

Deleuze's and Guattari's body without organs and Lacan's Other jouissance: bodies under capitalism¹.

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Abstract

Much has been written about the disagreement and even radical opposition between Gilles Deleuze's and Félix Guattari's conceptualizations and those of Jacques Lacan: for example, about desire, psychotherapy, the subject and the radically opposed political consequences that result from their approaches. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate from a Lacanian perspective that in the case of a central concept such as the body, there are rather more similarities than differences. Its main thesis is that Deleuze's and Guattari's body without organs is very close to Lacan's notion of the Other jouissance and that with slightly different strategies they both provide arguments to fight the same enemy: i.e. the control and repression of singularity under capitalism.

Key words

Deleuze, Lacan, psychoanalysis, desire, body, capitalism.

Introduction

Most of the literature discusses the dissension between Lacanians and Deleuzians. There is no secret about Deleuze's and Guattari's explicit dismissal of psychoanalysis on such important points as the conception of desire as lack, the subordination of the unconscious to the Oedipus complex, the understanding of the unconscious as representational, the existence of a hierarchical, paternalistically organized School of psychoanalysis, etc. In general, Lacanians have argued that

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schizoanalysis is a kind of literary proposal without any possible clinical application, which omits the suffering and anguish of the patients²; or at least, that Deleuze's and Guattari's debts to Lacan are far more than they would be willing to acknowledge³. The most of the Deleuzians also insist on the insuperable differences between these two theoretical positions⁴. It is not possible to deny that desire is something quite different for Deleuze and Guattari -a kind of immanent positive production process- and for Lacan -even if the object of desire is not truly lacking, as the former claim, in his first version it is in effect an absent object-. What is important to us now is that lately there have been serious new approaches which bring to the fore certain fundamental similarities between them, by arguing in general that Deleuze and Guattari want to progress in the Lacanian project through other means⁵. This paper seeks also to demonstrate that there is another at least as important and fundamental area where both focuses are quite similar: when thinking of the body, Deleuze's and Guattari's and Lacan's positions resemble one another much more than was previously suspected⁶.

The paper has three parts. First, we introduce some aspects of the notion of body without organs: its anti-organicism, its anti-significative character, its unproductiveness, and its peculiar intensity equal to 0. Secondly, we compare the body without organs with Lacan's *jouissance*⁷ focusing on his last teaching in seminars XX (1972-73) and XXIII (1975-76) and we remark that it is the fact of forgetting the importance of the concept of *jouissance*, what prevents some Deleuzians from finding common ground⁸. Finally, we present some conclusions about what common strategy against capitalism is being proposed by these two approaches.

1. The body without organs.

1.1. The body without organs against the organism.

The first time that Deleuze mentions the 'body without organs' is in his *Logic of sense* (1968), which he wrote before starting to work with the French psychoanalyst and Lacan's patient Félix Guattari. The main purpose of the book is to build a language theory which after introducing designation, manifestation and signification claims sense as the core linguistic dimension.

Nevertheless, the book also develops a detailed analysis of the experience, which schizophrenics have of their bodies. Following an intuition from the French theater writer Antonin Artaud, Deleuze distinguishes between a whole and deep body, completely fragmented or fissured, and the separated and surface organs, which come out of this fragmentation. Schizophrenics would feel their bodies as being fragmented in “decomposed elements which affect and assail them”⁹. Melanie Klein thought of schizophrenia as a kind of opposition to some bad partial object and the search for a better partial object; Deleuze explains it as the refusal of any partial object -good or bad-, a refusal played by a body which wants to rest complete, “an organism without parts, a body without organs”¹⁰. The body without organs resists fragmentation by “melting and welding”¹¹, by “soldering the pieces into one block”¹². This particular schizophrenic experience will be generalized as being the norm for every human being in *Anti-Oedipus* (1972) and in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980)¹³. The subject is considered an ensemble of desiring machines connected one to the other along some flow. There would be two kinds of desiring machines: organ-machines -which cut the flow- and energy source machines - which produce the flow¹⁴. It is against the psychoanalytical conception of a representative unconscious that this conception of a radically immanent unconscious emerges. Desiring machines establish continuous and multiform connections, which have nothing to do with interpretations, with family scenes, with the Oedipus complex, but follow some machinist functioning. Machinist, and not mechanical, because it is unpredictable which new connections they are going to establish. Production means for Deleuze and Guattari no more than connection; desiring production means no more than connection between one organ and something else, whether another organ or some external thing. The events that occur between organ-machines and energy-machines produce some cuts in the continuous flow and organize this way a body, where there was no one. From now on it must be distinguished between the organism, formed by the desiring machines, and the “full body” [corps plein] which lies beyond and under them¹⁵. Still following Artaud, they think of the body as being situated under the skin, feeling tortured under the organization created by desiring-machines, and trying to rest slippery and undifferentiated¹⁶. The body in itself does not like this organization

and it would rather stay with “no organization at all”¹⁷. In fact, it is not exactly that the body without organs repels the organs/partial objects, but the organization of these objects in an organism. This body without organs is in itself “a burning, living center of matter” crossed by different degrees of intensity¹⁸. On their own drives, organs and desires would not integrate into a whole, but would stay separate and different, each one of them with its partial object.

1.2. The body without organs against the signifying.

In *Logic of sense* Deleuze recovers the stoic logic and ontology to defend that the sense of words and phrases is produced on the surface. Artaud’s language -which according to Deleuze is the language of schizophrenia – is nevertheless “carved into the depth of bodies”¹⁹, because it is not just a language, but also something corporal. Artaud says that real poetry refuses grammar and sense because it is born directly from some “torment” or “suffering”²⁰. He himself starts to write a series of incomprehensible sounds to transform the phonetic values of language in “values which are exclusively tonic”²¹. The schizophrenic destroys the meaning and takes the words as pure sounds which cause affects and passions upon the body: “a pure language-affect”²². For the schizophrenic it is not the meaning that matters, but “destroying the word”²³ and transforming it into a sound which operates at some deep level where there are only affects, sounds, howls and breaths as some kind of “ideal fluids of an organism without parts”²⁴. So, just as under the phonetic word there is a tonic word, under the fragmented organism there is a body without organs. The body without organs, being something non-linguistic, breaks the signifying chains to establish “transverse communications, transfinite summarizations, polyvocal and transcursive inscriptions”²⁵. Organism, significance and interpretation are ‘strata’, which prevent us from going beyond and from arriving to the body without organs -also called there, plane of consistency-²⁶.

And, of course, if there is no room for signifying, much less for more complex symbolic structures such as the family triangle of the Oedipus Complex. It does not make any sense to search in the unconscious for any family roles, because upon the body without organs nothing is clearly distinguished: as Deleuze and Guattari proposed, the subject may be there the mother, the father,

and the son of himself. Psychoanalysis, including the Lacanian orientation, was mistaken when it focused on the family figures instead of on the pure intensities which completely ignore the family structure: the body without organs doesn't know anything about family relations, "the unconscious is an orphan"²⁷.

1.3. The body without organs as unproductive.

While desiring machines are productive machines, the body without organs is "the realm of anti-production"²⁸. Deleuze and Guattari compare desiring-production with social production and state that every social production is inscribed upon, and emanates from an anti-productive element or surface -the socius-, just as every desiring production is inscribed upon, and emanates from the anti-productive surface of the body without organs. After an initial repulsion, the body without organs appropriates this desiring-production and uses it for its own sake, which is none other than an increase in intensity. It is as if the body without organs had started on its own the production process and then caught it and re-inscribed it upon itself, describing an "apparent movement"²⁹, which is really nothing more than the body without organs "own self-production"³⁰.

1.4. The zero intensity of the body without organs.

Beyond the production of the desiring machines and the production of its recording over the body without organs, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish a third one: the production of consumption. It is very interesting that for Deleuze and Guattari the subject appears only in this third moment as a kind of "wandering about over the body without organs" which remains "peripheral to the desiring-machines"³¹. Properly speaking there is here no subject, but an inconstant succession of intensity states, where the subject can only be found among "the disjunctions of a recording surface, in what is left after each division"³². In the introduction to *A thousand Plateaus* it is said that the body without organs has the peculiarity of being able to attribute to itself subjects, which are no more than the name of some "trace of an intensity"³³. The result of this third kind of production is a "cosmic jouissance", "a pleasure that can rightly be called autoerotic, or rather automatic",

“intensive quantities”, “a really primary emotion”³⁴, motivated by the temporary reconciliation of the body without organs with the desiring-machines.

The attraction and repulsion movements established between the body and the desiring-machines cause some “bands of intensity”³⁵ to appear. It is a very peculiar intensity, because it is an intensity without energy; they called it a “zero intensity”³⁶. An example of this ‘zero intensity’: when a schizophrenic is violently forced to renounce his own desiring-machines and to oedipalize them, he becomes mute and immobile, autistic³⁷. Even if there is a tendency of the body without organs to recuperate this zero intensity, which Freud called “the death-drive”, fortunately it is normally allowed some degree of intensity to emerge, so as Freud’s death-drive is accompanied by some life-drive). This “lowest form of life”³⁸ allows some desiring-machines to traverse it, as if they were footpaths through the desert of the body without organs. Considered from the other side, the only possibility of abandoning this desert is, then, by desiring.

That is why Deleuze and Guattari do not propose an ascetic, Schopenhauerian nihilism where desire would be condemned. Only in the clinical case of pathological schizophrenia, where desiring production is stopped and inscribed over the body without organs rather too soon, the body becomes dumb, autistic³⁹. Repulsion, then, must be counterbalanced with some attraction of the organs. In this process, caution must be taken with doing so as not to transform the desiring-production in a codified desire, so as not to submit and totalize the organs in an organism: desire must come from the body without organs itself. In fact, it is unjust to state that the body without organs is a desert, because once loosed from the organism, desiring-production arises naturally from it. If it were a desert, it would be not a dead desert, but a “populous” one⁴⁰.

A Thousand Plateaus goes deeper into the idea of intensity by proposing some new notions which turn around it like ‘multiplicity’, ‘becoming’, ‘nomadic singularities’ or a little bit further on the process of ‘becoming’ or “unstratification”, by which subjects are liberated from the social desiring production and search their own way through life. There is a main change from *Antioedipus* to *A thousand Plateaus*. In the first book, the body without organs was a kind of finished structure

placed at the beginning of the process, some fundamental underlying structure that is already there. In the second book, it is however something that needs to be built up by an active operation of the subject. The aim changes and now becomes the careful and vigorous construction through experimentation of a body without organs -which is now understood as “a set of practices”-⁴¹.

2. Lacan’s body and the Other jouissance.

2.1. Desire as lack and desire as drive.

Although the object *a* appears well before as the object indicated by desire, it is in seminar X, *The anguish*, when it receives its definitive form. Against many other theoreticians who think that anguish it is caused by a lack, for example, a total lack of the world, as Heidegger suggests, Lacan proposes that it is when the subject approaches too close the *a object* of its desire that anguish appears. For Lacan anguish is not without an object, even if the subject cannot identify at first which object is at work there⁴². There is then an object involved in anguish, even if it is an object, which does not appear in the spatial-temporal world, an invisible object, which escapes the laws of Kant’s transcendental aesthetics. This object is Lacan’s small *object a*.

We cannot discuss here again, which is better, whether it be Lacan’s desire as lack or Deleuze’s and Guattari’s desire as some plenitude⁴³- but there are some important remarks still to be made. When Lacan introduces his small object *a* not as the object aimed for, but as the object which causes desire, his concept of desire as lack is radically transformed. The object *a* is the object which causes desire because it is “the object around which the drive turns”⁴⁴.

Deleuze and Guattari recognized that Lacan’s *object a* heads completely in the right direction in order to understand rightly desire⁴⁵. This object *a*, understood as the object around which revolves the drive, changes from being a mere logical form, which uncovers some void with four different styles - anal, scopic, oral and the voice-, to being at the end a “surplus-of-enjoying”⁴⁶ or “a condenser for jouissance”⁴⁷.

Desiring machines work upon a resistant body without organs. In fact, for Deleuze and Guattari, body without organs, desiring production and drives are no more than aspects of the same process,

only formally separable but in reality, deeply connected⁴⁸. Aaron Schuster remarks that Deleuze's and Guattari's desire equates to Freud's and Lacan's drive" (Schuster 2016, 162). This is correct as long as we do not forget that Lacanian desire (symbolic register) is inseparable from the drive (real register), so that both conceptions are at the end very similar. In seminar XI (1964), and eight years before *Antioedipus*, Lacan shifts to the background his conception of desire as lack and introduces the drive. In fact, the title of the seminar is "*The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis*", that is, unconsciousness, repetition, drive, and transference, and none of them is desire.

2.2. Lacan's impossible real is jouissance.

Objects a are made of jouissance, they 'overflow' jouissance, so as desire-machines 'overflow' the body without organs. Lacan's jouissance appears in Seminar VII as the result of a detailed commentary on Freud's *Beyond the pleasure principle* (1920). Thinking the repetition of nightmares in traumatic war neuroses and in other circumstances, and the resistance to healing of many of his patients, Freud refuses definitively to base his explanation of human behavior on pleasure. Although the pleasure principle might remain valid in the field of consciousness, the subject is conditioned in his unconscious by an unpleasant compulsion to repetition. Human beings may consciously pursue pleasure, but some death drive rules their unconscious⁴⁹. Freud confesses to not being able to find a plausible explanation for this repetition that is so contrary to pleasure and Lacan develops the concept of jouissance to solve this problem⁵⁰.

As early as in seminar VII: *The ethics of psychoanalysis* (1959-60) Jacques Lacan postulates that each subject is always in a peculiar relation to a certain strange and transcendent 'Thing'. The subject is no more than a set of defenses to keep this sinister Thing at bay, so that it does not invade him: beauty, Kant's categorical imperative, pleasure and desire are ways to turn away from this unbearable object, to which the subject is attracted and repulsed at the same time. The Thing is another name for jouissance and so Lacan interprets Freud's pleasure principle as the principle, which prevents the subject getting too close to his own jouissance⁵¹. Jouissance endeavors not only to explain, as in Freud, resistance to healing but also the attraction exercised by suffering, the

unconscious substitutive satisfaction caused by the symptoms of the patient, which is the real obstacle to a psychoanalytical cure. Despite his/her complaints, the subject is always happy, that is, he/she always gets *jouissance*⁵².

When talking about priests who want to deviate desire from its immanent field and ‘transcendentalize’ it by submitting it to a distant and absent goal, Deleuze and Guattari directly criticize Lacan’s statement about the impossibility of *jouissance* and the “lack-of-enjoying” [manque-a-jour] that is life” (Deleuze and Guattari 1980, 154). They give the example of the masochistic joy, which knows no lack or impossibility, and of courtly love, a “state in which desire no longer lacks anything but fulfills itself and constructs its own field of immanence” (Deleuze and Guattari 1980, 156). Lacan will totally subscribe to the idea that the courtly lover lacks nothing, once understood that in the place of the lacking object comes renunciation and that renunciation causes *jouissance*⁵³. In conclusion, *jouissance* is for Lacan exactly the opposite of a lack. It is indeed something massive, thick, like some clay or mud where our feet are stuck, and at the same time, keeps us upright; just that it is not only our feet, but our entire body which is caught and held upright in it-.

Many readers interpret Lacan’s concept of the real as impossible as if it were some void or nothing, but this impossibility refers to the impossibility of symbolizing something in the register of the symbolic. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the real as impossible is a mere nothing. The real is a gap in the symbolic but it is not a mere nothing: it is a *jouissance*, which cannot be put into words, but still felt, enjoyed. This impossibility is not a lack, but something real present, too present, omnipresent, which may become on occasions unbearable and suffocating for the subject. Lacanian psychoanalysis develops an attempt at displacing a small part of this *jouissance*, of putting it a little farther away, so that the subject can breathe and avoid the repetition of his/her symptoms.

2.3. The Other jouissance as jouissance of the body.


Towards end of the 60's and especially in the seminar XX, “Encore” (1972-73) Lacan proposes a distinction between two types of *jouissance* motivated by two reasons. The first one, he wants to

think the difference between the sexes. The second and most important one, he wants to understand why although a part of jouissance can be more or less domesticated, put into words, treated through meaning, another part remains wild, as a kind of indecipherable remainder. Lacan distinguishes phallic jouissance and the Other jouissance. Phallic jouissance is the jouissance of the phallus, not in the sexual sense but in the Lacanian sense of a prominent signifier that orders the subject's discourse and desire. The phallus should be thought of as a kind of interpretative key that allows meaning to be given to the set of sentences a subject can pronounce. Phallic jouissance, shared by women and men, has to do with sense, with the belief that what the subject complains about can be deciphered, understood, and explained.

There are two important remarks to formulate here. First, phallic jouissance is for Lacan an autoerotic and autistic jouissance. This means that despite being sexual it does not really allow contact between the subjects because they only really enjoy their own phallus⁵⁴. Secondly, because of being a jouissance concentrated on one part of the body, it is not really a jouissance of the entire body.

Later, in seminar XX, Lacan considers women also to have access to an exclusively feminine jouissance⁵⁵. It is a drifting, ineffable, enigmatic jouissance that appears as a supplement independently of phallic jouissance. Lacan illustrates it with the mystical ecstasy of St. Teresa sculpted by Bernini which appears on the cover of the French edition of Seminar XX⁵⁶. Mystics, in contact with the divine, suffer and enjoy at the same time without limit in their bodies without being able to say a word about this experience; in “Deleuzean jargon”, meaningless zero intensity where no organs and even no organism is distinguished.

In Seminar XXII RSI Lacan designs a Borromean ring with the three registers - imaginary, symbolic and real - and the symbols of the small object a (a), the phallic jouissance ($J\Phi$) and the Other jouissance (JA)⁵⁷:



JA: Other jouissance; J: phallic jouissance; a: small object a

R: real, I: imaginary, S: symbolic ICS: Unconsciousness⁵⁸

There are at least three relevant issues in this graph to understand Lacan's concept of the body:

- Lacan argues that the body is partly imaginary. Lacan based this on some observations of Joyce's *A Portrait of the Artist as a young Man* (1916) where the protagonist narrates how some schoolmates beat him, and he confesses to not having felt even hatred, because he was able to separate from his body as if a shell separates from a piece of fruit. Lacan uses Joyce to show that the body is not an organism formed by organs but only a certain wrapping, a figure, a continent, or a line that surrounds them and offers them "consistency"⁵⁹.

- the second issue is that phallic jouissance is located at the intersection between the register of the Real and the register of the Symbolic, that is, it is related at the same time to impossibility and to speech; nevertheless, it is completely outside the ring of the imaginary register. If the body is mainly imaginary, then phallic (symbolic) jouissance is not properly speaking a jouissance of the body. As Deleuze's and Guattari's desiring production we should conclude that Lacan's desire is outside of the body.

- the third and final issue is that the exclusively feminine Other jouissance appears in the graph between the register of the imaginary and the real, between the body and some 'disturbing strangeness' that always refers to the impossible⁶⁰. Lacan means women have access to this Other jouissance which they feel in their bodies without being able to say anything about it⁶¹.

Therefore, Deleuze's and Guattari's body without organs and Lacan's Other jouissance are very similar. They are complete, full and unreachable in their core; they do not concern the anatomical body; they refuse any division in organs and any organization into an organism; and, finally, they have to do with something beyond speech and even sense, so that both schizoanalysis and psychoanalysis are not to be considered as interpretative 'machines' but as descriptive tools to discover the functioning of one's own body.

3. Conclusions. An ethical and political apology of singularity.

There are undeniable differences between Deleuze's and Guattari's optimism and Lacan's pessimism or, rather, measured view about the possible transformations the subject can develop about his body⁶². For Lacanians the human relationship towards jouissance, as opposed to an animal's, is always more or less problematic. For Neurotics it is always too much or too little, never the right amount. Psychotics are invaded by an unregulated, dis-organized jouissance that causes strange body sensations, hallucinations, and delusions. Deleuze and Guattari are supposed to be less pessimistic, but that does not mean at all they refuse every kind of negativity⁶³. Examples: the anti-productiveness of the body without organs, the assumption of the death-drive, the claim that is needed always some correction⁶⁴. The plasticity of jouissance is of course much smaller than that of the body without organs, and the operations upon it which psychoanalysis proposes are quite modest and small. For example, psychoanalysts criticize queer-theory and the possibility of freely changing our sexual orientation or even of choosing not to have one. For psychoanalysis, (imaginary) identities can maybe change, but (real) jouissance remains the same or nearly the same before and even after 10, 15 or 20 years of 'enjoying' the couch. Lacanians do not accept the

possibility of changing *jouissance* at will, as Deleuze and Guattari would appear to be suggesting. The question is whether this last statement is right or not. After reading *Anti-Oedipus* some of Deleuze (bad) students became drug addicts in their search for the best way of being free from desire. Deleuze's and Guattari's plea for prudence in *A thousand plateaus* is reminiscent of Lacan's self-criticism in seminar XVII, *The Reverse of psychoanalysis*. There he refutes what he had expressed in Seminar VII and maintains instead that there is no possible access to *jouissance* through a more or less violent transgression⁶⁵. Deleuze and Guattari also insist that experimentation must be developed in a prudent way, otherwise one risks creating a paranoiac, clinically schizoid, drugged, or masochistic body. The Cold the junkie desperately seeks is not the same as the intensity equal to zero of a prudently built body without organs and the experimental elaboration of a new body without organs. The introduction of new intensities must be both done carefully, always avoiding the self-destruction promoted by the death drive. Of course, to be free from desire production is still the aim in view, but it is not possible to get to a useful body without organs when unstratifying wildly. No organization at all would be worse than the social or Oedipal organization of the desiring production, probably causing "a suicidal collapse"⁶⁶ or "pure self-destruction whose only outcome is death"⁶⁷.

The proposed strategies are accordingly different. For Lacan, the only possible way of touching this Other *jouissance* is through speech in the psychoanalyst's couch. Schizoanalysis still needs some schizoanalyst who helps the subject to discover his desiring machines, but it is true that it is more about a careful experimentation of new connections, of new encounters with other bodies and, above all, a new encounter with one's own body. Schizoanalysis is a more practical therapy based on discovering the lines of *scape* which cross the body without organs, lines which "can be also be one's life, or a literary or art work"⁶⁸, so that it is not so important the role played by the psychotherapist. Well, Lacanian psychoanalysis does not deny that there are many ways of going ahead and overcoming symptoms. It does not intend to be a substitute for life. Nevertheless, it

proposes that, on occasions and for some individuals, the less dangerous and safer way is to go through some preparatory phase that necessary takes place on the couch.

In spite of the huge amount of “Zizekian” literature about Lacan’s Marxism, which we cannot discuss here, it is highly risky to state that Lacan was a Marxist or that psychoanalysis is destined to be the main weapon of contemporary Marxism⁶⁹. Anti-capitalism is much more evident in Deleuze and Guattari than in Lacan. In fact, this is maybe the main difference between both positions. Deleuze’s and Guattari’s proposal of a desiring production that is free from any family structure or social control, and their defense of changing our desiring production for another more singular and freely chosen means, in our opinion, very clearly separating from capitalism⁷⁰. Schizoanalysis wants to help the subject to desire something else than being a part of the system, accepting work exploitation and consumer products as the only possible compensation. Schizoanalysis would help to stop desiring inside the present social field and to start desiring in a freer social organization. Deleuze and Guattari criticize capitalism because it promotes a free desiring-production only as long as it is useful to it –deterritorialization, descodification-, stopping then to fix it in the most profitable way –reterritorialisation and axiomatization-. Capitalism always stops before real freedom is achieved. It is perhaps because of the recognition that it is impossible to completely separate any desire production from the social production, that in the second volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* they decide to change the field of action from desire to the body without organs. Because it is very difficult to know when a new desire production really succeeds in breaking social norms, the goal becomes now to build oneself a new body without organs. If capitalism controls desiring production, it is only thanks to the repulsion of desiring (social) production developed by the body without organs that a place could be found where another free and singular desiring production might be built. That would also explain the smaller number of references to desire and to schizoanalysis in *A thousand plateaus*, or, in any case, the consideration that schizoanalysis is not so creative, but it has just “to distinguish the body without organs from its doubles: empty vitreous bodies, cancerous bodies, totalitarian and fascist”⁷¹.

Having said that, the point is that there is a similar attempt to connect political economy with desire in Lacan. From the very beginning of his teaching he considered unconsciousness as inseparable from the social and the cultural because the unconscious is to him some kind of amorphous matter, which receives its form from language. When facing capitalism Lacan talks profusely about the homology between Marx's surplus value and *jouissance* in seminar XVI, explaining that there is not only a fortuitous analogy between the two concepts, but that they are homological⁷². In the conference of Milan (1972) he will introduce the capitalist discourse as a fifth discourse or structure to think of the contemporary relations of the subjects to *jouissance*. It is very interesting that Lacan makes in his teaching a similar change of direction to Deleuze's and Guattari's. In *seminar VII*, the liberation of desire plays the main role against social repression; later, in *seminar X* and *XI* desire is no more the central point, but the drive. That is because Lacan also discovers that desire is inseparable from language, that the symbolic arises in the social, and that it is impossible so to arrive at the singular core of the subject.

Lacanian psychoanalysis has developed in latter times an intense fight against other psychotherapeutics (cognitive and behavioral) to preserve the right of patients to speak and to assume the responsibility for the symptoms they suffer (and enjoy) from⁷³. Cognitive neuroscience invites kindly the subject not to speak and to consider his or her problems as brain diseases without any relation to desire or to *jouissance*. Patients find refuge in the ordinary, widespread neurological understanding of diseases so as not to have to speak and to be responsible for their desire. For example, sadness and schizophrenia are to be considered insufficiencies of serotonin. Deleuze and Guattari and Lacan do not talk from a neurological point of view: they talk about desire and about a body which is not reducible to the nervous system of an organism⁷⁴. If Deleuzians want to fight the neoliberal, cognitive and neuroscientific homogenization or even elimination of the subject, they should rather consider Lacan as an ally in their radical defense of the singularity of the subject⁷⁵.

Lacanian psychoanalysis is maybe not openly anticapitalistic, but it fights at least political the later day capitalism's dictum "Enjoy!!" "Buy! Travel! Listen! Write! Feel!". Psychoanalysis is not

against experimentation, as long as this experimentation arises from within the subject; but it is against the alienated fake experience that capitalism offers as a consolation, the fake copies of a singularly chosen desire. Schizoanalysis has the same goal. If what it aims at is to singularly construct as much as possible one's own body, in Lacanian jargon, being able to do something positive with one's own Other jouissance, it is not Lacan the most dangerous enemy.

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2 For example, the French psychoanalyst Serge Cottet has shown strong criticism over Deleuze in different texts ("Les machines psychanalytiques"; "Deleuze, pour et contre"; "Lacan et l'a-Freud"). Jacques-Alain Miller recalls how Lacan himself considered *Antioedipus* as delirious (Ewald, "Une histoire de la psychanalyse", 24). An especial place deserves Philippe Mengue, who offers a kind of Lacanian moderate criticism of Deleuze without forgetting Deleuze's originality (*Gilles Deleuze*, especially in "Chapter IV. Of desire and of the fluxes"), and remembers the suffering of the small Hans (*Proust-Joyce, Deleuze-Lacan*, 123).

3 Slavoj Žižek suggests the repulsion for the organs is already in Lacan's conceptualisation of the body of hystericals (*Organs without bodies*, 94). Levi Bryant finds the machinic character of desiring machines already in Lacan's description of the drive as some kind of "dynamo" ("Deleuze and Guattari *avec* Lacan"). Lacan's description is to find in chapter 13 of the seminar XI (*Le séminaire livre XI*).

4 For example, Peter Hallward ("You can't have it both ways") and, more moderately Deleuzian, Monique David-Ménard (*Deleuze et la psychanalyse*).

5 Following this line of thought, we find: Smith ("The Inverse Side of the Structure"), Mendelsohn ("Jacques Lacan – Gilles Deleuze"), Caldwell ("Schizophrenizing Lacan"), Schuster (*The trouble with pleasure*). This last book, despite the remarkable effort to find the nuances that separate Lacan and Deleuze, ends up by approaching them even more.

6 We want then provide a "reading of the way in which Deleuze took up and developed Lacan's thought" (Smith, "The Inverse Side of the Structure", 354) that "rather than rejecting the insights of Lacan, as Žižek claims [...] radicalize him in an effort to overturn the ideological apparatus of capitalism and liberate desire from reactivity » (Caldwell, *Ibid.*, 27).

7 The original French term has been chosen because it depicts the notion in a more appropriate manner. Enjoyment is too positive and does not include the suffering side of *jouissance*.

8 For example, in De Bolle's book (*Deleuze and psychoanalysis*) the word 'jouissance' appears just six times and just one has to do with Lacan's concept. In the same book, Peter Hallward claims: "Ultimately, there is no place in a Deleuzian universe for a psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious itself" (Hallward, *Ibid.*, 46). Of course, there is no place in Deleuze for a symbolic or linguistic unconsciousness as Lacan's early one, but not later than 1960, in his seminar VII, Lacan begins to give room to *jouissance* as the principle which regulates unconsciousness (Lacan, *Le séminaire livre VII*, 195-281).

⁹ Deleuze, *The logic of sense*, 88.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 188.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 189.

¹² *Ibid.*, 351.

13 There is maybe here a silent reminiscence of Merleau-Ponty's 'flesh': "My body is a Gestalt... but it is also and imminently, heavy signification and flesh. The system constituted by the body is organized around a central axis, a hinge which is opening to closed and not free possibility... the flesh of the Gestalt is what answers to its inertia, to its insertion in the world, to its camp prejudices" (Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, 259). But even if they talk about flesh or lived body as phenomenologists do, differences should not be forgotten: "The BwO seems certainly to the body living, but not the ordinary living that phenomenologists describe" (Zourabichvili, *Le vocabulaire de Deleuze*, 16-17).

¹⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

16 "Under the skin the body is an over-heated factory,/ and outside,/ the invalid shines,/ glows,/ from every burst pore." (Antonin Artaud quoted in Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 3).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁹ Deleuze, *The logic of sense*, 84.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 84

²¹ Deleuze and Guattari, *The logic of sense*, 88.

²² *Ibid.*, 88.

²³ *Ibid.*, 88.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 88.

²⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 43.

²⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, *A thousand plateaus*, 134.

²⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 49.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 15.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 18.

³² *Ibid.*, 18.

³³ Deleuze and Guattari, *A thousand plateaus*, 4.

³⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 19.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 19, 21, 124.

37 "A drop in intensity to the body without organs = 0, autism: the schizo has no other means of reacting to this blocking of all his investments of reality, the barriers placed before him by the Oedipal system of social and psychic

repression” (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 124). “Then they become immobile, silent, they retreat into the body without organs, still a // territoriality, but this time totally desert-like, where all desiring-production is arrested, or where it becomes rigid, feigning stoppage: psychosis” (Ibid., 138-139). It is not of course this autism that Deleuze and Guattari are defending.

³⁸ Ibid., 134.

39 There is then to distinguish in the book two meanings of schizophrenia: a) schizophrenia as a clinical case is given the word ‘psychosis’, where the body without organs is completely closed on itself and refuses and silences every desire; b) schizophrenia meaning the free desiring-production is named as the operation of ‘schizophrening desire’, where subjects do not become mentally ill, but free from the family and social organization who want to control their desires.

⁴⁰ Deleuze and Guattari, *A thousand plateaus*, 30.

⁴¹ Ibid., 150.

42 “It is commonly accepted that anguish is without object. This, extracted, not from Freud's discourse but from a part of his discourses, is properly what I am correcting through my discourse. You can take it then to be certain, as I have gone to the bother of writing here for you on the blackboard as a kind of petit memento -why not this among others?- *it is not without an object* [...]. This relationship of not being without having does not mean that one knows what object is involved. When I say *He is not without resources*, he is not without guile that means precisely that, at least for me, these resources are obscure, his guile is not of the usual sort” (Lacan, *Le séminaire livre X*, 105).

43 See specially Hallward, “You can't both it”, 33-50.

⁴⁴ Lacan, *Le séminaire livre XI*, 251.

45 “Lacan's admirable theory of desire appears to us to have two poles: one related to ‘the small a object’ as a desiring-machine, which defines desire in terms of a real production, thus going beyond both any idea of need and any idea of fantasy; and the other related to the ‘great Other’ as a signifier, which reintroduces a certain notion of lack” (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 27, footnote). They only needed to add that the second pole is overcome but also Hegelian conserved [aufgehbt] by the first one in Lacan's theoretical progress.

⁴⁶ Lacan, *Le séminaire livre XVI*, 25.

⁴⁷ Lacan, “Allocution sur les psychoses”, 368-369

48 “There is no doubt that at this point in history the neurotic, the pervert, and the psychotic cannot be adequately defined in terms of drives, for drives are simply the desiring-machines themselves” (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 35). “The BwO is desire; it is that which one desires and by which one desires” (Deleuze and Guattari, *A thousand plateaus*, 165).

49 “A drive would then be some organic lived inherent effort of reproducing some previous state, which the lived had to resign under the influence of external perturbing forces” (Freud, *Beyond the pleasure principle*, 36). “This hypothesis deduces a drive of the necessity of recovering some previous state” (Freud, *Ibid.*, 56).

50 Belgian psychoanalyst Paul Moyaert considers that Lacan arrives at jouissance from pleasure or that jouissance is a form of pleasure: “We shall see that, unlike Freud, Lacan differentiates between two forms of pleasure -plaisir and jouissance- and that the criterion to distinguish between them is to be found in the question that Freud neglected: namely, the relation between pleasure and what can be called ‘good’” (Moyaert, *What is Frightening*”, 28). In our opinion, Freud and Lacan start from suffering, from the immovable massiveness of the symptoms and from the painful satisfaction they provide.

51 “[...] it is evident that the first formulation of the pleasure principle as displeasure or less suffering principle, entails with all certainty something beyond, that it is but made just to keep us more here. His use of the Good [Freud's] comes down to keep us far from our jouissance” (Lacan, *Le séminaire livre VII*, 224).

52 “Where is in all this that which is happiness? Everywhere. The subject is always happy” (Lacan, “*Télévision*”, 526).

53 It is this jouissance of renunciation which leads Lacan to see both the Kantian categorical imperative and Sade's maxim of using the other limitlessly for one's own pleasure as the two faces of one and the same coin: the jouissance of submitting oneself to a rigorous, bar none and cold law. “If happiness is an uninterrupted agreement of the subject to his life, as the Critique very classically defines it, it is clear that happiness is refused to those who don't renounce to the path of desire” (Lacan, “*Kant avec Sade*”, 785).

54 “Jouissance, as far as it is sexual, is phallic; which means that it doesn't relate to the Other as such” (Lacan, *Le séminaire livre XVIII*, 14).

55 This Other jouissance “subsists always in her, different and parallel to the one she obtains because of being the man's woman, to the one which is satisfied with men's jouissance” (Lacan, *Le séminaire livre XVI*, 386)

56 *L'Estasi di Santa Teresa o Santa Teresa in estasi o Transverberazione di santa Teresa* (1647-1651), Gian Lorenzo Bernini's sculpture in St. Mary of the Victory's Church in Rome.

57 After having proposed the register of the real as the most important of the three (imaginary, symbolic, real), he puts them all now on the same level. This Borromean knot is a special knot in which if one of the rings is broken, the other two are immediately released (Lacan, *Le séminaire XXII*, 25).

⁵⁸ Lacan, *Le séminaire XXII*, 35.

⁵⁹ Lacan, *Le séminaire XXIII*, 63.

60 "It is in as much as here, joined to the Imaginary of the body, something like a specific inhibition which would be characterized especially by the 'worrying strangeness'. I will allow myself, at least provisionally, the place of the aforesaid strangeness" (Lacan, *Le séminaire XXIII*, 48-49).

61 "There is a jouissance that is hers, that belongs to that "self" that doesn't exist and doesn't signify anything. There is a jouissance that is hers about which she herself perhaps knows nothing, only that she experiences it - that much she knows" (Lacan, *Le séminaire livre XX*, 69).

62 In the case of Deleuze and Guattari, it is not easy to know if it is the subject or his own desiring production. Schuster gives in the bull's eye: "Deleuze ethics can be seen as a kind of paradoxical Aristotelianism insofar as it demands the exercise of phronesis -prudence, practical reason- in a situation that would seem precisely to exclude it, a situation of disorientation, of intoxication, of depersonalization, of self-loss, even of madness. Does prudence require the residual existence of a coherent moral agent able to exercise it, and thus guide the process of sublimation from without (as Deleuze sometimes suggests), or is it the process itself which must be, in some way, 'wise'?" (Schuster, *The trouble with pleasure*, 87).

63 On this point, David-Ménard (*Deleuze et la psychanalyse*). Mengue approaches Deleuze and Lacan's conception of language and clearly distinguishes Deleuze -a kind of producing and becoming virtuality where everything is possible- and Lacan's real -the impossible- (Mengue, *Gilles Deleuze*).

64 We cannot subscribe to following statement by Žižek, talking about Spinoza and his influence on Deleuze and Guattari: "What is unthinkable for him is what Freud terms 'death drive': the idea that *conatus* is based on a fundamental act of self-sabotaging" (Žižek, *Organs without bodies*, 34).

65 "What psychoanalysis shows, if anything [...], it is precisely this, that there is no transgression. Sliding is not transgressing. To see a half-closed door, it is not crossing it. We will have another occasion to meet up with what I am introducing here -it is not here about transgression, but rather about an irruption, an unlikely discovery in the field of something which has to do with jouissance - a surplus [boni]" (Lacan, *Le séminaire livre XVII*, 18-19).

66 Deleuze and Guattari, *A thousand plateaus*, 161.

67 *Ibid.*, 162.

68 *Ibid.*, 249.

69 Lacan would be Marxist because of "proposing a structuralist reading that implies a much more unorthodox, albeit no less politically radical, Marx" (Tomsic, *The capitalist unconscious*, 4). We find this approach too audacious and even more so David Pavón-Cuellar's proposal of a 'Lacanian Marxism' (*Marxisme lacanien*; "Marx in Lacan"). It is not the same a diagnosis of the diseases of capitalism, which Lacan of course helps to develop with his fifth discourse of the capitalist, than the necessity of completely overcoming it, which Lacan does not propose.

70 Refusing their strategy does not justify considering them as "ideologists of digital capitalism" or of "the late capitalism" (Žižek, *Ibid.*, 2004, xii and 184, respectively).

71 Deleuze and Guattari, *A thousand plateaus*, 165.

72 "This surplus enjoying appeared in my last discourse in function of a homology with respect to the Marxist surplus value. Homology means exactly, that the relation is not one of analogy" (Lacan, *Le séminaire livre XVI*, 45).

73 For example, note the furious discussion between the cognitivist Meyer (*Le Livre noir de la psychanalyse*) and the Lacanian Miller (*L'Anti-livre noir de la psychanalyse*).

74 "These bricks or blocks are the essential parts of desiring-machines from the point of view of the recording process: they are at once component parts and products of the process of decomposition that are spatially localized only at certain moments, by contrast with the nervous system, which is a great chronogeneous machine: a melody-producing machine of the "music box" type, with a nonspatial localization" (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 40).

75 We subscribe totally to the following statement of the Northamerican psychoanalyst Levi Bryant: "One would think that were Deleuzians looking for a worthy project along the lines of Anti-Oedipus, they would begin not with psychoanalysis- which at least provides the possibility of providing a space where all that resists the "normal" might at least be enunciated, where the treatment isn't 8 meetings with a cognitive-behavioral psychologist with tried and trusted methods to get rid of the symptom, where the solution isn't a chemical straight-jacket" (Bryant, "Deleuze and Guattari avec Lacan").