cit., p.282.

⁴⁸ The procedure underwent several changes during the 1920s. As a result of the report written by the Italian delegate Tittoni and approved by the Council in October 1920, individuals or associations belonging to national minorities won the right to report breaches directly to the Council. The *Comités des Trois*, made up of three members of the Council cooperating with the Secretariat, were set up to examine and decide upon the petitions sent to Geneva denouncing violations of the Treaties. But the

to a great extent the daily work of this complex system was centred around the Secretariat of the League, in its minorities section.⁴⁹ Until 1923, the Council devoted 15 % of its meetings to minority questions, a percentage which grew progressively until 1929 and beyond. In 1933, more than 50 % of the Council's meetings dealt with minority questions, and in 1934 33 %. The Annual Assemblies of the League also dealt with this subject.

In general, the problem of national minorities provoked several important debates within the League of Nations, and was one of its most controversial spheres of action. The minority question was easily manipulated and exploited by those States most affected by territorial losses after the First World War (Germany, Hungary), and which to differing degrees maintained revisionist objectives. On the other hand States such as Spain, France or Italy consistently opposed any extension of the obligations contained in the Treaties signed by members of the League of Nations. The States subject to minority treaties saw them and the system of protection in general as a flagrant attack on their sovereignty, and responded by advocating the general application of the treaties to all member States; this was proposed by delegates to the League's Annual Assemblies such as Gilbert Murray (representing South Africa, in 1922), or Dandurand (representing Canada, in 1929), and the Pro-League movement in general, which in the 1920s and 1930s became quite influential, especially in countries such as the United Kingdom.⁵⁰ The Geneva debates on the minority question were followed in the late 1920s by the actively pro-minority policy followed by Germany under Chancellor Stresemann, which in 1929 marked the culmination of international pressure in favour of the extension of national minority rights, although the ambitious aims of the German «Champion of Minorities» - partly a response to internal pressures from the *völkisch* Right - were of less consequence than initially

minorities' right to appeal to Council carried no juridical obligation for the Council to act: in fact, petitions could only be regarded as informative. The petitionary received no information on the steps being taken in relation to the petition, and the State allegedly responsible for the breach was informed of the minority's claims, and was allowed a period of time in order to formulate comments and observations. As a result of pressures from the States covered by the Treaties, in 1923 the Council resolved to stipulate carefully the way in which petitions should be presented: they could not contain strong language or be based on false or unknown sources, they had to be consistent with the principles laid down in the Treaties, refer to facts not previously mentioned in any other petition, and they could not express separatist objectives.

⁴⁹ The Presidents of this section were E.Colban (1920-1927), E.Aguirre de Cárcer (1928-1930), P. de Azcárate (1930-1933), H.Rosting (1934-36) and the Dane Peter Schou. See the books by Azcárate, *League of Nations and national minorities. An experiment*, New York, 1945, and *La Société des Nations et la protection des minorités*, Geneva, 1969.

⁵⁰ See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 206-253; S.Sierpowski, «Le mouvement de soutien à la Société des Nations dans les années 1919-1926», *Acta Poloniae Historica*, n.48 (1983), 165-193.

thought.⁵¹ After these attempts, the German Government continued to press - although with less intensity - for a revision of the minorities protection procedure, but the procedure was not further modified until 1933; between 1933 and 1939 the Geneva system fell into decline as a result of Hitler's rise to power in Germany, the tensions between Germany and Poland, and the increasingly evident inability of the League of Nations to use minority law to stop anti-semitic persecution. The withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations (1934) and the unilateral renouncement of the Minorities Treaty by Poland (1934), led to the paralysis of the first effective attempt at internationalising the problem of national minorities. The fact that the minorities themselves did not play an active role in the procedure (which led to their being represented by the States) also encouraged the growing politicisation of minority conflicts. Moreover, the procedure took too long, left the States considerable room for manoeuvre in defending their interests, and above all, what definitively wrecked the system was the fact the States likely to breach the provisions of the Treaties were mostly linked through the system of alliances to the great powers which dominated the Council of the League of Nations (such as the so-called *Petite Entente* dominated by France).⁵²

There were two issues relating to the procedures and application of the system for minority protection which caused particular conflict amongst the Member States of the League of Nations: 1) the possible creation of a Permanent Commission on Minorities within the League, similar to the Commission on Colonial Mandates, a proposal which was always opposed by the States subject to Minority Treaties (but with support from a varied collection of foreign diplomats); 2) the extension of the obligations contained in the Minority Treaties to all the Member States of the League of Nations. This demand gave smaller States a number of possibilities for manoeuvre (for example Latvia or Poland).

⁵¹ See C.Fink, «Defender of minorities. Germany in the League of Nations, 1926-1933», *Central European History*, V:4 (1972), 330-357; id., «Stresemann's minority policies 1924-29», *Journal of Contemporary History*, 14 (1979), 4-3-422; H.Pieper, *Die Minderheitenfrage und das Deutsche Reich, 1919-1933/34*, Hamburg, 1974; B.Schot, *Nation oder Staat? Deutschland und der Minderheitenschutz. Zur Völkerbundpolitik der Stresemann-Ära*, Marburg a.Lahn, 1988. The works on Hungarian politics are less satisfactory: G.C.Paikert, «Hungary's national minorities policies, 1920-1945», *American Slavic and East European Review*, XII:2 (1953), 201-218, and L.Tilkowsky, *Nationalitätenpolitische Richtungen in Ungarn in der gegenrevolutionären Epoche (1919-1945)*, Budapest, 1975.

⁵² As indicated by the report sent by Quai d'Orsay to the French delegation to the League of Nations, on the subject of the petition filed in 1923 by Magyar landowners in Rumania over agrarian reform: «La réclamation des Hongrois est fondée en droit, mais les Roumains sont nos amis». Cit. by Bogdan, «Le problème», cit., p.84.

The annexation of the Sudetenlands by Germany in March 1938 was the *coup de grâce* for the League's system for minority protection. After 1932, the number of petitions received by the Secretariat fell into decline, and in 1935-1936 only 15 were filed (compared with 204 in 1930-31); in December 1939, only 7 issues were awaiting consideration by the Council of the League.

The number of petitions between 1921 and 1939 reached 950, of which 550 were followed up. Most of them came from minorities in Poland (especially Germans) and in Rumania. The year when most petitions were received was 1930-31 (305, of which 153 were followed up).⁵³ The petitions filed dealt with a broad range of subjects: the suppression of minorities' private schools by the State authorities; restrictions in the official use of minority languages; issues arising from the application of agrarian reform laws to the detriment of minorities; the denial of citizenship by State authorities, and even acts of violence and terrorism perpetrated against national minorities. The fact that authoritarianism was the dominant tendency in East-Central Europe left minorities in an even worse situation, and to an extent led to hope for a *völkerrechtlich* international solution which would guarantee their right to cultural autonomy. One of the first problems that the League of Nations had to face was that of agrarian reform, which caused a growing number of petitions from 1920 onwards. Some partial successes were obtained (for instance, in 1922 the Polish Government withdrew a law which was particularly damaging to big German landowners, the replacement law being approved by Geneva in 1925). However, although in these cases the Secretariat of the League of Nations attempted to gather information on the practical effects that the application of reforms would have on the situation of minorities, in practice the Council tended to allow the reforms to be put into effect.⁵⁴ Moreover, the fact that Germans and Hungarians figured amongst the most assiduous petitionaries - there were few petitions from Jews, for instance - shows the destiny of this system, «used progressively by 'strong minorities', conscious of belonging to a wider community and unhappy at their subjection to 'inferior' peoples».⁵⁵ The role of the Council of the League of Nations was purely political, that of the Secretariat, technical and that of

⁵³ See Gütermann, op.cit., p.346, and J.Robinson, *Were the minorities treaties a failure?*, New York, 1943, p.128. 100 petitions were received from Upper Silesia (under the protection of article 147 of the Geneva Convention), 29 from the German part and 71 from the Polish. In this area special offices were set up in Katowice and Opole in order to deal with petitions relating to minority issues, and which in the period 1922-37 dealt with more than 13,000 cases, most of them presented by Germans.

⁵⁴ There are few detailed studies on this aspect of the activity of the League of Nations. One can only refer to B.Schot, «Nationale Autonomie und demokratischer Einheitsstaat. Das Dilemma der deutschen Minderheitenpolitik der Weimarer Ära», in V.A., *Deutsche, Slaven und Balten: Aspekte des Zusammenlebens im Osten des deutschen Reiches und in Ostmitteleuropa*, Bonn, 1989, 159-160.

⁵⁵ Thornberry, *International law*, cit., p.46.

the Assembly, almost symbolic. The International Court of Justice at the Hague only intervened in 7 cases relating to minority petitions, giving «advisory opinions». Detailed analyses of the relation between the domestic policies towards minorities of some States and the examination of minority petitions in Poland-Lithuania, the Sudetenlands and Transylvania lead to similar conclusions: the League of Nations tended to institutionalise the procedure as far as possible, and at the same time prevent any risk of conflict, avoiding the adoption of excessively specific or committed positions in favour of minority claims.⁵⁶

Not every State's domestic policy caused the same number of petitions before the League of Nations. The distribution of petitions between States and the reasons for them are an interesting indicator: Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia were barely responsible for any violations (no more than a small number in relation to agrarian reform in the Baltic States); other States did give rise to a greater number of petitions, but refused to cooperate with the League of Nations for reasons of international and territorial politics (Lithuania - embittered by the intervention of the League in favour of Poland during the conflict over Vilnius in 1923 - or Turkey); there were also States which caused numerous breaches, but who were relatively cooperative with the League of Nations procedures (Albania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Germany). Most petitions referred to cases of agrarian reform and educational and cultural discrimination. Two cases were particularly controversial: the Czech refusal to grant territorial autonomy (stipulated in the Minorities Treaty) to the Ukrainians of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia; and the Hungarian law of «*numerus clausus*» directed against the entry of Jewish students in universities. A fourth group of States caused a continuous flow of petitions from minorities, but only cooperated, and reluctantly, when pressurised to do so (Rumania, Poland and Greece). Above all, Germans and Hungarians were the cause of a flood of petitions, again relating to issues of agrarian property and autochthonous schooling. After 1931, a large number of petitions were received from Ukrainians and Bulgarians in the Dobrudja.

Was the system for the protection of minorities in the interwar period a failure? The answer is yes, but the reasons for its failure must be sought in the conditions and political limitations imposed by the manoeuvres and balances of international politics,

⁵⁶ See K.Zydowicz, *The League of Nations and national problems in North-Eastern Europe, 1920-1940*, June Paper, EUI, Florence, 1991; B.Schmid-Egger, «Völkerbund und Sudetendeutsche 1920-1926», in V.A., *Ein Leben-drei Epochen. Festschrift für Hans Schütz zum 70. Geburtstag*, Munich, 1971, 385-415; and M.R.Mouton, *La Société des Nations et la protection des minorités. L'exemple de la Transylvanie, 1920-1928*, Thèse de Doctorat, Univ de Grenoble, 1969.

rather than in the intrinsic nature of the mechanisms established by the League of Nations. These mechanisms could be considered as a first step towards the creation of an efficient system, through their progressive application and reform. The tensions which defined the international situation, particularly in Europe, in the period 1919-1939, and the crisis of liberal democracy, were decisive for the fate of national minorities, which were transformed into new sources of conflict.

III

National minorities (or, to be precise, their official or semi-official representatives) did take a series of initiatives outside the framework of the official system, taking advantage of the legal and political protection provided by the system. These initiatives were directed at sectors of Western public opinion (non-Governmental organisations, as they would be called today, which constituted the movement in support of the League of Nations) and the diplomatic strategies of more or less revisionist States (above all, Hungary and Germany). These initiatives aimed at extending the achievements of the system for protection of minorities, improving the conditions of minorities through the sensitisation of public opinion and the Member States of the League of Nations, and playing the role of mediators of the interests of the national minorities in the international sphere. The ideological principles governing their activities, despite their utopian aspects, are still relevant today, since they form a link with the tradition of Austrian social democratic thought and some Sionist thinkers, whose objective was to reconcile the existence of States and the freedom of national groups.

Independent initiatives of cooperation between the political representatives of the oppressed nationalities did have precedents dating back to before 1918. Apart from the various attempts at forming internal alliances in some States (an example would be the collaboration of Basque, Catalan and Galician nationalists in Spain), at the end of the 19th century the Austro-Hungarian Empire had already seen the creation of a «Congress of Nationalities», formed in 1895 by Rumanians, Slovaks and Serbs, who met in Budapest to protest against the policy followed by the Hungarian Government, although only a joint coordination committee emerged from this, which folded in 1899.⁵⁷ In 1912 the *Union des Nationalités* was founded in Paris, which

⁵⁷ See K.Hitchins, «The Rumanians of Transylvania and the Congress of Nationalities», *The Slavonic and East European Review*, XLVIII:112 (1970), 388-402. This organisation planned to follow a campaign of international pressure through the Interparliamentary Union and international pacifist organisations.

at first included numerous national movements from East-Central Europe, and even some from Western Europe (such as the Catalans), pacifist organisations and figures from Western political and intellectual life. However during the war the Union, exiled in Switzerland, fell gradually under the control of the Lithuanian nationalist Paul Gabrys. The Union des Nationalités only survived until 1919, as its initial aim of becoming the official representative and mediator of oppressed nationalities at the Peace Conference was not fulfilled. However, its theoretical proposals prior to 1918 did contain interesting principles, especially the need to achieve an international solution guaranteeing the rights of national minorities.⁵⁸ Other international organisations, emerging from the international pacifist movement and liberal European public opinion, presented themselves before 1914 as defenders of the principle of self-determination and the rights of national minorities in Europe: examples of this are the *Ligue Internationale pour la Défense des Peuples*, founded in 1910 in Paris, or the *Organisation Centrale pour une Paix Durable*, founded in 1915, as well as the various congresses of pacifist organisations and the first steps of the pro-League of Nations movement since the end of the 19th century.⁵⁹ All of them were to a greater or lesser extent in favour of respect for the freedom of small nations and tolerance towards the rights of national minorities, as an integral part of a new world in which Peace would reign.

The new dimension which national problems acquired after the First World War, especially in view of the internationalisation of the rights of minorities under the protection of the League of Nations, as well as the *Zeitgeist* linked to the Wilsonian ideal of respect for the self-determination of peoples, contributed to a significant extent to the emergence of new initiatives for the articulation of European nationalities organisations in the early 1920s. These attempts continued to be related to the activities of pacifist and non-governmental organisations and movements in support of the League of Nations which also extended their influence in the post-war period, such as the *Union Internationales des Associations pour la Société des Nations* (UIA), the Interparliamentary Union, the International Law Association, etc. At the beginning of the 1920s, a *Bureau International pour la Défense du Droit des Peuples* was formed in Geneva, promoted by ex-members of the *Union des Nationalités*, and figures linked to the Union of Democratic Control.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ For the evolution of the Union des Nationalités, see Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 93-134. The Union used the journal *Annales des nationalités*, later titled *Tribune libre des Nationalités* (1912-1919), as a mouthpiece.

⁵⁹ See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 141-160.

⁶⁰ See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 209-210. This Bureau published an occasional journal, *Le Droit des Peuples*, and in fact seemed to be sustained by Polish money, since at all times it defended the right of Poland to create a «Great Poland». In September 1921 a *Congrès International pour la Défense des Droits des Peuples* was held, but few activities appear to have taken place in subsequent years. See R. Claparède, *L'Organisation de la lutte pour le droit des peuples*, Geneva, 1921.

But the most important attempts came from the national minorities themselves, especially the best organised, the German minorities, who had more material support and a greater national consciousness. After 1919, several organisations had been created inside Germany, mostly encouraged by or in close collaboration with the intellectual and political circles of the *völkisch* Right, and the many associations and *Vereine* in support of Germans abroad (the *Auslandsdeutsche*), such as the *Deutscher Schutzbund*, the *Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland* (VDA), founded in 1881; the *Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland*, and many other associations, scientific institutes, etc.⁶¹ The ideology permeating this network of organisations in support of German minorities abroad moved between the ideal of bringing all Germans together in a single State - including the *Anschluss* - and the nostalgia for pre-capitalistic forms of social organisation: Germans abroad came to be regarded as the paradigm of Germanness, because of their traditional corporative organisation (*ständisch*), particularly strong in the Baltic States. Whilst using a vocabulary similar to Wilsonism or classical national movements (self-determination etc.), the most prominent German ideologues of nationality rights and the *Volkstumsideologie*, usually members of the circles belonging to the so-called Conservative Revolution, such as Max-Hildebert Boehm, advocated a geo-political reorganisation of the European continent on the basis of genuine ethnic nationalities, on occasion defending positions very close to what is today known as the «Europe of the Free Nations», although the German conservative thinkers gave a prominent role to the German people in this utopian ethnic restructuring of Europe.⁶² The existence of this private network of political and cultural support organisations was naturally complemented by the official policy of protection of German minorities abroad followed by the German Foreign Ministry, making economic and political support available for their compatriots (within the limits of the Weimar Republic's economic weakness).

The first attempts to internationalise the minority problem stemmed from the German minorities themselves, although in the early 1920s a number of «unofficial

⁶¹ See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 254-283. See also, apart from numerous monographs, P.Lévy, *Le Germanisme à l'étranger*, Strasbourg, 1933; K.H.Grundmann, *Deutschtumspolitik zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik. Eine Studie am Beispiel der deutschen baltischen Minderheit in Estland und Lettland*, Hannover-Dören, 1977; see also the account of an activist, M.-H. Boehm, «Die Reorganisation der Deutschtumsarbeit nach dem ersten Weltkrieg», *Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft*, V (1958).

⁶² See R.Jaworski, «Der Auslandsdeutsche Gedanke in der Weimarer Republik», *Annali dell'Istituto Storico Italo-Germanico in Trento*, IV (1978), 369-386; W.Emmerich, *Zur Kritik der Volkstumsideologie*, Frankfurt, 1971. See also, as examples of the European projects of nationality reorganisation held by the main ideologues of the *Auslandsdeutsche* movement, M.-H.Boehm, *Europa irredenta. Eine Einführung in das Nationalitätenproblem der Gegenwart*, Berlin, 1923; M.-H.Boehm, *Das eigenständige Volk. Grundlegung und Elemente einer europäischen Völkerideologie*, Darmstadt, 1965 (1932); K.Trampler/K.Haushofer (eds.), *Deutschlands Weg an der Zeitenwende*, Munich, 1931; K.Trampler, *Staaten und nationale Gemeinschaften. Eine Lösung des europäischen Minderheiten-Problems*, Munich-Berlin, 1929.

diplomats» set themselves up as intermediaries between the German minorities and the League of Nations, through the creation of consultative bureaus, offices for the handling of petitions to Geneva, etc. The colourful Baltic German aristocrat Baron Heyking, who had been a diplomat for the old Tzarist Empire, aspired, in the early 1920s, to be seen as the genuine representative of the interests of the German minorities at the League of Nations, through an intense personal campaign in diplomatic circles and in the UIA, but his plans, responding to the interests of the big Baltic-German rural proprietors, failed to prosper.⁶³ Other more charismatic leaders with greater support within the German minorities came to prominence. Between 1921 and 1924 various German opinion leaders, and ideologues and representatives of the German minorities began to talk of the need for a Europe-wide coordination in defence of the interests of the Germanness abroad and the rest of the national minorities in the continent.⁶⁴ The first step was the creation of the *Verband der deutschen Minderheiten*, a joint initiative of the German groups in the Baltic States (Estonia and Latvia), which mainly represented the interests of the German merchants and urban bourgeoisie. These groups preferred to follow the path of understandings with the ethnic and legal majorities, and worked together with the *Verband der Deutschen in Rumänien* of Rudolf Brandsch, in part through the mediating role of the *Deutscher Schutzbund* in Germany.⁶⁵ The First European Conference of German Minorities was held in October 1922 in Vienna, in accordance with a detailed programme drawn up by Ewald Ammende, a German minority leader from Estonia. This programme asserted the legalistic and non-revisionist aims of the organisation, its willingness to cooperate with other international organisations in defence of minority rights, the setting of common objectives, the creation, if necessary of a permanent office or representation in order to defend the interests of German minorities, and the intention of increasing cooperation with other nationalities.⁶⁶ The organisation was at first

⁶³ See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 284-293. For Heyking's points of view see id., *La Conception de l'Etat et l'idée de la cohésion ethnique. Le point de vue du Droit public et des Gens*, Paris, 1927.

⁶⁴ See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 293-94. One example is C.Morocutti, *Europa und die völkischen Minderheiten*, Jena, 1925.

⁶⁵ See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 295-307, for the early years of the *Verband der deutschen Minderheiten*. For Baltic-German internal politics and the origins of the idea, see also M.Garleff, *Deutsch-baltische Politik zwischen den Weltkriegen. Die parlamentarische Tätigkeit von deutschbaltischen Parteien in Lettland und Estland*, Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 1976. The dialectic between the «opposition» and «collaboration» attitudes of the German parties in the Baltic can be seen as an example of the dilemma, indicated by Balling, which faced most Germanic minorities in the continent: the choice between «defensive activity» and «constructive activity». See M.O.Balling, «Einleitung», in Id., *Von Reval bis Bukarest. Statistisch-Biographisches Handbuch der Parlamentarier der deutschen Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa, 1919-1945*, Copenhagen, 1991, Vol.1, xxxvi-xxxvii.

⁶⁶ E.Ammende, *Gründe, Aufgaben und Programm für eine Zusammenkunft der Vertreter aller deutschen Minoritäten in Europa, 20.9.1922* (Archive of the League of Nations, Geneva, 41/24379/24379).

successful and ensured its continuity through annual congresses, with an initially ambivalent relationship with the Wilhelmstrasse, which only became interested in the possibilities of the League of Nations minority protection system towards 1922-23, as a result of the pressure of C.G.Bruns, the juridical advisor of the German minorities, who was based in Berlin. The Verband der deutschen Minderheiten was not the product of the external revisionism of the Weimar Republic; instead it was promoted by minorities - Baltic Germans and Germans in Rumania - who had very little interest in being incorporated into the Reich.⁶⁷

From this beginning, the subsequent successes - or at least they were interpreted as such - of the German parties in the Baltic States in 1924-5, achieving a generous law of cultural autonomy in Estonia in February 1925, and more modest gains (a law of educational autonomy in Latvia),⁶⁸ brought optimism to the plans to internationalisation of national minority claims. The Estonian law of minorities in particular seemed to respond to the principles of cultural autonomy based on the individual's voluntary allegiance which were advocated by the Austrian social democrats at the turn of the century. This law guaranteed cultural autonomy - separate from political autonomy - for members of national minorities, who if they wished could set up their own Cultural Councils, on the basis of the voluntary and individual registration of all the citizens in a «nationality census». These Cultural Councils were responsible for the cultural and educational obligations of the minorities in each district, and could also raise their own taxes; however under no circumstances could they operate in the political arena. It was hoped that in this way the political-administrative sphere could be separated from the cultural sphere, thus «depoliticising» the national question.

The Estonian solution came to be advocated enthusiastically as the ideal model to be applied to all regions of Europe with national conflicts and minority problems. From this initial impulse emerged the pan-European nationalities organisation which, with varying success, aimed at representing the interests of national minorities in Geneva and in diplomatic circles: the Congress of European Nationalities (CEN).⁶⁹

⁶⁷ I do not accept, therefore, the mechanical arguments of the historiography of the former GDR, which considered the Verband and all the subsequent international activity of the minorities as the direct product of German desire for revenge. See M.Rothbarth, «Grenzrevision und Minderheitenpolitik des deutschen Imperialismus», *Jahrbuch für Geschichte*, 1981, 220-223, and A.Czubinski, «Deutschlands Minderheitenpolitik 1918-1945», *Polnische Weststudien*, I;1 (1983), 62-63. In any case, the Wilhelmstrasse followed the movements of the Verband der deutschen Minderheiten, especially through the role of intermediary played by Bruns.

⁶⁸ See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 307-313; H.Weiss, «Der deutsch-baltische Vertrag zur Lösung der Minderheitenfrage in der Zeit zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen», E.G.Schulz (ed.), *Leistung und Schicksal, Abhandlungen und Berichten über die Deutschen im Osten*, Cologne, 1967, 323-329; R.Rühlmann/Jückenstorff, *Das Schulrecht der deutschen Minderheiten in Europa*, Breslau, 1926, 32-48.

⁶⁹ On this organisation, see Núñez, *El problema*, cit., vol.II; previous studies by E.Kelmes, *Der Europäische Nationalitätenkongress (1925-38)*, Phil. Dissertation, Cologne University, 1958; M.Rothbarth, *Der*

There was no shortage of initiatives to form Europe-wide national platforms, some of them in direct competition with the CEN, in the 1920s and 1930s. Many of them were the result of the intrigues between Hungarian diplomacy and the German and Austrian *völkisch* Right,⁷⁰ although a number, such as the *Bureau Central des Minorités* founded in Geneva in 1934 by the exiled leader of the Hungarian Party of Rumania, Gustave de Köver, were fairly stable organisations which even acted as intermediaries in the petitions of Magyar minorities.⁷¹ However, none of these organisations could match the continuity and relevance of the CEN, and neither did they offer ideological alternatives.

The CEN emerged out of the negotiations between Baltic German deputies (Paul Schiemann and Ewald Ammende), the Germans in Transylvania (Rudolf Brandsch) - the promoters of the *Verband der deutschen Volksgruppen* - and political groups of other nationalities: Magyars, Slavs - particularly the Slovenes in Italy, led by the Sloven deputy in Rome Josip Vilfan -, the *Comité des Délégations Juives* in Paris and national groups from Western Europe, such as exiled Catalan nationalists seeking to use diplomatic pressure against the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. The First Conference of European Nationalities, held in Geneva in September 1925, was a great success, despite the reluctance of the Secretariat of the League of Nations and the German diplomacy, and the general lack of optimism. The CEN's structure was that of a permanent liaison, in practice acting parallel to the UIA - most minority leaders involved in the CEN's activities were also involved in the international pro-League of Nations movement, and even in the Interparliamentary Union.

Europäische Minderheitenkongress als Instrument deutscher 'Revisionsstrategie'. Grenzrevision und Minderheitenpolitik des deutschen Imperialismus (1925-1932), Ph.D. Dissertation, Rostock University, 1983; R. Michaelsen, *Der Europäische Nationalitätenkongress (1925-1928). Aufbau, Krise und Konsolidierung*, Frankfurt, 1984. A contextual summary can be found in X.M. Núñez, «Some international aspects of problems of nationalities in interwar Europe (1919-1939)», *Europa Ethnica*, 50:1-2 (1993), 1-23.

⁷⁰ As example we could mention the mysterious *Vereinigung der vergewaltigten Völker* and a Committee for the Protection of Minorities under Magyar sponsorship which was active until 1925, or the project of Viennese Professor Viktor Otte, linked to the Austrian *völkisch* Right, in order to celebrate a «Conference of Oppressed Peoples» in Berlin, using his contacts with exiles from various national groups and the German Government. This project was not approved by the Wilhelmstrasse. See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 463-464.

⁷¹ The Bureau Central des Minorités was without doubt the paradigmatic representative of revisionism amongst the Hungarian minorities, and was almost certainly financed by the Budapest Government. Its aim was to support the diplomatic activity of the Magyar representative in Geneva, Bethlen, and handle the petitions of Magyar minorities, although it also hoped to set a pan-European nationalities organisation, as is revealed in its monthly bulletin, *Minorité-La voix des peuples*, and Köver's book *Non! Genève ne protège pas les minorités nationales!*, Geneva, 1938. A short time after its creation, this Bureau sought the support of German minorities, although with little success. See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., p.540.

During the 1920s, the CEN became the main independent forum of debate for European national minorities (both those subject to the Treaties, and those who were not), and the debates of its annual congresses as well as its general activity provide a good benchmark for the level of discontent and dissatisfaction amongst the various European ethnic minorities towards the international solution implemented by the League of Nations. At the same time the history of the CEN reveals the contradictions and internal cleavages between the European national minorities. The CEN's position towards the subsidies and directives of official German minority policy, especially from 1927 onwards, was one of ambiguous dependency/independence, and in the end it became a mere instrument of German foreign policy after the III Reich's reorganisation of the *Volkstumspolitik* from 1933 onwards. However the history of the CEN is not that of a straightforward link with German diplomacy, and still less one of participation in the global strategy of revenge. It is true that the CEN was manipulated by various actors within the European diplomatic scene of the 1920s and 1930s (the Wilhelmstrasse, the different national movements and political interests of the ethnic minorities within the CEN, etc.). But at the same time it owed its existence to an arena parallel to that of the official diplomacy of the States which emerged within the new international system after Versailles, and to a new way of looking at foreign policy which took account of public opinion and proto-diplomacy in the European concert, encouraged by the existence of the League of Nations. In fact, the CEN at all times defended a legalistic line of respect for International Minority Law, and did not openly defend territorial revisionism or the claims of some discontented nationalist movements (hence its reluctance to accept the Ukrainian and Macedonian nationalist movements between 1925 and 1928). The CEN was much more interested in elaborating an alternative doctrine, a programme for the solution of the nationalities problem in Europe, and this was perhaps its greatest contribution, despite the internal divisions it suffered. However, the CEN contained several contradictory positions: 1) the block of German and Hungarian minorities and their allies; 2) the Slav minorities, represented in particular by the powerful Polish minorities group and the non-German minorities in Germany, who abandoned the Congress in 1928 in protest at the exclusion of the North Friesians as a recognised national minority within the CEN; 3) Jewish minorities, under the control of the leadership of the *Comité des Délégations Juives* in Paris, and who acted in concert with the German minorities until 1933, when the latter failed to condemn the first anti-semitic measures taken in Nazi Germany; 4) an exotic and less relevant group of Western European national movements, in which the Catalan group made a major contribution.

The evolution of the CEN has already been widely studied, but two important turning points are worth mentioning: the first was in 1928-29, when the CEN was

reorganised after the withdrawal of most of the Slav minorities - this marked the high point of the Congress's involvement in the preparations for the big debate on national minorities which took place in the Assembly of the League of Nations, as part of Stresemann's strategy; the second was in 1933, in the IX Conference of the CEN, when the Jewish minorities left, and the organisation began to fall under the control of the minorities policy followed by the III Reich.⁷² The CEN maintained an ambiguous position towards the persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany, as the more liberal sectors of the German minorities left the organisation, as a result of the growth of Nazi influence, joined Paul Schiemann and his short-lived *Deutscher Verband zur Befreiung Europas*.⁷³ Thus, the CEN remained under the influence of the more conservative sectors close to the *völkisch* movement which in Germany had already been absorbed into Nazism - as is shown by the trajectory followed by M.-H.Boehm -, but it still attempted to present itself as the legitimate intermediary of all European national minorities before the League of Nations. Therefore the CEN, in connection with the strategy of friendship with Great Britain followed by Berlin in 1936-38 (aided by London's policy of appeasement), and exploiting the favourable climate for the «reparation» of the injustices of Versailles, undertook a major propaganda campaign in Britain in order to obtain British support for minority claims in Geneva. To this end the XII Congress of National Minorities was held in London in 1937.⁷⁴ After this Congress, the organisation entered into steep decline, and the XIV Congress held in Stockholm (1938) was more or less meaningless.

The CEN very rarely acted as an intermediary to present petitions before the League of Nations, and only in a few cases, in 1927-28, did it attempt to mediate in frontier conflicts over minority questions.⁷⁵ Instead its role was mainly a proto-diplomatic one in Geneva or in State Foreign Ministries, and above all within non-governmental international organisations. It was also involved in the elaboration of a theoretical solution to nationality problems, a programme which did not exclude a clearer commitment to the improvement and extension of the League of Nations' minority protection system.

What was the content of this programme? Since national problems in East-Central Europe were of a quite different nature to those of Western Europe, the

⁷² See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 515-541. For the general context, see also V.O.Lumans, *The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German minorities of Europe*, PhD Dissertation, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill), 1979, and A.Komjathy/R.Stockwell, *German minorities and the Third Reich*, New York, 1980.

⁷³ For an extensive coverage of Schiemann's thought, see his book *Ein europäisches Problem. Unabhängige Betrachtungen zur Minderheitenfrage*, Vienna-Leipzig, 1937.

⁷⁴ See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 541-563.

⁷⁵ Such as the conflict between Austria and Yugoslavia over a statute of cultural autonomy for the Carinthian Slovenes, or that between Germany and Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein.

solutions proposed by the CEN were adapted to the specific conditions of East-Central Europe. Therefore the solutions to be applied in this area could not not, unless in exceptional circumstance, be based on territorial statutes of autonomy (such as those established in the Spanish Second Republic).⁷⁶ Instead they required a combination of respect for minority rights and an unchanging political structure for States which would always be multinational (as argued by some thinkers in the mid-19th century).⁷⁷ The CEN advocated a mixture of loyalty to the existing States (and by extension to their borders), and respect for the personality and cultural characteristics of the different nationalities, thus following the theoretical debates of the pre-war Austro-Hungarian Empire: the *Nationalitätenbewegung* took up the proposals of Austrian social democracy and other authors (Jellinek, Seipel),⁷⁸ and the doctrinal legacy of Otto Bauer and Karl Renner in particular was transformed into a new and vigorous formula for the future.⁷⁹ The idea of cultural autonomy survived for many years and left a lasting impression on the history of political thought, from the Jewish-Sionist nationalists to the Mensheviks,⁸⁰ and even obtained a (fleeting) recognised legal expression in the

⁷⁶ By 1938 this difference was already being emphasised in *Nationalitätenbewegung* circles (T.Veiter, *Nationale Autonomie*, Vienna, 1938). See also E.Lemberg in 1950 (*Geschichte des Nationalismus in Europa*, Stuttgart, 1950, 221-241).

⁷⁷ See T.Schieder, «Idee und Gestalt des übernationalen Staates seit dem 19. Jahrhundert», *Historische Zeitschrift*, 184 (1957), 336-366.

⁷⁸ See H.Raschhoffer, «Das ältesterreichische Nationalitätenrecht und die deutschen Vokgruppen nach 1918», in S.Graf Bethlen (ed.), *Volksgruppenrecht. Ein Beitrag zur Friedenssicherung*, Munich-Vienna, 1980, 53-69; see also G.Stourzh, «Problems of conflict resolution in multi-ethnic states: lessons from the Austrian historical experience, 1848-1918», in U.Ra'anan et al. (eds.), *State and nation in multi-ethnic societies. The breakup of multinational states*, Manchester/New York, 1991, 67-80. The principle of cultural autonomy was first formulated in 1866 by the Austrian liberal A.Fischhoff (*Österreich und die Burgen des Bestandes*, Vienna, 1866), who proposed the creation of a series of legislative bodies which deliberate together, but vote separately in national *curiae*. The work by Jellinek, *Das Recht der Minoritäten*, Vienna, 1898, established the possibility of ethnic minorities possessing a veto; the liberal Chancellor I.Seipel, in his classic work *Nation und Staat*, Vienna, 1916, traced a strict separation between Nation and State, between «Kulturbereich» and «Staatsbereich», in a similar way to the Austrian Marxists. See K.von Klemperer, *Ignaz Seipel. Staatsmann einer Krisenzeit*, Graz, 1976, 53-61.

⁷⁹ See the classic works of Renner, *Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat*, Leipzig/Vienna, 1902; id., *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen in besonderer Anwendung auf Österreich*, Leipzig/Vienna, 1918; O.Bauer, *Die österreichische Revolution*, Vienna, 1923; id., *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, Vienna, 1924. For an analysis of Bauer's thought, see E.Nimni, *Marxism and nationalism*, London, 1991, 119-184.

⁸⁰ The legacy of Renner seemed particularly appropriate for the Jewish minorities in Russia and Austria-Hungary, and from then on the Jewish nationalists used the principle of personal-national autonomy as the definitive solution for their problems. Thinkers such as Zhitlowsky, Dubnow or Nathan Birnbaum presented interesting theories on the ambitions for national-cultural autonomy of the Jewish minorities in Europe. See O.Janowski, *The Jews and minority rights (1898-1919)*, New York, 1966 (1933), 50-85; also K.Stillschweig, *Nationalism and autonomy among Eastern European Jewry*, New York, 1944. After 1918, the principle Zionist theoretician of cultural autonomy was E.B.Sadinsky, who argued that nationality and the State should have separate spheres of activity. See his work *Die nationale Sozietät. Beitrag zur Lösung der Judenfrage im Zusammenhang mit dem allgemeinen nationalen Problem*, Heidelberg, 1921.

Ukrainian Republic established in 1918. Another influential model was the Swiss plurinational State (although this was seen rather as a model of federative coexistence, based on the territorial autonomy of various national groups within the same State).⁸¹ A similar source of inspiration, decisive in the case of the German minorities, was the tradition of corporative thought in particular amongst Baltic Germans, organised in professional, religious, educational and cultural corporations based on ethnic belonging (*Verbände*). This form of autonomous organisation was suppressed after 1918 in the new Baltic States, although corporativist thought survived as an active proposal for social organisation, also adapted to the national-cultural field.⁸²

This precedents were taken up by the European national minorities movement in the elaboration of a doctrinal synthesis, whose fundamental premise, above and beyond the demands for reform of the Geneva system for the protection of minorities, was the separation of the activities of the *Kulturnation* and the *Staatsnation*. A direct consequence of this separation would be, according to the CEN, the depoliticisation of national questions and the adscription of each individual to whatever national group he wished to choose. In this way, the criteria of belonging to a national group was not territorial but personal, and therefore the dilemma of Nation against State in East-Central Europe could only be resolved if national communities lived together in peace and accepting the existing political communities. This general programme, accompanied by a negative vision of the phenomenon of nationalism itself and the assertion of cultural autonomy, in accordance with the model of the Estonian law, was supported by most of the minorities participating in the CEN, although with some differences. It can be stated that the key ideologue of the organisation was the Baltic German Paul Schiemann, who argued that national autonomy should be based upon a criterion of personal attachment, and should be established in those areas where the minority was locally the majority in cultural autonomy; this meant that the minority would be granted the right to administrate its own affairs and cultural life (schools, libraries etc.), and in return would be loyal to the State in which it lived. In this way, cultural supra-State communities (the *überstaatliche Volksgemeinschaften*) would exist independently of State frontiers, peacefully coexisting with them, since the States would be «non-national». However Schiemann also established the compatibility between the loyalty of minorities towards their *Mutterländer* and their political cooperation with the States

⁸¹ See T.Schieder, «Die Schweiz als Modell der Nationalitätenpolitik», in V.A., *Zur Geschichte und Problematik der Demokratie. Festgabe für Hans Herzfeld*, Berlin, 1958, 489-552.

⁸² See W.Hasselblatt, «Die Durchführung der Kulturautonomie in Estland», K.C.von Loesch (ed.), *Staat und Volkstum*, Breslau, 1926, 156-162; H.Rothfels, «Das Problem des Nationalismus in Osten», in Id., *Ostraum, Preussentum und Reichsgedanke*, Leipzig, 1935, p.188.

in which they lived. Schiemann's proposal, like Bauer's, had profoundly liberal and democratic roots, and aimed to uncover the apparent contradiction between parliamentary democracy and the nationality problem.⁸³ Obviously, after 1933 Schiemann's ideas became less influential inside the CEN.

A more conservative position, with its roots in the ideological tradition of the German Right, was advocated by Werner Hasselblatt, also a Baltic German, who explicitly rejected the term «national minority», preferring that of *Volksgruppe*. Hasselblatt had a purely instrumental view of liberal democracy, and based his programme on the assertion of nationality or *Volkstum*; although he used a similar vocabulary to Schiemann and the CEN in general, cultural autonomy for him was a way of recovering the Baltic Germans' corporatist traditions. Hasselblatt also proposed the functional separation of nationality and State, but he never (particularly in the 1930s) rejected the idea of bringing all Germans together in one State - the *Gesamtvolk*. So it is not surprising that from 1933 onwards Hasselblatt accepted National-Socialism as an opportunity to bring all Germans together in a single «political nation», and that he advocated a reorganisation of the European map which would separate the «Protestant-Nordic» area from the Western world as well as the Slavic «Euro-asiatic East».⁸⁴ The similarities to the theories of Rosenberg were no coincidental, although not identical in nature.

Apart from the two dominant tendencies in the *Nationalitätenbewegung* which followed the programmes described above, but which, at least until 1933, joined together in a common programme, the positions of the national groups represented within the CEN in favour of cultural autonomy varied according to their cultural and economic potential, their political maturity and their internal social composition. The Jewish and German minorities - with the exception of the Germans in Hungary - were among the most determined advocates of cultural autonomy and the *Personalitätsprinzip*, which largely responded to their individual political traditions. Similarly, the Catalan nationalists supported the principle of cultural autonomy as a possible solution for European national problems, as long as it was combined with territorial autonomy - a solution which the CEN in the end accepted - for those nationalities which fulfilled

⁸³ See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 410-417; M.Dörr, «Paul Schiemanns Theorie von «anationalen Staat». Ein Beitrag zur europäischen Nationalitätenbewegung zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen», *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 8 (1957), 407-420; M.Garleff, «Paul Schiemanns Minderheitentheorie als Beitrag zur Lösung der Nationalitätenfrage», *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*, 25 (1976), 632-659.

⁸⁴ See M.Garleff, «Nationalitätenpolitik zwischen liberalem und völkischem Anspruch. Gleichklang und Spannung bei Paul Schiemann und Werner Hasselblatt», in J.von Henn/C.J.Kenez (eds.), *Reval und die baltischen Länder. Festschrift für Helmuth Weiss zum 80. Geburtstag*, Marburg, 1980, 113-132.

the requirement of a homogeneous occupation of a given geographical area. Moreover, the Catalan nationalists' doctrinal fidelity to the right to self-determination - explicitly rejected by the CEN - was an important obstacle to obtaining their full support.⁸⁵ Other national groups that were not strictly speaking ethnic minorities, but genuine national movements or «oppressed nations» which had not achieved their objective of self-determination (Ukrainians, Russian-Carthians, Belorussians in Poland...) were faced with a similar dilemma. The Magyar delegates also firmly supported the formula of cultural autonomy, at least in the early years of the CEN. The Slav minorities, however - Poles, Czechs and non-German minorities in Germany, including Danes - tended to reject the formula for ideological reasons: cultural autonomy was considered by them as an instrument for irredentism and betrayal of the State by the minorities, which favoured the richest and most socially powerful minorities (who had better means for organising their cultural life) as well as those whose compatriots had established powerful States. Cultural autonomy, therefore, tended to favour «strong» over «weak» minorities.⁸⁶

Thus the cultural autonomy solution, despite being formulated as an ideal of the European national minorities movement in the 1920s and 1930s, was not free of contradictions. Apart from its idealistic character, its application in the Baltic States during the interwar period was not as successful as was hoped (only the German and Jewish minorities, the most economically powerful, were able to put it into practice) and the conditions of the time made it even more difficult to apply properly (for example, the voluntary registration of nationalities was rejected by the Germans in Hungary in fear of repressive measures from the Budapest Government).⁸⁷

So, we can conclude that in spite of the reappraisal of the doctrinal legacy of Austrian Marxism and the renewed hope in an international system for the protection of minorities on a European scale, the history of the failure of the internationalisation of the nationality question during the interwar period can probably show us some of the mistakes and contradictions to be avoided in the present days, as well as in the future.

⁸⁵ See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 699-708. There was a clear difference between the proposals defended by the Catalan delegates in Geneva, and those defended later at home.

⁸⁶ See Núñez, *El problema*, cit., 405-409. The debate over cultural autonomy became particularly intense in 1927-28, as a result of the dispute over the acceptance of the North Frisians as a fully recognised national minority. See an extensive description (with reservations over her interpretation) by M. Rothbarth, «Kontroversen im Europäischen Nationalitätenkongress», *Studien zur Geschichte der deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen*, III (1980), 49-62.

⁸⁷ Krabbe, a member of the Secretariat of the League of Nations, made an intelligent critique of the cultural autonomy programme advocated as a panacea by the CEN and other international organisations, in his report *L'autonomie culturelle comme solution du problème des minorités*, 18.11.1931 (Archive of the League of Nations, Geneva, 4/32835/32835).

Cuius Regio Eius Natio. The process of national demarcation, division, separation and exclusion in East Central Europe

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From the 1st of January 1993 every ethnic group or «nationality» which once belonged to the old Austro-Hungarian empire has its own state. Now, as then, the dominant nations regard the state as their own «nation state», nevertheless, there are both larger and smaller national minorities living in these states; among the larger ones are the Magyars in Rumania, Slovakia and Serbia, the Albanians in Serbia, the Serbs in Croatia, the Ukrainians and Germans in Poland, and above all the Russians in the Ukraine. The result of this is there are, once more, divisive, exclusionary and assimilatory attitudes towards the national minorities which have already prompted to many of them to leave and to emigrate to their own «nation states». In spite of the many declarations concerning human rights and minority rights which have been made by the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the CSCE, it seems as if the memorable slogan of confessional absolutism «cuius regio, eius religio» (uttered by Canon Stephani from Greifswald) is enjoying a new lease of life under a national pretext. The fact that, in addition to the ruler's «Jus reformandi», the «Jus emigrationis» seems to have been renewed, now in the much more brutal form of «ethnic cleansing», gives rise to questions of historic development, continuity or discontinuity, mentalities and motives. Unfortunately, the problems of national demarcation, division, separation and exclusion have not been, and are not being, sufficiently dealt with in either theoretical, or specific-case, discussions in the study of nationalism. Among the few exceptions are the recent work by Piotr S. Wandycz dealing with Poland and East Central Europe, by Jan Kren dealing with the Czech-German community of conflict, by Bela Köpeczi and Zoltán Szász on the history of Transylvania and by Ivo Banac on the national question in Yugoslavia.¹

¹ Cf. Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom. A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present*, London/New York: Routledge, 1992; Jan Kren, *Konfliktní společenství: Česi a Němci 1780-1919*, Praha: Academia, 1990; Bela Köpeczi/Zoltán Szász (ed.), *Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens*, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1990; Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia. Origins, History, Politics*, Ithaca/London: Cornell UP, 1984.

I will approach these problems with five questions:

- (1) What does national differentiation mean before the emergence of modern nations?
- (2) How does national demarcation take place at the start of a national movement?
- (3) What were the causes of national division or assimilation in the nationality conflicts at the end of the nineteenth century?
- (4) Why did the incipient solutions between the «dominant nations» and «national minorities» fail after 1918?
- (5) What are the consequences of the decade of national exclusion between 1938 and 1948?

(1) *What does national differentiation mean before the emergence of modern nations?*

The modern nation which has emerged since the end of the eighteenth century became the sustainer of certain standardized values, the basic ordering principle in the social, economic, political and cultural spheres for members of a specific large group, in a specific territory, and thus became the dominant object of group loyalty. Modern nations - regardless of whether they were conceived as a new political union of a people or as a historic organism rooted in the «spirit of the people» - did not emerge from a vacuum. Their preconditions and antecedents were found in the old formulas of integration which had been forming ever since the Middle Ages. Although before the eighteenth century, the *genus humanum* had primarily been divided into religions, states and local groups, we know that at medieval universities students were organised into *nationes* consisting at least partly of their fellow countrymen, and that at late medieval councils votes were taken according to nation. As early as the Council of Constance a further differentiation took place:

The nation can either be understood as a community of descent as distinct from another separate group of people (*gens*), or by the difference in language which especially and essentially characterizes the *natio* and which according to divine and human law likewise forms its character, but also ... in a territorial sense, which would be suitable.²

² Jenő Szűcs, *Nation und Geschichte*, Budapest: Corvina Kiadó, 1981, p.176.

Three examples serve to illustrate these different views:

a) Although, in early fifteenth century Hungary, the aristocracy was generally understood to be the «nation,» the concept of nation in Transylvania was broadened to include the Szekler and the Saxons. The Szekler «nation» embraced the whole nation with the rights of the Szekler, but the *natio saxonica* only included the citizens of towns in Saxon territory, thus excluding the Saxon serfs from the comitatus. The Rumanian nobles on the other hand belonged to the aristocratic «nation», while the Rumanian people lived under the rule of the Voivods and the Knezes. The Saxons became prosperous as a result of their success as craftsmen and tradesmen which in turn increased their civic and ethnic self-confidence. This was significantly revalued by the king, Mathew Corvinus: in 1469 he gave numerous Saxon districts the right to elect their own judges; in 1486 he united all Saxon districts as well as Bistritz/Bistrita and Kronstadt/Brasov in the *universitas Saxonum*, the «University of the Saxon Nation» under the leadership of the mayor of Hermannstadt/Sibiu who was known as the Saxon Count.³

b) The «national» aspect was not originally a characteristic of Czech Hussitism. Jan Hus wanted to reform all Christendom; the Czechs were merely the «chosen people» for the beginning. His teachings, in which social and religious aspects were closely intertwined, were initially characterized by a consciously propagated universalism which was also supposed to attract the Germans in Bohemia, as well as various other peoples in Europe. It was only after the German patricians and landowners repudiated Hus's teachings, and the armies of the Holy Roman Empire started devastating the country, that concern about the Czech language, combined with a pathos of the Czech self-conscious and a patriotism which was unique in the Middle Ages, moved into the foreground. The highly developed civic and aristocratic motifs of a «national consciousness» based on estates melted away due to fear on the part of the Taborites who had become politically active. The Tabor social, religious and political community, as well as the community of Zizka's army, formed the foundations of their patriotism. However, «Czech self-conscious» and «nationalist» phraseology were not primarily characteristics of the Taborite communities - because right up to the end, the radical social and religious element was dominant - but of the Calixtine wing which was represented by the lower nobility and the Prague patricians. After the catastrophe of Lipany in 1434, the popularly influenced patriotism was worn down, and in the second half of the fifteenth century the «nationalism» of

³ Köpeczi/Szász, op.cit., 217-28.

the Calixtine-Hussite Czech nobility once more became similar in quality and content to that of the Catholic nobility in Poland and Hungary.⁴

c) When the Archduke of Inner Austria, Karl, started building a chain of fortresses in Croatia and Slavonia he gave the new fortress Karlstadt/Karlovac the right to settle soldiers of all nationalities «whether they be German, Hungarian, Croatian or another nationality.» This open nationality policy, which was pursued while building up the military border, was completely in accordance with the policies of his predecessors from the time the Croatian-Slavonian estates had called upon King Ferdinand to help them fight the Turks. The Habsburgs not only sent imperial troops to the Croatian border, they also allowed refugees from the Balkans such as the «Uskoks,» «Raitzen,» «Vlachs,» «Martholosen,» «Pribegs,» and «Morlachs» and so on, to settle there with the assignment of protecting the border. In response to a suggestion made by the Inner-Austrian Captain-General, Johann Katzianer, and the Ban of Croatia, Ivan Karlovic, the «Uskoks» were granted the privilege in 1535 of being allowed to settle on the Kupa and around Sichelburg/Zumberak in south east Krain. In 1538, King Ferdinand granted several Serb and Rascian captains and voivods a similar privilege for Upper Slavonia in response to the suggestions made by the Captain-General, Niklas Jurisic. The settlers kept this document in the Greek Uniate monastery of Marca and in times of difficulty the monks had to read it to them, together with the *Statuta Valachorum* of 1630, at peoples assemblies. It was these privileges which separated these groups of refugee settlers from the social order of the Croatian-Slavonian estates and strengthened the power of the Inner Austrian (from Ferdinand II onwards, once more, Austrian) ruler.⁵

The examples mentioned above show that, as Jenő Szűcs has convincingly demonstrated, national self-consciousness and national feeling really do have a history: certain elements of group consciousness were connected early on with an ethnic community which spoke the same language and had the same historic and cultural traditions, as was the case with the «nationalities provincials» in the *regnum Franciae* or the Bavarian, Saxons, Franks, and Swabians in the *Regnum Teutonicorum*. This «nationality» is already differentiated from an ethnic group but still not yet a state entity. A group political consciousness only came about with the development of a «political society» (*communitas regni*). Parallel to this - starting in the thirteenth century - the political concept of the «Fatherland» emerges. In most cases this was a «state

⁴ Josef Macek, *Jean Hus et les traditions hussites*, Paris: Plon, 1971.

⁵ Mirjana Gross (ed.), *Društveni razvoj u Hrvatskoj (od 16. stoljeca do pocetka 20. stoljeca)*, Zagreb: Liber, 1981, 83-101.

patriotism» of the estates and also embraced the category of political loyalty (*fidelitas*). In the late Middle Ages, and the Early Modern period, people were conscious that they somehow belonged to a «nationality» but this did not mean political «society» and this «nationality» was not the centre of their political «loyalty.»⁶

(2) *How does national demarcation take place at the start of a national movement ?*

The French Revolution began equating «people» with «nation» and «state» and thus also, as Eric Hobsbawm has emphasised, with political society and loyalty. Part of this equation was the use of a state language, something which was not a mental problem for the citizens of the French provinces. But what did this equation mean for East Central Europe where at the end of the eighteenth century three large dynastic empires ruled over many different nationalities? How did the population at large react to the modernization of the state which was ordained from above by Joseph II, Frederick II and Catherine II? Could the French model be copied in the multi-lingual towns and regions in East Central Europe? Did the 'language of the people', in Herder's sense, have to be a central element in the nation building process?⁷

In the early 1770s Count Kinsky wrote «if the mother tongue of a Frenchman is French, and German the language of a German then the mother tongue of the Bohemians must be Bohemian.» Of course a modern Czech literary language had first to be developed, and it was the Bohemian nobles as well as the Czech officers and clergymen - with the important support Maria Theresia's school reforms - who were responsible for the increasing diffusion of the language as early as the 1780s. Thus the process of Czech nation building benefited from the reforms of Enlightened Absolutism, and was stimulated by the Bohemian Estates' Declaration of Loyalty, to the Emperor and King, Leopold, which was formulated in Czech by Josef Dobrovsky in 1791 and which was described as the «voice of the whole country» or even as the «voice of the people.»⁸

⁶ Szűcs, *Nation*, op.cit., p.181. Cf. Thomas Eichenberger, «*Patria*», *Studien zur Bedeutung des Wortes im Mittelalter (6-12. Jahrhundert)*, Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1991.

⁷ Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, myth, reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990; Emil Niederhauser, *The Rise of Nationality in Eastern Europe*, Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1982.

⁸ Eduard Winter, *Frühliberalismus in der Donaumonarchie*, Berlin, 1968; Jan Havránek, «The Education of Czechs and Slovaks under Foreign Domination, 1850-1918», in Janusz Tomiak (ed.), *Comparative Studies on Government and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940. Vol.I: Schooling, Educational Policy and Ethnic Identity*, Hants/New York: Dartmouth/New York UP, 1991, 235-61.

Although the representative of the Prague Enlightenment, Johann Ferdinand Opiz, differentiated between «Deutschböhmen» and «Stockböhmen» as early as 1782, virtually all other scholars and authors in Bohemia who wrote in German at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries - from the historian Frantisek Martin Pelcl to the philosopher Josef Dobrovsky to the young Frantisek Palacky - used the words «Bohemian» and «Czech» interchangeably without being conscious of the explosiveness that would later become attached to the differentiation of these concepts. This can also be observed in all territorial political Bohemian institutions such as the Royal Bohemian Society for Science or the Fatherland Museum etc. The National political separation between the concepts «Bohemian» and «Czech» started in German newspapers - not least of all in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* - in the years 1839/1840. This tendency was firmly supported by the philogian Josef Jungmann and his circle - the Czech disseminators of Herder's ideas - because the Czechs wanted to become a nation equal to other nations in Europe. As early as 1831 the «Matices Ceska» had been established within the Museum of the Kingdom of Bohemia to publish valuable Czech books and in 1846 the «Mestanska beseda» in Prague provided a representative centre for the Czech middle class elite.⁹

A clear demarcation can also be seen in the letter of refusal to the Committee of fifty, in Frankfurt-am-Main, written by the historiographer of the Bohemian estates Frantisek Palacky on 11th April 1848.

The express purpose of your assembly is to replace the league of princes which has existed until now with a league of the German people and to genuinely unite the German people ... I am not a German - at least I do not feel myself to be such - I am a Bohemian of Slav race and have dedicated myself with my possessions and abilities to the service of my people for all time. This people is indeed small but it has always been singular and in existence ... All Bohemian links, first of all with the Holy Roman Empire and then with the German Confederation were always purely royal and were hardly ever acknowledged by the Bohemian people and the Bohemian estates ... so that all previous links between Bohemia and Germany cannot be understood as a relationship between the peoples but only as a relationship between rulers...¹⁰

Of course the Czech patriots around Palacky had two important reasons for using the terms «Bohemia» and Bohemian instead of Czech in their German language publications until the early 1860s. At the centre of their considerations were the efforts

⁹ Jiri Koralka, *Tschechen im Habsburgerreich und in Europa 1815-1914. Sozialgeschichtliche Zusammenhänge der neuzeitlichen Nationsbildung und der Nationalitätenfrage in den böhmischen Ländern*, Vienna/Munich: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik/Oldenbourg, 1991, 51-75.

¹⁰ Stanislaus Hafner/Otto Turecek/ Günther Wytzens, *Slavische Geisteswelt*, Baden-Baden 1959, 176-83.

of Bohemian politicians to win over the conservative Czech nobility to a common national opposition which would then aim to extend its own political control over the whole of the territory of Bohemia or the lands of the Bohemian crown. Another consideration was the disparagement of the concept «Czech» which the German press had been engaged in ever since the 1840s. In their eyes the Czechs were more or less an uneducated people or as Friedrich Engels put it a «people with no history», the «ruin of a people» with no historical power of action and unable to survive.¹¹

In spite of clear indications of national demarcation in the form of a new wave of Czech history - from the publication of forged documents by Václav Hanka to the glorification of Hussitism in Palacky's «History of Bohemia» - a real division of Czechs and Germans only took place after 1861. The centralistic-liberal February Patent with its census orientated three curial electoral system and to an even greater extent Schmerling's Communal Law, provided the emerging bourgeois Czech national movement with a completely new platform for representative political work. Parallel to this a rapid growth in the number of Czech societies occurred, starting with «Sokol» in 1862 and Czech music societies and co-operatives which were quite clearly divided upon national lines. This meant however, that the Czech national movement had also turned into a political mass movement - phase C in Miroslav Hroch's terminology - and was now a model for the Croat, Slovene, Slovak and later even Ukrainian national movements which were patently less well situated as far as their social structure was concerned.¹²

(3) *What were the causes of national division or assimilation in the nationality conflicts at the end of the nineteenth century?*

In spite of the clearly different legal foundations of the Austrian nationality state in 1867 and the Hungarian nation-state of 1868 both parts of the Empire suffered from increasingly serious divisions which - although they only rarely led to fatalities - deepened the continuing nationality conflicts until it came to national exclusion.

a) The modern state came into increasingly close contact with its population via the administration, schools, the post, railways, the police, the army and the census,

¹¹ Koralka, *Tschechen*, 221 ff.

¹² Miroslav Hroch, *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas. Eine vergleichende Analyse zur gesellschaftlichen Schichtung der patriotischen Gruppen*, Praha 1968 (= Acta Universitatis Carolinae Philosophica et Historica, Monographia 24); Otto Urban, *Ceská společnost 1848-1918*, Praha: Svoboda, 1982.

whereby the language used in the administration and in communications with the population became increasingly important. Thus in 1910 Cisleithania already had 700,000 civil servants. In connection with the language question, which intruded into more and more areas of life, lower ranking civil servants, teachers, railway employees, priests and chaplains - who due to school laws were increasingly monolingual - supported by provincial journalists became increasingly involved in the national struggle. These people were supported in their endeavours by national sports, music and shooting associations.¹³

b) The disputes about language were heightened by the large increase in migration which had taken place since 1860, although the majority of the migrants who found work in Vienna, Budapest, Prague, Trieste or the brown coal mining areas in the north west Bohemia were prepared to assimilate linguistically. However, nationalist division policies insisted on «policies of rights of present possession» even to the extent of the national separation of Crown Lands. On the other hand, the ethnic groups and «nationalities» demanded real equality in education - including their own universities - more political participation in parliament and the diets, not to mention the lack of Slovak, Rumanian and South Slav participation in the decision making process in the Hungarian parliament.¹⁴

c) The Increasingly strong irredentist movements also contributed to the intensification of nationality conflicts before World War I: starting with the Italian as of 1877, the Serbian after 1903, the Rumanian as of 1905 and the Ukrainian after 1908, although older movements were also in existence.¹⁵

Parallel to the nationality conflicts which had become more intense since the 1880s an increasing number of assimilation processes could also be observed:

in Vienna and Lower Austria, the Czechs and the Jews with the Germans;
 in Styria and Carinthia, the Slovenes with the Germans;
 in Bohemia, the Germans and the Jews with the Czechs, especially in Prague;
 in Silesia, the Poles with the Czechs;
 in Galitzia, the Ruthenes and the Jews with the Poles;

¹³ Adam Wandruszka / Peter Urbanitsch (ed.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. Band III: Die Völker des Reiches*, Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980.

¹⁴ Gerald Stourzh, *Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung Österreichs 1848-1918*, Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985.

¹⁵ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester: Manchester UP, 1982, 90-117; Robert A. Kann, *Das Nationalitätenproblem der Habsburgermonarchie*, 1. vol., Graz/Cologne: Böhlau, 1964, 336-43.

in the whole Kingdom of Hungary, the Jews and the Germans with the Magyars;
in Upper Hungary, the Slovaks with the Magyars;
in Transylvania, the Rumanians with the Magyars;
in southern Hungary, the Catholic Bunjevci and Sokci with the Magyars.¹⁶

National assimilation in Cisleithania, following the principle of equality as expressed in Article XIX of the 1867 constitution, which dealt with the general rights of the citizen, was predominantly the result of migration and integration processes in large towns and prosperous areas. National political pressure to assimilate was often merely complementary. By way of contrast, Magyarization was the result of the political understanding of the single and indivisible Hungarian political nation, and the conclusions which were drawn from it. Baron Josef Eötvös criticized the demands of the nationalities as early as 1851:

Everywhere the struggle for equality before this has been achieved, everywhere the struggle for dominance as soon as they no longer have to complain about oppression.¹⁷

The Hungarian Nationality Law of 1868 was supposed to ensure the free development of linguistic nationality for all citizens, but the Western educated Magyar elite still equated the state with the nation. The exception was the treatment of «Croatia» as a political nation. However, the determined Magyarization measures which were taken in politics, schools and the administration from the 1870s, were not only the result of the adoption of the definition of nation and state found in modern French public law, they also had a psychological background:

a) the opinion that Magyarization would allow non-Magyar peasants to climb the social ladder and become Magyar «gentlemen»; b) the Magyar elite's fear for the future existence of the Hungarian state.¹⁸

(4) *Why did the incipient solutions between the «dominant nations» and «national minorities» fail after 1918?*

During World War I national politics and war propaganda increased tendencies to national separation. One only has to remember the activities of the

¹⁶ László Katus, «Die Magyaren», in *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, III/1, 431-36; Ernest Gellner, *Nationalismus und Moderne*, Berlin: Rotbuch, 1991.

¹⁷ Ludwig Gogolák, «Ungarns Nationalitätengesetze und das Programm des magyarischen National- und Zentralstaates», in *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, III/2, 1207-1303.

¹⁸ Peter Hanák, *Ungarn in der Donaumonarchie*, Vienna/Munich: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik/ Oldenbourg, 1984.

national councils of the Poles, Czech-Slovaks and the South Slavs in exile, not to mention the increasing disputes on the «domestic front» - for example the allocation of Chelm to the Ukrainian Peoples Republic in February 1918. The right of the nations to self-determination propagated by both Lenin in 1917 and Wilson in 1918, although under completely different ideological auspices released new forces of integration amongst all the nations and nationalities of East Central Europe. As a result of this development they aspired, after the collapse of the Hapsburg and Romanov empires, to their own independent «nations states» and these aspirations were in the main realized at the Paris peace conference with French, British and American support.¹⁹

Nevertheless, the Czech Foreign Minister and historian, Kail Krofta was only partly right when in May 1938 he defended «Twenty Years of a new Central Europe»:

a) The new order in Central Europe had the advantage that «it brought to an end the rule of two chosen people over the members of other nations.»

b) Every nation of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy received its own free state and was free to «make the most of it politically and culturally»

c) Greater political justice had been achieved because in old Austria-Hungary 22 million Germans and Magyars had ruled over almost 30 million members of other nations, but in the new Central Europe there were 64 million members of «dominant nations» and only 22 million members of minorities who in any case were protected by legislation for the protection of minorities.

d) The dissolution of the old customs and currency union, the erection of tariff barriers and numerous import and export bans had to be viewed against the various opportunities of «liberation from the previous economic and financial dependence on Vienna and the creation of an independent currency and industrial concerns.»²⁰

What were the weaknesses of the order of nation states established in 1919/20?

a) The right of the peoples to self-determination was only partially applied in the new arrangements. Depending on the advantages to the victor nations, historic

¹⁹ Richard G. Plaschka / Hort Haselsteiner/ Arnold Suppan, *Innere Front. Militärassistenten, Widerstand und Umsturz in der Donaumonarchie 1918*, Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1974; Arno J. Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking. Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967.

²⁰ Kamil Krofta, «Zwanzig Jahre neues Zentraleuropa», in *Prager Rundschau*, 5 (1937/38), 1-10.

and legal, economic and strategic principles were also applied. Plebiscites were only held in exceptional cases - in Masuria, West Prussia, Upper Silesia, Sopron and south east Carinthia. That it was possible to draw more nationally just borders in the midst of national struggle was proved by the new frontiers in the Banat and Burgenland which also survived the Second World War.²¹

b) The new «dominant nations» expected that their independence in a nation state of their own would improve their living standards, as their political leaders had very often started from the false assumption that the national question had been the only source of economic and political backwardness. Thus necessary economic and political reforms were often implemented with the supposed purpose of strengthening the «dominant nation» - above all in cases of the «repatriation» of banks and industrial concerns. However, transfers of ownership to the detriment of Austrian, Hungarian and former Russian citizens only contributed very rarely - as in Bohemia and Moravia - to an economic take off. Besides, the new national political elites, of civil servants and soldiers, professors and diplomats, directors and administrators, preferred to occupy themselves with quarrels about posts in the public sector and the enforcement of the official language in all public institutions as well as gaining control over universities and the media for the nation state.²²

c) The attempt to adopt the French model of the state and the nation led to the East Central European elites taking an exclusionist or assimilationist attitude to their new national minorities. As these were regarded as «colonists» and «strangers» or at the best as «guests» the «dominant nations» never developed an interest in implementing the minority treaties which they had signed in 1919/20. The Yugoslav government limited the treaty's validity to former Austro-Hungarian areas right from the start, while the Polish government unilaterally cancelled the treaty in 1934.²³

d) The Borders drawn after the First World War left previous *terre irredente* in existence on one hand - although of course it was now another nation who hoped for their «salvation» as in West Prussia, east Upper Silesia, Transylvania, the Vojvodina and the coast - while on the other hand, they created new ones such as Techen, Sudetenland, southern Slovakia, Lower Styria and south east Carinthia. Both potential

²¹ Sara Wambaugh, *Plebiscites since the World War*, Washington, 1933.

²² Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars*, Seattle/London: Univ. of Washington Press, 1977; Alice Teichova, *Kleinstaaten im Spannungsfeld der Großmächte. Wirtschaft und Politik im Mittel- und Südosteuropa in der Zwischenkriegszeit*, Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1988.

²³ Ernst Flachbarth, *System des internationalen Minderheitenrechtes*, Budapest: R. Gergely Verlag, 1937.

and existing irredentisms were strengthened by the more or less open demands for revision which had been made as early as the 1920s by the governments in Berlin, Moscow, Rome and Budapest and which strained the relations of the East Central European nationality states with the German, Magyar, Russian minorities living on their borders.²⁴

(5) *What are the consequences of the decade of national exclusion between 1938 and 1948?*

Chances of compromise between the nationality states and the German minorities in East Central Europe rapidly vanished after the world economic crisis with its mass unemployment and Hitler's assumption of power. The Foreign Office and Quai d'Orsay were quite prepared to grant Hitler certain territorial concessions - conscious as they were of the contradiction between nation and territory in East Central Europe - but of course right from the start his policies were not only directed towards the «fight against Versailles» but also towards the «conquest of new Lebensraum in the East and its ruthless Germanization.»²⁵ In November 1937, he named the subjection of Czechoslovakia and Austria as the first aims of this violent policy. This was supposed to mean an increase in food supplies for 5 to 6 million people «provided that the forcible emigration of 2 million people from Czechoslovakia and 1 million from Austria could be carried out.» While it is true that neither after the annexation of Austria, nor after the incorporation of Sudetenland, nor after the Germans marched into Prague and the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia did it come to mass expulsions of millions of people, the Nüremberg Laws and the first expulsion of Jews, Austrians and Czechs turned national or racial exclusion and expulsion into new political instruments in East Central European nationality politics. They were then put to use, after the two Arbitrations of Vienna, in southern Slovakia and in Transylvania and in October 1938 in the Olsa region.²⁶

After September 1939, and in agreement with Stalin, Nazi exclusion policies were massively directed against Poles and Jews, especially against their intelligentsia, but also against peasants and craftsmen in the newly conquered areas who were forced

²⁴ Paul Smith/ Kalliopi Koufa/ Arnold Suppan (ed.), *Ethnic Groups in International Relations, 1850-1940*, Hants/New York: Dartmouth/New York UP, 1991.

²⁵ Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, *Großdeutschland. Außenpolitik und Kriegsvorbereitung des Hitler-Régimes*, Munich, 1987, p.199.

²⁶ Peter Glotz/ Karl-Heinz Pollok/ Karl von Schwarzenberg/ John van Nesziegler (eds.), *München 1928. Das Ende des alten Europa*, Essen: Reimar Hobbing, 1990.

to emigrate to the General Government. Hitler planned to adjust the new borders of the Reich to the «historic, ethnographic and economic facts», «that meant resettling the minorities so that at the end of the process better dividing lines would be in place». As Hitler told the Reichstag on 6th October 1939 the whole of Eastern and South East Europe was

...full of small groups of the German people not all of which are sustainable. Their existence is the cause and occasion of continued disturbances in bilateral relations... It is therefore the responsibility of a far sighted European order to undertake resettlement in order to remove at least some of the reasons for conflict in Europe.

Fifteen resettlement treaties formed the basis for the resettlement of almost 800,000 Germans from the Baltic, Wolhynia, eastern Galitzia, the Bukovina, Bessarabia, the Black Sea area and the Dobruja after 1939. They were mostly transferred to the settlements and farms of the 1.2 million Poles and Jews who had recently been driven out of the region of Warta.²⁷

However, the violent measures which had the most serious consequences for the ethnic structure of East Central Europe were the mass murder of Jews, and the mass expulsion of the Germans. According to Raul Hilberg almost 5 million of the 8 million Jews living in East Central Europe and the western Soviet Union before the Second World War fell victim to the National Socialist extermination policies. Recent historiography makes it clear that the political leaders of the satellite states of Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Croatia participated in this, and that almost 200,000 East Central and South East European Roma were also murdered in National Socialist extermination camps.

According to the report of the German Federal Archive of the 28th May 1974 about 12 million Germans either fled to the West, were expelled or were forcibly resettled, on the basis of the Potsdam Resolutions, from the areas east of the Oder-Neiße, the Bohemian Forest and Leitha, as well as south of the Mur from autumn 1944 onwards. Over 600,000 of them died violently.²⁸

²⁷ Martin Broszat, *Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939-1945*, Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1965.

²⁸ Raul Hilber, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, New York: Harper, 1961; *Vertreibung und Vertreibungsverbrechen 1945-1948. Bericht des Bundesarchivs vom 28. Mai 1974. Archivalien und ausgewählte Erlebnisberichte*, Bonn: Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen, 1989.

Conclusion

An extremely varied political, economic, social and cultural history led to the emergence of a colourful pattern of nationalities, confessions, languages and scripts in Eastern Europe between the Middle ages and the beginning of the nineteenth century. Although the peoples were integrated into four large dynastic empires with their social leadership divided between the aristocracy and the middle class, they were more inclined to adopt the German model of the modern cultural nation, than the French model of the modern state nation. Thus the first national demarcations - if we leave aside the first Polish uprising - were demands for national equality. It was only with the creation of modern associations for the masses from the 1860s onwards that national division began to affect the wider population, although in 1867 Austria-Hungary made attempts at integration. The increasing centralization tendencies of the modern states at the turn of the century led to the intensification of both nationality conflicts and the politics of assimilation as well as an increase in conflicts in foreign policy. However, it was left to the violence of the military and propaganda battles of the First World War to turn national separation into national exclusion. 1918 brought about the victory of the French national model in an area which lacked the integrating force of modern democracy. The national separations which immediately followed made a homogenization of society, economy and culture even more difficult. The transition to authoritarian regimes on the other hand allowed an increasing nationalization of states in East Central Europe. Of course after 1938, Hitler, and after autumn 1939, Stalin, called this into question as they began to instrumentalize their co-national minorities in favour of their wars of conquest. The most vicious persecution was that of the Nazis against the Jews and Roma in East Central Europe, while policies of exclusion were primarily directed against the Polish, Czech, Slovene and Serb intelligentsia. Finally, from 1945 to 1947 it was very often the desire for revenge which led to the expulsion and violent transfers of East Central European Germans. Thus the result of a good century of national and nationalistic policies was the far reaching homogenization of ethnic nations in nation states and the drastic reduction of national minorities. This trend also seems to be continuing after 1989.

The «National-Democrat» Question in Rumania

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Although often expressed only indirectly, a basic aim of all nationalist ideologies is the become an inter-class movement. The *Volksgemeinschaft*, of union of a people in the name of a national destiny, regards socio-economic problems as secondary. However, no nationalist discourse can be neatly separated from these considerations. Even the nationalist ideologies of intellectuals who see themselves as above such material problems, can turn out to have different meanings when used by different people.

A good example of how nationalist projects can acquire different social meanings is that of the middle-class nationalism of the National Democratic Party in Rumania, which emerged as the liberal State was established at the turn of the century. This phenomenon can be seen even more clearly if we compare it to the new middle-class nationalism emerging now after the collapse of the Socialist State.

Elite Nationalism

Throughout the 19th century, Moldavian nationalist movements were created by very influential minority sectors of society. In the absence of genuine middle class or bourgeoisie, the lower ranks of the boyars drew the first outlines of modern Rumanian nationalism in terms of their own socio-economic interests. They advocated the adoption of the French constitutional model for the new States of the Danube, hence their emphasis on the identification of Rumanian culture with Latin culture, which was an effective form of national self-assertion in the face of the political influence of Turks, Russians or Greeks.

Until the failed revolutions of 1848, this primitive Rumanian nationalism also contained social elements, partly because of the influence of political exiles in Paris,

* Translated: Jonathan Hopkin.

but also in the hope of involving the Moldavian peasant masses in the nationalist movement in order to combat the threat of annexation by Russia.

This reformism soon disappeared after the events of 1848, which showed the boyars the dangers of involving the masses in politics. For the rest of the century, the successive phases in the construction of a Rumanian State dominate nationalist discourse, still led by the social elites of Moldavia and Wallachia, at the expense of social reformism.¹ There was only one exception to this: the interregnum of Prince Alexandre Ion Cuza (1859-1866), a military officer who attempted to create a Bonapartist regime after making a decisive contribution to the union of Danubian principalities within the first Rumanian proto-State.² Cuza carried out a certain disentailment of the monasteries «subordinated» to the patriarchs of Constantinople, Alessandria, Jerusalem or Mount Athos and initiated the agrarian reform of 1864, which in effect brought the confirmation of contractual-capitalist relations of production in rural areas, and the final banishment of feudalism.

Nevertheless, these measures cost the Prince his throne, and he was overthrown by the conservatives and liberals, with the support of the army. Subsequently, the Rumanian elites - particularly the new financial and industrial bourgeoisie supporting the Liberal Party - concentrated on the creation of a Rumanian State and the most prominent nationalist discourse was based on the fight for total independence from Rumania to the exclusion of economic reform. The 1866 Constitution - copied from the Belgian Constitution - and the crowning of the ultra-conservative Carol Hohenzollern as monarch both confirmed this tendency. The military participation in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78, which destroyed the last ties of dependency with the Sublime Porte, became part of the grand struggle of modern Rumanian nationalism. In the period after this, Turks, Slavs, Magyars and Greeks were perceived as a threat to Rumanianism, the last bastion of Latin culture. The «intelligentsia» linked to the State invented the myths emphasizing the supposed originality of the Rumanians and their culture («the only Orthodox who are Latins and the only Latins who are Orthodox») whilst at the same time presenting themselves as elite Europeans, which could not be said for the foreign peoples surrounding them or even living in their territory as ethnic minorities.

¹ An excellent analysis of this question can be found in Stephen Fischer-Galati, «Rumanian Nationalism» in Peter F. Sugar & Ivo J. Lederer *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1969, pp. 375-395.

² For a competent study on the period in power of Prince Cuza, see Gerald Bobango *The Emergence of the Rumanian National State*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1979.

Anti-Semitism as a nationalist theme

In this context, the Jewish question soon came to play an important role in the official Rumanian nationalist movement. After the first Rumanian constitution was proclaimed in 1866, anti-Semitic measures were passed with a certain frequency.³ The movement towards consolidated state structures with political parties - with their respective elites ready to govern the country -, armed forces and a civil service, implied barring the Jewish minority from land ownership, from the institutions of the State, and from certain professions. All this, as in other Eastern European countries, was the result of the traumatic development of a bourgeoisie divided into two parts increasingly in conflict, but also closely interdependent. This situation arose in 1829, when the Treaty of Adrianopolis gave full commercial freedom to the Danubian Principalities still within the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian and Jewish traders' quickly became dominant as a result of their contacts abroad.⁴ At the same time, a professional middle class was painfully emerging among the Christian boyar Rumanians. Thus, for a long time the enormous social distance between landlords and the peasant masses contained more or less isolated sectors of the Jewish community, to the extent that the Rumanian revolution of 1848 was in part financed by a Jewish banker.⁵

The result of all this is paradoxical. The liberal oligarchy which built the State presented the Jews as the very image of anti-Rumanianism, a cosmopolitan people to be kept under tight legal control. However, this conflict varied ambivalently between pacts and wars, progress and regression. The economic bases of the emerging Christian bourgeoisie were very often linked with those of the emerging Jewish bourgeoisie. The Jews could be periodically punished in order to keep them in their place, but to eradicate them would be counterproductive.⁶ As a result, the tactic followed was harassment; in this way, the «pogroms» and restrictive legal measures were very often directed against the lower end of the Jewish community, the poverty-stricken Jews of the towns and cities of the Moldavian north.

³ For a complete list of the anti-Jewish restrictive measures from 1804 to 1902, see Isidore Singer (ed) «Rumania» in *The Jewish encyclopedia*, New York and London, 1905, Vol. X,

⁴ In 1832, the Jewish traders of Bucharest were sufficiently powerful to achieve complete autonomy as a guild independent of those formed by Christian Rumanians. See Vladimir Didculescu, *Bresle, negustori si meseriasii in Tara Romaneasca 1830-1848*, Bucuresti, 1973 p.80.

⁵ Dr. Didi Rosenzweig, «Un bancher evreu participant la Revolutia din 1848 din Tara Romanescu» in *Toladot*, No. 8 December 1974, pp. 10-12.

⁶ In 1868 Jews were banned from practising medicine; three years later, the clause was suppressed. In 1864 four conditions for a Jew to be considered a naturalized citizen were published; one of them was to have founded a factory. See Isidore Singer, op. cit., pp. 516-517.

As a response, lower and middle class Jews sought refuge in the powerful socio-cultural discipline of their community. On the basis of the religious burial associations they set up cooperative and mutual-aid societies, schools for the underprivileged, cultural centres and medical, life and commercial insurance. In some cases they used the most advanced technological innovations of the period.⁷ In this way, the rivalry between the two bourgeoisie groups became interminable.⁸

The Jews could also count on the help of supra-national aid associations for protection against the State. The *Alliance Israelite Universelle*, the Anglo-Jewish Association, the *Israelitische Allianz* in Vienna, the Board of Delegates of American Israelites, and other similar organizations had an impressive capacity for putting pressure on young states such as Rumania that were dependent on the acquiescence of the great powers.

This pressure was used at three important points in contemporary Rumanian history, with the consequence that anti-Semitism intensified in Rumania. The intervention of Adolphe Crémieux, president of the Alliance Israelite Universelle from 1866, in order to ensure that the Jews would be given full Rumanian citizenship in the new Constitution, was one of the causes of the increasingly suspicious attitude of the Rumanian elites in their newly created state. Disguising their opposition as popular indignation by encouraging demonstrations and pogroms, the liberals led the question of Jewish emancipation to a dead end.⁹ Eleven years later Rumania, already as a country, finally rid itself of Turkish tutelage at the Congress of Berlin. The Alliance returned to the attack, but this time with the support of France: independence would not be granted without the naturalization of the Jewish community.

The Rumanian State responded with a legal device whereby Jewish emancipation would be granted separately to individuals, thus paralyzing the application of the Berlin Treaty.¹⁰ However, the Western powers did formally recognize Rumanian independence three years later under the pressure of the newly united Germany, which found the

⁷ Examples can be found in Valentin Saxone «Societatae Marpe Lenefes (Tamaduirea Sufletului)» in *Toladot*, No. 15 (January 1977), pp.20-25; in Marin Mircu «Istoria filantropiei evreesti in Romania: Societatae Ghemiluth Hasadim» in *Toladot*, No. 16 (May 1977), pp. 3-21.

⁸ In 1904, 21% of traders were Jews, and in some cities, such as Iasi, Jews accounted for as many as 75.3%. Also 21% of artesans were Jews, 75.9% in the case of watchmakers and 81.3% of engravers. As far as industry is concerned, Jews possessed 19.5% of the 625 firms existing in Rumania. See «Romania» in *Enciclopedia Judaica*, Jerusalem, n.a. Vol. 14 (RED-SL) p.398.

⁹ Carol Iancu, *Les Juifs en Roumanie (1866-1919). De l'exclusion à l'émancipation*, Université de Provence, 1978, pp.65-66.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 159-168.

Balkans to be an excellent terrain for economic expansion, and a platform for political pressure against Austria.

Rumania and Russia were the only independent countries in Europe which actively resisted granting full citizenship rights to the Jews in the last decades of the 19th century; they also had the largest Jewish colonies within their borders. Moreover, the fact that the independence of their country was subordinated to the pressures which one of its minorities exercised from abroad had a strong emotional impact on Rumanian nationalism. As a result of this, Rumania came to be the touchstone of European anti-Semitism. Drumont, in his famous work *La France Juive* (1866) continually referred to a country besieged by the European powers manipulated by Jewish interest. Meanwhile, persecution, pogroms and expulsions continued in Rumania.

Nicolae Iorga

Various nationalist and anti-Semitic movements emerged on the basis of this conflict. One of the most famous was created out of the literary circle «*Junimea*» (Youth) led by Mihai Eminescu, who was venerated as a great national poet. This movement was the expression of a conservative and ultra-nationalist romanticism in opposition to the first romantic generation of the 1840-48 period with its French liberal influences. In contrast, Eminescu and «*Junimea*» were influential in the period 1860-1890, and establishing strong intellectual ties with the world of German culture. This was the period of the French defeat at the hands of the young «*Reich*»; in Rumania, and other European countries, Germany was seen as a new and exciting protagonist which would ruffle the feathers of the other European powers. «*Junimea*» also led a kind of cultural-nationalist reaction closely linked to Moldavian society, which had been based on the power of the landowners but which was now in steep decline, cut off from the State resources of distant Bucharest. The *junimisti*, led by Eminescu, became an intellectual movement in support of Rumanian particularity, although unlike the liberals, they based their movement on a declining agrarian culture through which they energetically denounced foreign influences, a fifth column of abuses and interference of the great powers. The poet never disguised his indignation over the reports of the Congress of Berlin, which for him insulted the independence that Rumania had recently achieved.¹¹

¹¹ Carol Iancu, op. cit., pp. 214-216. For a broad coverage of Mihail Eminescu's political ideas see D. Murarsu *Nationalismul lui Eminescu*, Madrid 1952. Another interesting study is Keith Hitchins «'Gandirea': Nationalism in a spiritual guise», pp.140-173, in Kenneth Jowitt (ed.), *Social change in*

Samanatorism was a political-intellectual movement of much greater importance than *junimism* in the creation of twentieth century Rumanian nationalism. The name derived from *Samanatorul* («The Sower»), a literary journal, and the first systematic attempt to define and establish Rumanian national identity on the basis of a series of intellectual myths was made. This took place in the traumatic period of the imperialist crisis of the turn of the century, when lower and middle bourgeoisie, threatened by the crisis of capitalism, rejected urban-industrial society. In this context, *samanatorism* can be identified with the group of intellectual movements which sought to secure this threatened national identity through the search for an idealized past.¹² The foreign capital which flooded into the country, an opportunistic and «unpatriotic» foreign policy, the effects of the great international economic crisis which Rumania suffered between 1900 and 1903, and the reappearance of Rumanian agitation in Transylvania, in a period in which Hungarian authorities were pushing ahead with the magyazation of their ethnic minorities, were the circumstances under which this literary publication appeared in 1901.¹³

However, *Samanatorul* did not come into its own until it became a catalyst for a range of young nationalist intellectuals who were unhappy with the corruption of the ruling liberals who distributed offices and sinecures to sympathetic intellectuals. Most importantly, the journal really caught momentum in 1905, when the versatile Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940) became its fiery leader.

At that time, this prominent intellectual was one of the best known and most strident personalities of the nationalist and anti-Semitic movement. The father of modern Rumanian historiography, and known internationally, Iorga had a significant impact on Rumanian literary culture in general. His prodigious intellectual output consists of around 1300 volumes and 25,000 articles, although his biographers are not certain that they can identify and classify all his works.¹⁴ This intellectual Pentagrue also intervened in politics and made his mark, to a lesser extent than in the cultural world, before the First World War. At present he is revered in the official historiography, and although his role is constantly defended, his anti-Semitism and

Romania, 1860-1940, op. cit., see page 143. The founder of *Junimea* was the literary critic Titu Maiorescu.

¹² The best reference text on this subject, due to its extensive documentation, is the book by Z. Ornea, *Samanatorismul*, Bucuresti, 1977. For this phenomenon see pp. 262-263, 292-293 and 296-297.

¹³ *ibid.*, pp. 24-33.

¹⁴ Bianca Valota Cavallotti, *Nicola Iorga*, Naples, 1977, p.13; for a painstaking listing of all his works see pp. 257-297.

the reactionary nature of much of his political activity is rarely mentioned. A historian of the origins of modern Rumania, but also a man of great energy and enthusiasm for politics, Iorga was the great founder of nationalist myths which in the 1920s and 1930s would be used by both the conservative Right and the extremist Right.

At the turn of the century, Iorga not only wrote article after article on the medieval origins of the Rumanian National State, but also in the belief that he represented the Rumanian national conscience, he also sought to mobilize public opinion around the great social and national issues of the moment. His enthusiasm for «*Samanatorul*» lasted for only a year, but he set the movement alight with a xenophobic nationalist campaign which ended with a violent boycott, in March 1906, against the performance of a French play attended by Bucharest high society.¹⁵

Samanatorism emphasizes two issues which years later would be taken up by Rumanian ultra-nationalism, a movement with fascist sympathies: the exaltation of an idealized, archaic and bucolic, Rumanian countryside, and the belief that in the past there was a model of *Volksgemeinschaft* - real or imagined - to be recovered. Iorga refined this romantic myth in order to give it a new scientific credibility, based on the «Popular Constitution of 1300», where the origins of a «Rumanian Style» democracy¹⁶ similar to the *razesi* «republics», without parties of bureaucrats, could be found. These communities of free peasants in Moldavia and Wallachia, governed by popular councils and custom-based laws, had played a key role under the leadership of the Voivods, in the defence of the principalities against Turkish aggression. But the high point of this mythology was the defence of the idealized myth of the old inter-class patriarchal order, headed by the «good Boyars», and the rejection of class hatred as a grave sin of modern times. According to Iorga's:

modern times ... have brought, on top of our old sins a new and deadly sin: class hatred. Before, we had a peasantry, a number of boyars and men of wisdom who lived together, who saw eye to eye on many issues who loved each other, more than we can imagine today, and who were capable of uniting in certain circumstances in order to act for the benefit of everybody.¹⁷

Finally, the debate over schooling as a premiss for the construction of a strong nation - a European-wide debate at the end of the 19th century between the lay schools

¹⁵ Z. Ornea, op. cit., pp. 189-190.

¹⁶ Z. Ornea, op. cit., pp. 189-190.

¹⁷ Nicloae Iorga, «Boierimea de tara care se duce», in *Samanatorul*, anul V, No 47, 25.XI 1905, pp. 861-862. The journal also emphasized the need for the nation to be governed «by a tiny minority of great men» at the head of a strong State. See Aurel C. Popovici «Intre evolutie si disolutie», in *Samanatorul*, Anul VII, No. 12, 16.III.1908, pp. 221-233.

advocated by Jules Ferry, the German technical school and new teaching experiments - was animated in Rumania by the passing of a law of secondary and higher schooling in 1898 and the efforts of the Rumanian-Transylvanians to avoid the Magyarization imposed in Hungarian schools. Moreover, the corruption of the liberal academic authorities throughout the period of liberal dominance, giving grants, jobs and prizes to their proteges, had provoked the fury of students and intellectuals. The idea of promoting the national culture among the people as a way of achieving unity is notably present in Iorga,¹⁸ in the end the Iron Guard, the Rumanian fascist movement, also adopted this theme in the inter-war years. Its leader, Corneliu Codreanu, constantly referred to this question in his work, regarding his movement as a great spiritual school which would produce a new Rumanian, full of civic and patriotic virtue, and defending the Rumanian centres of culture and education against the increasing power of the Jews: «Those who run the cities run the schools, and those who run the schools tomorrow will run the country».¹⁹

So *samanatorism* was a populist Right-wing nationalist movement, in theory opposed to the Left-wing populism of *narodnikii* inspiration imported from Russia by Constantin Stere, a socialist born in Bessarabia in the times when it was a province of the Czarist Empire. In fact, the two movements had common programmes and activists,²⁰ and in both the origins of agrarianism and part of the fascist style of the Iron Guard can be detected: for example in the naive enthusiasm shown in the «campaign for the people», and in the nationalist idealization of the peasant masses as «the purest of the race». This influence was not exerted directly through *Samanatorul*; instead it was an outcome of Iorga's later political activity. Iorga, after leaving the journal, created his own publication, *Neamul Romanesc* (The Rumanian Nation), and later the National Democrat Party. In this new phase, Iorga retained most of his previous ideas, but attempted to give them a more explicitly political expression than in the literary aestheticism of *Samanatorul*.

Of course, anti-Semitism was present in *Samanatorul*. Iorga launched fierce attacks against Jewish and Greek tenants (*arendasi*) contracted by landowners as

¹⁸ Bianca Valota Cavallotti, op. cit., p. 62. It is interesting that the first article signed by Iorga as the new editor of the journal in May 1905 was titled «A new era of culture». Moreover, the journal published many articles related to education of the social role of students. See for example the series «Studentii si poporul» by Zamfir C. Arbure, published by the journal in July and August of 1907 (Nos 28 to 34).

¹⁹ Corneliu Z. Codreanu, *Pentru Legionari*, Bucharest, 1936, p.95.

²⁰ Catherine Durandin, «Les intellectuels et la paysannerie roumaine de la fin du XIXème siècle aux années 1930», in *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, Vol XXVI, January-March 1979, pp. 144-155. Z. Ornea claims that the German educated Transylvanians involved in the journal were influenced by the *Dorfgeschichte*, a group with similar ideas to «samanatorism». Representatives of this current in Germany included Auerbach, Gottfried Keller and Albert Bitzins. See Z. Ornea, op. cit., p. 297.

managers of agricultural production which exploited Rumanian peasants, or against Jewish journalists, targetted in a section entitled: «*Anexa la Jidanii in presa*»²¹ dedicated to exposing all those who had changed their original name for a more Rumanian one.

The National Democrat Party

From then on Iorga, the great intellectual man of action whose articles «had the elegant cadence of the most beautiful works of Carlyle»²² began to acquire a broad intellectual audience. In Moldavia, all students of higher education were dedicated readers of *Neamul Romanesc*.²³ Iorga's anti-Semitism reflected most coherently the social tensions which lay behind it through the creation of the National Democrat Party (NDP) in 1910.

Historians have tended to regard this party as unimportant; when it appears in a text it is usually set aside as a simple anti-Semitic movement.²⁴ Certainly this is partly due to the presence in the leadership of A.Z. Cuza (1857-1944), professor of Political Economy in the University of Iasi (no relation to Prince Cuza) and one of the most famous and most radical anti-Semites.²⁵ The NDP was also the first Rumanian political party to include anti-Semitism in its programme, and in a prominent position. This attitude expressed the anxiety of the regional petty bourgeoisie in the North of the country. The five points relating to the «nationalist solution to the Jewish problem» in its programme are revealing. The second of these demands²⁶ is particularly interesting:

any government called to rule Rumania has the duty to help the nation represented by that government ... and support the nation in its attempts to solve the Jewish problem.

²¹ See an example in *Neamul Romanesc*, No. 110 -anul V- 17.IX. 1910, pp. 1746-1752.

²² The opinion of Pamfil Seicaru, op. cit., p.44.

²³ Ibidem. In Olthenia, his popularity was similar to that in Moldavia, whereas in Munthenia few students read his journal.

²⁴ In some cases, such as the work of Mircea Iosa and Traian Lungu, *Viata politica in Romania 1899-1910*, (Bucharest, 1977), the NDP is simply ignored.

²⁵ The best work on A.C. Cuza is in Pamfil Seicaru, *Un junimist antisemit: A.C.Cuza*, Ed. Carpatii, Madrid 1956. A defender of an obsessive anti-semitism with biological theories, Cuza was more and agitator than an academic. His only significant work in this field was *Nationalitatea in arta* (Nationality in Art), Ed. Minerva, Bucharest, 1908; here he even rejects the Old Testament as a sinister work of Jews, on pp.172-175, a theory that had already attracted H.S. Chamberlain and Tolstoy; see Peter G. Pulzer, *The rise of political anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria*, (New York, 1964), p. 55. Monotonous and dull in his writing, he was an admirer of Drumont's anti-Semitism, and Bluntschli's ideas on the political organization of the State.

²⁶ *Neamul Romanesc pentru popor*, anul II, No 2, 19.I.1911, pp. 17-21

This solution implied the following measures:

1. The protection and encouragement of the efforts of Rumanians; 2. The creation of cooperative societies; 3. Public contracts and supplies must be given to Rumanian artisans and traders; 4. The expulsion of Jews from the land they have no right to occupy; 5. The exclusion of Jews from the Army; 6. The removal of Jews from the Rumanian press; 7. The exclusion of Jews from all functions; 8. The strict application of the law for the encouragement of industry run by Rumanians.

The second, third, fifth, sixth and eighth points refer to the concerns of petty bourgeois traders, professionals and functionaries who saw themselves as threatened by the increasing strength of the Jewish rival. Artisans and traders considered the only solution to be State protection through the concession of «public contracts and supplies»; and the same applied to the cooperatives, which had to counteract the efficient cooperatives created by Jewish private enterprise, which covered social security, education and even the organization of funerals. The inclusion of the agrarian classes in this project is demonstrated by point four, and partially by the measures relating to the creation of cooperatives.

On the other hand, the NDP had been founded in a period of regeneration of Rumanian politics and culture. In 1907 there had been a devastating peasant uprising which began in the north of Moldavia and spread across the rest of Rumania acquiring revolutionary features as it spread south-wards. In the end, the Rumanian Army brutally crushed the unarmed peasants, even using artillery. The repression caused 11,000 civilian deaths: with the exception of the 1905 revolution in Russia, no other revolt since 1871 had caused so many deaths in Europe. The insurrection had its general origins in the peasants' situation, an economic crisis lasting from 1899 to 1903, and the failure of an attempt to create a cooperative movement, backed by the Government, to push out the *arendasi*. A whole series of causes relating to communal elections, tax increases and competition between *arendasi* - with the result of increased exploitation of the peasantry - sparked off the revolt.²⁷

The frightening image of a column of rebels with their scythes, pitchforks and axes attempting to march on Bucharest remained for a long time in the memory of the Rumanian middle and upper classes as a terrifying nightmare.²⁸ After this disaster

²⁷ The best study on this subject is the book by Phillip Gabriel Eidelberg, *The Great Rumanian Peasant Revolt of 1907. Origins of a Modern Jacquerie*, (Leiden, 1974)

²⁸ For a study on the way in which the rebels fought see: N Adaniloaie and C. Fotino, «Forme de lupt folosite de taranime in cascoala de la 1907» in *Studii* (extras No 2, anul XI, 1978)

- similar in its effects on Rumanian society to the Spanish crisis of 1898 - a great national debate began involving economists, journalists, writers and all kinds of intellectuals and politicians, in contrast to the lack of interest shown before this revolt.²⁹

The creation of the NDP is related to this situation. It was clear that the idealized vision of Rumanian peasants as the essence of the nation, promoted by *Samanatorul*, had been undermined. Iorga's party represented a greater political commitment. However, there was no social revisionism in Iorga's project: he sided with the peasant revolt in 1907, and then defended the traditional agrarian order under the tutelage of the «good Boyards»,³⁰ as well as aligning himself clearly with the big landowners.³¹ In fact, *Neamul Romanesc* was subsidized by among others, George Stirbel, a landowner in Olthenia, who contributed 7,000 lei, which at the turn of the century was a large amount of money.³² This balancing act was based on the opposition to the new «cosmopolitan» urban industrial society and the support of the big landowners of Moldavia, in an attempt to win support if the unruly agrarian masses. The nationalist image of the peasantry as the «healthy» and natural basis of the Rumanian nation could not be renounced.

Nevertheless, the aims expressed in the NDP programme had not been hurriedly improvised. An important example is the article by A.C. Cuza in *Neamul Romanesc* in 1910 refuting another article in *Secuolul*, the liberal paper, which had accused him of promoting an incoherent and primitive anti-Semitism.³³ This article contains two different ways of understanding anti-Semitism: the liberal grand bourgeois version, and the much more radical version of the conservative petty bourgeoisie. In *Secuolul* on the 25th of August he wrote:

The Jewish problem for us is, above all an economic question ... But in order to halt this advance (of the Jewish bourgeoisie), and nationalize our commerce ... we must find more practical credit systems, such as cooperative and professional trading, so that commerce can be in the hands of Rumanians.

²⁹ The drama of 1907 is present throughout 20th century Rumanian literature, from the fables of Caragiale, to the three volumes of the epic novel of Cezar Petrescu titled: *1907*, published in 1938, the sonets of Panaait Cerna, the ironic fables of George Ranetti - *El arado y el cañón* - and many other examples. See the article of Serban Cioculescu: «1907 in literatura», in *70 de ani de la marea rascoala a taranilor din 1907*, (Bucharesti, 1977), pp. 160-197.

³⁰ Pamfil Seicaru, *Nicolae Iorga*, op. cit., pp. 44-47.

³¹ In his «*Neamul Romanesc*» he stated, in 1907; «We have nothing against land ownership, we have never fought against the big landowners». See Catherine Durandin, art. cit. p.151.

³² P. Seicaru, *Nicolae Iorga*, op. cit., pp. 39.

³³ A.C. Cuza, «Intimpinările 'Secolului' calomnie d-lui Raut si miscarea nationalista», in *Neamul Romanesc*, 17.IX.1910, pp. 1745-1754.

Cuza responded angrily that in 1890 he had already mentioned the need to resort to cooperatives for credit, buying and production, as well as improving the training of Rumanian artisans in practice workshops, admitting and confirming that the Jewish question was an economic issue. Finally he pointed out that in 1902 he had emphasized the need for a Rumanian middle class. This assertion could also be found in one of Cuza's less refined works, *Despre Poporatie* (On population), which criticized the liberal State.³⁴

Iorga liked to say that the NDP represented a «bourgeois-radical, national, dynastic, religious and moral Left».³⁵ Behind this slogan was the first party of the lower and middle Rumanian bourgeoisie, a class which was beginning to acquire a certain group consciousness in the critical period of the turn of the century. But this class's discontent varied in its expression in different parts of the country, and was strongest in Moldavia, where the new capitalistic relations of production had penetrated most. Here, in the midst of the disappearance of the traditional rural relations of production, the *arendasi*, traders, artisans and «imported» Jewish professionals had filled in the gaps left by this process. In general, the problem of Rumanian anti-Semitism had the same characteristics: the end of century crisis as a result of a failure to adapt socio-economically to imperialist expansion. Whether the actors involved in the conflict were Jews, Greeks, or in the case of Finland, the Swedes, was a question of geographical proximity and the superior social organization of these ethnic groups.

The NDP was therefore an interesting nationalist project which mobilized the lower and middle bourgeoisie in a political context dominated by the alternation in power of two large cadre parties. The closest thing to the NDP was the Polish National Democrat Party, and this was no coincidence. This party had emerged in 1897 out of the nationalist National League, which, according to the authors of a modern history of Poland, «corresponded to the sentiments shared by the whole of the European bourgeoisie in that period. It was the sign of a new era, the era of Imperialism.»³⁶ As far as the NDP itself is concerned, Erasme Piltz, at the time of the events he analyses, argued that «it represents the radical nationalist tendencies in various social groups. It recruits amongst members of the liberal professions, functionaries, a part of the bourgeoisie, agricultural landowners and the rural classes.»³⁷

³⁴ Pamfil Seicaru, *Un junimist antisemit...*, op. cit., p. 7.

³⁵ Mircea Musat si Ion Ardeleanu, *Viata politica in Romania 1918-1921*, (Bucharest, 1976), p. 301.

³⁶ See Stefan Kieniewicz (ed.), *Histoire de Pologne*, PWN, Eds Scientifiques de Pologne, Warsaw, 1972, p.621, and Erasme Piltz (ed.), *Petite Encyclopedie Polonaise*, Libr. Payot, Paris, 1916, p. 119.

³⁷ Erasme Piltz (ed.), *Petite Encyclopedie Polonaise*, Libr. Payot, Paris, 1916, see p. 119.

The Polish NDP chose the wealthier peasants as its base of support, and absorbed the cooperative movement - as did its Rumanian counterpart - and, in search of wider popular support. Its leader, Dmowsky, encouraged the fight against the Ukrainians and Jews within the Austro-Hungarian empire at the turn of the century. In turn, there was a Ukrainian NDP of similar characteristics, just as fiercely nationalist as its rival, which attracted the intelligentsia of Eastern Galitzia, in close contact with the peasant masses.

However, the Rumanian NDP never enjoyed the strength of its Polish counterpart. It managed to consolidate in the ports of Braila and Galati - where Iorga was elected to Parliament - and in Iasi - Cuza's city - the districts of Covurlui, Bacau, Botosani, Suceava and other parts of Moldavia where Jewish presence was strong.³⁸ However, it never became a serious threat to the ruling parties. This was due in part to the failure of Iorga, the leader who could offer the most to the organization, to dedicate sufficient time to his party. Seicaru wrote: «We can say without exaggeration that N. Iorga was constantly unfaithful to the party he had created.»³⁹ Amongst other things, Iorga felt that the application of electoral techniques was a waste of time. The party was eventually pushed back into Moldavia, which was steadily losing ground to Bucharest. The ruling parties which shared out governmental power in the capital were able to maintain the NDP as a marginal force, often through electoral fraud or other methods of political trickery, as with other undesirable political formations.

Close Heirs

In 1919, the NDP enjoyed a great electoral success, sending 27 deputies to the capital. But the quarrel between Iorga and Cuza weakened this party which, in the post-war period, lost its meaning. In 1920 the NDP won only 3 seats, and 1922 brought a similar result. During the inter-war years, the party was reduced to almost nothing. The NDP and its newspaper simply became Iorga's personal possessions, and Iorga himself had only a small group of diehards and opportunists seeking to take advantage of his academic position.

With the incorporation into Rumania of new and extensive regions (Transylvania, Bessarabia, Banat and Bucovina) from the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires, the State emerging from the Great War was twice the size and had twice the population

³⁸ Pamfil Seicaru, *Nicolae Iorga*, op. cit., p. 48.

³⁹ Ibidem.

of the pre-war state. The entry of Transylvania, Bucovina and Banat provincial bourgeoisie into the political arena, as well as a number of ethnic minorities with their own middle-classes, transformed the Rumanian political context and brought new rules. The task of the institutional, social and economic construction of the new State was beyond the capacity of the NDP, which was limited to the context of the Old Kingdom and lacked a structured political programme. In this period the old liberal oligarchy also collapsed, and its party was dissolved at the end of the 1920s. The political symbol of the new era was the National Peasants' Party (Partidul National Taranesc or PNT) which brought together the educated Transylvanian bourgeoisie with middle and middle-upper class peasantry of the Old Kingdom in a wide ranging project which implied not only the democratization of Rumanian political life, but also the first serious attempt of the new Rumanian middle class to gain access to political power. From the early 1930s, after this attempt had failed in the political arena, Rumania was ruled by various weak governments until the end of the decade.

At that time, Rumanian intellectuals, as the representatives of the new petty bourgeoisie, were obsessed with the failure to consolidate the great Rumanian nation.⁴⁰ It was not just an intellectual idea. In 1921 agrarian reform had failed in its attempt to create a prosperous middle class peasantry, their children, many of whom had gone to university, now lived in poverty, whether in work or unemployed. A very high percentage of them found work in the over-manned civil service, one of the worst maintained in Europe as a result of the inexperience and inefficiency of the Governments of the 1930s. The causes of this situation are to be found in the importance for the middle classes and the Rumanian «intelligentsia», as for other Eastern European countries, of having access to the State administration. In a context in which the private labour market was incapable of absorbing the labour supply of the professional middle classes, the State bureaucracy became a route for social advancement and even the nucleus of a kind of class power. In 1934 the number of university students, which eight years earlier had been 18,000, was more than 30,000, whilst those staying on at school numbered 280,000, ten times as many as before the

⁴⁰ Mircea Eliade, who years later was to be famous as a researcher of religions, was a young intellectual in the 1930s, the author of several successful novels. One of them, *Return to paradise*, ... was centered on the loss of happiness, dreams and optimism which had marked the first 12 years of the Great Rumania. Like most people of my age - Eliade pointed out - I had lived through adolescence and youth in that atmosphere of euphoria, quiet confidence and credulity. Now I knew that Paradise was far away, and that we had lost it without even realising that we had had it. We were the first generation and the only ones to experience Paradise from 1919-1920 on. It is obvious that this Paradise was a spiritual one. It was merely the happiness we felt at achieving a collective ideal.

Cited in Z. Ornea, *Traditionalism si modernitate in deceniul al treilae*, (Bucharest, 1980), p.251.

war.⁴¹ Many of them sought a career in the civil service, which came to be dominated by the middle classes and other social groups, even at the highest levels, at the expense of the boyar families, which had dominated the civil service before 1915. However, salaries were very low: according to official figures, 76% of State employees earned less than 5,000 lei a month, so they were obliged to eke out a living with bribes and tips.⁴²

The irritation and anxiety over the political and economic crisis of social classes going through a massive change of social position are key to understanding the background and reactions of the activists and sympathizers of the Iron Guard. This fascist movement, which grew at great speed during the 1930s, recruited hundreds of policemen, councillors, State lawyers, railway workers and other similar socio-professional categories that acted as informers or active supporters. In December 1933, the movement had 28,000 activists, but by December 1937 it had grown to 272,000.⁴³ At that time it was the third most important fascist movement in Europe, behind the German National Socialist Party and the Italian Fascist Party.⁴⁴

The Iron Guard took up some of Iorga's nationalist discourse, especially in relation to the idealization of Rumanian country life (through *gandirism*, an intellectual movement formed around the journal *Gandirea* (Thought)).⁴⁵ However, a much wider range of nationalist themes were used: in fact, like any fascist movement, the Iron Guard brought together every possible discourse, including reformist projects taken from the Left. But this movement owed part of this lack of substance to the NDP. Both political groups channeled the frustrations of the middle classes caught in a traumatic period of growth and change, and the NDP's relative failure can be explained by the fact that in 1910 the Rumanian petty bourgeoisie was a very weak social group. The NDP was a characteristic example of the ambiguous political context which at the

⁴¹ Andrew C. Jonos, «Modernisation and decay in historical perspective: the case of Rumania», in Kenneth Kowitt (ed.), *Social change in Rumania 1860-1940*, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1978, pp. 72-116, see p. 108.

⁴² Ibidem.

⁴³ Armin Heinen, *Die Legion 'Erzengel Michael' in Rumänien. Soziale Bewegungen und politische Organisation. Ein Beitrag zum Problem des internationalen Faschismus*, Südosteuropäische Arbeiten, Munich, 1986, p.382.

⁴⁴ These points are covered by the author of this article in the book *La mística del ultranacionalismo (Historia de la Guardia de Hierro). Rumania 1919-1941*, Eds de Universitat Autònoma, Bellaterra (Barcelona), 1989.

⁴⁵ Nichifor Crainic offers an effective definition of «gandirism» in his article «Sensul tradiției», published in the journal *Gandirea*, anul XI, 1-2 (1929), January-February, pp.1-11, see especially pp.6-7 and 10. An Excellent general study of «gandirism» can be found in Kenneth Jowitt (ed.), *Social change in Romania, 1860-1940*, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1978.

turn of the century was undergoing a deep transformation. But in Rumania it was the first mass party to channel the «historic» nationalist discourse which until then had only been politically used by the Rumanian social elites.

The way in which the NDP went out of existence is symptomatic. Iorga had his moment of political power in 1931 when King Carol II asked him to form a government of «national unity» along with Constantin Argetoianu, a professional politician known for his defection from one party to another. The Iorga-Argetoianu Government lasted a year. In the face of the crisis in public finances, the Government reduced civil servant salaries by 15%, even though the previous incumbents, the national-peasant Government of G. Mironescu, had already reduced civil service pay by between 10% and 23%. The disastrous failure of the Iorga-Argetoianu experiment, which caused a number of sackings and unpaid pensions, destroyed Iorga as a politician. With the NDP weaker than ever, he decided to support the King in his dictatorial plans.⁴⁶ When, in 1938, the Monarch made the decisive step in this direction, the NDP was one of the first parties to express its support for the dictatorship. Iorga transformed the party into an apolitical cultural association,⁴⁷ and he himself was named councillor to the Crown in the new regime.

Since one of the objectives of the royal dictatorship was to fight against the growth of fascism, in an international situation that was particularly delicate for Rumania, Iorga was transformed into the sworn enemy of the Iron Guard, and even helped in the detention of Codreanu, who was assassinated by the state in 1939. When the Legionaries took power in September 1940, after the fall of King Carol's dictatorship, a group of extremists kidnapped and assassinated Iorga. The intellectual who had sponsored generations of ultra-nationalists and anti-Semites at the turn of the century - amongst them Codreanu's father - died at the hands of his pupils. Indirectly he was also a victim of the 20th century. These events can be seen as symbolic of the evolution of the Rumanian nationalist Right in these forty decisive years.

⁴⁶ Al.Gh. Savu, *Sistemul partidelor politice din Romania 1919-1940*, (Bucharest, 1976), see particularly p. 87.

⁴⁷ After the revolution of 1989, a National Democrat Party reappeared in Rumania under the leadership of Christian Butusina, who, in an interview with the author on the 17th January 1990, denied any link with Iorga's party. The NDP programme of 1990 was interchangeable with those of most parties founded at that time.

The nationalist effect of the «Stalinist paradox»

The military outcome of the Second World War seemed to have changed everything, but in fact the situation it created was curiously similar. After the 1950s, marked by the purest Stalinist doctrine, the following decade saw the re-emergence of national-marxist ideas, often resuscitated directly from the past. These shaped nationalist ceremonies, historical films, the restoration of statues in honour of Rumanian heroes - a replica of the Trajana Column was made - the revision of Rumanian history in school textbooks and even pompous ceremonies recreating the heroic past with actors dressed in period costume to regale Ceausescu.⁴⁸

The idea of the «Rumanian model» of socialism was a great popular success. This is shown, for example, by the notable increase in the membership of the PCR which grew from 593,393 members in 1955 to 1,3377,847 in 1964.⁴⁹ However, the growth cannot be regarded as a simple reflection of nationalism or the result of the invention of the communists' «heroic resistance» against the fascist military regime during the war, although it is clear that these factors played a part.

In reality, popular support for the Rumanian communist regime is a demonstration of the «Stalinist paradox». In the 1950s the dominant model for economic development throughout Eastern Europe was the Soviet model. This meant, above all, the development of a powerful heavy industry sector, which was not only seen as the muscle which safeguarded economic self-sufficiency, the key to the fight against the capitalist enemy. Industry also had to transform the social base of the Eastern bloc, especially in those areas where the majority population were peasants, thus creating the necessary proletarian basis for the consolidation of the communist revolution.

In some countries these transformations went very deep. Towards the end of the 1940s, 78% of the population of Rumania lived off the land. In 1966, this proportion had fallen to 61%, and five years later to 49%. In short, 35% of Rumanians, together with their families, changed their way of life in one generation.⁵⁰ These percentages reveal the enormous effort, characteristic of the Stalinist-type regimes in the 1950s, in order to establish a heavy industrial sector. The huge iron and steel works

⁴⁸ Ion Ratiu offers a vivid description of these phenomena in his *Contemporary Romania*, Richmon, England, Foreign Affairs Publishing, 1975, see 3rd part, Chap. 2, pp. 52-53. The most serious study on Rumanian nationalism during the communist period is the excellent book by Katherine Verdery, *National ideology under socialism. Identity and cultural politics in Ceausescu's Romania*, University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford, 1991.

⁴⁹ Mary Ellen Fischer, «The Romanian Communist Party and its central committee: patterns of growth and change», in *Southeastern Europe*, Vol. 6, part 1 (1979), p. 8.

⁵⁰ For a comparison with the rest of the Balkan States, see John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, *Balkan Economic History 1550-1950. From Imperial borderlands to developing nations*, Indiana University

would not only bring economic independence and development for the country, but it would also create a genuine Rumanian proletariat to sustain the revolution; a more political decision than an economic one. But these industries could not be set up without the creation of a minimally efficient services sector and the training of technical and managerial personnel. This implied the need for an army of specialized managers, planners, bureaucrats, economists, engineers, experts lawyers and so on.

Therefore the decision to develop a policy of relative independence towards Moscow, backed by nationalist ideas, had an unexpected consequence: the creation of a significant middle class for the first time in Rumania. Of course this middle class was not defined in terms of economic capacities, but in terms of influence, and even social power.

But above all, this model affected social expectations. In comparison with the poverty, chronic illness and illiteracy of the (mainly rural) masses in the Balkans before the war, the development of the 1960s was revolutionary. The Western observer might well have believed that this communist «welfare state» was merely a poor version of the Western model, and that it could not justify the regime. However, for the peasants of South Eastern Europe it was quite a different experience: never before had they enjoyed social services of this kind. Above all, now their children could go to university or technical institutes no matter what their background.

In Rumania (as for much of the Balkan area), this phenomenon helps to explain the rapid growth of ultra-nationalist movements after the fall of the Marxist regimes in 1989. These movements have also inherited structures, language and attitudes from the old national-communist leaders. In Rumania, for example the newspaper of the *Partidul Romania Mare* (Party of Great Rumania) mixes ideas characteristic of Ceausescu with biting attacks on the Magyars and the Jews. However, as in the case of the NDP at the turn of the century, the ultra-nationalist dialectic of the present PRM hides the unease of a middle class which sees its position in the Rumanian social structure as under threat.⁵¹

Press, Bloomington, 1982, see table 14.1 on p. 597. Constantin C. Giuresca (ed.) *Histoire chronologique de la Roumanie*, ed. Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, Bucharest, 1976, see p. 337.

⁵¹ On the basis of the list of candidates presented by the PRM in the parliamentary elections of 1992, the following professional composition emerges:

Engineers:149; Technicians: 93; Professors and teachers: 69; Workers (skilled and unskilled): 28; Army officers (retired): 26; Lawyers:24

Doctors and veterinary surgeons: 132

None of the other socio-professional categories contain more than ten candidates. It is worth pointing out that the list contains only one private businessman. See *Romania Mare*, No. 115 (18.XI.1992), pp. 8-9.

Central Europe, Ex-Yugoslavia, and the Balkans: New or Old Nationalisms?

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Some Slovene historians maintain that Slovenes in the second half of the 18th century were in a situation similar to that of the Bretons concerning their social, linguistic, and cultural position¹. In Slovenia, as in Brittany, there were two languages and cultures separated by a social divide. The nobility, the urban upper classes, the bureaucracy, and the intellectuals wrote and spoke among themselves in the language of official communication, of offices, of schools, and of the elite. For the Habsburg Monarchy, and therefore for Slovene provinces, this was German, in the Hungarian territories Latin, and also Italian in the Littoral. For the French monarchy and Brittany, it was French. In contrast to these two languages and the social elites, the great majority of the population —illiterate peasants and the urban lower classes— spoke the language «of the people»: Slovene and Breton.²

Both languages were mainly used for oral communication and were the carriers of the oral tradition, rather than of the written word. The first printed Breton book, the «Catholicon» by Jean Lagadeuc, was published at the end of the 15th century, in 1499, a good half century before the first Slovene book, the «Catechismus» was written by the Lutheran pastor Primo Trubar in 1550. But the greater or lesser literary creativity in both languages was limited to religious or didactic texts, language manuals, and in Brittany also to poems and mystery plays, until the latter part of the 18th century. In the 16th century, Slovene publishing and literary works were the result of the Reformation; the most important were a Slovene grammar written in Latin and the translation of the Bible into Slovene (1584). The Slovene Counter-Reformation brought crisis and stagnation to literary endeavours, even though in the 17th century passion plays and dramas with religious mystical themes appeared, just as they had

¹ Vasilij Melik, *Zgodovinske osnove za~etkov slovenskega narodnegagibanja*, Obdobje 1, Obdobje razsvetljenstva v slovenskem jeziku, znanosti in kulturi, Filozofska fakulteta, Ljubljana 1979, p. 421

² Georges Minois, *Nouvelle histoire de la Bretagne*, Fayard-Paris 1992, p. 379.

in Brittany, but to a lesser extent. A completely new period of literary efforts began in the second half of the 18th century in both languages. Yet individual Slovene authors united their interest in «the language of the people» with greater ambitions. The Augustinian monk Marko Pohlin published his «Carniolian (Slovene) Grammar» in 1768 in which he called on his compatriots not to be ashamed of their tongue and rejected the opinion that peasant serfs should learn German in order to be able to communicate with their masters. The Slovene language, he wrote, is as old and honorable as other civilized tongues and it may therefore be considered as an equivalent means for «learned talk» and social communication.³

It is true that the language barriers in Slovenia and in Brittany were never completely identical to the social and ethnic ones, as both countries had a few autochthonous members among the intelligentsia and the middle classes, and even a few members of the aristocracy. But for this social climb, the Slovene or Breton speaking farm population needed to know the language of the «elite». The language hierarchy suited the social hierarchy and those who wanted to climb the social ladder and who aspired to the nobility or to a State or Church office had to know the language of the «upper social classes» and of «the higher culture». So from the very beginning, the problem not only concerned language but also position in the social hierarchy. In the 18th century in Central and Western Europe this was not at all unusual; it was also characteristic of other spheres where two linguistic-ethnic groups lived in other social structures. In the pre-modern, pre-industrialized states with weak integrative, centripetal tendencies and a mainly peasant population living in relative social and cultural isolation, such a «parallel life» with different structures and linguistic communities was still possible, and relatively free of conflicts. But the situation changed substantially with the creation of modern, centralized countries which tended not only towards administrative and economic unity but also towards linguistic and cultural homogeneity. The question of the survival of groups which did not have their own upper classes or which had lost them during historical development can be understood at the end of the 18th century in light of the community's ability to create its own intellectual and urban groups, to found for itself a unified, socially structured brotherhood with its own elite, its «higher» culture, and its own national political desires.⁴

³ Pohlin's «Kranjska gramatika» was written in German and in it the author encouraged his fellow citizens to respect their own Slovene language. Literally, it read: «Schamen wir uns nicht unserer Muttersprache, liebste Landesleute! Sie ist nicht so schlecht als ihr es glaubet». Quoted after J. Pogačnik, F. Zdravec, *Zgodovina slovenskega slovstva*, Maribor 1973, p. 136

⁴ In this context Slovenes and Bretons are examples of a nation which based its ethnic/national singularity on the importance of its language. The author is well aware that language is only one of the possible

In this lies the importance of the Breton and Slovene developments of the 19th and 20th centuries, which were particularly momentous and unique in the case of the Bretons. Slovene literary and cultural work continued into the 19th century, and after 1830 reached its first Romantic peak with the greatest Slovene poet, France Prešeren. In 1848 Slovene students and the intelligentsia formulated the first Slovene political program. In it they joined those demanding the federalization of the Habsburg Monarchy and took up a cry for a special autonomous unit, «A United Slovenia», within the Habsburg Monarchy. Two decades later, in 1867, Slovene politicians celebrated their first great victory, which demonstrated that the sensational, political demands enjoyed wide social support among the population. In the last decades of the 19th century, Slovene political leaders realistically limited themselves to «the politics of small steps» and, in particular, demanded recognition of the Slovene language in schools and administration from Austrian authorities. But sharpened national opposition within the monarchy and the increasing pressures of «germanization» at the end of the century clearly showed that the «good will» of the German majority was not to be counted on. The Slovenes therefore began to search for other allies; they sought them within the Southern Slavs - the Croats, in part the Serbs, also the Bulgarians. In the years before the First World War all Slovene political parties clung to the «Yugoslav idea». Even though their conceptualization of association and cooperation among the Southern Slavs was very abstract and heterogeneous until 1918, all had the same tendency: to protect the little nation of Slovenia before its great and aggressive neighbours - the Germans and the Italians - and to ensure its further national development with its nearest kin by language, by «blood», and by historical destiny.⁵ Thus, in the 19th century the Slovenes developed into a culturally and politically vigorous nation, desiring to keep and strengthen their national individuality, just as the other nations in the Habsburg Monarchy did. The determining factor in this development was undoubtedly the fact that in somewhat more than 70 years — from about 1840 to the First World War— the predominantly peasant majority formed its own middle class and developed intellectuals, who then became the bearers and

criteria and one of the possible arguments used since the 18th century by modern nations to prove their national identity and to create the foundations for their national demands. The Yugoslav nations, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, had already based their modern national consciousness in a quite different way. The Serbs called on State and Church tradition; the Croats depended on their traditional nobility and feudal autonomy in the Hungarian kingdom; only the Slovenes had recourse to their language. This does not change the fact that from the 18th on, in modern times, only those nations with developed higher social classes, thus «socially emancipated», won recognition. This is only the more visible in those who had founded their national identity on a specific language.

⁵ See: F. Zwitter, *The Slovenes and the Habsburg Monarchy*, *Austrian History Yearbook* 3, Houston 1967, pp. 159-188.

active creators of national consciousness and politics. To use a somewhat literary phrase, the Slovenes succeeded where the Bretons had failed. In contrast to the Slovenes, in the 19th century the Bretons did not succeed in developing a social and political elite capable of protecting the survival of their peasant and lower classes from the «*langue d'oui*» majority or to protect it with a more decisive national political «mobilization» so that the foundation of their own national institutions could have played a more definitive role in French national and cultural life. The national survival and affirmation of Slovenes and Bretons in the 19th century was closely and fatefully connected to the possibilities and impossibilities of their social and political emancipation in relationship to the leading majority.

The difference between the Slovene and Breton national and historical destinies—from the standpoint of a Slovene and Central European—vividly and tantalizingly demonstrates the differences that occur in the formation and development of more slowly developing ethnic and national groups in Central-Eastern and Western Europe from the 18th century on. Like many other West European countries in the 19th century after its revolution, centralized, modernized middle-class France leant towards increasingly rapid assimilation of the weaker structures of ethnic and linguistic groups and towards the political, cultural and linguistic domination of the «*langue d'oui*» speaking people. This formed an identification and national model of «*l'état nation*». In accordance with this model (and with revolutionary ideology), France was to become one nation not only politically but also linguistically. From this point of view, «*langue d'oui*» was the language of «freedom and progress», while «patois» was considered the language of the underdeveloped and reactionary.⁶ This linguistic hierarchy, with the only exception of German-speaking Alsace, on one hand meant following the linguistic practice of «the old order», as «*langue d'oui*» had been the language of the elite in the French monarchy; on the other hand, in the 19th century this kind of linguistic scale of values was also an expression on social and cultural reality. «Patois» did not have the strength to develop into a literary language and to eventually become the basis for the formation of a national consciousness. Its social basis was too weak for this and the societal and national political integrative processes were too strong, tending towards the formation of middle class elitist groups speaking the language «of the nation» who saw an important guarantee for their internal stability in the abolishment of singularities.⁷

⁶ F. Brunot, *Histoire de la langue française des origines à 1900*, Tome IX, Première partie: Le français, la langue nationale, Paris 1927. Also: F. Zwitter, *Slovenski politični preporod 19. stoletja v okviru evropske nacionalne problematike*, Zgodovinski tasopis - Ljubljana 1964, pp. 75-153.

⁷ F. Zwitter, *ibid.*

A similar process may be noted elsewhere in Western Europe wherever there was a strong enough central authority or where intensive processes of 19th century modernization enabled efficient economic, social, and cultural integration within the state. This at least gave the middle classes a strong feeling of national or homeland consciousness. It had to be stronger than other levels of identification such as regional, ethnic-linguistic communities, or faith. It is clear that in Western Europe countries varied and that integrations of linguistic-ethnic groups depended on the varying circumstances. While several reasons exist for this, I would like to draw attention to the social ones, which seem to be more important than historical tradition. In Wales and Scotland the spoken «patois» remained on the level of the Breton one, while the upper and middle classes became in the main assimilated into the the English speaking British elite. In the second half of the 19th century, in Catalonia and the Basque provinces the process was reversed, as the upper and middle classes did form and where they disavowed the central unification tendencies and became the bearers of autonomic demands. Even more instructive, at least from the Central European point of view, is the example of Belgium; in 1830 two differently organized social groups, each with its own elite and political desires, were joined into a unified country. But their fusion following the French or British model was not possible; a non-conflicting balance could only be achieved through political respect for the individuality of both parties and the creation of a unanimity of opinion between the Flemish or Walloons and the Belgian allegiance.⁸ To this day Belgium has not found a path out of this labyrinth.

The formation of states in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Balkans took a different path, mainly through dynamics which were different to those of the West. According to Philip Longworth, the development of Central European countries lagged behind the Western ones not only on economic, social and lesser populational criteria, but also in the slow development of towns, the long-lasting political and legal domination of the nobles, the peasant situation and serfdom. Apart from these, their development was significantly affected by their excessively disordered and weak central dynastic states along with the commensurate administrative and economic institutions in the 18th century. Later, in the 19th century, they were too rigid and too deformed to be able to do away with singularities to reach a stage of integration similar to that of Western Europe. Furthermore, they were unable to assimilate the weaker, linguistic-ethnic groups into a socially formed and structured «national state» with the language of the ruling social elite⁹.

⁸ J. Lope, Zur Diskussion um die Identität der Belgier im Umfeld der Revolution von 1830, *Nationale und Kulturelle Identität*, Hsg. von B. Giesen, Suhrkamp-Wissenschaft 940, pp.426.

⁹ P. Longworth, Central Europe-Selective Affinities, *Times Literary Supplement*, 22.28. September 1989.

As is well known, the first attempt to unify the language and administration in the Habsburg monarchy had already failed under Joseph II. A new defeat followed the revolution of 1848 in the modernized social and economic conditions of the mid-19th century. The Viennese court leant towards centralization and integration, but in the first half of the 19th century and particularly after 1848 its «old» and «historic» nations, the Hungarians, the Poles and the Czechs, opposed this; they were able to call on their national and historical traditions. But the «new» nations «without a history», who wanted to form their own «higher classes» composed of their middle classes and intellectuals, called on natural law first in 1848 and even more loudly from the beginnings of the constitutional period in 1861. Their leaders and representatives demanded acknowledgement and respect for their national specifics. The ruling Germans and Hungarians treated them unfairly and hierarchically - particularly in view of their historical, social, and political strengths - which only made relations more strained and increased misunderstandings. But this was not enough to prevent the social, cultural and political maturation of the «unhistorical nations - the stragglers». This is not the place to meditate on whether the breakdown of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918 was unavoidable, or whether with international support and no World War it could have reformed itself, as some authors think to this day. But one cannot lose the feeling that until 1914, in terms of their national ideology, the majority of Austro-Hungarian nations were nearer to Herder's principles in which the national leaders and ideologists based their rights for national existence on Hegel's vision of completely independent national-ethnic states. In this sense, it took the World War and the persistent hostility of the Habsburg leaders towards demands for federalism and reforms in the last two years of the War, 1917/18, to radicalize the position of the new nations. The Slavs lost their faith in the monarchy's ability to implement profound political change.¹⁰

Thus, from the century of the Vienna Congress to the First World War, the principle of nationalism in Central Europe had (as Joseph Rothchild describes so convincingly) a completely different outcome and yielded results later than in Western Europe. In the West, it led to the uniting of smaller political units into larger ones, as shown by the unifications of Germany and Italy and the consolidation of the Swiss Confederation. In Central Europe, it led instead to the disintegration of larger, usually multinational units¹¹. The new national and political organization of Central Europe

¹⁰ Concerning the definition and role of «historical» and «non-historical» nations in the Habsburg Monarchy, see: F.Zwitter (with J. Sidak and V. Bogdanov), *Nacionalni problemi v Habsburgski monarhiji*, Ljubljana 1965.

¹¹ J.Rothschild, *East-Central Europe between the Two World Wars*, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, p. 3.

and the Balkans after the First World War, which was to have fulfilled the wishes of the majority of nations in the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, did not succeed in the short decades between the two World Wars in forming «national states» with a longed-for stability, nor in surmounting the traditional nationalistic oppositions, nor in beginning a period of multinational and state tolerance. According to the literature, one of the most often quoted reasons for the old/new conflicts and misunderstandings were the Peace Conferences of 1919/20 which drew the borders and thus formed new minorities. On one hand, these fostered the irredentism of the parent nations/states from which they had been separated; on the other they became a destabilizing element demanding unification in the countries to which they were attached.

But borders and minorities were only part of the problem with which the new post-World War Central European and Balkan nations had to cope.

In attempting to evaluate their relationships and development to the present day, one must not forget that until 1918 the majority of their territories were not settled economic, administrative, and political units. In this sense, they now had to form anew. Some of them, such as Austria and Hungary, consisted only of parts of their once larger and more complex countries. Some, such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and in part Rumania, found populations within their borders which had never lived together, or at least not for several centuries. In both cases there was an increased sense of national threat; modernization and integration were slowed and made more difficult. This led to the rise of conservative, nationalistic, and authoritarian political concepts. As there was no long democratic tradition, they found fertile soil - the only exception being Czechoslovakia. In this sense, the nations and countries of Central Europe and the Balkans (until the Second World War) lagged behind Eastern Europe socially, economically, and integratively and, more particularly, in the degree of their internal strength. The Second World War - which does not need particular mention - only sharpened national antagonism which the Communist regimes from 1945 on were also unable to abolish.

Today, there is no doubt that the Communists were unable to resolve the national processes in the Soviet Union, Central Europe, or Yugoslavia. Various decrees, particularly those regarding the abolition of democracy and pressures towards political and ideological uniformity, only temporarily frustrated the social and political reality hidden below the surface. The ex-Communist countries convincingly demonstrate the

¹² Nathan Gardels, Two Concepts of Nationalism, An Interview with Isaiah Berlin, *The New York Review of Books*, Volume 37, no. 19, November 21, 1991, p. 19-23.

thought of Isaiah Berlin: »Nationalism is not resurgent«, for »it was never dead«¹². At the same time, it shows a developmental picture which, whether one likes it or not, is reminiscent of Braudel's historical »storeys«. The political, social, and economic changes on the surface from the Second World War - in the Soviet Union even from the First - seen on the surface are part of historical reality. But the second half was hidden under an outer shell which could be sensed and seen as the flow of history and tradition. National divisions and definitions survived Communism with unbelievable tenacity and returned to political life with a fateful strength after the democratization of ex-Communist countries. In this light, the example of Yugoslavia is particularly tragic; after the Second World War its leaders realized more clearly than others of ex-Communist states the meaning of national controversies and the dangerous consequences of unresolved national oppositions and yet, within the limits of their ideological vision, they tried to find a model which would enable the concurrent formation of the socialist/communist idea and multiethnic and multicultural symbiosis of the Yugoslav society. But they themselves underestimated the strength and tenacity of national divisions and the cultural/historic differences, while at the same time they failed to understand that there are no long-lasting agreements without political democracy and freedom of opinion.

The Yugoslav movement and the Yugoslav idea are in their modern political form a phenomenon from the second half of the 19th century. Their Croatian and Serbian founders were conjoined by a romantic faith in their linguistic and ethnic kinship and the conviction that the attainment of »national freedom« for the Southern Slavs guaranteed mutual solidarity and aid; at the same time they were also brought closer by the quite realistic thought that a non-conflicting border between the Serbian and Croatian populations in Slavonia, the Military Frontier, and particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, was impossible. Only in this way could both Croats and Serbs unite their national territories in the same country¹³. Before and during the First World War the Yugoslav idea had had its adherents among the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but they had not had a uniform and concrete idea of what kind of, and how close a, unification they wanted. The unexpectedly rapid formation of the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918 caught all by surprise and the very first discussions of the future of the country proved that expectations varied greatly. The Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were stepping into a new country as already formed, socially structured

¹³ Of course, for the majority of Serbs and Serbian supporters of the Yugoslav idea, this did not mean »ethnic and national« conjunction into a unified nation following the German or Italian examples, as claimed by E. Hobsbawm. Both groups leant towards a common state which would permit both to keep their national integrities. Quoted from the Italian edition: E. Hobsbawm, *Nazioni e nazionalismo*, Einaudi, p. 38.

national communities. From the very beginning the question as to what degree the country's organization should recognize the ethnic/national aspects provoked intense disagreement. The fact was that the ruling elites in Belgrade were willing to grant the status of constituent nations (or «tribes», as they were called in the political glossary of the day) to the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. But other ethnic and minority groups, including the Macedonians, Albanians, and Muslims, were denied any national rights whatever. This only sharpened antagonisms, and in the early 1920s this resulted in armed ethnic/national conflicts in some regions which are still flashpoints today - Kosovo and Eastern Bosnia.

As is well known, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes attained a constitution in 1921, mainly but not exclusively under pressure from the Serbian parties. It completely avoided the principles of ethnicity and nationality and put into effect a centralistic organization of the country following the Western European (or French) model of «l'etat-nation». Objections that the stability of a multinational community could only be maintained by an administration which reflected actual reality and took into account the country's plurality, were decisively denied in Belgrade. They had decided on a centralistic administrative model which they further supported with the thesis of a uniform «Yugoslav nation». In keeping with it, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were, historically speaking, one nation which had been tragically separated in the days of yore, and now to be re-united. But these politics indisputably led to conflicts and only a few years after its creation, Yugoslavia was divided into two opposing camps. On one hand there was the old Kingdom of Serbia (with parts of Montenegro) where the Serbian viewpoint of Yugoslavia had majority support; on the other, the ex-territories of Austro-Hungary where the majority still liked the idea of federalism and national autonomy. It was not only the Croatians who opposed centralism and Serbian political domination, even though they were its strongest opponents; the Slovenes, the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina¹⁴, and even Serbs in Vojvodina joined them. The national and cultural divisions only deepened the economic ones. Slovenia and Croatia which until 1918 had belonged to the most poorly developed part of the Austrian Monarchy, now paradoxically became the most developed sections of the new Yugoslavia. The forceful channeling into uniformity thus hindered, not helped, the integrative processes. At the same time, with the repeated crises and tensions, it prevented the unified concept of national allegiance

¹⁴ The work of H. Sundhausen is one of the best dealing with the history of Yugoslavia from 1918: *Geschichte Jugoslawiens*, Stuttgart, 1980. The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina obtained their status only after the Second World War, in the 60s, but they already had their party in the 20s and 30s. In this sense they were already an important influence in the politics of the first Yugoslavia.

which might have rivaled that of ethnic and national identification. In the 30s, all the Yugoslav nations felt the escalation of national threats; and this led to episodes of national intolerance and extreme exclusivity. When, at the end of the 30s, the court and the political leadership - under the influence of approaching war - acceded to the formation of an autonomous Croatia, for the first time giving in to the demands for federalization, it was already too late to calm the passions and to search for an equilibrium based on new, federal foundations. The tragic outcome followed in the Second World War: first the rapid breakdown of the Yugoslav state, then the fratricidal war, and finally uprisings against the occupation led, in the absence of other cohesive political forces, by the Communists who gradually changed the entire war into a Communist revolution.

After the Second World War, the Communists organized Yugoslavia according to the Soviet model; on one hand as a federation where the borders partly followed ethnic/ national ones, in part by historical criteria, and on the other hand as a one-party state in which all political authority was in the hands of the Communist Party. Its organization was extremely centralist and hierarchical and at the same time it stood, on principle, for the supranational belief. The duality was therefore more than apparent and under such conditions federalism could only be a formality. But the Communist leaders kept proving that through social revolution and the restructuring of Yugoslavia into a federalist state, problems of nationality would be solved once and for all. The constitutional system would assure equality and the right of «self-determination» to all nations. The political pressures and the memory of the tragic consequences of the Second World War did, for a short time, actually calm national passions and disagreements. But in the 50s, after the conflict between the Yugoslav Communists and Moscow had somewhat calmed the political pressures, it became evident that old antagonisms had not been overcome in the least. In 1957 this was first publicly acknowledged by the leading Yugoslav Communist ideologist, Edvard Kardelj, who attributed the growing national tensions to the inequality in economic and cultural developments of individual parts of the country and to «the remnants of bourgeois nationalism». He also determined that the efficacy of internal integration in Yugoslavia and the formation of a new, patriotic Yugoslav consciousness could only be assured by the «idea of socialism». But Kardelj still thought that development in this direction should not be hastened by force. Therefore, let the Communist duty be to fight against nationalism as well as bureaucratic centralism.

Kardelj's criticism of «centralism» divided the Yugoslav Communist elite at the end of the 50s into his followers, who supported his demands for increasing decentralization of the state, and his opponents, who kept proving that the very

singularities and national divisions were the greatest threat to Yugoslavia. But even Kardelj and his adherents in the Yugoslav political leadership never agreed to changes which could endanger the power of the Communist authorities and the Communist ideological and political monopoly. This became very apparent in the later 60s, when under the influence of the economic crisis, all the republics strengthened their demands for democratization and greater republic economic and political autonomy. The democratization of political life in Yugoslavia after 1965 had a contradictory effect - on one hand, through the loosening of political pressure all the nations desired greater autonomy and showed increased nationalistic tendencies. This reached its peak in the mass movement in 1970-72 in Croatia. On the other hand, the authorities in all the republics gained the support of young and dynamic Communist leaders who wanted thorough political, economic, and social modernization and a new, realistic agreement between the nations of Yugoslavia. In the early 70s Yugoslavia found itself at a turning point: a new and more permanent balance could be achieved only through radical political and social reorganization. It would have to insist on discussion as the only means of agreement between the nations, and to quicken modernization and allow the peaceful solution of disagreements. The political leadership with Tito and Kardelj at its helm decided the very opposite: power politics, and in 1972 changed to a leadership which favoured reform in the republics with bureaucrats faithful to them only. Two years later, in 1974, Yugoslavia received another constitution, which only deepened the paradox. On one hand it increased the autonomy of nations, on the other it strengthened the power of the Communist party which, despite the external decentralization, continued to be exceedingly hierarchical and centralistic. The period to the end of the 70s was a time of general dissatisfaction and uncertainty in the face of political pressures which made the expression of one's point of view impossible. The political authorities were weakening and did not promise the fulfillment of the constitutional and judicial possibilities and rights.

In these conditions, Tito's death in 1980 - the death of a charismatic leader - opened a great vacuum in Belgrade which the federal and Serbian bureaucracy tried to fill by strengthening the state and political centralism. How very brittle and uncertain this balance was, was demonstrated by the 1981 uprising of the Albanians in Kosovo. They demanded increased autonomy from Belgrade. The emotional and brutal Serbian answer to the Albanian demands only increased fear among non-Serbian peoples that Kosovo could become the model solution for solving national questions in other parts of Yugoslavia. Political, social, and national antagonisms were also intensified by the economic crisis which, under the conditions of socialist «consensus economics» regarding the national debt, did not burden only those who had borrowed, but also, sometimes even predominantly, those who had economized.

The ten year-process of Yugoslavia's disintegration took place from 1980 to 1990 on two levels, and with different dynamics in individual territories and republics. The rapid growth of the democratic opposition in the western part forced the Communist leadership in Slovenia and Croatia into compromises. It increased the differences between Yugoslav Communists and weakened the already inefficient Communistic system. The demands for unity, centralization, and a disciplined opposition, coming from the federal Communist bureaucrats in Belgrade, increased tensions in relations between republics and nationalities and gave the impression that was now impossible to achieve agreement in Yugoslavia. In this, the main opposition to the agreement of republics and nations came from Serbia. There were several reasons for the aggressive Serb attitude. One of them was that Serbs - as other Yugoslav nations - looked on Yugoslavia as the state which must primarily solve their national problem, joining all Serbs within one homeland. The fact that the Serb population was scattered in two thirds of the state of Yugoslavia was, to the Serbs, a convincing argument for its perpetuation and also one more argument for the demand for greater internal connections. The Serbian battle for «a strong and firm» Yugoslavia, strengthened following the disintegrative processes after 1980. It had, therefore, a nationalistic background. In the middle of the 80s, the demands for strengthening the central authority in Belgrade, to the detriment of the other republics, was supported not only by the Serbian Communist Party bureaucracy but also by the so-called «Serbian democratic intelligentsia»¹⁵.

The reasons for the sharpening of tensions in relations between Serbia and the other, particularly the western, republics in the 80s is, of course, not only to be found in the different views of Yugoslavia and its future but also in the different dynamics of political democratization and the slower separation of the Serbs from Communism as compared to the Croats and Slovenes. Slobodan Milo{evi}, who reached the summit of Serbian political power in 1987, from the very beginning symbolized and personified two theses: the Serbian understanding of «being Yugoslav» and the Serbian slowness in democratization as compared to the western republics. The new Serbian leadership rapidly showed its aggressiveness. In 1988 under pressure from the Serbs, the Yugoslav army occupied Kosovo; a year later Serbia suspended economic ties with Slovenia; and it threatened both western republics with the organization of mass

¹⁵ This was clearly demonstrated by the «Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences», 1986, and a series of essays written by Serbian intellectuals in newspapers and journals. All are for a strong, centralized state community which, as a basic democratic leader, should win recognition for its principle of one person, one vote. In fact, this brought the discussion back to the beginning, to 1920, as it was clear that this system would lead to Serbian domination with a Serbian majority in a multinational state.

demonstrations on their land for the support of Serbian politics. The attempts of the federal government to hasten economic modernization and ease the crisis by economic reforms came too late to stop the disintegration of the state. Still, in 1990 both the Western republics, Slovenia and Croatia, were ready for an agreement which would change Yugoslavia into a loose economic alliance of more or less independent states. In this sense, the fate of Yugoslavia was definitively sealed only in June 1991 by its armed intervention in Slovenia.

The question is, of course, whether the outbreak of national dissension and the inability to find a «modus vivendi» in Yugoslavia had to be as truly brutal and tragic as it is. Somewhat more than 70 years of Yugoslav history convincingly show that neither the first nor the second Yugoslavia managed to solve the problem of nationalities and historical/cultural differences successfully, nor to find a balance which would enable a more or less tolerant way of life for its nations. Political discussions on how strong or how loose was to be their alliance were caught in a vicious circle and always returned to the beginning: how is a common state to be understood; to what degree is it only a political community of citizens-individuals; to what degree must its internal arrangements also reflect that it is comprised of different ethnic/national collective bodies. National prejudices, hatreds, and conflicts, often only formed and deepened in everyday life after 1918, and in these conditions were stubbornly passed on from generation to generation because the political crises were always repeated. All this is true, yet it does not mean that the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia, such as it is, was an inevitable end. Its ten year history from 1980, in a more precise chronological order clearly shows that the critical period after Tito's death was not only a time of increasing national intolerance and closing of the republics within their own borders but also a time of stubborn search for compromises and new balances. The failure of these endeavours was primarily the consequence of the politics of the Yugoslav federal bureaucracy. Second, but also important, was the Serbian Communistic bureaucracy which tried to shore up the weakening Communistic authority by way of political pressure and new centralization. They firmly denied the thought that Yugoslavia could change into a democratic and loosely organized, confederative state.

The second question is, could Yugoslavia - even if the forces desiring discussions and agreements had triumphed - have survived the fall of Communism. The example of Czechoslovakia concurs with those who say that in all probability it would not have been possible. The reestablishment of democracy in post-communistic Central and Eastern Europe is a complex process and it confirms the thought that history cannot be overtaken. The step towards democracy in the communist countries was also a step

into history, but at the same time it unavoidably led to questions of their internal divisions and self-image. In discussions of «old and new» nationalisms in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe we all too often forget that Western Europe did not enter the phase of surpassing traditional nationalistic divisions and antagonisms in 1900 or 1918, but only in 1945, at a time when Europe was intersected by the iron curtain and its Eastern part was forced into an ideological and political straitjacket. This - which is quite clear today - did not hasten or further integrative processes according to the example of the European West, but, on the contrary, by preventing freedom of expression and recognition of differences, honed and deepened the divisions. Insistence on respect for the national principle in the political organization of Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism is in no way a new phenomenon; it is part of a process with roots in the 19th century which never had the chance of coming to fruition in the 20th century. Characteristically, it was defended by nations who in their recent history have not yet acknowledged national sovereignty or their own states. «With all the destructive power of nationalism uncovered by both great Wars in the 20th century, we must not forget that also in Western Europe it was the nation which gave the framework for the modern experience of democracy» ascertains Alain Fienkelkraut.

No matter how much it goes against the grain of European humanistic consciousness, obtaining sovereignty is for small nations the means which open doors to the world, to the feeling of openness and freedom. This is particularly apparent in the Baltic countries which in the world and for the world exist only from the moment when they tore themselves loose from the Empire.¹⁶

The phenomenon of nations and nationalism cannot be adequately explained only by an analysis of nationalism and nationalistic ideologies. On the contrary, one must agree with R. Bubner who warns that «the idea of a nation was covered for too long with the historical concept of nationalism.»¹⁷ The formation of modern nations was, historically speaking, a phenomenon with an important social and cultural/historical emancipational role. In Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, this process was inordinately irregular and in comparison to Western Europe, late. Thus - it seems -its final outcome began with the fall of both the Berlin Wall and Communism. Old/ new nationalisms and the formation of new national states in this sense cannot stop intellectual discussions or anachronistic and retrogressive national


¹⁶ «The awakening of small nations, a discussion with Alain Fienkelkraut», *Politique internationale*, No. 55, spring 1992.

¹⁷ Rudiger Bubner, *Zakaj je potrebujemo pojem naroda*, *Novarevija*, Ljubljana, No.120, April 1992, pp. 452-56.

definitions¹⁸, complaints against the tenacious national-political crumbling of Central Europe after 1918, and the admonishments of Western European triumphs in linkages and associations.

The way out of the trap, which caught the Central European nations drawn between Herder's understanding of national ethnic allegiance and Hegel's view of the national ethnic state can only be possible with a broad and general recognition that nationality and cultural differences in the world are an undeniable asset and quality,

wrote the Slovene poet, Edvard Kocbek, in a 1940 essay on Central Europe.¹⁹ Fifty years later, the tragic disintegration of Yugoslavia confirms Kocbek's thought: Yugoslavia was not broken by up national or cultural and historic differences, but by aggressive tendencies wishing to surmount them rapidly and to promote uniformity.



¹⁸ «Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau affirmed Lord Acton's idea that the theory of nationality is a retrograde step in history, but that still did not prevent the Quebecois from demanding independence,» is the realistic and witty comment of Isaiah Berlin, cited in note 12.

¹⁹ E.Kocbek, *Srednja Evropa*, *Dejanje* 3 (1940) pp. 89-92. see also P.Vodopivec, *Slovenes and Yugoslavia 1918-1991*, *Eastern Europe Politics and Societies*, Vol.6, No.3,a;



Polish Nationalism until 1919

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In 1795 the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth collapsed and was divided up among its three neighbours: Prussia, Austria and Russia. «Poland does not exist any more, and the Polish nation is wiped out from among other nations», cried one of the most distinguished representatives of the Enlightenment in Poland. Until that moment, his country was the second and then the third largest in Europe. Its population was inferior only to a few other countries. For 400 years the state was a crucial element in the political landscape of Central and Eastern Europe. The Polish–speaking population at the time amounted to about 8 million. Its politically active section was extraordinarily large. Yet a member of the cultural elite and a devoted patriot was falling into despair and envisioned the end of the nation.

This stance appears to be a fairly typical example of the attitude of members of the political class who had hitherto supported the old notions. For hundreds of years these had been sufficient to secure relative wealth and later the existence of the state. It was not because they were obsolete that this state eventually fell; Prussian, Russian and Austrian prowess too was founded on them. Once there was no state, however, these notions proved incapable of pointing the way into the future, already proclaimed by the French Revolution. The idea of loyalty to the nation, an element superior to state, dynasty, political regime, religion or cultural model, was rather alien to this set of values.

This paper maintains that the process of modern Polish nation–building was launched against a background of this type of political consciousness, sometimes blossoming among cultural leaders, but more commonly atrophying among the wide political strata.¹ The alternative theory holds that by the end of the 18th century the

¹ The general framework of Polish nation–building was provided by T. Lepkowski, *Polska. Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu* [Poland. The modern nation is born], Warszawa 1967, and a more sketchy version in his «La formation de la nation polonaise moderne dans les conditions d'un pays démembré», in *Acta Poloniae Historica* 19 (1968).

national community was strong enough to undergo a hundred years of alien domination. Accordingly, the ideological prerequisites of a nation are alleged to have already been formed and to have been relatively widely spread.² Another fairly popular school claims that the state, and indeed its loss, played a key role in stimulating the development of Polish national ferment.³ It was founded, the theory goes, on an old-type state loyalty and then gained the character of a restoration movement. In this paper serious doubt is cast on both the above schemes. The Polish political community that emerged in 1918 was so entirely different from the one of 1795 that equating them would be highly misleading. Claims to statehood, on the other hand, must have been made comprehensible to the vast majority of the population, hitherto indifferent to them. Thus, the general mechanisms of their proliferation appear to be of greater importance than the mere continuity of their presence. The principal content of Polish history in the 19th and 20th centuries seems to be not the struggle to regain and maintain independent state, but rather the formation of the modern nation.⁴

The process of nation-building was initiated somewhere round about the 1760s. At the time, the idea of *patria* was designed to occupy central place in the citizen's set of values. However universalist in principle, it embraced also ethno-political ideas of community consisting of some secondary national features. When the old Poland collapsed, this new concept was together with the old notions residing in the conscious of the political class, which was at the time confined almost entirely to the nobles.⁵ This was the point of departure for the evolution to come.

During the next phase, roughly between 1795 and 1831, popularity of the concept was growing, while the idea itself was undergoing considerable alterations. Napoleonic turmoil elevated the ethno-political element to a much higher status than ever before. During the subsequent years, this remarkably transformed, and thus to some degree new, notion was promoted by the lower-middle gentry. This group was heavily affected by the new political conditions, which meant chiefly economic

² A sample is J. Zarnowski, *Ojczyzna był język i mowa* [Language and tongue were the fatherland], Warszawa 1978.

³ The thesis is pursued as an evidence backing the general theory constructed by J. Breuilly, see his *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester 1982, pp. 83–87.

⁴ The idea was introduced to Polish historiography in the late 1940s, see H. Wereszycki, «O problematyke najnowszej historii Polski» [On problems of modern history of Poland], in *Dzieje Najnowsze*, 1 (1947); S. Kieniewicz, «Historia narodu czy historia państwa» [History of nation or history of state], in *Dzieje Najnowsze* 3–4 (1947).

⁵ J. Kawecki, «U początków nowoczesnego narodu» [At the outset of the modern nation], in B. Lesnodorski (ed.) *Polska w epoce Oświecenia*, Warszawa 1971; R. K. Lewanski, «La Polonia dalla «nazione nobiliare» alla patria di tutti i ceti sociali», in *Risveglio delle nazionalità nel periodo napoleonico*, Pisa 1981.

disaster. Consequently, they were struggling to work out a satisfying formula for comprehending the new reality. This process overlapped and combined with Romanticism. In terms of national ideology, these two epochs met at the frontier between *patria* and *nation*, and the latter soon attracted the allegiances of the dissenting gentry.⁶ Hence, it was not the section of society still enjoying a certain amount of power within autonomous institutions which was responsible for feeding the insurgent sentiments, but rather those who were deprived of this privileges.⁷

The reforms of the early 19th century, which triggered the forging of a new approach among the nobles, are also believed to be crucial by disciples of another school. It centres on the position of the peasant majority and not on the make-up of the values held among the political class. The previous period was marked by feudal stability, insignificant social tension and the traditional patriotic influence of the nobles upon the rural masses. The measures undertaken by the Prussian, Austrian and Russian governments against the upper strata generated the emancipation of the peasantry, which began to turn to the alien administration as to its supposed ally. This proved to be a phase in the process of mental maturing of the masses, preceding the stage when agrarian reform, progress in education, the social division of labour and the new capitalist relations stripped peasants of these illusions. From the 1860s, they eventually became allies of the national movement and joined the process of identification by self-opposition.⁸

⁶ Some say that in fact the modern Polish nation emerged in the course of the profound transformations of national culture in the first half of 19th century, compare A. Zielinski, *Naród i narodowość w polskiej literaturze i publicystyce lat 1815–1831* [Nation and nationality in Polish literature 1815–1831], Wrocław 1969; his *Początek wieku. Przemiany polskiej kultury narodowej w latach 1807–1831* [Beginning of the century. Transformations of Polish national culture 1807–1831], Łódź 1973. Also K. Symmons-Symonolewicz stresses the impact of pre-19th century foundations, and tends to consider the period 1800–1830 as their mere transformation, *National Consciousness in Poland. Origin and Evolution*, Meadville 1983.

⁷ Detailed studies developed in: J. Szacki, *Z historii rozwoju ideologii szlacheckich rewolucjonistów lat 20-tych* [On history of the noble revolutionaries of 1820s], Warszawa 1955; idem «O polskich rewolucjonistach drugiego i trzeciego dziesięciolecia XIX wieku» [On the Polish noble revolutionaries of 1820–1830s], in *Mysł Filozoficzna* 4 (1955); idem, *Ojczyzna – Naród – Rewolucja. Problematyka narodowa w polskiej myśli szlachecko-rewolucyjnej* [Fatherland–nation–revolution. National issues in theory of Polish nobles revolutionaries], Warszawa 1962; B. Lesnodorski, «Niektóre zagadnienia nacjonalizmu, patriotyzmu i inteligenckiego radykalizmu» [Some questions of nationalism, patriotism and intelligentsia radicalism], in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 3 (1961); H. Lowmianski, «Pojęcia «naród», «lud» i «klasa» w pismach politycznych Joachima Lelewela» [The terms «nation», «peoples» and «class» in political writings of Joachim Lelewel], in *Naród i Państwo*, Warszawa 1969; G. Bujarski, «Polish Liberalism 1815–1923, The Question of Cosmopolitanism and National Identity», in *Polish Review* 17 (1972); A. Walicki, «The Conception of Nation in the Polish Romantic Messianism», in *Dialectics and Humanism* 1 (1975), idem *Philosophy and romantic nationalism. The case of Poland*, Oxford 1982.

⁸ The master of the peasant issue is S. Kieniewicz, see his «Le développement de la conscience nationale polonaise au XIXe siècle», in *Acta Poloniae Historica* 19 (1968); idem «Rozwój polskiej świadomości

The place of patriotic warfare periodically staged against the alien power is disputed. The masses were for the most part not attracted. Some claim that in fact, the disastrous results of these initiatives alienated them and facilitated the process of their getting rid of the nobles' patriarchal guidance.⁹ On the other hand, to many the military activities seem to be a critical element in the nation-building process. The assumption is that these collective experiences, the result of the above mentioned transformations in the patriotic idea, shaped the core of national identity and provided the crucial impulses for its reinforcement. This scheme worked chiefly within the upper classes, i.e., the nobles with the small and weak bourgeoisie. The aftermath of the suppressed 1863 insurgent attempt brought about the unprecedented mounting of alien pressure, and constituted the ultimate uniting experience.¹⁰

The social transformations associated with capitalism hastened shift of the most active and conscious element from nobles to the bourgeoisie. Thus, the latter gradually assumed the central position in the national movement. Because of the changing social basis, some lean are inclined to see this metamorphosis as a sort of discontinuity. This paper tends to regard that observation as a gross overstatement. In fact, those years would indeed provide arguments for another theory; this holds that the Polish nation did not emerge on the basis of ethnic community, but of the cultural community of the nobles, gradually joined by other groups.¹¹

The conventional date of 1870 is believed to mark the completion of the emergence of the modern Polish nation. By this time the idea of national loyalty had been embraced by almost all of those capable of political reflection. Approximately

narodowej w XIX wieku» [Development of Polish national consciousness in 19th century], in *Pamiętnik X Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Lublinie*, vol. 1, Warszawa 1968; idem «Drogi wiodące do niepodległości» [Roads to independence], in *Droga przez półwiecze*, Warszawa 1969.

⁹ The case study of 1863–1864 warfare in S. Kieniewicz, *Powstanie styczniowe* [The January Uprising], Warszawa 1972. General onslaught on military option in J. Benyskiewicz, *Naród wobec państwa. O czynnikach integracji i dezintegracji narodu polskiego* [Nation without state. On integration and disintegration factors], Zielona Góra 1987.

¹⁰ E. Halicz, *Polish national liberation struggles and the genesis of the modern nation*, Odense, 1982; H. Barszczewska-Krupa, *Generacja powstancza 1830–1831. O przemianach w świadomości Polaków w XIX w.* [The insurgent generation 1830–1831. On changes of Poles' consciousness in 19th century], Łódź 1985; K. Molenda, «Wpływ ukształtowania się nowoczesnego narodu polskiego na walkę o niepodległość» [Forming of the modern Polish nation and the fight for independence], in *Z perspektywy 60 lat*, Warszawa 1982. More ambiguous conclusions in J. Skowronek, «L'insurrection de 1830: revolution ou nationalisme?» in *Pologne: l'insurrection 1830–1831*, Lille/Wrocław 1982.

¹¹ T. Lepkowski can not be held responsible for fathering the theory, but he provided an interesting overview in «Poglądy na jedno- i wieloetniczność narodu polskiego w pierwszej połowie XIX wieku» [Theories on mono- and multiethnicity of the Polish nation in the first half of 19th century], in *Swojskość i cudzoziemszczyzna w dziejach kultury polskiej*, Warszawa 1973.

30–35% of the Polish language speakers began to share it consciously and had little difficulty in understanding their national identity clearly.¹² This percentage might be considered as *Poles* not only in the ethnic, but also in the national sense. It is believed that given the circumstances, this proportion guaranteed that the nation would last as a community distinct from other nations, and not simply dissipate. Certainly, the process of nation-building was not over: in fact, merely the initial stage had concluded. The national future of the remaining 65–70% of the Polish-speaking population was yet to be decided, and many members of non-Polish ethnic groups were to become part of the Polish nation. Yet it is held that with the national movement having acquired its basic strength about 1870, the emergence of modern Polish nation was complete.

The theory which highlights emergence of the bourgeoisie, equipped with clear national loyalty and conscious of the traditional values inherited from the gentry, tends to locate the core of Polish nation-building in a widely understood cultural sphere. The national heritage saved from the collapse of state was preserved and enriched among the nobility of the early 19th century. In course of the social ferment resulting first from the policies of the alien states and then from profound capitalist transformations, this heritage was shared with, and finally handed over to, urban intelligentsia and bourgeoisie.¹³ Eventually, it was accepted and willingly adopted by the lower strata as a means of social and cultural progress. The scheme resembles a picture drafted in social sciences, and featuring two concentric circles. The smaller inner one represents a set of people conscious of their nationality, and the larger outward one stands for set of people not sharing this awareness, but nevertheless considered by the inner group to be members of the nation. The nation-building process would consist of the gradual expansion of the inner circle until it equals the external one, however the characteristic feature seems to be that the core is the same, while more and more agents are being admitted to it.

This framework is contested by the school which points to ethnic community as the primary basis for national integration. Its most detailed and coherent version points to language as the first and indispensable element of nation-building in case of Eastern Europe.¹⁴ Linguistically united smaller ethnic communities endured on the

¹² The calculation and rationale behind it is produced by T. Lepkowski, *Polska. Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu* [Poland. The modern nation is born], Warszawa 1967.

¹³ The most comprehensive studies on intelligentsia were produced and edited under the guidance of R. Czepulsiś-Rastenis, see *Inteligencja polska XIX i XX wieku* [Polish intelligentsia of 19–20th century], vols. 1–5, Warszawa 1963–1987.

¹⁴ The author of developed and cohesive theory is J. Chlebowczyk. The main body of his scientific output is: *Procesy narodotwórcze we wschodniej Europie Środkowej w dobie kapitalizmu* [Nation-building

peripheries of dynastic empires until the mid-19th century. Metamorphosis brought about by the social division of labour, increasing trade and a new system of communication was expected to wipe out the ideas keeping these groups together, however capitalist evolution proved to be the basis for their revitalization. With progressing democratization nationalities found a new voice. Ethnic, and soon also political, consciousness developed, while the principle of self-determination was adopted as the vehicle for pursuing national claims. With the omnipresent linguistic factor still operating, predominantly plebeian communities were transformed into modern nations. This theory locates the final phase of the formation the national community between 1870 and 1920.

During this 50 year long process in which the lower social strata entered the conscious national community, the peasantry were the group which made up the overwhelming majority of the population in question. There is one proposal which suggests analyzing the phenomenon in two general stages.¹⁵ The first is the realization of the existence of ties with language, customs, and culture, and thus with the Polish nation. The second embraces acceptance of and support for claims for independence. The non-political phase persisted among the Polish peasantry at least until 1910–1920, although commitment to ethnic features may have been far greater than among the sections of society which openly voiced political demands.¹⁶ Of course, considerable sections of the rural population entered the political arena before the Great War, and some even as early as in the 1880s.¹⁷ Moreover, there is a theory maintaining that

processes in Eastern Central Europe in the capitalist period], Warszawa 1975; *On Small and Young Nations in Europe. Nation-forming processes on ethnic borderlands*, Wrocław 1980; *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów* [On the right to existence of small and young nations], Warszawa 1983; *Miedzy dyktatem, realiami a prawem do samostanowienia* [Between dictate, reality and self-determination right], Warszawa 1988.

¹⁵ S. Kieniewicz, *Polska swiadomosc narodowa i spoleczna* [Polish national and social consciousness], in: *Kultura* 39 (1977).

¹⁶ The two-phase theory was developed by A. Molenda, see his «Uwagi o kształtowaniu sie swiadomosci narodowej w pierwszym dwudziestolecu XX wieku» [Remarks on forming of national consciousness 1900–1920], in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 2 (1978); idem «Transformations in the Social Structure and in the Consciousness and Aspirations of Polish Peasants at the turn of the 20th century», in *Acta Poloniae Historica* 57(1988); idem, «The Formation of National Consciousness of the Polish Peasants and the Part They Played in the Regaining Independence by Poland», in *Acta Poloniae Historica* 63–64 (1991).

¹⁷ The most optimistic scholar remains H. Brodowska, see her «Ze studiów nad kształtowaniem sie poczucia spoleczno-narodowego chlopów w Królestwie Polskim w drugiej polowie XIX wieku» [On forming socio-national consciousness among peasants in Kingdom of Poland in the second half of 19th century], in *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego* 34 (1964); idem «Kierunki rozwoju swiadomosci spolecznej i narodowej chlopów polskich w okresie kształtowania sie nowoczesnego narodu» [Directions of development of social and national consciousness of Polish peasants during the forming of modern nation], in *XI Powszechny Zjazd Historyków w Toruniu*; idem, *Swiadomosc spoleczna i narodowa chlopów na progu niepodleglosci Polski w 1918 r.* [Social and national consciousness of

the peasantry gradually assumed the role of the driving force in the nation-building process and did not join the movement in its pre-shaped noble-bourgeoisie framework, but actually took it over to produce something new.¹⁸

The transition to the subsequent phase occurred when the rural perception of personal circumstances became associated with independence claims. Previously the idea of a sovereign Poland was beyond the political horizon of the masses, confined to personal, or at best regional, fate. The change took place when personal and national fortunes were linked in the conscience of the village. Thus, in the last decades of the 19th century, developed the phenomenon of increasing peasant participation in various manifestations of patriotic zest. It is unclear, however, whether peasants were thus expressing their national awareness or whether they were thereby gaining it, while taking part initially to some other social ends. Moreover, there seems to be no overall pattern in how the mechanism of equating personal and national goals worked.¹⁹ In the Austrian part of Poland, it is the agrarian political activists who are mostly credited with bringing about the change. It was achieved by means of a critical appraisal of the past and the planting of images of a new, democratic-republican Poland. Hence, the province of Galizia became the bedrock of both democratic and national rural political parties.²⁰ In the Prussian provinces the villages accepted the political guidance of the higher class, and did not produce a political movement of their own.

The territories under German rule underwent the process of identification by self-opposition with particular intensity. It is believed that as far as the lower classes

peasants in the wake of 1918 independence], in *Roczniki Dziejów Ruchu Ludowego* 17 (1975); idem «Kształtowanie się świadomości społecznej i narodowej chłopów w XIX stuleciu» [Forming of social and national consciousness among peasantry during the 19th century], in *Acta Univ. Lodzensis, Folia Historica* 24 (1986).

¹⁸ The chief exponent of this school is J. Chalasinski, see his «Przemiany samowiedzy narodowej w pamiętnikarstwie Opolszczyzny» [Transformations of national self-knowledge in memoirs of the Opole region], in *Przegląd Humanistyczny* 5 (1965); idem «Od narodu szlacheckiego do ludowego» [From nobles' to peoples' nation], in *Kultura i Społeczeństwo* 1 (1969); idem, *Przeszłość i przyszłość inteligencji polskiej* [Past and future of Polish intelligentsia], Warszawa 1973.

¹⁹ K. Groniowski, «W sprawie dróg i sposobów przenikania świadomości narodowej na wieś w latach 60-tych XIX wieku» [On proliferation of national consciousness into the country in 1860s], in *VIII Powszechny Zjazd Historyków Polskich*, Warszawa 1960; J. R. Szaflik, «Czynniki kształtujące świadomość narodowa chłopów polskiego w koncu XIX i na początku XX wieku» [Factors shaping national consciousness of a Polish peasant by turn of the 19th century], in *Przegląd Humanistyczny* 12 (1982), 4 (1983); A. Wojtas, *Kształtowanie świadomości narodowej i państwowej chłopów* [Forming of peasants' national and state consciousness], Warszawa 1988.

²⁰ See T. Krawczak, «Kształtowanie świadomości narodowej wśród chłopów polskich w Galicji w latach 1864–1914» [Shaping of national consciousness among Polish peasants in Galicia, 1864–1914], in *Przegląd Humanistyczny* 11 (1978).

are concerned, national feelings first took hold in the Prussian provinces of Poland. The mainstream Marxist interpretation used to link the phenomenon with the greater development of capitalist relations compared with the Russian or Austrian provinces. Those who challenge this interpretation point out the Bismarck's chancellorship, during which the Prussian administration embarked on a course of exercising enormous pressure on the non-German population.²¹ What amounted roughly to policy of Germanization became perceived as compulsion among the population hitherto rather indifferent to national issues. Accordingly, they underwent an accelerated process of national identification which soon made them not only Poles, but also Poles standing against German rule. The Polish intelligentsia in one of the Prussian regions, the Grossherzogtum Posen, is estimated at 2300–2500 persons, i.e. 0,3% of the total number of ethnic Poles.²² Despite this insignificant percentage, this population produced, during the years from 1880 to 1910, one of the most effective models of national community resisting alien pressure. The number of Poles soared from 62% in 1867 to 71% in 1910.²³ Local studies on other Prussian provinces indicate that from the late 1880s in Ostpreußen, and 1890 in Westpreußen, well-organized, Polish political movements also acted.²⁴

There were quite a number of different means of either constructing or facilitating the construction of national identity among low-status Poles in Prussia. Among them were temperance unions, gymnastic clubs, choirs, mutual-improvement unions, Sunday gazettes, leaflets, books, calendars, occasional publications, rural

²¹ See J. Krasuski, «Znaczenie tzw. kulturkampfu dla sprawy polskiej» [Impact of Kulturkampf on the Polish cause], in *Przegląd Zachodni* 2 (1969); L. Trzeciakowski, *Kulturkampf w zaborze pruskim* [Kulturkampf in Prussian partition], Poznań 1970; idem *Pod pruskim zaborem 1850–1918* [Under the Prussian rule 1850–1918], Warszawa 1973.

²² The chief expert on Polish intelligentsia in Prussia is W. Molik, *Kształtowanie się inteligencji polskiej w Wielkim Księstwie Poznańskim 1841–1870* [Forming of Polish intelligentsia in the Grand Duchy of Posen, 1841–1870], Poznań 1979; also J. Borzyszkowski, «Warunki rozwoju inteligencji polskiej w Prusach Zachodnich w II połowie XIX i na początku XX wieku» [Forming of Polish intelligentsia in West Prussia in late 19th–early 20th century], in *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Historia* 10 (1980); idem *Inteligencja polska w Prusach Zachodnich 1848–1920* [Polish intelligentsia in West Prussia 1848–1920], Gdańsk 1986.

²³ The most comprehensive seems to be the German study of R. Jaworski, *Handel und Gewerbe im Nationalitätenkampf. Studien zur Wirtschaft der Polen in der Provinz Posen (1871–1914)*, Göttingen 1986. For a sample of the Polish approach see A. Czubinski, «Rola Wielkopolski i Poznania w rozwoju polskiego ruchu narodowowyzwoleńczego w zaborze pruskim» [The role of Wielkopolska and Posen in the Polish national-liberation movement in Prussian partition], in *Przegląd Zachodni* 5–6 (1975).

²⁴ On Ostpreußen see J. Jasinski, *Świadomość narodowa na Warmii w XIX wieku* [National consciousness in Ermland in 19th century], Olsztyn 1983; on Westpreußen S. Wierchosławski, *Polski ruch narodowy w Prusach Zachodnich w latach 1860–1914* [Polish national movement in West Prussia 1860–1914], Wrocław 1980.

libraries, the press, religious communities, schools, kindergartens, scouting, other education initiatives for children and the youth, celebrations of patriotic anniversaries, local funds, banking associations, insurance companies, cooperatives etc. Certainly, one should be aware of simplifications: for many, almost all of above activities might have been mainly a means of cultural progress rather than of maintaining national culture. Besides, it is hard to refrain from a comment that majority of measures listed above were available only to a society with a certain level of culture. The Prussian policy aiming at wiping out illiteracy, creating communication networks and introducing economic reforms certainly might be held responsible for providing the indispensable pre-conditions. Combined with a Germanization policy, they produced a situation which in turn encouraged national identification.²⁵

A characteristic feature of nation-building on local level in Prussia seems to have been that regionalism was rarely used as a vehicle. Among the reasons listed are: the strong traditional pre-19th century links; the alluring attractiveness of the buoyant national centre in Posen; the incompatibility of national identification with strong local patriotism in the circumstances given. According to the latter theory, regional identities jeopardized rather than reinforced national ones. In case of Poles, being the weaker side, crossing to the middle ground was a step towards adopting the culture of the stronger side. An interesting sample of the phenomena is provided by the Kaszubi/Kashëbe, s/zzacy/Schlesier and particularly the Mazurzy/Masuren.²⁶ Another remarkable dimension seems to be that Polish nation-building did not emerge as a consequence of the German national movement. The triggering role should rather be attributed to the state, which in the 1870s embarked on a tough Germanization policy and became perceived as the chief opponent. This was subject to change in the late 1890s, when German nationalism joined the race; subsequently, it was met by the Polish one. I do not accept the theory presenting Germanization as a constant feature of Prussian policy from mid-18th century and occurring in three phases: the

²⁵ It seems hardly possible to select even a fraction of the writings produced on the issue, usually confined to case studies. About 80 titles are listed in K. Zydowicz, *National Question in Poland. Historical Research after 1945*, European University Institute Working Papers 92/8, Florence 1992, pp. 25–49.

²⁶ The evolution of a scientific approach may be observed in the example of Mazurzy/Masuren. The traditional orthodox approach holds them to be Poles of unclear national consciousness, see W. Wrzesiński, «Kwestia mazurska na Działdowszczyźnie w latach 1920–1939» [The Mazury issue on the Soldau region, 1920–1939], in: *Komunikaty Mazursko-Warminskie* 1959; E. Sukietowa-Biedrawina, *Dawno i niedawno* [Land and not long ago], Olsztyn 1965; K. Mallek, *Polskie są Mazury* [The Mazury are Polish], Warszawa 1972. The new theory in A. Sakson, especially his *Mazurzy – społeczność pogranicza* [The Masuren – a borderland community], Poznań 1990. The German survey in J. Rogall, «Die Tragödie einer Grenzlandbevölkerung – polnische Forschungen über die Masuren», in *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* 1 (1992).

first introduced by the Frederick the Great, modified after the Vienna Congress and merely perfected by Bismarck. Rather I believe that such a vision overlooks crucial differences which are important in history.²⁷

With wider social groups joining political life in the last decade of the 19th century, the national movement entered the phase of ideologies and political parties. Conscious sharing of national identity and support for the idea of national loyalty did not necessarily have to determine the means of securing national well-being. In the late 1860s the idea gained ground of acquiring a certain range of national liberties through cooperation with Russian, Prussian or Austrian authorities, the so-called *triloyalism*. Except for some liberal dissent, the conservative hold on policy lasted until late 1880s, when was defied by movements pledging to defend the interests of the working class.²⁸ In the 1890s political parties, legal or illegal, emerged, appealing to peasants or to workers groups. Agrarian and socialist movements did not conceal their national character, however only the latter worked out a national program for the future. It envisioned a sort of voluntary federative unit, embracing many nationalities on the basis of their equality.²⁹ It went without saying that in such a state the Poles would play a leading role. The socialists became fairly successful in gaining the support

²⁷ See J. Kokot, *Problemy narodowosciowe na Slasku od X do XX wieku* [Nationality problems in Silesia, 10th–20th century], Opole 1973; B. Grzes, J. Kozłowski, A. Kramski, *Niemcy w Poznanskiem wobec polityki germanizacyjnej 1815–1920* [Germans in the Posen region and the Germanization policy, 1815–1920], Poznan 1976; W. Jakóbczyk, *Prusy – Polacy – nacjonalizm* [Prussia – Poles – nationalism], Warszawa 1979.

²⁸ On conservatism, organic work and national issues see H. Kozłowska-Sabatowska, *Ideologia pozytywizmu galicyjskiego* [Ideology of the Galizian positivism], Wrocław 1978; J. Ziolkowski, «Pozytywizm, naród, niepodległość» [Positivism, nation, independence], in *Znak* 342–343 (1983); S. Błejwas, *Realism in Polish Politics: Warsaw Positivism and National Survival in Nineteenth Century*, New Haven 1984; M. Król, *Konserwatysty i niepodległość* [Conservatives and independence], Kraków 1985.

²⁹ See W. Suleja, «Kresy Wschodnie w myśli politycznej polskiej irredenty w okresie powojennym» [Eastern Borderlands and the Polish irredentists, 1864–1914], in *Miedzy Polska etniczna a historyczna*, Wrocław 1988; A. Bobrus, «Koncepty federacyjne w programie Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej» [Federal concepts in the PPS programme], in *Naród i państwo w myśli politycznej i działalności polskiego ruchu robotniczego*, Lublin 1984; M. K. Dziewanowski, «Dualism or Trialism? Polish Federal Tradition», in *South and Eastern European Review* 97; idem «Joseph Pilsudski, the Bolshevik Revolution and Eastern Europe», in *Polish Review* 4 (1969); idem *Joseph Pilsudski. A European Federalist, 1918–1922*, Stanford California 1969; idem «The Making of a Federalist», in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 11 (1963); idem «Pilsudski's Federal Policy 1919–1921», in *Journal of Central European Affairs* 10 (1950); K. Grunberg, *Koncepty federalistyczne w polskim ruchu socjalistycznym 1864–1918* [Federal concepts in the Polish socialist movement], Warszawa 1968; idem *Polskie koncepty federalistyczne 1864–1918* Warszawa 1971; J. Lojek, «Idea federacyjna Józefa Piłsudskiego» [The federation idea of Pilsudski], in *Libertas* 6 (1986); P. S. Wandycz, «Polish Federation 1919–1920 and Its Historical Antecedents», in *East European Quarterly* 4 (1970); I. Werschler, «Federalizm i prometeizm w poglądach oraz działaności Tadeusza Hołównki» [Federalism and prometheism according to T. Hołownko], in *Dzieje Najnowsze* 1–4 (1982).

of the urban working class. However, they had to be aware of constant competition from the social democrats, who based their approach to the national problem on the internationalism of the workers' cause. The radical left was in a much more inconvenient position: they lacked the mechanism of national and social causes reinforcing each other, like in the socialists' propaganda.³⁰

Eventually, both the policy of *triloyalism* and that of social commitment were challenged by the emergence of nationalism, originating chiefly in Russian Poland. It offered national union based on a democratic platform, and thus became known as National Democracy. The institutional foundations of the movement were laid down in the late 1880s–early 1890s, and the legal political party was established in 1897. Then followed the organization's targeting of specific sections of society, be it the youth, craftsmen or workers. In 1902–1903 appeared in print two works believed to constitute the ideological basis of the movement. The first Russian elections of 1905 elevated the national democrats to position of the principal political force in the country: the socialists staged a boycott and the nationalists won 34 out of 37 seats.³¹

The character of the group underwent two considerable changes as far as the social basis and political tactics were concerned. National Democracy was a movement appealing mostly to the lower middle class. Its programme was initially designed as a challenge to the obsolete, out-of-touch, ineffective conservative inertia of the former political establishment. The latter, however, became nationalists and commanded street-level support and unlike the socialists, offered some room for compromise. The offer was not rejected, and National Democracy gained ground among the upper strata of middle class and even higher. The nationalists changed their belligerent profile as well. Having entered political life, they switched to a more

³⁰ See J. Kancewicz, «SDKPiL wobec zagadnień wojny, rewolucji i niepodległości Polski w latach 1914–1918» [SDKPiL and the problems of war, revolution and independence of Poland 1914–1918], in *Ruch robotniczy i ludowy w Polsce*, Warszawa 1961; W. Najdus, «Z historii kształtowania się poglądów SDKPiL w kwestii narodowej» [Forging of SDKPiL's stance on national issue], in: *Z Pola Walki* 3 (1962); W. Kondelski, «U źródeł poglądów SDKPiL na kwestie narodową» [At the origins of SDKPiL stance on national issue], in *Z Pola Walki* 2 (1967); W. Wic, «Kontrowersje wobec hasła niepodległości w polskim ruchu robotniczym w okresie zaborów» [Controversies on independence question in Polish workers' movement during the partitions], in *Roczniki Naukowo-Dydaktyczne WSP w Krakowie* 3 (1982); idem «Stanowisko polskiego ruchu robotniczego w kwestii narodowej w okresie zaborów» [Polish workers' movement and the national question under the partitions], in *Z Pola Walki* 2 (1981).

³¹ The crucial work on Polish nationalism is R. Wapinski, *Narodowa Demokracja 1883–1939* [National Democracy 1883–1939], Wrocław 1980. Volumes on two ideological leaders of the group are A. Micewski, *Roman Dmowski*, Warszawa 1971; R. Wapinski, *Roman Dmowski*, Warszawa 1979; T. Kulak, *Jan Ludwik Popławski 1854–1908*, vols. 1–2, Wrocław 1989.

conciliatory policy towards Russia, and after some hesitation turned to the administration rather than to the Russian liberals in search of a deal. Gradually, this stance was reinforced by deliberately pointing to Germany as the principal enemy of the Polish nation. This attitude failed to produce significant results in terms of national liberties, and in particular with respect to autonomy. Nevertheless, it installed nationalists in a safe position as the dominant element in official political life of the Russian Poland. Polish nationalist leaders became members of the highest Russian democratic institutions. In terms of influence on the masses, national democrats were equalled only by the socialists.

In Austria, a traditional stronghold of the conservatives, nationalism failed to move the bourgeoisie. Since the reforms of 1870s, the Poles enjoyed a large degree of self-government and nationalism did not find an easy target. The major enemy of the movement became not the Austrian government, but the Ukrainian national revival, which posed a threat to the Polish political domination of autonomous institutions. Mostly for this reason, nationalism was confined to the eastern, ethnically mixed half of the Galizia province. The combative spirit of the movement and incompatible character of its claims with those of other nationalisms became fairly clear.³² A similar mechanism worked in Prussia, especially since German nationalism entered the contest at the turn of the 19th century. Except in Silesia, where Christian Democracy was leading the way, the national movement gradually began to fall under control of the nationalists during the second decade of the 20th century. Initially the group competed against the conservatives, but became allies with them later. The spread of nationalist influence was fuelled by the clearly uncompromising character of the Polish and German national demands, and ensured that conflict was of an intrinsic and unavoidable character.³³

In the Russo-Polish provinces the Russians constituted a relatively thin and not very numerous, though undoubtedly privileged, category. Unlike the Germans in Prussia, their position was almost entirely dependent upon the administration. Nationalism did not take deep roots among them, and had to give way to some sort

³² See H. Wereszycki, *Pod berłem Habsburgów* [Under the Habsburgs], Kraków 1984; M. Kozłowski, *Miedzy Sanem a Zbruczem* [Between the San and the Zbrucz rivers], Kraków 1990; J. Radziejowski, «Ukrainians and Poles, the Shaping of Reciprocal Images and Stereotypes», in *Acta Poloniae Historica* 50 (1984).

³³ M. Orzechowski, *Narodowa Demokracja na Śląsku do 1918 roku* [National Democracy in Silesia until 1918], Wrocław 1965; J. Marczewski, *Narodowa Demokracja w poznańskim 1900–1914* [National Democracy in the Posen region 1900–1914], Warszawa 1967; briefly sketched section also in R. Wapinski, *Endecja na Pomorzu* [National Democracy in Pomerania 1920–1939], Gdansk 1966.

of positive loyalty to the empire. For these reasons too, Polish nationalism did not turn as much against the Russians. Neither did it focus on the Lithuanians and Ukrainians, although for somewhat different reasons. In the most backward regions of the East, the social basis for Polish nationalism was extremely thin: the middle class was virtually missing, and among the landed gentry nationalist ideology had to struggle against the ruling conservatism. It took some time before neighbouring Eastern nations, especially the Lithuanians and Ukrainians, became perceived as national enemies, and this change did not actually occur until the turmoil of the Great War. Therefore, Jewry was the national enemy that Polish nationalism in Russia oriented itself against.

Anti-semitism was placed in one of central positions in the National Democrats' propaganda. As Germans were far away, it provided an opportunity to manifest patriotic fervour. Some claim that perceiving it in economic terms would not take us very far. The nationalists, this theory goes, did not consider nations as some sort of companies, competing with each other for the same resources.³⁴ The economic conflict was rather dragged into the foreground as the most convenient and impressive means of demonstrating the alien character of the Jews. In fact, this demonstration fitted the dichotomous and magical categories of nationalist ideology. This is the motive why anti-semitism served as a programme for tackling the economic issues. Besides, it was suited very well to social profile of the movement, which could not have afforded to neglect striking poverty but which stood against the leftist propaganda of the socialists.

Another facet of the anti-semitic resentment which seems worth looking at briefly is the Catholic context of this hostility. The anti-Jewish agenda completed the merger between nationalists and the Roman Catholic church. Originally, the latter found itself under fire for a generally passive, conservative and often opportunist policy towards the Russian administration. Later the two got closer, and religion was incorporated into the nationalist ideology. Roman Catholicism acquired the position of another link strengthening the internal prowess of the nation, and the process produced an image of a Catholic-Pole. The obvious benefit in securing a sort of reinforcing cohesion outweighed the flaw of excluding some protestant and orthodox Polish groups.

The merger of nationalism and Roman Catholicism might be held responsible for making the Polish-Ukrainian or Polish-German conflict more acute, as religious

³⁴ See T. Kulak, K. Kawalec, 'Endecja wobec kwestii Żydowskiej (lata 1893–1939)' [Nationalists and the Jewish question, 1893–1939], in *Polska – Polacy – mniejszości narodowe*, Wrocław 1992.

issues tended to overlap the national and social ones. On the other hand, it is maintained that the phenomenon eliminated a racist dimension from Polish nationalism, and at times one might even hear that it was in fact anti-racist. Religion promoted universalist and Roman-culture notions, and immunized nationalism against pagan, biological or racist leanings. Therefore, in its Polish variant, it resembled Carlism or a Salazar-type ideology rather than some of the northern nationalisms.³⁵ Some go even further to arrive at the conclusion that anti-semitism was neither an introduction to racism nor its collateral product. In brief, anti-Jewish resentments among the Polish nationalists would not appear to be a clear introduction to events of 1939–1945. Rather, they should be perceived as a rivalry of nationalisms, which were part and parcel of the common burdens of multiethnic co-existence.

Another dispute over Polish nationalism is concentrated upon its alleged anti-parliamentarian and anti-democratic profile.³⁶ It has, for quite a long time, been believed that extreme nationalist right-wing elements, second-rate - but dynamic and noisy political groups in Poland of the late 1930s, can be linked to the very origins of nationalism in Poland. As soon as the movement emerged in the last two decades of the 19th century, it was said to be driven by disguised totalitarian mechanisms. The evidence is traced throughout the following years, until they surfaced in pure fascist shape by the end of the interbellum period. Recent opinion does not agree.³⁷ Nationalism enjoyed a remarkable appeal precisely because it addressed spheres which were previously denied political significance. This link enabled the development of a broad basis not merely in areas where ethnic conflict was driving Polish population to nationalism anyway, but also in regions of negligible tension. The movement even used to slip into politically amorphous populism, and was accused of such by its rivals. Totalitarian and fascist tendencies were born as the result of unsolved questions put on the agenda by regained independence. Burdening the leaders of pre-1918 National Democracy with responsibilities for excesses of the fanatic youth is held to be a gross exaggeration.

³⁵ B. Grott, *Nacjonalizm i religia. Proces zespalania się nacjonalizmu z katolicyzmem w jedną całość ideową w myśli Narodowej Demokracji 1926–1939* [Nationalism and religion. The process of merger between nationalism and Catholicism in thought of National Democracy, 1926–1939], Kraków 1984, preceded by a few smaller publications of 1979–1984.

³⁶ Apart from previously quoted works, compare also R. Wapinski, «Niektóre problemy ewolucji ideowo-politycznej endecji w latach 1919–1939» [Some questions of ideological and political evolution of National Democracy, 1919–1939], in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 4 (1966); idem «Ruchy nacjonalistyczne a formowanie tendencji faszystowskich i parafaszystowskich» [Nationalist movements and forming of fascist and quasi-fascist tendencies], in *Studia nad faszyzmem i zbrodniami faszystowskimi*, vol. 3, Wrocław 1977.

³⁷ K. Kawalec, *Narodowa Demokracja wobec faszyzmu 1922–1939* [National Democracy and fascism 1922–1939], Warszawa 1989.

In 1914 the movement's vision of the future was based on the fairly typical nationalist assumption that Poles could be strong only by themselves. Thus, the movement aimed at reconstructing Poland in as large and as populous a format as possible. On the other hand, this country should also be nationally homogeneous to the highest achievable degree. The wish to have as few non-Poles in Poland as possible contrasted with the desire to embrace almost all the Poles scattered throughout the vast areas to the East. The obvious result of this contradiction was the problem of national minorities. The nationalist approach was based on the principle that ethnically alien elements could only be included in numbers allowing their Polonization: neither more and nor less. Therefore, the eastern frontier of Poland marked the territories where Lithuanians, Belorussians and Ukrainians were considered prone to Polish influence. In the long run, they were destined to adopt Polish culture and lose their original ethnic features.³⁸ The nationalists themselves considered this to be a generous attitude. The Germans continued to be perceived as the principal political enemy, and little room was to be left for them in the future Poland. They would face either forced emigration or be reduced to a minority position.³⁹ The presence of Jews was accepted with even greater hesitation: in general, they were expected to leave Poland *en masse* or assimilate totally, giving up anything that made them a distinct group in any conceivable sense.⁴⁰

The nationalist vision remained the most important rival of the plans produced by leftist independence groups. The latter, unlike the nationalists, believed in amicable cooperation in a mixed population once the alien yoke and social injustice were

³⁸ R. Wapinski, «Endecka koncepcja polityki wschodniej w latach II Rzeczypospolitej» [Nationalist concept of eastern policy in the Second Republic], in *Studia z Dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej* 5 (1969); his «Endecja wobec kwestii ukraińskiej i białoruskiej» [National Democracy and the Ukrainian and Belorussian question], in *Słowianie w dziejach Europy*, Poznań 1974; A. Borkowski, «Narodowa Demokracja wobec wojny na wschodzie w 1920 roku» [National Democracy and the war in the East in 1920], in *Biuletyn Naukowy ART w Olsztynie* 1 (1991); K. Gomółka, «Sprawa białoruska w koncepcjach Narodowej Demokracji w latach 1918–1921» [The Belorussian issue and National Democracy 1918–1921], in *Polska – Polacy – mniejszości narodowe*, Wrocław 1992.

³⁹ M. Mroczo, *Związek Obrony Kresów Zachodnich 1921–1934* [Union of Defence of Western Borderlands 1921–1934], Gdansk 1977; his «La pensée politique de l'Union de Défense des Confins Occidentaux – Union Occidentale Polonaise (1921–1939)», in *Polish Western Affairs* 1 (1985); idem *Polska myśl zachodnia 1918–1939* [Polish western concept 1918–1939], Poznań 1986; R. Wapinski, «Endecja wobec problemów polskich ziem zachodnich w latach 1919–1939» [National Democracy and the problem of Polish Western territories 1919–1939], in *Zapiski Historyczne* 4 (1966) and many others.

⁴⁰ See T. Kulak, K. Kawalec, *op. cit.* and also J. Orlicki, «Szkice z wybranej problematyki do genezy tzw. kwestii żydowskiej i koncepcji jej rozwiązania w II Rzeczypospolitej» [On origins of the so-called Jewish question and concepts of its solution in the Second Republic], in *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 3 (1976); idem *Szkice z dziejów stosunków polsko-żydowskich 1918–1948* [On Polish–Jewish relations 1918–1948], Szczecin 1983; J. Majchrowski, «Problem żydowski w programach głównych polskich obozów politycznych (1918–1939)» [The Jewish problem and principal Polish political groups, 1918–1939], in *Znak* 339–340 (1983).

removed. Hence, the socialists stuck to their old federative vision of separate units organized roughly according to ethno-historical principles; these units would be expected to voluntarily accept the guidance of Poland. As the leftist vision of independence happened to father the pro-Austrian military activities, the nationalists and socialists found themselves totally at odds from the beginning of the Great War, and did their best to destroy each other's chances with the Entente and to thwart each others schemes on the spot. The nationalists, because of their anti-German stance, were deprived of official influence in Poland, then entirely under control of the Central Powers. For the same reason, however, their leaders secured a certain position with the Entente and enjoyed a monopoly on representing Polish interests to the Great Powers. During the last years of the war, however, suspicion mounted in western capitals as to the political wisdom of the group, apparently consumed by ambitions far exceeding what was considered realistic. Their devotion to the cause of the Allies became almost matched by anxiety that nationalists would be unable to come to terms with the neighbouring nations.⁴¹

When German and Austrian rule in Poland collapsed in October–November 1918, the National Democrats were recognized as official Polish representatives to Britain, France and the United States. Furthermore, they remained at the same time one of the chief anti-German elements claiming power in the country, and once the provisional arrangements broke down, they also became the most dynamic group. During the struggle against neighbours National Democracy was leading the way, be it against the Germans in Posen, the Ukrainians in Lemberg or the Lithuanians in Vilnius. It was clear that the local population entirely embraced their approach to national issues. Despite the fact that central power remained in hands of the coalition led by the left, decisions referring to territorial issues were either made, or forced by, the National Democracy.

If the nationalists failed to take the lead in the government, it was because their influence was not strong enough to prevent outbreaks of the social tension. For this reason the leading role in the government was assumed by the leftist independence movement. The national democrats were entering the interwar period as the second political force. They were to gain influence throughout the following 20 years, and although they failed to run the country politically, they emerged in the late 1930s

⁴¹ See M. Leczyk, *Komitet Narodowy Polski a Ententa i Stany Zjednoczone* [The Polish National Committee and the Entente and the United States], Warszawa 1966; J. Pajewski, *Wokół sprawy polskiej. Paryż – Lozanna – Londyn* [Around the Polish cause. Paris – Lausanne – London], Poznań 1970.

as the most dynamic ideology.⁴² There is no doubt that this strength endured throughout the Second World War, and it was the profound change of the post-war period that terminated this domination. It was long believed that in fact, nationalism had finally been wiped out: the recent past suggests that this assumption was wrong.



⁴² The major works on nationalists after 1918 are J. J. Terej, *Idee, mity i realia. Szkice do dziejów Narodowej Demokracji* [Ideas, myths and reality. On the history of National Democracy], Warszawa 1971; his *Rzeczywistosc i polityka* [Reality and politics], Warszawa 1971; his «Narodowa Demokracja – fakty i oceny» [National Democracy – facts and evaluations], in *Dzieje Najnowsze* 3 (1974); also R. Wapinski, *Narodowa Demokracja 1883–1939* [National Democracy 1883–1939], Wrocław 1980.



Section III

Nation-Building in Germany and Italy

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Introduction

The subject matter of this section is a classic topic of historical and political comparison. There is an extended comparative literature on Germany and Italy, the latecomers to state-building, in 19th century Europe. In Germany, this discussion started in the 1860s with the texts of Lassalle and Treitschke.

In my introduction, I would like to present a few comparative observations on the foundations and paths of nation-building in both countries. First, I shall talk about the initial state of nation-building in the 18th century. I will then discuss the significance of the challenge from France in the years around 1800. Finally I will deal with the process of nation-building in the course of the 19th century.

There is as little scientific consensus about the terms «Nation» and «Nation-building» as there is about the methods for their investigation. Therefore, before talking about the specific cases of Germany and Italy, let me make two points:

First: «Nation» is at present the central term of identity for a political society within in any specified territory. Originally defined along ethnic lines, in accordance with its Latin roots, the term nation has since the 16th century acquired an increasingly political meaning. The modern nation may be defined as a community based on the will and the solidarity of its members; it is not a «natural fact». It changes according to the political awareness and conduct of the different classes composing a society. This is why we can, with good reason, talk about «nation-building» as an on-going, never-ending social and mental process.

Second: The fundamental condition for nation-building, and therefore the most important criterion for its understanding and comparison, is the process of modernization. It implies several dimensions: economic, cultural and socio-political.

The extension of communication between these areas of development is particularly important for nation building. Its decisive dimension seems to be the process of socio-political modernization.

I

What was the initial situation of nation-building in 18th century Germany and Italy? A fundamental fact concerning the socio-economic development of the two countries was their relative backwardness. Both had had an early start in the Middle Ages with the development of trade and industry in highly developed urban communities. But in the late 16th century a standstill in economic development began, which lasted until the 18th century. Some of the external reasons for this were the shift in world trade towards the Atlantic ocean and the expansion of the Ottoman empire. Internally, the «re-aristocratization» of the leading middle classes during the period of absolutism was another important factor.

Nevertheless, from the middle of the 18th century, a remarkable advance in modern forms of economy took place, which was accompanied by strong population growth. The reform policy in the enlightened principalities also played an important role. The improvement of infrastructure had particular significance for nation-building. In the cultural area, the development of a vernacular written culture was another main precondition for this process.

In Italy, there had been an early breakthrough with Dante and Renaissance culture. But the distribution of this written culture was limited to the lay intelligentsia, which only formed a small section of the population. Apart from vernacular Italian, ecclesiastical Latin was also widely used, and the lower social strata continued to communicate in their regional languages until well into the 19th century.

In Germany, a common written culture developed only after the Reformation (Luther's bible translation) and thus it was more widely disseminated among the Protestant section of the population. Therefore, the process of nation-building in Germany began in the Protestant regions. By the second half of the 18th century, it had reached all German countries as a result of a considerable cultural upswing.

Religion was another important factor in nation-building. After the Papacy had asserted itself during the Counter-Reformation, it became a crucial cohesive force for the whole of Italy. In Germany, on the other hand, the confessional split caused a

far-reaching barrier to communication within the population. For nation-building, this meant a great step backwards.

Finally I would like to mention the influence of the Enlightenment movement in both countries. The establishment and diffusion of written culture played an important part in this, and in Germany earlier than in Italy. The market for books and magazines became a central factor.

State formation was of first and foremost importance in the development of modern political structures. The development of territorial states claiming sovereignty was a decisive basis for the process of nation-building. The regional representational bodies (e.g. the *Landestände*), which established themselves in opposition to the kings, can be seen as the institutional nuclei of the new political nation. Both Italy and Germany had relatively early starts on their way towards modern statehood. In both countries, though, this beginning took place within the smaller territories. Apart from these regional attempts at state formation, and unlike the experience in other European countries, no early modern nation-state emerged. Nevertheless, we should not overlook an important difference between the two: Italy was a politically fragmented country, governed by sovereigns of foreign origin. In Germany, by contrast, there was a political framework in the form of the Holy Roman Empire. Although the Germans played a dominant role in the empire, it was not restructured into a German nation-state.

Thus, neither in Germany nor in Italy was there a common modern state which could support a process of nation-building. Nevertheless, from the 18th century onwards a national consciousness developed in both countries. It spread mainly within the educated classes of society who participated in the written high culture. In Italy, this early expression of national consciousness took an almost exclusively cultural form. In Germany, by contrast, the framework of the empire made the development of a «Reichsnation» of the ruling classes possible. The «Reichstag» can be seen as the early modern parliament of this «Reichsnation», although it was no more than an assembly of the various sovereigns. They could not agree on the common project to build a national state, and they stood clear from the nation-building within the educated classes. From the 16th century, but in particular from the middle of the 18th century, these classes had developed their own national consciousness, which was also orientated towards the empire. The so-called «German Movement» around 1770 of the literary elites was one of the peaks of this process of nation-building. As a result, an aristocratic nation of the sovereigns, and a middle class nation of the educated, co-existed in the German empire.

Patriotism, which originated in 8th century Europe as a new form of socio-political behaviour, can be seen as the translating of national consciousness into active social commitment. In Italy, as in Germany, there was an upswing of patriotism in the 18th century. However, the *Patria*, or fatherland, with which this patriotism was related, was not the national territory but rather the regional state. Therefore, it is possible to speak also of nation-building in the regions or principalities. In both countries the origins of a patriotic consciousness can be found there. Only within this framework could political and social commitment exist and succeed. In Germany, there existed, in addition, an imperial patriotism. But it evolved later than the regional variation and in the political situation of the late 18th century had no real chance to grow.

In summary, one can say that in Germany and Italy in the 18th century, there were the beginnings of a process of nation building which manifested itself as a shaping of political ideas and patriotic commitment. The basis and precondition for this was the process of modernization related to the Enlightenment. The social classes which had been mobilized by this process became the representatives of a new national and patriotic consciousness.

What makes the example of Germany and Italy special is that there was no national state as the basis of nation-building. This process only started as the constitution of a modern society. In German literature, you often find the term «Kulturnation» for this form of nation-building. However, this is a problematic notion, because in Italy and in Germany national consciousness and patriotic commitment were also always linked to a political territory.

The most important peculiarity about both countries is that patriotism as well as the process of nation-building took off at a regional level! The political reference to the territorial state was one of the constituent parts of 18th century national and political consciousness. Our historiography is deeply influenced by the national movements of the 19th century. For this reason, it tends to backdate the 19th century nation to the 18th century. The situation in Italy and Germany nevertheless shows, that the original shaping of the modern national political commitment started in the regional representative bodies. Correspondingly, a shaping of a greater national consciousness took hold among the educated classes, which were the carriers of high culture. Both identities co-existed - and there is little sign of a conflict between them.

II

The French revolution and the reign of Napoleon represented a great challenge to further development in Italy and Germany. The young and barely politicized process of nation-building was confronted with the most advanced model of the leading early nation-state in Europe. The occupation by French troops, from the middle of the 1790s, dramatically altered the political and constitutional order of the two countries. The most outstanding features of the French challenge can be summed up in four points:

- (1) For the first time, a nation shaped by the middle classes became a revolutionary political protagonist and brought up the question of political participation. It pitted the principle of sovereignty of the people against that of aristocratic reign.
- (2) The modern nation state, based on universal human and civil rights, became a new constitutional model. The most consistent realization of the modern national state, even at such an early stage, seemed to be the republic.
- (3) The political success of the middle-class nation meant a great stimulus to the process of nation-building. Nearly all areas of social life became «nationalized.»
- (4) The victorious French nation developed a dynamic of expansion and tendencies of nationalism towards other peoples.

As for the influence of this new national experience on Germany and Italy, three phases can be discerned: the great impact caused by the French constitutional change to a nation of citizens (*Staatsbürgernation*) until 1792; the direct confrontation with the expanding French national Republic and its nationalism between 1793 and 1799, and the years of Napoleonic hegemonic rule from 1800 onwards.

The enlightened societies of Germany and Italy lived within the framework of small states. Confronted by this new political model, they conceived the first phase of the French revolution as the consequence of their own enlightened patriotism and national orientation. In reality, it meant a revolutionary change of their whole socio-political system. In both countries, the debates surrounding the French model of the nation-state caused a social split within the enlightened societies, and several national-political orientations emerged.

However, the concrete consequences of the French influence on the national development in Germany and Italy were very different. In Germany, the result of the

wars against France was the disintegration of, and in 1806 the end of, the empire. This led to a deep crisis of national and political orientation within the educated classes. They tried to overcome the political uncertainty in a productive way, mainly through a new cultural, philosophical and religious reorientation.

In the years after 1807, the first German national movement came into being. It was a liberation movement against Napoleonic hegemony, and meant a great new impulse for nation-building in Germany. As it was naturally characterized by an anti-French orientation, the German patriots had to look for alternative models of national reconstruction. However, it should not be forgotten that even before this anti-Napoleonic struggle, a great movement of modernization and political reform had started in the central German states. This modern state formation was influenced by France and it was connected to a new impulse of nation-building within the particular states. In this epoch of German history, there was again a coexistence of regional and all-German tendencies of nation-building.

In Italy, the French connection from 1796 caused a far-reaching change in boundaries and political structures. In connection with these events, the Italian educated classes realized, for the first time, the possibility of a political nation-building. It is remarkable that their politicization was based on the experience of liberation from foreign absolutist reign and of the foundation of republics following the French example. For the Italian elites, therefore, the republic was the first convincing model for a modern national constitution. With the foundation of a «republic», and later a kingdom of Italy at the beginning of the 19th century, which encompassed areas of northern and central Italy, the possibility of an Italian national state was, for the first time, conceivable. Finally, we have to stress that this first phase of national politicization of the Italian educated classes was dominated by France as a guiding model.

III

Following the period of political modernization under French influence, economic modernization came to the foreground in the first half of the 19th century. In Germany as well as in Italy, although not at the same time, modern agriculture and industrialization achieved primacy. This economic change was the reason for the emergence of new strata within society and for the formation of social classes along economic lines which disregarded the traditional social stratification. This led to a very new situation for the further process of nation-building. The educated and property

owning bourgeoisie took over the position of leading class, and took the modernization of all areas of society into hand. The more advanced national states such as England, Belgium and France, served as examples. Part of the programme of the economic elites was the demand to overcome the small states and to create a national economic area. Nevertheless there still existed a great number of regional differences and hold-ups. In Italy, for example, the economic asymmetry between the North and the South began to be one of the major problems of modernization.

The 19th century was also the age of science and of middle-class culture. Due to the dominance of the middle classes, their culture became *the* national culture, replacing regional or stratum based cultures. The new principle of voluntary organization played an important part here, just as it did in other dimensions of modernization. The creation of associations and societies became one of the driving forces of the process of nation-building.

The state formation of Italy and Germany, which took place after the Napoleonic period, was not carried out according to the national principle. With respect to the prevailing judgment in historiographic tradition, it has to be said that the spirit of restoration was not the only reason for the Vienna decisions. It seems quite clear that at beginning of the 19th century the regional political structures and identities in Italy and Germany were still strongly developed and therefore politically dominant. They played a much bigger role in the later history than has been admitted in most of the literature.

After the decisions of 1815, the constitution of a national state became the central issue for the national movements in both countries. To an increasing extent, these movements came to occupy the centre of political life and to dominate social life. Two models of the modern nation-state stood side by side: in Italy the unitarian-centralistic state, as it had most typically developed in France; in Germany the democrats supported a federal state based on the model of the United States of America, whereas the other political directions wanted to reconstruct the old Reich.

In both countries, the revolutionary attempts to form a national state in the revolutions of 1848 were unsuccessful. It only became possible during the 1860s through a compromise between the middle-class nation and the principalities. This process was connected with a reversal or weakening of the principle of the sovereignty of the people.

The process of nation-building in Germany and Italy during the 19th century was mainly characterised by two problems of development. One of them was the formation of the modern class system. As a consequence of economic and cultural modernization, the middle class had asserted itself as the leading national class in both countries. For the further process of nation-building, two problems had to be solved. The first was the integration of the aristocracy, which still had a great power potential. The other was the nation-building in the labouring classes, especially the relationship between the workers' movement and the modern nation.

In Germany, the middle class nation was not able, in the end, to assert itself fully against the political and military aristocratic elites and could not integrate them into the modern nation. The labouring classes went through a relatively early process of class formation from the 1840s and, from the 1860s onwards, they formed their own political organizations. The process of nation-building in Germany was, therefore, from the middle of the century, characterised by the competition between two «nations» - middle-class society, and the workers. To complicate matters further, the old «Reichsnation» of the principalities still existed!


In Italy, the majority of the aristocracy were able to integrate into the process of nation-building and to join the programme of modernization. A greater problem was the mobilization of the lower classes, mostly illiterate, in support of the modern nation.

The second central problem in the process of nation-building was the question of political participation and the assertion of the modern nation as sovereign. In Germany, a compromise was reached, between the middle-class and ruling-class elites, which was widely conceived as a failure of the middle-class nation. Furthermore, the exclusion of the Austrian part of the nation movement from the common state-building was a factor which turned further nation-building in Germany into a problematic process.

In Italy, on the other hand, the liberal bourgeoisie of the *Moderati* and the sovereign rulers of Piedmont reached a better compromise. They eliminated the democratic-revolutionary version of political nation-building, represented by Mazzini and Garibaldi. Another factor furthering the middle-class-aristocratic compromise on nation-building was the common confrontation with the anti-national and anti-modern Papacy.

In both countries, the national movement, the «Risorgimento» was the decisive impulse for nation-building throughout the first half of the century. All parts of the middle classes, all social and cultural areas of life, were included and mobilized in this great movement. When the great goal, namely the foundation of a national state, had been achieved, the progress of nation-building remained a major problem. The competition from those parts of society, which did not yet belong to the nation, but which now demanded their rights, could not be overlooked: workers, women, national or religious minorities. Another problem that had been suppressed and remained unsolved was the role of regional traditions and identities within the framework of the nation state.

In view of these problems, organised nationalism with an activist programme offered itself as a solution for the middle classes. Thus, an age began in both countries that would lead to the biggest strain ever upon the process of nation-building.





Discussion

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The unifications of Germany and Italy have always been considered as paradigmatic in the historiography because they represent major examples of successful movements for national independence in the nineteenth century Europe. The two countries are presented, by both contemporaries and later historians, as providing strong proof of the historical trend towards the triumph of the nation state. They have also been utilised as prototypal examples of opposing concepts of the nation, expressed, for example in the voluntaristic beliefs of Mazzini contrasted to the organicist philosophy of Fichte.

Both Italy and Germany can be classified as «unification nationalisms», in John Breuilly's classification¹, in the sense that they brought together formerly independent states and territories within a single nation state. But if considered within the context of their historical period - the political history of Restoration Europe - such categories become less significant when placed alongside the other examples of successful national movements: Greece was an example of separatist nationalism, breaking away from the Ottoman multi-national empire, as was Belgium, created by splitting off from Holland. The feature common to all these nationalisms is perhaps to be sought elsewhere, and in particular in the characteristic association of nationalism with liberalism. The historiography has often tended to conclude from such an association that this early nationalism was of a different quality from that of the later nineteenth century, that the former was 'open' and progressive, in contrast to the 'closed', aggressive character of the latter. But such contrasts explain little unless they are placed firmly within their historical context. Nationalism was associated with liberalism in Restoration Europe because both ideologies were identified with progress and middle class values; and if, until 1848, the two were seen as inseparable, the painful experience of the revolutions of that year led both Italian and German liberals to question whether national independence might not be necessary as the condition for liberal reforms. The practical consequences of this subordination of liberal reformism

¹ J. Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester, 1982).

to political unity were to lead to the victory of moderate and conservative groups, to a heavy imposition of the state on civil society, and ultimately, by the late nineteenth century, to the abandonment of any identification of liberalism with nationalism.

The purpose of these preliminary remarks is to question the long established historiographical interpretations of the triumphant march of national movements, with their inbuilt teleological conclusion that (in Hegel's words) the outcome of the history of nations was the state. Perhaps it would be more fruitful to focus attention on society rather than the state, on the nature and persistence of local and regional identities and loyalties, rather than consider the 'people' as merely the passive object of the message of national movements.

Of the papers presented in this section, those of Ullrich Mugnaini and Petersen relate the political history of Italian unification. Ullrich² provides a useful summary of the Risorgimento, which he denies was a 'bourgeois revolution', as affirmed in Marxist historiography. He places proper stress on the continuous tension between contrasting models of political order, from the Jacobin period through the Restoration, the 1848 revolutions and in the final period of unification. He argues that modernization (in the American social science use of the term) characterised the whole process and explains the strength of the moderates, compared to the revolutionary democrats: the outcome of the Risorgimento was a 'revolution of the middle'. The most original aspect of Ullrich's paper is his analysis of lists of patriots in the final, decisive years of the Risorgimento: an incomplete list for 1858 of members of the National Society (the organization responsible for catalysing support for Cavour and Sardinia), and the volunteers in the Piedmontese army and in Garibaldi's irregular *Cacciatori delle Alpi* in 1859-60. He concludes that the composition of these lists of patriots demonstrates the effectiveness of the National Society as a channel for the diffusion of a national commitment, for which there was broader support, geographically and socially, than is conventionally affirmed. He estimates that the membership lists probably amounted to 14,000 names. He estimates that the membership lists probably amounted to 14,000 names, and that at least 50,000 individuals must have supported the national movement more or less actively. He argues for a far greater participation in southern Italy, even Sicily, and a relatively broader social composition than the students and artisans from northern and central Italy normally identified in the historiography. One must hope that Ullrich will develop his necessarily brief analysis by examining more closely the social origins of these patriots.

² H. Ullrich, »Risorgimento: Nationalbewegungen und liberale Nationalstaatsgründung in Italien.«

Mugnaini³ looks at the images and role of Spain in Italian foreign policy between 1848 and 1868. After concluding that it is legitimate to identify the foreign policy of Sardinia after 1848 with that of the future Italy, he stresses the rupture between earlier years and post-1848 in Italian attitudes towards Spain. Italian liberals had great admiration for the Spain of the constitution of 1812 and the 1820 revolution. But Spain's alignment with Austria after 1848 led to the hostility of the Spanish government towards Italian national aspirations and policies. Spanish foreign policy was closely dependent on the changes in the internal politics of the country, thus only responding positively to Italy during the brief liberal bienio of 1854-6, as was to occur again with the revolution of 1868.

Petersen⁴ explores the central issue of what is understood by national consciousness by discussing how it has been presented in the mainstream of Italian historiography. His analysis includes extremely interesting, albeit all too brief reflections on the differences of the German experience compared to the Italian. He starts from the insistence of contemporaries and of the historiography on the precocious sense of cultural identity in Italy, based on its language and literature from the fourteenth century. The political fragmentation of the peninsula - the «land of a hundred cities» of Carlo Cattaneo - excluded the larger concept of a state and underlay the later resistance, after unification, to administrative and political centralization. He rightly stresses that the choice of Rome as capital derived not only from the resonant cultural echoes expressed in Mazzinian myth of the 'Third Rome', but was a political solution to the rivalries of the other cities (including many former capitals). He notes the fundamental difference from Prussia in terms of educational provision: in 1860 only a quarter of the Italian population of 28 million were literate, with a deep divide between North and South; as literacy levels slowly rose (only becoming universal after the mid-twentieth century), the North-South gap increased.

Petersen's choice of the *longue-durée* of the development of a national consciousness in Italy allows him to highlight changing judgments among contemporaries, as well as in the later historiography. As the heroic period of the Risorgimento was followed by the apparent failures of united Italy, and later by fascism and the experiences of the Italian republic, the meaning of national consciousness has changed significantly and is once more in question in the current crisis of the Italian

³ M. Mugnaini, «Culto della nazione, religione della libertà o ragion di stato? La Spagna nella politica estera italiana (1848-68)».

⁴ J. Petersen, «Wandlungen des italienischen Nationalbewußtseins im 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts».

state. Similarly, Petersen notes (following Sergio Romano⁵) how the image of Italy's place in the international scene has changed, as the myth of the universalist 'mission' of Rome played out its effects in the disastrous search for the role of protagonist in European affairs until the collapse of the Second World War.

The distinction between a political movement working for independence and nationalism after the achievement of a nation-state is a conventional one in the historiography that retains its validity, as the aims and responsibilities of the ruling elites and the relationships of nationalist leaders with the new state changed. The methods and processes of state formation undoubtedly influenced subsequent political and ideological attitudes and administrative measures. Administrative centralization was central to such a process, as is well known in the Italian case.

Cook⁶ discusses the notorious example of Sicily's incorporation into the Italian state, achieved through the military intervention of Garibaldi and then the Piedmontese army. His paper sums up the substantial literature that has denounced or analysed the gap between the claims of the nationalists about the creation of a new Italy and the realities of its rejection by Sicilians. He argues - within the framework of Gellner's propositions⁷ about the conditions necessary for individuals to develop a sense of national appertenance - that Sicilian nationalism, subsequent to the unification of Italy, was a negative reaction to modernization. Perhaps he could have developed his theme more profitably by asking in what ways, and how far, the incorporation of Sicily in the new Italian state kept alive a pre-existing sense of separateness, and what the implications of such continuities were for the subsequent forms of 'Sicilian' identity. Why, for example, did the Sicilian language never serve as the basis of a nationalist movement, as in Catalonia or so many other regional nationalisms? The problem of regional identity is not, of course, limited to Sicily, but has long been marked in the periphery of the Italian state, and even more marked in some other states, such as Germany, where regional identity was intrinsic to the whole process of the national movement for unification. Given such comparisons, why did Sicilian regionalism not function as an effective aggregative political force after 1848 until the Second World War? Was it because of the depth of social divisions in the island? Did the collusion of the mafia with the landowning class and the new political elites function as a distorsive factor, impeding the progress of a Sicilian political nationalism? Or did the

⁵ S. Romano, 'La Cultura della Politica Estera Italiana', in J.B., Bosworth and S. Romano (eds), *La Politica Estera italiana (1860-1985)* (Bologna, 191).

⁶ B. Cook, «Sicilian autonomism and Italian national unification».

⁷ E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983).

massive emigration from the 1880s inhibit the possibilities of establishing a popular basis for such a Sicilian nationalism? Hroch's model of the social preconditions of nationalism in small countries⁸ offers a valuable comparative framework, precisely because of the absence of a national movement in Sicily corresponding to Hroch's three stages.

An abundant literature, particularly over the past thirty years, exists on the question of nation-building. The creation of a nation state by a small minority of activists did not generate automatic support among new citizens, as the nationalist leaders (at least in their public utterances and presumably in their more optimistic moments) assumed, and as nationalist historiography has long pronounced, in a teleological vision of the inevitability of the state, to which the 'nation' is presumed to conform. Hobsbawm⁹ has rightly stressed the changing structural conditions that made states more conscious and active in trying to stimulate and direct a sense of national loyalty. Eugen Weber, many years ago, had the merit of extending the question to old-established states as well.¹⁰

Recent historiography, strongly influenced by American social science, has posed the problem from the viewpoint of the state of the economic forces of capitalism. But the concepts of both nation-building and modernization implicitly assume the success of such imposed processes on passive citizens. It is very important to study the practices of the elites as the crucial groups involved in the forging of national loyalties, through a range of administrative, political, economic and symbolic measures. The papers of Tobia, Tacke and Ballinger are concerned with this problem, each from a different angle.

Tobia¹¹, most suggestively, opens up the question of the relationship between architectural and artistic style and nationalism, in the sense of the need felt in Italy for a 'national style', once Rome had become the capital. The problem was particularly acute in Italy, because the universalist perceptions of ancient and papal Rome implied the need for a distinctive 'Italian' mark. The result was the monstrous edifice erected in memory of Victor Emanuel II, the Vittoriano, the largest and most expensive monument of its genre in Europe. The monument, even before its completion was

⁸ M. Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge 1985).

⁹ E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge, 1990).

¹⁰ E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford, 1976).

¹¹ B. Tobia, «Assetti Urbani e Monumenti nella Nazionalizzazione delle Masse della Seconda Metà dell'Ottocento: il Caso Italiano».

utilized as a means by which a national expression of loyalty to the dynasty (equated with the state) could be organised, in the form of a pilgrimage to Rome in 1884, twenty-fifth anniversary of the second war of independence. Tobia argues most convincingly that the pilgrimage was a remarkable example of the success both of the regional elites in mobilizing support (there were 76,000 participants) and of the central authorities of Rome in asserting centralised control.

Tacke¹² stresses the need to go beyond nation-building from above in her comparison of French and German monuments to national heroes - Vercingetorix and Hermann. She argues that it is necessary to understand the process of nation-building as a process of interdependence between national authorities and local bourgeoisies. The latter used the occasion provided by the organisational efforts necessary for the erection of such monuments to consolidate and confirm their role both locally and as part of the national society. Her careful comparisons of the purposes of local elites and their networks underlies the differences in state structures, as well as the changes over time of the expectations and hopes of the local notables. The monuments to Vercingetorix in Clermont-Ferrand, Tacke demonstrates, symbolized the regional identity of the Auvergnat within France, but was also an illustration of the successful affirmation of new bourgeois elites over the traditional notables of the town through their construction of a second monument. In Germany, the construction of a national monument to Hermann symbolized the *Bürgertum* ideal of a classless society, to be created firmly within the framework of existing social distinctions; in this it reflected the German bourgeois ideal of a classless Volk in the Nation.

National symbols, fêtes and collective rituals were thus understood and functioned at a supra-regional level, but were interpreted locally and regionally through the social space of the different social groups, with their own networks of relations, hierarchies and mental world of what constituted the proper order of society. The papers of Tobia and Tacke both point towards the complexity of what we understand as national identity, which did not exclude other identities, was never monolithic, but which was interpreted and practised in multiple ways through regional, class or other deep attachments.

Ballinger's paper¹³ is also concerned with the importance of symbolism in creating a patriotic self-consciousness, as exemplified in the nationalistic ritual

¹² C. Tacke, «Die Nation in der Region. Nationale Bewegungen in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert».

¹³ P. Ballinger, «Italian Pentecost; Receiving the Word of the Italian Faith. The Development of Nationalistic Ritual at Fiume, 1919-1921».

established by Gabriele D'Annunzio during his occupation of Fiume. Her interest is in exploring the implications of Benedict Anderson's thesis of the 'imagined community'¹⁴ through a detailed anthropological analysis of this extraordinary ritualistic occasion. She stresses the use of oratory and choreography to blur the distinction between the orator and listeners in a collective oneness, the nationalization and militarization of religious ceremonies, with their overtones of carnival and millenarianism. Like Tobia and Tacke, Ballinger underlines the intimate link between larger political movements and traditional and local conflicts. Their papers point to an aspect crucial to the success of nationalism - its capacity to relate to the image of the nation to elements, whether historical, linguistic or visual, that were recognizable locally by individuals and groups, in their references to multiple earlier collective identities. It would be easy to extend such an approach to the particular ability of fascism and Nazism to exploit regional contexts and conflicts. But it is important to distinguish between such rare moments like the D'Annunzian ritual at Fiume - which was only rendered possible by the particular nationalistic fervour of the immediate post-war in the name of which the post-adventurer carried out his piratical gesture against the international order - and the expression of national identity in normal times, which has always been essentially passive and non-conflictual with the multiple other identities of individuals and social groups.

Italy and Germany offer paradigms of how national identity in times of stability was able to sink roots, albeit slowly and irregularly, among ever broader sectors of the populations of the two national territories. But they also provided examples of how, in times of political and economic crisis, nationalism can become divisive through its polarising effects.

¹⁴ B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, New York, 1983).



Italian Pentecost: Receiving the Word of the Italian Faith The Development of Nationalistic Ritual at Fiume, 1919-1921

Pamela Ballinger

Fiume today blows into the face of all of us Italians, kindles our faces with her breath, and says to us: 'Receive ye the Spirit, receive the Flame.'

Gabriele D'Annunzio, 1919

In the summer and autumn of 1992, Italian nationalists seized the opportunity provided by the Yugoslav conflict to revive questions of Italy's "historic right" to the Istrian peninsula. Demonstrators in Trieste demanded the renegotiation of border treaties with ex-Yugoslavia¹ and the restitution of property lost by the 350,000 Italians who fled Istria after World War II. The neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) inundated the city with campaign posters calling for a "New Irredentism." This slogan invoked the memory of perhaps the most spectacular episode in the history of Italian irredentism: the occupation of Istrian Fiume-Rijeka in 1919 and the creation there of a ritualistic "Regency of the Carnaro" headed by the flamboyant Italian poet Gabriele D'Annunzio. The persistence of this irredentist rhetoric points to the difficult process of Italian unification, which proved neither as facile nor benign as theorists like Ernest Gellner (1987) would have it. This paper considers the relevance of Fiume for the Italian nationalist movement specifically and for nationalist movements in general.

The first sections of the paper situate the Fiume venture in the context of the fractious and incomplete process of Italian unification. Fiume not only highlights the unresolved territorial questions of the Risorgimento but also the potency of the myth of the betrayed or missing revolution (*la rivoluzione mancata*). This arose out of nationalist dissatisfaction that the Risorgimento — conceived as an exercise in nation

¹ Debates over the Treaty of Osimo, the definitive 1975 border settlement between Italy and Yugoslavia, have once again brought the question of Trieste and Istria to national attention in Italy after many years.

building — in reality “was more an administrative and bureaucratic fact than that social and spiritual fusion without which no truly national consciousness was possible” (Salomone 1960: 87). The poet D’Annunzio rhetorically linked Fiume with the nationalist myth of the missing revolution by means of the “mutilated victory” (*la vittoria mutilata*), the belief that the failure to advance Italian territorial claims at the Versailles Conference was merely the latest liberal betrayal of the Risorgimento. For D’Annunzio, the Fiume venture would not only redeem the victory but also would realize the Risorgimento’s promise of territorial and cultural integrity.²

Over the course of the venture — which lasted from September, 1919, to the final “Bloody Christmas” of December-January 1921, when the Italian navy forced D’Annunzio out — the poet articulated an increasingly universalistic and ritualized vision. Believing that the “city of the holocaust” (*città olocausta*) would provide the spark for a universal renewal, D’Annunzio created a League of Fiume to unite national liberation movements everywhere. The poet hoped that the corporate (anti)state based on rituals and spectacle provided for by his utopian Constitution of Fiume could serve as a universal model. Reconstructing the episode from participants’ diaries and memoirs, the latter part of the paper explores the innovation of nationalist ritual at Fiume. In the process of articulating a nationalistic liturgy, D’Annunzio translated an elite nationalism (in the tradition of the *Carbonari* and *Giovane Italia*) into a more participatory nationalist movement, thereby anticipating the “new politics” (Mosse 1980) of the twentieth century.

The Spectre of the Risorgimento

Theorists of nationalism often present the Italian Risorgimento as a classic example of Romantic or liberal nationalism. Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm, for example, distinguish a liberal, inclusive, Risorgimento-style nationalism typical of the West from an exclusionary, ethno-nationalism common to the multi-national empires of Austria-Hungary and the East. Employing a distinction made earlier by John Plamenatz, Gellner views Western nationalism as “acting on behalf of well-developed

² The fascists similarly claimed that their movement represented the culmination of the Risorgimento. Opponents of the regime such as Don Luigi Sturzo and Benedetto Croce instead considered Fascism a “parenthesis” discontinuous with Italian history. “The irremediable contradiction between the character and aims of Fascism and the natural and historical mission of the Kingdom of Italy, as it has evolved from the time of its formation to the present day, seems self-evident,” declared Sturzo (Sturzo 1970: 266). The partisans picked this up in their condemnation of Fascism as the “anti-Risorgimento” and their own claim to herald a second Risorgimento (Pintor 1970: 426).

high cultures, normatively centralized and endowed with a fairly well-defined folk clientele: all that was required was a bit of adjustment in the political situation and in the international boundaries" (Gellner 1987: 100). Gellner thus concludes that unification movements in Germany and Italy put a "political roof over a culture (and over an economy)" (ibid: 99) in a benign manner unlike that of the Balkans and Eastern Europe, where the lack of a crystallized high culture necessitated brutality in the attempt to render state and nation congruent. Hobsbawm similarly proposes that contemporary ethno-national movements merely appropriate the language of a now defunct liberal, Risorgimental nationalism (Hobsbawm 1992).

In constructing Risorgimental nationalism as an ideal type, these scholars thus neglect the historical particularities of Italian unification and (at least in the case of Gellner) overestimate the cultural unity of the Italian peninsula.³ The notion of a national awakening implied by the term *Risorgimento* masked a reality of enormous cultural heterogeneity (acknowledged by Massimo D'Azeglio's project to "make" Italians)⁴ and profound political division, division which carried over into the era of statehood.⁵ Risorgimental patriots had prescribed various paths to unification: revolution or reform, republic or monarchical/papal federation.⁶ Working in the tradition

³ The historical experience of Italian unification not only forces one to question the ease with which it was accomplished but also its isolation from «Eastern» nationalisms. In the irredentist territories, for example, Italian and Slavic nationalisms developed in tandem. The period leading up to Italian statehood witnessed frequent collaboration between Italian and Slavic nationalists, united against the common enemy of Austria-Hungary (Raditsa 1964-1965). After 1861, however, those Slovenes and Croats who came under Italian administration soon became the object of assimilatory policies (and later, under Fascism, a vicious denationalization campaign).

⁴ The myth of the *Risorgimento* reflects the more general myth of homogeneity that underwrites nationalism. National cultures develop out of "the state-backed race/class conflation that becomes the ideologically defined 'real producers' of the nation's patrimony" (Williams 1989: 434). Legitimate producers thus become invisible in their ethnicity, now privileged as *the* national identity. Visible ethnicity, in contrast, identifies groups like the Slovenes and Croats "who are at the borders of the empire" (ibid: 439). The fact that labeled groups cannot dissolve these ideological boundaries emphasizes the external ascription of ethnicity within a state context. Slovenes located in the Valli di Natisone, incorporated into Italy in 1866, thus became defined as an ethnic group in part through the state-sponsored Italianization campaign which rendered their ethnicity visible.

⁵ Viewing irredentism as a product of or continuation of the *Risorgimento* forces one to question traditional periodization of the *Risorgimento*, which treats unification as an event (culminating in the 1861 creation of the Italian state) rather than a process.

⁶ After the brief period of unity under Napoleonic France, the Italian peninsula returned to being a checkerboard of states dominated by the Bourbons and the Austrian Hapsburgs. A series of unsuccessful revolts by liberal elites took place in the early 1820's, the same period in which secret *Carbonari* societies spread throughout southern and central Italy (Woolf 1979: 189-220). Mazzini built upon this tradition, espousing a new faith based on national fraternity (ibid: 203). The Papacy jealously guarded its position and rejected any Italian nation-state which it itself did not command. Inspired by Abbé Vincenzo Gioberti, a neo-Guelph movement promoting a federation of Italian states headed by the Pope sprang up in 1843. Under the popular Pius IX, this movement received considerable support. Moderate-

of the *Carbonari* and capitalizing upon the nationalistic sentiment aroused by Austrian repression, Giuseppe Mazzini founded his well-known *Giovane Italia* (Young Italy) in 1831. Mazzini couched his republican convictions in theological terms. "The Revolution - as I understand the word," wrote Mazzini, "has a creed, a faith . . . " (Mazzini 1945: 122). D'Annunzio's peculiar synthesis of religious and national symbolism clearly reveals this Mazzinian heritage.⁷

In the aftermath of 1848, when Italian revolutionaries found themselves unable to capitalize upon the insurrectionary spirit that swept over Europe, only the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia under Victor Emmanuel II maintained its independence. A critical advantage thus shifted from the revolutionary strategy of Mazzini and Garibaldi — who had heroically defended the short-lived Roman Republic against French forces — to the shrewd diplomacy of the moderate Camillo di Cavour, Piedmont's Prime Minister. Garibaldi's famous march of the *Mille* (or one-thousand volunteers) in the conquest of the South had halted at the threshold of Rome, the French-Papal stronghold. To Victor Emmanuel's request that he turn over leadership of his volunteers, Garibaldi had given his famous reply, "Obbedisco" ("I obey").

Although Pope Pius IX's Syllabus of Errors forbid Catholic participation in Italian politics, the Church and new constitutional monarchy agreed upon the need to suppress this revolutionary tradition and to minimize political participation by the masses (Tasca 1970: 278). As the myth of the *rivoluzione mancata* grew — a myth reinforced by the imposition of the Piedmontese administrative and legal system on the rest of the Italian kingdom and the state's harsh suppression of the popular revolt that broke out in Palermo in 1866 — the figure of Garibaldi increasingly came to symbolize the revolution's martyrdom. "The way in which Italy was united left a dull, persistent ache in the Italian body politic. The exclusion from politics of most Italians was part of that legacy. Garibaldi came to represent the participation through direct action of those who had been left out" (Grew 1970: 51).

reformist movements under the leadership of men such as Massimo D'Azeglio and Cesare Balbo rivaled both the neo-Guelphs and the Mazzinian republicans.

⁷ Calling for an unmediated relationship between the people and God, Mazzini dreamt of a Third Rome (after those of the Roman Caesars and the medieval Popes). This idea reappears in D'Annunzio's novel *Le Vergini delle Rocce* and, later, in Mussolinian rhetoric. Mazzini's transcendental vision of a Third Rome resonates in D'Annunzio's image of Fiume as possessing a vast spiritual horizon. Mazzini declared the Third Rome as that of the people, from which would arise "a third and yet vaster unity, which, harmonizing earth and Heaven, a Right and Duty, would speak, not to individuals, but to peoples, a word of Association teaching to the free and equal their mission here below" (Mazzini 1945: 57).

Despite the fact that the *Mille* represented a fairly elite group composed largely of students, those desiring a popular Italian revolution took the Garibaldian Red Shirts as their standard (Thayer 1964: 92). The importance given to revolutionary activity derived in part from the belief that armed conflict proved an essential step towards nationhood. In the 1880's, for instance, Rocco de Zerbi called for a "bloody baptism" that would allow Italy to assume her rightful place among European nations (Lyttelton 1976: 16). Such rhetoric contributed to the development of the imperialistic fever which gripped Italy in the 1880's and 1890's.

Born in 1863 to the first generation of Italians who had known no other reality besides that of the nation-state, Gabriele D'Annunzio played a prominent role in calling for military action in both the *terra irredenta* — the "unredeemed" Italian lands such as the South Tyrol and the Istrian and Dalmatian coastlines — and North Africa.⁸ By 1893 D'Annunzio had completed his *Odi Navali*, eight nationalistic odes to maritime power. "A Una Torpediniera nell'Adriatico" ("To a Torpedo Boat in the Adriatic"), for instance, proclaimed the Italian mission and destiny to (re)conquer not only the Adriatic but the entire Mediterranean (*Mare Nostrum*).

In the hopes of both redirecting this irredentist aggression (given Italy's 1882 alliance with Austria-Hungary) and building an Italian empire, Prime Minister Crispi launched Italy on a series of disastrous African campaigns. Crispi's programme made for a dangerous and vicious cycle. Each setback only intensified Italian humiliation, thereby renewing the desire for conquest and legitimacy. The resounding defeat at Adowa in 1896, for instance, influenced the Italian decision to embark upon the Libyan campaign (1911-12) and ultimately to enter World War I (Thayer 1964: 94-97).

As Benedetto Croce noted of discourse during the Libyan War " . . . almost all emanated from D'Annunzio or was dominated by his influence . . . the same spirit showed itself in every form of art, and poured itself out in the daily press, which, with few exceptions, gave way to a frenzy of intoxication, clothing all the circumstances and events of the war in startling colours and extravagant hyperbole" (Croce 1929: 263). Much to the dismay of the "anti-nationalist" Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti, this venture galvanized nationalist elements in Italy and helped mould Italian attitudes towards the imminent European conflict (Salomone 1970: 514). The bellicose poems

⁸ Among his contemporaries D'Annunzio reigned as the pre-eminent cultural figure of Italy. "Perhaps no modern poet has been more read, more admired, hated, despised and written about than D'Annunzio in Italy," writes Salomone (1960: 88). Nolte contends that "His influence in Italy was incalculable" (Nolte 1970: 155).

comprising D'Annunzio's 1912 *Canzoni dell Gesta d'Oltremare* (Epic Songs of Foreign Ventures) and the *Canti della Guerra Latina* (Songs of the Latin War, 1914-18) gained widespread currency as a result of their publication in the national newspaper *Il Corriere della Sera*.

The poet first voiced the fear of the *vittoria mutilata* in the *Canti's* "La Preghiera di Sernaglia" (The Prayer of Sernaglia). Here D'Annunzio cast himself as a modern-day Odysseus returned after the long war to find his home nearly destroyed by gluttonous suitors. The British and Americans, along with the liberal Italian politicians, sate themselves while Italy literally starves and suffers. In their post-consumption torpor, the politicians ignore the cries of Fiume, whose famished citizens had sacrificed their meager rations in order to secretly feed Italian prisoners of war.

§A New Garibaldi

With the Fiume question, the charismatic D'Annunzio cast himself in the role of a modern Garibaldi, who possessed a reputation as something of "a magician and a miracle worker" (Smith 1969: 2-5). D'Annunzio had first assumed the Garibaldian mantle during the interventionist campaign in May, 1915. After a five year "exile" in France, where D'Annunzio entered into collaboration with the members of the Italian army regiment commanded by Garibaldi's nephew Peppino, D'Annunzio returned to Italy via Genoa.

After dedicating a statue to the *Mille* there, the poet continued on to Rome, where a crowd of 80,000 awaited him. At a mass meeting at Teatro Costanz, D'Annunzio protested the forced resignation of the interventionist President Salandra and accused the Giolitti government of treacherously betraying the Italian people. In conjunction with the passionate demonstrations organized by Futurist impresario Filippo Marinetti and other prominent nationalists, this Dannunzian gesture precipitated three days of street violence. When the King refused to accept Salandra's resignation, D'Annunzio convened another meeting at the Campidoglio. Victoriously holding aloft the sword of Garibaldi's compatriot Nino Bixio, the poet led the crowd in calling for war (Griffin 1970: 109).

D'Annunzio's own bravery and series of outrageous exploits during the war lent authority to his Garibaldian pose and his condemnation of the politicians and war profiteers who threatened to rob Italy of its victory. After three long years of devastating warfare in which approximately 600,000 Italians lost their lives and another one million suffered injuries (Finer 1935: 112), the nation which had fought on the winning side found itself in a position of economic and social chaos similar to that of the

vanquished Germany. In addition, it appeared that Italy would be denied the territories promised by the secret 1915 Treaty of London. Signed to ensure Italy's intervention on the Allied side, this treaty promised Italy Zara, Split and much of the remaining Dalmatian coastline.⁹ Nationalists also demanded the port of Fiume, not originally included in the London agreement.

In raising the rallying cry of "Fiume Italiana," D'Annunzio cast himself not only as Garibaldi's successor but also his superior. Where Garibaldi had acceded, D'Annunzio literally and defiantly replied "Disobbedisco" to the Italian government's requests that he leave Fiume (Guglielmino 1959: 47).¹⁰ In contrast to Garibaldi's rag-tag band of Redshirts, D'Annunzio placed himself at the head of the special assault forces known as the *arditi* (the "ardent ones"), who formed the nucleus of the forces occupying Fiume on the day of the "sacred entry" (*sacra entrata*). With the success of this March on Fiume, a bloodless conquest as improbable as that achieved by Garibaldi's small force, D'Annunzio dreamt of carrying out the Risorgimento patriot's plans for a March on Rome. It would not be D'Annunzio, of course, but his rival Mussolini who would lead the blackshirts in such a campaign.

The Intersection of Fiuman and Italian Nationalism

The actors in the nationalist drama enacted at Fiume included not only members of the Dannunzian, Futurist and Fascist movements — who remained in constant

⁹ The establishment of Wilson's "Fourteen Points" as the basis for negotiations at Versailles rendered null such secret agreements and instead made the principle of self-determination paramount. While the Italians continued to demand the honoring of the London pact, they nonetheless also argued that by the principle of self-determination Fiume belonged to the Italian state, given the city's Italian character. Although Italian representatives Orlando and Sonnino left the Conference in a storm of protest, they eventually returned and acquiesced to Wilson. Many perceived this as a blow to national honor.

¹⁰ While this self-identification with Garibaldi perhaps confirms the charges of megalomania often leveled at D'Annunzio, it also reflects much more than merely his own poetic fancy. The memoirs of General Caviglia, for example, indicate that the typical Italian soldier also envisioned D'Annunzio in Garibaldian terms. In order to prevent further defections by Italian military personnel, Caviglia had to combat propaganda issuing from Fiume. When his men received letters from former companions describing the festivals, beautiful women and glory to be enjoyed at Fiume, Caviglia reminded them that Garibaldi instead had warned his volunteers that he had nothing to offer but hunger and death (Caviglia 1948: 143-144).

Given the widespread support for the Fiume takeover in its inaugural moment, the reluctance of another general ordered to block D'Annunzio and his legionnaires in their march proves understandable. When confronted face-to-face with D'Annunzio, General Pittaluga warned the poet that he had orders to prevent the occupation. In response, D'Annunzio lifted up his coat to reveal his numerous war decorations, pointed to a medal on his breast and taunted Pittaluga to shoot him in front of his men. Replying "It will not be I, son and nephew of Garibaldians, that will spill fraternal blood" (Pittaluga 1926: 256), Pittaluga instead accompanied D'Annunzio through the city gates.

dialogue and overlap, as well as rivalry — but also local fiuman nationalists. Prior to the Great War, Fiume had proven the object of competing national claims by Magyars and Croats within the Hungarian domains of the Dual Monarchy. In an attempt to maintain their control over Fiume against the demands of the Croatian majority, Hungarian administrators in Budapest had encouraged Italian businessmen to settle in the city. In the process of creating a barrier population between themselves and the Croats, however, the Magyar elites fostered the growth of an “Italian” bourgeoisie which soon aspired to political power.¹¹

Despite the relatively recent arrival of many of the *fiumani* from Italy and the Magyar administration’s encouragement of the use of the Italian language as opposed to Croatian, these nationalists claimed that the Italian community possessed continuity with original Roman settlements and later Venetian trading colonies. Within the text of this nationalist history, Fiume represented both “a Latin fortress which has withstood for centuries the attacks of diverse peoples” (Anonymous 1916: 16) and an Italian *comune* which had only agreed to nominal union with Hungary. By means of cultural organizations that celebrated this supposedly ancient Italian heritage, the *fiumani* participated in the “invention of tradition” (see Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983; Hobsbawm 1983a,b) common throughout much of 19th century Europe.

The first such association, the *Società Filarmonica-Drammatica*, was founded in 1872 with the purpose of promoting appreciation of Italian culture and language. This society coordinated the activities of subsequent institutions such as the *Università Popolare*, established with the aim of providing higher education in Italian, and the *Circolo Letterario*. The latter sponsored a lecture series featuring prominent (nationalist) Italian authors such as Enrico Corradini, Luigi Giacosa, and D’Annunzio.¹² Many of these speakers took as their subject the Risorgimento or Garibaldi.

In 1892, a more proto-militaristic or activist element emerged with the establishment of the *Società Nautica Eneo*.¹³ This association sought to inculcate love

¹¹ During the years in which the Magyar regime became much more directly involved in the city’s governance, the Italian population in Fiume expanded dramatically. The census numbers rose from 691 in 1861, before the Hungarian campaign to attract Italians, to 13,012 in 1890 to 24,212 in 1910 (Depoli 1919: 49). Such census figures remained disputed, however, since Slavs with Italianized names were often counted as Italians. This interpenetration of Italian and Slavic nationalist movements further points up the futility of creating a stark dichotomy between Western and Eastern nationalisms.

¹² In 1908, D’Annunzio presented his play *La Nave* to an enthusiastic fiuman audience and promised to return to the city (Venanzi 1972: 130).

¹³ See Hroch 1981 for a detailed study of the phases of development in nationalist movements, which tend to originate in cultural revival.

of the nation in youth through sports. Thirteen years later the *fiumani* formed an explicitly political organization, *Giovane Fiume*, modelled after Mazzini's *Giovane Italia*. This new stridency followed from the increasingly repressive attitude shown by the Hungarian government and the *fiumani's* unease at Italy's 1882 alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The *fiumani* made clear that they recognized only Italy as their nation, declaring public mourning in 1900 for the assassinated Italian King Umberto I (Venanzi 1979: 154). Six years later, *Giovane Fiume* sent a delegation to Ravenna, where it placed a Fiuman banner on Dante's tomb. Accompanied by representatives from the irredentist cities of Trieste, Zara and Pola, the *giovani fiumani* sang garibaldian hymns as they consecrated their banner.¹⁴

The experience of the Great War hardened the *fiumani* in their resolve to be reunited with Mother Italy. During the conflict, in which many fiumans and Triestines deserted the Austrian army for that of Italy, the Austrian police embarked on a campaign to arrest and deport *fiumani* to prisoner camps (ibid: 160-168). At the war's conclusion one such deserter, the fiuman *ardito* Giovanni Host-Venturi, organized a citizens' militia (the Fiuman Volunteers) to defend the annexationist cause (Lerda 1919: 131).

Two rival governments quickly coalesced in the city. To counter the Croatian faction, which demanded incorporation into the future Yugoslavia, the Italian element established the National Council. In August, 1919, an Allied commission proposed the dissolution of the National Council, the disbanding of the Fiuman Volunteers, and the replacement of Italian forces with inter-Allied troops and Anglo-American police forces (Pittaluga 1926: 233-235).

In response, the *fiumani* choreographed an emotional protest against the transfer of those Sardinian Grenadiers who had "liberated" the city. On the eve of the troops' departure, young boys ran throughout the city streets, knocking on doors. After 4:00

¹⁴ The official journal of the association not surprisingly took the title *Dante* (Venanzi 1972). The figure of Dante Alighieri — who in *De Monarchia* first expressed the idea of a Third Rome — holds enormous symbolic import within the discourses of Italian nationalism. The Constitution created by D'Annunzio, who not only aspired to be a new Garibaldi but also a 20th century Dante, stated that "In the Carnaro of Dante, the knowledge of the language of Dante results in respect for and preservation of that which, throughout the ages, has been considered the most priceless treasure of the people, the highest testimony to their noble origin, the supreme mark of their sense of moral domination" (D'Annunzio 1936: 6).

a.m., sirens began to wail as a crowd formed. Some citizens carried signs decorated with the Italian tricolor reading "The grenadiers swear: Fiume or Death!" while others sang newly composed verses foretelling the grenadiers' liberation of Fiume. The crowd saw the soldiers off at the station, bedecking the trains with flowers and banners and wreaths promising "We will return, do not doubt it." In the days immediately following their departure, the grenadiers' officers — stationed at nearby Ronchi — maintained contact with fiuman nationalists.

Having laid plans with the National Council for an eventual march on the city, the Grenadier Grandjacquet travelled to Venice with the mission of offering the movement's leadership to the self-described "first soldier of Fiume," who had previously offered to fertilize the Fiuman soil with his own blood (Venantzi 1979: 75). In that soil D'Annunzio located the true *italianità*, the genius of the Italian race (D'Annunzio 1974: 96). D'Annunzio envisioned Fiume as the site for Italy's national regeneration, re-imagining the Italian community as the nation *qua* Third Rome comprised by "We (who) are Italians from eternity and for eternity . . ." (ibid: 61).

In its reconstitution of *italianità*, the Fiume takeover held wide appeal for Italian soldiers, intellectuals and youth. That considerable numbers [as high as 9,000 by some estimates but in total probably closer to 4,000 (Frassetto 1940: 319-320)] made their way to Fiume reflected both the widespread dissatisfaction with the government and the popular appeal of the Fiume venture. Not all participants, however, shared D'Annunzio's particular vision.

§ *The Nucleus of Support*

Individuals possessed diverse motivations for going to Fiume; some sought glory, others adventure or profit. Some soldiers called up at the war's conclusion, for instance, made their way to Fiume in search of the military experience that had been denied them (Caviglia 1948: 81). Some *fiumani* and Italians too young to have participated in the war similarly welcomed the opportunity for heroism (di Carcaci 1954; Venanzi 1979: 14-17). The English poet Osbert Sitwell, one of many foreign intellectuals who visited the city, wrote of meeting two such youth. Having previously been turned back at the border because of their age, these adolescents — whose pockets bulged with pamphlets written by D'Annunzio — swore to go over the mountains if necessary in order to reach the city (Sitwell 1950: 116).

Seventeen-year old student Giuseppe Maranini, for example, set out for Fiume without telling his father, a devout socialist. Unlike intellectuals such as Giovanni Comisso and Leon Kochnitzky, who shared many of D'Annunzio's enthusiasms and

grand schemes, Maranini supported the Fiuman enterprise only as far as annexation. (Many of the *fiumani*, disturbed at the manner in which the project of redefining *italianità* had overshadowed their specific goal, shared this sentiment.) In a letter dated September 23, 1919, he resolved that should the action transform itself into an attempt to conquer Dalmatia or overthrow the Italian state, he would abandon the cause immediately. Despite his willingness to die for the Fiuman cause, Maranini disagreed with the “violent excesses” of D’Annunzio and Mussolini, who threatened to disrupt the national order (Maranini 1973: 37-40).

While individuals like Maranini came and went at Fiume, in their role as D’Annunzio’s “praetorian guard” the *arditi* proved central to the venture and its larger political aspirations (Ledeen 1977). The military command had established these “mythic” assault battalions in 1917 in the hopes of improving morale after the disaster at Caporetto. In their appearance and lifestyle, which Fascism would co-opt, the *arditi* bore the mark of a military elite. Unlike the ordinary foot soldier, the *arditi* enjoyed comfortable housing, received special training and generally acted as if above the law. Their distinctive costume consisted of mountaineering-style pants, a black shirt and a long coat open at the neck. This uniform bore two insignias, a Roman dagger and a flame; the latter signified the consuming passion of the *arditi*, who prided themselves on dying the “beautiful death” in daring missions and suicide charges. The *arditi* took many of their symbols and their distinctive Homeric war chant “Eia! Eia! Eia! Alalà!” from D’Annunzio, whom they considered their spiritual leader (Venantzi 1979: 70; D’Annunzio 1982: 570).

D’Annunzio had competition, however, for leadership of the *arditi* in the postwar period. In May, 1918, General Diaz nervously warned President Orlando that various parties were attempting to woo the *arditi* to their cause (Cordova 1969: 12). The government believed it could most effectively exercise control over the restive *arditi* — who contended that their wartime service had earned them a privileged role in politics — by maintaining them in uniform. As fears of revolution and anarchy spread during the “*bienno rosso*,” the red years of 1919 and 1920, the veterans offered a potentially powerful new force in the Italian scene.

Along with Fascism and Futurism, Dannunzianism was poised to harness the power latent in the veterans’ ranks. During the sixteen month occupation, figures like Mussolini, Marinetti, and the futurist-*arditi* Mario Carli and Ferruccio Vecchi made their way to the city, issuing proclamations of support while simultaneously attempting to co-opt the venture. Carli, for instance, founded at Fiume an “official” *arditi* journal known as *Testa di Ferro* (“Iron Heads”). In speeches delivered in the city, both Carli

and Marinetti claimed the poet as a “true Futurist” (Carli 1920: 78-81). Not surprisingly, D’Annunzio asked these futurist rivals to leave the city within the first month of the venture (Guglielmino 1959: 55).

The fascists also attempted to profit from the events at Fiume. A funding drive initiated by Mussolini on behalf of Fiume, for example, instead enriched the fascist cause. When D’Annunzio angrily wrote that Mussolini failed to match his words with actual support, the latter published a heavily edited version of the poet’s letter in the fascist paper *Il Popolo*, making D’Annunzio appear a somewhat unreasonable old man (De Felice & Mariano 1971: 9, 386). Mussolini cast further doubts on the political viability of Dannunzianism, describing the poet as “the man of the exceptional moment, not the man of everyday politics” (Cordova 1969: 132).

Political Ritual and Liturgy at Fiume

Given participants’ diverse ideologies and motivations, how did the Dannunzian enterprise manage to sustain itself for sixteen months? The answer lies, in part, in the poet’s innovative reworking of traditional religious symbols and rituals. Contrary to Hobsbawm’s understanding of such neo-traditions as rigid, these inventions proved highly flexible.

Central to the new political style described by Hobsbawm was its dramaturgic and participatory nature, the blurring of distinctions between orator and listener. While elaborate ritual had previously been the domain of a nationalist elite, the 20th century heralded the birth of a mass nationalism.

On the stage of public life the emphasis therefore shifted from the design of elaborate and varied stage-sets, capable of being ‘read’ in the manner of a strip cartoon or tapestry, to the movement of the actors themselves - either, as in military or royal parades, a ritual minority acting for the benefit of a watching mass public, or, as anticipated in the political mass movements of the period (such as the May Day demonstrations) and the great mass sporting occasions, a merger of actors and public. These were the tendencies which were destined for further development after 1914 (Hobsbawm 1983b: 305).

At Fiume, these tendencies developed in two distinctive ways: the creation of a dialogue with the crowd in which listener and orators constituted one voice (that of the *volk*), and the staging of spectacle and festivals. Mussolini proved an astute observer of both developments (Ledeen 1977; Mosse 1980).

§Dannunzian Oratory

D'Annunzio's performances at Fiume provided the archetype for later fascist oration. Delivering his speeches from the balcony of the Governor's Palace, D'Annunzio constructed a nationalist litany that made frequent use of the *noi* and *voi* forms and rhetorical questions to which spectators would respond with an enthusiastic "Sì!" or "Alalà!" or "Fiume o morte!".

The *Comandante's* speech of August 12, 1920, illustrates the Dannunzian style. In this case, the crowd initiated the discourse.

POPOLO: Speak, Comandante!

COMANDANTE: Speak again? To what end? I ask of you now the compensation for the girdle of patience that I brought to you eleven months [ago] like a good friar. Will you give it to me?

(D'Annunzio 1974: 307-308).

When the crowd replied "How?", the *Comandante* thundered "I request from the City of Life an Act of Life!" (ibid). The assembly fired back, "Don't ask, command!". Stressing that the *fiumani* themselves must create their own future, D'Annunzio then asked "From whom do you expect the victory?". To the shouts of "From the Comandante!" and "He who saved us will save us!" (ibid: 308-11), the poet declared that the people must make the victory themselves. He agreed to organize a celebration for the one-year anniversary of the March of the Ronchi only on the condition that the *fiumani* assist him.¹⁵

The *Comandante* then renewed the pledge of support given upon the occasion of the sacred entry:

COMANDANTE: With whom are you today? With the martyr against the misdeed? With sacrifice against [marketplace] dealings?

POPOLO: With the Comandante!

COMANDANTE: Until the end?

POPOLO: Until the end!

COMANDANTE: In the face of each burden? Before each obstacle?

POPOLO: Yes! (ibid: 316).

Directing his gaze to the future, to the vast horizon of Fiume's promise, D'Annunzio exclaimed that the moment had arrived to wage a war of the *fiumani*

¹⁵ This reflected D'Annunzio's insistence that the action be of a popular nature. The poet demanded, for instance, that the entire population of *fiumani* meet his forces at the city gates and welcome their Italian brothers in.

for the Italians. This prompted a brief soliloquy by the *arditi*, who promised their support in this struggle:

Whenever the Comandante wishes.
Wherever the Comandante wishes.
One for all, all for one.
All against all [others]. As one body! (ibid: 320).

Groups of *arditi* (or fiuman youths or women) often engaged in such exchanges with the poet, assuming a role analogous to that of a Greek chorus (Sitwell 1950: 123). This jibed well with the *arditi*'s penchant for inventing songs. Musicality and rhythmic patterning proved particularly important at Fiume, whose constitution declared music "a religious and social institution" (D'Annunzio 1936: 4). Many participants referred to the musical quality of D'Annunzio's oration as producing an effect akin to that of religious ecstasy.¹⁶ The Fiume speeches display the linguistic patterns identified by anthropologist Maurice Bloch in his analysis of Merina religious ritual: singing, formal oratory, and intonation [the "repeating again and again by the elders of a set formula in a chanting voice accompanied by whoops and other non-lexical shouts" (Bloch 1989: 22-23), an image not far removed from that of the *Comandante* leading the *arditi* in their *alalàs*].

Bloch warns against a symbolic approach that interprets meaning at the level of individual symbols (ibid: 19). Individuals may hold diverse interpretations of a ritual yet share a common sense of participation, suggesting that the "collective representations" embodied in rituals may create solidarity without necessarily producing consensus over meaning (Kertzer 1988).¹⁷ Paolo Santarcangeli, for instance, wrote that few could understand the *Comandante*'s high-flown discourse but nevertheless remained spellbound by his sonorous delivery (Santarcangeli 1969: 108). In image at least, the crowd which D'Annunzio elevated through his transcendental, musical oration appeared an organic whole, a "mystical body" (Mosse 1980: 98) that responded in unison. This depiction of the singular nature of the crowd referenced not only then-fashionable crowd theories but also the ancient Christian notion of the *corpus christi*, the unitary body composed by the community of believers.

§Festival Sponsorship

¹⁶ Throughout his career, literary critics had praised the musicality of D'Annunzio's language. In *La Nave*, the poet created a play whose sixth century military language proved so specialized that the performance resembled pure musical incantation (Klopp 1988: 96).

¹⁷ Since the reception of any text necessarily implies a re-inscription (Chartier 1982) and thus potential contestation, the "nationalization of the masses" (Mosse 1975) must be problematized rather than assumed.

The series of public funerals orchestrated at Fiume prove paradigmatic of the *Comandante's* sponsorship of festivals in which he fused Christian and nationalist imagery. In October, 1919, the poet organized funerals to honor aviators Aldo Bini and Giovanni Zeppegno, killed during an attempted reconnaissance over the city. After giving a final military salute, the *Comandante* delivered an impassioned oration to a crowd assembled at Piazza Dante. D'Annunzio exalted the fiery deaths as the consecration of the *città olocausta's* renewed will to sacrifice. "Glory to those who add fire to fire! Glory to the pair that offered the first holocaust of liberty to the holocaust! Glory to the two celestial messengers!" declared the poet. He then ordered the coffins covered with the sacred banner of Timavo, the flag of fallen war hero Giovanni Randaccio. "My pilots, cloak the two coffins," he commanded, "Perform the rite of the sign of the cross that is made by the shadow of the winged machine, with its double wings" (*Bolletino Ufficiale*: 11 October 1919; trans. Ledeen 1977: 95).

D'Annunzio repeatedly invoked the shroud of Randaccio as a neo-relic. Prior to the occupation, the poet had attached a black band to this banner as token of mourning for Fiume. With the March on Fiume, the *Comandante* presented the banner to the *fiumani*, who swore their faith upon it. The use of the Randaccio flag at the aviator funerals thus recalled the oath sworn on the evening of the *sacra entrata*.

In the subsequent eulogies honoring two pilots killed en route to nearby Pisino, the *Comandante* in turn invoked the Bini and Zeppegno funerals as neo-traditions. Just as the fiuman women had doused Bino and Zeppegno's burning aircraft with water and tears, claimed the poet, so too had the women of Pisino attempted to extinguish the blaze that consumed Ferri and Scaffidi's planes. D'Annunzio marvelled that a resident of Pisino had walked all night in order to bring him the banner which had covered the aviators' bodies. According to the poet, the traces of blood and the odor of death that clung to this cloth — which he likened to a relic of the Christian martyrs — lent it sanctity.

The *Comandante* pledged to take this "banner of sacrament" to the precise spot where the pilots had crashed. Only when this site had been located and the *fiumani* had knelt there in prayer would the funeral rite be complete (*Bolletino Ufficiale*: 17 February 1919). In all these public funerals, D'Annunzio therefore demanded that the populace not only unite in common sympathy but in ritual action. Appropriately, the funerals for those individuals killed in the "Bloody Christmas" were the last public ceremonies staged by D'Annunzio in the city; the Randaccio flag lay draped over the coffins of the fallen.

Presiding over these ceremonies, the *Comandante* established himself as both high priest and patron saint of an emerging nationalist faith. Some *fiumani* burnt candles before his image and others came in the hope that he possessed healing powers (Nardelli 1931: 282, 287). Fascist state rituals appropriated this imagery, Mussolini's picture at times carried in processions in the manner of a patron saint (Smith 1981: 124). In his priest-like capacity, the *Comandante* not only officiated at final rites but also constructed a ritual framework embracing baptism and communion.

Seeking to create a sacrament of war binding the community of soldiers together, D'Annunzio had first appropriated the liturgy of Eucharist during the war. On the battlefield of the Carso he had declared that

. . . blood is seething and glistening in the chalice of the air. It pours out from the edgeless cup, overflows from the rimless bowl. It repeats one word only, as in the closed Coenaculum: 'This is my blood. Let all drink of it' . . . Soldiers, each one of you should drink of it. Your hearts should be filled it . . . It will never suffocate you, but will give you power over death . . . She [the mother-country] repeats and commands each one: 'Take up this cup.' She administers a sacrament that makes you all partakers of her divinity and her passion, of her miserable humanity and her immortal hope (D'Annunzio 1917: 108-110).

At Fiume, D'Annunzio realized these rhetorical themes in ritual action. In a speech delivered to fiuman workers in April, 1920, the *Comandante* spoke of "breaking into pieces the bread of our communion." D'Annunzio declared that this bread, incomparable in its eucharistic flavor, had nourished those ancient fiumans who had struggled to preserve their communal freedom. Before going into battle, these warriors had taken an even more profound communion, placing some soil in their mouths as an act of unmediated union with the nation. This united the *fiumani* with their Italian brothers, men like Andrea Baafle who in a similar spirit had consumed sand from the bank of the Piave before offering his life at Caporetto (Susmel 1941: 137).

When D'Annunzio travelled to nearby Zara in November, 1919, he led the Italians there in a similar, collective rite of national communion. Declaring his religion as that of his legionnaires, who represented the will of the people and of God, D'Annunzio proclaimed the irrefutable *italianità* of Zara. When the poet presented the sacred Randaccio banner, the crowd of *Zaratini* knelt in the mud to adore it and to pledge their faith as an act of communion (Vedetta d'Italia: 19 November 1919). By taking communion with the body and spirit of the nation, the irredentist lands were thereby united with Italy spiritually and physically through the act of transubstantiation.¹⁸

¹⁸ For D'Annunzio, each soldier represented a crucified Christ, death thereby signalling rebirth and baptism into the national community. The *arditi* battle cry that death equalled victory proved central to such

D'Annunzio also appropriated other religious rituals such as feast days. The feast day of Fiume's patron saint St. Vito, for instance, became the occasion for military parades and carnivalesque license. Belgian writer Leon Kochnitzky described it thus:

The illuminated piazza, the banners, the great written proclamations . . . and the dances . . . They danced everywhere . . . it was unrestrained bacchanale. To the rhythm of martial fanfares one saw soldiers, sailors, women, citizens . . . (Kochnitzky 1922: 52; trans. Ledeen 1977: 151).

For the feast day of Saint Barbara, the laurels and palms associated with the saint's day decorated the howitzers and machine guns on display in Piazza Dante (*Vedetta d'Italia*: 6 December 1919).

In addition to this nationalization and militarization of religious ceremonies, D'Annunzio established a ritual calendar celebrating events related to the Regency. The local papers *Vedetta d'Italia* and the *Bolletino Ufficiale* reported upon numerous ceremonies to commemorate anniversaries (such as that of the sacred entry, D'Annunzio's war exploits and so on) or bestow the "Medal of Ronchi" upon individuals or military divisions exemplifying the Italian genius. These medals served as neo-relics akin to the pins and icons associated with saints. In medieval theology, relics possessed a sanctity transferrable through contact. The *fiumani* and legionnaires similarly sanctified themselves by wearing these medals, just as those who died in the Fiume takeover underwent canonization by virtue of the Randaccio's banner contact with their coffins.¹⁹

These ritualistic elements combined to constitute the "post-war faith" of Fiumanism. Participants at Fiume often spoke of their experience in terms of a conversion marked by trials and perils. Maranini, whose early letters decried Dannunzian excess, even went so far as to state that Fiumanism "is the new force of Italy that turns away from the obscurity of the past centuries and that is faith, devotion, religion. All of us here have the sensation of being creators of a great work" (Maranini 1973: 103-104).

a litany. To the poet's call "Long live death!", the *arditi* typically responded "For the Italy of Vittorio Veneto, for burning Fiume, for sainted Zara, for Spalato martyred, for all the irredentist Adriatic, for Gabriele D'Annunzio: PRISONERS, NEVER; DEAD, YES; LIVING, NO (Testa di Ferro: 22 February 1920). For a detailed analysis of the use of the idioms of baptism and brotherhood by the *arditi*, see the author's "The Sacrament of Blood and the Baptism of Fire: Celebrating the Warlike Rite of the Italian *Arditi*," forthcoming in *D'Annunzio in Fiume* (H. Gumbrecht, F. Kittler and B. Siegert, eds.).

¹⁹ I am grateful to Hans Gumbrecht for this suggestion.

This new religion existed uneasily with Catholicism. Don Celso Costantini, for example, protested that Catholicism had been reduced to mere ornament and liturgy at Fiume. A scandal erupted with D'Annunzio's blasphemous proclamation of a warlike "Sacrament of Iron" and with the participation of women during religious services;²⁰ as a result, the *arditi* chaplain Padre Giuliani was forced to leave the city (Pozzi 1936: 82-83). In other ways, however, the (local) Church collaborated with the *Comandante*. Costantini and Giuliani incorporated Dannunzian themes into the Catholic masses they conducted at the aviators' funerals and a group of rebellious Capuchin priests who supported the poet even went so far as to demand the right to marry (*Vedetta d'Italia*: 24 March 1920; Costantini 1948: 352-3).

This ambivalent relationship reflects the persistent tension in Church-state relations, a product of the manner of unification. It also highlights the reality that any movement seeking to bring state and nation into a contiguous relationship in Italy could not completely neglect Catholicism. The necessity of co-existing with the Church would eventually compel the anticlerical and antibourgeois Mussolini to assume a "mantle of respectability," espousing a conservative doctrine that extolled civil order and family life.²¹

The Fate and Legacy of Fiume

In creating a Regency founded on festivals and spectacle, D'Annunzio attempted to institutionalize the bacchanalian atmosphere that flourished in post-war Fiume. Fiume displayed many aspects of the carnival, that "borderline between art and life" in which distinctions between actor and spectator dissolve (Bakhtin 1968: 7). Carnival consists in a spectacle which its participants live, if but briefly; those present at Fiume not only participated in festivals orchestrated by D'Annunzio but also staged their own, as in the case of the *arditi* who organized a celebration in honor of the poet or the *fiumani* who held a ceremony to officially declare the *Comandante* a fiuman citizen. Fiumanism's universal aspirations clearly bear a strong relation to carnival's themes of expansion and revitalization, as well as to the millennialism

²⁰ The role of gender at Fiume remains an interesting and little explored topic. The progressivism of the Constitution of Fiume (which guaranteed full equality regardless of sex) coexisted uneasily with an emerging rhetoric of virility that would become central to the fascist regime (Spackman 1983).

²¹ Despite the supposed reconciliation effected by the 1929 Lateran Accord, however, the relationship between regime and Church remained marked by alternating cooperation and hostility. Particular tension developed in regard to socialization of youth (see Koon 1981) and questions of racial policy.

characteristic of the medieval little tradition out of which rituals of profanation such as carnival developed (Scott 1977: 284).

The Fiume venture pivoted upon such rituals of profanation, as well as those glorifying the nation *qua* millennium. D'Annunzio bestowed upon Prime Minister Saverio Nitti, who opposed the occupation, the excremental epithet *Cagoia*. "*Cagoia* is the name of a low, crapulous creature without a country . . . Led before the court . . . [he stated] that he did not even know if Italy existed . . ." declared the *Comandante* (D'Annunzio 1974: 139-40), who led a crowd in "baptizing" *Cagoia* by spitting on him; this constituted a ritual inversion of the soldiers' glorious blood baptism. When Nitti fell from power in 1920, D'Annunzio and the *arditi* staged mock funerals complete with false cenotaphs (Venanzi 1979: 133). This scorn rang out in the defiant laughter of the *arditi*, who took as their motto "*Me ne frego*" ("I don't give a damn"). Their rituals of profanation — particularly the administration of castor oil to opponents — acquired new dimensions under the fascists, who pursued a systematic campaign of violence. Fascist *squadristi* added a club to their repertoire, beating unfortunate castor oil recipients so severely as to induce death in some cases (Gallo 1964: 116-117). The elements of the absurd and "slapstick" (the *buffonata*) praised by the *arditi* and the futurists thus gave way to the literal "slap and the stick."

D'Annunzio's frequent calls for self-control and purity on the part of his followers, who at times veered towards violence, offered a millenarian counterpoint to the carnivalesque. As evidenced by his futile appeals for order, the *Comandante* could neither effectively control nor direct the various elements present at Fiume. Inherent to the Fiuman enterprise was the paradox of creating a regency out of what Victor Turner calls the anti-structure of "*comunitas*" (Turner 1969). Confronted with the dilemma of sustaining the tumult of the carnival and the eschatological movement of the millennium, the poet unsuccessfully sought to preserve the illusion of perpetual motion within a circumscribed framework of repetition.²² This represented an attempt to reinscribe sacral time within the new homogeneous, empty time in which the imagining of the nation became possible (Anderson 1983). As a result of these internal contradictions, the enterprise largely exhausted itself prior to the Italian navy's arrival.

By the episode's close, D'Annunzio had assumed the rhetoric of the crucified rather than the celebrant, ultimately locating Fiumanism's meaning in the space

²² On the one hand, the *Comandante* constructed a schedule of constant activity and missions for his legionnaires, who noted the frenetic pace of life in their diaries and memoirs (di Carcaci 1954: 12; Maranini 1973: 45-6). On the other hand, many followers complained of boredom and a sense of stagnation (di Carcaci 1954: 46, 74, 63; Comisso 1963: 88-89).

between the carnivalesque and the apocalyptic. Unlike the politically pragmatic Mussolini — who effectively exercised control over his movement's ranks and forcefully deployed specific themes within Fascism — D'Annunzio proved unable or unwilling to guide Fiume in a clear direction or to manipulate the many different messages and themes that emanated from the city. While appropriating many of D'Annunzio's symbols and techniques, as well as his actual supporters, Mussolini strove to marginalize his rival's political viability.

In the aftermath of Fiume, Mussolini realized the threat that the popular D'Annunzio could still pose, particularly after the latter expressed alarm at the tactics of the fascist paramilitary squads. D'Annunzio encouraged syndicalist leader Alceste DeAmbris — who sought to forge a broad anti-fascist coalition of socialists, communists, and *arditi* (Noiret 1991) — to present himself as a candidate in Parma for the 1921 elections. The following year, the Arditi Association adopted the Fiuman Constitution as its programme and declared independence from the fascists (Cordova 1969: 142). The poet also urged the *arditi* to demonstrate their solidarity with the Italian Federation of Naval Workers (FILM) in their struggle for autonomy from Mussolini's National Corporation of Sea Men. When all hopes faded that he might challenge or at least mediate fascist violence, however, the former *Comandante* withdrew from public life. He retired to the *Vittoriale*, a luxurious villa on Lake Garda given to him by Mussolini. The poet spent his final years transforming the villa into a literal museum to his alternative vision of the Italian nation.

Conclusion

Mussolini's success in situating Fiume as an anachronistic (if inspirational) text within the fascist state narrative has obfuscated both the episode's specific meaning within Italian culture and its significance for broader discussions of nationalism. The Fiume episode — which innovated a now commonplace style of mass media political theater — presents a dramatic example of the manner in which the nation is "conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship . . . that makes it possible . . . for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings" (Anderson 1983: 16). Crucial to these imaginings are rituals, capable of creating solidarity without consensus. Given the possibility for competing interpretations of such rituals, the failure of Dannunzianism underlines the importance of coercion as well as consent for the exercise of hegemony. In contrast to the often spontaneous and reciprocal process of invention found at Fiume, state-sponsored ritual under Fascism was carefully orchestrated from the top down and represented "a more

formalized code [in which] the possibility of contradiction becomes less and less" (Bloch 1989: 29)

Mussolini's co-optation of the venture also prompts one to question the centrist position assumed by most theorists of nationalism. The articulation of a local fiuman nationalism with broader nationalistic currents within Italy suggests the ways in which larger political movements both exploit and develop out of traditional and local conflicts, constituting a dialectical movement like that proposed by Peter Sahlin in his "oppositional model" of national identity as constructed on borders of difference (Sahlin 1989: 8).

The specific articulation of "local" irredentism in Venezia Giulia and Istria with larger movements — including the Risorgimento, Fascism, the Cold War and the current Yugoslav conflict — points up the fallacy of viewing the Risorgimento as having neatly and definitively effected national unification. (All nations, of course, must be continually renegotiated.) The problem of *italianità* that moved D'Annunzio and his adherents remains a potent one in an Italy currently rent by political and economic crises that have opened a space for chauvinistic groups like the Leagues of the North and the MSI.

Not surprisingly, Dannunzian rhetoric has not been totally extinguished and it retains its ambiguous status vis à vis Fascism.²³ In the renewed debate over Istria, groups such as the National League (Lega Nazionale) invoke D'Annunzio but distance themselves from Fascism. Neo-fascists agitating in Trieste, however, also claim the Dannunzian heritage. In November, 1992, for example, MSI leader Roberto Menio organized a "Dannunzian Sunday" (*domenica dannunziana*) for which 10,000 people gathered. Menio invoked one of the poets most celebrated wartime exploits, the "Trick of Buccari" (*Beffa di Buccari*). At the head of three small navy motorboats which slipped into the narrow Bay of Buccari near Fiume, D'Annunzio and his men had eluded the Austrian navy, narrowly escaping the harbor thanks to heavy fog cover. The enemy found only a mocking message in a bottle. In this Dannunzian spirit of the *beau geste*, Menio stood aboard a similar speedboat and tossed 350 bottles — containing messages demanding the return of Istria to Italy — into the sea.

²³ For some, like the few surviving legionaires who annually return to the *Vittoriale* or the Fiuman "government-in-exile" which donated a marker on the 70th anniversary of the March of Ronchi, D'Annunzio represents not the "St. John the Baptist of Fascism" (see Ledeen 1977), as is commonly supposed, but the incarnation of garibaldian heroism (Host-Venturi 1976: 11-12).

As this recent reappearance of irredentist rhetoric suggests, and as this paper has sought to explore, the relevance of Dannunzian Fiume extends far beyond its complicated relationship with Fascism. The grounds-keepers at D'Annunzio's villa claim that drinking from the *Piazzetta Dalmata's* fountain ensures that one day the visitor will return. Our age has drunk deep of the nationalist wellspring tapped by the poet D'Annunzio. The moment for revisitation has arrived.

Research for this paper — which follows from B.A. and M.A. theses on related subjects — was assisted by small grants from Stanford University and Trinity College at Cambridge University, as well as fellowship funding from the National Science Foundation. I am grateful to the staffs at the Beinecke Rare Book Library (Yale University), Biblioteca Nazionale (Florence), Hoover Institution (Stanford), Fondazione del Vittoriale and the Imperial War Museum for their assistance. I thank Sylvia Yanagisako and Ernest Gellner, my supervisors at Stanford and Cambridge respectively, for their helpful comments and criticisms. Especial thanks to Hans Gumbrecht and Jeffrey Schnapp for their inspiration and mentorship.

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Sicily and Italian National Unification

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«...national identification and what it is believed to imply, can change and shift in time, even in the course of quite short periods.»

Eric Hobsbawm¹

«...centralization would make of Sicily the Ireland of Italy.»

Francesco Ferrara²

In telling the story of the Risorgimento it is possible to distinguish between those who wanted liberation of a particular part of the Italian peninsula and those who sought unification of the entire peninsula.³ Liberation and unification were not necessarily complimentary. The problem becomes even more complex because liberation and unification were both subject to multiple and often contradictory formulations. Sicily is an area where these complexities and contradictions were most explicit.

In Sicily a desire for «liberation» emerged in the late eighteenth century and was given form in the Sicilian constitution of 1812, the rising of 1820, and particularly in the Sicilian Revolution of 1848. This desire for «liberation,» however, was not a generic desire for liberty but an effort on the part of the island's economic elite to preserve their privilege in the face of threatened reform by acquiring independence from Naples. For the common people of Sicily who gave force to the revolutionary explosions, «liberation» and «independence» would have had other meanings. For them «freedom» meant freedom from unjust taxation, police and gang repression, and the exploitation from which they suffered at the hands of the land owners. When Garibaldi came to Sicily in May 1860 hardly any Sicilians joined him for the sake

¹ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 11.

² Francesco Ferrara, *Cenni sul giusto modo di intendere l'annessione della Sicilia all' Italia*, (Palermo, 1860) in Gabriella Portalone Gentile, *La Sicilia post-unitaria nel dibattito parlamentare (1861-1867)* (Palermo: Istituto Siciliano di Studi Politici ed Economici, n.d.), p. 6.

³ Ronald S. Cunsolo, *Italian Nationalism: From its Origins to World War II* (Malabar, FLA: Robert E. Krieger, 1990), p. 23.

of «Italy.» Peasants rallied in hope of a social revolution; later the landed elite came over precisely to prevent social revolution. When Sicily joined Italy, it was not for the sake of «unification» but for the sake of «liberation.» And the «liberation» which was effected was a preservation of the status quo through a cynical connivance between the Piedmontese politicians and the Sicilian elite. What has been correctly characterized as «...the fundamentally counterrevolutionary . . . outcome of the Risorgimento in Sicily . . .»⁴

By the eighteenth century the forces of history and geography had combined to produce a Sicilian nationality.⁵ If, however, a Sicilian ethnic nationality existed by virtue of an existing social reality of language, culture, space and economics, conscious Sicilian nationalism developed exclusively among the elite as a tool to serve their interests. Sicilian nationalism was a reaction of the Sicilian elite against modernization, which threatened to bring administrative and social reform to the island. They would later convert to Italian nationalism when the alternative appeared to be a social revolution which would destroy their interests. To the majority of the Sicilians, the question of which dominating force held sovereignty was one extraneous to their principal concerns, land and food. Their unspoken agenda was social transformation. In hope of this, they rallied to Garibaldi. Italy and Victor Emanuel meant nothing to them. It might also be added that Sicily and the Sicilians meant nothing to Cavour and his successors. To Cavour its acquisition was necessary to

⁴ Jack Reece, «Sicilian Autonomists and the Sicilian Revolution of 1848 in Palermo: Prodrômes of Mafia Politics,» *1979 Proceedings of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe*, p. 104.

⁵ I believe that the constituent characteristics of nation enumerated by Miroslav Hroch, «a large social group characterized by a combination of several kinds of relation (economic, territorial, political, religious, cultural, linguistic, and so on) which arise on the one hand from the solution found to the fundamental antagonism between man and nature on a specific compact land-area, and on the other hand from the reflection of these relations in the consciousness of a people» were present in Sicily and justify the use of nation in regard to the island's people. Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 4-5. Sicilian historians are in broad agreement on this question. See Rosario Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia* (Rome: Editori Laterza, 1973 [1950]), pp. 11-13.

However, the concept of a «Sicilian nation» is less firm if Ernest Gellner's cautions about agro-literate societies are taken into consideration. He warns that «in a traditional milieu an ideal of a single overriding cultural identity makes little sense.» Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 13. On pp. 48-49, he argues that nations are invented from cultures by nationalism: «...nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality.» He would apparently deny the existence of a Sicilian nation before the development of autonomist agitation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Hobsbawm, as well, argues that «Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around.» Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 10. In addition to these arguments, a pervasive campanismo, or localism, also fractured Sicily.

sabotage the Garibaldian revolution. To his successors this colonial appendage was a producer of votes, parliamentary majorities, and taxes. While the Sicilian elite might have haggled over the manner in which Sicily's absorption by Italy was being carried out, hundreds of thousands of Sicilians, directed by their stomachs, voted their rejection of the status quo, the maintenance of semi-feudal relations on the island and the betrayal of their revolution, by emigration.⁶

Eric Hobsbawm describes nationalism as a product of modernization.⁷ In Sicily, Sicilian nationalism and the eventual adherence of most of the Sicilian elite to Italian nationalism was produced by modernization, but as a negative reaction to it.⁸ Sicilian nationalism arose in the late eighteenth century as an expression of the desire by the landowning classes to maintain their control over the social and economic life of the island.⁹ The Sicilian aristocracy had rejected the rational and critical perspective of the French Enlightenment which had made inroads even among the administrative bureaucracy in Naples.¹⁰ In contrast to the abstraction of the French, the Sicilian thinkers were drawn to the naturalism and empiricism of the English, and they countered universal theories with appeals to historico-political precedent.¹¹ They looked to England as a conservative paradigm. They saw in its history and institutions similarities to their own. A revitalized Sicilian parliament, they argued, would be an effective weapon against both enlightened absolutism and the aspirations of the lower classes.¹²

When Sicilian historians made the case for independence, they did so not «... to reform institutions but to reinforce them.»¹³ Especially during the tenure of the reform minded Domenico Caracciolo, Marquis of Villamarina, the enlightened

⁶ As Hobsbawm has noted peasants are among the last social groups to be infected with the virus of nationalism. The experience of Sicily certainly bears this out. While enduring the exile of emigration, the nostalgia of ordinary Sicilians was for family, home, land, and community, not «Italy.» Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 12.

⁷ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 14.

⁸ Peter Alter stresses nationalism as a response to a developmental crisis in society. Alter, *Nationalism*, translation of 1985 *Nationalismus* by Stuart McKennon-Evans (London and New York: Edward Arnold, 1989), p. 80.

⁹ Francesco Renda, *Movimenti di Massa e Democrazia nella Sicilia del dopoguerra* (Bari: De Donato, 1979), pp. 16-17. Renda correctly observed that «Sicilianism has always been the battleground of the landed class, the battle horse of the barons, the instrument of domination of the privileged classes to the complete loss of the working people.»

¹⁰ Francesco Brancato, «La Sicilia nel Dibatto Storiografico,» *Nuovi Quaderni del Meridione*, XXI (82-83), April-September, 1983, p. 170.

¹¹ Brancato, «La Sicilia nel Dibatto Storiografico,» XXI:170.

¹² Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia*, p. 108-109.

¹³ Brancato, «La Sicilia nel Dibatto Storiografico,» XXI:174.

Bourbon viceroy of Sicily in the 1780s, the preservation of the interests and privileges of the Sicilian aristocracy was increasingly seen to lie in autonomy from Naples.¹⁴ Trancredi Falconeri in *The Leopard* voiced the position of the latifondisti which continued into the later period portrayed in Lampedusa's novel, «If we want things to stay the way they are, things will have to change.»¹⁵ In their desire to keep things the way they were they looked to England.

The outbreak of the French Revolution gave a particular impetus to the Sicilian reaction against change and desire to shore up the oligarchic status quo through independence and the establishment of conservative constitutional institutions,¹⁶ which would guarantee «liberties» not as an instrument of the will of the amorphous people but of the political people, those with interests to preserve.¹⁷ The posting of British troops and ships, which accompanied the Anglo-Neapolitan Alliance of 1794, provided further stimulus for «Anglophilia and anglomania.»¹⁸ With the encouragement of Lord William Bentinck, who took charge of British interests on the island in 1811, «a feudal fronde»¹⁹ was engineered by and on behalf of the 2000 large land owning families. While Joseph Bonaparte in 1806 had abolished formal feudalism on the Neapolitan side of the Straits of Messina, the «revolution of 1812» was waged in defense of feudal privilege. The Sicilian nobility supported the project as a device for preserving their privileges, especially their exemption from taxation. A proto-Parliament met in June, 1812, authored a constitution, and declared complete independence from Naples.²⁰ Although the constitution abolished «feudalism,» it transformed old feudal holdings into private property and terminated the «community usages» which the people of the villages had traditionally enjoyed. It thus reinforced the position of the landholders at the expense of the peasantry.²¹

¹⁴ Denis Mack Smith *A History of Modern Sicily: Modern Sicily after 1715* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1968), III:407; F. Brancato, «Momenti di sviluppo dell'idea democratica nella Sicilia dell'ottocento,» *Nuovi Quaderni del Meridione*, XXIV, (93-94), January-June 1986, p. 15; F. Brancato, *La dittatura garibaldina nel Mezzogiorno e in Sicilia* (Trapani: Edizioni Célébes, 1965), p. 28.

¹⁵ Giuseppe di Lampedusa, *The Leopard* (New York: Pocket Books, 1967), p. 21.

¹⁶ Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia*, pp. 104-105.

¹⁷ Brancato, «La Sicilia nel Dibatto Storiografico,» XXI:176.

¹⁸ Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia*, p. 110.

¹⁹ Dennis Mack Smith, «The Peasants' revolt of Sicily in 1860,» *Studi in Onore di Gino Luzzatto* (Milan: A. Giuffré, 1950), p. 203.

²⁰ Francesco Renda, *La Sicilia nel 1812* (Catanisetta-Roma: Sciascia, 1964). Brancato, «La Sicilia nel Dibattito Storiografico, (L'idea autonomista),» *Nuovi Quaderni del Meridionale*, XXI (84), October-December, 1983, p. 481.

²¹ Sidney Sonnino, *I Contadini*, second volume of Leopoldo Francetti and Sidney Sonnino, *La Sicilia nel 1876*, (Firenze: Vallecchi, 1925), p. 338; Brancato, «La Sicilia nel Dibatto Storiografico,» XXI:482; Brancato, «Momenti di sviluppo dell'idea democratica nella Sicilia dell'ottocento,» XXIV:13-14.

After the reabsorption of Sicily into the Bourbon Kingdom of Two Sicilies, the self interest of the Sicilian landholders was romanticized. In 1848, Francesco Ferrara castigated the oligarches for not defending their constitution. «Your rights of 1812,» he said, «were lost; they were lost when our constitution was suppressed; they were lost with the fatal law of 1816 . . . Your silence was consent to a tyrannical act; your silence increased the weight of the people's chains.»²² He ignored the fact that the authors of the 1812 Constitution themselves held the key to the chains which bound the peasants, and were unwilling to turn the lock. Rosario Romeo, too, seems to have been taken in when he, with even less justice, wrote in 1950 of the aristocracy «. . . having betrayed, through its passivity and egotism in '16 and '20, that function of protecting the independence of the country which traditionally constituted its major glory.»²³ The landholders were protecting their self interest. Francesco Perez viewed the Sicilian Revolution of 1848 as part of a general revolution against the liberating principles of the Enlightenment in favor of «concrete historical values.»²⁴ This was equally true of the developments which led to Sicily's Constitution of 1812 and would also be true of Sicily's self-immolating absorption into Italy in 1860.

The eruption of class warfare in 1820 immediately cooled the interest of the propertied in pursuing revolution.²⁵ When they again entertained the idea as 1848 approached, it was because of their rancor at the half-hearted attempts on the part of the Bourbon administration to meddle with the usurpation of land by noble and bourgeois landholders.²⁶ The property holders maintained their control of developments and neutralized «. . . every movement of reform retaining too much drive . . . »²⁷ According to Francesco Crispi, they «. . . feared more the victory of the people than that of the Bourbon troops.»²⁸ Following the January 1848 rising in Palermo, they

²² F. Ferrara, *L'Indipendenza e la Lega*, 3 May 1848, quoted by Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia*, p. 324.

²³ Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia*, p. 324.

²⁴ Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia*, pp. 344-345. Francesco Perez, *La Rivoluzione siciliana del 1848 considerata nelle sue cagioni e ne' rapporti colla Rivoluzione europea, con appendice sulla Costituyente italiana*, in *Scritti vari* (Palermo, 1898), III:372.

²⁵ Mack Smith, «The Peasants' revolt of Sicily,» p. 205. Nino Cortese, *La prima rivoluzione separatista siciliana*, (Napoli: Libreria Scientifica Editrice, 1951); Francesco Renda, *Risorgimento e classi popolari in Sicilia, 1820-'21* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1968); Brancato, *La Dittatura Garibaldina*, p. 37.

²⁶ Jack Reece, «Sicilian Autonomists,» pp. 107-109; Ernesto Pontieri, *Il riformismo borbonico nella Sicilia del sette e dell'ottocento*, second edition (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1961), p. 225-238; Mack Smith, *A History of Modern Sicily*, III:405-414; Brancato, «La Sicilia nel Dibattito Storiografico,» XXI:176 quotes the Bourbon administrator, Lodovico Bianchini, *Storia economica-civile di Sicilia*, Second edition (Naples: E.S.I., 1972), to the effect that if Sicily were to gain separation from Naples, «there would never be freedom from the dominance of the baronage which would have impeded every social and economic progress.» On the identity of aristocratic and bourgeois interests see Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia*, p. 337.

²⁷ Brancato, *La dittatura garibaldina*, p. 28.

²⁸ Francesco Crispi, *Ultimi casi della rivoluzione siciliana*, p. 13, cited by Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia*, p. 334. See Giuseppe La Farina, *Storia della rivoluzione*, (Milan, 1860), II:301 and Fardella di Torreaarsa, *Ricordi della Rivoluzione siciliana degli anni 1848 e 1849* (Palermo, 1887), p. 326.

organized an elite National Guard, which according to Giuseppe La Farina, was «... born of the eternal suspicion of he who owns something against he who does not.»²⁹ They also preferred to rely on the support of Great Britain rather than the Sicilian people, and when British support failed to materialize preferred submission to the Bourbons over the danger of unleashed popular passions.³⁰

Though most property holders grudgingly accepted the restoration of Bourbon stability, liberal historians have stressed that, jarred by the failure of separatism in 1848, unitary consciousness grew among intellectuals and the small democratic sector of the revolutionaries, especially those who had gone into exile. Sicilian historians of the time, according to Rosario Romeo, «... no longer referred to Sicily as a 'nation.'»³¹ And according to Francesco Brancato, «... the separatist idea in these histories had gone with the northern wind.»³² But what this minority of intellectuals and political refugees thought, apart from the role that they might have played in stressing that peasant unrest in Sicily could serve as the spark which would ignite the south, was largely irrelevant to the Sicilians and Sicily in the 1850s. The most important dimension of this transformation is that these political refugees would serve as point guards of absorption after Garibaldi's victory. The desire to belong to a united Italy, even a federal Italy, only affected a tiny minority.³³ It was not in any way a motive for widespread discontent. If Sicilians disliked the Neapolitans, it was because they were the government and they were «foreigners.»³⁴ The Piedmontese would be shortly disliked equally for the same reasons.

In 1859 and 1860 there was growing unrest in Sicily, but the cause was not the handful of agitators sent from the north. The unrest was fueled by opposition to the milling tax, which sucked the life blood of the poor, and by desire for land and food. Unrest in Sicily was infectious. Any appearance of weakness or incapacity on the part of the

²⁹ La Farina, *Storia della rivoluzione*, I:112. See Antonio Calderella, «I compiti della Guardia Nazionale in Sicilia nella rivoluzione del 1848,» *Atti del Congresso di Studi Storici sul '48 Siciliano* (Palermo: A. Priulla, 1950), pp. 290-302.

³⁰ Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia*, pp. 335-336; Gaetano Falzone, *Il problema della Sicilia nel 1848 attraverso nuove fonti inedite* (Palermo: A. Priulla, 1951), pp. 134-142; G. De Pasquali, «La guerra del popolo e la capitolazione di Palermo,» in Giuseppe La Masa, *Documenti della rivoluzione siciliana del 1848-49 in rapporto all'Italia* (Turin, 1850), II:612.

³¹ Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia*, pp. 344 and 351-352.

³² Brancato, «La Sicilia nel Dibatto Storiografico,» XXI:177.

³³ The more active and enterprising sector of the Sicilian bourgeoisie also began to look to constitutional Piedmont as the agent of Italian progress (Brancato, *La Dittatura Garibaldina*, p. 30). But they too were a minority within a minority.

³⁴ Dennis Mack Smith, *A History of Sicily: Modern Sicily After 1713* (New York: Dorset, 1988), p. 431. The pagination differs from that of the 1968 Chatto and Windus edition.

authorities encouraged the ever present armed bands as well as new popular outbreaks. The growing popular unrest in the countryside and cities at first solidified the support among the landowners for the Bourbons. When, however, the Bourbons proved incapable of maintaining order and their own army became a threat to property and lives, the propertied shed their Bourbon loyalties.³⁵ The popular unrest had persuaded Garibaldi that an invasion was feasible and was, in fact, essential to his success,³⁶ but his initial proposals of reform, which attempted to satisfy some peasant grievances, frightened the propertied.³⁷

Cavour who feared that Garibaldi might radicalize the whole process of unification, sent Giuseppe La Farina to Sicily to promote annexation by Piedmont as a remedy to disorder. Before he was expelled by Garibaldi La Farina succeeded. Most leading proponents of 1848 Sicilian independence now advocated incorporation into an Italian Kingdom led by Piedmont. At the beginning of July Luigi Tirrito warned in his Palermo *L'Italia* that only immediate union with Italy could end the threat of social revolution in Sicily.³⁸ Marquis di Torreaarsa, a former autonomist and prime minister in 1848, served in Garibaldi's government for only five days before resigning because of its radicalism and becoming with Baron Pisani a leading proponent of annexation by Piedmont.³⁹ In the first part of August thirty three of the island's leading nobles, at the urging of Mariano Stabile, also a prime minister in 1848, met at the Palermo home of Prince Trabia to issue a declaration calling for adhesion to Italy,⁴⁰ and Sicily's most prominent literary figure, Michele Amari, who was a wealthy aristocrat, wrote of unity with Piedmont as «... a means to stop the peasant movement and to forestall land reform.»⁴¹ In 1876 Sidney Sonnino decrying the social conditions on the island perceptively observed «... a social revolution would have necessarily occurred either with the prudent concurrence of the dominant class or as the result of a violent

³⁵ Mack Smith, «The Peasants' revolt» pp. 214-215.

³⁶ Mack Smith, «The Peasants' revolt», pp. 205-206; Mack Smith, *History of Modern Sicily*, III:433-435. «The support [which Garibaldi received in Sicily] had nothing to do with the nationalist cause, which was weaker in the south, particularly in Sicily, than in any other part of Italy. It was purely to do with the domestic problems of the Bourbon regime . . . It was Garibaldi's willingness to give way to the Piedmontese thrust from the north in the name of Italian unity that took a domestic crisis into national politics.» John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), p. 81.

³⁷ Brancato, *La Dittatura Garibaldina*, p. 38; Mack Smith, «The Peasants' revolt» pp. 236-237.

³⁸ *L'Italia* [Palermo], 2 July 1860.

³⁹ Amari to W.C. Cartright, 10 August 1860, in Mack Smith, «The Peasants' revolt», p. 239.

⁴⁰ Reece, «Sicilian Autonomists», p. 115; Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia*, p. 331.

⁴¹ Letter of 28 August 1860 cited by Paolo Alatri, *Lotte politiche in Sicilia sotto governo della Destra* (Milan: Longanesi, 1972), p. 246. For similar reactions see, Brancato, «La Sicilia nel dibattito storiografico», XXI:485, and Renato Compisto, «La borghesia siciliana di fronte al problema unitario», *Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento*, XLI (January-March 1954), pp. 9-16.

revolution. But we Italians from the other provinces prevented this. We legalized the existing oppression and assured the impunity of the oppressor.»⁴²

When moderate liberal aristocrats appealed to Victor Emanuel to annex the island they were motivated by their economic and social interests. While they had once seen separatism as the means to protect their interests, unity was now in their interest.⁴³ Although Garibaldi's program of agrarian reform was «. . . stillborn if not insincere . . . ,»⁴⁴ and he quickly deserted the masses in favor of order and the continuance of his campaign on the mainland, Cavour was able, nevertheless, to play on the fears of the landowners, who employed squadre leaders to mobilize an overwhelming majority in the October plebiscite in favor of annexation.⁴⁵ The results indicate little but the power of the dominant classes. The peasantry was almost entirely illiterate,⁴⁶ and had no idea who Victor Emanuel was or what Italy meant. The voting was public and conducted under the intimidating scrutiny of the village elite, the *galantoumini*. There were separate urns for yes and no votes. In many locales no negative votes were recorded.⁴⁷

Cavour had been theoretically faced with two options though there was not the slightest chance that he would or could opt for the second. The first was to gain the support of the Sicilian elite. To do this he had to guarantee their social and economic dominance. The system of private terror by which they maintained and enforced their rapacious exploitation could not be challenged. The second alternative, agrarian reform, was quite unthinkable for a politician, even if he had been so inclined [which he was not], who was dependent upon an electorate which consisted of the wealthiest two percent of the population. The support of the elite and the obedience of the masses was gained by the preservation of the traditional social structure. So upon Sicily was imposed a hybrid form of modernization, «. . . a 'modernization' which maintained the old ordering of social subordination . . . »⁴⁸ Sicily even in the late nineteenth

⁴² Sonnino, *I Contadini*, p. 339.

⁴³ Brancato, *La Dittatura Garibaldina*, p. 35.

⁴⁴ Mack Smith, «The Peasants' revolt of Sicily in 1860,» p. 216.

⁴⁵ Francesco Brancato, «Genesi e psicologia della mafia,» *Nuovi Quaderni del Meridione*, 1964, II:17.

⁴⁶ Sonnino, *I Contadini*, p. 149. Sonnino estimated that in 1871 Sicily was 87 per cent illiterate and the peasantry almost totally illiterate.

⁴⁷ For the plebiscite all males with civil rights 21 or older could vote or 575,000 of the 2,300,000 Sicilians; of these 432,720 voted. Less voted throughout Italy in the first parliamentary election in January 1861, only 419,938. Of the 432,720 Sicilians who voted in the plebiscite, 432,053 voted «to form an integral part of Italy one and indivisible under Victor Emanuel as their constitutional king.» 667 voted no. In one commune 94 votes were recorded in excess of registered voters; of the 292 Sicilian districts, 238 recorded no negative votes. Gentile, *La Sicilia post-unitaria nel dibattito parlamentare*, pp. 16-19.

⁴⁸ Eric Hobsbawm, «Inventing Traditions,» in *The Inventing of Tradition*, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 265-266.

century conforms to Ernest Gellner's characterization of an agro-literate polity.⁴⁹ Horizontal cultural cleavages were utilized to further «... the interests of the privileged and the power holders.»⁵⁰

Despite the quest for security within the mantle of a united Italy, the desire for regional self-government remained strong. Cavour had indicated that he would allow a degree of devolution or administrative autonomy once unification was effected⁵¹ but his concern to form a unitary and indivisible state left this promise unfulfilled.⁵² Garibaldi had desired a general movement toward unity and the formation of a united Italy through «... the voluntary accession of all its parts.» Cavour, on the other hand, envisioned the progressive annexation by Piedmont of the rest of Italy. In his mind, «... the kingdom of Italy should be built up simply by an aggrandizement of the original province.»⁵³ This different conception of the Italy which was being constructed led to divergent practical approaches to the problem of assimilating new regions into the whole. Garibaldi apparently took into consideration the unique characteristics of Sicily. Following the advice of the Sicilian Crispi, assimilation would be accomplished through a gradual «educative» process. The existing formal administration would remain in place, but government would bit by bit be made more effective and incrementally an institutional assimilation would be effected.⁵⁴ Cavour

⁴⁹ «In the characteristic agro-literate polity, the ruling class forms a small minority of the population, rigidly separate from the great majority of direct agricultural producers, or peasants.» Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 9.

⁵⁰ Gellner, p. 11.

⁵¹ *L'Annessione* [Palermo], June 28, 1860; 16 Dec 1860 C. Amari to P. Amari p. 141 Carteggio di Amari, ed d'Ancona, Vol II, in Dennis Mack Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi 1860: A Study in Political Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985 [1954]), p.416; 19 Oct 1860 letter from Cavour, *Il Regno d'Italia*, 24 October 1860, in Mack Smith, p.398; Mack Smith, *Cavour* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 251.

⁵² Dennis Mack Smith claims that the outbreak of the Civil War in the United States on 12 April 1861 played a determining role in Cavour's decision to opt for centralization. I believe that the Cavour's words (*L'Opinione*, 13 Dec 1860) and actions indicate that the decision predated the attack on Ft. Sumter. However, what Mack Smith says of Cavour's reaction to the outbreak of the American Civil War illuminates Cavour's attitude concerning the tenuous «national» link between Sicily and Piedmont. According to Mack Smith, Cavour's «... immediate reaction to the news from Fort Sumter was to say that secession by the southern states of the American union would be unfortunate, but probably could not be avoided since they constituted 'almost if not altogether' a separate nationality. Just possibly this pessimistic view reflected a similar but concealed fear about southern Italy. He certainly took events in America as a warning of what might happen if a state abdicated too many powers to its constituent regions.» Mack Smith continues: «La Farina went further and asserted that just because they were both federal states and racially divided, the United States and Switzerland were not strictly nations at all, and would disintegrate at once if confronted by any European army.» Mack Smith, *Cavour*, pp. 263-264.

⁵³ W.J. Stillman, *The Union of Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1899), pp. 320-321.

⁵⁴ Stillman, *The Union of Italy*, p. 320.

«... opted for state-articulated and government directed nationalism, based neither on the people nor on popes and princes but on dynastic, political, administrative, social and economic institutions.»⁵⁵ The essence of Italian nationalism boils down to state power, the power of the expanded Piedmontese state.⁵⁶ Cavour demanded annexation to Piedmont and immediate assimilation to Piedmontese governmental, administrative, and legal practices. As Cavour wrote to Victor Emanuel on 14 December 1860: «The objective is clear; it is not open to discussion. To impose unity upon the most corrupt and weakest part of Italy. As to the means there is no doubt: moral force, and if this is not enough physical force.»⁵⁷ A «new Italy» was not created. The constitution and laws of Piedmont were imposed upon the «conquered» regions and, to the dismay of those Sicilians still championing a degree of autonomy within a united Italy, Victor Emanuel insisted that his enumeration not be transformed from «the second» to «the first».⁵⁸

If there was unhappiness with the subordination of Sicily to the north through the centralizing policies of the new government, and Cavour's broken promise of devolution,⁵⁹ the enthusiasm of the propertied for autonomism was cooled by continuing popular unrest and the willingness of the central government to tolerate the economic and social status quo on the island.⁶⁰ The events after 1860 followed «... the tendency for every liberal regime in Sicily to degenerate into a dictatorship of the dominant class and into the dominance of privilege.»⁶¹ The old agrarian laws were not enforced, and the number of small holdings decreased after 1860.⁶²

⁵⁵ Cunsolo, *Italian Nationalism*, p. 21.

⁵⁶ «To focus upon culture, identity, class or modernization is to neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics, and that politics is about power. Power, in the modern world, is primarily about control of the state. The central question, therefore, should be to relate nationalism to the objective of obtaining and using state power.» Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, pp. 1-2.

⁵⁷ Cavour to Victor Emanuel 14 December 1860 *Carteggi completi Cavour-Nigra*, vol IV:292-293; 16 December 1860 Cavour to Farini, *Carteggi di Cavour La Liberazione del Mezzogiorno* (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1961), IV.

⁵⁸ *Atti parlamentari*, C.D. Discuss. leg. VIII, sess. I, 16 april 1861, vol. I, p. 562; «Cavour decided before Parliament met that the royal title ought to remain 'Victor Emanuel II' ... Ricasoli protested that keeping the old title was yet another example of 'Piedmontization' and of Cavour's high-handedness; he thought it degrading to other regions who thought of themselves not as 'annexed' to Piedmont but as part of an altogether new kingdom for which they had voted. Cavour, however, under pressure from the royal palace, insisted on 'annexation'. ... » Mack Smith, *Cavour*, p. 253.

⁵⁹ 19 Oct 1860 letter from Cavour, *Il Regno d'Italia*, 24 October 1860, in Mack Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi*, p.398.

⁶⁰ Brancato, «La Sicilia nel Dibatto Storiografico», XXI, pp. 169, 179, and 486; Antonio Gramsci, *Il Risorgimento*, (Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 1966), p. 98; Mack Smith, *A History of Modern Sicily*, III:484.

⁶¹ Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia*, p. 337.

⁶² Mack Smith, «The Peasants' revolt of Sicily in 1860,» p. 206.

The unification of Italy subjected Sicily to colonial subordination and exploitation. It was a rather classic case of a relationship between a developed and relatively powerful center and an underdeveloped periphery.⁶³ This subordination was accomplished with the connivance of the Sicilian landowning class which had earlier championed autonomism. That the landowners were bought off in a cynical deal, which insured their economic and social dominance, is not surprising; their devotion to autonomy had always been self serving.

The Piedmontese-Italian Kingdom was not the source of the problems of Sicily or the Mezzogiorno as a whole, but Cavour and the northerners did not understand and made no effort to understand the south.⁶⁴ The northerners took no responsibility for it and far from contributing to the eradication of the problems of the south exacerbated them.⁶⁵ Sonnino could recognize that the usurious exploitation of the peasantry was « . . . the worm gnawing away at Sicilian society.»⁶⁶ But the Sicilian land owners and their galantoumini dependants in the towns controlled the elections which were needed to produce parliamentary majorities.⁶⁷ The land reform laws of the Bourbons remained a dead letter and those of Garibaldi were still born. The peasants received no relief nor even cynical consideration. They received not land

⁶³ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

⁶⁴ «Cavour confessed to knowing far more about England than southern Italy—he once told Parliament that he thought Sicilians spoke Arabic.» Dennis Mack Smith, *Cavour*, p. 216. According to Mack Smith «the new Piedmontese administration chose to impose an authoritarian and military rule over a population that they all too clearly disliked and treated with open contempt. Farini indignantly reported that the inhabitants of the countryside were utterly inferior to those of what he called 'Italian Italy' in the north. He referred to them as primitive barbarians, compared with whom the African bedouin seemed the very flower of civilization; and the phrase 'ferocious bedouin' was also used to describe Sicilians by Cavour's first viceroy in Palermo. When the king boasted that a single Piedmontese regiment would be sufficient to keep such canaille and riff-raff in subjection, Cavour repeated his approval of using martial law and armed might 'to force unity on the weakest and most corrupt region of Italy'—another remark that was prudently cut out of Luigi Chiala's edition of his letters.» Mack Smith, *Cavour*, p. 239.

⁶⁵ They ascribed the economic backwardness, the poverty, the ignorance, and the violence of Sicily and the South in general to moral and genetic deficiencies, not to historical socio-economic factors which they abetted. See Roberto Lorenzetti, «Rébellion paysanne, conscience de classe et conditions sociales dans Cicolano après l'unification,» *Mouvements populaires et conscience sociale*, ed by Jean Nicolas (Paris: Maloine, 1985), p. 325.

⁶⁶ Sonnino, *I Contadini*, pp. 135-136.

⁶⁷ In 1861 out of a population of 2,300,000, due to literacy and property restrictions, only 43,430 Sicilians had the right to vote. Of these 36,595 (84 percent of the qualified and 1.85 percent of Sicilian population) voted in the January 1861 election for the first Italian parliament. The electoral districts of Sicily were gerrymandered to give disproportionate weight to the interior dominated by the latifondisti. Only 1.92 percent of the population of the Kingdom voted in the parliamentary election whereas 18.8 percent of the Sicilian population had voted in the 21 October 1860 plebiscite. Gentile, *La Sicilia post-unitaria*, pp. 16-19.

but conscription and the reimposition of the *macinato*, the hated and regressive milling tax. This tax which had been a principal cause of popular unrest in 1848 was abolished by Garibaldi only to be reimposed in 1868. In all, taxation increased by about a third. With taxes like the *macinato* and taxes on donkeys and draught animals but not on cattle, they fell with the greatest severity on those least able to pay.⁶⁸ Coupled with the increased taxes, which «. . . had the overall effect of taking money away from southern agriculture for investment in the north, deliberately increasing a regional disparity which was already dangerous,» was «. . . an austerity programme which kept the south backward.»⁶⁹ Money flowed from the south to the already more developed north. With its infrastructure already in place, the north developed «. . . far more rapidly; and this big differential between Italian regions was to continue widening for the next hundred years, with official encouragement—and not without many harmful side effects.»⁷⁰

To the dismay of many Sicilians, measures in accord with Piedmontese anti-clerical legislation were taken against the Catholic Church in Sicily. Its property was confiscated, but, rather than serving as the basis for the establishment of small freeholdings, most ended up engrossing the holdings of the existing landowning class.⁷¹ The proceeds which went to the treasury in Turin amounted to a tremendous transfer of capital to the north.⁷² With the secularization of church institutions, and the confiscation of their income producing property, the common people were deprived of social services.⁷³ The charitable foundations which remained «. . . were regarded by those who administer[ed] them as opportunities for their own personal profit.»⁷⁴

With the assimilation of the peninsula by Piedmont, the center of economic as well as political power was in the north. «The interests of the new Italy were therefore largely equated with those of the north.»⁷⁵ When the interests of the industrialized north were identified with free trade, that policy was extended to Sicily and destroyed local handicraft production in the same way that British free trade policies did in India.⁷⁶ When the north later sought protectionism that policy again

⁶⁸ Sonnino, *I Contadini*, pp. 140-141.

⁶⁹ Mack Smith, *A History of Modern Sicily after 1713* (Dorset), pp. 455-6

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 455

⁷¹ Leopoldo Franchetti [and Sidney Sonnino], *La Sicilia nel 1876: Condizioni Politiche e Amministrative*, vol. 1, second edition (Firenze: Vallecchi, 1925), p. 239.

⁷² Gentile, *La Sicilia post-unitaria*, p. 11.

⁷³ Mack Smith, *Cavour*, p. 244.

⁷⁴ Sonnino, *I Contadini*, pp. 142-143.

⁷⁵ Mack Smith, *A History of Modern Sicily after 1713*, p. 455.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 454-455

prevailed, this time to the detriment of the most industrious and modern segments of Sicilian agriculture, the producers of wine and fruit. But the wheat growers of the inefficient and under utilized latifondi, the mainstay of Sicilian politics profited.

Frederick Hertz wrote that the will of a minority plays a seminal role in the history of national development, and it did in Italy, and particularly in Sicily; but he added that that for a nation to be constituted that minority will must « . . . in the course of time succeed in gaining more or less the assent of a majority.»⁷⁷ Leopoldo Franchetti and Sidney Sonnino did not believe that this moral assent was present in Sicily in the 1870s. They wrote in 1876 that «most Sicilians do not have a concept of the law as superior to all and equal for all . . . this absence of the concept of a law and an authority which represents and assures the common good without individual exceptions, is manifested in relations of every sort among the Sicilians. They do not consider themselves as a unique social body uniformly subject to a common law, equal for all and inflexible, but as so many groups of persons formed and maintained by personal bonds. The personal bond is the only thing that matters. . . In sum, all relations are founded upon the concept of individual interests and of obligations between individual and individual, to the exclusion of any social and public interest.»⁷⁸

The case of Sicily shows how uncertain and difficult the process of creating a nation, and subsequently nationalism, can be. Miroslav Hroch has asserted that «the origin of the modern nation . . . [is] the fundamental reality and nationalism . . . [is] a phenomenon derived from the existence of that nation.»⁷⁹ Although a Sicilian nation predated the development of Sicilian nationalism, for most Sicilians in the first half of the nineteenth century there was no consciousness of being part of an Italian

⁷⁷ Frederick Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 13. Alter comments that «perhaps only the educational élite and the commercial and industrial middle class in the economically dominant state of Piedmont broadened their horizons beyond their own borders and shared an all-Italian view.» Alter, *Nationalism*, p. 74. Relevant is the famous quote ascribed to Massimo d'Azeglio, the former prime minister of Piedmont: 'We have made Italy: now we have to make Italians,» in Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Inquiry into the Origin of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (London: 1977), p. 107. Also Breuille's observation: «Nationalism was more important as a product than as a cause of national unification. There was a limited nationalist movement in both [Italy and Germany] countries. Their major contributions to unification were to provide legitimation for unity in the eyes of outsiders and essential support in the construction of a new state system once the initial act of unification had been carried through. The crucial interventions by Prussia and Piedmont were not inspired by nationalism. Nationalism had little popular appeal.» Breuille, *Nationalism and the State*, p.65.

⁷⁸ Franchetti, *La Sicilia nel 1876*, p. 44.

⁷⁹ Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, p. 3.

nation.⁸⁰ Adhesion to Italy for all but a small band of politically conscious exiles was a matter of material interest, deception, or compulsion. It is very dubious that the Sicilians, most of whom did not recognize the validity of any relations beyond the personal, had any feelings of nationalism.⁸¹ For them Italy was an artificial construct. For the elite it proved useful if taken with a grain of salt. For the majority, however, its utility was illusive. The people of Palermo, feeling betrayed and insulted by the Piedmontese had to be bombarded into submission by the Italian navy in 1866. In 1893, the Sicilian Crispi destroyed the Fasci, a popular movement for reform, inventing the fabrication that those agitating for reform were attempting to establish an independent Sicily. Again the Italian navy was employed against the Sicilians. Sicily was placed under martial law and thirty thousand troops occupied it. Actions which indicated the attitude of the Italian state toward the Sicilian people and which must have reinforced the attitude of the ordinary Sicilian toward any authority, including that of the «Italian» state.

⁸⁰ 7 September 1860, Crispi to Correnti in Dennis Mack Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi*, p.443; see pp. 8-9. Sicily and the relation, or lack of it, of the Sicilians to «Italy» and «the Italians» do not conform to either of Gellner's tentative criteria for nation: 1: «Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating.» 2: «Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations are the artifacts of men's convictions and loyalties and solidarities.» Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 7.

⁸¹ Franchetti, *La Sicilia nel 1876*, p. 12.

CULT OF THE NATION, RELIGION OF LIBERTY OR REASON OF STATE? SPAIN IN ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY (1848-1868)¹

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1. The national principle and the birth of Italian foreign policy

The problem of the relationship between national questions and the international context is undoubtedly central to the interpretation of the many-sided phenomenon commonly referred to as nationalism. Historically, the dialectic between national systems and the international system has been examined through the prism of foreign policy. However, in order to apply these problems to Italo-Spanish relations, we must first ask: when did an Italian foreign policy first emerge?

This question can be approached from various analytical perspectives, such as comparative politics or international relations, which often lack the necessary historical depth. This depth, as this Conference is demonstrating, is indispensable for distinguishing between the ambiguities and various meanings attached, in different historical and social contexts, to such a many-sided and «absorbent» term as nationalism. It is sometimes defined as being antithetical to other similarly many-sided terms, equally subject to historical interpretation, such as municipalism, imperialism, internationalism, modernisation or democratisation, but it is almost invariably presented as interrelated with the problem of national and international political legitimacy. This is confirmed by the study of the Italian case. First of all, in terms of the distinction between the two typical phases of the nationalist phenomenon in Europe: the «nationalisation of the elites», identifiable with the 19th century, and the «nationalisation of the masses» evident in the 20th century. But also, and more emphatically, in terms of the relations between the different national policies historically emerging in the European context and the foreign policies of the principal,

¹ Translated: Jonathan Hopkin.

if not only, actors in the international system in the last two centuries: the Nation-States.

As is well-known, State and nation are two different concepts. The identity between them began to be asserted in Europe after the French Revolution and the Declaration of Rights attached to the Constitution of 1791. But in that period, Italy was not one of the European State formations capable of following an independent foreign policy. Lorenzo dei Medici's embryonic proposals did not survive his death, and Niccolò Machiavelli's teachings were ignored, ultimately being distorted into use in other countries. There were various political entities in the Italian peninsula, whose authority derived from legitimistic rather than national criteria, and which could only move within external coordinates established elsewhere: in Madrid, Paris or Vienna. Even the political action of the Dukes of Savoy (who became Kings of Sardinia after the Spanish War of Succession), so highly praised by Savoy historiography, was in fact no more than a cautious and realistic «pendular» movement between the principal poles of the European political balance of power of that time, in search of better conditions on territorial and dynastic matters. Even in the 18th century the independent policy of the Piedmontese State was only a supposedly national policy. In the absence of modern States such as those formed in Spain, France and Great Britain, or of Empires such as Austria and Russia, in Italy different realities co-existed, crystallised into two distinct but complementary ideas: the particularism placing the nation within the city or the region, and the universalism inspired by the Roman tradition, adopted by the illuministic cosmopolitanism of the 18th century.

The problem of the political unity of Italy has not been studied in the same way by all historians. It is well-known that B.Croce, particularly sensitive towards formalistic-institutional problems, dated the beginning of Italian history as the proclamation of the unitary kingdom of 1861, or even after the creation of Rome as capital in 1870. L.Salvatorelli, on the other hand, emphasised the cultural aspects of the nation, tracing back the origins of Italian unity to the struggle of the *Comunes* against the Empire in Medieval times. Both great historians were right, but were dealing with different aspects of the national problem. Between them we can place some historians of the *Risorgimento* and, even more clearly, the historiography of international relations (F.Chabod, W. Maturi, F.Valsecchi, R.Moscato, E.Anchieri, E. Di Nolfo). Notwithstanding differences of emphasis, these historians, particularly since the Second World War when the ethnocentric criteria which had so heavily influenced Italian historiography, have swept away many of the misunderstandings and ambiguities of pro-Savoy and nationalist historiography. In particular, it has been shown that the existence of an Italian nationality in political terms cannot be postulated

in periods when the Italian national conscience was not yet developed, and remained a cultural phenomenon, «as a literary nation, the dream of poets and men of letters». Moreover, it should be remembered that in the rest of Europe, the vague concept of nation only acquired a political nature when combined with the State, with the transformation of the dynastic State into the Nation-State. This same historiography has also established that the formative period of Italian national foreign policy does not begin and end in 1861, the year of the proclamation of unity and the death of C.Cavour, but instead goes back to the period preceding the proclamation of the new Italian State, lasting into the following decade.

Italian unity has also been interpreted in terms of continuity with the tradition of the State of Savoy. Remaining within the perspective of pro-Savoy historians, this is a relevant but not decisive factor in the dynastic reason of State. The question could be reformulated in the following terms: when did the Savoy State, understood in political and dynastic terms, radically modify its character and physiognomy to become Italy *in nuce*? The problem has already been raised and resolved by F.Valsecchi and E.Di Nolfo. As far as internal politics is concerned, there is no doubt that 1848 was a turning point between two distinctive periods, confirmed by the concession of a Constitution and the participation of the Kingdom of Sardinia in the war against Austria. But above all after the second Restoration of 1849 Piedmont was progressively transformed into the centre of Italian hopes and the meeting point for exiles from other parts of the peninsula. Its resistance against Austrian pressure to suppress the political freedom of the Savoy State is, from this point of view, the principal merit of the Turin Government after 1849; this was the premiss for the assertion of the liberal contractual doctrine of the State as a substitute for dynastic legitimism in the rest of the peninsula. From the point of view of foreign affairs, the turning point was participation in the Crimean alliance, which confirmed the overturning of the European balance of power established in 1815, and Cavour's statement on the Italian question at the 1856 Paris Conference. These were the first signs of the policy which would lead to the choices of 1859-60.

The problem of the building of the Italian Nation-State, which continued through 1866 (the conquest of the Veneto) to 1870 (the Roman question), had not arisen spontaneously in 1861 or 1860, but was the result of a process whose origins dated back to at least 1848-49, and whose solution was made possible by the political action (domestic and international) followed during the Cavour decade. This permitted Italy to reach the level of the most advanced areas of Europe through the suppression of ancient localisms and anachronistic barriers, and the creation of a national market broad enough to promote social and economic development, as well as the creation

of institutions to encourage free political debate and the improvement of popular education. But this was not the victory of a spontaneous national movement, the fortunate success of the initiatives of the House of Savoy, or the mere reflection of political choices made elsewhere (Napoleon III before or Bismarck afterwards). Instead it was a much more complex phenomenon, containing in part these elements, which as well as putting an end to *ancien regime* society in Italy, became emblematic of the phase of ideas and national political movements present in Europe between 1848 and 1870.

This was a period, beginning with the revolution of European nationalities in 1848 and ending with the formation of the Italian Nation-State, in which the conditionings of international politics were clearly perceptible, and in which the Spanish Nation-State played a peculiar role.

2. The Risorgimento and the Spanish national model

Even before playing a role in the formative phase of Italian foreign policy, Spain had been involved in the origins of the Risorgimento. During the period in which the *ancien regime* came to an end in the Iberian peninsula, the Spanish national model had been taken as an example by the romantic and Risorgimento elites, with an influence which, although in a different form, lasted through into the period afterwards.

In Europe, after the upheavals of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the Treaty system of 1815 had restored order, an order which was to last until 1848. At Vienna the German question, in which the interests of Austria and Prussia often collided, had been much discussed; the rivalry between the two major powers of the German confederation was to remain a constant after 1815. However at the same time, the treaties of Paris and Vienna had denied the existence of an Italian problem. Despite the noble but powerless protests of Confalonieri and the democratic opponents of Napoleon against the decisions taken by the victorious powers, Italy remained unable to present itself as an independent political entity and was dismissed by the European chancelleries of the anti-Napoleonic coalition as a mere geographical expression, as Metternich repeated to the Spanish ambassador Gomez Labrador during the negotiations.

The Italian peninsula was still a stage for confrontations, where the great powers could resolve their continental rivalries, as they had in centuries past. This position, famously attributed to Metternich and adopted for the ends of Austrian imperial

diplomacy, but also substantially shared - although obviously for different ends - by Talleyrand, was derived from a traditional lack of confidence in the political capacities of the Italian people, and found its external motivation in the interest in restoring the monarchies of the *ancien regime*. This was the criterion which prevailed in the committee for Italian affairs created at the Congress of Vienna, composed of representatives of Austria, France, Spain (as directly interested powers), Russia and Great Britain (as mediators). The same principles of legitimacy and the return to the *status quo ante*, so dear to the men of the Restoration, were themselves subordinated to the needs of the new European balance of power: one example of this was the elimination from the European map of the pre-existing republics of Venice and Genoa.

For the signatory powers of the 1815 Treaties - the so-called Pentarchy (Austria, Russia, France, Britain and Prussia) and Spain, Portugal and Sweden - Italy was considered to be a geo-political reality but not an independent political entity. The Italian peninsula was in fact divided into several States, governed within by absolute sovereigns, but strictly subject to foreign dependency, a dependency which in that moment essentially meant Austrian hegemony. The impossibility of escaping from the restraints of international politics was soon demonstrated by movements against the *Ancien Régime* in various European national contexts, such as Italy and Spain between 1820 and 1823.

In Italy, the evolution from the idea of nation to the concept of nationality was closely intertwined with the principle of liberty, a phenomenon which became accentuated after the decisions of the Congress of Vienna. In the early years of the Restoration, the national model most admired by those Italians aspiring to liberty and independence was the Spanish example of 1812. The Spain of the war against Napoleon and the Cortes of Cadiz excited the enthusiasm of Italian romantics, and the repression of the *doceañistas* by Ferdinand VII had placed the Italian and Spanish liberals in a similar situation. So it is understandable that the victory of Iberian pro-constitutionalists in 1820 (the Spanish example was followed by Portugal) reawakened the hopes of Italians aiming to modify the post-1815 situation. This was confirmed when the Italian rebels of 1820-21 adopted the Cadiz Constitution, which sanctioned the principle of national sovereignty, as a political programme, with the predictable reaction of Austrian diplomacy.

As far as Metternich was concerned, the international conferences of Troppau (1820), Lubiana (1821) and Verona (1822), which served to legitimise the intervention of the Holy Alliance in Italian and Spanish affairs, signified the confirmation of the predominance of Austrian interests in the Italian peninsula. This objective of Vienna

diplomacy was aided by the positions held at Verona by the representatives of the various Italian courts, and in particular by the representative of the most faithful instrument of imperial policy in Italy: the Duke of Modena. On that occasion, Francis IV of the Este in fact reiterated that there was no such thing as an Italian nation, but instead various Italian States: this was the official proclamation of the incompatibility between the reason of state and the modern concept of nationality in the Italian case. The Conference of Verona, however, was important for other reasons. After the cautious divergences expressed by British diplomacy over the decisions taken at Troppau and Lubiana, at Verona a split emerged between the powers of the Pentarchy. Great Britain, which although it had shared with Austria the major responsibility for the rebuilding of Europe in 1815, had never joined the Holy Alliance, and distanced itself from the policy of interventions, carried out in this case by France in Spain; at the same time, the *Foreign Office* prepared to recognise the national independence of the Hispano-American ex-colonies. The British position of 1822-23, like the French and Spanish position in 1776, was therefore promoting the development of national movements in America. But the international position of Great Britain was also decisive in the change in the European political climate, and in particular for the consolidation of the 1830 revolution in France and the victory of the liberals in Spain at the time of the first Carlist War.

Until 1848 the Italian national movement lurched to and fro between attempted revolutions by Mazzinian democrats and disillusionment in the face of these insurrectionary initiatives and of the positions of the various sovereigns governing in the peninsula. The Italian States, or at least the most important such as the Kingdom of Sardinia, the Two Sicilies and the Vatican State, did have their own foreign policy, but they were essentially dynastic policies founded on ancient municipalism, or simply aimed at the maintenance of the *ancien regime* in the face of the threat of new political tendencies. On the other hand, the Vatican was torn between the universalistic aspirations of the Church and the temporal interests of the small State in which the Holy See was based. None of the States could follow a policy capable of interpreting the general interests of the Italian people and translating the revolutionary concept of national sovereignty in terms appropriate to the reality of the Italian case.

In the absence of a national foreign policy organised at State level, it was mainly the waves of Italian exiles abroad between 1821 and 1848 which kept the Italian question alive in public opinion and the European chancelleries. In those years, the Italian national movement was mainly driven by Mazzinian ideas, summarised in the formula Unity-Independence-Liberty, but was unable to escape from the spiral of insurrection-defeat. The passing of the years and the defeats suffered, along with the

changes in the European political scene, led many exiles to re-examine the coordinates within which they could follow their projects. The Spanish War of Independence fought between 1808 and 1814 had enthused the Italian romantics, and the 1812 Constitution of Cadiz had reflected the model preferred by Neapolitan and Piedmontese patriots in 1820-21, but the Spanish failure to help the Italians in 1823 and the return of Ferdinand VII to absolutism had inflicted a serious blow to the «Spanish myth» in Italy. During the first Carlist War, the two main elements of the Italian national movement - the liberals and the democrats - once again looked to Spain, as an example of liberty both at home (the battle against the absolutist princes) and abroad (the struggle against the autocratic powers supporting don Carlos), and some exiles went to fight on Iberian soil, as they had in 1821-23. The results of that conflict showed the impracticality of two hypotheses which had been nurtured by Italian democrats and liberals: the exporting of the national *doceañista* model to Italy; and the possibility of help from liberal Spain for Italian national aspirations. The moderate stabilisation of Narváez after 1843, the «doctrinaire» Constitution of 1845, the «Spanish marriages» of 1846, along with the Franco-Austrian rapprochement after 1840, removed any remaining doubts in that respect.

Spain had definitively buried the *ancien regime*, and was being politically organised along the lines of liberal nationalism, but this did not immediately or directly favour the Italian national movement. For those aspiring to national unity and the liberty of Italy, the most positive result of the changes to have taken place in the Iberian peninsula (including Portugal) was the weakening of the absolutist princes on the European political scene. However this was a situation which could only be exploited in the long term, with a strong and forward-looking policy which was slow to emerge, and which was only to mature with the upheavals of 1848-49 and the second European Restoration.

3. Spain and Italian foreign policy after 1848

This paper does not aim to trace the reasons for the passage from the revolutionary movement of 1848 to the subsequent «golden age» of national movements in Europe. Suffice to say that in Italy the Spanish national model, now identified with the Pretorian and centralising moderation of Narvaez and damaging internal conflicts, became less and less attractive.

The events of 1848-49 swept away many aspirations and illusions. The reason of state of the Italian dynasties, so dear to Solaro della Margarita (Piedmontese Foreign

Minister from 1835-47), which Charles Albert had attempted to modernise in the face of the approaching storm, was turned upside down. The «cult of the nation» (or nationalist myth), emerging in the neo-Guelph ideas of C.Balbo and V.Gioberti, which claimed European «primacy» for Catholic Italy, was broken in the clash between revolution and reaction. Whilst the «religion of liberty», which tended to set Italian questions in the context of a more general movement of European peoples, and which inspired both the unitarian G.Mazzini and the federalist C.Cattaneo, suffered the consequences of defeat. Italian problems had to be reconsidered under new light. It was clear that, on the contrary to what Charles Albert had rhetorically proclaimed in 1848, Italy could not «fare da sé». The Italian movement, with its characteristics of nationalism and political renovation, could only assert itself by taking account of international realities. After the experience of 1848-49, it was in fact even clearer that European history and political dynamics would condition the developments and orientation of Italian affairs.

Another intervention of foreign powers in Italian political affairs in 1849 had contributed significantly to this awareness. Here, for the first time, the three States which had contested the peninsula for centuries - Austria, France and Spain - acted in unison. This was a cause for reflection. First of all, the different domestic political arrangements, and the different attitudes towards national questions of the Habsburg monarchy, the Second French Republic and the Isabelline moderates, had not stood in the way of the convergence of interests between Vienna, Paris and Madrid over Italian problems. Societies organised politically in the form of States were an inescapable reality in Europe. This was also demonstrated by the case of Spain, transformed from an absolutist Empire into a liberal Nation-State, and its participation in the 1849 intervention in Italy. The motives of the Spanish Government were the result of the interaction between national politics and international context. These motives can be summarised as follows: interest in outdoing the Carlists in devotion to the Church (the period of the war of *els matiners*); the hope to include liberal Spain in the «European Concert» of the great powers (the new Isabelline regime was not recognised by the absolutist powers until 1848); interest in saving the alliance with France, which had been undermined by the proclamation of the Republic, but which was on the way to being reaffirmed with Louis Napoleon.

The Italian States had emerged from the events of 1848-49 profoundly shaken and now had to face up to the political phenomenon of the Italian national movement. Leaving aside Lombardy-Veneto where Austria was forced to strengthen military occupation, the Duchies were increasingly revealed to be fragile entities subject to the interests of Vienna. In the Grand Duchy of Tuscany the previous attempts at

reformism were compromised, whilst the Vatican State, by entrusting foreign powers with the restoration, destroyed the neo-Guelph dream, as well as the patriotic enthusiasms raised by Pius IX between 1846 and 1848. The King of the Two Sicilies, after sending his own troops to fight with the Austrians, French and Spanish, had discredited his own position towards the national question. Finally, the Kingdom of Sardinia had to recover from the consequences of the defeat at Novara and rethink the objectives of its foreign policy.

After 1849 Italy not only could not «fare da sé»; neither could it expect disinterested help from the liberal Nation-States in the rest of Europe. The new political aims of the men of the Risorgimento, and the reuniting of Italy with the advanced countries of Europe, required the formulation of a national policy which fitted into a broader horizon. Apart from the various attempts of other Italian politicians, historically this task was executed by men such as C.Cavour and E.Visconti Venosta on the level of political action, and by P.S.Mancini on the theoretical level.

C.Cavour brought together national policy and a European vision, together with a clearly liberal and pragmatic approach to the problems of the moment. He was the principal author of Piedmontese policy between 1849 and 1861, the man who transformed the small Savoy State into the motor of the process of national unity. This does not imply that Piedmont and Prussia had similar roles in the unity of, respectively, Italy and Germany, as some have asserted. This analogy seems plausible, but fails to take into account the following differences: Prussia was one of the great absolutist powers, and had signed the Treaties of 1815; the capitals of Piedmont (Turin) and Prussia (Berlin) had different roles in the political-administrative arrangements of the Italian Nation-State and the German Empire.

The liberal Cavour transformed the Italian national question into an instrument of the Piedmontese State's foreign policy, but this presupposed a change in the political life of that State, and even a different institutional dynamic between the monarchy and the *representative* Government emanating from parliamentary majorities. The «deal» between the historical Left and Right made this possible, a political operation which had been inconceivable, and which was subsequently opposed by Solaro della Margarita, the man who had been the head of Savoy diplomacy for 12 years until 1847. Educated in the tradition of Galeani Napione and de Maistre, Solaro did not rule out an active foreign policy for Piedmont, as long as it formed part of out-of-date political formulas in order to avoid embracing the revolutionary doctrine of national sovereignty. After having long opposed the transformation of absolutist Spain into a liberal State, first as ambassador to Madrid from 1824 to 1834 and later as Savoy's

Foreign Minister, Solaro then curiously interpreted the new Isabelline regime as an element of support for his position on the Italian problem. In reality, between 1848 and 1868 (with the exception of the liberal period of 1854-56) Isabelline Spain was almost always hostile to the Italian national movement in its various manifestations, questioning its domestic and international legitimacy. This coldness and hostility was skillfully opposed by Cavour in 1859-60, through the alliance with France agreed at Plombières, but reemerged in 1861 in the dispute over the «Neapolitan archives», which became the formal reason for the breaking of diplomatic relations between Turin and Madrid.

The breaking of relations after the proclamation of the new Italian Nation-State was followed by five years of tension in relations with Spain which, alongside Austria, became one of the strongest opponents amongst the European powers of the changes occurring in Italy. But the «Italian question» had been transformed into an international question which intensified domestic political debate in Spain. This debate became increasingly fierce and, as J.M.Jover Zamora has pointed out, contributed towards creating the conditions for the six years of democracy.

The late recognition of the Italian State by Spain in 1865, after the signing of the September convention between Italy and France and the transfer of the capital from Turin to Florence, seemed to point to the normalisation of relations, but also had the aim of bringing Spain out of its isolated pro-Austrian position, which was becoming dangerous in the approach of the Austro-Prussian War, which broke out in 1866. The concurrent radicalisation of the internal political conflict in Spain and the crisis of Italo-Spanish relations after Mentana in 1867, coinciding with the Italo-French crisis, brought a new state of tension between the two Governments. This tension only eased with the revolution of September 1868 which overthrew Isabella II and the Government of Madrid which, it was feared, was plotting alongside Napoleon III and the powerless Borbons to undermine Italian national unity, still in the phase of consolidation. For Spain this was the beginning of six years of democracy, for Italy the prelude to the events of 1870.

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The transformation of the Italian National consciousness during the 19th and 20th centuries.

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1. Italy belongs, in terms of the emergence of the nation states of Europe, to the the «later» nations, perhaps indeed - as if some kind of irreparable birth defect were connected to this postponement - to the «backward» nations. The origin of the nation states in Europe during the stormy middle part of the 19th century caused massive turmoil within the system of European states. In contrast to the newly founded German empire, which was able to tread consciously and politically in the steps of a great power - Prussia, the Italian nation state appeared after 1860 as the newcomer on the European stage. Italy, as described in a compelling image by G. Salvemini, appeared on the scene like the newly arrived 6th passenger, in a railway compartment full to the penultimate seat, who forced the existing passengers to squeeze together uncomfortably.

The emergence of this Nation State is one of the crucial events in European history and indeed in the morphology of national movements. It was - far more so than the contemporary events in Germany - an example for the many national movements in 19th century Europe, and its repercussions extend to third-world national liberation movements in the second half of the 20th century. In the works of G. Mazzini and G. Cattaneo, in the diplomatic and military actions of G. Garibaldi and C. Cavour, are to be found almost perfect, ideal model solutions for the new ordering of state and society.

It is not without grounds that research into nationalism sees a model in Italian events, as it was these which introduced the term «Risorgimento nationalism.» Here, as also with the terms «irredenta» and «sacro egoismo,» specific constellations or configurations are described which are particularly marked in the Italian case. Italy's Risorgimento in the 19th century is, thanks to its amazing rapidity and its success in

* Translated: Simon Macgennis.

the face of severe obstacles, frequently looked on as, and interpreted as the most successful example of the European national movements. Democratic, liberal and conservative-monarchist endeavours here, in a coincidentia *oppositorum*, achieved a result, which created in the constitutional monarchy a future heralding structure and a home for many different political endeavours. The monarch's double title «re d'Italia per volontà di Dio e del popolo italiano» expressed the dynastic and popular legitimization of his position. Garibaldi's Expedition of the Thousand to Sicily, the defeat of the Bourbon Kingdom and the annexation of the south also showed the outside world the great importance of popular initiative. Looking back Benedetto Croce called the Risorgimento «the masterpiece of 19th century national liberal movements.» «One saw to one's great amazement the interplay of the various elements, esteem for the old and a readiness for thorough renewal, the wise caution of statesmen and the onward surging of revolutionaries and volunteers, passion and moderation. In this sequence of events and its conclusion lay a logic and coherence that were very close to reality.

2. The Italians felt themselves to be a «nation of culture» (F. Meinecke) long before the desire for state-political unity took shape. The memory of the Roman past, often felt to be their direct inheritance; classic Latin text as their spiritual heritage; pride in the architectural testimony of the often still visible age of the the communes; Renaissance culture which the Italians as «Europe's first-born» (J. Burckhardt) saw as being in the prime position in Europe; all these memories acted as stimuli. Finally, the position of the global Catholic church, which was frequently regarded as the masterpiece of Italian genius, was not forgotten. The Italian people were conscious, from the 14th century at the latest, of their uniqueness and individuality. This consciousness was related in particular to language and literature. Dante, his person and his work, still today provides the foundation on which this common cultural consciousness is built. «The intellectual existence of Italy begins with Dante.» The Divine Comedy is an expression of that «deep-seated Italian-ness,» «which Dante, at all times quasi as the intellectual father of the nation, allowed to emerge.» «All the towns of Italy, its memories, traditions and hopes, its historical experience, its sufferings and weaknesses appear in the light of Dante's literature. These together form the picture of the «Bel paese» which will then speak to the hearts of all future generations» (G. Gentile). Dante is considered «the father of the Italian language» and «the symbol of everything great (in Italy) down through the centuries.» «The Italian nation lived ... through the centuries only as a literary nation, as the dream of poets and scholars.» The Italians had thus developed, in language and literature, a consciousness of their own specific individuality, long before a political dimension was added.

3. Carlo Cattaneo wanted, in the middle of the 19th century to see, in the existence of the «hundred cities,» in their self-confidence, in their pertinacity, and in their inner and outer wealth, the quintessence of Italian history. The common traits of these were: variety, scope, domestic competition, local patriotism, particularism. The Italian language had, for this phenomenon, the term «campanilismo.» The city, like the Greek Polis, had drawn to itself almost the total loyalty potential of its citizens and had left nothing for broader structures. According to many observers the Italians had a historic-organic incapacity to form a modern state. The Italians, one can read in Goethe's *Italienischer Reise* «are all fiends in the most wonderful of ways, they have a most peculiar provincial and civic zeal, they all abhor each other, the classes are eternally quarrelling, and that all forever with the most immediate lively passion.» In a Catholic journal a half a century later «the inhabitants of the peninsula in no way see themselves as one and the same people, the national antipathies are directed principally against their fellow Italian neighbours. ... A sense of nation means so much as extended family love.»

Due to this almost inbred «spirit of separation» of the Italians, many observers saw a durable unification of entities like Venice, Genoa, Florence, Rome, Naples, or Palermo with their rich historical traditions, culture, self-confidence and vitality, as being in the long run an impossibility. The regions incorporated by these cities, wrote Giuseppe Galasso, the publisher of a multi-volume history, which was organized by region, of pre-1860 Italy: «present historical individualities, which correspond to their own large cultural circles.” They have specific strongly marked character traits. «The unification of Italy ... could neither add to nor take away from their historic and cultural-society autonomy.» History is once again about to encounter the continuity of this polycentricity and localism after 1860 despite all the unification efforts on the part of central government.

4. The language is the foundation and the heart of the Italian awareness of identity. «When a people have lost their fatherland and their freedom and are scattered all over the world, then their language is the fatherland and surrogate for everything else. ... The language was a reminder for us of greatness, science and freedom.» Its study «was the first sign of national feeling».(L. Settembrini) Florence was, since the days of Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio, the linguistic and intellectual capital of Italy, the centre of the Nation of Culture, seat of the oldest language academy - the *Crusca* (since around 1590) and the capital in all matters concerning language, literature, and the republic of scholars. The choice of Florentine Tuscan as the national language came about completely freely since the 14th century, without any pressure from a central state authority or from a ruling economic centre. In the words of Vincenzo Monti:

«Long go the Venetian and Tuscan dialects struggled ... for supremacy. The the struggle did not last long and the Tuscans won. The Venetians may have had a leading position in trade and politics, but not with the poets. In language it is not the weapon which gives strength, but rather the texts. They are the shrines of human thought and of all expressions of reason, whose strength is above all in words.»

Outside of Tuscany, Italian remained, throughout the centuries of the modern period, the language of a very narrow cultural and intellectual elite. It is estimated that in 1860 scarcely more than 2% of Italians could speak Italian. The stark reality was one of dialects and varieties: Sardinian, Sicilian, Neapolitan, on up to Piedmontese and Venetian. Cavour spoke and wrote mainly French, even the King, Victor Emmanuel II preferred to speak Piedmontese. These dialects are so far apart that they are mutually unintelligible. Italian emigrants to the USA spoke to each other in their rudimentary English. Films where the dialogue is in dialect are shown with Italian subtitles in Italy. A text spoken in Sicilian would not be understood in other parts of the country. Italian is unique among the national languages of Europe as having existed for centuries as the language of scholars. The strongest rationale for its survival in the various parts of Italy was «the patriotic inclination of the scholars» towards their language.

Italian was, at the beginning of the 19th century, still one of the «dead languages,» cut off and almost petrified in its written form, its written canon, and used only as the the vehicle for a narrow culture of the elite. Tullio de Mauro speaks of the paradox of «a language (which was) celebrated but not used and which (was) so to speak a stranger in its own land.» In 1860, at the time of unification, only one quarter of the 28 million inhabitants were able to read and write. However, in many instances even those who had attended primary school could not read or write. Much of the teaching was through dialect. Even after four or six years of school, there was little on-going contact with Italian. Church sermons too were largely in dialect. Only those who continued on in school (less than 1% of the population in 1870) achieved a solid command of Italian.

Other researchers have argued against this rigid contrast between literates and illiterates, between dialect speakers and speakers of Italian. According to A. Castellani's research, one must start out from mixed forms, whereby in addition to dialect use, an understanding of, though not a continuous use of, Italian must be assumed. Depending on the parameters chosen, up to 10% of the population could be addressed in Italian in 1860. Be that as it may, one must accept that in the middle of the 19th century only a small minority would have been able to take part in a

national discourse. The rise of Italian was not a condition for, but rather a result of national unification. It set a «far reaching linguistic revolution» into motion.

5. Italy's marriage-rich history offered numerous opportunities to identify, to wax lyrical about, and to mythologize figures and institutions. This was true too of the blossoming of the northern communes, the deeds and the pertinaciousness of the maritime republics or the economic and cultural prime of the Renaissance and Humanism. The memory of Rome, however, still held the most allure. Through the centuries the myth of Rome proved to be the «benchmark of Italian national consciousness,» «as the ideal reference point, rallying call, lament for, and promise of historic greatness in periods of decline.» (F. Valsecchi) The winning of Rome was, for all the parties involved in the Risorgimento, the end-point and crowning glory of the process of unification. The close coupling of the question of a capital city with the Roman question led to totally different visions of the objective being linked to this desire. The democratic left, which already had, in the sparkling defence of the Roman Republic in 1848/49, a swiftly mythologized example for the «third Rome», which had yielded The People's Rome and which had in Mazzini «the greatest apostle of the Rome-idea and the Rome-mission,» saw the capital as the centre of a future Italian Republic. The liberal Catholics hoped for a reconciliation between State and Church, the liberals sought the final legitimization of the new order and a reconciliation with the South. The rivalry discussions between Turin, Milan, Florence, Naples and Palermo, which were characterized by regional pride and municipalism, yielded only one leadership claim acceptable to all, namely Rome's. To Rome as the «eternal city», as the «Urbs,» there was no alternative. Being a neutral city, it was at the same time the «inevitable capital city» (G. Galasso). The adherence of Rome in 1870 was an essential acquisition for Italy's claiming and securing of its «own national individuality» in the face of the nation states of Western Europe which had already been established for hundreds of years. Rome also brought the young nation state a weighty, and according to some foreign observers, a dangerous heritage. «Rome» in the words a Swiss writer in 1864, «is a lustrous name but (it is) also a heavy burden which (Italy) can not carry on its shoulders.» T. Mommsen was of the same opinion and warned his Italian friends that in Rome the absence of a universal mission was unimaginable. Such «mission» ideas did in fact circulate within the Italian leadership groups. They ranged from a second Reformation of the church to the establishment of a new capital of art and science. However, «Caesar's shadow» also appeared: Italy as a great power, the third Rome as herald of a new blossoming of all things Latin, a future «Mare Nostro» and colonial policy as an expression of an imperial destiny.

6. Massimo D'Azeglio's memoirs «I miei ricordi» appeared posthumously in 1860. In the introduction: «One planned to change Italy. But nobody realized, that if this task were to be successful one had first to change oneself.» To achieve this «that precious dowry, character to be precise» is required. «Italy has been created, the Italians unfortunately have not.» This passage is the basis for the oft quoted «L'Italia è fatta. Dobbiamo fare gli italiani.» All informed observers were well aware that the unification of Italy was a coup, which could prove to be the nation's senile folly, if it were not able to fill out the structure of the state with spirit and inner life and to integrate and homogenize the various traditions. A whole generation of intellectuals, poets, writers, historians, composers, «engineers of Italian-ness» (G. Bollati) were busy trying to «invent» and to retell the “becoming” and “being” of the nation in historical novels, drama, and operas. The «hundred books which created Italy» include *I promessi sposi* by Alessandro Manzoni and *Storia della letteratura italiana* by Gaetano De Sanctis. The «national mission» of the House of Savoy was interpreted in new legendary forms. Dynastic loyalty became one of the strong forces for integration in the new state.

Its narrative, visual and symbolic self-representation in text, pictures, inscriptions, statues, monuments, festivals and ceremonies has only in very recent times become the object of research. The great saga of national unification with its martyrs, its ominous defeats, its rulers, battlefields, ossuaries, and «historic» sites has step by step been made readable and visible to the eye. Urban geography in every Italian town has taken on the the saga of the Risorgimento with the naming of streets and squares. No village lacks lacks a Piazza Garibaldi, a Corso Vittorio Emanuele II or a Via Cavour. In a virtual orgy of monument building, Italy's parks and squares were filled, in the decades to 1914, with statues celebrating the major figures of national unification.

One instrument, and in the long run perhaps the most important, in the creation of the new Italian citizen was the school. It is commonly held that the introduction of compulsory school, the rapid increase in literacy, and the development of the education system in general including universities was the driving force behind the rise of Prussia in Central Europe. The Prussian school master was also victorious at Königgratz. Civic education, the creation of a broad consensus, the «nationalization of the masses,» all that appeared to be possible only through a rapid increase in the literacy level of the population. This «conquering of the alphabet» proved to be much more difficult and much more time consuming than even the pessimists had expected. The 1861 national census showed that three quarters of the Italian population could neither read nor write. A steep North South gradient was also revealed. The literacy rate in Northwest Italy was 48% while in the South it was 15%; forty years later in

1901 the figures were 79% and 29% respectively. This showed, moreover, that 5-6 years primary schooling was frequently too little to ensure a permanent knowledge of reading and writing. The literacy campaign reached well into the second half of the 20th century. Confident use of reading and writing as vehicles for communication was achieved only by those who went on to attend one of the «scuola media» schools. Here too the relevant regional statistics are also conclusive. In 1911 4% of the 11-18 year old cohort attended a «scuola media» (Latom: 7.4% Basilicata: 2.1%). In 1959 this had risen to 31% (Liguria 49.8%, Basilicata: 19.1%). The structural change in the public at large can also be seen in the development of the Italian press. In 1880 the circulation of the leading daily newspapers was under 20,000. Two decades later the new bourgeois dailies such as «Il Secolo» or «Il Corriere della Sera» sold hundreds of thousands of copies.

In addition to school there was a second powerful instrument in the creation of the nation: conscription. The Italian army had, after 1861, rejected the territorial recruitment principle used successfully in Prussia for fear of the development of local and regional opposition. All the disadvantages (higher costs, delayed wartime mobilization, breaking of family and neighbourly ties) associated with a nationwide recruitment programme were outweighed by fear of the emergence of an organized regional opposition. The nationwide recruitment system also had the inestimable advantage of making young Italians, of an impressionable age, familiar with the wide variety of landscapes and towns in their fatherland. The theoretically universal compulsory military service proved to have numerous loopholes. A considerable number of bourgeois conscripts avoided service by buying themselves out or by paying stand-ins.

7. Diplomat and historian Sergio Romano wrote that 1945 marked «the end of a great political project.» It meant «a break in the continuity of the history of the nation.» With the passage of time the consistent features of this history are brought ever more strongly to the fore. The leading elite of the Risorgimento 's «historic right, «centred around Cavour, Ricasoli and D'Azeglio, came on the scene with their eyes towards France and England, desiring to catch up with Western Europe in economic, social and political-institutional terms, and to put the country on an equal footing in the circle of major powers. This, with different emphasis and methods, was also the ambitious target of the revolutionary left of the action party. Before and after 1860/61 Europe was the benchmark. From 1870 Germany joined England and France, and on the other side of the Atlantic the USA. This looking outward was concerned with the long endangered and precarious international position of the young Nation State. The Roman question remained the Achilles heel of Italian politics for decades. It once

again threatened to become acute in the first world war, and was finally resolved in the Latern Treaty of 1929.

Sergio Romano in a recent essay reflected on the «unspoken assumptions» which, within Italy's leadership class after 1860, represented the basic convictions behind foreign policy, convictions which are scarcely ever expressed but nevertheless are a central element in national self-understanding. This «foreign policy culture» is made up of an ensemble of dogmas, purviews, myths, fears and unmentionables. This includes the fear of an invasion from abroad, the idea of Italy's historically based cultural-religious superiority, its missionary role in the world and its claim to be the legitimate heir to the glorious Roman past. To this must be added the hope that Italy would «grow» in every respect and be called to a new and greater future. The «stellone», the benevolent star of destiny, seemed to be leading the country in this direction. Both the liberal, post first-world war Italy, and Fascist Italy belonged to this intellectual tradition. That also explains why the transition, after 1900, from the national and irredentist setting of goals to imperial ambitions went so smoothly. The alliance between the liberal-conservative and nationalist elites and fascism, which promised the nation's great imperial future, was completed as a symbol of this foreign policy and power politics programme.

On the «Vittoriano», the «alter of the fatherland» in Rome, which was the largest most expensive national monument in Europe in the 19th century, stand the two inscriptions «Patriae unitate» and «Civum liberati.» National unity and internal freedom were the two guiding ideas of the national rebirth. However, this programme reached only a small qualified minority. The task of unification was borne only by a narrow consensus. In 1861 the total number of enfranchised voters was scarcely more than 2%. Giolitti's 1912 voting reform increased the number of voters to over 20%.

It was however, the first world war and its political and socio-psychological consequences which first brought the masses onto the Italian political stage. Fascism through its mass organization of party, militia, unions, leisure, sport and youth, aimed to «nationalize the masses» and to strengthen the myths of State, Nation and the «new Italians.» Fascism was a political religion. Its rites, symbols, ceremonies, liturgies, feasts and myths have only recently become objects of study in their own right. This «political religion» includes the death cult and «martyrs», the glorification of violence in militarist peer groups (squadrisimo), the flag and insignia cult, the monopolization of all traditional kinds of patriotism, and the legends of foundation, rescue and new beginning. Monarchical, national, and specifically fascist symbols and myths joined

in an ever closer symbiosis. At the centre of this world of myth lay the cults of «romantà» and of the Duce. The Mussolini myth was the actual cement which held this symbol world together. Mussolini had explained as early as 1920 that fascism intended to give back the «religious concept of Nation» to the Italians. After defeating the «reds» fascism was able to go about persuading the new Italians to «believe, obey, fight.» This intervention was intentionally «totalitarian.» Fascism wanted, via this political religion, to alter the character of the Italians and thereby lay the foundations for its continued rule. This interpretation sees fascism as a mentality, as a «lifestyle» and as a huge laboratory for upbringing. «Fascism» ... can be interpreted « as an experiment to convert the Italians, with force if necessary, ... into a nation and a people.» In order to achieve greatness for the nation, it sacrificed freedom and thereby separated the two fundamental values on which the Risorgimento had been based.

Mussolini, as «homo italicus» and as «Genius of the Nation,» saw himself as responsible for executing this task when he introduced a new calendar in 1922 and promised to bring forth the «century of fascism,» seeing Italy in the year 2000 as one of the four leading imperial world powers. In hindsight the hypertrophy of nation sentiment is perhaps the most important characteristic of the fascist period. Both from the point of view of domestic and foreign policy the appeal to the real or to the supposed national interests functioned as a very effective instrument for the achievement of consensus and political integration. Even the progressive traditions of the Risorgimento could, via the primacy of things national, be pressed into to service of the myth of the «new» Italy, with Mazzini and Garibaldi appearing as Mussolini's «forerunners.» As the history of clerical fascism shows this nationalist appeal worked its way deep into the genuine Catholic section of Italian society. Fascism, with its tremendous organizational work, also had mobilizing and integrating effects on emigration. The vast majority of Italians abroad were, until 1939/40, pro-fascist.

9. The self-interpretation of the nation, the central declaration of which was always the same and always optimistic though its contours were uncertain - wavering between fear and hope, broke down step by step after the military defeat of the winter of 1940-41. The mud fields of Albania and Northern Greece and the desert roads of Libya revealed the fascist Italy's military weakness and the unbridgeable gap between propaganda's images and harsh reality. Mussolini's fall on the 27-07-1943 and military surrender on the 8-9-1943 ended in total military and moral catastrophe. For Italy, the 8th of September meant the disappearance of 1.7 million strong army, the handing over of the fleet, the loss of the capital city, and the shameful flight of the King, the government and the top military commanders to the unoccupied furthest South of the country. Even today, the 8th of September is, far more than at the time, the symbol

in the collective consciousness for defeat and collapse, which is written into everyone's biography. War and civil-war seemed to have extinguished the country's future.

The importance of 1943 for the self-understanding of present-day Italy can scarcely be overestimated. The historian, Ernesto Galli della Loggia, spoke of «a kind of silent pact,» which the vast majority of the Italian people «during the fascist wars and later in the war of liberation» made with themselves: «A silent, but nonetheless lasting pact, built on a collective experience of privation and suffering like none which the country had ever suffered before. In essence this pact said that one would never again succumb to the temptations of war, and that the accounts with fascism, with its ideals and methods were closed for ever.» The interpretation of the great liberal historian Rosario Romeo is that, at that time, «the picture, that Italy had of itself ..., as a people who had won their unity in order to play a great role in world history, this picture was destroyed for once and for all, and with it the idea of the nation.»

The catastrophic situation cast a deep shadow over the whole history of the unified state and on the means of the unifying processes themselves. Criticism of illusory hopes and endeavours could, like the increased realism with regard to national history, be regarded as a sign of maturity and of «undeniable political and civic development». This self-exploration was at the same time accompanied by serious doubts, as to whether Italy would ever be in a position to join the great states of the western world.

Even the «resistenza», the Italian resistance movement against German occupation and internal fascist enemy, could not escape these the deep inner doubts. The *resistenza* proved to be an important military factor in the liberation of the national territory. However, its moral and political importance was far greater. Out of illegality and resistance the new party system was born, a new political elite emerged and the nation found a new moral-political confidence. The anniversary of the liberation of Northern Italy is still today a national public holiday, as a symbol that national rebirth was not a present from the allies but rather an act of self determination and self-discovery. The resistance, after 1945, thus became the founding myth of the new state and part of Italy's political culture. This myth was institutionalized with hundreds of monuments, thousands of memorial plaques, tens of thousands of street names, school and institutional dedications, and thus became a new civil religion.

10. «Wherein lies the character of a people» asks B. Croce. His answer runs:» in its history, its whole history and nothing but its history.» Where, however, does this history begin? This question has been answered in the most varied of manners.

The «Storia d'Italia» begins with the establishment of the northern Italian communes, with the end of period of the migration of peoples, with the end of the Western Roman empire, with the establishment of the Bishop of Rome as the the Pope, with the Social War in the first century BC, or with the founding of Rome. Whatever way this history of Italy is divided into periods and however long it may be, it has glorious periods, deep splits, declines and renaissances. Political unity came late and remained in danger. This history, full of change, is reflected in the Italian conscious. «The simultaneity of decadence and ideas of supremacy, of objective inferiority and as overcompensation, an undying feeling of superiority, is one of the most durable patterns of Italian history as a whole.» It is, according the writer Giorgio Bocca, disastrous to be an Italian. However, it would be even more disastrous not to be an Italian. The awareness, of standing on and living in three thousand years of history, almost anywhere in Italy, bestows a peculiar feeling of permanence and superiority. The relationship of Italian intellectuals to themselves, to their nation and to the Italy of today and of the past, is characterized by this love-hate ambivalence, by emphatic consent and overly severe criticism. Coming to an understanding - opportunism ennobled through high intelligence - with the political powers that be, is a tradition that dates back to Machiavelli and Guicciardini. The «courage and cowardice» of the intellectuals is an ever recurring theme of politico-cultural dialogue in Italy. Political rifts, emigration, and system changes have created the practical and psychological prerequisites for such an «Italian agony.»

Anyone who seeks a sketch of Italian national identity is on difficult terrain. There are scarcely any backed up by scholarly research. Demographic surveys rarely go beyond the banal or the obvious. The brilliant essays which are to be found in this field, for example by L. Barzini, G. Prezolini, C. Malaparte or I. Montanelli, usually stick to a sparkling and only at first sight, fascinating subjectivity. Cultural-anthropological, socio-psychological or political science studies, which attempt to uncover cultural constants, mental structures and collective behaviour patterns below the plane of political events, go much deeper. Here one should mention for example the work of the Americans E. Banfield and Robert Putnam, which uses «amoral familism» as a model for explaining southern Italian society. Studies by C. Tullio Altan's, which consider a private-individualist interpretation of social relationships, characterized by «clientelism» and «familism,» as distinctive of Italy, should also be included. The experience of hundreds of years of foreign domination, repression and foreign rule, has by degrees been fixed into mental structures and traditions.

Anyone seeking the self-definition of the cultural and political ruling elites in Italy after 1860 could effortlessly compile a florilegium of quotations reaching from

Cavour to Crispi and Mussolini. The emerging mission and supremacy concepts naturally are mostly strongly expressed in fascist times. The east facade of the most imposing building for the planned 1942 World Fair bears the inscription: (the Italians) «A people of heroes, poets, artists, saints, discoverers, inventors, seafarers, emigrants.» This Mussolini text expresses mostly explicitly the claim for historical, cultural and moral supremacy which emerged in Vincenzo Gioberti's work at the beginning of the Risorgimento. This whole World Fair project is more appropriate than almost anything else to illustrate the integral nationalism which then permeated broad sweeps of Italian society. EUR 42 was certainly the most expensive and most ambitious exhibition of its kind in the 20th century. Italy wanted to show the world its future as a imperial world power. Almost everything, which had a reputation, and ranked in Italian culture at that time, took an «active» and «enthusiastic» role in this project with contributions which were sometimes of high quality, but which were nevertheless «characterized by a strong and sometimes insufferable superiority complex.» (E. Garin)

A further example from many: Giovanni Papini, the Tuscan Catholic poet, published a eulogy, «Italia mia,» in 1939, which by 1942 had reached its fourth edition, and which was one single hymn glorifying the industry of the Italians, their spirit, their heroism, their talent for invention, and their sense of beauty. Italy, distinguished by unique natural beauty, represents a «faireytale micro-cosmos» of all the possibilities and achievements on this earth. The Italians are the first-born race «without which Europe would not be Europe.» They are the born master race. «For two thousand years bold Italians have demonstrated superiority and ruled ... with the eagle or the cross, with gold or the pen, with the power of faith and the brilliance of genius, but always as master.» This testimony is interesting because it comes not from the hand of an extreme nationalist but from a moderate Catholic writer.

All these exalted self-evaluations have through the experience of the second world war been toned down, indeed some have been completely reversed. The memory of war, defeat and catastrophe still today determine the view of the past. A distancing from, and lack of identification with it still rule today. In the words of former *Le Monde* correspondent Jacques Nobécourt: «Everyone I spoke with (in Italy) reacted in the same way when the conversation turned to the (recent) past of the nation: cold-bloodedly almost to the point of indifference.»

11. The question of the substance and transformation of the national consciousness is today of burning relevance. The constitutional and social crisis in Italy has led to a thorough discrediting of the parties. The *resistenza* myth has paled and no longer holds any mobilizing effect. The *resistenza*, as a civil religion tied to

a State liturgy, seems to have exhausted itself. For the first time this century national unity as such is at risk. According to opinion poles a quarter of all northern Italians are in favour of having their own state. Almost half of the northern Italians are in favour of a federal reorganization of Italy, which could be the first step towards secession. The economic crisis, falling real income, sharpened battles for its distribution and the pressure for a radical reorganization of the deeply indebted state budget threaten to split the social consensus between North and South. The Lega movement won many north Italian city councils in the last local elections and would become by far the largest party in the North in new parliamentary elections. In the words of Senate president G. Spadolini in July 1993: « National unity ... and the moral and civic unity of Italians is in danger. ... Linked to the tragic confrontation between North and South one can see signs of secessionism in various parts of the country. ... We reaffirm the value of Italy as an ideal ... and look to the Europe of tomorrow as our forefathers looked towards the Italy of the Risorgimento .»

Francesco Cossiga, the president of Italy, made a similar appeal in his farewell speech on the 25.04.1992 where he called on the youth « to love the fatherland, to honour the nation, to believe in freedom and in our country. ... This land may not be a major political power, it may not be a major military power. ... But it is a land with a great culture, with a great history, a land with immense moral, civic, religious and material energy. ... What must be done is to found institutions which allow the efforts of the individual to work to the benefit of all.» With this appeal, he resigned.

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THE NATION IN THE REGION. NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN GERMANY AND FRANCE IN THE 19TH CENTURY*

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There is almost unanimous agreement in research into nationalism that the establishment of the European nation states in the “nationalization of the masses,” in the process of which the individual was increasingly separated from restricted, traditional dependencies and solidarities and directly tied to national society and to the national state. In this interpretation, influenced by the premises of modernization theory, region and nation are antagonistic and mutually exclusive. Only when the process of nationalization has been weakened, so the argument frequently goes, can regional or local solidarities be “renewed.”

If, as for example Rainer Lepsius argues, “the nation’s ideas about organization” thereby “have a greater claim to a higher order and more general meaning, than those of other solidarity associations, for example classes, confessions, ethnic or socio-cultural groups, familial and kinship groupings”, that does not necessarily mean, -as should become clear below-, that these relations and solidarities have no influence on national organization or that the members of national movements are not without other allegiances, be they local, regional or familial. The image of the nation as an abstract community of individuals, united only by solidarity, and which is otherwise underlain either by no other bonds or by those over which the nation has priority, is, in my opinion, misleading. Conflict between the various levels of loyalties and solidarities is not by any means necessarily automatic. Rather, the individual’s identification with the nation rests, evidently, on a large variety of social ties, which simultaneously forge the links between the individual and the nation.

This phenomenon of the negotiation of regional and national identity will be investigated more closely by looking at the example of the monument movements,

* Translated: Simon Macgennis.

which emerged in Germany and France in the 19th century around the construction of national monuments. To this end, the movement for the Hermann's monument in Detmold (The Principality of Lippe) will be compared with those for two Vercingetorix monuments in Clermont-Ferrand (Auvergne). Subsequently an attempt will be made to show how strongly regional solidarities developed in these movements without national solidarity being rejected or put into question, and in a second part an interpretative model will be put forward which sees national symbols and rituals as the starting point for social representation at a local and a regional level.

I

In the Auvergne the phenomenon of the negotiation of regional and national identity was particularly marked. Here, Vercingetorix was defined with reference to the region and by monument movements which were confined to the region, and in which the Notables played a fundamental role. In the 19th century Vercingetorix had a twofold role: as a national hero he symbolized the politically constituted nation, unyoked from Germany. As "héros auvergnat" he represented, even before his discovery as a national hero, a symbol for the ethnically constituted unity of the Auvergne. A view of the region eliminates the political character of the national symbol and thereby one of the major differences between Germany and France. Vercingetorix should thus not be interpreted merely as a republican national hero, but rather allows the national symbolism to be seen as the expression of a regional elite culture.

In Clermont-Ferrand, the capital of the Auvergne, the erection of a national monument was not the focus of interest. Certainly, Vercingetorix was identified here as a "héros national," and the founders of the monument movement certainly claimed that they wanted to finance both the monuments, which were to be built here in his honour, through nationwide subscriptions and thus make them the property of the whole of the French nation. However, regional loyalty always came before national, "cet amour de la petite patrie qui alimente celui de la grande patrie". Vercingetorix, who was born in the Auvergne and was thus an "enfant du pays," was chosen as the "chef avergne" by the Arvernian tribe in Gergovia and leading Arvernian warriors had won a decisive victory over Caesar on Arvernian soil. Thus he was the direct ancestor of every Auvergnais who in turn could consider themselves to be the descendants of the Arverni. "En un mot, l'Auvergne est bien le représentant de la vieille race de Gergovie, de la race celtique". Thanks to the "national" Vercingetorix mythus, a direct line was drawn between the Gaulish Arverni tribe and the inhabitants of the historic province of Auvergne, although the latter possessed no administrative or political meaning after the French revolution and the division of France into Departments.

In this (re-)invented tradition of the historic region, one should observe the widespread paying of homage to "men of substance" in France in the 19th century. Vercingetorix was only one of the numerous "men of substance" which the Auvergne produced, and whose memory was, in the 19th century, systematically kept alive and cultivated by the *Sociétés savantes* and by local politicians. The collective identity represented through these regional heroes was thus based far less on an acceptance of some voluntary adherence of a group of people to some abstract idea, as the classic distinction between the French Nation of State and the German Nation of Culture would have us believe, but rather it was much closer to the German cultural concept expressed in the phrase "uniqueness of peoples". The Auvergnois people, constructed in terms of the "men of substance" was fully understood to be part of the French Nation. The version of national unity advocated here differs from the idea of a voluntarily constituted French "people" in that the individuals are bound to the nation primarily by the ethnically defined unity of the region. The French people present themselves here as an "objective" unit, which is held together by origin, culture and history.

The finding that the Vercingetorix myth in France apparently bound national and regional loyalties together and mediated between them seamlessly, was the stimulus to take a closer look at the Hermann myth. Hermann was, in fact, on one hand a symbol of the culturally and ethnically defined anti-France nation; on the other hand however he founded the nation through the mediation of regional social relationships and loyalties. The equation, ever-present in research, of national claims (*Vormärz*) with anti-particularist and even anti-monarchical objectives must be questioned. Certainly, Hermann, through the repulse of the Roman invaders, symbolized the common roots of the German people as well as the timeless continuity of German culture, language and history through the centuries. The political structure of the nation and its particularist configuration were by no means put into question by the Hermann's monument movement. Hermann did not represent a concrete political and state unity of Germany, but rather a historical and organic unity of the German people which was outside of the then current political demands. The movement for the Hermann's monument made no political demands for concrete changes to the particularist structure of the nation, but rather celebrated the German people as a harmonious union of princes and people.

Accordingly, the national movement in Germany, which during the 40's and the 60's consisted of about 30 branch associations for the Hermann's monument, disintegrated into numerous regional movements defined in terms of the small states and which, in their national declarations and their communications structures, emphasised a federal structure for the nation, which did not question the particularist structure of the state.

The whole Hermann's monument association movement was founded in Detmold and coordinated from there. It took shape as a communications network in which the paths of communication reflected the particularist structure of the nation. Thus the central association in Detmold endeavoured to win over influential personalities, in the capital city of every German state, who would found a Hermann's monument association in their region and undertake the collection of subscriptions for the monument within their regions. Collections, in which the individual collectors and donors crossed small-state borders, were not only extremely rare, but were rejected by the members of the individual associations as trespasses against their territorial sovereignty. Bourgeois communication paths functioned almost exclusively on a regional and local level. The arguments, which were frequently heard in calls for donations in small states, that the individual state should not fall behind national averages, or that the Hermann's monument had some particular significance for that state, add plausibility to the assumption that it was by no means national but rather local, regional and "small state" motives, commitments and relationships which led individuals to contribute to the national monument. The call for donations in Altenburg in 1842 is an excellent illustration of the importance of regional and local loyalties: "Contributions for this purposed have been received from all sides, bigger and smaller towns, indeed whole countrysides are competing with each other". Furthermore, when the central association for the Hermann monument in Detmold arranged its printed financial reports, about subscriptions received, on the basis of regional criteria and listed the subscription amounts in terms of the individual small states -and this seems to be typical of all 19th century subscription campaigns- it did so in all probability in order to document its national success in regional terms. Simultaneously, however, this regional order made it clear that national unity in no way replaced or displaced regional loyalties and relationships. Regional boundaries in Germany were apparently more than merely an expression of small scale regal rule, rather they reflected the social realities of civic communication.

In the monument and the monument movement the relationship between nation and region initially developed in completely opposite ways in Germany and France. Whereas Vercingetorix represented, above all a symbol of regional collective memory, Hermann primarily symbolized national meanings. Furthermore, state and cultural identities were connected in contrary manners with national and regional concerns. The fact that the Auvergne was first "invented" as cultural and social space of the Notables at the time of the French revolution, at a time in other words when the provinces ceased to exist as political units due to the creation of "departments", indicates that would be unwise to interpret regional concerns as merely conservative, traditional leftovers. The inclusion of local and regional areas, as well as their social, cultural and political reality, in national history thus seems compelling.

II

In that the nation will be investigated below via, and in terms of, the region, the thesis will be advocated that the symbolic revaluation of the region in bourgeois national monument movements simultaneously served the symbolic revaluation of the local bourgeoisie which in turn, by example, represented and consolidated its social position in the local society. Thus it is not national symbolism and its abstract national meanings and ideas which will be emphasised here, but rather we will be concerned with the forms of societal representation which were focused on the two symbols, Hermann and Vercingetorix. In this model nation is interpreted as the historically malleable product of collective interaction and perceptions. It is understood as the result of collective and symbolic construction, as a multiple, multi-form, and continuous process of social dynamics, in which individuals and social groups move, coexist and come into conflict. The nation thus provides the symbolic framework for social interactions, in which cognitive and normative elements mix. Individuals through their social mediations constantly recreate the social sense of the nation. At the same time however, they perceive the nation as a stable, objective and legitimate authority. Thus, the nation appears, not least, as a generally valid, accepted and at the same time natural social reality, the historicity of which is never questioned by the participants.

In this process of institutionalization myths, symbols and collective rituals play a central role. They not only provide the affective connection between the individual and an "imaginary community" but also represent this community, its social relationships and conflicts as well as the position of the individual within it. It is only through symbols, myths and rituals that the nation can be perceived by the participants themselves and be understood as a lasting phenomenon above and beyond the level of their individual actions. From this theoretical perspective the nation is not perceived as a stable, closed and unitary system, which could be defined clearly, and held together, through a rigid system of formal rules. Rather the nation exists only through the collective and implicit knowledge of its members and can only be represented and understood through exemplars - symbols and symbolic actions. Consequently, myths, symbols and rituals guarantee active and continuous reproduction and thus supply the necessary conditions for the existence of, and transformation of this "imaginary society."

Thus arises the problem of how far, and to what extent, alternative and complementary forms of social and spatial identities have a place in the definition of the nation. In that the nation is not defined as a unitary and closed system of

convictions, but rather as a multi-form, flexible and polyvalent system of various elements, it is assumed that various social and areal identities come through and permeate the nation during its construction. The region may thus be understood as a space in which the social concepts of the national, bourgeois society come through and are expressed in a concrete social representation, which binds the individual, not only in the abstract, but rather via symbolic negotiation in a specific local society, to an imaginary community.

Thus it is not the forms and symbols of monuments which should be looked at. Rather one should look at that which gives life to the symbols, i.e. their societal application. It is only through the symbolic practice associated with a monument, i.e. through a contextual interpretation, that the societal function of national symbols can be decoded.

If one investigates national symbols in terms of their associated forms of representation -in bourgeois monument movements, in associations, subscription campaigns and festivals-, one can compare the social and cultural socialization of the bourgeoisie in Germany and France, and thereby understand the nation within the self-portrayal of the local bourgeoisie. It is assumed, that in the process of the erection of the monuments, in the individual's dealings and social behaviour within the association and at festivals, the cultural practice of the German and French bourgeoisie was actively shaped, unified and symbolically represented. Thus, a monument movement should not be investigated primarily in terms of its political aims and successes, but rather as a means which propelled the development of a class in the sense of common communication and culture of its adherents and at the same time represented this development. Internally, it contributed to the homogenization of the bourgeoisie, clearly delineated the bottom limit of that class and presented the social differentiation of society as a binding model of bourgeois society for all its members. A national symbol represented the nation, through the symbolic practice focussed on it, not just as an "imaginary community" but above all as a socially differentiated society - as a bourgeois society.

The comparison put forward here -an analytical socio-historical questioning with a hermeneutic cultural historic element- sees the bourgeoisie in both countries as differently composed economic and social groups. However, it appears as a class socialized via a specific bourgeois mechanism of cultural integration and differentiation.

The year 1871 plays a special role in the social history of Germany and France. Not only was it a key date in the development of political and governmental conditions

in both countries. For the Germany bourgeoisie and the French Notables marks a clear crack in their social position in society. The slogan "the end of the Notables" in France and the "Vassal society" in Germany summarizes these interpretation.

The end of the Notables denoted a comprehensive process of democratization of French society, which, with the emergence of what Gambetta proclaimed as new classes, ended the class privileges of the Notables and brought broader social classes into the process for creating society. In the German context the frequently cited idea of a Vassal society suggested, to the society of the imperial Reich, bourgeois classes dominated by a monarchic state, a pushing back of bourgeois values and a strong emphasis on the traditional aristocracy of German society.

If one compares the Vercingetorix monument movement in France with the Hermann's monument movement in Germany at a local and regional level, then one meets not only a similar cultural distinction of Bourgeoisie and Notables in the 19th century, but also a clear continuity of this mechanism past the threshold of 1871 is also seen. The Notables, though they lost ground politically, held onto their influence for a long time, above all in cultural matters. Furthermore, a clear continuity from the Notables to the Elites of the Third Republic can also be seen. While the Republican Elites were more downwardly open, they were, nevertheless, as a culturally and socially distinct class, very near to the traditional Notables. In Germany a similar continuity can also be seen. Up until the first world war the well-to-do middle classes succeeded in dominating regional cultural and social life and in presenting themselves as a clearly superior social class. Simultaneously, like in France though with a totally different content, a model of social harmony was propagated which guaranteed the permanency of society via the national community.

The two Vercingetorix monuments which were erected at the beginning of the 20th century, reflected both in their outward appearance and their position in the social life of the town and region two different 19th century regional cultures. The monument in Gergovie, with its abstract form, its Latin inscription and its location outside of the town, was a typical monument of French Notable society. It was the expression of a regionally orientated elite culture which was centred on the historical investigation of, and the revaluation of, the region, as well as on the "men of substance" cult in the Auvergne. In contrast to this was the Vercingetorix monument in Clermont-Ferrand which was erected in the central Place de Jaude in order to compete with the traditional Notable society. The figurative form of the monument, its French inscription understandable by all, and its physical proximity to the city masses positioned it much more clearly in the context of a republican cultural practice, that of the republican

elite - the "new" Notables - who were nevertheless still cut off socially and culturally from below. They did however at the same time attempt to influence the masses by education and to integrate them into the bourgeois society.

The contrasting programme of the monuments corresponded not only to the opposite concepts of societal organization on the part of the old and "new" Notables. The socialization of these two groups and their relationship to each other and to society as a whole was reflected in the process of erecting the monuments themselves, in the associations in which the monument initiative was manifested, in their contents, form of organization and in their methods of action as well as in their relationship with local society as a whole.

Throughout the 19th century the Vercingetorix monument in Gergovie was the project of the *Académie* in Clermont-Ferrand. With its political and social closeness to the Ancien Régime this Société savant served the local Notables not only as an exclusive place to socialize, but they also cultivated the social values of Notables' society there by the invention and historic revaluation of the region, by genealogical studies on their forefathers and by keeping academy seats within the Notable families of the region by means of inheritance. The Académie thus created not only a space in which the cultural unity of the local elite could be expressed but also legitimated and cemented the position of its members in regional society. It linked socially and culturally with many of the (invented) traditions of the Ancien Régime. The objective of the Notables' culture was not - unlike in Germany in the first half of the 19th century - to transform society step by step into a bourgeois society which would integrate further social classes, rather it sought to consolidate the exclusive position of the Notables in all areas of society and to secure their position in local society, a position which had been put into question by the French revolution. The Vercingetorix monument and numerous similar projects to the honour of men of substance in Auvergne in the 19th century did not symbolize a politically constituted nation, but rather were the location for the caste representation of the regional Notable society.

The second initiative for a Vercingetorix monument in Clermont-Ferrand in the 1880's signalled, in the long term, the "end of the Notables". Firstly, it was produced by a new social elite which was more strongly based along class lines, and secondly it aimed to bind non-bourgeois classes into society. At the same time, this new bourgeois class leaned in large measure towards the Notable culture in order to to differentiate itself from the lower orders in cultural and social terms and thus prolonged the demise of the Notables. The *Société d'Émulation*, which was responsible for the Vercingetorix monument in the Place de Jaude, was founded in 1884 expressly in

opposition to the socially exclusive structure of the Academie and adhered to the *a priori* openness of the *Sociétés savantes*. There was however no difference between it and the academy in terms of objectives, above all the scientific and historical reevaluation of the region. The different social structure of the *Société d'Émulation* membership did not reflect a fundamental downward social opening. Rather the academy's exclusivism in using birth and property holdings as criteria for membership was replaced by the criterion of education. Thus new social classes were able to take part in the regional culture albeit to a limited extent, though as before a sharp lower boundary was drawn. The aristocratic differentiation of the Notables' society was replaced by a class differentiation. The cultural content of the distinction was nevertheless retained; thus one can speak of an integration of the "new Notables" in the traditional Notable society rather than of an abrupt end to the latter.

While on one hand the new social classes sought a connection with Notable society, they formed a front against the privileges of the Ancien Régime and were aligned with the republic and thus with the masses. Thus culturally they were upwardly orientated and took on the traditional differentiation mechanism of Notable society. On the other hand they attempted to integrate the masses into bourgeois society by founding the monument movement and through paternalistic leadership of local associations. They sought to bring about the end to Notable society not merely by means of an internal transformation of the local elite, but rather through a transformation of society as a whole. Through this tie between the Republic and Notable society, through national political contents, the "new Notables" succeeded, at the beginning of the 20th century, in expelling the traditional elites from their position and in bringing about the end of the Notables. On the other hand they understood how to maintain their own social position as the local elite and to conserve the unity of society which was thereby doubly, nationally and regionally, safeguarded and legitimized.

Throughout the 19th century, the festivals in honour of the men of substance in Clermont-Ferrand, which came under the influence of the Academie and later of the *Société d'Émulation*, were, in the main, non-political. What they celebrated was rather a local social unity, which was exaggerated in the regional cult founded by the *Sociétés Savantes*. Simultaneously they represented through their hierarchical structure, the social position of the old and new Notables both of whom took part. The Notables always took a preeminent position in the hierarchically organised space and avoided any contact with the masses. They decided the festival programme and the social order in the festival's street parade which bound the celebrating crowds into the rigid hierarchy of society. With military and guild type discipline, which was

supplemented rather than weakened in the Third Republic by the advent of associations, the people were fitted into a symbolic order controlled by the Notables.

It was only at the beginning of the 20th century that this imaginary regional unity was ruptured by political and social conflict at a festival. As a result of widespread republican polemic, imported in part from Paris, the traditional Notables were excluded from the 1903 Vercingetorix festival. Their place was now taken by the new republican elite. The end of Notable society was also to be seen on the street. For the first time social interest groups such as unions and political parties took part in the festive activities and undermined the regional social unity of Notable society through recourse to national class-based society. Similarly, they symbolized their position in local society with (invented) corporationist and regional relationships and loyalties, which they built into the hierarchy of the festival. The position of the new Notables in the class society was in no danger despite occasional voicings of the The International. On the contrary the position of the the new regional elite was finally secured as a social class distinguishable from below *and* from above.

At a region level the Hermann's monument fulfilled a similar role in Germany to the one played by the Vercingetorix monuments in France. The Hermann's monument movement reflected on a local and regional level, in Detmold and in Lippe, the social and cultural socialization of the Bourgeoisie and its relationship to civic society as a whole. The Hermann's monument association, which was founded in 1838 in order to organize a national subscription campaign to finance the monument, was initially limited to five officers from Lippe's higher civil service. It was, however, connected on a personnel basis with all the social associations of the city and the state of Lippe. While in the first half of the 19th century, the Academie in France, as a multi-functional and exclusive association, possessed a monopoly in local society, in Germany at the same time "association" meant a large number of functionally differentiated entities. It was, however, held together on a personnel or membership basis by a numerically limited, if large group of bourgeois members. This difference is above all related to the position the two social groups, the Notables and the Bourgeoisie, held with respect to the society around them. The Academie, with its backward looking cultural practice sought to recover its exclusive social and cultural position in regional society. The Detmold bourgeoisie, in the first half of the 19th century, pursued with the Hermann's monument and association a twofold objective, pointed towards a future civic society which was still to be realized. As citizens in the various social and scientific associations, they created their own bourgeois cultural space, the aims of which were the same as the Academie. These associations were however far less exclusive in their membership practice and in their behaviour than

the French *Sociétés savantes* at the same time. Their aim was not to consolidate a noble elite but rather to create a bourgeois class which was in principle open. At the same time and to complement this openness in principle of the bourgeois society served the bourgeois associations at a local level to improve, morally and economically, the lower civic classes, who though they were not yet part of bourgeois culture, should be brought into it by degrees. The class society should thereby be nudged closer, in the long term, to the utopian ideal of a "classless civic society of moderation". If the time perspective of the Notables society was for a restoration of the past, then that of the German bourgeoisie was aimed at a thorough restructuring of society in the future. Both social groups however, based and consolidated their social positions in the present using a similar social practice.

However, their relationship to society as a whole were effected by the major differences in their relationship to the state. The French Notables, both economically as a social group defined primarily in terms of their ownership of land, and with their regionally based social privileges, were relatively independent from central state influence. As a social group they survived numerous changes in the political system and as individuals they could afford to abandon the state service without losing prestige or influence. The German bourgeoisie, which was composed largely of civil servants, were much more dependent on their income from the state service. Moreover, civic groups could only achieve their social and societal objectives through a change in the structure of the state, to which as civil servants they had direct access. The German bourgeoisie therefore looked much more towards state reform from above for changes to society as a whole.

The bourgeois social life in Detmold, the seat of Princes of Lippe, despite the numerical dominance of civil servants, was on the whole organised as a space, free of state influence, by citizens who all had equal rights. At the same time the Lippe officials represented state authority, in the associations they founded and led, and therein sought to extend downwards the practice of their liberal state reforms. The members of the Hermann's monument movement also played this double role. This association which aspired to society wide acceptance and wanted to unite "everybody, young and old, poor and rich" in the organization, frequently behaved more like a government office than a civic association. The association nevertheless maintained its bourgeois character, in that it was tightly bound to bourgeois relations and forms of socializing; it cooperated with the Detmold social club-house "Resource" and created in the festival and in the subscription a means for bourgeois self-representation.

All festivals, which were celebrated in the 19th century at the Hermann's monument, operated beneath official national or state symbolism, by which they were uneffected, like in France, a place where they reflected social relationships and hierarchies. At the same time they elevated bourgeois society symbolically through imaginary community ideas as social harmony. Through the hierarchical structuring of space, by the integration of the masses through associations, workers organizations and the military discipline of the festival, the Detmold bourgeoisie, like the French Notables, succeeded in demonstrating themselves to be a class clearly divided from the lower orders and at the same time in putting themselves on the stage as a self-determined bourgeois mediation space. In this way they manifested their claim to social and cultural leadership in local society. Even in the German Empire the festivals did not die out as the bourgeois came under the rule of the authoritarian state, rather they offered numerous opportunities for the political representation of bourgeois freedom though not for outright opposition.

What was really transformed during the course of the 19th century was the vision of society propagated at the bourgeois festivals. Initially the Hermann's festival launched a utopian concept of a classless civic society which took in, in principle, every member of the nation. This vision of the future was thoroughly revised in the course of the 19th century and by the beginning of the 20th century leant towards a backward-looking "classless national community" (*klassenlose Volksgemeinschaft*), in which the lower orders were no longer active participants in bourgeois society but were merely connected ideologically to the nation. The "nationalization of the masses" signalled the separation of nation and bourgeois society in the ideological message of the festival. While the nation continued to serve as an integrating social concept for societal unity, the concept of a bourgeois society was restricted to the bourgeoisie themselves.

The festivals in Germany and France at the beginning of the 20th century thus portrayed totally different ideas of national harmony; in one a national community held together ethnically, in the other a politically grounded republic. They were however alike in the socialization mechanism and in the differentiation of the German and French bourgeoisie in their regional spheres of influence.

III

Analysing the bourgeois movements, which were formed in the 19th century around the erection of the Hermann's monument in Germany and the Vercingetorix

monuments in France, it was seen that while bourgeois society certainly found its symbolic expression in the nation, nevertheless at a local and regional level it functioned above all as a network of cultural and social relationships in which the bourgeoisie as a class were constituted by and represented by a common cultural practice. Although the movement's objective and claim was to promote and to represent symbolically the existence of the nation, in the movement and in the monuments, the movement in Germany broke up into numerous regional and local individual movements, which remained together on a national level only through personal contacts and commitments and scarcely at all through a formal organisational or communications structure. In France this movement was in fact limited to one region, the Auvergne, where Vercingetorix was simultaneously celebrated as a national and a regional hero. At a local level both groups drew together a network of social, societal and associative relationships, through which the bourgeoisie were on one hand constituted as a socially and culturally homogeneous bounded group and which represented itself symbolically, and at the same time were able to propagate a bourgeois utopia as a catchall social order which would integrate the lower orders into bourgeois society. The monument movement brought together all areas of public life on a regional level and symbolized the bourgeoisie's claim to social leadership. The regional structure of the national movement thereby reflected the internal ambivalence of the national idea itself. Just as the term nation or the term "patrie," respectively, always possessed a double meaning, on one hand national unity and on the other the particular small state or historical region, so were the social and cultural relationships of the bourgeoisie played out on this double field of town, region and nation.

The rhetoric of national symbols, festivals and rituals was oriented towards the nation and thus certainly mediated supra- regional identity. However, at the same time it remained tied to one societal space in which specific social groups represented their regional relationships and contacts. In the monument movement - in associations, subscription campaigns and festivals - the bourgeoisie presented themselves simultaneously as the representatives of the nation and as the leading social group in town and region. The social relationships and hierarchy of bourgeoisie society was not restricted to an abstract space, but rather manifested itself concretely for all the participants and observers on the spot. The monument movement in Germany and France manifested in their social and symbolic practice, aside from their completely different rhetoric - on one hand the social and cultural homogeneity of the bourgeois class as distinct from the lower classes. At the same time they did not refrain from interpreting the whole of local society - hierarchical and ordered- as a harmonious symbolic and ideological unit.



Conjuntos urbanos, monumentos y nacionalización de masas durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX: el caso italiano

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1. El gran historiador del arte Carlo Argan, desaparecido recientemente, ha escrito que «si las nueve décimas partes de nuestra existencia se desarrollan en la ciudad, la ciudad es la fuente del noventa por ciento de las imágenes sedimentadas en diversos niveles de nuestra memoria». Coherentemente, al preguntarse sobre la esencia de la urbanística y de sus funciones, la ha definido como «ciencia de la administración de los valores urbanos», que son económicos, pero también históricos, estéticos y morales: «colectivos e individuales; debidamente reconocidos e inventariados o sedimentados, letantes en el inconsciente». El verdadero deber del administrador de los valores urbanos (el urbanista) es, por lo tanto, la de ser «educador más que técnico», ya que su verdadero fin «no es crear una ciudad, sino crear un conjunto de personas que tengan el sentimiento de la ciudad. Y a este sentimiento confuso, fragmentado en miles y millones de individuos, darle una forma en la que cada uno pueda conocerse a sí mismo y la propia experiencia de vida asociada». Por lo demás, entre el sujeto (el administrador de los valores urbanos) y el objeto (la ciudad) existe una correspondencia sustancial: desde la Antigüedad más remota, en efecto, la ciudad se ha configurado como «un sistema de información y de comunicación, con una función cultural y educativa». Los monumentos de la ciudad tenían una razón «no sólo conmemorativa, sino también didáctica: comunicaban la historia de la ciudad, pero la comunicaban desde una perspectiva ideológica, es decir, a la vista de un desarrollo coherente de las premisas dadas» (Argan 1982: 236-51).

Es probable que estas consideraciones, agudas y penetrantes, reflejen la crisis sufrida contemporáneamente por el estatuto de la ciencia urbanística en la era post-industrial, y que indiquen un desplazamiento de la reflexión en búsqueda de fundamentos nuevos y más sólidos. Ciertamente, tras la modestia aparente de la nueva

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definición propuesta por el urbanista (la administración de los valores urbanos), se puede vislumbrar, a decir verdad sin esfuerzo, un papel político dilatado y central, en un sentido literal, de aquello que *da forma a la polis*; papel tan consustancial al acto de pensar la ciudad, cuanto más -en varios lugares de este artículo- se afirma que ésta no puede ser proyectada por uno mismo, sino imaginada, mientras que dejando de imaginársela, resulta menor la posibilidad de proyectársela a uno mismo; además, se afirma también, las ciudades no se fundan, sino que se forman, en una reapropiación y reutilización continua de los «puntos de valor» preexistentes. Se puede pensar en un resultado sorprendente: en un continuo fluir de historicidad sedimentada, no hay nada tan conservador y al mismo tiempo subversivo como el plasmarse y replasmarse de un organismo urbano, en el que la única continuidad dada lo es por la «transmisión de ciertos significados a través de ciertos signos arquitectónicos: más exactamente, por los diversos significados que han sido atribuidos a esos signos en las sucesivas épocas» (Ivi, p.248).

2. Si nos hemos detenido en referir estas notas de reflexión, es debido a que nos parecen especialmente adecuadas para los objetivos de nuestro artículo. El ordenamiento urbano y la utilización de los monumentos en el proceso de nacionalización de las masas en la Italia de la segunda mitad del siglo XIX (desde la unificación política en adelante) se han alimentado explícitamente de una voluntad de «administrar valores urbanos», de «formar» una ciudad como lugar de autoidentificación y de ostentación «didáctica» del sentimiento de pertenencia a la nueva comunidad política recién constituida. Camillo Boito -un arquitecto importante, culto, refinado, sensible y un moderno restaurador, que fue director varios decenios de la Academia di Brera en Milán y uno de los «dictadores» de la Italia oficial en las licitaciones públicas para monumentos y obras de arte-, se planteaba explícitamente en 1880 el problema de la creación de un «estilo nacional», a semejanza, sostenía, de lo que tenía lugar en otras naciones europeas:

«Ya las demás naciones se aprestan a reencontrar un estilo: los alemanes vuelven a su arco apuntado, los ingleses retornan a su Tudor, los rusos se acercan a su bizantino, los franceses están todavía indecisos entre su gótico y su Renacimiento. Para Italia, el gran problema está en la maravillosa riqueza de su pasado. Pero, tarde o temprano, se necesitará que exista una arquitectura italiana, máxime ahora que Italia se ha convertido en una Nación, y tiene su capital. Y deberá ser un estilo, como en el siglo XIV, variado, flexible según las necesidades al clima, a la índole de las diversas provincias; y deberá ser digno de la civilización refinada, de la ciencia que ha avanzado en este nuestro siglo XIX y en el siglo XX, porque ya tratamos, para nuestro disfrute, de las cosas que han de venir» (Boito 1988 [1880], p.15).

La búsqueda de un estilo nacional por parte de Boito no desembocará en un auténtico éxito (propugnaba una vuelta al estilo lombardo del siglo XIV, con excepción de Roma, para la que sostenía el clasicismo del siglo XVI); pero se esforzaba en resolver el problema por el que, le parecía, existían «edificios y arquitectos, no arquitectura» (Ivi, p.14); es decir, quería resolver la cuestión de tener «un estilo contemporáneo, pero nacional; preservar por ello aquella parte del espíritu del pasado que sirva para imprimir a la obra el sello de la italianidad, pero renovarlo, modernizarlo en todo aquello que no responde a las condiciones y a los deseos de hoy» (Boito, 1988 [1880], p.203). Era el mismo problema abordado por el primer congreso artístico italiano en 1872, en el que surgieron lamentos por la paradoja de que en Italia, en ausencia de unidad política, se había disfrutado sin embargo de unidad estilística (en las formas neoclásicas), mientras que tras la unificación se produjo un fraccionamiento de las escuelas regionales (Borsi, 1980, p.13).

Las reflexiones de Boito se inscriben bien en el típico contexto asumido en Italia por la *pedagogía política de la forma*, tal y como fue practicada (y en la medida en que lo fue) por las clases dirigentes tras la unificación. La Italia liberal, de hecho, a semejanza de todos los sistemas políticos considerados por aquello que los hacen permanecer, que los constituyen en «régimen», produjo una serie de formas conmemorativas urbanísticas y monumentales para transmitir un mensaje pedagógico-político excesivo. Esta pedagogía política de la forma intentó aunar conjuntamente dos aspectos: la búsqueda orgullosa de un mito fundador de la realidad nacional, fijado en el pasado, anclado en el pasado y alimentado por el pasado, así como por la afirmación no menos orgullosa de la nueva modernidad que, con la consecución de la unidad política, veía -y quería- hacer su irrupción a través de la Porta Pia. La estrecha *dialéctica entre tradición y modernidad* es la primera característica destacable en el examen del proceso de nacionalización de las masas llevado a cabo en Italia en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX mediante la nueva ordenación del espacio urbano y la monumentalística. Es como si las élites dirigentes liberales se volcasen en un intento de hacer compatibles dos sentimientos, dos impresiones de ánimo igualmente presentes y vivas, que habían encontrado respectiva expresión -nos agrada personificarlas en dos grandes intelectuales no italianos y amigos de Italia-, una en Ferdinand Gregorovino, cuando había asistido con dolor a la toma de Roma por parte de las tropas piemontesas, juzgando como irreparablemente catastrófico para la ciudad eterna, hasta entonces concentrada totalmente en su pasado augusto, aquel brusco asalto de la modernidad; la otra en Theodor Mommsen, que interrogaba al ministro Quintino Sella sobre qué principio, en base a qué nueva idea universal podían los italianos permanecer ahora en Roma, una vez barrido de ella el pontífice; y escuchaba la respuesta: sobre la base de la Ciencia. La apuesta de las élites liberales

se jugó totalmente en la dialéctica entre estos dos términos, aquí ocultada: ¿en qué modo podía la modernidad combinarse con el pasado y basarse en él sin ser condicionada por ese pasado?

Por lo demás, también el renacimiento historiográfico italiano de la primera mitad del siglo XIX, tan rico de muestras político-patrióticas, se había nutrido ideológicamente de este mismo impulso dialéctico entre homenaje a la tradición y deseo de modernidad, cuando había ido a la búsqueda, queriendo contribuir a preparar el futuro, del principio de la Historia de Italia; mientras, en un plano político-cultural, la individualización por parte del filósofo y político Vincenzo Gioberti de un primado moral y civil de los italianos había obedecido a la misma lógica, tratando aquél míticamente del pasado pelágico de Italia, para preconizar su despertar político; igualmente, por aquella misma exigencia de combinar pasado y modernidad, había comenzado Giuseppe Mazzini, quien afirmaba la misión «europea» de Italia, compendiándola en la tercera Roma, la del *Risorgimento*, que venía a sustituir a la Roma de los Papas, una época que había vencido a su vez a la de los Césares. Finalmente (o, deberíamos decir más bien, al comienzo de los albores napoleónicos del *Risorgimento*), por el mismo motivo (extraer del pasado auspicios para el futuro), la exhortación del poeta Ugo Foscolo al estudio de la Historia era reentonada, no por casualidad, como una preparación de la acción patriótica. Y el mismo Foscolo, en su propio campo -el de la posesía *Dei sepolcri* (de los sepulcros) (U.Foscolo, 1974[1807], 51-65)- había proporcionado un pequeño pero espléndido ejemplo de la Historia como memoria mediante la exaltación de la Iglesia de la Santa Croce en Florencia -como si ese templo fuese, con las tumbas de Maquiavelo, Galileo y Miguel Angel Buonarroto, un Westminster italiano-, siendo como era consciente de que

«Las tumbas de los fuertes encienden el fuerte ánimo para gloriosas empresas...»

Del ejemplo de la Santa Croce podrá servirse nuevamente, en una época posterior, otro poeta, el poeta civil de la Italia unida, Giosué Carducci. Este hacía un *topos* de la conciencia nacional, la cornisa monumental simbólica en la que, de modo sucesivo, revivía «nuestra antigua patria»; en la cual las «legiones sagradas libres hasta la muerte» habían jurado rebelarse contra el extranjero, o donde se reunieron los «mártires» y las «fraternas sombras agitadas» para invocar a Dios en la guerra contra Austria. O bien la describía como el punto de encuentro fantástico de tres fuerzas «altas y excelsas», radiantes con los colores del estandarte nacional, dispuestas a liberar Sicilia, Venecia y Roma (G.Carducci, 1907[1850-60], 98, 201, 213, 243); y finalmente cantaba a la Santa Croce, culminado el *Risorgimento*, como un «lugar de gloria» y «solemne y solitario/ templo de los padres», digna sede de las cenizas del

mismo Foscolo, el cual por primera vez «desveló a su pueblo/ Desde el profundo corazón y el ingenio altivo/ La ola y la luz de la nueva vida» (Ivi [1871], p.364). Solamente que después se preguntaba, desesperanzado y con desilusión en el corazón, sobre el resultado de aquel *Risorgimento* que, a la luz de los hechos, le parecía inadecuado y lleno de promesas no cumplidas, hasta el punto de dudar, ante un resultado tan decepcionante, de los mismos destinos de la patria y de la utilidad de los monumentos:

Patria de grandes y fuertes,
¿Cuál es tu hado? Si éste responde
A sus antepasados, todavía hoy esta mal viva
Gente, ¿Para qué sirve, los huesos de los muertos
grabar con mármoles?

Pero Carducci estaba en la oposición y, aunque investida de autoridad, su voz permaneció aislada en aquel año 1871. Por lo demás, ¿No será quizás verdad que, por lo general, una cierta *deprecatio temporum* juega un papel de indispensable contrapeso frente a otras voces que pueden, en cambio, elevarse entusiásticamente? La conquista de Roma, que parecía a Carducci, por el signo moderado e indeciso bajo el que tuvo lugar, una pura y verdadera traición a las esperanzas del *Risorgimento* («¡Mal con la mente de la doma perezosa/ Mal destacan el Campidoglio y Roma!»), a juicio de otros no sólo era la coronación gloriosa de la liberación de Italia, sino también el terreno admirablemente predispuesto de la Historia para representar *visiblemente* el anuncio de los nuevos tiempos. Valga como ejemplo el del escritor y periodista Edmondo De Amicis, corresponsal del periódico *L'Opinione* en el cuerpo de tropas victoriosas. Para vencer cualquier duda sobre la transferencia de la capital a la ciudad de los Papas, aquél describía enfáticamente a Roma como «una de las ciudades más bellas y cómodas de Italia», con «madera de capital de Europa». Con un mínimo esfuerzo, derrumbando algunas casas, se habría preparado un plano de la ciudad «inmenso y estupendo» (E. de Amicis, 1870, 63-67). Ingenuidad aparte, había quien se planteaba de modo inmediato el problema de dotar a la capital de un valor representativo y reconocible políticamente. El general Raffaele Cadrona, el liberador de Roma, había constituido apenas transcurridos diez días tras la conquista una Comisión de Ingenieros y Arquitectos que estudiase un plan para «el engrandecimiento y embellecimiento» de la ciudad. Será la primera de muchas comisiones, ya que la gestación de un plan regulador para la capital resultará una empresa larga y difícil (será preciso esperar al de 1883 para disponer de una definición de algún modo estable y menos provisional), de la que no podemos seguir aquí todas las etapas. Queremos destacar, sin embargo, un punto global: la definición del nuevo

rostro de Roma es situada explícitamente por la clase dirigente nacional-liberal en contraposición a la imagen secular que había asumido la ciudad eterna bajo la acción de los grandes Papas urbanistas. El modelo en el que inspirarse, en el intento de subvertir aquélla, es la representatividad conmemorativa de la antigua y magnífica ciudad católica. Se trata de un modelo grandioso y, naturalmente, espléndido: de aquí derivan muchas dificultades para una confrontación triunfante, y esto obviamente no puede sorprender. Pero el problema no es solamente -y, diríamos, ni siquiera esencialmente- de índole estética. El problema es exquisitamente político-ideológico.

De hecho, tras 1870 las relaciones entre el Estado italiano y la Iglesia se agravaron: se abre la cuestión romana; el pontífice se considera, usurpado en sus derechos, prisionero en el Vaticano. En consecuencia, una Italia que configura su capital debe volver programáticamente la espalda al Vaticano. Pero también ha de saber distinguir entre la Ciudad Eterna como centro espiritual del Catolicismo (de lo que sólo debía diferenciarse) y Roma en cuanto antigua sede del poder temporal del Papa rey (al que debía necesariamente contraponerse). Operación compleja y ardua, en el límite de lo imposible, justamente en la medida en que bajo los pontífices, y sobre todo bajo el último de los grandes Papas urbanistas, Sixto V, valores urbanístico-encomiásticos vinculados a la Catolicidad universal y valores conmemorativos visibles del poder teocrático se habían conectado y entrelazado de modo indisoluble. Los italianos debían hacer cuentas mismamente con la Roma de Sixto V, con su planificación política, religiosa y devocional, perfeccionada en los dos siglos y medio que siguieron. Se trataba de un plano muy caracterizado, dotado de una estructura panóptica bastante marcada, que unía los dos puntos cardinales del poder pontificio (San Pedro y Letrán) y las basílicas en un circuito conmemorativo, jalonado por evidencias monumentales extraordinarias (los obeliscos), que rodeaba el centro, y el cual no había sido alterado por los sucesivos desarrollos urbanísticos, que más bien lo habían reforzado y enriquecido.

En Roma, por ello, aquella dialéctica entre pasado y modernidad de la que estamos tratando (y que es fundamento de la nueva representación de la autoconciencia nacional a través de la pedagogía de la forma) se presenta con características particularmente arduas. En Roma, la presencia de una tradición municipal sobre la que basarse es demasiado débil: el Campidoglio ha permanecido aplastado por el Vaticano durante siglos y es un punto demasiado débil sobre el que apoyarse. Por lo tanto, todo debe ser inventado. El problema se ve agravado por el hecho de que, si con la toma de Roma se culminó objetivamente una revolución, los sectores políticos que la completó eran básicamente moderados, que rehúye las soluciones extremas del garibaldinismo o del mazzinismo. Por esto, el desarrollo de

la idea de una ciudad que pueda exhibir *enteramente* el signo de una explícita monumentalidad simbólica es lento y cansino, poco claro en su evolución paso a paso, y acaba por ser un *resultado* casi casual al que se llega al término de una gran, aunque fragmentaria, sucesión de construcciones públicas y reordenaciones de calles entre 1875 y 1895. No parece casual que para completar de modo efectivo la destrucción de la ciudad monumental panóptica de los Papas sea necesario esperar a la decisión política, tomada en 1882, de erigir en el centro de la ciudad (cerca de la Plaza Venezia) el marmóreo y gigantesco monumento a Víctor Manuel II, el «Padre de la Patria» (el llamado Vittoriano). Mejor dicho: es precisamente aquella decisión a determinar *en los hechos* finalmente el centro urbanístico conmemorativo de la nueva capital que todos los planes precedentes no fueron capaces de fijar. Así, el policentrismo de la Roma papal es destruido y Roma retorna a un monocentrismo olvidado desde hacía siglos, sellado por el homenaje al Gran Rey y a la «Unidad de la Patria» y a la «Libertad de los ciudadanos», en la intersección entre la milenaria Via del Coroso (la *via lata* de la antigua Roma) y la modernísima arteria que desciende desde la estación de ferrocarril, denominada no por casualidad Via Nazionale.

Pero, ¿Qué diferencia respecto a la monumentalidad como *circuito* que había ofrecido el modelo sixtino, naturalmente según su específica significación político-religiosa! Citemos solamente el esbozo, a lo largo de la Via XX Settembre (la antigua via Pia, así rebautizada en recuerdo de la fecha de la liberación de la capital) de una especie de Whitehall romano, con los ministerios de Finanzas, de la Guerra, y con el Ministerio de Exteriores en la plaza del Quirinal, residencia oficial del rey. La posibilidad de controlar y englobar otras evidencias representativas no resulta realizada: fracasa el proyecto de un nuevo Parlamento sobre la via Nazionale, nunca construido; el enorme Palacio de Justicia crecerá en la parte opuesta de Roma, en el nuevo barrio de Prati; Mazzini será recordado con un monumento sobre las pendientes de la lejana colina del Aventino y el otro monumento nacional significativo, la estatua ecuestre de Garibaldi sobre el Gianicolo, encontrará la sede oportuna para celebrar en la capital la epopeya del héroe en el mismo lugar donde se desarrolló, pero el gigantismo de las obras no podrá ocultar la pobreza de una renovada *forma urbis* incapaz, con su monocentrismo exasperado, de constituir una verdadera ciudad monumental panóptica: una ciudad en la que las evidencias arquitectónicas y representativas estén unidas por un sistema estudiado expresamente para enfatizarlas, de modo que todo el organismo urbano pueda ser recorrido idealmente como una unidad conmemorativa. Ni la demolición por causas higiénicas (y especulativas) de barrios antiguos (el Ghetto, Parione), ni la construcción de las infraestructuras modernas (el largo Tevere, Policlinico, cuarteles, hospital militar, el Palacio de Exposiciones de Arte) serán suficientes para corregir esta impresión: en

Roma, celebración y modernidad procederán de modo separado y escindido, si no en abierto contraste, y la destrucción de la estructura de la ciudad papal no conseguirá ser una propuesta completada. La alternativa se detendrá a medio camino, esto es, será retóricamente ideológica y vinculada estrechamente al culto del Rey difunto, celebrado por el circuito monumental que tiene su punto central en la mole del Vittoriano en Plaza Venezia. Este inmenso monumento destruye las pendientes del Campidoglio, aplanando y cubriendo sus formas: en esta relación de prepotente yuxtaposición entre lo antiguo y lo moderno parece leerse la metáfora arquitectónico-urbanística del vínculo conmemorativo entre pasado y presente, bastante más allá de las proclamadas intenciones de la retórica oficial. Y por lo tanto no por casualidad, bajo el signo de la retórica, y con este insistente fondo funerario, se desarrollará la mayor manifestación patriótica de homenaje a las instituciones nacionales conocida en la Italia liberal: la Peregrinación a la tumba del Rey Víctor Manuel II en el Panteón de Roma en enero de 1884, a ocho años de la muerte del soberano con ocasión del 25 aniversario de la segunda guerra de independencia.

3. El hecho reviste una gran relevancia: ante todo por sus dimensiones. Desfilaron en Roma frente a la tumba real las delegaciones provinciales de los peregrinos en tres días diferentes (el 9, 15 y 21 de junio) en número de 68.000 personas, a las que se añadieron los componentes de la provincia y de la ciudad de Roma, con un total de 76.000 participantes. Si se considera que la organización fue asumida por un comité nacional, que se apoyó en sus correspondientes comités provinciales, nacidos con tal finalidad, y que esta organización fue voluntaria, no se puede negar que nos encontramos de frente a un éxito inesperado. Este juicio se refuerza aún más si se piensa en las dificultades existentes en la Italia de la época para organizar los traslados en tren, procurar alojamiento, sincronizar las salidas y las llegadas. Un segundo motivo de éxito se debe encontrar en la capacidad de compromiso que *socialmente* supieron crear los organizadores. El comité directivo con sede en Roma estaba compuesto por políticos constitucionales de toda tendencia (gubernamental o no), por nobles, propietarios, funcionarios del Estado, profesionales; pero si se pasa al comité ejecutivo, observamos que en su presidencia y en su secretaría (es decir, en los organismos verdaderamente importantes, operativos y no honoríficos) «disminuye la representación social de aquéllos, aumenta su carácter conservador, se hace aplastante la función de los elementos ligados al ejército y a la tradición militar-patriótica» (B.Tobia, 1991, p.107). Políticos conservadores, militares y veteranos afiliados a asociaciones de ex-combatientes son los ejes organizativos de la Peregrinación, del mismo modo que en las provincias. En éstas, el alcalde (o su delegado) juega un papel igualmente fundamental. En lo que respecta a los participantes llamados a la manifestación de homenaje, debemos subdividirlos en dos

grandes categorías: los participantes a título individual, en calidad de ciudadanos aislados (el 55% del total), y los que forman parte de alguna asociación. Entre éstas, prevalecen las sociedades obreras y de mutuo socorro, así como las delegaciones de los ayuntamientos. Se deducía de ellas una estructura piramidal: en el vértice directivo militares y ex-combatientes, en la base ciudadanos encuadrados en su mayoría por los únicos centros aglutinantes de la sociedad civil con fines de amplia movilización política y comunes en la Italia de la época: el ayuntamiento y la asociación de oficio, que todavía no es un sindicato moderno. El cuadro conjunto es, pues, al margen del indudable éxito de la manifestación, un cuadro de debilidad: tenemos por un lado una burguesía culta, intermediaria del consenso, y una burguesía propietaria y de negocios que prefiere *delegar* una función representativa más amplia en organismos cuyo papel político esté fuertemente mediatizado por su rol institucional (el ejército y el ayuntamiento); por otro lado, estamos frente a una articulación política de la sociedad civil que, si quiere mostrar sus propias convicciones monárquico-constitucionales, debe basar su fundamento esencialmente bien sobre un aspecto institucional (una vez más, el ayuntamiento), o bien sobre una estructura asociativa en la que prevalece la caracterización paternalista e interclasista.

Todo ello permite desglosar algunas consideraciones ulteriores sobre las características de la nacionalización de masas italiana en la época liberal. El primer rasgo ya lo hemos individualizado en la dialéctica resaltada entre pasado y modernidad. Ahora debemos destacar de ella su *carácter centralista*. La ocasión más importante y de mayor alcance social para la ostentación «masiva» de los valores patrióticos tuvo lugar en Roma, en torno a la figura del soberano, símbolo de la unidad nacional. El comité organizador había pensado también en celebrar de modo paralelo a la Peregrinación un homenaje «descentralizado» a las tumbas de Carlos Alberto en Turín, de Cavour en Sàntena, de Mazzini en Génova y de Garibaldi en Caprera. La idea fue abandonada y el tributo de reconocimiento a los llamados «cuatro hacedores» del *Risorgimento* no se celebró, debido a que prevaleció finalmente un contenido conmemorativo diferente de este esfuerzo de pedagogía unitaria. Tanto el ala conservadora y gubernamental del espectro político como el ala de «izquierda» constitucional convinieron en que debía otorgarse una atención central a la Monarquía como única institución capaz de representar la unidad de la Patria, bien por inmediata identificación país-dinastía (el gobierno) bien como expresión del vínculo Nación-Rey a construir dinámicamente como Monarquía popular (la oposición constitucional). La Peregrinación debía llevar a término esta aspiración de modo visible. El hecho de que las delegaciones provinciales, tras haber depositado su corona de flores sobre la tumba del rey difunto (Víctor Manuel), sean recibidos en audiencia en el Quirinal por el rey viviente (Humberto) es altamente significativo: testimonia la voluntad de instaurar y

exhibir un vínculo de doble fidelidad institucional: la que se manifiesta en el tributo devocional por el pasado y la que se prolonga en la reverencia política hacia el presente. Los álbumes de firmas del homenaje a Humberto recogidos en las provincias y llevados al rey prueban el mismo intento. En este contexto no existe ningún espacio para un tipo diferente de manifestación del fervor patriótico: despreciadas, las organizaciones garibaldinas renunciaron a la batalla por el derecho de desfilar en los cortejos de modo distintivo y reconocible.

La Peregrinación tiene lugar en Roma, y naturalmente no podía ser de otro modo: allí está ubicada la capital, allí se encuentra la tumba del rey. Pero si el itinerario es obligado, no tan obligada es la función que, con amplia resonancia propagandística, se quiere hacer desempeñar a las imágenes de Roma. El tema se articulaba de varias formas. Por un lado, se atribuye un valor exorbitante a Roma en comparación con otras ciudades italianas; por otro lado -y no es una contradicción- se reafirma la indiscutibilidad del derecho de posesión de toda Italia sobre la Ciudad Eterna. La primera versión de la lápida que se quiere dejar en Campidoglio en recuerdo de la Peregrinación se inspira en el clasicismo, en el intento de afirmar el carácter especial e incommensurable de la nueva capital de Italia. Los peregrinos son invitados a ascender a la fatal colina para dar rienda suelta a su voto patriótico ante el Foro,

«para que los italianos sientan
el deber sagrado de realizar actos
no indignos de la antigua grandeza»

Sobre la misma línea, a continuación, figuran los mensajes que envían los alcaldes de las ciudades de Italia al de Roma en agradecimiento por la hospitalidad dispensada a las delegaciones durante la Peregrinación: Roma es definida como «la ciudad alma de los Césares, en tiempos reina del mundo y ahora digna capital de Italia» (así se expresó el alcalde de Palermo); o bien se prefiere reevocar el vínculo que, en la época republicana, estrechaba a la «alma Roma» con las ciudades itálicas (son palabras del alcalde de Siena). Por su parte, el alcalde de la capital, el príncipe Torlonia, se encarga de mostrar en los mensajes de respuesta la reivindicación del derecho de Italia a la posesión de Roma: el intento es explícitamente unitario y atemporal. El resultado conjunto es el entretejimiento, también con ocasión de la Peregrinación, de un mito de Roma como lugar sumamente retórico y punto de equilibrio geográfico-ideológico, como único reclamo, única idea-fuerza capaz de superar los contrastes localistas: como mediación y momento de construcción de esa mediación. Roma, en definitiva, como recuerdo indispensable en el centro del país de las Cien Ciudades, como lugar en el que fue posible la proyección directa del municipalismo en una dimensión *nacional*.

Es necesario subrayar que no se trata de un resultado predeterminado. Ciertamente, en la conquista de Roma y en la transferencia de la capital a la Ciudad Eterna, la gran mayoría del personal político del *Risorgimento* -Cavour el primero- había individualizado la realización de la unidad nacional porque solamente en Roma los celos particularistas habrían podido tranquilizarse: el mito de Florencia como cuna de la cultura italiana y, por tanto, símbolo de un país dividido políticamente que aspiraba a la unidad es sustituido por el de Roma como único lugar en el que esa unidad, una vez lograda, podía ser representada. Pero las resistencias a aquella traslación de capitalidad habían sido fuertes. Hubo quien propuso también la construcción en Umbría de una capital *ex novo*, en el corazón geográfico de la península, casi como un Washington italiano. Y cuando en 1881 se sometió a discusión en el Parlamento la ley de la capitalidad de Roma y la ayuda necesaria por parte del Estado para la construcción de todas las infraestructuras necesarias para modernizar la ciudad y hacerla más funcional para el papel que ahora se le atribuía, las resistencias no fueron pocas. Las obras de modernización o de representación ideológica parecieron inútiles «pompas edilicias» a los ojos de no pocos diputados, pues los ejemplos de Londres y de París habían sido aducidos como pésimos modelos de ciudades «absorbentes», megalópolis negadoras de la más auténtica tradición italiana, tan rica en presencias provinciales. Por lo tanto, el valor del centralismo en el ámbito político-administrativo, como fue afirmado sin vacilaciones y con un tono que ha sido definido en justicia como «jacobino», fue replanteado de este modo por los más fervientes partidarios del valor simbólico de Roma en el terreno de la pedagogía nacional unitaria, monumental y urbanística. El diputado Francesco Crispi, el futuro presidente del Consejo, intervendrá precisamente en aquel debate parlamentario con fogosidad, recordando el precedente de los legisladores americanos que, ya en época de graves restricciones financieras, no dudaron en destinar los recursos necesarios para la construcción de la nueva capital del Estado; y recordaba la campaña de licitaciones públicas desarrollada por la Convención francesa en plena vorágine revolucionaria, pues aquél sostenía que «los Gobiernos y las instituciones no solamente deben procurar el bienestar de las naciones, sino que tienen además la obligación de perpetuarse en los mármoles y en los monumentos» (Cit. en B. Tobia, 1991, p.26). Hablamos de Crispi, particularmente sensible a los temas de pedagogía política de la forma, viejo garibaldino y revolucionario, ahora alineado junto a la Monarquía, de la que propugnaba una versión «de izquierdas», popular y cesarista (no por casualidad será un gran admirador de Bismarck); de un Crispi que en 1878, en calidad de ministro del Interior, había organizado los funerales de Víctor Manuel, con particular atención a los aspectos ceremoniales: a él había escrito el prefecto de Palacio, Cesare Correnti, a propósito de las exequias, con un rasgo de modernidad que nos parece extraordinario: «No tenemos precedentes. Mejor, inventadlos» (cit.

en U.Alfassio Grimaldi, 1973, p.112). Así, Roma había vivido la jornada excepcional del transporte fúnebre el 17 de enero y, el 16 de febrero, la del funeral de Estado en el Panteón, donde el catafalco del rey, rodeado por estatuas representando las virtudes del difunto, estaba debajo de la cúpula en la que ardían ciento cuarenta estrellas iluminadas con gas e incrustadas en la bóveda, mientras el gran ojo era cubierto por otra gigantesca estrella de velo blanco, la estrella de Italia.

En conclusión: valor exorbitante de la Monarquía, como símbolo de unidad, a ser representado en la figura del Padre de la Patria en monumentos que recubren toda Italia y que, de modo masivo, debía reconocerse en Roma en el Vittoriano, el cual se convierte en una especie de centro de irradiación ideal del mito del *Risorgimento* a escala nacional, provocando un replanteamiento urbanístico-conmemorativo general de la capital. En tal sentido, como ha sido observado justamente, en Italia -al contrario que en Alemania- solamente en Roma, y más precisamente en el monumento a Víctor Manuel II, el Vittoriano, es posible recrear un verdadero monumento nacional en cuanto lugar superador de las particularidades geográfico-político-sociales que suscita una idea comunitaria nacional (F.J.Bauer, 1992, p.14).

4. Sin embargo, como sabemos, el *Risorgimento* no había sido únicamente -es más, debemos decir, ni siquiera esencialmente- una iniciativa regia. En el fondo no puede sorprender que el máximo y más genial protagonista del renacimiento italiano, el conde Cavour, se tuviese que contentar con «simples» titulaciones de plazas o calles (aún cuando importantes, en ocasiones ornadas con una estatua suya -los casos más notables son los de Milán o Roma-), que, en definitiva, no se le dedique un verdadero «monumento nacional». El mito, para poder alimentarse, tiene necesidad evidentemente de dirigirse al corazón: y cultura, sabiduría política, habilidad diplomática, sólidos conocimientos y actitudes en el campo de la economía pueden no parecer virtudes adecuadas para entusiasmar los ánimos y ser trasladadas al imaginario. Tampoco se presta fácilmente a ser glorificada una muerte muy burguesa en la propia cama, aún cuando fuese precoz y provocada por el agotamiento de un decenio de trabajo continuo. Es mucho más fácil, quizás, inventar las virtudes estratégicas y guerreras del rey Víctor Manuel, sobre la base del cierto desprecio personal del peligro del que dio pruebas el difunto soberano, y, sobre ello, construir del mismo una imagen mítica. Pero menos comprensible a primera vista es el tratamiento subordinado de la figura de Giuseppe Garibaldi.

En él, es inútil decirlo, se combinaban todos los ingredientes para un uso conmemorativo muy eficaz de la pedagogía política de la forma: comenzando por

la aureola aventurera de la que venía rodeada su fama, que provenía incluso de la lejana América, y por el clamor suscitado en todos los países por sus éxitos como comandante militar. Por eso el «León de Caprera», el «Héroe de los dos Mundos» fue retratado de diversos modos: también en su honor Italia dio nombre obligatoriamente a plazas y calles, y se cubrió de monumentos en recuerdo de sus gestas (algunos son también grandiosos -como el ya recordado sobre el Gianicolo en Roma, rodeado por los bustos de sus camaradas y, en la época fascista, flanqueado por otro monumento a su compañera Anita, hasta el punto de hacer de las calles arboladas de esa colina una suerte de santuario garibaldino). Se ha hablado así, eficazmente, relacionando el culto de Víctor Manuel con el de Garibaldi, de una especie de «Diarquía conmemorativa» (M.Isnenghi, 331-37), casi una correspondencia encomiástica del proceso de dialéctica política del cual cobró vida el nuevo Estado unitario. Se puede estar de acuerdo, a condición de subrayar la neta subordinación de un término (Garibaldi) a otro (Víctor Manuel): así, podemos añadir que la insistente acción de exaltar las actitudes guerreras y las capacidades militares del rey (en verdad bastante escasas) responden propiamente al fin de reequilibrar lo más posible, sobre un terreno en principio demasiado favorable al héroe de camisa roja, el peso diferente de las dos figuras. En esta *diarquía conmemorativa* de términos asimétricos es posible entonces detectar la tercera característica general de la pedagogía política de la forma, tal y como se expresó en Italia en la formulación de un mito fundacional representado en los monumentos, en las inscripciones, en los símbolos arquitectónicos.

En consecuencia, el problema consistía en «limitar» en papel, significado y función de la figura de Garibaldi, para que no oscureciese a la del rey, lo que se aplicaba también a la monumentalística y a la toponomástica, a la creación de lugares especiales de «culto». Un ejemplo entre muchos: Garibaldi falleció el 3 de junio de 1882, tras lo que las iniciativas conmemorativas fueron inmediatas (suscripciones para monumentos, lápidas, denominaciones de calles). Pero el mismo día se asistió en el Parlamento casi a un altercado entre el presidente Nicotera y el diputado Filopanti, quien proponía como sede de la sepultura del héroe el Panteón y no Caprera, donde, por otro lado, el mismo Garibaldi había pedido ser incinerado. El motivo de la discordia era clarificado explícitamente por el respetable diario *Corriere della Sera*: «Los despojos incinerados y dejados sobre el escollo de Caprera se prestarían poco a demostraciones y agitaciones *frecuentes*; y éstas no son deseadas. Las cenizas en Roma podrían servir, cada aniversario de la muerte el 3 de junio, cada aniversario de Marsala el 11 de mayo, cada aniversario de Mentana el 3 de noviembre, cada aniversario de San Pancracio el 30 de abril, etc., a molestar al Gobierno, a agitarse, a hacer saber al mundo que el partido republicano existe» (cit. en V.Labita, p.129).

En la «diarquía conmemorativa» del *Risorgimento* se incluía por lo tanto de modo palmario una cautela fuertemente moderada. Esta cautela se transmutaba en un verdadero ostracismo frente a otro protagonista fundamental del *Risorgimento*, el republicano Mazzini, el antagonista de Cavour, para el que ninguna gran ciudad italiana había predispuesto a fines de siglo un monumento conmemorativo significativo, con excepción de su ciudad natal, Génova, que lo había inaugurado en 1882 (¡diez años después de su muerte!). En la Roma de la que Mazzini había sido triunviro durante la República de 1848-49, su monumento, ya decretado por Crispi en 1890, deberá esperar su construcción hasta 1949; el único homenaje dedicado al líder republicano en la capital hasta entonces será un modesto busto de piedra en el jardín público del Pincio, mezclado con los de otros doscientos italianos ilustres, y aún así sólo a partir de 1910. Es un caso límite y ciertamente clamoroso, si bien totalmente en línea con aquella característica de la exorbitancia conmemorativa de la monarquía en la figura del rey Víctor Manuel que ya hemos destacado, de modo que no nos parece casual que el proyecto de decoración estatuaría del monumento a Víctor Manuel en plaza Venezia se orientase al final solamente hacia estatuas alegóricas de conceptos abstractos (el Pensamiento, la Acción, el Derecho, la Guerra, la Filosofía, la Victoria, Roma, etc.) y que se abandonase totalmente la idea primitiva de colocar también junto a éstas las imágenes de los grandes protagonistas del *Risorgimento*, reservando exclusivamente a la gigantesca estatua ecuestre del rey las características *verdaderas y personales* del homenaje conmemorativo.

La cautela moderada actuaba también en otro sentido: en la búsqueda continua de un *compromiso* en la representación pedagógico-política, violado el cual se liberaban los vetos recíprocos de los partidos. En este sentido, una *vocación de mediación* puede ser encontrada continuamente en la tradición italiana de pedagogía política de la forma y es éste el aspecto fundamental en el que se expresa la «diarquía conmemorativa», la encarnación monumental de la dialéctica entre ala moderada y ala democrática del proceso *risorgimentale*. Un caso acontecido en Milán ilustra bien, digamos en contraluz, este aspecto. Es un caso en el que no se llegó a la búsqueda de un término medio en el que los «partidos» opuestos pudiesen converger; por el contrario, es un caso en el que, por incurables enfrentamientos recíprocos, no fue posible mediación alguna y por lo tanto no hubo modo de realizar el homenaje conmemorativo. Nos referimos a la verdadera batalla entre dos monumentos que tuvo lugar en la capital lombarda por un período muy largo, más de cuarenta años, y con fases agudas, entre los que pretendían erigir un homenaje en bronce a Napoleón III, liberador de la ciudad juntamente con el rey Víctor en 1859, y aquéllos que querían celebrar, a través de los caídos en la batalla de Mentana, la incorporación de Roma a Italia.

Evidentemente, se enfrentaban dos programas políticos y dos lecturas del *Risorgimento* netamente antagónicas. En el primer bando se reconocían todos los moderados de la ciudad: de hecho, en favor de la suscripción financiera pro-monumento a Napoleón, promovida en 1873, se movilizó la flor y nata de la burguesía, de la nobleza y de la intelectualidad milanesa y lombarda. En 1880 la estatua ecuestre del emperador fue fundida y expuesta en un pabellón de la Exposición Nacional del año siguiente. Pero las polémicas comenzaron enseguida. En el mismo año 1873 los demócratas milaneses promovieron una nueva suscripción a favor de otro monumento a los caídos de Mentana, el desafortunado intento garibaldino de liberar Roma en 1867 repelido por las tropas francesas colocadas bajo la protección del pontífice. Ese monumento fue realizado después, en 1860, e inaugurado en presencia del mismo Garibaldi, ya gravemente enfermo. No podemos seguir aquí todos los momentos de esta polémica, que hemos reconstruido detalladamente en otro lugar (B.Tobia, 1991, 168-80). Diremos únicamente que 1886 es el año crucial de esta batalla. A fines de año, en una tempestuosa reunión del Consejo municipal, se enfrentaron dos opiniones contrapuestas acerca del papel jugado por Napoleón III en el *Risorgimento*: por un lado, la de la mayoría moderada, tendiente a mostrar los méritos personales del emperador en la intervención francesa a favor de la independencia italiana, incluso contra los mismos intereses de Francia; por otro lado la de la minoría democrática, que negaba tajantemente que fuese un mérito lo que sucedió por mera necesidad, de acuerdo con la misma lógica que había impulsado a Luis Napoleón a apagar la República romana, a ir a México, incluso a consumar el delito de Mentana. Si en el Consejo municipal resultó vencedora la propuesta de colocación de la estatua en los nuevos jardines públicos, en eje con la de la Paz, no por ello disminuyó la agitación del bando contrario. Ésta, incluso, extendiendo la protesta al ámbito nacional, consiguió hacer inoperante la decisión tomada previamente. En este resultado de parálisis se reflejaba el doble equilibrio político que gobernaba Milán, donde existían contemporáneamente dos mayorías, la de las elecciones administrativas que expresaba el Consejo municipal, moderada y marcada fuertemente por el aporte de los electores católicos (a los que el papa permitía el voto municipal); y otra que, por el contrario, privada de los condicionamientos de aquellos votos, enviaba al Parlamento una representación de Milán mucho más orientada hacia la izquierda. Esto producía que el alineamiento democrático milanés fuese en verdad demasiado débil como para impedir una decisión -y de hecho había sido derrotado-, pero seguramente lo suficientemente fuerte como para obstaculizar su puesta en práctica. Así, podía ejercitar una especie de derecho de veto, y de hecho hizo uso de él cada vez que tomó forma el peligro de que se pasase de los simples votos a los hechos concretos. La cuestión fue finalmente resuelta por el fascismo que, en 1927, decidió la colocación de la estatua del emperador en el parque ciudadano, aunque no precisamente en el lugar previsto por la antigua decisión municipal.

Nos hemos explayado sobre el episodio porque éste muestra bastante bien cómo cada vez que se rompe un pacto no escrito, pero no por ello menos eficaz, entre los «vencedores» (los moderados) y los «derrotados» (los demócratas) del proceso *risorgimentale* se desgrana también el mecanismo de la pedagogía monumentalística italiana. Aquí son fundamentalmente los moderados los que traicionan el acuerdo tácito, con su insistencia en querer honrar a Napoleón III. Aquéllos se desmarcan de una línea de comportamiento tradicional, según la cual la «monumentalidad» oficial, digámoslo así, siempre había accedido a las razones del partido opuesto, esforzándose en interpretar sus deseos para que fuesen reconducibles a un denominador común. En este sentido el binomio Víctor Manuel-Garibaldi había expresado bien, también en el ámbito de las celebraciones monumentales, una propensión inclusiva, centrada en la institución monárquica -como hemos visto- y por lo tanto desequilibrada hacia el primer término, pero sobre una monarquía que tendía sus propios esfuerzos a la Unidad. En cuanto asoma la voluntad de salir del paradigma del *compromiso conmemorativo* surgen los vetos recíprocos: el homenaje a Napoleón III es sentido como una afrenta insoportable por parte de los demócratas, como expresión de una *tendencia*, de un solo partido; y el monumento a los caídos de Mentana puede ser sólo tolerado por los moderados en la ilusión de pagar un peaje por las propias y encomiásticas intenciones bonapartistas.

5. Al final de nuestra exposición podemos extraer algunas conclusiones de carácter más general. Preguntémonos por el juicio que cabe emitir acerca de las tres características fundamentales de la pedagogía política de la forma desarrollada en Italia en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX: sobre el esfuerzo de mantener juntas tradición y modernidad, sobre la voluntad de afirmar un centro ideal de irradiación en Roma, y sobre la tendencia a proponer una mediación, un compromiso conmemorativo entre ala moderada y ala democrática del *Risorgimento*, con ventaja sin embargo para la figura del rey. Comencemos por el último aspecto. La tendencia al compromiso conmemorativo expresa ciertamente una capacidad hegemónica y de dirección de la parte moderada sobre la democrática. De hecho, el esfuerzo de proponer un mito fundacional del proceso nacional fue un esfuerzo serio, conducido con intensidad y sin interrupciones. A los ejemplos que hemos analizado podríamos añadir, al menos, el circuito conmemorativo urbano de Milán. Este comienza en la plaza de la Catedral, con la célebre y muy moderna Galería Víctor Manuel -la sala de estar burguesa de la ciudad- y el monumento dedicado al rey, para acabar en el restaurado castillo medieval, con su torre dedicada a Humberto I, enfrente a la cual está el monumento a Garibaldi. También este circuito expresa todas las características de la nacionalización italiana a través de los monumentos: el vínculo entre el pasado y el presente, la centralidad de la Monarquía, el espacio para el compromiso. Y fue un recorrido

usado oportunamente en muchas ocasiones: la más importante fue la celebración del cincuentenario de la revolta antiaustríaca de 1848, llevada a cabo con cortejos y comicios. Pero precisamente esta ocasión nos proporciona el modo de especificar el límite de la capacidad encomiástico-política de las capas dirigentes de la Italia liberal. Se desarrollaron en esta jornada dos manifestaciones distintas, en la práctica sobre el mismo recorrido, una por la mañana, la oficial liberal-monárquico-moderada, y otra por la tarde, republicano-radical-socialista, bastante polémica sobre la versión que el gobierno y el municipio habían querido dar de las jornadas del 48. Esto habría sido impensable solamente diez años antes: y, de hecho, hemos mencionado con razón el éxito de la Peregrinación nacional de 1884 a la tumba del rey en el Panteón. El hecho es que en el momento en el que las clases populares italianas adquieren una capacidad política autónoma, con la constitución del nuevo Partido Socialista (en 1892) y con la renovación del republicano (en 1894), la debilidad de la hegemonía patriótico-conmemorativa del liberalismo italiano se revela en toda su dimensión. Así, el compromiso conmemorativo, la misma voluntad de mediación, ocultaban un gran temor: que la afirmación de los valores nacionales pudiese expresarse en una forma autónoma y no controlable desde arriba, que tomase la vía de la oposición neta al resultado del *Risorgimento*, asumiendo la vestimenta del republicanismo más encendido, quizás para disolverse después progresivamente, entre las masas populares, y enfilar la proa hacia formas clasistas y radicales en lo social.

También puede leerse la obsesión centralista del proceso de pedagogía política de la forma, tal y como se ha manifestado en Italia, como otro límite de la hegemonía encomiástico-moderada. En el país de las Cien ciudades, de los encendidos particularismos, de la división secular, de los siete Estados anteriores al *Risorgimento* conducidos por fuerza a la unidad, solamente en Roma podía surgir un verdadero monumento nacional, y éste debía tener un contenido que no fuese alusivo, sino explícitamente político, como era el del Vittoriano. Una comparación puede ayudar a comprender. Se trata de la Torre inaugurada en 1892 en San Martino, cerca del lago Garda, en el lugar donde tuvo lugar una de las batallas más sangrientas de la segunda guerra de Independencia. También en este caso es una torre dedicada a Víctor Manuel: en su interior contiene una estatua del rey y frescos que ilustran varios momentos de su vida, así como episodios militares del *Risorgimento*. Se encuentra en una colina, en medio del campo, en las cercanías del osario de los caídos. Pero no es un monumento verdaderamente *nacional*. Lo quiso la rica burguesía del Norte, siendo financiado por ésta y por las ciudades del Valle del Po, con la ayuda del Gobierno, y mantiene un carácter acusadamente local. Los grupos que lo promovieron eran sumamente patrióticos, de modo similar a los que tomaron iniciativas análogas en otras partes de Europa, por ejemplo en Alemania: «La élite tradicional de la

administración, la burguesía predominante de la cultura y de la propiedad» (W.Hardtwig, 1990, p.245). Pero más que ser un monumento a la unidad de Italia, expresa el orgullo de la contribución de las regiones septentrionales a la independencia del país (y no a su unificación). En su intento de honrar a la Casa Real y al Ejército, constituye un típico ejemplo, como ha afirmado Thomas Nipperdey ilustrando varios casos alemanes, de «monumento nacional-dinástico» (T.Nipperdey 1968, p.533). Por ello, expresa no una fuerza, sino una debilidad, «una situación de duda y de inquietud sobre la capacidad efectiva de proponer y elevar en común valores nacionales indiscutibles» (B.Tobia, 1991, p.181). Es como si, trasladándose a las provincias, el valor de la unidad asumiese inevitablemente caracteres locales y particulares. Estamos así tentados de ver en ello una suerte de metáfora de una debilidad hegemónica; en Italia resulta impensable lo que en otros lugares, en Alemania por ejemplo, tiene lugar en cambio de modo casi natural: la *capacidad de difusión* y la *capacidad alusiva* del monumento nacional. Dicho de otro modo, los ejemplos del *Hermannsdenkmal*, del *Kyffhäuser* o del *Niederwalddenkmal* no pueden ser emulados al sur de los Alpes.

Finalmente, nos queda un último aspecto: el nexo conmemorativo entre pasado y modernidad, tal y como se pretende proponer en la realización del monumento o en el uso de espacios públicos. También en este caso nos parece estar en presencia de una dificultad de cierta importancia. El ejemplo del *Kyffhäuser* puede orientarnos de nuevo en la comparación. El *Kyffhäuser* expresa de modo adecuado una fuerte concepción temporal, como es exigido por la representación especializada de la Historia. Naturalmente, la noción temporal que se expresa en estos casos no es necesariamente lineal, pero a pesar de ello puede ser tanto más compleja cuanto más se plantea un problema de transcodificación, siempre impuesta por la utilización simbólica del monumento. Inmersa en el tiempo eterno de la saga, se crea, en el complejo del *Kyffhäuser*, una flecha temporal que es al mismo tiempo jerarquización del espacio: de la Edad Media germánica (la gruta donde reside Barbarroja en espera del despertar) al nuevo Imperio alemán (la plataforma sobre la que se yergue la estatua ecuestre de Guillermo I). En Italia buscaríamos en vano algo semejante. La personalización contemporánea de los monumentos italianos es prácticamente absoluta: no se conoce un solo ejemplo relevante de monumento que reproduzca la forma simbólica de «Italia»; esto significa que la dialéctica entre pasado y modernidad nunca es traducida en el presente en una figuración abstracta, sino que ésta siempre debe ser reconstruida, por decirlo así, como un *a posteriori* implícito.

Lo mismo sucede también en la utilización de espacios creados expresamente para sugerir, esta vez de modo explícito, una dialéctica entre gloria de la tradición

y triunfo de la contemporaneidad. En la Exposición nacional de Turín de 1884 el tema de fondo es el de la exaltación de la técnica y de la producción moderna, pero flanqueado por el de la valoración del rico pasado histórico-artístico italiano. A este fin responden el castillo medieval reconstruido «en estilo» (para exaltar los antiguos orígenes montañoses de la monarquía) y la muestra sobre Roma desde la época republicana e imperial hasta las realizaciones más recientes. Se querían crear así dos polos en interacción mutua: la exaltación de la secular tradición cultural y artística del país como el más firme pedestal del milagro actual de una Italia guiada finalmente hacia la unidad. Solamente que, he aquí la cuestión, queda preguntarse sobre el éxito de esta operación. En esta enciclopedia construida, lo que cuenta - así lo afirman los propios organizadores- es el mensaje de estudio y trabajo que se quiere transmitir. Comitivas obreras, según un módulo bonapartista, son organizadas desde toda Italia para visitar la Exposición, de modo que alrededor de cuatrocientos mil obreros admiraron los pabellones de esta efímera ciudad. El pedagogismo patriótico se prolonga en el pedagogismo interclasista. Pero el hecho es que de allí al poco tiempo, como ya señalamos, con la fundación del moderno Partido Socialista, la posibilidad de esta prolongación se estaba diluyendo sustancialmente. Tradición y modernidad, pasado y presente, eran conceptos que asumían significados bien diferentes para la clase obrera que se estaba organizando autónomamente: el principal destinatario del uso público del espacio conmemorativo, orientado a conjugar los fastos de la Italia antigua con los de su *Risorgimento* político, parecía escapar de su alcance. Nuevos actores descompondrán el juego y la nacionalización de masas italiana quedará como suspendida en el vacío al finalizar el siglo xix. La inclusión en el Estado nacional de franjas más amplias del pueblo, urbanas o rurales, sólo será posible mediante la conjugación de los valores *liberales* del *Risorgimento* con los valores *democráticos* afirmados por los nuevos sujetos en movimiento, es decir, en un horizonte que, por lo menos en parte, habría sido más amplio que el propuesto por el nacionalismo.

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Risorgimento: Los movimientos nacionales y la fundación del Estado liberal unificado en Italia¹

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Con la constitución en el siglo XIX de un Estado nacional y liberal, que fue aceptado en el círculo de las grandes potencias europeas (de modo formal en 1867), el movimiento nacional italiano se sitúa en el grupo de aquéllos que pudieron ver realizado su objetivo de alcanzar una plasmación propia en un Estado nacional. Sin embargo, la tardía unificación estatal de Italia contrasta de modo evidente con la temprana conversión en Estados de Inglaterra, Francia y España. La existencia de una vieja identidad cultural-nacional, que se remonta a casi un milenio, no fue capaz de dar lugar a una realización en época más temprana de un proceso de *Nation-building*, sino todo lo contrario, como ilustra tras la fundación del Estado italiano la famosa frase «hecha Italia, ahora es necesario hacer italianos» (*fatta l'Italia, bisogna fare gl'italiani*).

Para la conformación de la Nación cultural contribuyó expresamente el temprano establecimiento de un canon de autores clásicos (en el siglo XIV) y con ello una lengua escrita que en lo sustancial cambió bastante poco en los siglos venideros, y cuya permanencia permitía en el siglo XIX a todo italiano con formación el acceso directo a la literatura nacional, del mismo modo que la paradigmática situación de la cultura del Renacimiento adquiriría una significación que apenas se puede sobrevalorar. Así, los vínculos con la Antigüedad por un lado, y por otro con el Papado y el Imperio, se sitúan en una correlación significativa, aunque también contradictoria, con la identidad cultural-nacional. La rica historia de la literatura italiana del siglo XVIII fortalece el carácter apolítico de esa identidad.²

¹ En este artículo de ámbito general, se ha reducido el aparato crítico al mínimo, prácticamente a la ilustración de las citas. Para la bibliografía anterior, me permito remitir al lector a mis propios trabajos citados en la bibliografía de la nota 3.

* Traducción: Xosé M. Núñez.

² Vid. Klaus-Dieter Schreiber, *Untersuchungen zur italienischen Literatur- und Kulturgeschichtsschreibung in der zweiten Hälfte des Settecento*, Bad Homburg v.d.H., Berlin, Zürich, 1968.

A lo largo de esos siglos sólo de forma esporádica se registran proyectos políticos de alcance más amplio (quizás en Maquiavelo), en la medida en que aquéllos -como sucedió p.ej. en el siglo XVIII, como apoyo a la política del Cardenal Alberoni- eran meramente instrumentales. El gran apogeo del reformismo político en la práctica y en la teoría entre las primeras señales del Reformismo ilustrado (*Settecento riformatore*) conllevó un impulso modernizador brusco y renovado, tras el estancamiento sufrido en el período de dominación contrarreformista española. Pero ese impulso era anacional, orientado al mismo tiempo en dirección cosmopolita y de modo individual en cada Estado, estando fuertemente vinculado a los dos grandes ejes conformados por los Estados habsbúrgicos y borbónicos tanto en la recepción de las fórmulas como en las innovaciones transmitidas a través de las fronteras.

Las esbozadas interpretaciones que siguen tratarán -también en relación con mis propios trabajos previos de temática similar³- acerca de los rasgos esenciales del nacionalismo del *Risorgimento* (entendiendo aquí «nacionalismo» -más allá de la concepción de Eugen Lemberg- en el sentido más bien del término inglés *nationalism*, sinónimo de patriotismo o de movimiento nacional), con especial consideración de la problemática global de la modernización, la existencia en particular de movimientos nacionalistas diferentes y opuestos, sus programas, sus estrategias y sus bases sociales; con ello se abordarán de modo más profundo dos cuestiones de especial interés, merced a la consideración de fuentes novedosas:

- (1) El cambio repentino desde la nación cultural a la reivindicación de un Estado nacional, bajo el influjo de la Revolución francesa;
- (2) Aspectos de la historia organizativa y de las bases sociales del movimiento nacional italiano en una fase clave del *Risorgimento*, en concreto los años 1859-60, con especial atención a la *Società Nazionale* y los voluntarios.

1. La época de la Revolución francesa y del *Grand Empire*

De acuerdo con las tesis más al uso, es opinión común que el movimiento político nacionalista en Italia surgió como un importante aspecto parcial de la recepción de la Revolución francesa, y que continuó desarrollándose en el contexto

³ Especialmente, H. Ullrich, «Bürgertum und nationale Bewegung in Italien des Risorgimento», en O. Dann (ed.), *Nationalismus und sozialer Wandel*, Hamburgo, 1978, 129-56; id., «Der italienische Liberalismus von der Nationalstaatsgründung bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg», in D. Langewiesche (ed.), *Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert. Deutschland im europäischen Vergleich*, Göttingen, 1988, 378-414.

de la política modernizadora y hegemónica de Napoleón, a pesar de todas las hipotecas que ésta supuso para el desarrollo de las actividades nacionalistas (de lo cual Foscolo puede ser muestra ejemplar, en el campo de la literatura, de la ilustración de una disensión articulada en base al consenso alrededor de las ideas de 1789), y por ello hasta 1814 el movimiento nacionalista solamente pudo desarrollarse de modo lento. De modo impactante, aceleró este proceso el uso del término «Patriotismo» como muestra de la asunción de posiciones políticas de la Revolución (así, p.ej., en la obra de Melchiorre Gioia, *Cos'è patriotismo* [1798])⁴ sin connotaciones nacionales o étnicas de ningún tipo.

Es de destacar el momento de nacimiento, estrechamente situado en el tiempo, en el que una identidad cultural secular es transformada por segmentos significativos de las élites modernizadoras en un programa político que incluye la reivindicación de independencia y unidad estatal de toda la península: se trata de la década de 1790, con la fundación de las repúblicas revolucionarias bajo la égida de Bonaparte y el *triennio giacobino* (1796-1799) como hitos principales.

1. La colaboración conjunta, duradera y fructífera, entre las élites ilustradas y las dinastías italianas entró por diversas causas en una crisis profunda, y los acontecimientos franceses indujeron a los principados a liquidar las políticas reformistas.

2. Sobre todo en Italia central y septentrional, el antiguo Orden social sufrió una serie de cambios, en parte gracias a la acción del Absolutismo ilustrado: así ocurrió especialmente en Lombardía y en el Gran Ducado de Toscana (de modo que los milaneses podían explicar en 1796 a Napoleón que entre ellos las reformas burguesas de la Revolución francesa ya eran ley desde hacía tiempo); en parte también, aquél fue deslegitimado por la evidente esclerotización de las repúblicas aristocráticas de Génova y Venecia.

3. Las ideas reformistas político-constitucionales con fundamento en una sociedad de propietarios no estamental ya estaban articuladas en 1790: éstas tenían un importante precedente en el proyecto de Constitución, finalmente no legislado, del Gran Duque Pietro Leopoldo de Toscana.⁵

⁴ Reeditado en Melchiorre Gioia, *Opere minori. III*, Lugano, 1833, p.219 y ss.

⁵ Vid. el reciente trabajo de Giulio M. Manetti, *La costituzione inattuata. Pietro Leopoldo Granduca di Toscana: dalla riforma comunitativa al progetto di costituzione*, Florencia, 1992.

4. Tanto los ilustrados decepcionados por el giro conservador de los príncipes como una segunda generación más radicalizada se convirtieron en protagonistas y activistas del *Triennio giacobino*, y con ello asumieron también un proyecto de política modernizadora alimentado por la recepción de la Revolución francesa, aceptando la hegemonía política de la Francia revolucionaria. Los «jacobinos» italianos eran en su mayoría republicanos moderados, más bien Termidorianos, enfrentados a una minoría de jacobinos radical-democráticos; la existencia de dos movimientos reformistas enfrentados, que constituyó también la base del movimiento nacional del *Risorgimento*, caracteriza ya la década de 1790.

5. Objetivos nacionalistas de alcance italiano ya son observables en el intento revolucionario jacobino de Buonarroti en 1793; los jacobinos italianos (parte de ellos en el exilio) impulsaron a Francia hacia una política de liberación de Italia, y para ellos el postulado de la unidad italiana era una pieza fundamental de un programa de transformación radical.

6. Muy expresivos del proceso contemporáneo de transformación de la identidad cultural nacional en una conciencia política nacional italiana son la formulación de principios y los 57 textos presentados al certamen «¿Cuál de los gobiernos libres conviene mejor a la felicidad de Italia?», convocado por la República Cisalpina en 1796 a iniciativa de Bonaparte.⁶ La perspectiva es mayoritariamente pan-italiana, es decir, trasciende los límites de Lombardía o de Italia septentrional; el Gobierno francés y los participantes franceses en ese certamen son los que con más insistencia quieren insinuar un mayor gradualismo y una limitación a Italia del Norte... Los autores italianos están imbuídos en su mayoría de la idea de la misión libertadora de la Revolución, y el premiado, Gioia, invitaba a «los patriotas italianos de todas las ciudades, de todos los pueblos» a estar «preparados» para «levantarse en masa a la primera señal y formar un sagrado batallón, que deberá extirpar la tiranía de Italia»⁷ desde Turín hasta Nápoles. Si la opción por la República era dominante, aunque con claras diferencias entre republicanos liberal-moderados y republicanos demócratas, existía un cierto equilibrio entre «federalistas» (federadores del Estado, pero también y ante todo unificadores de Estados) y unitarios. La República de pequeñas dimensiones parece haber sido además, en la visión de la publicística unitaria de la época, un marco de referencia habitual de un Republicanismo igualitario

⁶ Publicados en Armando Saitta, *Alle origini del Risorgimento: I testi di un «celebre» concorso (1796)*, Roma, 1964, 3 vols.

⁷ Melchiorre Gioia, «Dissertazione sul problema dell'amministrazione generale della Lombardia: quale dei governi liberi meglio convenga alla felicità dell'Italia», in *Ibid.*, II, p.127.

y orientado hacia lo clásico, venerador de la «Virtud» y la frugalidad, mientras que los preconizadores de la modernización y el desarrollo económico, de una *commercial society*, reivindicaban una construcción estatal más amplia. Pero más que el nuevo Estado federal norteamericano, se impone fuertemente contra la alternativa federal el que parece el modelo francés indiscutible de la *République une et indivisible*: desarrollo económico y todas las características del *Nation-building* (¡la superación de las antítesis históricas!), el desarrollo del poder del Estado unitario como garantía indispensable frente los deseos de revancha de los poderes del Antiguo Régimen tanto al sur como al Norte de los Alpes; la promesa de la reinstauración tanto del «antiguo esplendor» perdido de Italia y de sus futuras grandezas como de su situación de «centro de comercio y rectitud», como un «poder generoso con sus amigos, y que infunda temor a sus enemigos»,⁸ y finalmente el temor de una inevitable dinámica desintegradora del «Federalismo» (es decir, de un Estado federal), que podría conducir a la «disgregación». Todos los argumentos desembocaban en una misma conclusión: «¿Debemos acaso retrasarnos, en seguir su ejemplo[el de la República francesa]?».⁹

7. El armisticio de Campoformio (1797), que entregó Venecia a Austria, ensombreció la imagen hasta entonces resplandeciente del Bonaparte «liberador de Italia», mientras que fortaleció el sentimiento nacionalista.

8. Tampoco las élites moderadas dominantes desde 1800 dejaron que se diluyesen las perspectivas panitalianas, incluso bajo la dominación de Napoleón y la aceptación de una configuración territorial de la Península a menudo cambiante, pero progresivamente disgregada. Así se defendía con éxito el principal exponente de los *Moderati* milaneses y futuro vicepresidente de la República italiana de 1802/2 contra el proyecto de estructuración confederal de la 2ª República Cisalpina defendido por Talleyrand, y que de todos modos llevó a Bonaparte a la significativa concesión del cambio de denominación en «República italiana» en 1802; tenazmente perseveraban Melzi y sus amigos en la determinación de la disolución posterior de la unión personal del *Regno Italico* con Francia: libertad interior mediante una Constitución y -en el caso de anexión a Francia- irrenunciable derecho a la posesión de un Estado propio se convirtieron en elementos inseparables.¹⁰

⁸ Vincenzo Lancetti, «Del Governo Libero più conveniente alla felicità dell'Italia», *Ibid.*, III, pp. 31 y 41.

⁹ Giovanni Ristori, «Discorso sopra il quesito quale dei governi liberi convenga meglio all'Italia», *Ibid.*, III, p. 108.

¹⁰ Así expresaba p.ej. Marescalchi en 1805 al embajador francés sin rodeos la deseada reordenación de Lombardía, es decir del Estado matriz de Italia septentrional y central, que debería ser «entièrement séparée de la France, gouvernée par un Prince indépendant [¡ciertamente un francés!], garantie contre

Difícilmente puede dejar de valorarse la significación de la época napoleónica, y en especial del primer Estado que se denominó «italiano» y se extendió a toda la península con Constitución, simbología nacional, Administración, Ejército, etc., para la conformación de una identidad política italiana, que unió Nación y modernización bajo la anexión a un poder hegemónico occidental. El crecimiento progresivo de una conciencia política nacional entre las élites se aceleró, primero por el desesperado intento de Murat de salvar su trono napolitano entre Napoleón, Austria, Gran Bretaña y los Borbones mediante la proclamación de un programa nacional italiano y la *Proclama di Rimini* (1815), y en segundo lugar por las reivindicaciones independentistas de la aristocracia lombarda en 1814. Este proceso fue coronado por el éxito en cuanto una potencia con intereses en liza, en concreto Gran Bretaña, en pugna por lograr la adhesión de las élites políticas italianas, no solamente desarrolló una política constitucional, sino que también incluyó postulados nacionales en ella (especialmente con la Proclamación de Livorno de Lord Bentinck).¹¹

2. De la modernización mediante el compromiso de los cuatro Estados a la constitución del Estado nacional liberal como una condición *sine qua non* de la modernización

2.1. Algunos rasgos principales de la Italia de la Restauración

Un punto de partida indispensable de toda consideración de la situación de Italia desde la Restauración hasta los comienzos de la industrialización en la década de 1880 ha de ser la fragmentación de la península en regiones, zonas y Estados particulares (hasta 1861), que viven de modo aislado e ignorándose mutuamente, y que poseen estructuras sociales, económicas y políticas muy heterogéneas. La ausencia de comunicaciones fluídas (¡incluso la falta de enlaces de correos regulares entre Italia septentrional y central en fecha tan tardía como 1840!) permitieron la pervivencia de los antiguos estrangulamientos, mientras que la diferente orientación en política interior de Lombardía-Véneto bajo dominio austríaco y de los Estados italianos tras 1815 contribuyó también a reforzar viejas y nuevas desigualdades estructurales.

son souverain par une constitution mixte, et contre la France», a través de un Tratado, que resolviese de modo «liberal» el problema financiero de las subvenciones. (Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, París, Correspondence Politique Milanaise, vol.61, Informe D'Hauterive, s.f. [Ventoso 1805], fol. 9).

¹¹ Sobre este aspecto, me remito a los conceptuales trabajos de Carlo R. Ricotti.

El proceso de *State-building* y de *Nation-building* del *Risorgimento* no podía tener lugar, sin embargo, a partir de una *tabula rasa* : en su lugar habría que colocar más bien la imagen de un campo de ruinas engañosamente complejo en el que están en curso múltiples crisis de legitimidad susceptibles de conducir al colapso. Los elementos feudal-estamentales del Orden social eran poco más que una lejana reminiscencia, el profundo impacto del Absolutismo ilustrado había convulsionado gravemente los tradicionales valores y privilegios, y las dinastías del *Settecento riformatore* habían perdido de nuevo su legitimidad recuperada mediante prácticas reformistas hacia 1790. Con la presencia ideal y todavía viva de los nuevos modelos políticos de la Revolución y del sistema napoleónico y contra la influencia de un liberalismo occidental del que no era posible aislarse realmente, entre 1815 y 1848 Italia se convirtió en un escenario en el que competían de modo cada vez más encarnizado modelos políticos totalmente diferentes. Ciertamente, no debe desestimarse la permanencia en esta fase de identidades políticas particularistas a menudo muy antiguas, así como de sentimientos patrióticos premodernos (*Landespatriotismen*), e incluso en casos aislados su relativo reforzamiento: desde la conciencia estatal napolitana persistente hasta la década de 1850, pasando por la vitalidad de la *nazione siciliana* impregnada de un fuerte sello aristocrático-estamental (la revolución de 1848 comenzó como un movimiento de separación de Nápoles, antes que como una movilización con fines italianos), hasta la Saboya-Piamonte bilingüe caracterizada por un fuerte patriotismo dinástico. Por un lado, la continuidad de estas identidades y lealtades, y por otro lado un vacío de legitimidad -muy resaltable, si se compara con Alemania-, son factores que configuran una imagen contradictoria de la Italia de la Restauración.

2.2 ¿La fundación del Estado nacional como creación de un mercado nacional por una burguesía madura y progresivamente consciente de su fuerza y de sus objetivos?

A pesar de los importantes puntos de apoyo establecidos en la Historia del *Risorgimento* (como p.ej. las cuatro reivindicaciones de libertad de actividades económicas, abolición de los obstáculos aduaneros, incremento del tráfico comercial y unificación de pesos y medidas en uno de los programas más significativos del *Moderatismo*, el *Programma per l'Opinione Nazionale Italiana* de Massimo d'Azeglio en 1847), la interpretación economicista del proceso de Unificación -que data de al menos un cuarto de siglo- y del movimiento nacional italiano ya no es sostenible por más tiempo. Las características fundamentales de la península durante la época de la Restauración -en parte apuntados más arriba-, las estructuras sociales y económicas

de Italia, no solamente preindustriales, sino también precapitalistas -aparte de algunos islotes de modernidad situados ante todo en partes del Norte y Toscana- invalidan totalmente aquel esquema interpretativo. Más bien cabe plantearse la cuestión de si existía el presunto protagonista de la interpretación económica, es decir, una burguesía italiana como tal. La burguesía (en singular) puede ser considerada sólo como un agregado de capas burguesas heterogéneas, fragmentadas y muy segmentadas dentro de cada uno de los Estados, que solamente en casos excepcionales se comunicaban entre sí al nivel de toda Italia (este último aspecto puede ser también de interés en relación con las teorías de K.W.Deutsch). Frente a los grandes propietarios, y también frente a funcionarios y profesionales liberales, los pequeños grupos iniciales de industriales, a menudo también extranjeros, configuraban no sólo el estrato más reciente, sino también el más débil y ligado además estrechamente en su mayoría a cada uno de los Gobiernos.

En realidad, el programa nacional-liberal fue presentado a los dispersos y a menudo pusilánimes elementos burgueses en las diversas partes de Italia por una minoritaria élite político-cultural de orígenes mixtos aristocráticos y burgueses, en cuyas filas los militares tuvieron además un lugar destacable -como en España-, sobre todo en las fases iniciales.

La combinación de sectores aristocráticos liberales con grupos burgueses en los movimientos reformistas, constitucionales y nacionalistas representa una de las características principales del *Risorgimento*. El *Moderatismo*, que no puede ser considerado sin más como una variante italiana del liberalismo, sino que se ha de encuadrar entre el Liberalismo moderado y el reformismo conservador en virtud de su búsqueda incansable de un equilibrio entre sus propios deseos de renovación y el orden político (dinástico) y cultural (el catolicismo) existente, establecía como su objetivo supremo el progreso económico y cultural, con lo que el siguiente paso de la reforma política era innegociable; conseguir de nuevo figurar entre los países más avanzados de Europa occidental -Francia, Bélgica, Gran Bretaña- era el deseo fundamental. Los anhelos de reforma de los *moderati* comprendían sin lagunas y gradaciones todas las esferas, desde la modernización de la agricultura hasta la vida literaria.

La política modernizadora de los *moderati* era concebida dentro del marco de los Estados peninsulares, respetaba sus delimitaciones, pero sin embargo estaba forzada a buscar de modo creciente un contexto más amplio -en forma de unión aduanera o confederación de Estados-, y conducía a conciliar la lealtad al orden estatal existente, los deseos de reforma y la progresiva identidad italiana que emanaba de la conciencia de Nación cultural, superando los conflictos.

Un programa nacionalista que estableciese como postulado claro la consecución de un Estado nacional unitario hacía ya tiempo que había sido formulado categóricamente en la Italia anterior a 1848 por los sectores democrático-republicanos, especialmente por la *Giovine Italia* de Giuseppe Mazzini (1831): «Restaurar a Italia como nación de hombres libres e iguales, independiente y soberana», así rezaba en el primer artículo de sus estatutos el objetivo de la *Giovine Italia*, como «hermandad de todos los italianos»,¹² lo que era un postulado central del movimiento de Mazzini, en el contexto de una solidaridad fundamental de todas las Naciones y movimientos nacionalistas, iguales en dignidad y deberes, unidos por una obligación moral de ayuda mutua en la conquista del derecho de autodeterminación y del autogobierno nacional (lo que encontraría su primera forma organizativa y operativa en la *Giovine Europa*), juntamente con la consecución de la República, concebida ésta más allá de la dimensión político-jurídica como una institución ética sobresaliente (o, como definió adecuadamente el historiador Salvemini, él mismo influido por la tradición mazziniana: «una institución esencialmente religiosa»¹³).

El republicanismo mazziniano, que configuraba el componente principal de las variadas corrientes del democratismo italiano -incluso con el desarrollo de modernas formas partidistas de organización política (de las que surge una línea de continuidad directa con el *Partito Repubblicano Italiano* posterior a 1945)-, sin poder absorberlas del todo, pertenece a la familia de los movimientos nacionalistas democráticos y como tal deberá continuar activo en Europa, sobre todo en Europa centro-oriental y sudoriental, y más allá de Europa hasta el siglo XX; a menudo las clasificaciones pertinentes que lo catalogan dentro del liberalismo europeo son totalmente engañosas: a ellas se oponen no sólo la propia autoconcepción de los mazzinianos antes y después de 1848, sino también -y de modo más claro- la dura crítica de Mazzini contra los postulados fundamentales del liberalismo y de la doctrina del libre comercio (desde su escrito *Interessi e principi* de 1836). Así, el movimiento demócrata-republicano surgiría como un antagonista del liberalismo, y no como su ala extremista o como una escisión del mismo.

Por lo tanto, el dualismo entre dos movimientos de renovación nacional, por un lado los *Moderati* de la alta burguesía y la aristocracia (de los que, principalmente, nacerá más tarde el liberalismo italiano) y por otro lado los demócratas burgueses y pequeño-burgueses, configura una segunda característica principal del *Risorgimento*,

¹² «Istruzione per gli affratellati nella Giovine Italia», § 1, en Giuseppe Mazzini, *Scritti editi ed inediti*, Imola, 1904-43, II, p. 45 y ss.

¹³ Gaetano Salvemini, *Scritti sul Risorgimento*, ed. de Piero Pieri y Carlo Pischedda, Milán, 1961, p.175.

que será una constante de la Historia del proceso de unificación italiano desde sus orígenes hasta el *triennio giacobino* y que continuará activa a través del período de fundación del Estado nacional. Ambos movimientos se diferencian y marcan nítidos límites entre ellos en todos los aspectos, desde su modelo político constitucional hasta sus apoyos sociales respectivos.

2.3. *El Piamonte liberal como imán de las fuerzas nacionalistas y reformistas de Italia*

En 1848 se desvaneció al instante la ilusión de poder solucionar la cuestión nacional en armonía con el Papado y los demás príncipes italianos (*neoguelfismo*), así como se aceleró la irreparable crisis de las antiguas identidades locales ya mencionadas (*municipalismo*). En el verano de 1849 eran patentes tanto el fracaso del *L'Italia farà da sé* sellado en los campos de batalla del norte de Italia, una pretensión de ámbito italiano con apoyo en el añejo Estado piamontés, como el descalabro de la estrategia revolucionaria universal del republicanismo, en el contexto general de la derrota de la democracia desde París hasta la llanura húngara. Revoluciones, instituciones y hazañas de los años 1848/49, en particular las heroicas defensas de la República romana y de Venecia, se convertirían no obstante en importantes elementos de la propia identidad del futuro Estado unitario.

El denominado «decenio de preparación» (1849-59) está marcado por la construcción de un moderno Estado matriz liberal, ejemplificado en el Reino de Cerdeña, y la vinculación definitiva de los movimientos reformistas y políticos con el objetivo de constituir un Estado nacional.

La realidad de la reacción minó el terreno, desde Módena hasta Palermo, a aquellos sectores que todavía pensaban en revivir las políticas reformistas de cada Estado en equilibrio con las viejas dinastías, o a renovarlas en relación con cambios dinásticos y reorientaciones en política exterior (así ocurrió con el movimiento del *murattismo* en Nápoles). El abanico de opciones políticas se redujo así finalmente a tres posiciones principales:

- la defensa a toda costa de un ya frágil viejo Orden, apoyada en el Papado y en el poder de los Habsburgo.
- el republicanismo revolucionario, con el objetivo prioritario de un Estado democrático unitario en la perspectiva universalista de una reordenación libre de Europa basada en el respeto a las nacionalidades.

- el liberalismo monárquico y orientado a escala de toda Italia, apoyado en el Estado piamontés y en íntima conexión con Francia y después Gran Bretaña.

Mientras que las tendencias republicanas, y en especial el movimiento de Mazzini, se sumían en una crisis cada vez más profunda, con el trasfondo del fracaso de la Revolución de 1848/49 y el carácter infructuoso de los nuevos intentos revolucionarios en Italia, así como la perspectiva cada vez más lejana de una revolución europea, el movimiento liberal sentaba las bases de su victoria final de 1861. Una precondition para ello era el mantenimiento de la constitución de la particularidad política sustancial del reino de Piemonte-Cerdeña, incluso tras el desastre militar de 1849, entre la reacción habsbúrgica y el autoritarismo bonapartista. Bajo la égida de Cavour se convirtió aquél, a partir del antiguo Estado de Saboya, en un Estado liberal radicalmente renovador y ejemplar en el aspecto político, legislativo, económico y cultural, que se orientaba hacia Francia, Bélgica y Gran Bretaña, y que ejercía una atracción magnética cada vez mayor sobre las élites modernizadoras de toda Italia: como Estado más avanzado que impulsaba una política de alcance hasta cierto punto nacional. El destacado papel de los emigrados de otras partes de Italia en la política y la administración también contribuyó a la nacionalización de la política piamontesa y respaldó las aspiraciones italianas de Turín. Mientras tanto, de la fusión de las facciones más progresistas del *Moderatismo* subalpino con el centro liberal (*connubio* de 1853) surgió un movimiento liberal en manos de Cavour, que no tenía nada que envidiar en su modernidad a los partidos liberales más avanzados de Europa occidental. En la medida en que progresaba la transformación liberal del antiguo reino de Piemonte-Cerdeña, al tiempo que lo hacía la convicción de que Cavour y el rey podrían alentar una política exterior de objetivos nacional-italianos en vez de una mera política de expansión de una «Gran Saboya», los antiguos demócratas reorientaron sus simpatías desde Mazzini y la República hacia los liberales de Cavour.

La organización principal nacida de este proceso de revisión de la Democracia moderada y de su vinculación con Cavour es la *Società Nazionale* (SN), la cual merece una atención particularizada, para así poder profundizar en nuestros conocimientos acerca de las formas organizativas y bases sociales del movimiento nacionalista liberal.

3. *Società Nazionale* y voluntarios de 1859

En la Historia del movimiento nacional italiano hasta hoy no existe, debido al descuido de toda una generación de investigadores sobre el *Risorgimento*, una exploración global y sistemática que abarque una serie de aspectos relevantes, tales como su sustrato social, educacional y geográfico, las estructuras de comunicación, etc. -en la dirección del modelo de Hroch. Existe solamente un cierto número de datos y resultados de investigaciones parciales -algunas muy valiosas-, pero que apenas permiten conformar un mosaico de conjunto -lo que se puede aplicar también a la construcción de un elenco, por lo demás bastante heterogéneo, de políticos demócratas del *Risorgimento* llevado a cabo por Lovett en 1982.

La organización más activa políticamente en la fase cumbre del *Risorgimento*, la *Società Nazionale* (modelo reconocible de la *Nationalverein* alemana), ha sido relativamente poco investigada -incluso en el contexto del extendido distanciamiento que se ha producido desde la II Guerra Mundial con respecto a la historiografía clásica sobre el *Risorgimento*-, a pesar de que desempeñó un papel director en la expansión del programa nacionalista italiano en 1857-59, y prestó una inestimable contribución al apoyo de la política de Cavour en 1859-60 y al proceso revolucionario nacional-liberal en el Centro de Italia en 1859-60, a pesar del armisticio de Villafranca, y acto seguido a la liberación del Sur. La única investigación sistemática existente hasta hoy, de la pluma de Grew,¹⁴ tiende a una minusvaloración sistemática de su influencia.

En el contexto del proceso de revisión de la democracia italiana tras el fracaso de la segunda revolución democrática a fines de 1848/49, la SN fue fundada en 1857, como consecuencia de la cierta orientación del ala moderada de los demócratas hacia el Estado constitucional liberal de Piamonte-Cerdeña, posponiendo la cuestión institucional a la reivindicación prioritaria de la unidad e independencia de Italia, y bajo la dirección de los veteranos de la oposición lombarda de 1820/21, los «Mártires de Spielberg», el marqués de Pallavicino, y del defensor de la República de Venecia en 1849, Manin. A fines de la década la Società se había convertido, bajo el liderazgo del abogado y literato siciliano La Farina, en un fiel apoyo, si no en el instrumento, de la política de Cavour. Su significación se ha de valorar nuevamente no sólo en relación con el proceso de revisión ideológica del democratismo tras 1849,¹⁵ sino

¹⁴ Raymond Grew, *A sterner plan for national unity. The Italian National Society in the Risorgimento*, Princeton (N.J.), 1963.

¹⁵ Romano Ugolini, «La via democratico-moderata all'Unità: dal 'Partito Nazionale Italiano' alla 'Società Nazionale Italiana'», en *Correnti ideali e politiche della Sinistra italiana dal 1849 al 1861. Atti del XXI Convegno storico toscano* (Castelvecchio Pascoli, 26-29 maggio 1975), Florencia, 1978.

sobre todo a la luz de un conjunto de investigaciones regionales (sobre todo las de Ugolini, Bartoccini e Isastia,¹⁶ quienes también confirman la crítica a Grew del mayor biográfico de Cavour, Rosario Romeo¹⁷); así como se ha de volver a considerar de modo diferente su mayor peso en los acontecimientos de 1859-61. Una serie de nuevas fuentes archivísticas hasta hoy no explotadas y sólo parcialmente accesibles, pertenecientes al fondo del secretario de la SN, Carlo Michele Buscalioni, permiten arrojar nueva luz -aunque por el momento sólo sea parcial- sobre la historia de la organización, así como configurar los rasgos básicos de la militancia, influencia y actividad de la SN en las elecciones de 1860-61.¹⁸ Estos elementos todavía provisionales cobran un especial interés si se procede a una comparación con la primera investigación sistemática de los voluntarios de 1859, de la pluma de A.M.Isastia.¹⁹

3.1. Sobre las bases sociales y la organización de la *Società Nazionale*

Un fragmento de una lista de suscriptores del órgano de la SN, el *Piccolo Corriere* (que ya en 1858 tenía una difusión de 3-4000 ejemplares, en una época en la que sólo existía libertad de prensa en el Reino de Piamonte-Cerdeña, mientras que en Lombardía-Véneto y en la mayoría de los demás Estados, aparte de Toscana, dominaba una férrea censura), datable hacia 1860, y que comprende desde la letra O a la Z, nos proporciona la siguiente imagen:²⁰

Los 2354 suscriptores presentan una notable distribución regional: 137 de Italia septentrional, de los cuales 82 son de Piamonte-Cerdeña; 1906 de Italia central, de los cuales 750 son de Toscana y 907 de Emilia, en los *Ducati* (pequeños Estados de Parma y Módena, y en las antiguas legaciones papales), y también en los dos capitolios de la SN; 311 del Sur y de las islas, de los que 241 son sicilianos.

¹⁶ Una buena visión de conjunto sobre las nuevas aportaciones bibliográficas en Anna Maria Isastia, *Il volontariato militare nel Risorgimento. La partecipazione alla guerra del 1859*, Roma, Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, Ufficio Storico, 1990, 277-305.

¹⁷ Rosario Romeo, *Cavour e il suo tempo*, III (1854-1861), Bari, 1984.

¹⁸ Las siguientes observaciones, sumarias al tiempo que provisionales, a las que seguirán investigaciones más concluyentes, se basan en lo sustancial en esas fuentes, que se encuentran repartidos entre la colección Nelson Gay (en el *Museo Centrale del Risorgimento*, Roma), y la colección Patetta (en la Biblioteca Apostólica Vaticana, Roma). Agradezco a los directores y personal archivero de ambas instituciones su generosa ayuda.

¹⁹ Isastia, op.cit.

²⁰ El vaciado de la fuente fue efectuado con la colaboración del Dr. G.Kuck (*Deutsches Historisches Institut* de Roma), a quien agradezco su amable ayuda en la elaboración de los resultados.

El grueso de la lista de suscriptores refleja la dinámica del proceso de unificación de 1859 y desmiente la idea hasta ahora dominante de la escasa penetración en Sicilia. Disponemos al menos de datos rudimentarios sobre la profesión y estatus social de 870 suscriptores:

El perfil social experimenta sustanciales modificaciones de Norte a Sur: mientras que en el Norte la aristocracia representa solamente un 2,7% de los suscriptores, en Sicilia llega a un 20%; los individuos con formación universitaria (*dottore*) oscilan entre 1/7 (en el Norte) y casi 1/4 (en Italia central); a éstos se añaden considerables componentes de otras categorías profesionales: las profesiones liberales representan más de los 2/5 en el Norte, 1/6 en Italia central y en Sicilia; los *possidenti*, es decir, los propietarios agrarios y urbanos (sobre la problemática definición de esta categoría vid. infra) juegan un papel importante sobre todo en Toscana (22%), mientras que su escasa participación en otras regiones requerirá análisis más detallados; la proporción de profesores y maestros en general es sorprendentemente escasa, y los sacerdotes tienen una participación apreciable casi únicamente en Lombardía y Sicilia, como residuos de un clero liberal y nacionalista; artesanos y trabajadores -de carácter preindustrial en su mayoría-, incluyendo personal doméstico, ocupan una posición en conjunto marginal, si bien se registra una destacable presencia de artesanos en Italia central (hacia un 10%).

La estructura organizativa de la SN se diferenciaba notablemente de las sociedades secretas de antaño: resaltaba ante todo su carácter público, y solamente fuera del Reino de Cerdeña (en razón de la censura y de la presión policial) se vio obligada a retroceder a formas más o menos conspirativas.

La afiliación (que contaba al menos 4.000 miembros antes de la Unificación) era individual, existiendo un programa difundido (el *Credo Politico*, febrero de 1858). Por debajo de la organización central en Turín existían comités provinciales, de distrito y locales; donde no podían ser formados por falta de adherentes o por las reglamentaciones policiales fuera del Reino de Cerdeña, actuaban los comisarios. Las cuotas de afiliación eran relativamente altas: 20 liras de cuota de ingreso para los *soci promotori*, la cuota mensual era de 5 liras, para los *soci ordinari* entre 1 ó 5 liras (40 liras de cuota impositiva era la base para establecer el censo electoral). No obstante, las fragmentarias fuentes indican una afiliación socialmente más diversificada al nivel de las delegaciones locales, frecuentemente con una presencia mayor de artesanos y funcionarios subalternos -mientras que el nivel social era claramente más alto en los comités provinciales.

3.2. La distribución geográfica

La formación y la propiedad eran características dominantes (teniendo en cuenta que el término *possidenti* a menudo no denota sólo a grandes propietarios o rentistas, sino que también, mediante la constatación de una segunda profesión - funcionarios, profesiones liberales, etc.- se pone de relieve el importante papel de grupos de clase media, y a menudo con la explicitación de un segundo oficio de artesano también se alumbra la presencia chocante de estratos urbanos inferiores); la aristocracia se halla escasamente representada en amplias zonas, y con frecuencia su abstinencia, cuando no su tendencia a alinearse con el Antiguo Régimen, es fustigada en los informes de las nuevas zonas.

El estado presente del trabajo permite únicamente dibujar unos cuadros relativamente «impresionistas» de algunas situaciones fundadamente reputables como típicas, y para ello un requisito de primera magnitud es la diferenciación regional.

En el Piamonte (cuya situación no se puede identificar con todo el reino de Piamonte-Cerdeña) los burócratas y militares juegan un papel considerable, y la conexión con los parlamentarios liberales está firmemente establecida (institucionalizada más tarde por vía electoral en la fracción *Unione Liberale*).

Esa impronta de predominio de los «honorables» se debilita en las zonas que sufrieron la revolución de 1859 (los pequeños Estados de Emilia, los antiguos dominios papales y Toscana), ensanchándose por la base de la escala social.

De los primeros grupos regionales serán investigados los 52 *soci ordinari* del comité provincial de Reggio (Principado de Módena) en 1860: solamente 2 aristócratas, 20 *dottori*, 2 ingenieros, 2 farmacéuticos...Vayamos a la esfera local: veamos los representantes de la SN en Bagnacavallo, en la Romagna occidental, al constituir el *comitato direttore* local con el claro deseo de agrupar a los honorables de significación liberal y nacionalista («principij ed esperienza»), y observamos que son invitadas 25 personas, empezando con el alcalde (¿viejo o nuevo?), un notario y *possidente*, y el conde Ercolani (quien más tarde destacaría políticamente en el campo liberal); a ello se añaden 8 *possidenti* más, 3 *possidenti*-ingenieros, 2 *possidenti* con profesión jurídica, 3 médicos y farmacéuticos, 1 maestro, 1 comerciante, 2 empleados. Si estos datos corresponden aproximadamente a nuestros conocimientos sobre la estructura social y económica de la región boloñesa (con su desarrollada agricultura), los datos adicionales -1 *possidente* y relojero, 1 *possidente meccanico*, 1 *artista sartore*, 1 *artista industriale*- muestran por un lado la capacidad de

movilización de la SN en los estratos artesanos urbanos, y por otro ponen en evidencia la dificultad de incluir los grupos profesionales de la época dentro de las categorías sociológicas actuales. La penetración entre los sectores pequeño-burgueses y artesanos aparece mucho más clara, por ejemplo, en una lista de afiliados del comisariado de una pequeña ciudad en una zona de actividad especialmente intensa de la SN, en concreto en la región de Carrara, contando -lo que es digno de mención- con una fuerte competencia contemporánea de los mazzinianos: en 25 afiliados (Avenza, verano de 1860), figuran 5 *possidenti*, 1 médico, 1 farmacéutico, 11 comerciantes/negociantes, 1 propietario de café, 1 molinero, 2 artistas, 1 funcionario y 2 herreros.

Por el contrario, en Roma encontramos -siguiendo las investigaciones de Bartoccini²¹- dos dominios claramente separados: por un lado el organizado Partido liberal-nacional (el *Comitato nazionale romano*), cuyos orígenes se han de buscar en la República romana mazziniana de 1849, y que tempranamente, en el proceso de revisión de los postulados democráticos, encontró la vía liberal de la alianza con la casa de Saboya, integrándose posteriormente en la SN. El partido, rígidamente organizado, contaba con una afiliación burguesa y popular, sobre la que incidió un nuevo estrato de grandes comerciantes de ganado (como la familia Tittoni, que jugaría después un importante papel político a través de dos generaciones, hasta el cargo de ministro de Exteriores de la Era Giolitti); por otro lado, existía una *opinione* liberal y nacionalista, una especie de esfera más amplia, que en parte apoyaba al Partido, y que en parte también se ocultaba en fases de reacción, sin exponerse; entre ella se contaba incluso una minoría de la antigua aristocracia romana (así, el jefe del *Comitato* era temporalmente bibliotecario de la familia Caetani). En comparación incluso con Emilia y Toscana, no deja de ser chocante la posición minoritaria del movimiento liberal y nacionalista (pero aún lo era más la de los republicanos) en una sociedad romana en la que casi todos sus componentes estaban ligados por sus intereses, tradición y subdesarrollo cultural al Papado y a la Iglesia.

En Sicilia, y teniendo en cuenta la estructura social, la SN parece haber apuntado y reclutado a los honorables -en parte burgueses, en parte aristócratas- de una sociedad esencialmente fundada sobre la propiedad de la tierra.

3.3. ¿A quién se dirigía la *Società Nazionale*?

«Las naciones florecientes y pudientes son libres, y las naciones libres son florecientes y pudientes: la riqueza da la libertad, y la libertad da la riqueza», escribía

²¹ Vid. ante todo Fiorella Bartoccini, *La «Roma dei Romani»*, Roma, 1971; vid. también Anna Maria Isastia, *Roma nel 1859*, Roma, 1978.

ya La Farina en 1855. Pero este postulado de un nexo entre libertad política y desarrollo económico no contradice en absoluto la imagen que hemos ofrecido: aquí en modo alguno reivindicaba una madura burguesía económica un liderazgo político -como muestra la composición de la militancia de la SN-, sino que más bien nos encontramos ante un movimiento nacionalista con un proyecto modernizador orientado hacia Europa occidental que hacía prosélitos para su programa de independencia nacional y unidad estatal en forma unitaria, con el argumento de que ese programa político ofrecía la única vía para el desarrollo social y el despegue económico, desde la creación de un sistema moderno de comunicaciones hasta la industrialización. «Los magnánimos y generosos desean la unificación de Italia por amor a la libertad, a la independencia, a la dignidad y gloria de la nación; por ello la unidad nacional se convierte en un deseo general, hay que mostrar las ventajas del comercio para la empresa, y para el bienestar de la mayoría» (*Credo político* de la SN).²² Correspondiendo a la prioridad del postulado de independencia y unidad con un decidido modelo constitucional de parlamentarismo liberal, la SN se presentaba como un movimiento integrador y superador de divisiones regionales, de clase o de pasadas rivalidades partidistas, cuya cosmovisión burguesa era ciertamente notoria; sin embargo, «no rechazamos a la aristocracia que quiera reconocer nuestras exigencias civilizadoras, y abrazamos la democracia, que quiere fundarse sobre la base de la igualdad y la equidad»²³.

3.4. ¿A quiénes llegó el mensaje de la Società Nazionale?

Es de destacar en primer lugar su expansión capilar, también en pequeños municipios, sobre todo en Italia central, y más tarde también en Sicilia, presentando a menudo un número de miembros sorprendentemente alto, habida cuenta de la respetable cuota de afiliación. En segundo lugar, sobresale su excepcional fuerza de movilización con ocasión de las campañas de recaudaciones de donativos en 1859 y 1860: las fuentes, aunque aún fragmentarias, muestran, aparte de algunos grandes mecenas, una sorprendente capacidad, sobre todo en 1859-60, para movilizar a favor de la unificación a capas más amplias de la población -como muestran las listas de donantes, p.ej.- que con diferencias relativamente cortas donan repetidamente grandes recursos, distribuidos de modo extenso en modestas aportaciones (menos de una lira).

²² Citado por el folleto programático de la SN: *Società Nazionale Italiana, Unificazione Indipendenza*, Turín, 1860 (en *Museo Centrale del Risorgimento*, Roma, doc. 720/8 (10), p.10.

²³ *Ivi*, p.16.

También fue cometido de la SN la movilización, transporte, organización del paso ilegal de la frontera, dotación con dinero, uniformes, armas, etc. de los voluntarios de otras partes de Italia en la víspera y en el curso de la guerra de 1859. La primera investigación sistemática de los voluntarios de 1859, realizada por Isastia²⁴, ofrece un panorama sintético y bien descifrado, desmintiendo clichés vigentes en el pasado, como aquél surgido de la extrapolación de la composición de los Mil de Garibaldi (544 estudiantes y trabajadores sobre un total de 1089); el trabajo de Isastia muestra por el contrario la existencia de una base social sorprendentemente amplia, detectable tanto en los voluntarios enrolados en el ejército sardo-piamontés como en los *Cacciatori delle Alpi* garibaldinos. La autora ha identificado 9692 voluntarios «regulares» y 4164 *Cacciatori delle Alpi*. No disponemos de datos fidedignos sobre el número total de los voluntarios de 1859 en Italia central y septentrional, pero a pesar de ello se puede partir de un mínimo de 50.000.

El origen geográfico de los dos grupos de voluntarios estudiados por Isastia presenta pocas diferencias: por razones de proximidad geográfica y en razón también originariamente de la prehistoria del alistamiento de voluntarios, proceden del Véneto-Lombardía aproximadamente la mitad, alrededor de un 10-15% proceden de cada uno de los Estados de Parma y Módena y Toscana, y el resto casi en su totalidad de los Estados pontificios (cuadro 1). La sobrerrepresentación extrema de los lombardos entre los voluntarios de Lombardía-Veneto (87, un 93%) no sólo se explica geográficamente, sino que remite también -como señalan las fuentes- al patrón de extrema interacción, también fortalecida por la emigración, entre Lombardía y Piamonte.

La decisión entre voluntarios «regulares» y los *Cacciatori delle Alpi* garibaldinos no era solamente una opción ideológica: también era determinada en buena medida por los rigurosos criterios del ejército sardo-piamontés (límite de edad, exclusión de casados o viudos con hijos, etc.). Lo que también explica las evidentes diferencias de edad entre ambos grupos: la proporción de jóvenes entre 18-20 años es al menos dos veces mayor entre los «regulares» que entre los garibaldinos, pero un 42,48% entre estos se sitúa entre los 27-58 años, frente a sólo un 1% de los garibaldinos.

El perfil social (cuadros 2 y 3) pone de relieve la importancia de artesanos y oficios comerciales, así como de trabajadores, en su mayoría preindustriales (con una alta proporción de albañiles y trabajadores de las minas de mármol de Carrara y su

²⁴ Isastia, op.cit.

entorno), que totalizan entre un 9% y 13,5%; los estudiantes están representados en mayor proporción entre los «regulares» -ciertamente en razón de los criterios de edad-, mientras que los *possidenti* retroceden bastante en conjunto en relación con la SN (en sus filas se han de buscar también los voluntarios aristócratas, que se orientaron hacia la caballería); en el caso de los militares de profesión, enrolados casi solamente entre los garibaldinos, se trata en este caso de desertores del ejército austríaco o de las fuerzas armadas de otros Estados italianos.

El estudio de Isastia confirma asimismo con estos dos cuadros la imagen ya conocida de la escasa participación del campesinado italiano en el proceso de unificación: particularmente, del análisis del origen urbano, semiurbano (2000-6000 habitantes) o rural de los voluntarios, se deduce que entre un 71-71% procedía de la primera categoría (urbana), repartiéndose el resto a partes iguales entre las otras dos categorías geográficas, un resultado similar al mostrado por las fuentes de la SN. Sin embargo, esta constatación, de la que a menudo se deduce de modo muy general una interpretación que reduce la falta de participación a una -parcialmente virulenta-secular posición contraria al ejército (más bien para -sea en perspectiva marxista o clerical- evocar el manido esquema país legal/país real), precisa aún de un análisis más minucioso y continuado a escala más reducida. Si extendemos nuestra visión de los activistas de los dos movimientos nacionalistas al panorama de la aceptación del nuevo Orden (que tuvo ciertamente acogida -incluso teniendo en cuenta las manipulaciones e irregularidades electorales- de avasalladoras mayorías en los plebiscitos celebrados por sufragio universal), un memorándum de enero de 1860 sobre la situación de Toscana y dirigido a Ricasoli nos proporciona varias observaciones interesantes sobre ese proceso de aceptación:

El clero estaría en buena parte «contra el nuevo Orden», pero «no menos párrocos» tendrían una actitud favorable. En lo referente a los *possidenti*, éstos «si no todos, ciertamente muchos de los más respetables en nobleza y riqueza se han pronunciado en la asamblea decididamente por apoyar las ideas nacionales»; sobre todo la «muy poderosa...clase de los propietarios agrarios medianos» en Toscana se habría pronunciado de modo muy positivo. Del campesinado no se podría afirmar «que estuviese informado sobre las cuestiones italianas», pero ni se situaba decididamente en una posición contraria, ni se sentía unido a la derrocada casa de Habsburgo-Lorena.» Tampoco se debe creer, que ellos [los campesinos] sean totalmente dependientes del clero, como algunos dicen; ya que dependen sobre todo de los propietarios agrarios o de sus administradores, con los que están en contacto directo y permanente». Las clases populares urbanas estarían, al igual que la clase

media, «decididamente» a favor de la causa nacionalista.²⁵ Junto a las minorías activas de los dos movimientos nacionalistas y los partidarios del Antiguo Régimen, debía orientarse una mayor actividad hacia el gran número de indiferentes e indecisos, los cuales sobre todo no estaban aún politizados. Y para su movilización debían en lo sucesivo luchar los tres campos. Este era el análisis desde una de las regiones que ofrecía condiciones de partida más favorables, y especialmente se hacían palpables los dramáticos obstáculos existentes para la construcción del Estado unitario, así como las frustraciones de la política cotidiana.

En primer lugar, sin embargo, la SN debía jugar un papel de primer orden en las elecciones de 1860, y sobre todo en las de 1861: en los nuevos territorios, especialmente Italia central, aparece aquella como la organización liberal, el movimiento de integración nacional -que conscientemente articula candidaturas nacionales simbólicas más allá de los dominios de Cavour-, así como la maquinaria electoral del gobierno de Cavour. Cuatro años más tarde ya no era capaz de hacer oír su voz en la confusa situación de normalidad, reagrupamiento y protesta de las elecciones de 1865. Ya a finales de 1864 se había disuelto el comité central, ante la noticia del traslado de la capital a Florencia.²⁶

4. La fundación del Estado nacional: la revolución moderada de los modernizadores liberales

Tras una última y dramática marcha con los rivales demócratas en 1860 (la «marcha de los mil» de Garibaldi y su liberación del Sur), el movimiento nacionalista liberal liderado por Cavour había triunfado. Ciertamente cuestionado en el plano internacional (como muestran las largas disputas alrededor de su reconocimiento diplomático), considerado como peligroso engendro de los principios revolucionarios, el nuevo reino de Italia podía alegrarse sin embargo de obtener el apoyo de las potencias occidentales, y el orden monárquico-liberal parecía ser cada vez más claramente, tanto al Sur como al Norte de los Alpes, el mejor baluarte contra cualquier revolución republicana («roja»). Con la fundación del reino en 1861, y la amplia adopción de las instituciones del reino modélico y matriz de Piamonte, la Italia pobre, atrasada económica y socialmente en amplias zonas, había ingresado en el grupo de

²⁵ Giovanni Fabrizi a Bettino Ricasoli, 12 de enero de 1860, en: *Carteggi di Bettino Ricasoli*, ed. de M. Nobili y S. Camerani, XI, Roma, 1960, 216-18.

²⁶ Vid. el acuerdo de disolución, datado el 26 de diciembre de 1864, en *Museo Centrale del Risorgimento*, Roma, doc.720/19 (5).

vanguardia del progreso político-institucional, como una de las pocas monarquías parlamentarias de Europa junto a Gran Bretaña y Bélgica.

Pero Cavour y sus sucesores (como ya los *moderati* de 1848) no sólo miraron a Francia en su búsqueda de modelos de Constitución y cultura política: en todos los ámbitos, el objetivo global y absoluto para la capa dirigente liberal del joven Estado era la superación del antiguo atraso, conseguir una modernización amplia no sólo del aparato económico, sino también de la economía y la sociedad orientándose hacia Europa occidental, y desde 1871 en gran medida también hacia Alemania (fascinaba de modo predominante la *scienza tedesca*²⁷). Esta política modernizadora se extendía desde la unificación y renovación del Derecho y de las estructuras de la Administración, pasando por la creación de una red de comunicaciones italiana, hasta una enérgica secularización del Estado y de la sociedad, desde la inclusión del Estado italiano en el sistema europeo de libre comercio implícito en el acuerdo Cobden-Chevallier hasta la renovación del sistema escolar y educativo. No sólo se importaron ideas, modelos, *know-how* y capitales, sino que los extranjeros también fueron bienvenidos -tanto empresarios como intelectuales²⁸- en calidad de portadores de la deseada modernización. La actitud de los liberales fundadores del Estado italiano testimonia receptividad, no separación, hacia los vecinos europeos; el objetivo era conseguir una participación igualitaria en la civilización y en el concierto de las potencias europeas.

Pero en los años 1860 todavía no se había cumplido el programa nacionalista: una Venecia en manos austríacas y una Roma -la futura capital, ya designada en 1861 por el Parlamento- bajo el yugo del dominio mundial del Papa protegido por las bayonetas francesas también ponían en cuestión en última instancia la legitimación del Reino como realización de la *coscienza nazionale* de los italianos, y este sentimiento era general, pasando por las filas de la oposición mazziniana intransigente hasta los adeptos de aquellos demócratas que crecieron desde el seno del *Partito d'Azione* y asumieron el papel de una oposición leal al sistema bajo la forma de la *Sinistra parlamentare*, integrándose también en la Monarquía liberal.

La liberación de Roma (1870), en primer lugar, y la inmediata ubicación de la capital en la ciudad del Tíber resolvieron las últimas reservas acerca de la

²⁷ Vid. Otto Weiss, «La 'scienza tedesca' e l'Italia nell'Ottocento», *Annali dell'Istituto Storico Italo-Germanico in Trento/ Jahrbuch des italienisch-deutschen historischen Instituts in Trient*, IX (1983), 9-86.

²⁸ Sobre este tema, el autor volverá más ampliamente en breve en otro lugar.

legitimidad, y los movimientos nacionalistas en competición se debilitaron notablemente en su componente principal republicano-intransigente, pues su derrota histórica ya era palmaria. Al mismo tiempo, se abrió una profunda fosa, que se convirtió en insuperable, entre los fundadores del Estado nacional liberal y el Papado (y asimismo con el catolicismo político en formación). Debido a la negativa del Papa a reconocer al nuevo Estado y su capital, así como a ver en su dueño algo más que un mero usurpador, la persistente «cuestión romana» prestó a la lucha entre liberales y clericales en Italia una connotación especial y peculiar en el contexto general de los conflictos secularizadores en la Europa del siglo XIX, ya que en este caso la oposición entre laicos y clericales estaba inseparablemente entrelazada con la cuestión de la aceptación o rechazo del Estado nacional. Así, para el líder de los liberal-conservadores era impensable aún en 1913 apoyar la candidatura de un nacionalista (!) en Roma, pues ésta había sido promocionada «en sus cuatro quintas partes por la clerigalla y los católicos»: se trataba del distrito electoral n.1 de la *Roma capitale*, lleno de simbolismo.²⁹

Roma capitale era de hecho el símbolo visible de una unidad estatal obtenida tras difícil lucha, la ciudad a la que los liberales darían enseguida la forma del Estado unitario y centralista de acuerdo con el modelo francés. La defensa de una unidad nacional todavía percibida durante mucho tiempo como precaria y gravemente amenazada configuraba para los liberales un binomio inseparable con la monarquía parlamentaria como centro de la construcción estatal liberal-parlamentaria.

Ambas cosas eran susceptibles de ser defendidas en una lucha a dos frentes: contra la oposición clerical antisistema, que se había convertido también progresivamente en el centro aglutinador de todos los particularistas y los partidarios de los regímenes derrocados en 1859-61; y contra la oposición republicana también colocada fuera del sistema, que si bien aceptaba -como los liberales- la existencia del Estado nacional, rechazaba su orden político y social. En la década de 1890, sería ciertamente el joven Partido Socialista el que ganaría peso frente a los republicanos.

No obstante, los objetivos nacionalistas no habían perdido vigencia para los liberales tras 1871. Abarcando un amplio espectro, inusual en comparación con otros países de Europa, los liberales italianos en todas sus gradaciones y agrupaciones, desde la *Destra storica* de los herederos de Cavour hasta la *Sinistra storica*, en la que los demócratas se encontraban de nuevo, que habían aceptado sin reservas la solución

²⁹ Carta de Sonnino a Bergamini, 10 de septiembre de 1913, en Hartmut Ullrich, *Le elezioni del 1913 a Roma. I liberali fra Massoneria e Vaticano*, Milán/Roma/Nápoles/Città di Castello, 1972, p.105.

liberal-monárquica, en primer lugar los arquitectos del nuevo Estado; ellos integraban el campo de las fuerzas sostenedoras del Estado. El *Nation-building* y el *State-building* no eran ninguna obra ya finalizada, y que les hubiese sido legada. Aunque sólo fuese por la viva conciencia de amenaza continua desde el interior y el exterior (siendo la cuestión romana un punto de reunión de ambas amenazas). Pero la Nación tenía aún mucho campo por delante para realizarse en el interior, en relación con amplios sectores de la población cuyas identidades y lealtades eran aún premodernas, parroquiales y particularistas, o que incluso tenían un cariz antinacional en su movilización. Finalmente, la Nación y su libre autodeterminación era para los liberales italianos (y con una base filosófica parcialmente diferente también lo era para los demócratas y republicanos) la base legitimadora del Estado -de todos los Estados y precisamente del propio, que era contemplado en su proceso constitutivo como un ejemplo de la marcha triunfal a través de la historia mundial del principio de las nacionalidades- y al mismo tiempo del derecho de gentes. *Sovranità nazionale* y *principio di nazionalità* no eran más que la expresión interior y al nivel del derecho de gentes de un mismo principio,³⁰ como destacaba el jurista (y más tarde ministro de Justicia y de Asuntos Exteriores en la era de la *Sinistra*) Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, muy influyente fuera de las fronteras italianas,³¹ cuya lección inaugural sobre la «Nacionalidad como principio del derecho de gentes» (1851) se convertiría en un clásico de la cultura política del *Risorgimento* y del Estado liberal de él surgido.³² Que la Nación no se basaba en condiciones dadas, objetivas y «naturales», sino esencialmente en la decisión voluntaria y racional, es decir, en criterios subjetivo-voluntaristas, era en todo caso un sujeto de consenso general; la relevancia, no sólo filosófica, de esta convicción, y sus implicaciones políticas directas para la situación de otras naciones se pusieron claramente en evidencia en la conocida controversia sobre la anexión de Alsacia-Lorena entre Francia y Alemania, en la cual -en disputa también con Mommsen, muy apreciado en Italia- los liberales desde la derecha hasta la izquierda (con pocas excepciones, como el periódico de Crispi *La Riforma*) defendieron el criterio de la libre autodeterminación y consecuentemente la exigencia de un plebiscito, contra la tesis de la nacionalidad objetiva. «Somos el país del plebiscito por excelencia, pues nuestra vida política es un plebiscito cotidiano...Este

³⁰ Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, *Discorsi parlamentari*, Roma, 1893, II, p.119.

³¹ Sobre Mancini, me permito remitir a los fundamentales estudios de Erik Jayme, sobre todo *Pasquale Stanislao Mancini - Internationales Privatrecht zwischen Risorgimento und praktischer Jurisprudenz*, Elsbach, 1980; así como al volumen colectivo *Stanislao Mancini. L'uomo, lo studioso, il politico*, (O.Zecchino, ed.), Nápoles, 1991.

³² Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, «Della nazionalità come fondamento del diritto delle genti», en id., *Diritto internazionale - Prelezioni con un saggio sul Macchiavelli*, Nápoles, 1873.

es el carácter de nuestro movimiento nacional»³³; la unanimidad en lo fundamental con la definición de Nación formulada por Renan no necesita ningún comentario especial; y el liberal de derecha Ruggero Bonghi resaltaría en especial en su ácida crítica del «Bismarckismo» el hecho de que Bismarck hubiese guiado Europa de nuevo a un sistema de derecho basado en la razón del más fuerte y a la violencia, alejándola de la legitimación jurídica de las relaciones internacionales, en especial precisamente del reconocimiento internacional al menos en principio del principio de las nacionalidades y de la obligación resultante de considerar los plebiscitos como el fundamente de todo cambio de fronteras.³⁴

«La preservación de la paz, el progreso liberal y la preservación del orden social», así había definido en 1872 el ministro liberal-conservador de Asuntos Exteriores, Visconti Venosta, los intereses de Italia, identificándolos con los de toda Europa.³⁵ Con la liberación de Roma se había «acabado la época de la revolución», como explicaban repetidamente los gobernantes del Estado de la *Destra* al resto de Europa,³⁶ y el nuevo Estado nacional italiano quería ser un miembro fiel y pacífico, y por supuesto conservador, del concierto europeo. La aceptación implícita en ello del status quo, incluida la existencia de la monarquía tetranacional austrohúngara, era para muchos liberales demócratas de orígenes mazzinianos difícil de combinar con el principio de las nacionalidades como idea fundacional de la «revolución italiana» o con la idea del destino de Italia, como se pondría de manifiesto durante la crisis de Oriente de 1875-78. La incompleta unificación de todos los italianos en un Estado nacional, la existencia de una *Italia irredenta*, era además un argumento adicional en manos de la oposición republicana antisistema para cuestionar la legitimación nacional del reino liberal.³⁷

En 1870-71 los liberales italianos se planteaban también en sentido más amplio la cuestión de su propia autoconcepción como fundadores del Estado nacional y como revolucionarios. Para un ex-mazziniano como Francesco Crispi, que nunca dejó de verse a sí mismo como uno de los «viejos conspiradores» y que reprochó abiertamente a Cavour el haber «diplommatizado» la revolución, la «revolución italiana» seguía siendo un legado vivo, con la dimensión de un nostálgico mito glorioso. Sin embargo,

³³ Así se expresaba el diario liberal *L'Opinione*, 3.7.1871, citado por Federico Chabod, *Storia della politica estera italiana dal 1870 al 1986*, Bari, 1962(2ª), p.129. El estudio de Chabod ofrece el análisis clásico de esta controversia (vid. especialmente p.53 y ss., y p.127 y ss.).

³⁴ Ruggero Bonghi, «Il bismarckismo», en *Nuova Antologia...*, 1871.

³⁵ Citado en Chabod, op.cit., p.329.

³⁶ Así, p.ej., Marco Minghetti en 1872 (*Discorsi parlamentari...*, Roma, 1872, V, p.253).

³⁷ El irredentismo era en principio de mayoritaria orientación republicano-demócrata.

¿cómo se presentaba esa cuestión en los herederos de la tradición de los *Moderati*, y en el mismo Cavour? Este ya se había formulado en el otoño de 1830 la cuestión dramática de «si la gloriosa revolución de 1830 continuará su marcha o si se hundirá en el carril sangriento que trazó 1792». ³⁸ No sólo la sombra de Robespierre, y después el fantasma de la revolución social, sino que también al menos la impresión de que la radicalización de la revolución podría tornarse en reacción o en ruido de sables, eran factores que marcaban hondamente su posición frente a la revolución. El fracaso del gradualismo fuera del reino de Cerdeña, y también tras 1848, había convertido a los moderados en cierto modo en revolucionarios contra su voluntad, en aras del objetivo de la modernización. La lucha en dos frentes contra el viejo Orden y contra la alternativa republicano-radical les convirtió en revolucionarios del justo medio, tanto en lo referente a su estrategia como en su programa y sus principales apoyos sociales. «El nuevo régimen nacido de nuestra revolución», como afirmaba el presidente del Consejo de ministros Rattazzi en 1862³⁹: ¡quién osaba negar tras 1870 que el nuevo Estado tenía su origen en una revolución! -piénsese solamente que sus creadores habían tenido que barrer al Estado más antiguo de Europa: el Estado eclesiástico-; el radical Nitti aún diría a comienzos del siglo XX que la *Destra storica* había sido la única fuerza revolucionaria de la Historia de Italia.⁴⁰ Pero se trataba (y sobre ello insistían tanto los liberales de derecha como de izquierda) de una revolución que se diferenciaba cualitativamente en modo positivo de la mayoría de las revoluciones del pasado reciente: ya que fue llevada a cabo con mesura, sin excesos, y «sin los hechos violentos, que en otros lugares acompañan a los grandes cambios políticos»⁴¹; precisamente por eso, coronada por el éxito. La revolución como un instrumento necesario, pero peligroso, sobre el que no se podía perder el dominio. Medio, pero no fin (en esta delimitación renovada con la utopía revolucionaria republicana universal de Mazzini coincidían tanto Minghetti como Rattazzi). Pero cuando la revolución había cambiado, no para la *Destra*, sino también para el líder de la *Sinistra* Rattazzi tras 1870 con la consecución del objetivo (en la Cámara no habría nadie que «pretendiese poner hoy en marcha una política revolucionaria»⁴²), se conservó un manido sinónimo para la «revolución italiana» que se difundió

³⁸ Rosario Romeo, *Cavour e il suo tempo. I. (1841-1842)*, Bari, 1971(2ª), p.311.

³⁹ Citado en Luigi Lucchini (ed.), *La politica italiana del 1848 al 1897. Programmi di governo*, Rom, 1899, vol.I, p.195.

⁴⁰ Francesco Saverio Nitti, *Il partito radicale e la nuova democrazia industriale. Prime linee di un programma del partito radicale*, Turín/Roma, 1907; de modo semejante, describía con ocasión de la muerte del Marqués de Rudini a la *Destra storica* como «el único gran partido radical» de la historia italiana (Hartmut Ullrich, *La classe politica nella crisi di partecipazione dell'Italia giolittiana. Liberali e Radicali alla camera dei Deputati 1909-1913*, Roma, 1979, vol.I, p.55.

⁴¹ Así se expresaba Minghetti 1865: citado en Lucchini, op.cit., vol.I, p.289.

⁴² Así hablaba Visconti Venosta en 1874: *ivi*, p.522.

entonces en el discurso político y que tendría vigencia durante medio siglo hacia el interior: *rinnovamento* [renovación]. La unificación de Italia había sido una revolución nacional. En muchos aspectos una *property revolution* (en especial en lo que se refería a la secularización de las propiedades eclesiásticas), y sólo en un cierto sentido una revolución burguesa, sobre todo en el establecimiento de nuevos valores seculares y universales. *Risorgimento* = *rinnovamento* : el objetivo global al que se aspiraba era la modernización de Italia en todos los aspectos, que fue acometida por los liberales a partir del modelo matriz de Piamonte-Cerdeña con el instrumento de un Estado nacional, y que en breve tiempo condujeron, bajo una sucesión de circunstancias extremadamente difíciles, como la simultaneidad de fases y crisis del *political development*, a resultados notables, a largo plazo incluso dignos de admiración.

Cuadro 1

Procedencias por Estado preunitario de los voluntarios «regulares».

Lombardía-Véneto	44%
Gran Ducado de Toscana	16%
Ducado de Parma	15%
Ducado de Módena	12%
Estados pontificios	12%
Extranjero	1%

Cuadro 2

Procedencia por Estado preunitario de los voluntarios «garibaldinos»

Lombardía-Véneto	51%
Ducado de Parma.	12%
Gran Ducado de Toscana	12%
Ducado de Módena	10%
Estados pontificios	7%
Reino de Cerdeña	5%
Extranjero	3%

Cuadro 3

Actividad laboral de los voluntarios.					
Profesiones	Regulares		Garibaldinos		diferencia en %
	v.a.	%	v.a.	%	
Propietarios					
agrícolas	205	3,7	109	2,6	1,1
Empresarios	16	0,2	8	0,2	0,0
Comerciantes	805	14,5	685	16,6	-2,1
<i>Possidenti</i>	417	7,5	230	5,6	1,9
Artesanos	1690	30,4	1203	29,1	1,3
Profesiones					
liberales	268	4,8	218	5,3	-0,5
Jornaleros					
agrícolas	44	0,8	57	1,4	-0,6
Obreros	695	12,5	398	9,6	2,9
Servicio					
doméstico	389	7,0	317	7,7	0,7
Empleados	305	5,5	279	6,7	-1,2
Profesores	28	0,5	30	0,7	-0,2
Militares	35	0,6	384	9,3	-8,7
Religiosos	1	0,0	2	0,0	0,0
Estudiantes	667	12,0	216	5,2	6,8
Total	5565	100,0	4136	100,0	





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